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REGULATION OF FISHING EFFORT (FISHING MORTALITY) NEW ZEALAND

by

G. Duncan Waugh
Fisheries Research Centre
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Wellington, New Zealand

BACKGROUND

New Zealand's chain of islands extends from latitude 29- to 53- South. The nearest continental land mass, Australia, is about 1200 km to the west. The main islands have a narrow continental shelf, average width 19 km, extending down to a depth of about 200 m. The limited area of shelf, which nevertheless extends from subtropical to subantarctic waters, and the small population (less than 3 million) were the two main factors which determined the pattern and scale of fishing until the mid 1960s. Local demand for fish in a primarily agricultural society was small - less than 7 percent of the per capita intake of animal protein. Even in the 1930s there was concern that the resources could be overfished and as a result a limited entry system was introduced in the 1940s and remained in force until 1962.

In 1959 foreign vessels began fishing to within three miles of the coast. This suggested that the resources were larger and more readily saleable on the international market than had previously been recognized. Even so these vessels, like their local counterparts, concentrated on a few high-value species such as snapper (Chrysophrys auratus). In 1961 a Government Select Committee recommended delicensing of the fishing industry and a system of commercial fishing permits was introduced. Thus anyone, on payment of a nominal fee, had the right to catch and sell his catch commercially. His recreational counterpart, on the other hand, was prevented from selling his catch and there was a limit on the number of fish or shellfish he could have in his possession on any day. Inevitably there were conflicts of interest between the local and foreign vessels and crews with respect to fishing areas. Finally it was agreed that foreign fishing should be phased out to beyond 12 miles from the coast by 1974. In this same period the local industry began to develop, first slowly and then much more rapidly as major markets for finfish began to be developed. By 1949, even before the finfish markets developed, rock lobsters - primarily Jasus edwarsii - were being exported to the USA in quantity, and they continue to be the single most valuable species. Amongst the finfish, snapper was the most valuable until 1982 when its position was usurped by orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus).

From 1963 to 1967 fisheries exports increased gradually, but from 1968 they increased rapidly while local markets remained virtually static (Table 1). Thus the industry underwent a change from one oriented primarily to local supply and demand with limited exports to one with the principal objective of earning overseas exchange. As these developments were taking place in the local industry foreign vessels were exploring further afield and fishing deeper on some of the undersea plateaus (see Fig. 1). This, coupled with the Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations, led New Zealand to declare its own 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1978 (see Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977). Under the terms of the draft convention and because of the presence of small offshore islands the zone encompasses some 1.18 million square nautical miles of ocean (Blezard, 1980). Apart from two minor jurisdictional boundaries between Australia and New Zealand, New Zealand is in the privileged position of having a virtually complete 200-mile zone for its exclusive management and administration.

However, there was and continues to be considerable uncertainty with respect to the magnitude of the resources. It was almost inevitable that the Government, impressed by the sheer size of the zone, should assume that almost unlimited quantitites of fish would be automatically available, and words of caution (Waugh, 1977) tended to go unheeded.

It was quite apparent that the coastal craft were incapable of exploiting the deeper offshore waters and few local fishermen had experience in the operations of deep-sea trawlers. At the same time there was vitually no information on the species and their abundance in the zone. Nevertheless the Government, having declared the EEZ, had, under the LOS, accepted the concomitant obligation to manage the zone and its resources.

It is the evaluation of the management strategies and measures and their impact on the local industry that is the main purpose of this paper.

Table 1 Value of New Zealand fishing exports (× $1 million) from 1963 to 1981

YearFinfishRock LobstersTotal All Products
19630.88  2.05  2.92
19641.10  3.04  4.15
19651.10  3.95  5.10
19661.22  4.62  5.88
19671.35  6.36  7.76
19681.6912.7314.63
19691.9014.2316.54
19704.4012.4317.33
19715.0013.5020.30
19726.7911.6220.40
19737.3011.3020.10
19747.3111.4220.33
19758.8012.0725.75
197614.75  19.0537.88
197721.45  23.6750.36
197832.13  25.4063.63
197953.35  26.9497.65
198085.87  29.48162.44  
1981117.22    35.69190.22 

Fig 1: New Zealand's Exclusive Economic Zone, showing the management areas A to H and the areas closed to foreign fishing.

