Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations

A joint FAO/WFP update for the United Nations Security Council

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The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017 (SOFI) has revealed that global hunger is on the rise again after declining for more than two decades. Global hunger rose from 777 million in 2015 to 815 million people in 2016.

This recent surge in hunger resulted in the worst-case scenario in South Sudan, with famine declared in February, and alerts of a high risk of famine for Somalia, Yemen and northeastern Nigeria in 2017.

Conflict remains the main reason behind this reversal. Data shows that the majority of hungry people live in countries affected by conflict – 489 million out of the 815 million people. And almost 75 percent of the world’s stunted under-five year olds live in countries affected by conflict – 122 million out of the 155 million children.\(^1\) That means an entire generation will likely grow up to face diminished productive capacity, income-earning potential and social skills with far-reaching implications for many communities and countries.

According to the Global Report on Food Crises 2017, about 108 million people faced crisis-level food insecurity in 2016 and required urgent humanitarian assistance – up from 80 million the previous year. Critically, the report showed that 10 out of the 13 major food crises in the world were driven by conflict.

Conflicts adversely impact food insecurity in many different ways. They cause mass displacements, deep economic recessions, drive up inflation, disrupt employment and erode finances for social protection and health, and make basic necessities, including food, less available and accessible. Where people's livelihoods rely significantly on agriculture, conflict undermines agricultural supply chains and marketing channels from production to harvesting, processing, transportation and marketing. Conflict undermines resilience and often forces individuals and households to engage in increasingly destructive and irreversible coping strategies that threaten their future livelihoods, food security, nutrition and dignity.

While conflict affects food security and nutrition, deteriorations in food security can exacerbate tensions and risks of conflict. The combination of poverty and hunger, lack of opportunities, unequal access to jobs, land or wealth, is a volatile mix that can create feelings of anger and hopelessness. These grievances can be exploited by individuals and groups with a desire to encourage violence. Not being able to afford enough food can be a trigger for violence and instability, particularly when institutions are weak and economic disparities are broad.

With the Presidential Statement of the 9 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/14), the United Nations Security Council reiterated its commitment to work with the Secretary-General to “pursue all possible avenues to end conflicts, including through addressing their underlying root causes in an inclusive and sustainable manner”. Investments in crisis prevention and recovery call for a robust understanding of the humanitarian consequences of conflict, agreement on the number of people in need and coordinated efforts to respond to the crises. Without peace, it is impossible to achieve a world free of hunger; and while there is hunger, a peaceful world where human rights are respected will remain elusive.

Against this background and in the context of increasing humanitarian crises, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme are committed, alongside Member States, to provide decision makers and the public at large with transparent and harmonized information to increase accountability by all.

Foreword

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Rationale and methodology

Six months on from the last joint report for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), this report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) provides an update on the acute food insecurity situation in most of the conflict-affected countries currently being monitored by the UNSC.

People are considered food secure when they have adequate access at all times to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. For this to happen, food must be available in sufficient quantities – either home grown, locally grown or imported. Food must be accessible – in other words, people must be able to acquire it regularly in adequate quantities and diversity, whether through purchase, home production, bartering, gifts, borrowing or food aid. And finally, the food that is available and accessible needs to have a positive nutritional impact. This refers to the way it is utilized – that is, the way it is stored, cooked, handled and shared within the household.

Availability, access and utilization are known as the three pillars of food security. A fourth pillar – stability – refers to the fact that all three must be maintained consistently. Conflict undermines all these pillars in many, and often interlinked, ways. As already discussed in the foreword, food insecurity can also be a driver of conflict.

This report uses existing data and analysis to give a country by country assessment of the number of people in need of emergency food, nutrition and livelihood assistance, and whether the food security situation has improved or deteriorated since the same period the previous year. It clarifies the main factors driving food insecurity in each country.

In countries where the government and food security stakeholders have adopted the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) or the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) as the national protocol for classifying the severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity, results from the latest IPC/CH analyses are used.

The IPC is a set of tools aimed at providing a “common currency” for classifying food insecurity. This evidence-based approach uses international standards that allow for comparisons of situations across countries and over time. It is based on consensus-building processes to provide decision-makers with a rigorous analysis of food insecurity, along with objectives for response in both emergency and development contexts.

This report specifically looks at the more severe IPC phases – Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Famine/Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – to highlight the number of people requiring urgent assistance. In West African countries, the CH tool is used, which is a variation of the IPC tool, customized to the context of the region. For some countries where IPC or CH are not available, the latest UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Humanitarian Needs Overview is also used in order to provide an updated and reliable figure concerning the number of people in need, along with baseline and emergency food security assessments from WFP and FAO situation and early warning reports (FEWSNET).

For Syrian refugees in Lebanon the latest 2017 Vulnerability Assessment is used. A variety of sources are used for Iraq, including the UN OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview, the FAO situation report and Assessment Working Group’s Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment.

The report covers 16 countries (Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon regarding the Syrian refugees, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen) plus the Lake Chad Basin.

Countries or territories under UNSC monitoring with no recent data available have not been covered. Access constraints preventing food security assessments in some countries are a serious concern for humanitarian agencies. Despite widespread knowledge of the high prevalence of hunger, up-to-date data are not available to provide substantive support to operational planning.
### IPC acute food insecurity reference table for area classification

**Purpose:** To guide short-term strategic objectives linked to medium- and long-term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.

**Usage:** Classification is based on the convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase Name and Description</th>
<th>Phase 1 Minimal</th>
<th>Phase 2 Stressed</th>
<th>Phase 3 Crisis</th>
<th>Phase 4 Emergency</th>
<th>Phase 5 Famine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than four in five households (HHs) are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse: minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse: food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition. OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse: large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality. OR extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short-term.</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have an extreme lack of food and other basic needs where starvation, death, and destitution are evident. (Evidence for all three criteria of food consumption, wasting, and CDR is required to classify Famine).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Response Objectives</th>
<th>Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction</th>
<th>Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods</th>
<th>Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and reduce acute malnutrition</th>
<th>Save lives and livelihoods</th>
<th>Prevent widespread mortality and total collapse of livelihoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Consumption and Livelihood Change</td>
<td>More than 80% of households in the area are able to meet basic food needs without engaging in atypical strategies to access food and income, and livelihoods are sustainable.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 2 or worse.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 3 or worse.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 4 or worse.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Outcomes</th>
<th>Nutritional Status</th>
<th>Mortality*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(directly measured or inferred)</td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: &lt;5%</td>
<td>CDR: &lt;0.5/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: 5–10%</td>
<td>USDR: &lt;1/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: 10–20%</td>
<td>USDR: &lt;1/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: 20–40%; 1.5 x greater than reference</td>
<td>USDR: 1–2/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: &gt;40%</td>
<td>USDR: 2–4/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: &gt;30%</td>
<td>CDR: &lt;0.5/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: &gt;15–30%; OR &gt; usual and increasing</td>
<td>USDR: &gt;4/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acute Malnutrition: &gt;40%</td>
<td>USDR: &gt;2/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits must be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of a phase classification. For example, elevated malnutrition due to disease outbreak or lack of health access – if it is determined to not be related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for an IPC classification. Similarly, excess mortality rates due to murder or conflict – if they are not related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for a phase classification. For Acute Malnutrition, the IPC thresholds are based on the percentage of children under five years who are below two standard deviations of weight for height or presence of oedema. BMI is an acronym for Body Mass Index. CDR is Crude Death Rate. USDR is Under 5 Death Rate.
Table 1. Current and previous estimates of people in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>People in need of food, nutrition or livelihoods assistance December 2017 (millions of people)</th>
<th>Total population (%)</th>
<th>Previous estimates July 2016 (millions of people)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1.1(^2)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Chad Basin (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and northeastern Nigeria)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (Syrian Refugees)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.2(^3)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>17(^4)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Or broadly equivalent.
\(^2\) The new IPC analysis is expected to be released in early 2018 and will be included in the Global Report on Food Crises 2018 (March 2018).
\(^3\) Some 26 percent of people in Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCAs) and 15 percent in Government Controlled Areas (GCAs) in conflict-affected Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts were moderately or severely food insecure in June 2017.
\(^4\) This figure refers to the last available IPC analysis (March 2017). The situation is expected to have worsened, but no current analysis is available.
Main findings

Afghanistan
The proportion of Afghans in need of food, nutrition and livelihood assistance is far higher than during the post-harvest periods in 2015 and 2016. Conflict, climatic shocks including floods, low yields, increased influx of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and lack of employment and income opportunities resulting in increased poverty are contributing to the deteriorating food security situation. IDPs, host communities, returnees, refugees, female-headed households, families relying on casual labour and landless households are the most vulnerable. Between January and October 2017, more than a quarter of a million Afghans had left their homes. People in need of assistance are often in hard-to-access areas and where there is resistance by armed groups. Returnees are flooding back into Afghanistan because of the deteriorating protection spaces in Pakistan and Iran, and are competing for jobs in an already over-saturated local labour market.

Burundi
Following a good harvest in August, the food security situation has improved since the previous analysis in April and May 2017; however, it is projected to deteriorate in the lean season mainly due to food stock shortages and people’s inability to afford food in markets. Burundi has experienced a cycle of violence and unrest since 2015. High poverty and decreasing purchasing power, high population growth rates, environmental degradation and low resilience to natural disasters, including flooding, drought and epidemics, displacement, diminishing work opportunities and high food prices are curbing food access. Communities are trapped in a vicious cycle in which the coping strategies they use to deal with shocks further exacerbate their vulnerabilities.

The Central African Republic
The already volatile security situation in the Central African Republic has deteriorated since July 2017. Increasing displacement and escalating conflict are disrupting livelihoods, lowering household income and eroding purchasing power. Trade channels are cut off, the prices of imported foods are increasing and food stocks are low following four consecutive years of reduced harvests. While the last IPC analysis estimated the number of acutely food insecure to be 1.1 million, the updated situation with the new IPC analysis is expected in early 2018 and it will be included in the Global Report on Food Crises 2018 to be released in March 2018. Today, the Central African Republic is one of the few countries in the world where almost one out of two people depend on aid to survive.²

The Democratic Republic of the Congo
The number of acutely food insecure people from June to December 2017 has risen by almost 2 million since the same period in 2016. Conflict is causing widespread insecurity and population displacements in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Tanganyika, Haut-Katanga and Kasai provinces. As of October 2017, 3.9 million people were internally displaced, more than 1.3 million in Kasai. Many people are eating little more than a meal a day – typically just maize or cassava root and leaves. Crops have been destroyed, production areas and market routes cut off, huge numbers of farmers displaced and planting areas severely reduced. Crop production has been affected by pest attacks such as the Fall Armyworm, which has affected more than 80 territories. The depreciation of the local currency has resulted in more expensive and reduced imports. This, combined with limited domestic food supplies, has pushed up cereal prices.

Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau has faced years of political instability and endures extreme poverty. Irregular rainfall and price volatility for rice imports and local cashew nut exports undermine food security. The aggregate 2017 cereal production is estimated to be seven percent lower than last year’s bumper level and five percent below the five-year average; however, the 2017 cashew campaign is expected to improve revenues for smallholder farmers.

Haiti
Thanks to favourable climatic conditions contributing to a normal spring harvest, the food security situation has improved compared with the period after Hurricane Matthew and the last analysis from February to May 2017. The recurrence of shocks has severely affected food security and livelihoods in the departments of the Grand-Anse, Sud, Nippes, Nord-Ouest and Sud-Est. Last September, the North region and the Northeast department were affected by Hurricane Irma. The food security situation is expected to deteriorate during the first half of 2018 in some areas as the lean season takes hold.

Iraq
The Iraqi Prime Minister announced the end of major military operations in the country on 21 November, following the retaking of the last districts under insurgents’ control in Anbar. But the Iraqi population remains extremely vulnerable, especially in recently liberated areas
where they face limited livelihood opportunities, reducing their ability to purchase food and other necessities, and restricted access to the public distribution system, a social safety net that entitles Iraqis to receive flour, rice and cooking oil rations. As of September 2017, 3.2 million people remained displaced within Iraq according to OCHA. Some newly liberated territories, such as Xazraj and Sarjxana in western Mosul, are not yet suitable for returnees, mostly due to uncleared improvised explosives, lack of essential services and very few livelihood opportunities. Crop and livestock production has been devastated by the conflict.

**Lake Chad Basin**
The eight-year Boko Haram insurgency has pushed vast areas surrounding Lake Chad, towards the brink of disaster. Some 2.3 million people have been uprooted from their homes; 1.76 million people are displaced within the borders of Nigeria alone. Millions are facing acute food insecurity, and malnutrition rates are beyond emergency thresholds. The majority of those in need of urgent assistance in the Lake Chad Basin are in northeastern Nigeria. Military operations have restored relative security in the main towns and axes across the four countries. However, although the food security crisis has been mostly contained thanks to humanitarian assistance over the past months, access to affected areas is still limited, constraining the delivery of food and livelihood assistance to local and displaced populations, especially in Local Government Areas facing Emergency (CH Phase 4).

**Lebanon (Syrian refugees)**
The influx of more than a million registered Syrian refugees has placed a huge strain on Lebanon’s economy, public services and infrastructure, as well as social relations. Some 91 percent of Syrian refugee households are food insecure to some degree. The main underlying causes of their food insecurity are lack of income earning and worsening economic vulnerability as they exhaust their capacities to cope. The use of food-related coping strategies is nearly universal among Syrian refugee households. Dietary diversity deteriorated compared with 2016 with 21 percent of households reporting low dietary diversity (compared with 14 percent in 2016). Infant and young child feeding practices also worsened.

