

RESILIENCE PROGRAMME EVALUATION SERIES

**Evaluation of FAO Somalia Resilience
Sub-programme (2013-2014)**

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Acronyms and abbreviations

CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CCAP	Community Consultation and Action Planning
CCPP	Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia
CPF	Country Programming Framework
DFID	Department for International Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFS	Farmer Field School
FPMIS	Field Programme Management Information System
FRP	Full Resilience Package
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IHRA	Integrated Humanitarian/Resilience Approach
JRS	Joint Resilience Strategy
LoA	Letter of Agreement
Lol	Letter of Intent
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
OED	Office of Evaluation
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PFS	Pastoralist Field School
PNTD	Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development
PPR	Peste des Petits Ruminants
PSG	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
RGA	Rapid Gender Assessment
RIMA	Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis
SEED	Sustainable Employment and Economic Development Programme
SOWELPA	South-West Livestock Professional Association
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

Introduction

1. The Office of Evaluation (OED) of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) conducted an evaluation of the first two years of the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme (2013-2014) in order to analyse the programme's relevance and assess the progress made towards building resilience in Somalia. This evaluation also focuses on the application of the programme approach in FAO, and the added value of working under a joint strategy with other UN agencies in the context of Somalia. The evaluation will provide accountability to donors and Government, while serving as a learning exercise for the organization and offering guidance to the resilience programme.
2. The overall objective of the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme is to ensure that "at risk households anticipate, resist, absorb and recover quickly from pressures and shocks". The Sub-programme (and more generally the FAO Somalia Country Programme) is characterized by a shift from the traditional multi-project donor driven response to a more coherent programme approach structured along thematic pillars. In addition, part of it is implemented under a joint FAO-World Food Programme (WFP)-United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) resilience strategy, which provides FAO with a unique opportunity to work in partnership with sister UN agencies towards the common goal of building resilience.

Methodology

3. The evaluation team consisted of a team leader, a qualitative data analyst, a quantitative data analyst and two external experts who provided advice and quality assurance during the various stages of the evaluation. The field work in Somalia was conducted by a team from the Heritage Institute of Policy Studies (HIPS), and with the logistical support of FAO Somalia field staff.
4. The evaluation took place between January and September 2015, with an inception mission in Nairobi in March 2015, and the main evaluation mission in April-May 2015. The evaluation questions were defined through a participatory process: they were drafted by the OED evaluation manager based on a preliminary desk review and discussions with the country office, then shared for comments with the country office, donors, and HQ staff involved in the resilience programme, and finalized during the inception mission through a series of key informant interviews with FAO staff and partners. The existing sources of information were also analysed during the inception mission, as well as the gaps.
5. The baseline and midline surveys conducted by FAO Somalia in Dolow in 2013 and 2015 respectively, the fieldwork in Somalia conducted by HIPS, as well as interviews conducted in Nairobi by the evaluation team, formed the main source of information used.

Context

6. In Somalia, security remains one of the biggest challenges. Internal conflicts have prevailed for more than two decades, influenced by both regional and global political agendas. In the current situation of protracted and complex crisis, efforts to rebuild state institutions remain a challenge. Following a fragile but positive transition in mid-2012, Somalia now has a federal government in Mogadishu, based on a provisional constitution. In 2013, the government published the Somali Compact, setting forth the priorities for Somalia for 2013 through 2016. These priorities, articulated in the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), are the framework under which all future funding is expected to be allocated in Somalia during this timeframe.
7. At present, conflict prevails in the south of the country, where the forces of the Federal Government of Somalia assisted by African Union peacekeeping troops are fighting against various militant Islamist groups. The fighting has claimed the lives of over 10 000 people and forced hundreds of thousands to flee the capital. The war resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis in 2011-2012, exacerbated by a prevailing drought which was widely acknowledged to have created famine conditions. Despite of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, the 2011-2012 famine showed that people were not equipped to deal with drought and other shocks.

8. Following the famine, FAO, WFP and UNICEF launched in April 2012 the Joint Resilience Strategy (JRS). The aim was to refocus their efforts on improving resilience in Somalia by better aligning their programmes and coordinating their interventions to bring about more resilient outcomes for beneficiaries.
9. The FAO Resilience Sub-programme was formulated by FAO Somalia following the elaboration of the JRS, with a view to refocus ongoing activities towards resilience building. Before the elaboration of the Resilience Sub-programme, interventions were clustered under each technical sector (agriculture, livestock, cash for work and fisheries), with separate sectoral objectives. The idea of the Resilience Sub-programme was to bring all sectors together under a common results framework, ensuring more strategic coherence and merging humanitarian and development programming to establish synergies and durable outcomes.

Findings (presented against the four main evaluation questions)

Does the programme design adequately address the various elements that may affect the resilience of communities in Somalia?

10. While the JRS document recognises the need to contextualize approaches to specific livelihoods, and mentions the need for “detailed resilience assessments”, the Resilience Sub-programme documents reviewed by the evaluation team do not present an explicit discussion of exactly which pressures, shocks and crises the programme is expecting to make individuals, households and communities more resilient to. As it stands, the programme and its many activities appear to work towards preparing households and communities against virtually any shock, both at the household and at the community level. While the intention is commendable, it is virtually impossible to have a single programme making households and communities resilient to any shock that they may be exposed to. Moreover, there is a possibility that, unless premised on a robust problem analysis, initiatives may improve communities’ ability to withstand one shock and at the same time increase their vulnerability to others.
11. Interviews conducted by the evaluation team with FAO staff and reviews of the project logframe and of programme documents all seem to point to one general underlying assumption that could be phrased as follows: “if households and communities have higher income levels and increased production capacity, then they will be better able to withstand shocks and in turn will be more resilient”. While this assumption is highly relevant in the context of Somalia, a more detailed explanation on the specific target groups, possible livelihoods and diversification strategies in each livelihood zone could help the programme team to refocus some of its interventions.
12. Some of this is already happening. In JRS areas, FAO, WFP and UNICEF have invested in local consultation processes in the form of community consultations and action planning (CCAPs) and seasonal calendars. These community-based exercises are aimed at informing the development of activities (per livelihood group and per season), and ultimately improving the relevance of the programme and the coordination of its activities. Through another tool called “Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development” (PNTD), FAO also attempted to gain an in-depth understanding of existing relationships, institutions and mechanisms that govern access to and use of land and resources, production and tenure systems in two villages in Dolow and 30 villages in Somaliland, and of the effects that a planned expansion of the irrigated area could have on such arrangements. The PNTD has significant potential for building resilience. Indeed, it puts emphasis on work that seeks to change ‘the rules of the game’, to bring about lasting, pro-poor changes in institutional arrangements around ownership and use of land. At the same time, such initiatives are challenging, and it is important to take into account the inherently conflictual processes at play.
13. The findings from our fieldwork in JRS areas indicate good awareness within communities of the consultation processes that have taken place in their area. In general, these consultations were indicated as inclusive, with involvement of the different segments of the community (e.g. young and old, women and men). The overwhelming majority welcomed the opportunity that consultations provided for different community members to be included in discussions, and to express their views on the challenges they faced and the solutions they felt could redress those challenges.
14. While this evaluation found evidence of ad hoc programmatic adjustment based on data

collected through community consultations, there is currently no process to ensure that such data is systematically incorporated into cyclical planning. This appears to be a missed opportunity, as the consultations have the potential to provide very useful information for programming.

15. Another issue is that the rationale behind the definition of the Resilience Sub-programme outputs, outcomes and activities is not explained in the reviewed documentation; nor is it clear how the different sectors and activities can jointly contribute to the different outputs, and how these outputs can lead to the outcomes needed to build the resilience of the targeted population in Somalia. The rationale underpinning the distinction between areas receiving the Full Resilience Package (FRP) and those targeted with the Integrated Humanitarian/Resilience Approach (IHRA, where the FAO work tends to be dominated by Cash For Work, input distributions and livestock vaccinations) is important for programme design, since it should presumably inform different modalities of interventions in the two types of areas, different choices of activities, different targeting groups and so on, but is equally unclear.
16. The Resilience Sub-programme was designed before 2012, in the context of failed central government and at the height of the famine crisis. In that specific context, stepping in to provide services that would be typically delivered by the government (e.g. agricultural extension services, livestock vaccinations) was an appropriate modality of engagement (see also FAO, 2013). Today, however, the presence of the Federal Government and strengthening of Federal Member States may call for a reflection by FAO Somalia on the role that emerging government institutions may assume in service delivery.

To what extent has the Resilience Sub-programme made progress in strengthening the resilience of the participants and their communities, considering the short-time frame since the beginning of the programme (two years)?