Figure 1

Figure 1

PLANNING AND REGULATION

The fisheries are administered under the Fisheries Act of 1908. Since then there have been a large number of amendments and regulations which have been intended to conserve resources, protect ethnic fishing rights, limit gear and so ensure a more equitable distribution of the resources amongst fishermen, etc. Most of these measures have been subject to the Parliamentary process and as such have been inordinately delayed. A new Bill, which has been widely discussed with industry and other user groups, has been drafted and could be passed into law during 1983. Basically, this Bill is designed to rationalise the provisions of the previous Act, to consolidate them, and to make it possible for managers to react much more swiftly to changing circumstances in the fishery.

After the abandonment of limited entry in 1962 the local industry began to expand, grants and loans were available for new vessels and new gear, and new markets were being developed. Export earnings began to increase (Table 1) so that by 1978 the overseas earnings were 22 times what they had been in 1963. However, even by 1978 there was some concern amongst the finfish and rock lobster fishermen that resources were being over-fished. In 1979 empowering legislation was introduced to permit the control of eel, dredge oyster, paua (= abalone), snapper, and rock lobster fishing. In the next few years a controlled fishery was established for eels in Lake Ellesmere, a system of daily boat quotas and an overall catch quota for the Foveaux Strait oyster fishery, an export quota for paua, quota and gear controls on the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery, and a controlled fishery for rock lobsters based on a number of regions around the coast (Saila et al., 1979; Annala - in press).

These various controls, coupled with the collapse of the trevally fishery in the Bay of Plenty (Waugh, 1977a; James, 1980) and the decline in catches and mean size of prime species elsewhere, finally forced Government and fishermen to look to some further limitation on fishing effort. Since 1981 there has been a moratorium on the issue of any further fishing permits, the methods which may be used are more rigolously prescribed, and the fishermen are required to provide more detailed catch and effort data.

Unfortunately, in New Zealand, as in practically every country with a developed or developing fishery, vessel numbers and processing facilities were allowed to develop and multiply to a point where they could no longer be sustained by the available resources. There was a shift from prime species to exploitation of those of lesser value. This led to successive over-fishing of a number of species and could continue to do so unless total effort is reduced or there is a definite break in the species/fishery sequence.

Inevitably there will have to be some restructuring of the industry and new management concepts applied. However, because of what happened to the inshore fisheries there was an earlier and much readier acceptance that the resources of the wide EEZ could be equally liable to over-fishing and over-capitalisation. It was also recognised that more responsive management measures would be needed to obtain maximum benefit.

Thus there have been two types of fishery - inshore and offshore - developing slightly out of phase with each other, both aimed at increasing overseas earnings, at maximising New Zealand's share of the available resources, and at maximising local employment.

The principal differences that have emerged to date are that in the coastal fisheries there is very little room to manoeuvre - there are too many vessels trying to catch too few fish - but in the offshore fisheries there is room to rationalise fishing now, before it too gets out of hand.

EEZ planning and objectives

Prior to the declaration of the EEZ a small task force, comprising a senior fisheries scientist, a fishery manager, and an administrator, was established within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to develop objectives and strategies for the deep-water fisheries. Recommendations followed by others that embrace the general philosophy of utilising the resources were embodied in a Policy Paper which has since been modified and published as a definitive document (Anon., 1981) which defines the way of apportioning the known resources between vessels and between companies during the next few years. However, the lead up to this situation has not been straightforward.

There was little or no information on the size or species composition of the resources of the zone. The LOS requires that the Coastal state determines Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and determines what proportion it can harvest with its indigenous fishermen and vessels and then allocates the balance to those countries which have “traditionally” fished in the area. Few foreign trawlers had fished in the region beyond the immediate continental shelf before the early 1970s and so the question of traditional rights hardly arose. Tunas and billfishes had been exploited for much longer, but as highly migratory species they were treated separately.