**Liberia**
Despite major achievements and successful national policy initiatives to maintain national peace and security, the long-term consequences of the 14-year civil war (1989-1997) still disrupt public infrastructure, value chains and distribution systems, and its root causes remain unaddressed. Due to its limited domestic food production, Liberia remain dependent on imports to ensure food security. In a context of post-Ebola crisis and high food prices, food insecurity and undernutrition remain a concern for the most vulnerable households.

**Mali**
Since the radical Islamist Group Ansar Dine seized control of northern Mali in 2012, the economic and social structures of the country have been in decline. By 2017, instability had spread to central areas, hampering economic recovery. Despite above-average cereal production in 2017, acute food insecurity has slightly worsened since the period of March to May. The situation is expected to deteriorate between June and August 2018. The work of humanitarian workers continues to be hampered by acts of violence and robberies overwhelmingly in northern and central regions. Global acute malnutrition rates remain a great concern nationally (10.7 percent), rising to over 15 percent in Timbuktu and Gao.

**Somalia**
Somalia’s dire food security crisis has been further undermined by poor rains and a reduced Gu (April-June) cereal harvest, coupled with high local cereal prices, livestock losses and depressed incomes. Civil insecurity is disrupting trade and agriculture, triggering displacement (1.2 million people were internally displaced in the first nine months of the year, mainly because of drought and insecurity) and limiting humanitarian access in several areas. Three times the number of people were estimated to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between August and December compared with the same period last year. Somalia’s alarming nutrition situation continues to deteriorate, especially in northern and central parts. The Acute Watery Diarrhoea/cholera outbreak peaked in April and increased malnutrition and mortality in parts of southern Somalia.

**South Sudan**
Despite slight improvements mainly driven by the scale-up in humanitarian assistance, the situation remains critical. Households endure continuously constrained food access because of widespread insecurity, large-scale displacements, high food prices, crop pests, market disruptions, macroeconomic collapse and stagnant labour rates. People have exhausted their strategies to cope with such adversity after four years of conflict. Since July 2016, conflict has spread to new areas particularly to some of the country’s most productive green-belt counties such as Greater Equatoria, severely affecting agricultural activities. While the number of
people in need of humanitarian assistance – Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – dropped from a peak of 6 million in September to 4.8 million between October and December 2017, immediately after the harvest, food insecurity is expected to be more severe during 2018 than in 2017. Malnutrition remains a major public health emergency, with acute malnutrition even worse in September 2017 than in September 2016.

The Sudan
The humanitarian situation in the Sudan remains serious and complex, with acute humanitarian needs across the Darfur region, Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, eastern Sudan and other areas. High food prices, conflict between pastoralists and settled farmers and inter-tribal conflicts, poverty, the continual influx of refugees from South Sudan, as well as depletion of food stocks, market disruptions and constrained access to livelihoods undermine food security. By October, sorghum prices were 10 to 40 percent higher than the previous year, and near record-high wheat prices resulted from the depreciation of the local currency, foreign currency shortages, high production costs and sustained demand. The Sudan has recently experienced unpredictable rainfall patterns and desertification, which have damaged the harvest and food supply.

The Syrian Arab Republic
Seven years of war have trapped most Syrians in a vicious cycle of poverty and hunger. Purchasing power is weakened by unemployment, reductions in government subsidies and a drastic devaluation of the Syrian pound. The protracted conflict has severely hit agricultural production, disrupted humanitarian assistance and led to massive population displacement. High transport costs linked to fuel shortages, road insecurity and check points have reduced market supply and increased food prices. One in three Syrians remaining in the country are acutely food insecure. The most affected areas, in terms of absolute numbers, are Rural Damascus and Aleppo while the governorates of Ar-Raqqa and Deir-Ez-Zor are facing the highest prevalence rates of food insecurity. Critical conditions are reported in camps across Ar-Raqqa governorate, where people face shortages of food, water and medicine, and in hard-to-reach areas of Homs and Hama. Food prices have skyrocketed in eastern Ghouta, an enclave under siege in rural Damascus.

Ukraine
Four years of conflict have aggravated the harsh economic reality of life in eastern Ukraine. Mines and factories – the main livelihood sources – have closed because of war, safety concerns, workers fleeing, damage from shells and mortars and damage to transport infrastructure. Unemployment, depleted income and high inflation are severely limiting food access for more than a million people in conflict-affected Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Several groups are particularly vulnerable, especially in the face of a predictably harsh winter. These include the elderly living alone, families headed by women, households/individuals without any regular income, those not receiving the social benefits to which they are entitled, and the chronically ill and disabled. Nearly all households in Non-Government Controlled Areas are resorting to negative coping strategies.

Yemen
There has been no improvement in the dire situation in Yemen since the last UN Security Council briefing in June. The deteriorating macroeconomic situation and a conflict that is about to enter into its third year has led to the near complete collapse of public services, including health and sanitation systems, major displacement (some 3.1 million people are internally displaced, including returnees) and part of the population on the brink of famine. Yemenis rely on purchasing imported food – but food is unaffordable as its cost keeps rising and 70 percent of the population is living at or below the poverty line. The closure of seaports in November 2017 by the Saudi-led coalition stopped critical supplies, including medicines, from reaching the Yemeni people. Throughout 2017, Yemen experienced the fastest spreading cholera outbreak ever recorded.

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1 Stunting is evidence that children are too short for their age, which in turn is a reflection of a chronic state of undernutrition. When children are stunted before the age of two, they are at higher risk of illness and more likely than adequately nourished children to develop poor cognitive skills and learning abilities in later childhood and adolescence. If widespread, stunting also drags down the economic development of entire communities and nations.
2 ReliefWeb October 2017
3 http://www.unocha.org/iraq
4 World Bank estimates 2017
Conflict, natural disasters, an influx of returnees, internal displacement and the lack of employment and income opportunities resulting in low household purchasing power have contributed to the deteriorating food security situation. Afghans are caught in a vicious cycle of increasing asset depletion, greater migration and food insecurity.

- IPC figures indicated 7.6 million people (26 percent of the total population analysed) were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4) during the post-harvest period.
- Out of 34 provinces, 22 provinces were classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and one province, Badghis, in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Faryab, Khost, Bamyan, Ghor and Kandahar reported the highest numbers of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
- IDPs, host communities, returnees, refugees, female-headed households, families relying on casual labour for income and landless households were the most vulnerable.
- Between January and November 2017, more than a quarter of a million Afghans left their homes, adding to the estimated 636,500 people displaced by conflict in 2016.

During the post-harvest period (August – November 2017), around 7.6 million people (26 percent of the total population) were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions. This marks a substantial increase in the percentage of people in need of food, nutrition and livelihood assistance compared with the 2015 and 2016 post-harvest periods.

Between August and November 2017, assistance was needed for:

- 1.9 million people (6 percent of the total population) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 5.7 million (20 percent of the population) in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)

**Acute food insecurity situation**
August – November 2017

Source: Afghanistan IPC Technical Working Group, October 2017
Context
According to UN OCHA, Afghanistan is one of the world’s most complex humanitarian emergencies, characterized by protracted conflict which has seriously hampered poverty reduction and development, strained the fabric of society and depleted its coping mechanisms. After four decades of conflict, there are huge economic and development challenges and the country remains ranked in the bottom decile of countries in the global Human Development Index at 175 out of 186.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Conflict and migration severely constrain livelihoods
Conflict is the root cause of migration in Afghanistan, with people leaving their homes mainly for fear of persecution, kidnapping, armed enrolment or destruction of their houses and assets. IDPs lack food, sanitation, health care, protection and shelter. They struggle to earn money as their livelihoods are severely disrupted. Insecurity in Badghis, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nimroz and Nangarhar has paved the way for another wave of internal displacement. Between January and November 2017, more than a third of a million Afghans left their homes, adding to the estimated 636,500 people displaced by conflict in 2016. It is extremely challenging providing humanitarian assistance to many of these people; they are often located in hard-to-access areas and places where there is resistance by armed groups. A third of the population lives in areas that are contested or not under state control and so risk missing out on humanitarian assistance. At the same time, documented and undocumented returnees are flooding back into Afghanistan because of the deteriorating protection spaces in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. So far in 2017, almost 96,000 Afghans have returned from Pakistan and 407,666 from Iran, adding to 700,000 who returned in 2016. With their support network in Afghanistan weakened, returnees need help to be socially and economically reintegrated into a country where they are competing for jobs in an already over-saturated local labour market.

Harsh climatic conditions and falling yields hit rural poor
Falling incomes, harsh climatic conditions, low yields (land and livestock) and lack of access to quality farm inputs and extension services continue to entrench food insecurity in rural areas. From January to October 2017, more than 45,000 people were affected by natural disasters across the country, including floods and flash floods in Hirat, Nimroz, Balkh, Baghlan, Nangarhar and Badakhshan. Even in years with above-average wheat production, poor households suffer from seasonal food insecurity. But national wheat production in 2017 is forecast to be almost 16 percent below the five-year average following dry conditions in autumn and a lack of certified seeds. Poor pastures as a result of low rainfall in livestock-raising regions, coupled with a lack of fodder and disease, have compelled farmers to sell their animals as a coping mechanism.

Falling income, rising poverty
The economy has continued to deteriorate following foreign military disengagement and the ensuing loss of revenue. An increasing prevalence of poverty and ultra-poverty undermines people’s resilience to shocks. According to the Seasonal Food Security Assessment (SFSA) 2017, almost half of the population faced some type of shock in the last year, with loss of employment (26.6 percent) and reduced income (12.6 percent) being the main ones. Two in five households rely on insecure, low-paying agricultural wage labour. What little work is available in urban markets is very poorly paid. Almost 60 percent of the households said they had experienced a fall in income in the last year. While wheat prices remained generally stable in 2017, and inflation has been easing, the country is expected to rely more on cereal (mainly wheat) imports in the 2017/18 marketing year compared with the five-year average. Large price differentials persist among different areas of the country, with wheat grain almost 30 percent more expensive in Kandahar than in Herat.

Poor sanitation, drinking water and knowledge undermine food security
Safe drinking water, adequate sanitation as well as knowledge of food storage, processing, illness management and basic nutrition are essential for achieving food security and adequate nutrition. Half of the households access drinking water from ‘unimproved’ sources such as wells, surface water or rivers. Sanitation is very poor, with one in ten households having no facilities at all and 64 percent having traditional latrines with no water. Very high levels of illiteracy, particularly among women, inhibits knowledge of food preparation and nutrition. These factors contribute to high levels of malnutrition (wasting is 9.5 percent, stunting 40.9 percent and underweight 25 percent).

1 SFSA 2017
2 OCHA Afghanistan Weekly Field report (20-26 November 2017)
3 SFSA 2017
4 SFSA 2017
Following a good harvest in August, the food security situation has improved since the previous analysis in April and May 2017, when 2.6 million people were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4). It has also slightly improved compared with the same period in 2016; however, the food security situation is projected to deteriorate in the lean season.

Urgent humanitarian assistance is needed for:
- 294,000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 1.5 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)

Recurring displacement, disruptions in livelihood activities, a deteriorating economy, high food prices and climatic shocks, including floods, drought and epidemics, remain the key drivers of food insecurity in Burundi.

- From July to September, 1.76 million people (18 percent of the Burundian population) were in need of urgent humanitarian support – Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity levels.
- The western parts of the country, Imbo, are the most vulnerable to food insecurity, with 35 percent of the population classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and four percent in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) from July to September 2017, compared with 14 percent and six percent, respectively, during the same period a year earlier.

Acute food insecurity situation

July – September 2017

October – December 2017

During the lean season (October to December), the number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance – Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – was expected to rise from 18 percent to 27 percent or 2.6 million people mainly because of food stock shortages and people’s inability to afford food in the markets. Areas of the Congo-Nile watershed, East and North depressions, eastern dry plateau and Imbo plain were expected to revert to Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

In July, over 400,000 Burundian refugees were in neighbouring countries, and around 192,000 were internally displaced as of August 2017 due to the sociopolitical situation and natural disasters.
Burundi has experienced a cycle of violence and unrest since 2015. This protracted crisis – set against an already fragile backdrop of high poverty and decreasing purchasing power caused by high population growth, environmental degradation and low resilience to natural disasters and other human-made shocks – has devastated the country’s economy. On top of that, several Western resource partners have suspended budgetary aid and introduced sanctions, resulting in low levels of foreign currency, hampering trade and further depleting the national currency and delivery of basic services. An epidemic of malaria was declared in March 2017. In the first nine months of the year, there were 5.9 million cases of malaria and over 2 500 deaths.\(^1\)

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**Factors driving acute food insecurity**

### Multiple agricultural challenges hinder food availability

High population growth and the return of refugees can generate disputes over scarce natural resources. The poorest people – particularly women widowed during the war – are farming on marginal lands with severely eroded soils. They lack the capacity to cope with severe shocks, such as drought, epidemics, torrential rains, hailstorms and floods, which often claim lives and undermine the livelihoods of Burundians.

Despite favourable weather for the 2017B harvest in August, which produces half the yearly crop output, total food production declined by 0.4 percent compared with July to September 2016. In fact, the season B harvest has consistently failed to meet the country’s food needs since 2013. Fall Armyworm outbreaks, attacking newly planted maize crops, were reported in lower altitude areas, including southwestern Makamba and Rumonge provinces and northeastern Muyinga and Kirundo provinces. Infestation control measures have been successfully implemented in parts of Muyinga province, but a nationwide action plan is not in place.

There is a risk of a severe proliferation of the Fall Armyworm, which could seriously damage maize crops (the main crop for the 2018A season), leading to significant production losses and new food insecurity peaks. Because of the poor early 2017 harvest, many Burundians depleted their food stocks from the second improved harvest in two months rather than four. Repeated shocks deprive households of their ability to recover their livelihoods in order to weather the next shock, which then further erodes their resilience and exacerbates their food insecurity.