17. The progress in terms of resilience that can be attributed to the Sub-programme evidently varies across outcomes and activities. Because of the limited timeframe of this evaluation, it was not possible to undertake an in-depth assessment of each outcome, related outputs and programme activities. As such, this section only explores a limited number of programme activities, concentrating on those that were mentioned by the field work respondents and/or for which the evaluation team could access sufficient secondary information.
18. The analysis of the quantitative baseline and midline surveys in Dolow showed that the average number of income sources per household increased from 1.97 to 2.59 between 2012 and 2015 in the treatment group, while it remained stable in the control group. This shows that the population in a programme area (Dolow) had more opportunities to diversify their livelihoods between 2012 and 2015 than the population living in a non-programme area (Luuq).¹ This conclusion is also supported by the limited field work undertaken as part of the present evaluation.
19. The same surveys in Dolow indicate an increase in the resilience of benefiting communities over the course of the Sub-programme, although the issue of whether or not this increase can be attributed to the Resilience Sub-programme deserves additional analysis.
20. The income gained through cash-for-work (CFW) activities was frequently mentioned as increasing, albeit temporarily, household income levels. Cash wages were also indicated as having positive trickle down effects on the local economy. Post Distribution Assessments (PDAs) have shown that, in addition to the immediate effects of the cash transfers, beneficiaries also made livelihood investments (particularly on the second payment), with reported investment increases in education (school fees), health care, livestock and livestock medicines, farming tools, seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, fishing equipment, transport, and starting businesses and small enterprises.
21. However, the temporary nature of employment opportunities was highlighted by our respondents as a source of concern. The above benefits were often described as temporary, or short-lived. While the Sub-programme aims to reach the same beneficiaries for two to three seasons, this is hampered by the short-term nature of the funding and the targeting

1 Quantitative Evidence from Mid-Term Review of the Impact Evaluation for the "Building Resilience in Somalia" joint strategy, FAO/UNICEF/WFP (September 2015).

of CFW primarily towards areas classified in IPC phases 3 and 4, which change from one season to the next. In practice, this means that FAO often encourages WFP to intervene in the same areas, as a way to provide a critical mass of support over several seasons. The evaluation's fieldwork findings indicate that on a number of occasions, CFW and food-for-work (FFW) interventions have been implemented in the same areas (e.g. districts) during the same period by FAO and WFP, respectively.

22. Data from the Dolow baseline and mid-term surveys showed that despite a large increase in income from livestock, there is only a minimal increase in the quantity of livestock owned. This could be due to a higher productivity of the livestock owned.
23. Community members interviewed for this evaluation felt that livestock support activities, specifically community animal health workers (CAHWs) and vaccinations, had contributed to improving livestock health and reducing mortality. CAHWs in particular were mentioned as providing important services that, unlike before, could now be easily accessed at the village level. The recently published Impact Assessment of the CAHW Intervention in Dolow indicates that CAHWs are having a positive impact on communities. Data gathered indicates that CAHWs are accessing drugs and services through linkages to the South-West Livestock Professional Association (SOWELPA, supported by FAO) agro-vets; are charging fees for services and drugs, and therefore increasing their chances of sustainability in a private sector market; and are improving the health of herds (camels, goats, cattle) through services and simple surgery (e.g. dehorning). Enhancing the entrepreneurial skill of CAHWs will further strengthen their service delivery capabilities and the sustainability of their operations for the betterment of their communities.
24. Agricultural support activities were indicated by beneficiaries as having improved their agricultural production. While the majority of the respondents to our qualitative survey in these areas stated that increased production was used predominantly for household consumption, a minority also stated that they had surplus production of vegetables and crops such as maize, sorghum, onions and tomatoes that they could sell. The findings of the quantitative analysis in Dolow also point to positive effects of the programme on food consumption. However, in one locality (Baki, Somaliland) challenges related to market access resulted in producers incurring high transport costs and high perishability risks. Similarly, in the villages of Beer and Owdweyne (Somaliland) a number of respondents complained that WFP food distributions constrained their ability to obtain better prices for their cereals at markets. Respondents indicated that they typically stopped selling their surplus production during these periods, as market prices were unfavourable.
25. Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and related trainings that provided good agriculture practices – including the introduction of new varieties of crops and vegetables, integrated plant and pest management and rural commercialization – were well-received by communities. The majority of beneficiaries interviewed (81 percent) reported that the training was useful and 31 percent reported that they had trained other farmers after receiving their own training from the Sub-Programme (SATG, 2013). In Dolow, FFS were found to have well-connected marketing committees linked to various markets, which were able to access information on prices and negotiate contracts with new buyers. Echoing our findings on agricultural activities, this was noted as benefiting female traders of agricultural products in particular. According to FAO Somalia, this is because women do most of the marketing of agricultural produce.
26. The JRS acknowledges an increasing rate of deforestation and land degradation, and explicitly recognises the importance of activities focused on improving natural resource management, including land, water and soil. These activities are seen as strengthening the resilience of pastoralist communities, as a long-term drought management strategy, and as improving agricultural productivity (FAO Somalia, 2015). However, the nexus between conflict and natural resource management is not given sufficient attention in programme implementation.

What is the added value of the programmatic approach adopted by FAO Somalia, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and results of the programme?

27. While there is general support for the programme approach, the evaluation found that not all staff in FAO Somalia have a clear vision of the rationale behind the shift. There was a lack of awareness among staff and other stakeholders as to what the programme

approach meant regarding impacts and fundamental change in how FAO Somalia operates. A contributing factor is that FAO also lacks an organization-wide definition of the programme approach, as well as a broadly agreed-upon rationale as to why it might be an improvement over the project approach.

28. Throughout interviews with FAO employees in Rome, Nairobi and Somalia, the characteristics of the programme approach were described through three lenses: more flexible financial management; more integrated planning/coordination mechanisms; and an impact focused programme. Senior FAO Somalia management for instance described the programme approach as ensuring a “higher level of outcomes” while being more responsible, accountable, and flexible, and as being more “proactive, consistent and coherent in how we support countries.” In interviews with the FAO Somalia team, terms such as “funding flexibility” or “unearmarked funds” or “money” and “allocation prioritization” were most commonly repeated and show a perception that for them, the programme approach is primarily a financial tool.
29. This perception is borne out by facts: thanks to the programme approach, FAO Somalia was able to procure unearmarked funds, which allowed for the opening of permanent offices in Somalia. The FAO team mentioned this would not have been possible under the project approach, where only temporary project offices could be supported. However, unearmarked funds move the responsibility for prioritization to FAO Somalia, and it is therefore very important that FAO Somalia has the technical capacity and solid evidence base to make such decisions.
30. The existence of a nearly two-year gap in a top leadership position has had negative impacts on the FAO Somalia programme in terms of funding, teamwork and capacity to forge change. Perhaps most pointedly, both donors and FAO Somalia respondents perceive that FAO Somalia have lost their position as a leader in the resilience field, as their momentum for critical thinking and innovation has slowed following the departure of the previous FAOR. However, the presence of a newly appointed FAOR is encouraging and presents an opportunity for FAO to re-establish its leadership in resilience programming.
31. There is evidence that FAO Somalia’s effectiveness has improved through increased internal coordination, and that the pattern of working strictly in silos appears to be no longer the case. Just over half of FAO respondents commented that they no longer work in silos and now they know what the other sectors are doing.
32. There is however no indication that donor coordination was impacted by the transition to the programme approach. Many donors stated that intrinsically they saw the benefit to a programme approach (e.g. more cohesive nature of planning) but that it did not impact their direct relationship (funding or otherwise) with FAO.
33. Even though an umbrella programme has been created in the Field Programme Management Information System (FPMIS) to facilitate the programme management in the country office, another system (called PMSR) is still in use. Many respondents explained that FPMIS continues to be too cumbersome for the needs of the programme approach. Another reason for this may be that the team is now used to their parallel system and has no incentive to move to FPMIS. In any case, this indicates a continued inability of the country office to manage a programme approach solely through FPMIS.

What are the potentials and opportunities of the partnerships developed in the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme?

34. The development of the JRS represented an important contribution towards getting three UN agencies to think and analyse together, and helping to steer a conversation among aid actors in Somalia towards the longer term. The idea of the JRS itself was highly relevant and timely, both because of the need for a strengthened response, but also because of trends towards consortia in the development and aid fields.
35. There are many indications that the JRS teams have succeeded in some key areas. Most notably, the JRS has improved each agency’s capacity and scope on community engagement and impact evaluation. In some instances, the JRS has allowed for implementation staff in the field to broaden their scope, in terms of community engagement as well as adding value through synchronization of activities. Because food security initiatives are intrinsically linked to agriculture, they must be synchronized both with the seasonal calendar and with

each other to have maximum impact. A simple example of this is the need to synchronize diversification of crops (seed distributions, agronomic training) with diversification of diet (nutritional training, cooking class) and with marketing (training, pricing, awareness) for new products. Also, there is clear evidence of efforts being made to change the modus operandi from working in agency silos to working collaboratively, which has the potential to significantly improve the results for beneficiaries. However, this potential still needs to be translated into concrete results.