RESOURCE ASSESSMENT AND ALLOCATION

Trawl fisheries

Because New Zealand lacked a suitably large and seaworthy deep-water craft, scientists attempting to assess resources were dependent upon data from other research cruises, primarily Japanese but also some Russian. Francis and Fisher (1979) made the first estimates of the overall magnitude of the resources. At the same time it was recognised that there were areas or regions in which particular associations of species occurred. Some of these last are associated with water masses north and south of the Subtropical Convergence and with the principal warm and cold currents which flow around the islands.

The net result was the establishment of eight management zones (A to H, Fig. 1) outside the 12-mile territorial sea. In the meantime, and before the zone was formally gazetted, intense fishing in critical areas, for ling off the south-west of the South Island and for silver warehou east of Stewart Island, meant that these two areas were closed to all fishing. Within 2 years most of the shelf was included in the ‘New Zealand only’ fishing zone (Fig. 1) as the local industry demonstrated its capacity to fully exploit the prime species.

New Zealand, though lacking the deep-water vessels and crews to fully exploit the resources, nevertheless wished to benefit as much as possible from the potential harvest. To achieve this there was encouragement by way of loans, waiving of customs duty, etc., to enable local industry to acquire larger vessels. However, none of these craft were sufficiently big to work on the offshore rises and plateaus. The alternative was to establish joint venture or cooperative venture arrangements with foreign partners. New Zealand generally requires that foreign equity will not exceed 24.9 percent, although in some instances 49.9 percent has been acceptable. In most cases the foreign partner has provided the vessel and most of the crew as well as some additional opportunity for access to new markets. Various structures were set up involving varying degrees of risk for the participants, but the net result was that the quantities of fish available to foreign licensed vessels was substantially reduced.

Francis and Fisher's (1979) estimate of the resources also indicated the bounds within which there could be a reasonable annual harvest. With so few data available it was considered reasonable to err on the conservative side in setting catch quotas. Allocation was made first to local vessels on the basis of their expected catch as assessed by the Fishing Industry Board and second to joint venture vessels on the basis of the fishing plans they were required to lodge. After both these allocations had been deducted from the TACs the balance was made available to foreign licensed vessels from Japan, the USSR and Korea. Apportionment between these countries was made at Government level and took into account previous fishing history, levels of cooperation, trade access, etc.

Joint ventures were seen as a way of accelerating New Zealand's participation in the capture and processing of as much as possible of the resource. However, they also meant that much larger quantities of fish were landed into processing plants and this was seen as a threat by local fishermen who foresaw a reduction in the prices paid to them. Both the fishermen and the processors were also concerned that species taken and processed by licensed vessels were being sold at reduced prices on some of New Zealands's traditional overseas markets.

One of the original aims was the progressive New Zealandisation of the industry so that ultimately all fish would be taken by locally owned and crewed vessels. In practice, although the joint venture vessels have a proportion of local fishermen aboard for training in appropriate fishing technology, the language and ethnic barriers preclude the gradual replacement of foreign crews by New Zealanders, particularly where the foreign partners continue to own the vessels. To resolve this problem nine companies with a percent greater than 75 percent New Zealand shareholding have been allocated varying quantities of the principal deep-sea species, up to the total estimated quota, as from 1 April 1983 (see Table 2). From that date the effective ownership of the fish will pass into New Zealand hands, although the companies may continue to use their joint venture partnership vessels on a charter basis. It is also worth noting that one local company has now made its own investment in two deep-water trawlers.

There continue to be very few quantitative data on the seasonal distribution and abundance of the different offshore species. When TACs were first assessed there was no consideration of the unit value of the various species. Thus southern blue whiting (Micromesistius australis), which is particularly abundant in area E, is of relatively low value and as such is unlikely to be of economic interest to a locally-based industry. Thus it has been necessary to consider the unit value as well as likely yields in apportioning quotas which can maintain the economics of the various operations.