### Price increases and scarce employment opportunities

Households that rely on agricultural labour for their main source of income (23 percent at country level) have limited food access. Employment opportunities in the sector are increasingly scarce and wages very low. Work opportunities in neighbouring countries are rare. Livelihoods and private sector activities are disrupted by people fleeing natural disasters and insecurity.

Meanwhile, inflation continues to rise (21 percent in the first three months of 2017), particularly for food. Compared with May and June 2016, the cost of basic food items (sweet potato, cassava and maize) increased by 30 percent. This constitutes a major problem for the 31 percent of households spending more than 65 percent of their income on food during the harvest and post-harvest periods (July). In Buragane, Northern depressions, Imbo plain and Congo-Nile watershed zones, an even higher percentage of households spent more than 65 percent of their income on food (>41 percent). Burundi does not produce enough food to meet the needs of its people, making it vulnerable to economic shocks and fluctuating imports. Food inflation is spurred by fuel shortages and increased transport costs, reduced imports from neighbouring Tanzania and Rwanda, local currency devaluation and low foreign currency reserves hampering trade. In the capital Bujumbura, maize prices declined by 10 percent between June and October, as newly harvested crops from the 2017B and C harvests increased supplies; however, October prices remained about 35 percent higher than from a year earlier.

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\(^1\) OMS and Burundi Ministry of Public Health
The humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic is deteriorating as conflict intensifies and spreads.

Urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance is needed:

- 315,870 people (9 percent of the population) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 794,150 people (22 percent of the population) in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)

Increasing displacement and escalating conflict, particularly in the northwest, southeast and central areas, are disrupting livelihoods, lowering household income and eroding household purchasing power. Trade channels are cut off, prices of imported food and livestock are increasing and food stocks are low.

- The most recently available IPC analysis estimates the number of acutely food insecure to be 1.1 million.
- Over half the population needs humanitarian assistance – an estimated 2.4 million people out of a total of 4.6 million, which represents one of the highest rates in the world.
- The most vulnerable people are refugees, IDPs and the poorest households. According to UNHCR, due to increased violence, the IDP caseload at the end of October 2017 was estimated to be about 602,000, a 12 percent increase since the end of June and an almost 50 percent increase since January 2017. In addition, 538,432 refugees are in Chad, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Congo.
- Armed fighting is engulfing territories that had been relatively stable, including Basse-Kotto, Haut-Mbomou and Mbomou. Over the past 12 months, eight out of 16 provinces have been affected by violence, and nearly 70 percent of the territory is controlled by armed groups. Civilians are forced to live under the constant threat of violence, and 14 of the 16 provinces host people who desperately need humanitarian assistance.

Acute food insecurity situation

February 2017 – May 2017

Source: Central African Republic IPC Technical Working Group, February 2017
Context
The already volatile security situation has deteriorated further since July 2017, with clashes between armed groups, hand-to-hand fighting, burning of villages, looting of homes, attacks on displaced population settlement sites and UN peacekeeping forces, abductions, thefts and confiscations of property. Conflict and forced displacement are spreading to previously unaffected parts in the southeast (Pombolo, Dimbi, Gambo and Pavica) and northwest (Bocaranga and Niem) of the country. In addition, four consecutive years of reduced harvests, compounded by market disruptions and declining purchasing power, have created an alarming food security situation for most households.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Fourth consecutive season of below-average crop production
Food security relies on subsistence agriculture. More than 75 percent of the country’s 4.6 million people depend on agriculture for their livelihood. But agricultural activities have been severely disrupted by the widespread conflict. There was an overall decline in the area planted because residents in areas affected by the new rise in ethnic tensions could not access their land. Moreover, large-scale population displacements, input shortages and depletion of households’ productive assets will likely result in reduced agricultural output for the fifth consecutive year in 2017. However, in most provinces, the weather was favourable during the 2017 cropping season, with adequate rainfall in southern maize-producing areas and in the northern millet/sorghum-growing areas. The harvests are expected to extend from October to January and should bolster short-term food availability both in local markets and households. The lean season is expected to begin earlier than usual, by March instead of May, because of low levels of food stocks and limited employment opportunities. Insecurity is also disrupting other income-generating activities, such as livestock production, fishing, hunting and harvesting of wild plant products, eroding household purchasing power and preventing poor households from meeting their food needs.

Sharp rise in food prices in conflict areas
In the northwest, southeast and central conflict-affected areas, increased demand for imported foods and livestock, exacerbated by poor market access and below-average local supplies, have resulted in sharp price rises. From April to June 2017, maize prices were up by 10 percent in Bangui, 23 percent in Ouham Pende and 25 percent in Nana-Mambéré, compared with the previous three-month period\(^1\). Cassava prices were up by 28 percent in Bangui, 17 percent in Ouham Pende and 25 percent in Nana-Mambéré. Food prices continued to climb in August. Faced with low food stocks, higher food prices and falling income levels, people are living mainly on a diet of cassava leaves, tubers and wild yams and are essentially dependent on humanitarian food assistance. However, pillaging and attacks by armed groups, logistical constraints, inaccessibility and the decrease of humanitarian funding are preventing humanitarian agencies from reaching displaced, returning and host households in the northwest, southeast, and central parts of the country (Haut Mbomou, Mbomou, Ouham Pende, Haute Kotto, Basse Kotto and Nana Mambéré). Humanitarian workers have been targeted in many acts of violence in 2017 with 13 aid workers and 14 UN peacekeepers killed as of December 2017.

The vulnerability of displaced people
Some 602,000 IDPs are now spread across the country in 84 IDP sites or with host families, mostly in the east. Most IDPs live far below the poverty line with no access to their livelihoods or basic services, such as food, clean water, health care or education. Displacement increases the likelihood of child malnutrition, as the quantity, quality and availability of food diminishes. Forty-one percent of children under the age of five are chronically malnourished. Vulnerable households face a high risk of malaria outbreaks and diarrheal diseases during the rainy season. Most displaced households, returnees, host families and poor populations affected by the conflict in the northwestern, southeastern and central parts of the country (Ouham Pende, Nana Mambéré, Basse Kotto, Mbomou, Haut Mbomou, and Haute Kotto) are forecast to remain in a Crisis (IPC Phase 3) state of acute food insecurity at least until May 2018.\(^4\) The ever-increasing number of refugees also affects the socio-economic situation outside the country in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Democratic Republic of the Congo, putting a strain on already scarce resources.

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\(^{1}\) The new IPC analysis is expected to be released in early 2018 and will be included in the Global Report on Food Crises 2018 (March 2018)

\(^{2}\) The figures of persons in IPC 3 and 4 in February analysis does not consider the population of Nana Gribizi and Bangui due to insufficient data

\(^{3}\) OCHA October 2017

\(^{4}\) WFP’s Market Monitor Issue 36. July 2017

\(^{5}\) FEWSNET Remote Monitoring Report October 2017
The number of acutely food insecure people has increased by almost 2 million since the same period in 2016.

Urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance is needed for:
- 1.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 6.2 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)

The humanitarian crisis in the Kasai region and the extension of inter-communal conflicts in the Tanganyika region and eastern part of the country have created an alarming food insecurity situation. Many people are eating little more than a meal a day that is severely lacking in protein, vitamins and minerals – typically just maize or cassava root and leaves.

- In total, 7.7 million people are estimated to be in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood support – Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – in rural areas during the second half of 2017, up from 5.9 million from June 2016 to January 2017.
- From June to December 2017, 86 territories representing 59 percent of the country are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
- Some 86 percent of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are located in the Kasai and Tanganyika provinces. None of these provinces were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in June 2016.
- As of November 2017, 4.1 million people were internally displaced across the country, of which more than 1.3 million were in the Kasai region.

Acute food insecurity situation
June – December 2017

Source: The Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC Technical Working Group, June 2017
Context
Conflict, which has mainly affected the eastern provinces for the past two decades, has since broken out elsewhere in the country, causing widespread insecurity and population displacements in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Tanganyika, Haut-Katanga and Kasai provinces.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Conflict-induced displacement and refugees putting a strain on host communities
In November 2017, there were 4.1 million IDPs across the country – up from 2.2 million in late December 2016. A significant number of these IDPs are hosted by local families and communities, putting added strain on limited resources and compelling many to adopt unsustainable coping mechanisms and livelihood strategies.

Of the total number of IDPs, over 1.7 million were displaced by the conflict between the Kamuina Nsapu militias and the country’s armed forces in Kasai Central in August 2016. They are mostly elsewhere in Greater Kasai. Another 31 000 have reportedly fled to neighbouring Angola. More than 857 000 former IDPs have returned to their homes over the past 18 months, often to find their houses and possessions destroyed or looted.

In addition, according to the UN Refugee Agency, as of November 2017 the country has hosted more than 500 000 refugees from Rwanda, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Burundi. These refugees share the same livelihoods as their host communities in an extremely vulnerable context.

Poor agricultural production
The population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has more than doubled in the last 30 years – but the proportion of land cultivated has risen by only 0.1 percent to 11.5 percent. The country now has a 30 to 40 percent food production deficit. Some 50 to 75 percent of households depend on traditional subsistence agriculture as their main source of livelihood. But agriculture has been gravely affected by conflict, with crops destroyed, production areas and market routes cut off, huge numbers of farmers displaced and planting areas severely reduced in the conflict zones of Kasai and Tanganyika. People fleeing have not been able to tend to their fields. With the exception of cassava and sweet potatoes, all other crops, such as maize, cowpea and rice, have been lost or burnt.

Overall, rainfall was adequate and well-distributed during the 2017 cropping period, resulting in favourable vegetation conditions in most cropping areas, as reported by the FAO satellite-based Agricultural Stress Index. However, in addition to the constraints mentioned above, production has been curtailed by the spread of the Fall Armyworm in more than 80 territories, particularly in the North Kivu and Katanga regions. Maize production has decreased between 20 and 25 percent over the last two years. This is a serious concern as maize is a fundamental part of the food basket.

Escalating food prices
The local currency (Congolese franc) has depreciated significantly against the US dollar over the past months, resulting in more expensive and reduced imports from neighbouring countries. This, combined with limited domestic food supplies, has pushed up cereal prices throughout the country. The ongoing conflicts in Kasai and Tanganyika have disrupted markets, also driving up prices. In the Tanganyika region, there has been greater dependence on cross-border flows from Tanzania in the last six months, resulting in an almost doubling of local prices for maize and cassava. On average, households have experienced a 30 to 35 percent drop in their purchasing power. Price hikes have an even graver impact on households that spend a high proportion of their expenditure on food.

1 http://www.unocha.org/drc
Acute food insecurity situation

October – December 2017

No one was classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4), but almost 200 000 people faced Stressed levels (CH Phase 2) between October and December 2017.

The situation is expected to improve in the next six months, reducing the number of people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) by 42 percent to 24 882.

Chronic food insecurity is compounded by shocks related to political instability, irregular rainfall and price volatility for rice imports and local cashew exports.

• The number of people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) – 43 170 people or 3.6 percent of the population – is higher than the 22 200 reported from March to May 2017. It has nevertheless improved compared to the same period in 2016 when over 66 000 people were in Crisis (CH Phase 3).

• The food security situation remained acceptable in most of the country, except in Gabu and Bolama (the Bijagós Archipelago) where 200 000 people were Stressed (CH Phase 2).

• The aggregate 2017 cereal production is estimated at 210 000 tonnes, about seven percent lower than last year’s bumper level and five percent below the five-year average; however, the 2017 cashew campaign is expected to improve revenues for smallholder farmers.

• Real gross domestic product growth is projected to average five percent over 2016-2018. The increase in growth reflects the assumption that output from the agriculture sector will remain fairly robust, and that political stability will be achieved to allow for a return of resource partner financing.

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, November 2017
Context
Guinea-Bissau has faced years of political instability. The country is one of the most coup-prone in the world, with four successful coups and 16 attempted, plotted or alleged coups since independence in 1974. The country also endures extreme poverty, and, as a result, was ranked 178 out of 188 countries in the 2016 UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index. Sixty-nine percent of Bissau-Guineans live on USD 2 per day, with higher poverty rates among people aged 15 to 25 years and women.¹

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Agricultural production expected at below average levels
More than 80 percent of people in Guinea-Bissau earn a living from agriculture. Rice and cashews are the two main crops but a lack of inputs, erratic weather and weak infrastructure translate to low yields and revenues.

In 2017, the late arrival of rains in May and June delayed plantings, while abundant but poorly-distributed rainfall in July and August affected crop development in the main producing zones of the country’s marshy areas. Flooding in the freshwater rice shallows and mangroves affected production in a number of agriculturally important regions, including Bafatá, Gabu and Oio. The presence of local grasshoppers, nymphula moths and Fall Armyworms has also been reported throughout the country. The aggregate 2017 production is estimated at 210,000 tonnes, about seven percent lower than last year’s bumper level and five percent below the five-year average. However, the production of millet, sorghum and other cereal grains is expected to be similar to, or above, last year’s levels.

Cashew nuts exports are expected to improve incomes
The country is the world’s second largest exporter of raw cashew nuts, which account for more than 90 percent of its export revenues. For most poor rural households, cashew nuts are an important source of income and often bartered for imported rice supplied by cashew traders. Cashew farmers often sell excess rice bartered from cashew nuts on the local markets, earning income necessary to purchase other goods. In 2017, the Government set the farmgate price of cashew nuts at XOF 1,000 (USD 1.77) per kg, a substantial increase, compared with XOF 350 in the previous year. As of early November, 165,000 tonnes of cashew nuts, out of the 175,000 forecasted, had already been exported.