36. The initial intention of the JRS was to ensure that each target household had access to the services provided from the three agencies. However, not all three UN agencies work at the same level (e.g. household, community, schools) and targeting the same people is a highly complex exercise, especially as each agency already had ongoing operations before the development of the JRS, and the JRS did not result in new programmes but only the reformulation of pre-existing interventions.
37. The JRS is not yet able to focus the work of the three agencies on the same households or even communities. In the eyes of some respondents (donors and FAO/WFP/UNICEF staff), this represents a shortcoming of the primary impetus behind the JRS. On the other hand, although all UN agencies senior staff interviewed stated that the construction of the joint beneficiary database is a part of the vision, it does not appear to be on anyone's programme of work. In a recent paper documenting lessons learned through the JRS², the lack of a joint beneficiary database was noted. The document outlines next steps, including moving from a joint strategy to a joint programme with jointly implemented activities.
38. To the three agencies involved, the JRS may have felt innovative and starkly in contrast to how things were done before. But to outsiders, donors most notably, there has always been an expectation that UN agencies are collaborating in the field to ensure that no duplications occur and all comparative advantages are taken. More than one donor mentioned the expectation that agencies will not only work together but show evidence of increased cost efficiency by doing so. To date, this has yet to be proven. Each agency keeps working on its agency-specific programme, using their own funding and administration mechanisms.
39. The three JRS partners have set up a joint impact evaluation system involving household surveys among benefiting and non-benefiting communities. The system makes use of a set of composite indicators of household resilience called Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA). Many FAO staff were confident in the ability of RIMA to measure change in resilience levels in Somali households attributable to the JRS. Interviewed donors and JRS partners were often less positive, with some commenting that RIMA was complex to use and/or difficult to interpret. This challenge must be solved if FAO wants to gain broader consensus on its use for measuring resilience.
40. There was some capacity development targeted at the implementing partners with whom FAO is signing letters of agreement (LoAs), primarily consisting of training to do FAO-specific work on FAO-specific guidelines, regulations and software. While this may indeed build NGO capacities, the long-term impact and result is unclear. While FAO Somalia has put in place a new Risk Management Framework, which was developed to ensure higher levels of accountability and more rigorous checks and balances, there does not appear to be a consistent plan or criteria for working with implementing partners specifically for capacity development.
41. In contrast, there is substantial evidence that when FAO works directly with community groups, these groups are capacitated in various ways. Farmer Field Schools, Water Committees and Fishing Cooperatives are examples of community groups with which FAO is working directly and building capacity not only for the sake of improved relationships with FAO, but also for the sake of the community group itself to better perform for its constituents or members. Another example is the work of the FAO livestock sector with CAHWs in the South Central region.
42. FFS are another way in which community capacity building is occurring. FFS use a cascading model whereby a master trainer (lead farmer) is trained (often along with Ministry of Agriculture extension workers, where appropriate) and those master trainers, usually a farmer from a particular district, then train other farmers in the community. In general, sustainability is ensured through strong farmer association building. The empowerment process, rather than the adoption of specific techniques, is what produces sustainability.

2 Not yet published

Conclusions (presented against the four main evaluation question)

Does the programme design adequately address the various elements that may affect the resilience of communities in Somalia?

43. **The lack of a clearly understood theory of change, contextualized conflict and risk assessments, long-term vision and multi-year strategy of engagement for making households and communities more resilient makes it difficult to answer the question whether the programme is addressing the various elements that may affect resilience in the Somalia context.** In general, the conceptual underpinnings of the programme, underlying assumptions, causal linkages among outputs, and the rationale for the choice of programme activities – premised on rigorous problem analysis and geographical targeting – or the choice of IHRA vs FRP and other implementation modalities, have not been given adequate attention in programme development. The programme offers a long list of activities but these do not seem to contain novel implementation practices to take advantage of the transformative potential that the resilience agenda may have had. However, recent corporate strategic documents on resilience, the results matrix of the current Somalia CPF, as well as the RIMA model all provide useful theoretical grounds for the development of a theory of change for the JRS.
44. **There seems to have been little reflection at programme design time about which shocks, pressures, and crises the programme was expecting to make local households and communities resilient to.** The programme document pays limited attention to the underlying structural causes of vulnerability to improve the ability of at-risk populations to withstand future shocks. This being said, the RIMA surveys and the community consultations have since then devoted some attention to the specific vulnerabilities of interviewed households, and each sectoral team undertakes baseline assessments to better understand the needs of the communities they serve and areas for potential interventions, so the issue is progressively being corrected.
45. **Attention to gender within FAO is increasing and there is growing recognition of the changing social and economic roles of women in the country. However, the implications of these changing roles for the programme remain unclear.** A number of positive steps and initiatives are taking place to advance a gender analysis and perspective in the programme. Currently, however, the gender specialist officer remains the only staff tasked with advancing a gender agenda within the programme. It is difficult to see how one officer, who is not even a full-time staff member of the programme, can realistically provide the attention and support needed for a programme of such scale and complexity.
46. **Increased attention to natural resource management in programme design is a significant improvement. Basing the development of initiatives in Somaliland and Dolow on the PNTD approach was critical to addressing conflict at its root causes, and to understanding natural resource management as intimately linked to conflict. However, the nexus between conflict and natural resource management deserves further attention throughout the programme.** The evaluation has found evidence that intra-community conflicts arose as a result of some programme activities focused on natural resource management.
47. **Changes in the governance system underway since 2012 will affect the modalities of interventions on the ground. These implications have not yet been fully analysed and the programme has not yet adapted to take these changes into account.** There are difficulties associated with working in a complex environment such as Somalia, and in a context of shifting governance space. Notwithstanding the enormous challenges, a positive momentum for advancing a state-building process has been created for the first time in decades. This is an important opportunity for FAO and other UN agencies to step up their efforts in support of state structures, institutions and policies at all levels.

To what extent has the Resilience Sub-programme made progress in strengthening the resilience of the participants and their communities, considering the short-time frame since the beginning of the programme (two years)?

48. **CFW activities contribute to household food security, have positive spill over on the local economy and support communal assets.** However, by their very nature, CFW

interventions provide temporary, short-term employment. Questions can also be raised in relation to the sustainability of benefits of CFW interventions on community assets, although field assessments indicate much appreciation for the trainings offered on how to manage and maintain the infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated through CFW. Feeder roads, canals and water catchments, which are the focus of CFW projects in the areas under analysis, are assets that require continuous maintenance. With regard to the choice of transfer modality, no documentation was found outlining the rationale and decision making processes underpinning the choice made by FAO and WFP to implement CFW and FFW activities respectively. This appears to be a gap, since the decision to implement CFW and FFW should be premised on robust market-based evidence.

49. **There is potential for growth of the fisheries sector and FAO's relatively new engagement in this sector seems to be well placed.** Government interest in this sector also offers the opportunity to align FAO's efforts and priorities with those of the government, both in Puntland and in Dolow, and with nascent institutions. FAO is well placed to contribute to building capacity on the ground, helping fishers add value to their production and, where feasible and with a livelihoods diversification approach in mind, supporting the capacity of people to join this sector.
50. **Agricultural support activities in the areas visited for this evaluation were very welcome and appeared to contribute to enhanced agricultural production.** Our limited findings in Somaliland reveal that agricultural support activities may have benefited females the most. This is an important aspect of the programme design and implementation.
51. **In a country whose economy is dominated by animal husbandry, livestock support activities are achieving a positive impact.** However, very similar livestock support activities have been implemented by various actors (including FAO) in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa region for decades. Programme documents and interviews with FAO staff do not indicate that the nature, design and implementation of these activities has changed in any way now that they are packaged under the Resilience Sub-programme. The novelty of the JRS interventions may need to be better articulated by, for example, drawing from practical synergies observed between the work on animal health on the one hand, and the work on other production factors such as fodder or marketing on the other hand.
52. **The ability of producers to market their surplus is highly dependent on access and price constraints, but this does not seem to have been sufficiently taken into account in the programme.** In Dolow, market access was much easier than in Baki, for instance, where long distances to markets and roads in bad conditions were indicated as key constraints to marketing activities. Also, seasonal WFP food distributions and their repercussions on grain prices, as indicated by a number of our community-level respondents, represented additional constraints on the ability of agricultural producers to obtain profitable prices at the market.
53. **Farmer and Pastoralist Field Schools are a useful approach as part of a resilience-building agenda; however more focus is required on knowledge transfer opportunities and scaling out these islands of success.** Lack of ongoing support may limit the sustainability of these interventions.

What is the added value of the programmatic approach adopted by FAO Somalia, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and results of the programme?

54. **FAO Somalia is paving the way, as FAO country teams globally shift from the project approach to the programme approach, and nearly everyone supports this shift, but there is no plan to transition systemically to the programme approach.** FAO, as a global organization, is clearly moving towards programmatic (as opposed to project) thinking. However, there is no consensus regarding the rationale or corporate vision behind the shift, and there is no sense that the entire organizational structure or approach has changed. There has been no declared plan for the transition to the programme approach and this lack of clarity has left the transition in a holding pattern with some departments continuing to forge ahead and others reverting back to the project approach. There is no clarity on how the programme approach better serves beneficiaries and so far, some improvements to efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability are visible but remain limited.
55. **FAO HQ has contributed to developing some programme approach tools, but there is much more to be done, as organizational structures, skills and culture need**

enhancement and adjustment to the new approach, at all levels. Many of the corporate tools required to implement under a programme approach do not exist yet. In Somalia the JRS tries to break down technical silos, but the organogram of the FAO Country Office is still structured around teams with technical speciality as opposed to programmatic outcomes. Some sectors remain territorial over projects, activities and funding, while others are clearly collaborating more.

What are the potentials and opportunities of the partnerships developed in the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme?

56. **The JRS was a bold, timely and relevant initiative, but there is agreement that the resilience paradigm, as laid out in the strategy, has not yet been proven.** The lack of a joint beneficiary database or other mechanism (e.g. joint planning feeding into programmes, and field level coordination among agencies) that allows for assurance that all households received the inputs from each agency makes it impossible for the claim to be proven. Since the development of the JRS, an increase in resilience-focused consortia combined with a change in leadership at all three agencies have coincided with decreased funding, causing additional challenges and potentially lowering the motivation of leadership and implementation teams in the JRS.
57. **The mixed method approach has improved FAO Somalia's community consultation practice and culture to a limited extent.** Engagement with Somali communities by management and Nairobi level staff is constrained by the security situation, and linking programme design decision-making to CCAP and seasonal calendars remains challenging. There also remains a lack of familiarity and trust in RIMA among some partners. FAO must be careful not to forge ahead without responding to challenges, as this may further erode confidence.