Hake (Merluccius australis) only spawns off the west coast of the South Island and is then vulnerable to intensive fishing. The total stock appears to be small (Patchell, 1981). To prevent overfishing a quota system was introduced and when the quota was reached all trawling ceased until the remaining fish had dispersed. However, hoki (Macruronus novaezelandiae) occurs in the same area at the same time and is much more plentiful (Patchell - in press). This has meant that in order to protect the hake stock, the hoki resource has been underfished. Furthermore, the need for close monitoring created surveillance problems compounded by the conflict between locally owned and crewed vessels, which claimed to be able to harvest the total resource, and the joint venture charter vessels. Unless it becomes practical to target fish for the two species separately, which seems unlikely, the hoki stock will either continue to be underfished or the hake stock may have to be allowed to decline. This illustrates the manager's problem of conservation on the one hand and maximisation of earnings on the other. It also emphasises the need for more comprehensive quantitative and biological data on the species concerned.

In the past four years quotas have been established and are close to being reached for all the species assessed by Francis and Fisher (1979) except for the southern blue whiting in area E. Species not considered by them are the orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) and the various species of oreo dory, all of which occur in depths of 800 to 1,500 m and were located in 1979 and 1980 along the northern side of the Chatham Rise and off the east coast of the South Island. Licensed access for Russian trawlers is now restricted to area E. Japanese and Korean vessels have most of their allocations in the same area but are allowed limited access to primer species elsewhere.

The quota for orange roughy had to be established on very meagre information. The fish apparently occur in dense pre-spawning schools but little is known of their general biology or of their longevity. Thus again it was necessary to adopt what was hoped would be a conservative quota. Exploratory cruises in January and August 1981 along the edge of the Challenger Plateau from west of 172-E and between 37-S revealed significant quantities of orange roughy (van den Broek, 1981) both inside and outside the 200-mile boundary, and in the 1982 season substantial catches were made. Although this has been a further encouragement for investment in the deep-water fishery the basic problem of the size and resilience of the stock or stocks remains. Without their own research vessel capability, scientists have had to rely on opportunistic collection of data aboard commercial craft or occasional joint research cruises with Japanese institutes. However, in 1982 an additional quota of 1,000 t of orange roughy was offered by tender to a commercial company that was prepared to make one of its vessels available for a 42-day research cruise entailing stratified random sampling along the Chatham Rise (Robertson, 1982). The results obtained provide the first estimate of the standing stock along the Rise and it is hoped to undertake a similar survey on the Challenger Plateau in 1983.

From the foregoing it will be apparent that the management of the trawl fisheries of the wider EEZ has been based upon quotas and that these have had to be adjusted as more data have been acquired on the species themselves as well as on the economics of catching them.

Table 2 Allocations (tonnes) of prime species to take effect from 1 April 1983 (from Catch 1982, (9) 11

SpeciesAmaltalFletcher/JaybelSanford/Feron
Hoki3,3368,9478,231
Orange roughy2,7018,1236,701
Oreo dories1,7015,1174,221
Squid1,6524,4294,074
Ling   6611,7721,630
Silver warehou   4961,3281,223
Hake   198   532   489
Total:10,744  30,248  26,569 

SpeciesSealordSouth Island Deep Sea Fishing CompanySkeggsSouthland Fish Processors Co-opWanganui
Hoki8,1361,405   3,4867221,729   
Orange roughy6,8329653,0584951,398   
Oreo dories4,3046081,927312881
Squid4,0286961,726358856
Ling1,611278   690143342
Silver warehou1,208209   518107257
Hake   483  83   207  43103
Total:26,602  4,243   11,612  2,179   5,567  

SpeciesWattiesOtherTotal
Hoki1,769   2,638   40,000
Orange roughy8691,559   32,700
Oreo dories54898220,600
Squid8761,306   20,000
Ling350522  8,000
Silver warehou263392  6,000
Hake105157  2,400
Total:4,780   7,556   130,100 