Imports account for over 45 percent of the national cereal requirements in the country. Rice is the main import (accounting for close to 82 percent), followed by wheat (15 percent). In response to growing domestic demand and a slight decline in total production compared with the previous year, import requirements for 2017 are expected to increase by eight percent compared with 2016, reaching 134,000 tonnes.

Undernutrition situation
According to the food security and nutrition survey conducted by WFP in collaboration with the Government in July 2017, overall Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) of children aged 6 to 59 months has halved from 3.6 percent in 2016 to 1.8 percent, with 1.3 percent suffering from Moderate Acute Malnutrition and 0.5 percent from Severe Acute Malnutrition. The prevalence of malnutrition is higher in landlocked and insular regions (Bolama, Uno, Caravela and Farim) where the GAM rate is five percent.

Although the prevalence of stunting (chronic malnutrition) has dropped progressively over the past several years (from 40.9 percent in 2006 to 27.6 percent in 2014), more than a quarter of all children in Guinea-Bissau remain stunted. Stunting rates are highest in the Bafatá and Oio regions. Bolama, Bijagós and Bissau experience the lowest stunting rates, likely as a result of less severe food insecurity in these areas (WFP 2016). Even in the wealthiest quintile, almost one-fifth (18.8 percent) of children are stunted, indicating a need to drastically improve the nutrition status for all populations.

¹ WFP country brief, July 2017
Thanks to favourable climatic conditions, which contributed to a normal spring harvest, the food security situation has improved since the last analysis from February to May 2017 when 2.3 million people were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Urgent humanitarian assistance is needed:
- 133,000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 1.2 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)

The current food security situation still reflects the prolonged effects of several years of shocks. The recurrence of shocks has severely affected food security and livelihoods across the country and during 2014-2017 the departments of the Grand-Anse, Sud, Nippes, Nord-Ouest and Sud-Est in particular. Last September, the northern region, specifically the Northeast department, was affected by Hurricane Irma.
- Overall 1.32 million people in Haiti (18 percent of the population analysed, excluding those in the main cities) were estimated to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between October 2017 and February 2018.
- The Northeast department and mountainous areas of the Grand’Anse department (southwest) are the most vulnerable areas and the only ones classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3); however, certain areas (i.e. Haut Artibonite, La Gonâve, bas Nord-Ouest, coastal areas of the South department) also face high levels of food insecurity.
- The food security situation is expected to deteriorate in some areas during the first half of 2018 due to the lean season. Several factors could further exacerbate food insecurity by early 2018, including adverse weather conditions such as rainfall deficits or delay, sociopolitical turmoil, high inflation rates resulting from the devalued Haitian gourde and increasing oil and food prices on international markets.
- As of October 2017, about 37,700 people were still internally displaced following the 2010 earthquake; between July 2015 and September 2017, about 230,000 people had returned from the Dominican Republic.
Context

Haiti’s geography makes it prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, earthquakes and landslides. One million people are still in need of humanitarian assistance following Hurricane Matthew, which hit the island in October 2016. Even though the impacts of Hurricanes Irma and Maria were weaker than expected in 2017, they too revealed Haiti’s vulnerability; about 12 percent of the population faced severe acute food insecurity following the storms. Poverty, the depletion of the environment and limited government capacity to respond to crises leave Haitians highly vulnerable; even moderate shocks can push people into hunger.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Below-average agricultural output likely in some areas

Although the 2017 cereal production output is still uncertain, FAO estimates that the maize and sorghum outputs might decrease by 13 and 17 percent, respectively, compared with 2016. Hurricane Irma damaged 30 to 40 percent of cultivated areas in the North, Northwest and Northeast departments; more specifically, it damaged 50 percent of all crop areas in the Northeast.

However, an improvement in food availability and access between June and August is reported thanks to favourable climatic conditions and a near normal spring harvest. In early 2018, food security is expected to deteriorate in some areas as the lean season takes hold from March to June. Some 705 000 tonnes of food aid and commercial imports will be needed to cover the shortfalls in agricultural output over the 2017/18 marketing year (i.e. July/June).

Even with good rainfall conditions, the availability of and access to seeds pose major constraints to the success of the growing season, with some households forced to take on debt or sell livelihood assets (particularly livestock) in order to purchase farm inputs and cover high production costs.

Food prices remain high

Average harvests in areas where rains got off to a timely start have helped bring down prices for locally grown food crops such as maize and beans since May. Although prices for local produce dropped after the harvest, they were still higher than in the previous year. At the end of August, inflation was higher than the same period for the last three years (8.1 percent in 2017 against 3.9 percent, 7.3 percent and 6.6 percent in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively). In September, food prices were mostly stable except in the capital Port-au-Prince where maize meal and imported rice prices rose sharply. Red bean prices increased because of a limited supply in spring and a strong demand for seeds.

Although agriculture accounts for 25 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic product, the country fails to produce enough food for its people’s needs. More than 50 percent of its food is imported, including 80 percent of its main staple food – rice. This makes Haitians vulnerable to price hikes or instability in international markets. The stable exchange rate for more than three months, availability of locally grown crops and trends in world market prices have helped stabilize prices for imported cereals, in general, and rice and maize, in particular; however, prices in mid-2017 were still higher than they were last year and above the five-year average.

Undernutrition situation

Chronic poverty is widespread throughout the country and has major implications for food security and nutrition. More than 50 percent of the population is undernourished, according to the Global Hunger Index, and 24 percent of children are chronically malnourished. Poor living conditions, poor sanitation and disease are all underlying causes.

About 55 100 IDPs from the 2010 earthquake continue to live in 31 camps, mainly in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Approximately 71 percent of them are women and children. They are among the most vulnerable people in the country, often threatened with eviction and lacking access to basic services, including safe water and sanitation. For instance, 10 000 IDPs located in nine camps do not have access to a toilet. This leads to an increased risk of water-borne diseases: Haiti remains one of the countries with the highest annual incidence rates of cholera, accounting for nearly one-fifth of all cases worldwide. While undernourished children are more likely to become ill, illness also contributes to undernutrition. It is a vicious cycle.

1 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
2 World Health Organization
3.2 million people
in need of food security assistance
in July 2017

11 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.2

As of September 2017, 3.2 million people remained displaced within Iraq, according to OCHA.3

The Iraqi population remains extremely vulnerable, especially in recently liberated and ongoing conflict areas where people continue to face severe insecurity and financial challenges.

- Years of conflict in Iraq have left 3.2 million people food insecure. In newly retaken and accessible areas, families report limited livelihood opportunities, which reduces their ability to purchase food and other necessities, and restricted access to the public distribution system, an important social safety net that entitles Iraqis to receive flour, rice and cooking oil rations from the Government.
- Despite improvements, displaced people in Northern Iraq (Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din governorates) continue to face food insecurity. More than 65 percent of displaced households in and outside camps identified food as a priority need, compared with around half of the host community households and 56 percent of the returnees.
- Internally displaced households both in and outside camps reported reducing their food consumption by cutting portion sizes and the number of meals eaten per day.4 However, WFP’s monitoring of 1 100 respondents living in several locations in Mosul and in the district of Sinjar in Ninewa found inadequate consumption among IDPs, returnees and residents to be at its lowest level for six months.
- Humanitarian access remains an ongoing challenge. Some 74 percent of residents and 90 percent of returnees to Mosul reported that they did not receive any public distribution system assistance. IDP households outside camps were less likely to receive assistance than those inside.5

Context
In 2014, the so-called Islamic State (ISIL) took over significant portions of Iraqi territory, including Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul and other key towns, triggering mass displacement. Government operations to retake territory from ISIL were stepped up in 2016. By November 2017, Iraqi Security Forces had managed to force ISIL out of Mosul, Telafar and Hawiga. In 2017, one million civilians were evacuated from Mosul in one of the largest managed evacuations in recent history. The Iraqi Prime Minister officially announced the end of major military operations in the country on 21 November, following the retaking of the last districts under insurgent groups’ control in Anbar. But the situation remains tense and continually shifting.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Conflict and socio-economic impacts
In the past, vulnerability to food insecurity in Iraq was chiefly a result of obstacles to international trade – provoked by war and sanctions – impeding oil exports and food imports. Since 2014, the widespread conflict has created a major humanitarian crisis, with over 11 million people in need and 3.2 million IDPs.6 Conflict-related instability remains the main driver of food insecurity. Since February 2017, almost 1 million were displaced during military operations in Mosul and surrounding areas. Families are now deciding whether it is safe to leave camps and return to their homes in the newly liberated territories. Anbar governorate is experiencing the highest rate of returnees, followed by Ninewa and Salah al-Din.
Residents in East Mosul, where ISIL’s hold finally ended in August, have access to functioning food markets, children are going to school, services are being reestablished and businesses are open; however, other newly liberated territories, such as Xazraj and Sarjxana in western Mosul, are not yet suitable for returnees, mostly due to a number of uncleared improvised explosives, lack of essential services and very few livelihood opportunities. According to WFP’s latest mobile monitoring report, IDPs, residents and returnees are increasingly able to meet their food needs in Mosul, as access to fresh vegetables, dairy products and pulses has improved and prices have fallen to pre-conflict levels thanks to better market integration. Consequently, the use of negative coping strategies such as borrowing food or adults skipping meals in order to feed children has reportedly declined.

Nevertheless, purchasing power in western Mosul remains a challenge. In August 2017 unskilled labour wages were 30 percent lower than in the rest of Ninewa governorate, and in September 2017 they fell by a further eight percent. Many residents had to purchase food on credit and use their savings because job opportunities remained limited and wages low. According to WFP’s August Market Monitor, food prices fell by six percent across the country and by as much as 26 percent in Kirkuk and 22 percent in Erbil. But wages fell too – by four percent across the country for unskilled labour.

In the Kurdistan region of Iraq, IDPs and Syrian refugees make up 25 percent of the population. The purchasing power of Syrian refugees decreased in the second quarter of 2017 as food prices increased during Ramadan, according to WFP monitoring. A WFP mVAm survey among displaced populations in the Kurdistan governorates of Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and population groups affected by the conflict in Ninewa found food insecurity was worse in Ninewa than in the other three governorates, with 30 percent of displaced households having poor or borderline consumption; however, the use of negative food-based coping strategies continued to fall from its March peak in Ninewa.

**Conflict and agricultural impacts**

One-third of Iraq’s 36 million people reside in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. In conflict areas, many farmers abandoned their farms to escape violence. Destruction of agricultural infrastructure, machinery and livestock threatens agricultural livelihoods in liberated areas and limits employment opportunities for unskilled farm workers. Crop production has been devastated in Iraq by the lack of machinery, displacement of farmers, fields littered with unexploded ordinances, destroyed silos, storage and crop processing facilities, lack of seeds and fertilizers, and damaged irrigation infrastructure. In addition, import and transport regulations prevent the use of fertilizers, which could go toward manufacturing improvised explosive devices. Farmers’ incomes have been further hit over the last three years by Government delays in payments for crop purchases.

Areas that have been liberated or are experiencing ongoing conflict have suffered the most, with wheat and barley production losses amounting to as much as 75 to 80 percent. Ninewa governorate, producing over 20 percent of Iraqi wheat and almost 40 percent of Iraqi barley before the conflict, has been particularly affected, as ISIL looted and destroyed over 90 percent of pipes, sprinklers, water pumps and channels and filled in some of the wells, according to key informants. On average, as much as three-quarters of cattle, sheep, goats and buffalo were lost to the conflict, although in some areas this figure reached as high as 85 to 95 percent. In addition, the lack of and/or high prices of animal feed, inability to access pasture due to occupation or explosive contamination, lack of space for livestock in camps and government suspension of veterinary programmes (e.g. medicines, vaccines, etc.) have also contributed to massive livestock losses and to farmers selling their livestock for cash.
In conflict-affected areas in Crisis (CH Phase 3), Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Famine (CH Phase 5) from October to December 2017, 2.9 million people, or 15 percent of the population, required urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance.

Thanks to harvest and humanitarian assistance, food security has improved by 53 percent compared with the period between March and May 2017 when 6.2 million people faced acute food insecurity.

Urgent humanitarian assistance remains needed:

- in Nigeria’s Yobe, Adamawa and Borno States, 2.6 million people (19 percent of the area’s population) are estimated to be in Crisis (CH Phase 3), Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Famine (CH Phase 5).
- in the Diffa region of the Niger, about 65,000 people are estimated to be in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4).
- in the Lac region of Chad, almost 81,000 people are estimated to be in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4).
- in Cameroon, about 1.5 million people in the Far North region are food insecure, with around 129,000 people facing severe food insecurity.

Continued insecurity, trade restrictions and logistical challenges, coupled with internal displacement and movements of refugees, continue to undermine food security and limit humanitarian actors’ access to those in need.

- Overall, from October to December, 2.75 million people or 15 percent of the population were estimated to be in Crisis (CH Phase 3), Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Famine (CH Phase 5) in the conflict-affected areas of Niger, northeastern Nigeria and Chad. In Cameroon around 129,000 in the Far North were severely food insecure.
- The majority of those in need of urgent assistance – 90 percent of the population in Crisis (CH Phase 3), Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Famine (CH Phase 5) – in the Lake Chad Basin are in northeastern Nigeria, where two Local Government Areas (LGAs), namely Madagali in Adamawa State and Mafa in Borno State, are in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and 21 LGAs are in Crisis (CH Phase 3).
- Another 4.5 million people in the conflict-affected areas of Niger, northeastern Nigeria and Chad are classified as Stressed (CH Phase 2), which is a significant decrease from the 10.7 million reported in June 2017. Another 1.33 million are moderately food insecure in Cameroon’s Far North.
- The number of displaced people in the most affected areas has reached 2.3 million.