Recommendations

1. A more in-depth understanding of the varied Somali contexts would help inform programme design and improve relevance.

- An explicit theory of change should be supported by the development of a long-term vision and multi-year strategy of engagement that the programme envisages for each sector and in the areas that currently fall under FRP and IHRA categories. This analysis should also serve to make a realistic assessment of what is possible to achieve in FRP and IHRA areas and make explicit the different modalities of intervention in different areas. More generally, agricultural support activities, both in rain-fed and irrigation areas, should be premised on a robust analysis of the context, and an understanding of the potential winners and losers of some interventions. The PNTD is a useful tool to support this process.
- The Resilience Sub-programme should focus more on the institutional and structural causes that drive and reproduce vulnerability and risk, establish clearer pathways for moving out of vulnerability and into a development pathway and, where possible given ongoing challenges to operations, prioritize initiatives that more strategically intervene at the structural level.
- Changes in the country's governance landscape and the implementation of the federal formula on the ground have been underway since 2012. The shift from a context of failed government to one where government authorities can increasingly be considered as key stakeholders in interventions at the community level makes the issue of revisiting the possible synergies between these two CPF pillars a particularly pressing and timely one.
- The programme should take into account changing administrative and governance dynamics and, specifically, gain a finer understanding of the possible hotspots of the country where conflict and insecurity could arise. As such, the programme should consider revisiting the 2011 country-wide conflict analysis study and/or conducting another study to map at-risk areas, understand how programme activities and resources provided may affect the likelihood of conflict, and outline the steps that should be taken to minimize this risk.
- To better operationalize the resilience concept, the role of Cash For Work (CFW) activities should be rethought and must be seen as part of a more strategic and holistic approach in the agriculture sector, or any other sector where CFW interventions are rolled out. Beyond the "cash" dimension (wages), the quality and

use of the “work” (i.e. rehabilitated agricultural assets) needs to be prioritized. CFW must contribute to the advancement of a broader agenda of engagement and a more systemic approach in each sector. A viable and well defined exit strategy for infrastructure developed through CFW activities is especially relevant with issues of sustainability and resilience in mind. Exploring how nascent government institutions could be involved in maintaining these assets could also be reflected upon in this regard.

- FAO and WFP should determine, on the basis of robust market evidence (e.g. from the FNSAU), the appropriateness of FFW and/or CFW in a given area. The negative effects of seasonal WFP food distributions on agriculture producers’ abilities to sell at profitable prices must be taken seriously by both WFP and FAO.
- In the context of fisheries development, advocacy is particularly important. To complement its role in supporting fishing activities, the programme and FAO in general could engage in advocacy. Illegal fishing and foreign concessions seem to be priority areas for advocacy work.

2. A more structured and well-staffed effort, as well as dedicated corporate support and tools, are required for the programme approach to succeed.

- FAO Somalia must prioritize immediate action on filling vacant senior management positions to provide the programme with much needed leadership. In particular, a Resilience Sub-programme coordinator should be recruited in order to ensure that the vision is clear and shared among technical colleagues.
- FAO HQ must develop or adapt corporate HR and finance tools, including FPMIS, which can be rolled out to country teams as they transition from a project approach to a programme approach. The approach must in the very least include continuity (honouring the rich history of FAO), vision (clarifying the rationale behind the transition) and action (systematic steps to be taken, roles and responsibilities). Once the plan, vision and rationale are clear, FAO can articulate this as necessary to donors and other stakeholders.

3. Partnerships should be strengthened between the three agencies, as well as with national stakeholders.

- The three agencies are developing a new roadmap to reflect a new, dynamic, innovative perspective on taking the JRS to the next level. The donors are eager to see this and the JRS itself promised improved coordination. The JRS should develop a mechanism to provide evidence showing how targeted Somali households are benefiting from each of the three components, considering that synergies are necessary to build resilience. An important step will be to develop a joint community database (a concrete list of each village, mapped geographically and with clear population data) from which each of the three agencies commit to at least 80 percent coverage; thus the JRS could state that the three agencies’ inputs were received by 80 percent of the communities.
- The JRS needs to show how it is using data from the mixed methods approach to adjust implementation. A link from CCAP, seasonal calendars and baseline/midline data to activity review redesign should be clear. There also needs to be more clarity on how non-JRS components of the Resilience Sub-programme are improving their culture and practice of community consultation. The CCAP and seasonal calendar process can be rolled out to all initiatives.
- The JRS should strengthen its focus on the collaboration with local governments, including district councils and municipalities in peri-urban areas, and ensure that the support provided will enable them to sustain the results achieved by the programme in a context of strengthened local government institutions. The Joint Programme for Local Governance (JPLG) – which supports the planning and management capacity of selected district councils and in which UNIFEF is already a partner – provides an opportunity for FAO to involve local governments (i.e. municipalities and district councils) in the planning, delivery and subsequent management of some of the medium-size infrastructure rehabilitated through the Resilience Sub-programme.

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

58. This evaluation covers the first two years of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Somalia Resilience Sub-programme (2013-2014). The overall objective of the Sub-programme is to ensure that “at risk households anticipate, resist, absorb and recover quickly from pressures and shocks”.
59. The decision to undertake an independent evaluation of the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme was based on:
- the commitment of FAO Somalia to measure the results of its Resilience Sub-programme and make adjustments based on evidence;
 - a specific request to the FAO Somalia office from the major donors of the FAO Resilience Sub-programme in Somalia (in particular Germany, Switzerland and Denmark) to have a midterm review of the Sub-programme;
 - the size of the Sub-programme portfolio, which makes it one of the FAO’s largest programmes (the total budget for 2013-2014 was USD 102 741 443)³;
 - the introduction of innovative elements in the design and management of the Sub-programme, which may provide an opportunity to learn and improve programme management within FAO (e.g. Programme Approach).
60. The FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme (and more generally the FAO Somalia Country Programme) is characterized by a shift from the traditional multi-project donor driven response to a more coherent programme approach structured along thematic pillars. In addition, it is implemented under a joint FAO-World Food Programme (WFP)-United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) resilience strategy, which provides FAO a unique opportunity to work in partnership with sister UN agencies towards the common goal of building resilience.
61. In addition to analysing the programme’s relevance and assessing the progress made towards building resilience in Somalia, this evaluation also focuses on the application of the programme approach in FAO, and the added value of working under a joint strategy with other UN agencies, in the context of Somalia.
62. This evaluation will provide accountability to donors while serving as learning exercise for the organization and offering guidance for the Resilience Sub-programme. The full list of evaluation questions is provided in Box 1.

3 As per FAO’s evaluation policy, all initiatives funded by voluntary contributions with a budget over USD 4 million require a full-fledge separate evaluation

Box 1. Evaluation questions

1 - Is the programme design adequately addressing the various elements that may affect resilience of the communities in Somalia?

- 1a - How cross-cutting issues (such as conflicts, power dynamics, inclusion of disadvantaged and discriminated groups, governance and gender equality) are being addressed by the Resilience Sub-programme?
- 1b - How is conflict sensitive programming and implementation assured throughout the Resilience Sub-programme? Are the difference livelihoods present in Somalia and the relations between them being addressed by the programme, and how?
- 1c - How has the context changed compared to the planning period? What are the implications for the programme implementation?
- 1d - What are the lessons learned from the application of the evaluation model (mixed method approach) and the M&E system? How helpful is it for measuring results? How and by whom is the information used?
- 1e - Has the Resilience Sub-programme included initiatives to tackle the issue of sustainable natural resource use and management? In doing so, has it considered the socio-political implications of natural resources management in Somalia?

2 - To what extent has the Resilience Sub-programme made progress in strengthening resilience of the participants and their communities, considering the short-time frame since the beginning of the programme (2 years)?

- 2a - To what extent have the outputs and outcomes of the programme been achieved so far, considering the timeframe within which results were expected to be achieved?
- 2b - What are the key successes to date, and what are the challenges? Is the programme likely to achieve its development and immediate objectives?
- 2c - How appropriate are the IHRA and FRP interventions in addressing the respective resilience building needs of communities under respective emergency and development situations?
- 2d - Is the Resilience Sub-programme building capacities of the communities, and of implementing partners?

3 - What is the added value of the programmatic approach adopted by FAO Somalia, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and results of the programme?

- 3a - What are the characteristics of the programmatic approach in FAO Somalia? How is it defined? What has changed in the way FAO is implementing the Somalia country programme, since the adoption of the programmatic approach?
- 3b - How is the programmatic approach used by FAO Somalia improving the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of FAO's interventions? Is it facilitating donor coordination and reducing overlapping and duplication of initiatives?
- 3c - Is there anything specific about Somalia and FAO's role in the country that made the programmatic approach appropriate and feasible (or not)? If so, what are these characteristics?
- 3d - Does FAO (HQ and Country Office) avail of the right corporate instruments (programmatic, financial, HR, managerial, M&E, management information systems, reporting etc.) and culture to implement programmes instead of separate projects, and if not, what needs to be improved or developed? Is the skill set available at FAO Somalia appropriate, to implement the programmatic approach?

4 - What are the potentials and opportunities of the partnerships developed in the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme?

- 4a - How successful has the Resilience Sub-programme been in delivering the Joint Resilience Strategy? Does the combination of the three agencies working together add up to a better, more efficient, cost effective, durable response? Is this kind of partnership sustainable? Is there less duplication? What are the lessons learned for future WFP-FAO-UNICEF collaboration in the resilience domain? What are the challenges and opportunities for the coordination partners? Are the coordination mechanisms (in Nairobi and field level), including the common information platform efficient?
- 4b - To what extent is FAO partnering with local implementing partners? What can be done to improve ownership by national partners? What are the challenges faced by national partners in planning, implementation, monitoring and sustaining results, and how can they be overcome?
- 4c - Under which conditions should or could FAO work directly at community level, versus through implementing partners, considering the specificities of the Somalia context, and the security and access constraints? What are the lessons learned from FAO's implementation modalities?