Squid

Prior to the declaration of the EEZ, New Zealand fishermen took squid mainly as a by-catch. Japanese squid jig vessels had operated around New Zealand from 1972, and after 1978, as the technique was directed solely at squid, it was decided to restrict the number of licensed vessels to that which had previously fished the area. The intention was to prevent any further increase in effort. Licence fees are payable in advance and are based on an expected catch. The licence fee is based on the average catch over the preceding five years with a royalty on the catch over and above the base allocation. This management system seeks to prevent over-fishing in years of poor recruitment but to allow the vessels to benefit if recruitment is good. In practice it assumes that the few years of data that have been collected represent the norm and that there has not been, or is unlikely to be, any recruitment over-fishing.

New Zealand's entry to squid fishing has been via joint venture agreements and as the joint venture fleet has increased so licensed access has been abated. Jigging seems unlikely to be a significant local fishery in the short-term, but in the meantime the joint venture catches improve market access and provide product for onshore processing.

Trawled squid are the subject of area quotas for licensed joint venture and local vessels and until recently were based upon a single stock concept. However, the identification of at least two species of Nototodarus (Smith et al., 1981) suggests that future management will need to ensure that effort is appropriately distributed between them in relation to their abundance. It also illustrates the lack of basic data and the need for management to be flexible and able to respond to new research findings.

Tunas

Different management measures have been adopted for the highly migratory skipjack, albacore, and southern bluefin tunas. Skipjack occur off the North Island in large schools during summer (Fisheries Research Division, 1976; Habib et al., 1980, 1980a, 1980b, 1981) and the potential harvest is estimated at 24,000 t. In the mid 1970s the local purse seine fleet was incapable of taking such quantities and authority was given for local companies to enter into charter agreements for American super seiners. However, these vessels have been denied access within the 12-mile zone and in some other areas. As the fish often school close to the boundary and frequently inside it, combined catches by the local and charter fleet have seldom exceeded 10,000 t. Local political pressure has precluded the full harvest of the resource, yet there are insufficient other pelagic species to sustain a large local purse seine fleet for the balance of the year. Alternative fishing techniques such as pole and live bait fishing could increase the local component of the catch, provide alternative employment, and reduce effort on the traditional fisheries. This type of fishery could have even greater economic appeal if, as seems possible, the fish are of sufficiently high quality for sashimi.

The troll fishery for albacore has existed since the early 1970s (Roberts et al., 1972; Roberts, 1974, 1975, 1977) but has not yet become of major significance. Joint research studies undertaken by Japanese and New Zealand scientists suggest that this fishery could be further developed by vessels capable of fishing further offshore and trolling deeper. The potential harvest is estimated at 5,000–10,000 t and there are no major management constraints. The moratorium on fishing permits does not apply and may encourage diversification away from coastal trawl fisheries.

Southern bluefin tuna have been longlined south and east of New Zealand by the Japanese since the 1950s and in 1978 the size of the licensed fleet was limited to what it had been previously (i.e. 96 vessels) in order to prevent further increase in effort. Since 1979 a small but lucrative local handline fishery for adult bluefin has developed on the west coast of the South Island. The winter fishing season coincides with the trawl fishery for hake and hoki. The fish, if properly handled, can be marketed at sashimi grade and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Fishing Industry Board, and the Federation of Commercial Fishermen combined to train fishermen in appropriate techniques. Now only trained fishermen take the fish, which in 1981 and 1982 were landed into a refrigerated reefer vessel. It was also agreed that the annual catch should be limited to 5,000 fish. This limits the number of fishermen likely to enter the fishery and avoids any glut on the market. It is not considered a conservation measure in that the tonnage - about 300 t - is minor in relation to 40,000 t taken by Japan and Australia.