Acute food insecurity situation

October – December 2017

June – August 2018

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, November 2017

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, November 2017

**Lake Chad Basin**

Cameroon, Chad, Niger and northeastern Nigeria
Context
The eight-year Boko Haram insurgency has pushed vast areas surrounding Lake Chad, the region’s most important source of freshwater and livelihoods, towards the brink of disaster. Military operations have restored relative security in the main towns and axes across the four countries, many of which were previously out of reach for humanitarian actors; however, insecurity levels remain high, including in potential return areas. Some 2.3 million people have been uprooted from their homes; 1.76 million are displaced within the borders of Nigeria alone. Millions are severely food insecure, and malnutrition rates are far beyond emergency thresholds.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Northeastern Nigeria: Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States
The most devastating effects of the food security crisis have been mostly contained thanks to humanitarian assistance over the past months; however, access to affected areas is still limited, constraining the delivery of food and livelihood assistance to local and displaced populations, especially in LGAs facing Emergency (CH Phase 4). Interventions are particularly crucial for areas affected by the outbreak of cholera in Borno State, with 4,114 cases reported by the end of September, of which some 52 were fatal.

The number of people estimated to be in Crisis (CH Phase 3), Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Famine (CH Phase 5) across the three states fell from 4.7 million between October and December 2016 to 2.6 million for the same period in 2017, with almost 2,000 people still facing Famine (CH Phase 5) conditions. In Borno alone, about 30 percent of the population is currently classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4).

The projected analysis forecasts an increase to 3.7 million people or 44 percent of the population in Crisis (CH Phase 3), Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Famine (CH Phase 5) in northeastern Nigeria during the lean season from June to August 2018, including some 12,500 people facing Famine (CH Phase 5).

Conflict has disrupted trade activities in the area and triggered major price increases along with the depreciation of the national currency (Naira) and soaring transport costs following the removal of fuel subsidies. In September 2017 prices of various staple foods in some of the major northeastern markets were between six and 15 percent higher than in September 2016 and more than 150 percent higher than 2015.

Livestock disease outbreaks are likely to increase prices of meat and milk while plant diseases and pests – Fall Armyworm and locust infestations – are a concern in Yobe and Adamawa. Heavy rainfall flooded several agricultural lands and restricted road access. Some 1.7 million IDPs and 210,000 Nigerian refugees living in neighbouring countries are highly vulnerable to food insecurity.

The Niger: Diffa region
In Diffa, one of the world’s poorest regions, the number of acutely food insecure people halved between March-May 2017 and October-December 2017 to around 65,000. But improvements in acute food insecurity are expected to be seasonal only. Estimates for the lean season (June to August 2018) anticipate an increase in the magnitude of acute food insecurity.

Despite improvements in the security situation, population displacements, trade disruptions and the implementation of emergency measures continue to negatively affect food security in Diffa. As of October 2017, Niger hosted 108,000 refugees from Nigeria with the majority of them living in the Diffa region. The region was also hosting more than 129,000 IDPs because of the Boko Haram insurgency. Displacement has resulted in the depletion of household assets and high levels of indebtedness.

The lack of accessibility by humanitarian workers to certain areas is hindering food and livelihood assistance and worsening food insecurity among displaced households and poor local populations. The security situation remains tense and affects neighbouring areas such as Tillabéry and Tahoua regions. As a consequence, the Government of Niger imposed a state of emergency (from September to December), which triggered further population displacements and restricted access to fuel and fertilizers, constraining production and transport capacities.

Trade with Nigeria has been limited by higher transaction costs, insecurity and the low exchange rate of the Nigerian Naira. New trade routes are used to circumvent insecurity but have contributed to increasing costs and slowing trade flows of cereal, pepper crops and livestock. Agricultural production has also been curtailed because 71 villages (in
Bosso and Nguimi) out of a total of 606 were not able to plant any crops. Reduced production will diminish already limited food stocks and prevent households from meeting their food consumption needs.

**Chad: Lac region**
The number of acutely food insecure people (81 000 in Crisis [CH Phase 3], October-December 2017) has remained on a par with the same period in 2016 in the Lac region. The latest CH analysis for the whole country highlights a slight improvement in acute food insecurity, between March-May and October-December 2017. However, as with the above-mentioned Nigerian and Niger states acute food insecurity is expected to significantly deteriorate during the lean season between June and August 2018, with about 890 000 people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4) – of which more than 101 000 will likely face Emergency (CH Phase 4). The magnitude of acute food insecurity in the Lac region is forecast to increase by 80 percent to almost 150 000 people.

Since March 2017, military operations have resumed, and villages on the border with Niger and Nigeria have seen an upsurge in violent attacks, leading to multiple protection incidents and forcing humanitarian organizations to temporarily suspend operations in certain areas. Some 127 000 people (refugees, IDPs and Chadians who returned from the Niger) are currently displaced. Insecurity negatively affects agricultural production, markets and food prices. Displaced persons have had to abandon their fields, livestock and fishing activities while host communities now have to share their meagre resources. Crop production is expected to be below average (10 to 15 percent) due to prolonged dry spells limiting millet output, while households depending on fisheries have seen their income shrink by 40 percent. Insecurity and the consequent economic contraction in Nigeria have also reduced exchanges of livestock between the two countries. Livestock prices are falling, curtailing the purchasing power of pastoralists. The Government of Chad declared a pastoral crisis in June 2017. Meanwhile, prices of imported products (rice, pasta, etc.) have been rising in the Lac markets.

**Cameroon: Far North region**
In the Far North region, some 1.5 million people are food insecure, of whom approximately 129 000 are severely food insecure. Despite favourable weather conditions, the production prospects for sorghum and millet crops, expected to be harvested from October to November, were uncertain because of displacement and lack of inputs. Agricultural output is expected to fall for the third consecutive year.

The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in the displacement of about 238 000 Cameroonians and an influx of about 90 000 refugees from Nigeria. Boko Haram’s cross-border raids, suicide bombings and heightened insecurity have amplified the vulnerability of the local population. Food insecurity and malnutrition continue to be of high concern in the arid Sahel region, which is regularly affected by drought, food shortages and epidemics. Water and sanitation services are the weakest in the country, with only 40 percent of the population having access to safe drinking water.

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1 Or broadly equivalent
2 CH analysis conducted between March and May 2017 WFP.
3 Cameroon CFSVA, 2017
1.9 million people

in need of food assistance in 2018:
586,711 Lebanese,
1,371,000 displaced Syrians, and
34,000 Palestine refugees from
the Syrian Arab Republic

0.92 million people targeted for food security and livelihoods assistance in Lebanon
- 91,644 Lebanese
- 795,177 displaced Syrians
- 34,000 Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic

Among Syrian registered refugees, 36 percent of households are moderately food insecure and two percent severely food insecure. Those percentages have increased slightly over the last year.

The main underlying causes of food insecurity among the Syrian refugee community in Lebanon are lack of income earning opportunities and worsening economic vulnerability as refugees exhaust their coping capacities.

- Some 91 percent of Syrian refugee households are food insecure to some degree – the majority of them ‘mildly’ food insecure (53 percent), followed by moderately food insecure (36 percent) and severely food insecure (2 percent).
- Food insecurity is worse in Akkar, Jezzine and Jbeil, where more than half of the households are moderately or severely food insecure. This is followed by Baalbek, Hermel, Batroun, Bcharre, Zahle, Baabda, Aley and Saida (41 to 50 percent).
- The use of food-related coping strategies is nearly universal, with 96 percent of Syrian refugee households reporting having adopted them.
- Dietary diversity deteriorated compared with 2016, with 21 percent of households reporting low dietary diversity (compared with 14 percent in 2016). Infant and young child feeding practices worsened, with declines in the share of exclusively breastfed babies under the age of six months, and a significant worsening of dietary diversity for children aged 6 to 23 months.

Context
Now in its seventh year, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has caused the displacement of millions of people, including more than a million registered refugees in Lebanon, which hosts the second-largest population of Syrian refugees in the region and the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world. The population of Lebanon has grown by 28 percent in less than five years, a ratio of one Syrian refugee (including both registered and non-registered ones) to every four Lebanese. The influx of refugees has placed an unprecedented strain on the economy, public services, and infrastructure, as well as on demographic factors and social relations. In January 2015, Lebanon established restrictive border policies, followed by a freeze on the registration of newly arrived refugees. In 2017, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon dropped slightly from 1.017 million in 2016 to 1.001 million.
**Factors driving acute food insecurity**

**Limited agricultural production and increasing cereal imports**

Despite its significant contribution to the gross domestic product and employment, agricultural production in Lebanon is limited in terms of cultivated areas. Domestic cereal production covers on average about 17 percent of the consumption needs, and the country depends heavily on imports. In the 2017/18 marketing year, the cereal import requirements are forecast at 20 percent above the average for the last five years. Increased import requirements are in part supported by higher food consumption caused by population increases.

The Consumer Protection Department at the Ministry of Economy and Trade sets the price of local Lebanese flat bread. Other bakery products (baguettes, sandwich bread, etc.) are not subsidized.

**Persistent and worsening levels of poverty**

The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has affected Lebanon’s economic growth, deepening poverty and exacerbating pre-existing development issues in the country.

An even higher proportion of refugee households are living below the poverty line in 2017 than in 2016, up from 71 percent to 76 percent. Syrian refugees in Lebanon reported per capita monthly expenditures of USD 98, a drop of USD 6 since 2016 and USD 9 since 2015, showing that households have fewer resources. Three in four Syrian refugee households had expenditures below the Minimum Expenditure Basket, unable to meet basic needs of food, health care, shelter and education. Some 58 percent of households had a per capita expenditure below the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket, meaning they were living in extreme poverty, unable to meet survival needs – an increase of 10 percent over 2016.

Some 87 percent of refugees reported having to borrow money to buy food, cover health expenses and pay for rent – a slight fall since 2016 when 91 percent reported taking on debt. On average, 77 percent reported having experienced a lack of food or money to buy food– down from 88 percent in the previous year.

Two-thirds of Syrian refugees have continued to adopt crisis and emergency coping strategies, such as reducing essential expenditures on education and health care, selling household goods, productive assets and housing or land, taking children out of school and sending children to work. These severe strategies often have a harmful effect on households, further undermining their ability to cope and recover, and they can be irreversible. While this is a significant reduction since 2016, when 74 percent were adopting such strategies, it may mean that some households have exhausted their ability to employ such strategies – for instance, they may have no productive assets or land left to sell.

**Lack of income earning opportunities**

Limitations on access to the labour market and the consequent lack of income opportunities have made it difficult for refugees to meet basic needs without external assistance. WFP assistance was the primary source of income for 28 percent of refugee households, while borrowing and credit (incurring debt) was the primary source for 16 percent of households. Looking at the aggregation of households’ three main sources of income, informal credit and debt were the most frequent.

While there have been relatively few instances of violence between host communities and refugees, tensions appear to be rising, particularly around the issue of job opportunities, with signs of host community fatigue. The first half of 2017 saw numerous protests and social media campaigns around perceived Syrian labour competition, as well as a number of Syrian shop closures by local authorities. On the upside, a Common Card cash system has been put into place, and targeting has improved the ability to identify and support the most socio-economically vulnerable refugee households in Lebanon. However, insufficient funding is threatening food assistance, health care and access to safe water.

**Vulnerability of women and children**

As in previous years, for nearly every indicator of vulnerability, households headed by women fared worse than those headed by men. They were more food insecure, had worse diets, adopted severe coping strategies more often and had higher poverty levels. They were almost twice as likely to be living in informal settlements and less likely to have legal residency. Their monthly income was only USD 159, compared with USD 206 for men. The VASyR reveals the vulnerability of children. Child labour, violent discipline of children and child marriages are concerns. Refugees continue to cite the cost of education as the biggest barrier, including transport, supplies and clothing expenses.
The number of people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) has more than doubled since the period between March and May 2017, when those figures were estimated at 14,000; however, all counties are still in Minimal (CH Phase 1).

Humanitarian assistance is currently needed for:
- 12 percent of the population in Stressed (CH Phase 2)
- Around 1 percent of the population in Crisis (CH Phase 3)

Food security and the overall economy are still recovering from the consequences of the 2014 Ebola crisis. High food prices limit the purchasing power of the most vulnerable households despite favourable production prospects.

- Around 28,800 people (0.7 percent of the population) were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) between October and December 2017, marking a two-fold increase since the period from March to May 2017. Nevertheless, this number decreased compared with the same period in 2016 when almost 53,000 people were in Crisis (CH Phase 3).

- More than half the population classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3) lives in the country’s north-central regions (Nimba, Bong, Lofa and Grand Bassa).
- The latest CH analysis forecasts an increase in the number of food insecure people due to the lean season: more than 43,500 people are expected to face Crisis levels (CH Phase 3) between June and August 2018.
- The country is still hosting around 12,000 Ivorian refugees.

**Acute food insecurity situation**

**October – December 2017**

**June – August 2018**

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, November 2017
Although Liberia’s post-war recovery efforts have been characterized by major achievements and successful national policy initiatives to maintain national peace and security, issues identified as root causes of the country’s 14-year civil war (1989-1997) remain unaddressed. This has disrupted public infrastructure, value chains and distribution systems. As a result, farmers struggle to market their produce, and parts of the population, mainly in urban areas, suffer from food insecurity.

**Factors driving acute food insecurity**

**Limited domestic production and high dependence on imports**

Harvesting of the 2017 paddy crop, virtually the only cereal grown in the country, was completed by the end of December. The early onset of rainfall in February allowed for an on-time start to the cropping season. Although localized dryness was observed following below-average rainfall in July and August, the overall production outlook is favourable, and preliminary estimates put the 2017 aggregate paddy production at about 275,000 tonnes, two percent above the previous year’s output and slightly below the five-year average. Cassava production is expected to reach 892,000 tonnes – nearly 40 percent above last year’s level and 70 percent above the 2010-2014 average.