1.2 FAO-WFP-UNICEF Joint Resilience Strategy

63. Following the devastating famine in 2011, FAO, WFP and UNICEF launched in April 2012 the Joint Resilience Strategy (JRS), with the aim of refocusing their efforts on improving resilience in Somalia by better aligning their programmes and coordinating their interventions to bring about more resilient outcomes for beneficiaries.
64. The strategy states that “FAO, UNICEF and WFP have identified three complementary core building blocks to promote resilience in Somalia that must be addressed comprehensively in order to achieve communities’ resilience:
 - i. Strengthen the productive sectors - to increase household income by diversifying livelihood strategies, intensifying production at household level and by enhancing the access to markets and to market information to extend households’ frontier of possibilities.
 - ii. Improve basic social services - to strengthen vulnerable household human capital by creating systems able to assess communities and capture the information needed to enhance the demand and access to best practices and capacity building opportunities.
 - iii. Establish predictable safety nets - to address the most vulnerable peoples’ basic needs through predictable and sustainable transfer of food or cash for the destitute or seasonally at-risk populations.”
65. The main principle of the JRS is to ensure that goals and outcomes are jointly agreed upon by the three UN agencies, while outputs and activities are agency-specific. In its initial phase (2012-2015), the implementation of the JRS was therefore not done through a joint programme: each agency remained with its own way of operating, but realigned its programming within the strategy.
66. In 2013, FAO, WFP and UNICEF initiated implementation of their programmes under the JRS in five districts, namely Dolow, Burao, Odeweyne, Iskushuban and Bosasso (peri-urban areas). The areas for initial deployment were selected on the basis of the following criteria: i) represents the broad diversity of livelihood patterns in Somalia; ii) sufficiently accessible to allow for proper monitoring of outputs and impact; and iii) among the most vulnerable districts of Somalia.

1.3 FAO Resilience Sub-programme

67. The FAO Resilience Sub-programme was formulated by FAO Somalia following the elaboration of the JRS, with a view to refocus ongoing activities towards resilience building. Before the elaboration of the Resilience Sub-programme, interventions were clustered under each technical sector (agriculture, livestock, cash-for-work (CFW) and fisheries), with separate sectoral objectives. The idea of the Resilience Sub-programme was to bring all sectors together under a common results framework, and ensure more strategic coherence among the various interventions. The Sub-programme was defined around four outcomes and a number of outputs. Examples of activities implemented under each outcome are described in Table 1. The full list of projects is provided in Annex 2 (portfolio analysis).

Table 1. Outcomes and outputs of the resilience sub-programme

Outcomes	Outputs	Example of activities
1. Targeted households and communities have diversified their livelihood strategies (FRP) or benefitted from temporary employment (IHRA).	1.1 Targeted farmers, herders and fisher folks have received technical and material support to diversify their production and consumption	Training in the management of grain stores to farmer associations; support for vegetable production in peri-urban areas; introduction of new fodder species, provision of fodder processing machines and tools and training in fodder production; training on bee husbandry practices and honey processing; provision of equipment (e.g. solar refrigerators) and training in fish processing techniques; creation of temporary employment through CFW (e.g. to expand or rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure).
	1.2 Targeted farmers, herders and fisher folks have received technical and material support to add value to their production (e.g. transformation, storage)	
	*1.3 Temporary employment in labour-intensive schemes is created for vulnerable households	
	1.4 Agriculture-related services (for the crop, livestock and fisheries sectors) are established and create permanent skilled employment.	
2. Targeted households and communities: - have increased their food production and consumption in a sustainable manner (FRP); OR, - are able to restore/maintain their productive capacity when faced with chronic pressure or shocks IHRA)	*2.1 Improved and adapted production techniques are introduced to farmers, herders and fisher folks	Provision of agricultural input packages (including seeds-maize, sorghum and cowpea depending on livelihoods, fertilizer, irrigation vouchers and training); rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure through CFW or contractors (such as installation of solar water pumps for irrigation, rehabilitation of canals, feeder roads, construction of shallow wells and diversion weirs); rangeland rehabilitation through reseeding, harvesting fodder and storage; restocking of small ruminants.
	*2.2 Productive infrastructure (e.g. irrigation canals, water catchments, feeder roads) is expanded or rehabilitated.	
	2.3 Plans for natural resources conservation/management at community level are prepared and implemented in targeted communities.	
	2.4 Negotiation tables around access to – and use of – land and natural resources are established in target communities.	
3. Targeted households and producer organizations are able to sell their produce and obtain better prices	3.1 Value chain analysis for selected commodities is undertaken.	Value chain analyses focused on agriculture and livestock products; training and developing the capacity of producers associations (e.g. farmers associations, fodder producer representatives, beekeeping groups) in marketing; conducting Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) trainings and formalizing PPP agreements for meat and fish markets; improving marketing infrastructure and facilities (e.g. slaughterhouses, meat markets, ice plants at fish landing sites, fodder sheds).
	3.2 Producer organizations have received technical and material support to better deliver market-related services.	
	3.3 Market infrastructure and facilities (e.g. meat and livestock markets, slaughterhouses, feeder roads, produce stores) are established or improved	
4. Targeted households and communities have access to knowledge and support services for productive activities and consumption (FRP)	4.1 A pest and disease surveillance system/network is established and functional at community level.	Establishment of a pest and disease surveillance system, and improving local response capacities to manage pests and diseases; strengthening FAO's extension network through FFS and PFS.
	4.2 Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and Pastoral Field Schools (PFS) combined with nutrition education are established to deliver knowledge on best practices to farmers, herders and fisher folks.	

* IHRA (see below)

68. The FAO Resilience Sub-programme is articulated around three implementation modalities, described as below in the Sub-programme document:
- **The Integrated Humanitarian/Resilience Approach (IHRA):** includes assistance to contribute towards minimum food security levels, prevent major deterioration of livelihoods and respond to emerging threats to vulnerable livelihoods across the country. The intention is to address food insecurity and malnutrition in the most vulnerable areas of Somalia, an essential ingredient for laying out the necessary foundation for building medium- to longer-term resilience.
 - **The Full Resilience Package (FRP)⁴:** integrated package of support with the following characteristics: i) a multi-layered package including interventions from FAO, UNICEF and WFP; ii) a minimum engagement period of 2-3 years; iii) Community Action Planning (CAP) to ensure equitable and inclusive participation and ownership, inform targeting and identify priority requirements.
 - **Other development-oriented activities:** FAO has a broad portfolio of projects that directly contribute to the outputs and outcomes of the Resilience Sub-programme through development activities. These projects – featuring activities such as fishing fleet renewal, construction of slaughterhouses, equipping of veterinary laboratories and improvement of local seed production – are considered integral components of the Sub-programme.
69. The total budget of the Resilience Sub-programme for the 2013-2014 period is USD 102 741 443. Nine projects in the Sub-programme are above USD 4 million, with four projects above USD 10 million.
70. Although multilateral contributions represent the largest proportion of donations (USD 19 million), Norway is the largest single donor, contributing USD 15.7 million, in addition to providing USD 2 million within the multilateral contribution. The second largest contribution is provided by the UK (USD 15.2 million), followed by the United States (USD 14.5 million), the EU (USD 12.7 million), Denmark (USD 10.6 million within the multilateral contribution), Germany (USD 10.4 million) and Switzerland (USD 8.2 million).

4 The FRP is implemented in the five districts of the Joint Resilience Strategy.

Box 2 : Main Deliverable of the FAO Resilience Sub-Programme (2013-2014)

The following non-exhaustive list of outputs is based on FAO Somalia progress reports and M&E system, and provides an order of magnitude of the size of the sub-programme and the amount of work done. Many smaller activities were omitted on purpose, for brevity's sake. The evaluation team is of course not in a position to independently verify these numbers but trusts that they are by and large accurate.

Agriculture

1. Agricultural inputs distributed to 46 360 farmers, 29 farmers' associations and 40 Farmer Field Schools;
2. Tractor hours provided to 3 960 households in Baidoa district in Bay region, Beletthawa, Dollow and Luuq districts in Gedo region, Beletweyne district in Hiraan region and Jowhar district in Middle Shabelle region;
3. 3,923 metallic silos fabricated by local artisans and distributed in Jowhar, Afgooye and Marka districts of Lower Shebelle, and in Somaliland;
4. 337 animal-drawn seeders distributed to 2,200 HHs in Beletweyn, Hiran;
5. 82 Farmer Field Schools set up and operational (40 in Somaliland, 13 in Puntland and 29 in South Central) receiving various inputs and training;
6. 24 canals provided with water pumps in the Dur-Dur region; installation of 2 large water pumps to irrigate a network of over 25 km canals in Dollow;
7. Insect traps, insect specimen preparation, and data transmission equipment installed in 7 villages to establish crop pest surveillance and early warning system.

Cash for work

8. CFW reached 59 475 households with total cash transfers amounting to USD 4 956 586, helping rehabilitate or construct 386 irrigation canals, 123 feeder roads and 517 water catchments;
9. 42 km of canals were rehabilitated in South Central Somalia and Somaliland, with related small infrastructure;
10. Construction of 75 shallow wells in Somaliland and in the Dur-Dur watershed area (in collaboration with WFP).

Livestock and animal health

11. 1 452 067 animals belonging to 36 302 households, received emergency treatment through network of Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs).
12. 11 860 193 goats, belonging to 296 505 households, vaccinated against CCP (through government and veterinary associations campaigns);
13. Training on fodder production and conservation to 30 492 households and 180 community animal health workers (CAHWs), and on bee husbandry practices and honey processing to 488 HHs;
14. 27 196 sheep and goats redistributed to 2 085 households.