The total stock is already overfished (Murphy and Majkowski 1981) and it will be necessary for the three countries to develop management measures to limit the total catch. In the meantime New Zealand fishermen, having developed a fishery in a previously unexploited area, are anxious to increase their sphere of operations and share of the catch. Inevitably this will have to be at the expense of the Japanese longline fleet. Again the principal aims are maximisation of the harvest and of overseas earnings whilst avoiding over exploitation.

Data acquisition

Until recently only lip service had been paid to the creation of a sound statistical data base for fisheries. Prior to 1974 fishermen were only required to render monthly returns of days fished and quantities of species landed. An attempt to upgrade the system met with strong opposition and as a result few reliable data have been obtained since then. The recent creation of a Fisheries Statistics Unit attached to the Fisheries Research Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries now makes it practical to develop a data base for both management and research. The Division has always been responsible for data from the offshore trawl fisheries and the tuna and oyster fisheries. With the advent of the controlled fisheries for rock lobsters these data too have been entered, as fishermen are required, as a condition of the licence, to render returns. The same now applies to the renewal of permits under the present moratorium on coastal fisheries. Thus, in the future, trends in stocks and in c.p.u.e. should be more readily perceived, but data for the critical period when New Zealand's coastal fisheries underwent such rapid change will never be available.

EVALUATION OF REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES

Species quota and area restrictions have been favoured as the simplest to administer. In the deep-water trawl fisheries these have been further refined by allocating quotas by species to nine companies, local and joint venture, according to a set of criteria based on known performance, available vessels, and onshore processing capabilities (Anon., 1982). Quotas of particular species can be traded between companies so that they can fish for the best mix of species to meet their processing requirements.

Regulatory measures for the tuna, squid, and rock lobster fisheries have already been mentioned, but others have been introduced for other species. For example, in the Foveaux Strait oyster fishery the fleet which was already limited to 23 oyster dredgers now has an overall seasonal quota plus a daily boat quota. In this fishery the objective is conservation of the local fishery; exports are prohibited. In the abalone fishery, which is widely scattered, there is a minimum size limit and scuba gear may not be used. The overall harvest is set by an export quota which cannot be exceeded. This is probably satisfactory in that local demand is reasonably stable. The adverse effect of this type of control is that stocks can be heavily depleted in local areas, but if, as seems possible, the stocks can be supplemented by aquaculture, there will need to be some modification to the fish farming regulations.

For scallop fisheries, seasonal and area closures plus quotas have been imposed primarily to stabilise the fisheries. Seasonal and area closures have also been introduced for some of the finfish fisheries and have been supplemented by mesh regulations and area/method limitations.

Inevitably, there are conflicts of interest between the various commercial fishermen using different methods to secure the same species and between them and recreational fishermen who are quick to blame the commercial operator for any decline in their sport.

To overcome some of these problems, the country has been divided into six major regions and within these Regional Fisheries Management Plans (RFMPs) are being developed first at the local level through port liaison committees. These committees, usually but not always chaired by a Ministry Officer, include management, research, and enforcement representatives from the Ministry and also commercial fishermen, processors, and local authority and recreational interests. The principal objective has been to provide a forum in which each group can participate and gain an understanding of the others' point of view.

Initially this procedure seems to be working well in that there is a surprising commonality of views between the various groups at the local level. Whether this can be carried through to the regional level, particularly where widely ranging fishermen fish within the sphere of interest of several local liaison groups, remains to be seen. One immediate problem will be that any future management measures will require sound data for decision-making and, as already noted, historical and research data are lacking for many of the coastal fisheries.