Imports account for more than half of the country’s total cereal requirements. Cereal import requirements for 2017 are forecast at over 457,000 tonnes, about three percent above the previous year’s level and nine percent above the five-year average. Rice makes up over 80 percent of the imports, while wheat and maize account for about 13 percent and six percent, respectively.

**High food prices due to inflation and currency depreciation**

Households’ purchasing power and food access are curtailed by the high prices of imported food (food inflation was 5.4 percent in August 2017) driven by the depreciation of the Liberian dollar and the impact of high oil prices on transportation costs. Between September 2016 and 2017, imported rice prices increased by 32 to 49 percent in markets monitored across the country despite the new harvest and stable to decreasing prices on Asian markets. While the price of cassava was reportedly stable in most monitored markets, significant increases were observed in Nimba County (108 percent) and in Monrovia (43 to 47 percent). The price of a gallon of palm oil increased by 26 percent since last year. The prevailing exchange rate of the Liberian dollar against the US dollar has also had a significant impact on the price of a bag of charcoal, which increased by 21 percent over a year and by five percent between August and September. Furthermore, transportation costs have been driven up by the 23 percent increase in the cost of a gallon of gasoline between September 2016 and 2017. Under such circumstances, both rural and urban populations currently face reduced access to food. High food prices hit the poorest households hardest: an estimated 64 percent of Liberians live below the poverty line, of whom 1.3 million live in extreme poverty.

**Difficult economic recovery from the 2014 Ebola crisis**

The Ebola outbreak in 2014 seriously affected all sectors of the economy. Livelihood activities and the trade of agricultural commodities were severely disrupted by quarantine measures and border closures.

The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts a stronger rebound of 3.4 percent growth in 2017, well above the growth rates from the last two years, but still well below the 8.7 percent forecast before the Ebola crisis. As the economy continues to recover, household livelihoods and incomes are returning to the levels observed prior to the Ebola crisis.

**Undernutrition situation**

Undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies have been identified as major public health challenges in Liberia. Children deprived of good nutrition during the first two years of life have impaired physical and cognitive development. Stunting hampers the future ability of a child to learn and earn, and has a huge impact on the social and economic progress of the country. Some 230,000 children in Liberia suffer from chronic malnutrition. More than half (59 percent) of children under three years have an iron deficiency.

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1 WFP country programme overview
Mali still faces acute food insecurity due mostly to an erratic rainfall pattern leading to significant pockets of crop production deficits, insecurity, population displacement and high food prices.

- Around 291,000 people were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and above from October to December 2017. The highest prevalence rates of Crisis (CH Phase 3) food insecurity levels were reported in Gao, Mopti, Koulikoro, Timbuktu, Kidal and Bamako. This shows a deterioration compared with the same period in 2016 when 176,000 people were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4).
- The latest national Food Security Assessment shows that the “cercles” of Tombouctou, Menaka, Gourma-Rharous, Koro, Tessalit, Bankas, Kolokani, Gao, Bandiagara, Tominian, and Tin Essako have the highest levels of food insecure households with 40-67 percent food insecure people.

- Humanitarian assistance is still required, as the situation is expected to deteriorate further between June and August 2018, with 795,000 people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) including almost 20,000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) during the lean season. This is an estimated 32 percent increase since the 2017 lean season.
- The 2017 SMART survey was conducted across the country, even in Kidal, for the first time since 2014. Results show that Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates are of great concern nationally (10.7 percent), and more specifically in Timbuktu and Gao (15.7 percent and 15.2 percent, respectively). An estimated 630,000 children are likely to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2018, with 165,000 children expected to face severe acute malnutrition.

The situation of acute food insecurity has slightly worsened since between March and May when 255,000 people were in Crisis (CH Phase 3).

About 2.5 million people are estimated to be facing Stressed levels (CH Phase 2), underscoring the need for livelihood support and resilience building interventions.
Context
The 2012 civil strife has had a long-term effect on the economic and social structures of the country. Despite three consecutive years of record harvests and overall good prospects for the 2017 output, the conflict has had adverse long-term effects on the already vulnerable population, with nearly half of the people living below the poverty line. Labour shortages resulting from large-scale displacements, the lack of agricultural support services in northern Mali and market disruptions have had a negative impact on agricultural output and food production, leading to increasing food insecurity in the country over the last few years.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Persistent insecurity and population displacements
Despite some improvement in the security situation and the signing of a ceasefire agreement between two main ethnic groups, terrorist attacks and banditry (Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, northern Mopti) disrupt trade and displace populations, hampering Mali’s overall economic recovery. The northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal and northern Mopti have seen occasional disruptions in traditional trade routes due to insecurity. In Gao and Timbuktu regions, this has limited poor people’s market access by raising prices and pushing many (76 percent of households)\(^1\) to resort to crisis and emergency coping strategies. Insecurity has also triggered population movements in Kidal and Gao after clashes erupted between ethnic groups in July and August. As of October 2017, Mali was still hosting 58 600 IDPs and around 18 000 refugees and asylum-seekers from various origins. In addition, 142 000 Malian refugees were still living outside their country of origin.

A worrisome crop season with major pockets of deficits
The rainy season 2017 was particularly erratic with important temporal and spatial breaks, especially during July and September at critical moments of the development of the plants. In many areas farmers had to sow several times and the start of the crop season was delayed. Moreover, the season ended prematurely in September leading to pockets of crop production deficits. Latest rainfall final assessment shows a very worrisome situation in many cercles and final crop production estimates are expected to be lower than initially announced, especially in Kayes, Koulikoro and Mopti. Rivers’ floodwaters are unusually low which will affect the off-season (especially rice) production as well as gardening activities. This largely lower-than-average surface water level is an indicator of an early lean season for pastoralists.

Above-average coarse grain prices
Disruption of trade routes due to insecurity and decreased millet/sorghum cultivation has resulted in higher millet and sorghum prices compared with 2016. In October 2017, millet prices were 31 percent above their 2016 level nationally and went up to 60 percent in Kayes where crop production was very affected by dryness. Sorghum prices were 25 percent higher than the previous year in Mopti. Moreover, millet prices were still significantly above their five-year average in markets in several regional capitals, such as Mopti (30 percent), Kayes (25 percent), Timbuktu (18 percent) and Gao (14 percent); however, average to above-average prices for livestock contributed to improved terms of trade in favour of pastoralists. For instance, the price of female goats was above its five-year average in Timbuktu, Gao and Mopti – 13 percent, five percent and eight percent, respectively. The implementation of the National Response Plan and the related distribution of food aid by the Commissary for Food Security and its partners from May to October have eased food access for around 820 000 beneficiaries, mainly in Timbuktu, Gao, Ménaka, Taoudenti, Kidal and northern Mopti.

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\(^1\) FEWSNET Mali Food Security Outlook October 2017 (Based on the National Food Security and Nutrition Survey – ENSAN, September 2017)
Somalia’s already dire food security crisis has been further undermined by the poor Gu (April-June) cereal harvest, coupled with high prices for local cereals, substantial livestock losses and depressed incomes. Civil insecurity continues to disrupt trade and agriculture, triggering further displacement and limiting humanitarian access in several areas.

- Although humanitarian assistance is preventing food security from deteriorating in many areas – particularly in several northeastern areas – three times the number of people were estimated to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between August and December, compared with the same period the previous year; this accounts for one in four Somalis.

- During the acute food insecurity analysis carried out in August 2017, a risk of Famine was identified in the worst-case scenario, in which humanitarian assistance would have been scaled down substantially, food prices would have increased sharply and the Deyr rains would have performed poorly. Areas of greatest concern included the northeast and some IDP populations.

- Insurgency has hampered trading activities (Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiran regions), livestock movements (central regions) and the planting of crops (Shabelle regions).

- Some 2.1 million people are displaced across the country and particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.1

Acute food insecurity situation

July 2017

August – December 2017

The number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity levels has almost trebled from 1.1 million since the period from August to December 2016. The number of people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) has doubled from 400 000 between February and June 2017 to 800 000 between August and December 2017.

Urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance is needed for:

- 802 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 2.3 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)
Context

Poor rains, disease outbreaks, widespread livestock losses and hundreds of thousands of people being forced to move away from their homes because of drought and conflict have wrecked livelihoods and created widespread food insecurity. Since the Famine risk was highlighted in early 2017, large-scale humanitarian interventions have taken place in response to the drought. According to the Somalia Food Security Cluster, emergency food assistance has reached roughly 2.5 million people a month since April. While this has greatly mitigated food consumption gaps, many areas remain on the brink of Famine because of significant asset losses and lack of resources among responders and access problems.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Season after season of poor rains

Below-average to poor Gu (April-June) rains coupled with bird and pest attacks, the high cost of inputs and civil insecurity resulted in a reduced cereal harvest in the southern ‘breadbasket’ areas (13 percent below average) and a virtual failure in northwestern areas (87 percent below average). The reduced crop output meant cereal stocks were depleted earlier than normal, triggering an early start to the lean season.

So far, the Deyr October-December rains have performed poorly and erratically: in southern key-cropping areas, the Deyr crops, due to be harvested in January 2018, have been severely damaged by October’s dryness. In the main maize-producing areas of Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, October was almost completely dry. In the ‘sorghum belt’ of Bay region, October rains were about 50 percent below average. A full recovery of Deyr crops, especially for maize, is very unlikely. This may lead to a fourth consecutive season of reduced cereal production.

October rainfall was also very poor in most pastoral areas, where grazing and water resources have already been severely affected by consecutive poor rainy seasons. Central Galgaduud and Mudug regions, and southern Lower and Middle Juba regions have suffered the most from prolonged drought. In these areas, livestock body conditions are reported to be poor, with low milk productivity and birth rates. Herd sizes have sharply declined because of death and distress sales.

Most parts of Somalia are expected to receive average to below-average rainfall and above-normal mean temperatures during Deyr. The combined impact is expected to lead to a faster depletion of pasture and water sources and cause moisture stress on crops.

High food prices

With a higher volume of produce available in markets following the 2017 Gu harvest, sorghum and maize prices declined by 10 to 35 percent between August and October. However, they were still up to 55 percent higher than the same period in the previous year because the reduced Gu output and failed Deyr harvest restricted the supply. The high prices of locally produced cereal (red sorghum) that makes up the bulk of the consumer basket have dramatically increased the food expenditure share of poor households in most regions. Prices of imported commodities in areas affected by the depreciation of the local currency are also high.

October livestock prices were significantly lower than a year earlier in most markets as a result of drought-induced animal emaciation and distress sales. By contrast, milk prices were higher because of the reduced supplies. In Galkayo, one of the main livestock markets in the Horn of Africa in the Mudug region, prices of goats and camels in October were 29 percent and 47 percent lower than a year earlier, respectively, while prices of camel milk were 27 percent higher.

Undernutrition situation

Somalia’s alarming nutrition situation continued to deteriorate, especially in northern and central parts, with food insecurity, morbidity and lack of milk among the contributing factors. Results from 31 separate nutrition surveys conducted by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) and partners between June and July 2017 indicate that an estimated 388,000 children under the age of five suffered from acute malnutrition – including 87,000 in need of urgent medical care and at high risk of disease and death.

At national level, acute malnutrition among children under five remained Critical, increasing from 14.9 percent during the 2016 Gu to 17.4 percent during the 2017 Gu. In 20 out of the 31 population groups assessed, the prevalence of acute malnutrition exceeded the trigger for emergency action (Global Acute Malnutrition ≥ 15 percent). Critical or higher levels of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM>4 percent) were recorded in 11 out of 31 groups. Mortality rates have also increased. Crude Death Rates (CDR) and/or Under-Five
Death Rate (U5DR) have surpassed emergency thresholds in seven of the population groups surveyed (i.e. CDR > 1/10 000/day and U5DR > 2/10 000/day).

The Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD)/cholera outbreak that peaked in April and contributed to increased malnutrition and mortality in parts of southern Somalia has started to subside, with fewer AWD cases and deaths reported since August 2017. However, according to the World Health Organization and the Federal Ministry of Health, there were over 14,800 suspected cases of measles between January and July, making it the worst outbreak in four years.

1 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018
The number of acutely food insecure reached an unprecedented 6 million at the beginning of the harvest period in September – more than 30 percent higher than the previous September and over 4 million more than pre-conflict levels. It decreased to 4.8 million following the harvest.

Urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance is needed:

- 3.54 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)
- 1.25 million people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 25,000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)

Despite slight improvements mainly driven by the scale-up in humanitarian assistance, the situation remains critical in many counties. Households endure continuously constrained food access because of widespread insecurity, large-scale displacements, high food prices, market disruptions, macroeconomic collapse and the exhaustion of strategies to cope with such adversity after four years of conflict.

- The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance – Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – has dropped from 6 million in September (56 percent of the population) to 4.8 million (45 percent) between October and December 2017, following the harvest.

- Food insecurity is expected to be more severe during 2018 than in 2017, as conflict persists; more than 5 million people will likely require emergency food assistance during the January to March 2018 period (an increase of four percent compared with the same period in 2017).

- Overall, the number of people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) conditions declined from over 100,000 in February to about 45,000 in June and then to 25,000 in October thanks to sustained multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance operations.

- There is a high risk that any seasonal improvements will be short-lived and the next lean season will be even worse than the previous one, when Famine levels were declared in three counties in Unity and Jonglei States; however, it is not expected that any area will be at Famine level during the January to March period.