Diversification and marketing

15. Marketing infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated including: 1 slaughterhouse (Burco); 2 meat markets (Galkayo North and South); 1 animal passageway (Bosasso); 1 livestock market with related access road (Galkayo North); 10 meat hygiene units (Somaliland and Puntland); 3 fish landing and marketing stations in Tohin, Hurdiya and Eyl, with associated ice plants; and 8 grain stores in Middle and Lower Shabelle; 90 solar refrigerators provided to 180 female headed fishing households for keeping of fish stocks;
16. 64 farmers' associations received training on marketing and other topics;
17. Market price information disseminated through weekly SMS reaching close to 890 producers;
18. 15 KAAH Islamic Microfinance Services (KIMS) supported and serving 680 beneficiaries in Burco, Hargeisa and Bossaso; these beneficiaries received loans (total amount disbursed as loans: USD 406 193, average loan size: 589 USD) and using saving accounts (over USD 12 000 in total deposits);
19. 3 roads of 89 km in length rehabilitated (with WFP Food For Work) to link the local communities to markets in Boroma (Somaliland);
20. 1 915 households trained and provided with fodder production, processing and conservation inputs in Togdheer, Awdal, Gedo, Woq Galbeed and Hiran regions.

71. The total budget of the FAO Somalia Country Programme for the period under consideration (2013-2014) is around USD 155 million. The Resilience Sub-programme represented therefore two-thirds of the Country Programme budget. In terms of plans, the below table provides the budget and gaps for each of the three pillars of the Country Programming Framework (CPF).

Table 2. Available funds and resource gaps for the CPF pillars 2014-2017 (USD)

CPF Pillar	PLAN (USD million)				Total (USD million)
	2014	2015	2016	2017	
1. Resilience	119	110	110	111	450
2. Institutional capacity development and policy support	10	27	17	20	74
3. Information for action	7	12	12	11	42
Grand total	136	149	139	142	566
Available funds	97	21	5	0	123
GAP	39	128	134	142	443

1.4 Monitoring and evaluation

72. Through the JRS, a mixed method impact evaluation methodology has been defined based on the use of the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) model developed by FAO, and complemented by qualitative methods. The impact of the JRS will be assessed after three rounds of surveys (baseline, midline and endline) against the RIMA model.
73. The RIMA model is an econometric approach that builds on the Resilience Index. This index weighs the five dimensions that contribute to household resilience:
- Access to basic services (ability to meet basic needs, e.g. school, hygiene);
 - Productive assets (e.g. land, livestock);
 - Social safety nets (access to timely assistance from organizations, friends, family);
 - Adaptive capacity (sources of income);
 - Sensitivity (type of income sources, extent to which household has been affected by shocks in the past).
74. The index is measured through household surveys which include indicators related to each of the five components above. It is calculated for each household through a factor analysis, and the factor loading values indicate the relative importance of each dimension, providing information on factors that influence resilience to shocks. The absolute values of each variable also provide a household level descriptive analysis (e.g. by livelihood group and gender of head of household).
75. The JRS impact evaluation methodology includes the implementation of a baseline, midline and impact survey in each of the pilot districts. Baseline surveys were carried out in 2013 and 2014 using the mixed method approach, with qualitative data gathered through community consultations and other participatory methods and integrated into a RIMA-based quantitative analysis. As part of the joint planning and impact evaluation, baseline surveys, Community Consultation and Action Planning (CCAP) and seasonal consultations were also conducted in the other pilot zones (Puntland and Somaliland) in June 2014.
76. The JRS documents state that the baseline surveys and qualitative assessments also aim to provide decision makers with actionable information to inform response planning and targeting.
77. The report of the baseline analysis in Dolow district was released in February 2014. A second round (midline survey) was conducted in February/March 2015, and provides information at the midterm of the Resilience Sub-programme. As described in the methodology section, the data from baseline and midterm surveys in Dolow were used as key secondary quantitative data for this evaluation.

78. In addition to the mixed method impact evaluation methodology of the Joint Resilience Strategy, FAO Somalia has developed its own monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to monitor the outputs and outcomes of its country programme. The system combines various methods and tools, such as: regular post-distribution assessments; call centre exercises to ensure compliance with standards set for service; internal impact assessments and evaluations; external evaluations under specific projects (OSRO/SOM/108/EC, OSRO/SOM/126/EC, Cash for Work); crop yield assessments; and regular field missions conducted by the M&E Unit Field Monitors.
79. Regarding evaluations, although impact evaluation is undertaken jointly by the three UN agencies for the JRS pilot districts, to date each agency remains responsible for the external evaluation of its own programme, and has its own evaluation mechanism.

1.5 Context

1.5.1 Security and political context

80. In Somalia, security remains one of the biggest challenges. Internal conflicts have prevailed across most areas of Somalia for more than two decades, influenced primarily by both regional and global political agendas. At present, conflict prevails in southern Somalia, where the forces of the Federal Government of Somalia assisted by African Union peacekeeping troops are fighting against various militant Islamist groups. The fighting claimed the lives of over 10 000 people and forced hundreds of thousands to flee the capital. Most of the population has lived with chronic insecurity in which acts of politically driven war, armed criminality, and communal violence are often indistinguishable⁵. The war resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis in 2011-2012, exacerbated by a prevailing drought. The FSNAU declared a state of famine in June 2011. Despite nearly ten years of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, the 2011-2012 famine showed that people were not equipped to deal with drought and other shocks.
81. The overall humanitarian operating environment in Somalia continues to be challenging: over 3 000 violent incidents with humanitarian implications were recorded in 2014, severely restricting the mobility of aid workers especially in the southern regions. Large parts of southern and central Somalia, mainly rural areas and on the outskirts of the main towns, remain under the control or influence of Al-Shabaab.
82. The Al-Shabaab group is engaged in combat against the Federal Government of Somalia, its partners, and the African Union Mission to Somalia. Aid workers and humanitarian assistance in general are targeted. Numerous incidences of violence are regularly reported, including land mines, targeted killings, armed confrontations and suicide bombings, especially but not only in the southern regions of the country.
83. In the current situation of protracted and complex crisis, efforts to rebuild state institutions remain a challenge. Following a fragile but positive transition in mid-2012, Somalia now has a full federal government in Mogadishu, based on a provisional constitution. In 2013, the government published the Somali Compact, setting forth the priorities for Somalia for 2013 through 2016. These priorities, articulated in the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), are the framework under which all future funding is expected to be allocated in Somalia during this timeframe.

1.5.2 Livelihoods and food security

84. Pastoralism and agro-pastoralism are the country's main livelihoods systems. As in other areas of the Horn of Africa region, livestock mobility restrictions, demographic pressures and encroachment on pastureland are among the key drivers of escalating conflicts (e.g. among pastoralists and between pastoralists and settled farming communities) over pasture and water sources (FAO Somalia, 2015a). Pastoralists exist throughout Somalia with high concentrations of strict pastoralists in the north and central areas, and pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the southern areas. Throughout the region (including areas of Ethiopia and Kenya), rainfall patterns force a complex series of movements in search of grazing land between seasons⁶.

5 Menkhaus, K. (2012) 'Conflict analysis: Somalia', prepared for UN Political Office for Somalia

6 FSNAU Pastoralism

85. Agriculture, an important economic activity in Somalia, meets the cereal needs of roughly 50 percent of the population and generates income for farmers through crop sales and agricultural opportunities. While extensive rainfed agriculture predominates, irrigation schemes along the Shebele and Juba rivers permit the development of more productive riverine agriculture.
86. In rural areas, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and agriculturalists all depend on markets to varying degrees in gaining access to income and food. Pastoralists rely on the local and export sales of livestock and livestock products for 40-80 percent of their cash income, and cover 30-70 percent of their food needs through local and imported cereal purchases.
87. Since the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, both markets and trade have shown great resilience and dynamism. Trade (both domestic and export/import-oriented) is closely integrated with neighbouring countries and within the greater region. The livestock export sector is significant, as Somalia is the largest single exporter of live animals in the world. Livestock and livestock products constitute the largest exports from Somalia (80 percent of exports in normal years⁷). They are shipped to various countries in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as markets in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.
88. The prolonged history of protracted conflict and the lack of effective governance, law and order, especially in southern and central Somalia, have negatively impacted livelihoods. Cash-strapped farmers, for example, are forced to sell their produce immediately after harvest either to raise cash or to meet household needs. Moreover, many lack storage facilities and the means to transport their products to market. Insecurity and conflict further affect the availability of food through the destruction of productive assets, household food stores and the disruption of commodity trade networks. They undermine economic access to food, for example, through the diminution of financial assets, and limit physical access to food sources such as markets due to the presence of conflict frontlines or roadblocks. In conjunction with climate impacts, insecurity and conflict adversely affect livelihood strategies, as well as food and livelihood security.
89. The multiple impacts of civil insecurity and conflict may be short-lived, or felt across several seasons or years. However, in some instances, 'less visible' incidents such as tension over access to water and grazing, or numerous roadblocks, escape the label of 'war' or 'conflict'. These may be less dramatic than open conflict but the impact upon food and livelihood security can be profoundly disruptive. For example, people tend to shorten their time horizons and are unwilling to invest in the future if the future is uncertain: crops are not planted and business investments are limited⁸.