Furthermore, there remains the perennial problem of the large versus small vessel. As the recreational fisherman blames the commercial operator for decline in abundance of sports fish so the inshore fishermen blames the offshore operator for any decline in his catches. As yet there is no management policy which defines inshore/offshore limits for the medium sized craft, but in terms of the recently released deep-water plan (Anon., 1982) vessels over 45 m are excluded from fishing the 12-mile territorial sea, all of area B, and other areas now closed to foreign trawling.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR REGULATION

New Zealand has a very long coastline for its size and population; therefore coverage by any enforcement agency is necessarily limited. On the other hand, with such a high proportion of the product going for export through a limited number of outlets there can be some overall surveillance of the production from the various species if not from the fisheries themselves. However, in an attempt to protect species, protect nursery areas, apply mesh and minimum size limits, define and police areas in which particular methods may be applied, conserve fish, and protect commercial and recreational interests, a plethora of regulations has evolved which the enforcement agency has been unable to police. The new Fisheries Act and the development of RFMPs will, it is hoped, lead to rationalization of regulations on the one hand and a greater willingness to cooperate on the other. Furthermore, with the current moratorium on the issue of further fishing permits and the requirement that renewals will be dependent upon provision of adequate statistics for the preceding year, it is expected that fishermen will appreciate the need to cooperate.

Even so, in the traditional coastal fisheries, it is now apparent that there is too much effort being applied to the resources and measures to reduce effort either by a buy-back scheme or redeployment to less traditional fisheries seem to be inevitable.

In the offshore fisheries the principal administrative considerations have been simplicity and effectiveness. All licensed vessels are required to make a port call before they commence fishing so that their gear can be inspected and they can be instructed with respect to the regulations. Similarly they must make a port call when they cease fishing and before they leave the zone. Trawlers fishing the deep water are required to report their noon day position and their daily catch to the Fisheries Control Centre so that positions and accumulated catches can be monitored. In return, the Control Centre issues a warning before a quota is reached so that vessels can prepare to leave an area. With the jig vessels and liners there are similar requirements, except that weekly positions are usually sufficient unless a vessel or group of vessels moves a significant distance.

This procedure reduces the need for air and sea surveillance of the fleet but is only practical because of the exclusive nature of the zone. It has also had the effect of reducing the number of enforcement officers aboard foreign vessels to an absolute minimum. Although this may be less expensive and more convenient, it does mean that on the larger vessels there are far too few direct observations of catches and of operations which can be checked against the daily logs each vessel is required to complete. The only occasion when the presence of enforcement officers is obligatory is when catcher vessels are offloading to a reefer. In this case the transhipment must take place in a designated area in the presence of two or more officers. In such cases the off-loaded catch can be assessed in relation to the reported catch in much the same way as the stored catch is checked when a vessel makes its port call before leaving the zone.

CONCLUSIONS

Within the limitations on available staff and in economic terms the surveillance of the licensed and joint venture vessels fishing the EEZ may be regarded as satisfactory, although the paucity of observers aboard the vessels inevitably raises doubts where apparent discrepancies arise between reported catches and log book records. Similarly, reports of infringements can seldom be checked. Quota constraints as currently proposed can be operated reasonably effectively, but these in turn are primarily dependent upon good research data which defines the standing stocks and the proportions which may be harvested. At present there are inadequate facilities or personnel for regular stock assessment surveys and inevitably there is some concern that the quotas may not remain within the necessary bounds to permit sustained yields. To some extent this concern could be removed once a sufficiently long time series of c.p.u.e. data has been established. One disadvantage of the recently released deep-water plan is that it only sets quotas for seven major species, whereas others such as barracouta and jack mackerel - important to some companies - may well be subject to additional fishing pressure.

In the meantime the degree to which New Zealand fishermen participate in the exploitation of the resources will depend upon how and if joint venture and licensed vessels are phased out of the fishery and how acceptable this may be at the political level.

In the coastal fisheries the paucity of recent c.p.u.e. data makes management decision making in terms of who should or should not have access to the resources much more difficult. As mentioned earlier, there is the classic problem of too many fishermen chasing too few fish. Management regimes aimed at conserving the resources and at the same time preserving the livelihood of coastal fishermen need to be developed as soon as possible. Continuation of employment could come in part from redeployment either to fisheries for less traditional coastal resources or to deep-water craft. This in turn requires an integrated approach to the management of the total EEZ because although the coastal species may be over exploited, the total resources have yet to be fully developed.

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Anon., 1982 Deepwater trawl plan agreed. Catch '82, 9(11):28


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