- In a worst-case scenario in which current levels of food assistance cannot be scaled up or maintained, and conflict, climatic shocks and macro-economic instability continue, Catastrophe/Famine (IPC Phase 5) conditions are likely to happen in multiple locations across the country.
Acute food insecurity situation

September 2017

October – December 2017

Context
Despite efforts to revitalize the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), and the arrival of the first batch of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) in the capital, clashes between Government forces and armed opposition groups persist as the war heads into its fifth year. By March 2017, the conflict had spread to all states, leading to large-scale displacements. Since the start of the conflict in mid-December 2013, about 3.9 million people have been forced to flee their homes because of insecurity: of these about 1.9 million are IDPs and 2 million have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. In Uganda alone, about 2000 South Sudanese arrive each day. Over 1 million are now in Uganda, over 319 000 in Ethiopia, and nearly 400 000 are in the Sudan. The crisis is aggravated by deteriorating macroeconomic factors, such as hyperinflation, fuel shortages and stagnant oil revenues.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Conflict and pest outbreaks sharply reduce 2017 harvest
Persistent insecurity and armed conflict have disrupted livelihood activities, hampered access to fields and damaged households’ productive assets and access to inputs. The area cultivated is well below pre-crisis levels because of displacement and low access to seeds and tools, as households sell assets to cope with food insecurity and face high seed prices. Disruptions in agricultural activities and markets are keenly felt in Greater Equatoria and some of the country’s most productive greenbelt counties. About 75 percent of the people in the former Central Equatoria State have reportedly left their homes, which has severely inhibited the harvest and caused many people to miss the second round of planting in 2017.

Although weather conditions have been generally favourable (with seasonal rains average to above-average), the 2017/18 harvest is expected to be lower than last year and below the five-year average, especially in some counties in Greater Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile. Fall Armyworm has been reported in all regions, causing significant crop damage (especially in parts of former Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria and Central Equatoria States), as widespread insecurity and economic collapse have prevented appropriate treatment of infested crops.

Seasonal improvements in food availability and access are likely to be short-lived as people quickly exhaust food stocks from the anticipated below-average harvest,
prompting an early start to the next lean season. This will pose a serious risk to the very survival of the most vulnerable from January 2018 on.

**Seasonal declines in food prices ease purchasing power – but food prices remain very high**

Macroeconomic conditions, which have been very poor since the outbreak of conflict in 2013, have further deteriorated with the spread of conflict to Greater Equatoria in mid-2016. A tight supply situation, fuel scarcity, hyperinflation and a significant depreciation of the South Sudanese pound continue to fuel the economic crisis and keep food prices very high. According to WFP’s monthly market price monitoring, the prices of all cereals, including white sorghum, maize grain, maize flour, wheat flour and rice, more than doubled between July 2016 and July 2017 across most markets. At the same time daily wage labour rates have remained stagnant.

Conflict-related disruptions to trade and high transport costs are also severely restricting food availability and inflating prices. Trade flows are limited or non-existent from Rumbek to Wau, Kaya-Yei, Nimule-Torit and Juba-Bor. Trade to central and northern Jonglei remains very low. Of major concern are counties in central Unity and Raja of Western Bahr el Ghazal, where markets have minimal to no supplies.

However, between June and September, maize prices declined by about 10 percent and sorghum prices by 15 percent in Juba, as newly-harvested crops increased supplies. The Government’s establishment of a trading company, selling basic food commodities at subsidized prices, contributed to price declines, while increased availability of local cereals in some markets stabilized the price of some imported food commodities; however, prices remained more than twice their year-earlier levels and more than ten times those of two years before.

**Undernutrition situation**

Malnutrition remains a major public health emergency in South Sudan. Severe food insecurity, widespread conflict, displacement, poor access to health services, high morbidity rates, extremely poor diets and poor sanitation and hygiene are some of the main factors contributing to an even worse acute malnutrition situation compared with September 2016. Disease incidence is very high, with nearly 5 000 cases of cholera reported in 23 counties since January. Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates are at or above 15 percent (Critical) in many counties (in former Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, parts of Jonglei, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria States) and above 30 percent (Extreme Critical) in former counties of Renk and Twic and the Greater Baggari area in former Wau. Northern Jonglei is of particular concern. Results from GAM Mid-Upper Arm Circumference nutrition screenings conducted in April in Ayod indicate some 48.1 percent of the 5 153 children screened were acutely malnourished in Karmoun payam.1 Between September and December 2017, levels of acute malnutrition were expected to improve marginally thanks to seasonal availability of local produce, including fish and milk, and improved access to markets and services.

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1 UN Refugee Agency data
2 FEWSNET South Sudan Food Security Outlook, June 2017 – January 2018
Acute food insecurity situation

October – December 2017

High food prices, civil insecurity, the continual influx of refugees from South Sudan, as well as depleted food stocks and constrained access to livelihoods are the main underlying causes of food insecurity in the Sudan.

- Between October and December, over 30 percent of food insecure people were concentrated in the Darfur States where there are large numbers of displaced people. Blue Nile, North Kordofan, Kassala and Gadarif also had high levels of food insecurity – between 13 and 19 percent of their population is in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

- As conflict and food insecurity continues in South Sudan, increasing numbers of new refugees are crossing into South Darfur and West Kordofan. An estimated 185,000 refugees arrived in the Sudan in 2017, bringing the total number of South Sudanese arrivals to around 460,000 since 2013 (UNHCR).1

- As of late September, 2.3 million vulnerable IDPs were in need of humanitarian assistance, essentially located in Darfur States. The UNHCR also reports that over 322,000 Sudanese refugees are still in Chad.

This represents a deterioration in food security. The number of acutely food insecure people was up by 257,000 compared with the period from October to December 2016, though the number classified in Emergency fell by about 150,000.

Urgent humanitarian assistance is needed:
- 152,000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)
- 3.7 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)

1 Source: The Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, October 2017
Context
The humanitarian situation in the Sudan remains serious and complex, with acute humanitarian needs across the Darfur region, Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, eastern Sudan and other areas. Conflict and inter-communal tensions, compounded by poverty, under-development and environmental factors, are the driving forces behind displacement and food insecurity. The country has recently experienced unpredictable rainfall patterns and desertification, which have had a negative impact on the harvest and food supply. On top of that, the Sudan is currently hosting refugees from the Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, who are in need of humanitarian assistance and have very limited access to livelihood opportunities.

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Insecurity and displacement impede access to income sources and food
Despite unilateral ceasefires by the Government of the Sudan and most armed groups in Darfur, conflict between pastoralists and settled farmers and inter-tribal conflicts persist in some areas, leading to market disruptions, loss of assets and reduced access to livelihood options. In conflict-affected areas of South Kordofan and Darfur States, in particular, poor households and IDPs endure extremely limited income sources coupled with the early depletion of cereal stocks because of local production shortfalls during the 2016 season.

According to the UN Officer for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in late September, 2.3 million vulnerable IDPs were in need of humanitarian assistance, of which 2.1 million were in Darfur and 240 000 in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States. A lack of basic services and infrastructure, compounded by insecurity in some areas, continues to prevent the return of displaced people to their places of origin.

Refugees from South Sudan are also experiencing high levels of food insecurity. The influx of refugees increased in 2017, with around 455 000 people in White Nile, East and South Darfur and South Kordofan States as of mid-October. This distress migration is likely to increase competition for available domestic food and lead to food price increases.

Escalating food prices
Between July and September, prices of locally-produced sorghum increased in most monitored markets by up to 30 percent and millet by up to 45 percent, as seasonal patterns were aggravated by market disruptions following floods. By October, prices in most markets were 10 to 40 percent higher than in October last year, despite adequate domestic availability from the 2016 output and overall favourable prospects for the new harvest. This was mainly because of high production and transportation costs and poor crop performance in some areas. Near record-high wheat prices (up by over 30 percent between May and October, and 38 percent compared with the previous year) resulted from the depreciation of the local currency, foreign currency shortages, high production costs and sustained demand. Livestock prices also increased by more than 30 percent – mainly due to the lean season, fluctuation of rainfall, poor pasture conditions, conflict, high inflation rates and devaluation – which subsequently led to increases in prices of animal products.

Floods, dry spells and agricultural pests
The Sudan has recently experienced unpredictable rainfall patterns and desertification damaging the harvest and food supply. Since early June, heavy rains and flooding have affected about 100 000 people and destroyed over 19 000 houses, particularly in White Nile, South Darfur, North Kordofan, Al Gezira, Sennar, West Darfur and Kassala. On the upside, this has eased moisture deficits and lifted crop production prospects in areas affected by early season dryness. According to remote sensing analysis and the findings of a mid-season assessment led by the Government and supported by FAO and WFP, vegetation conditions were mainly good in October, and cereal production is expected to be above average. Nevertheless, some production areas, including in North, South, West and Central Darfur, Kassala, Gedaref and North Kordofan, reported dry spells, while others reported agricultural pests (Gedaref, Blue Nile, Sennar) and animal intrusion (West Darfur).

Undernutrition situation
According to the Ministry of Health, of the 2.2 million children suffering from wasting (Global Acute Malnutrition [GAM]) annually in the Sudan, some 573 000 suffer from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM). In 2017, 11 out of the 18 states have a malnutrition prevalence of...
above 15 percent, which is above the World Health Organization threshold for emergency. Three of these states – Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref – are not affected by conflict.\(^2\)

Some of the underlying causes of malnutrition include poor food diversity, harmful social norms and beliefs, weak awareness of breastfeeding practices, poor food preparation habits and high illiteracy rates, especially among women. There is a shortage of safe drinking water and a lack of improved latrines. Diseases such as watery diarrhoea, malaria and hepatitis also undermine nutrition.

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2. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017
The protracted conflict has severely hit agricultural production, disrupted the delivery of humanitarian assistance and led to massive population displacement. High transportation costs linked to fuel shortages, road insecurity and check points have reduced market supply and increased food prices.

- According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018, the most affected governorates, in terms of numbers of people acutely in need of food assistance, are Rural Damascus (1.4 million) and Aleppo (0.9 million); however, the governorates of Ar-Raqqa and Deir-Ez-Zor are facing the highest prevalence rates of food insecurity – 49 percent and 48 percent, respectively. Critical conditions are reported in camps across Ar-Raqqa governorate, with shortages of food, water and medicine.

- Out of 267 sub-districts, 28 are considered to be facing critical levels of food insecurity and another 107 facing severe food insecurity. People living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas, IDPs and overburdened host communities are particularly affected. WFP’s mVAM bulletin for October 2017 warned that food security indicators have deteriorated over the past six months in hard-to-reach areas of Homs and Hama.

- Food prices have skyrocketed in eastern Ghouta, an enclave under siege in rural Damascus, with reports of a sharp decline in the nutrition and food security situation of the estimated 400,000 people living there.²

- As of November 2017, over 1.2 million IDPs had been recorded over the last 12 months. In addition, 5.3 million Syrians were registered as refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.³

While the proportion of the population facing acute food insecurity has slightly decreased from 37 percent in 2016 to 33 percent, the number of people at risk of becoming food insecure has doubled to 4 million.

Urgent humanitarian assistance is needed:

- 6.5 million people – one in three Syrians in the country – are food insecure
- 4 million people are at high risk of becoming food insecure
- among those facing acute food insecurity, about 420,000 are Palestinian refugees and 490,000 are people living in besieged areas

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1. The Syrian Arab Republic
2. As of November 2017, over 1.2 million IDPs had been recorded over the last 12 months. In addition, 5.3 million Syrians were registered as refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.
Factors driving acute food insecurity

Insecurity and displacement
Displaced people generally lack food, sanitation, access to health care, protection and shelter. They struggle to earn enough money to cover the basic costs of survival as their livelihoods are severely disrupted, and they often compete with local populations for wage labour.

More than 60 percent of Syria’s population are displaced or refugees. As of September 2017, about 6.1 million people were internally displaced in the Syrian Arab Republic and 5.3 million were refugees in neighbouring countries. As of November 2017, almost 3 million people were living in hard-to-reach areas, of which more than 400,000 live in UN-declared besieged areas. Most IDPs have been displaced multiple times, and most are concentrated in Quneitra, Idlib, Rural Damascus, Lattakia, Dar’a, Damascus and Aleppo. IDPs are even more likely than residents to resort to negative food-related coping mechanisms, including borrowing food, buying food on credit, restricting adult consumption and reducing the number of meals and portion sizes.

Agricultural production hampered by the crisis
Now in its seventh year, the crisis has severely limited agricultural output. Wheat production in 2017 was estimated at 1.8 million tonnes, less than half of the pre-conflict (2002-2011) average of 4.1 million tonnes. It nevertheless represents an increase of about 12 percent compared with 2016 production levels, mainly due to better rains and local improvements in civil security, which allowed for a larger share of the planted area to be harvested. The winter planting season of wheat and barley started in October with favourable climatic conditions; however, high production costs, lack of inputs, high field contamination (i.e. explosive hazards) and damaged or destroyed infrastructure, particularly irrigation systems,
continue to constrain agricultural production. Herd sizes of poultry, goats, sheep and cattle have drastically shrunk, and production continues to be constrained by high fodder prices, low coverage of veterinary services and limited access to grazing areas.

Prior to 2011, agriculture provided employment for 47 percent of the population. Displacement, low productivity and lack of access to cultivable areas have drastically cut incomes in the sector.

**Dysfunctional markets, high food prices and low purchasing power**

Overall, trade remains hampered by insecurity. Localized mines and improvised explosive device contamination affect supply routes, which, along with reduced food availability, creates high and highly variable food prices. In addition, the removal of subsidies on certain goods, high inflation rates, lack of employment opportunities and income sources have substantially reduced households’ purchasing power. However, some trade routes have recently reopened such as those linking Damascus to other urban markets in the governorates of Aleppo, Al Hasakeh, and Deir-Ez-Zor. As a result, in October 2017 prices of a standard WFP food basket in some markets of Aleppo, Al Hasakeh and Rural Damascus were 12 to 35 percent lower than their yearly levels. Cereal import requirements are expected to continue to increase for the 2017/18 marketing year (17 percent compared with the previous year) due to below-average domestic production.