Box 3. Somalia and the New Deal

On 16 September, 2013 the Federal Government of Somalia and the European Union hosted a conference in Brussels to endorse the New Deal (or Somali) Compact. The Compact promised "a new political, security and development architecture framing the future relations between Somalia, its people, and the international community." This agreement, backed by pledges of EUR 1.8 billion seeks to increase the alignment of international assistance to Somalia's own national peacebuilding and state building priorities, and to enshrine the principles of mutual accountability for delivery on the commitments made between Somalia and its development partners (Hearn and Zimmerman, 2014).

The Compact determines the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia for 2013-2016. These peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities for Somalia are:

- PSG1: Inclusive Politics: Achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes.
- PSG 2: Security: Establish unified capable accountable and rights based Somalia federal security institutions providing basic safety and security for its citizens,
- PSG 3: Justice: Establish independent and accountable justice institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the people of Somalia by delivering justice for all.
- PSG 4: Economic Foundations: Revitalize and expand the Somali economy with a focus on livelihood enhancement, employment generation and broad-based inclusive growth.
- PSG 5: Revenue and Services: Increase the delivery of equitable, sustainable and affordable services that promote national peace and reconciliation amongst Somalia's regions and citizens, and enhance transparent and accountable revenue generation and equitable distribution and sharing of public resources.

Cross-cutting issues include: Gender, Capacity Development, Bringing Tangible Results to People, Respect of Human rights and External Relations.

7 FSNAU Livestock

8 FSNAU

90. Somali communities and institutions have limited capacities to absorb or adapt to risks and shocks, and are often unable to recover following such an event. Agro-pastoral, pastoral and peri-urban communities are particularly vulnerable to climate variability, drought and seasonal flooding. In addition, animal diseases (e.g. Rift Valley fever, tick-borne diseases, Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia, goat and sheep pox) are frequent and can have disastrous impacts on livestock and related trade flows. Indeed, the ban on live animal exports imposed by Saudi Arabia from 2001 to 2009 and linked to Rift Valley fever gravely disrupted the livestock sector. Such closure of livestock markets and disruption of cross-border trade due to outbreaks of livestock diseases can worsen food insecurity among the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Plant pests and diseases also affect food crops, causing significant losses to farmers and threatening food security.

1.5.3 International engagement

91. In the absence of a formal commercial banking sector, Somalia has become heavily dependent on aid, and even more so on remittances: the World Bank reports that in 2012 remittances to families in Somalia amounted to USD 1.3 billion annually, as compared with approximately USD 1 billion in official development assistance.
92. For over a decade Somalia has been one of the top 10 recipients of humanitarian assistance, with a peak at USD 1.1 billion just after the famine in 2011. The United States provided 18 percent of all humanitarian assistance to Somalia between 2003 and 2012. In 2012-2013, it was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, followed by the EU and the UK⁹.
93. OCHA's Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) began in 2013, at a time when there was limited development funding for Somalia. The three-year HRP intended to broaden humanitarian programming to address the underlying causes of vulnerability. The 2015 Somalia HRP retains three of the original four objectives of the 2013 HRP: (i) provide timely and quality life-saving assistance to people in humanitarian crisis and emergency; (ii) enhance the scale and quality of humanitarian protection services and improve the broader protective environment through preventative measures; and (iii) strengthen the resilience of vulnerable households and communities through livelihood support, and programmes for critical gaps in basic social services and social protection that complement disaster risk reduction, recovery and development interventions. The 2015 HRP includes 224 projects and seeks USD 862.5 million to address the humanitarian needs of 2.8 million Somalis.
94. Although the majority of official development assistance has been directed towards humanitarian assistance, there is a shift towards longer term development in Somalia, with several examples of efforts to strengthen resilience at various levels. In addition to the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme, and the FAO-WFP-UNICEF JRS described above, other actors have developed resilience programmes in Somalia in recent years. In particular, three major NGO consortia comprising a total of 14 NGOs have received USD 98 million to implement resilience programs in Somalia from 2013 to 2017. These are:
- Building resilient communities in Somalia: Concern, Cooperazione e Sviluppo, International Rescue Committee, Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children;
 - Somalia Resilience Programme: Action Contre la Faim, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, CARE, Cooperazione Internazionale, Danish Refugee Council, Oxfam, and World Vision; and
 - ACTED/ADESO.

1.5.4 FAO in Somalia

95. FAO Representation in Somalia was officially established in 1980, and closed in 1996 due to security constraints. Since then, the FAO Somalia country office has been located in Nairobi. Between 2012 and 2015, the office had no formal Representative, but was managed by an Officer-in-Charge or Head of Office. The current FAOR Somalia (the first FAOR since 2002) was officially appointed in August 2015, after a period of nearly two years since the previous Officer-in-Charge had left the office in October 2013.
96. The implementation of the FAO Somalia programme is therefore remotely managed through field offices in Somalia, located in Mogadishu, Dolow (South Central), Garowe and Bosasso (Puntland), and Hargeisa (Somaliland). Moreover, about 35 FAO field staff are posted in various locations outside the five offices in Somalia.

9 OECD - DAC ; <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats>

97. In 2012, FAO Somalia senior management initiated a plan to move some operational functions to Mogadishu, while others (e.g. procurement) would remain in Nairobi. The plan included a relocation or appointment of 26 international staff to Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe by June 2013. The move to Mogadishu has yet to happen, and is dependent on a number of variables, including the dynamic security situation (which declined in the past several months), the availability of office space that meets security standards, as well as the ability to accommodate the full staff of FAO within Mogadishu given that the UN has a ceiling on the number of staff positioned there. As of July 2015, although some premises have been built for the offices and staff, the move had been put on hold by management.
98. Remote management has become the modus operandi for most international organizations operating in Somalia. It poses a number of challenges ranging from conducting needs analysis, implementation, M&E of projects, and prevention or control towards possible funds diversion. Remote management and security constraints also considerably increase the cost of programme implementation, due to the need to frequently travel and comply with costly security measures.
99. FAO's activities in Somalia are implemented through implementing partners (generally NGOs, currently about 55), selected for their experience and presence, institutional competence, implementation readiness and compliance with UN fiduciary requirements.
100. Risk management is well developed in FAO Somalia, through the use of a comprehensive compliance oversight programme (e.g. call centres and satellite imagery) coupled with intensive M&E (e.g. field monitors, community surveys and external evaluations).
101. Overall FAO programme delivery in Somalia has increased steadily since 2011, with a peak in 2014 reaching USD 70 million and a slight decline thereafter. The figure below shows that interventions have been primarily emergency focused since 2011: non-emergency operations represented less than five percent of the total delivery in 2014.




Figure 1. Total field programme delivery 2010-2015 (as of 28 February 2015)

102. FAO Somalia's CPF¹⁰ was prepared in 2013 and is a guiding document for FAO's engagement in Somalia for the period 2014-2017. Priorities have been defined in consultation with the federal government and development actors, and are aligned with FAO's strategic framework.
103. The FAO Somalia CPF aims at improving livelihoods and food and nutrition security in Somalia through the following strategic priority areas (or pillars):
 - i. Resilience Sub-programme (focus of this evaluation);
 - ii. Institutional Capacity Development and Policy Support: develop the capacities of line ministries to formulate and implement strategies, policies and regulatory frameworks for sustainable development; and capacitate relevant government institutions to carry


10 Currently awaiting the final endorsement of the Federal Government.

- out applied research, build alliances with development institutions and comply with international standards and regulations;
- iii. Information for Action: increase evidence-based decision making by providing timely, actionable and well analysed information.

104. As shown in Figure 2 below, FAO's Programme in Somalia contributes mainly to FAO's Strategic Objective 5 on building resilience. In particular, the Resilience Sub-programme contributes to the following SO5 outputs:

- 5.2.2 - Improving capacities to undertake vulnerability and/or resilience analysis;
- 5.3.2 - Improving access of most vulnerable groups to services which reduce the impact of disasters and crisis;
- 5.4.1 - Improving capacities of national authorities and stakeholders for emergency preparedness to reduce the impact of crises;
- 5.4.2 - Strengthening coordination capacities for better preparedness and response to crises;
- 5.4.3 - Strengthening capacities of national authorities and stakeholders in crisis response.

Figure 2. FAO Somalia delivery estimates by Strategic Objective (biennium 2014/15)



105. In 2012/2013, FAO's Office of Evaluation (OED) undertook an evaluation of FAO's cooperation in Somalia, covering the period of 2007-2012. The evaluation analysed the relevance, effectiveness and impact, efficiency, and connectedness of the FAO Somalia Programme, as well as cross-cutting issues and partnerships. The evaluation highlighted results, gaps, constraints and opportunities for FAO's cooperation in Somalia, and provided 17 recommendations for FAO Somalia and FAO HQ. A summary of the most relevant recommendations to this current evaluation are reported below:

- Despite operational challenges, FAO Somalia needs to strengthen the culture and practice of community consultation within the programme, from the design stage onward.
- FAO Somalia must invest in more rigorous analysis to underpin its programming and to test some of the assumptions on which programme choices and decisions have been made.
- Linkages between the livestock and agriculture sectors in FAO Somalia should be strengthened.
- There needs to be greater investment in trend analysis, drawing on the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit-Somalia (FSNAU) and Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) data.
- New programming should be developed in four areas: natural resource management, peri-urban agriculture, nutrition (food-based approaches) and fisheries.
- FAO Somalia must develop a differentiated and more nuanced approach to partnership, at a minimum differentiating between contractual service provision

(e.g. a Letter of Agreement (LoA) and genuine partnership (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)).

- FAO Somalia's resilience strategy should be extended to 15 years (broken down into 3-year programming cycles), and should address governance issues.
- A review of FAO Somalia's skill sets should be undertaken in order to assess how they must change for effective implementation of the Resilience Sub-programme.
- FAO (HQ) should learn from the programme approach that has been pioneered by FAO Somalia and should promote this at country level over the project approach.