Since the Al-Wafideen crossing closed in September, all food supply routes to eastern Ghouta have been completely shut down and food prices have soared, with particularly serious consequences for the poorest and most vulnerable people. A WFP market assessment conducted in Kafr Batna (in eastern Ghouta) at the end of October found severe shortages of staple foods, such as rice, pulses, sugar and cooking oil, and it expected food stocks to soon be totally depleted. The cost of the standard food basket in October was 204 percent higher than in September and almost ten times more expensive than the national average.

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2. WFP Duma Food security Report: November 2017
3. The Syrian Arab Republic: Flash update on recent events - 8 November 2017. UNCHR
4. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018
5. The unemployment rate is estimated at about 50 percent in 2017, up from about 10 percent at the beginning of the conflict (GiEWs Country brief 17 October 2017).
6. The cost of a standard basket of dry goods providing 1 930 kcal a day for a family of five during a month. The basket includes 37 kg of bread, 19 kg rice, 19 kg lentils, 5 kg of sugar, and 7 kg of vegetable oil
7. It has recently re-opened for only one trader who is now importing limited number and type of goods with an add on tax of SYP 2 000/kg
Unemployment, depleted income and high inflation in conflict-affected eastern Ukraine are severely limiting food access for more than a million people in this formerly industrial area. The elderly living alone and families headed by women are particularly vulnerable, especially in the face of a predictably harsh winter, when households usually experience greater food shortages.

- Food insecurity has doubled since 2016. Some 1.2 million people were found to be either moderately or severely food insecure.
- For the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the highest level of food insecurity was in Donetsk NGCA where 28 percent (up from 12 percent in the summer of 2016) of the population was moderately or severely food insecure in June 2017. In Luhansk NGCA, traditionally the most food insecure part of the

NGCAs, 23 percent was moderately or severely food insecure (up from 14 percent). In NGCAs, the level of severe food insecurity almost trebled from 1.7 percent to 5 percent, reaching 6.4 percent in Donetsk NGCA.
- People’s savings and their ability to cope have declined. Some 87 percent of households in NGCAs used negative coping strategies (up from 40 percent) and many households have had to reduce their expenditure on food and medicines to pay utilities during the last 12 months.
- Besides women-headed households and the elderly, other vulnerable groups included households/individuals without any regular income, households/individuals eligible for social benefits but unable to receive them because of various reasons, chronically-ill and disabled people and host communities.

### Acute food insecurity situation

*Severity map, 2017*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhansk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGCAs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Humanitarian Needs Overview – Food Security and Livelihood Cluster (FSLC) indicator for the severity map in Donbas: Food Security Index. For the rest of Ukraine, outside of Luhanska and Donetsk Oblasts, the indication of severity refers only to IDPs, based on the Fragile States Index for IDPs in Luhanska and Donetsk GCA.
Civilians increasingly unable to fend for themselves in protracted conflict
In disputed areas and NGCAs of Donetsk and Luhansk, approximately 1 million people have been displaced. In GCAs, ongoing displacement of people from areas near the front lines is putting increasing stress on both displaced and non-displaced populations and exhausting local coping mechanisms. Addressing the needs of a mostly urban population resettling in host communities that were already experiencing social and economic difficulties is challenging.

People in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts fear shelling and aerial attacks as well as unexploded ordnance, landmines or abandoned ordnance. Lack of trust, a deepening political divide and the disruption of social networks due to displacement threaten social cohesion. The volatile situation in these Oblasts and the challenges of crossing the border (contact line) affect the delivery of assistance.

High unemployment and falling income
Some of the mines and factories – the main livelihood sources in the past – have closed because of war, safety concerns, workers fleeing, damage from shells and mortars and damage to transport infrastructure. During the first quarter of 2017, unemployment increased to 18.3 percent in Luhansk GCA and to 15.6 percent in Donetsk GCA, while it remained significant at 23 percent for IDPs. Since the beginning of 2017, nearly 12 percent of interviewed households in NGCAs and five percent in GCAs have experienced a loss of employment. The Food Security Assessment indicated a direct link between food insecurity and unemployment. In Donetsk NGCA, the food insecurity levels of households where no one was working were 45 percent (compared with 22 percent in households with one or more employed).

Lack of income coupled with rising costs of rents, utilities, food and other essentials are forcing affected people to adopt negative coping strategies, such as spending savings, purchasing food on credit, going into debt, cutting health care expenditures, migrating elsewhere in search of work or resorting to illegal work or high-risk jobs. The proportion of the population in the NGCA applying negative coping strategies rose from 40 percent in 2016, to 87 percent in 2017. In the GCA the level remained similar, 55 percent in 2016 and 53 percent in 2017.

In a context of increased prices, social payments such as pensions have remained stable with the income of most pensioners falling below the actual minimum subsistence level. This situation is worse in the NGCA. Moreover, the average monthly income of IDP households across Ukraine has fallen below the actual minimum subsistence level, increasing the risks faced by these households.

Seasonality and increased needs in winter
There is a clear trend of significantly higher unmet food needs during the winter, with 23 percent of households in both the GCA and the NGCA reporting that they did not have enough food to meet their basic food needs in February. With any household revenue prioritized to cover food and rent, many will not be able to afford heating in the harsh winter when temperatures can drop to -25 Celsius. This is likely to threaten the lives of many, especially the elderly, children and chronically ill. Food insecurity is lower during the summer months when food commodities are likely more available in markets and prices are lower.

Agricultural challenges
Agriculture is an important income source in all areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (both in GCAs and NGCAs). Following generally favourable weather during the growing season, aggregate cereal production in the GCA of Donetsk Oblast is officially estimated up 13 percent from the previous year’s level on account of higher yields. Aggregate cereal production in the NGCA of Luhansk was reported at 300,000 tonnes in 2017. Prices of wheat flour in non-GCA markets are regulated by the local authorities and kept at levels well below average prices in Ukraine. Although overall cereal production

Factors driving acute food insecurity

Context
In May 2017, Ukraine entered its fourth year of conflict which caused a protracted and complex humanitarian crisis, largely forgotten by the international community whilst the response is seriously underfunded. Conditions are especially difficult for those living along the ‘contact line’ and in NGCAs.
did not significantly decrease, supply chains show signs of disruption, particularly for fresh products.

Local agriculture is becoming an increasingly critical source of food for vulnerable households residing in rural areas along the ‘contact line’ and in the NGCA; however, only 38 percent of IDP households and 46 percent of non-displaced households have access to arable land. Mines are a hazard for farmers and in forests where people traditionally forage for mushrooms and chop wood for fuel. In addition to the extreme danger of shelling and many plots of land being destroyed, agriculture has ground to a halt elsewhere too because of damage to irrigation systems, loss of labour, the high cost of inputs and the expense of transporting goods to market.

1 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018
2 Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, Joint Food Security Assessment, 2017
3 Ibid
4 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018
5 Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, Joint Food Security Assessment – Summary Report, 2017
6 Ibid
7 In May 2017, the average pension was UAH 1 828 while the actual minimum subsistence level was UAH 2 930. See the SSSU website: www.ukrstat.gov.ua
8 Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, Joint Food Security Assessment – Summary Report, 2017
Yemen is the world’s largest food security crisis and most severe human-made humanitarian crisis today. After two and a half years of escalated conflict, the country faces an extremely fragile humanitarian situation. Impoverished people have exhausted their coping capacities.

- While the food security situation remains challenging across the country, the districts most at risk of famine are Taiz, Hodeidah, Lahj, Abyan and Sa’ada governorates.
- There are 1.7 million people living in districts with very restricted access; 700,000\(^2\) of these people are in acute need of humanitarian assistance. The districts with the greatest access constraints primarily fall within the conflict-affected governorates of Marib, Al Jawf, Sa’ada, Hajjah, Taiz and Al Bayda.
- The most vulnerable groups are families with no breadwinner, where women or children are already suffering from malnutrition, or IDPs with no income.
- As of September 2017, more than 2 million people across 21 governorates had been displaced by conflict since March 2015. For the same period, there were 956,076 returnees across 20 governorates.\(^3\)

**Acute food insecurity situation**

March – July 2017

Source: Yemen IPC Technical Working Group, March 2017
**Context**

Widespread conflict, including both airstrikes and armed clashes, continue throughout Yemen, particularly in more populated western areas. The deteriorating macroeconomic situation and the persistence of a conflict about to enter into its third year have led to the near complete collapse of public services, including health and sanitation systems, a major displacement crisis and part of the Yemeni population on the brink of famine. Any food stocks provided by the expected below-average 2017 harvest are unlikely to have much impact on household food security because cereal production in Yemen is limited by natural conditions. Household food access will likely be further constrained by high and increasing food prices, especially in conflict zones such as Ta’izz governorate. While the humanitarian community provides emergency aid, humanitarian access remains a major concern, as parties involved in the conflict are continuously impeding access to and within Yemen.

**Factors driving acute food insecurity**

**Intensified conflict cuts off supply routes**

Fighting continues to severely restrict livelihoods, disrupt trade, displace households (some 3.1 million people are internally displaced, including returnees), and limit humanitarian access. Areas where conflict has been most severe include Ta’izz, Sa’dah, Hajjah, Marib, Sana’a, Al Jawf, and Al Bayda governorates. The Protection Cluster and ECHO report that the number of airstrikes during the first half of 2017 exceeded the total number of airstrikes in 2016, with the monthly average being almost three times higher in 2017. Reported armed clashes in 2017 were also 56 percent higher per month compared with 2016.

Conflict and insecurity have made road access more difficult, with FEWSNET rapid assessments in April and May 2017 indicating significant disruptions on most major roads. The Yemen Logistics Cluster reported in mid-June 2017 that major roads were closed in the southwest (Lahj and Ta’izz governorates), the northwest (Al Jawf, Amran, Hajjah and Sa’dah governorates) and central areas (Al Hudaydah, Al Mahwit, Al Marib, Sanaa and Shabwah governorates). Road access has also worsened in Al Jawf, Al Marib, Hajjah, and Sa’dah governorates.

**Closure of ports blocks vital supplies**

Even before the conflict escalated in 2015, Yemen imported up to 90 percent of its cereal supplies, mostly via the commercial marine ports of Al Hudaydah and Saleef. Full humanitarian and commercial access to these ports is vital to prevent a dire situation from worsening further. The financial crisis within the Central Bank of Yemen, difficulties accessing currency and credit, along with increased fees for management, fuel and security at ports, have made it increasingly difficult for the private sector to import food. The import requirement for cereals to guarantee a sufficient calorie intake in the 2017 marketing year (January-December) is estimated at about 4.3 million tonnes, including 3.2 million tonnes of wheat, 700 000 tonnes of maize and 400 000 tonnes of rice. Between January and September 2017, about 2.78 million tonnes of wheat and wheat flour were imported.4

The closure of critical seaports and airports enforced throughout most of November 2017 by the Saudi-led coalition disrupted the humanitarian and commercial supply pipelines and stopped critical supplies, including medicines, from reaching the Yemeni people. As of 15 November, the blockade had prevented almost half a million tonnes of food and fuel on 29 vessels from reaching Yemen.

**Prices skyrocket while households’ purchasing power plummets further**

Seventy percent of the population are living at or below the poverty line6 because most public salaries have been frozen and the economy has contracted by 46 percent.6 Businesses have on average reduced operating hours by 50 percent compared with the pre-crisis period, leading to an estimated 55 percent of the workforce being laid off. Daily labour rates have remained unchanged for the last two years. Nearly 80 percent of families are now worse off than in the pre-crisis period.

Yemenis rely on purchasing imported food as the country only produces a fraction of its aggregate food requirements. Yet food has become unaffordable for most as its cost keeps rising. Scarcity is driving up fuel prices, which in turn drives up transport costs and inflates the cost of food and trucked water (by 133 percent in Sana’a), threatening to reverse the gains made in combating cholera.

While stock levels of wheat and rice in Yemen are expected to last two to three months2 the impact of the import blockade on the most vulnerable households has already been felt across the entire country, with an average cost increase in the food basket ranging from 8 to 28 percent. FAO reports that more than 70 percent of families have no
food stocks and are purchasing food as needed on a daily basis. Price increases will therefore have an immediate negative effect on their food security and nutrition status.

**Unprecedented cholera epidemic worsens already dire malnutrition situation**

The ongoing conflict has damaged water, sanitation and health infrastructure, contributing to the fastest spreading cholera outbreak ever recorded. From 17 April to 15 November 2017, there were 926,084 suspected cases and 2,202 associated deaths.

Children suffering from acute malnutrition are especially susceptible to cholera; poor nutrition inhibits the body’s response to infection, and infections can worsen nutritional status, resulting in more lives lost from both conditions. Malnourished children are more susceptible to developing diarrheal diseases that last longer and are more severe. It is a vicious cycle. An estimated 2.2 million Yemeni children aged six months to five years are acutely malnourished.

By October the cholera epidemic was starting to abate. *Médecins Sans Frontières* reported that weekly admissions at cholera treatment centres had declined from 11,139 in the third week of June – at the peak of the outbreak – to 567 in the second week of October, with only nine percent of patients admitted towards the end of October needing to be hospitalized. However, if much needed medical supplies are blocked from being delivered there could be another spike in the epidemic, which would put even greater pressure on humanitarian organizations working to prevent Yemen from slipping into famine.

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1 This figure refers to the last available IPC analysis. The situation is expected to have worsened, but no current analysis is available.
2 [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/yemen_humanitarian_bulletin_issue27_20092017.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/yemen_humanitarian_bulletin_issue27_20092017.pdf)
3 Findings from the Task Force for Population Movement (TFPM), co-led by IOM and UNHCR.
6 Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.
8 Ibid.