106. The evaluation includes a specific Annex on the then emerging Resilience Sub-programme, with an analysis of opportunities, issues and gaps, challenges and recommendations. This analysis is reported in the Appendix 3.
107. The follow up report to the recommendations was prepared by FAO Somalia in August 2015¹¹. It shows that a number of recommendations have been addressed by management. For instance, community consultations and consultations with federal and regional authorities during project formulation stages have improved, although direct consultation by FAO staff at village level remains limited due to access and security issues in many parts of the country. As detailed below, some initiatives (such as PFS and fodder production), have seen an increased collaboration of the livestock and agriculture sector, while new programming options are being tested related to natural resource management, peri-urban agriculture, nutritious food and fisheries. On the other hand, aspects related to partnerships, as well as the skill set of FAO Somalia, still require the attention of management.

1.6 Methodology

108. The evaluation team consisted of a team leader, a qualitative data analyst, a quantitative data analyst and two external experts who provided advice and quality assurance during the various stages of the evaluation. The field work in Somalia was conducted by a team from the Heritage Institute of Policy Studies (HIPS), and with the logistical support of FAO Somalia field staff.
109. The evaluation took place between January and September 2015, with an inception mission in Nairobi in March 2015 and the main evaluation mission in April-May 2015.
110. The evaluation questions were defined through a participatory process: they were drafted by the OED evaluation manager based on a preliminary desk review and discussions with the country office, then shared for comments with the country office, HQ staff involved in the Resilience Sub-programme and donors, and finalized during the inception mission (March 2015) through a series of key informant interviews with FAO staff and partners. The existing sources of information were also analysed during the inception mission, as well as the gaps. Following this analysis, the data sources and methods below were defined.

1.6.1 Quantitative data

111. Quantitative data for this evaluation were exclusively drawn from secondary sources: the baseline and midline household surveys conducted in Dolow in 2013 and 2015 respectively. These surveys were conducted by FAO Somalia as part of the impact evaluation methodology of the JRS, with technical support from ESA in FAO HQ but with no involvement nor quality control by the evaluation team. The methodology adopted by FAO Somalia/ESA for these surveys is briefly described below.
112. The Baseline data were collected in March 2013, involving 1 014 households; the midterm review took place two years later, in March 2015, involving 573 households. In each case, the survey was carried out in both Dolow and Luuq districts, and respondents were classified as treatment and control group respectively, as shown in the table below. Given time and resource constraints during the midline survey, the sample at midline was half the size of the sample at baseline (1 014 vs 573). Both samples were randomly drawn.

11 Available on OED's website.

Table 3. Households interviewed during baseline and midterm survey

Total households interviewed			
	Treatment (Dolow)	Control (Luuq)	Total
Baseline	711	303	1 014
Mid-term	400	173	573

113. The indicators included in both surveys were determined according to the information required to calculate the RIMA index, which is described above. The table below shows the list of indicators selected by the evaluation team, as they relate to the expected outcomes and impact of the Resilience Sub-programme.

114. In addition to the surveys mentioned above, the evaluation made use of the monitoring data collected by the FAO Somalia M&E unit, including (but not limited to) external evaluations and studies on crop yield assessments; agricultural project evaluations; an externally conducted cash-for-work evaluation by the Oxford Policy Group; post-distribution assessments for CFW; and Resilience Sub-programme progress reports.

Table 4. Indicators used for the impact evaluation in Dolow

Indicator	Unit
Income	
Weekly income from crop production	\$
Weekly income from livestock	\$
Weekly income from wage labor	\$
Weekly income from entrepreneurial activities	\$
Weekly income from transfers	\$
Weekly income from other sources	\$
Total weekly income	\$
Number of income sources	#
Productive assets	
Tropical Livestock Unit	Number of tropical livestock units owned by the household (#)
Cultivated land	Hectares
Crop harvested	Total amount of maize harvested in kilograms
Crop value	Value in \$ of yearly crop production
Employment ratio per household	%
Other indicators	
Food consumption score	The food consumption score captures the dietary diversity and nutrient value of the food people eat. It is calculated from the types of foods and the frequency with which they are consumed over a seven day period (#)
Access to credit	Percentage of households reporting that they have access to credit (#)
Debt	Amount of debt still owed (USD)
Coping strategies index	The coping strategies index is derived from the severity and frequency of consumption coping strategies that households apply in times of acute food shortages. It is a relative measure to compare trends of food insecurity over time, as well as cross sectional differences in food insecurity among sub groups (#)

1.6.2 Qualitative data

115. Primary qualitative data was gathered: (i) during fieldwork in South Central, Puntland and Somaliland, from 23 April to 15 May; and (ii) through interviews in Nairobi.
116. The evaluation team leader and evaluation manager interviewed FAO staff as well as more than 20 external stakeholders in Nairobi, including UNICEF and WFP staff and the main donor representatives (Canada, US, EU, UK, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland and Denmark), in addition to FAO Somalia staff (Nairobi and Somalia-based). Additional interviews with stakeholders based in Rome and elsewhere (e.g. donors with no representation in Nairobi) were performed by the team leader and evaluation manager, either in person or remotely by phone/Skype where necessary.
117. The field work in Somalia was conducted by a national team of four researchers from a Somali NGO called Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. The evaluation team leader trained the team in Hargeisa, Somaliland for 2.5 days, but did not participate in the field work because of a security situation that had worsened during that period.
118. The duration of the field work (three weeks) was based on the number of accessible locations to be visited, as suggested by FAO Somalia. During the entire exercise, the national team was accompanied by an FAO field staff in each location. The team conducted 20 focus group discussions and 31 key informant interviews with beneficiaries, partners (WFP and UNICEF) and government officials in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central.
119. The national team visited the following locations, which were defined on the basis of the activities implemented within the Resilience Sub-programme, as well as access and security considerations: Beer, Owdweyne, Baki, Hargeisa, Bossaso, Garowe, Dungarayo, Dolow and Mogadishu. Galkayo was also supposed to be visited, but was cancelled due to a report of high insecurity by the national team.
120. The team in Somalia collected information through key informant interviews, focus group discussions and site visits. Interview guide(s) and focus group discussion formats were developed by the evaluation team so that responses from different individuals could be compared across locations. Respondents to both key informant interviews and focus group discussions in Somalia were identified by FAO Somalia field and Nairobi-based staff.
121. The interview guides were prepared following the outcome harvesting method: rather than tracking activities to see whether they have been implemented, the evaluation team first identified the relevant outcomes and outputs in each location to be visited by the field team, and then focused on determining, in the interviews, how FAO contributed to them.
122. To establish contribution, the evaluation team used both the reported observations (progress reports, M&E unit information), and the data collected during the field work. Information obtained was, when possible, triangulated with other sources of information to ensure a coherent line of investigation.

1.6.3 Analysis

123. The main data analysis methods used by the team are described below:
 - **Mixed Methods Data Integration:** when possible, data collected from the various methods was integrated to arrive at findings and conclusions, especially for evaluation question two. Those instances are noted where different methods converged, yielding a finding that was supported by multiple types of data. When different methods produced conflicting evidence, the team has, to the extent possible, doubled back to examine the degree to which findings from different methods on the same question diverged and why these data conflict.
 - **Difference in difference and descriptive statistics:** wherever possible, the evaluation team has used descriptive statistics from the Dolow baseline and midline surveys to identify changes over time, using frequencies and/or time series statistics where appropriate. The difference in difference methodology was applied, given the availability of a treatment and control group in both surveys. The analysis consists of looking at the average change of the same units within each group in both time periods between treatment and control group. In this way, it is possible to remove

biases deriving from intrinsic differences between the two groups, or other biases due to experiment timing.

Table 5. Data collection sources by key evaluation question

1- Is the programme design adequately addressing the various elements that may affect resilience of the communities in Somalia?		
Primary data sources		Secondary data sources
Somalia	Nairobi	
Beneficiaries ¹ FAO field staff Other field stakeholders (e.g. government, NGOS, local elders)	FAO Somalia WFP UNICEF	Review of programme documents Progress reports M&E unit data Log Frames and updates CCAP reports Seasonal Consultation reports
2- To what extent has the Resilience Sub-programme made progress in strengthening resilience of the participants and their communities, considering the short-time frame since the beginning of the programme (two years)?		
Beneficiaries FAO field JRS field Other field stakeholders (e.g. government, NGOS, local elders)	FAO Somalia WFP UNICEF	Review of programme documents Progress reports M&E unit data Baseline/Midterm data Log Frames and updates CCAP reports Seasonal Consultation reports
3- What is the added value of the programmatic approach adopted by FAO Somalia, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and results of the programme?		
FAO field JRS field	FAO Somalia and HQ WFP, UNICEF Donors	Review of programme documents Progress reports Log Frames and updates
4- What are the potentials and opportunities of the partnerships developed in the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme?		
FAO field JRS field Other field stakeholders (e.g. government, NGOS, local elders)	FAO Somalia Donors JRS	Review of programme documents Progress reports Log Frames and updates

124. A data analysis workshop was held in Rome in June 2015, to discuss and interpret the data collected for each evaluation question, and identify preliminary findings. The workshop was facilitated by OED and included the team leader, the quantitative and qualitative data analysts, and the Somali field supervisor. The two other members of the team participated via Skype. The workshop offered an opportunity for the team members to discuss the results of the field work with the field supervisor, and in particular to investigate deeper into some of the findings by direct exchange with the only member who participated in the field work. This resulted in a better understanding and interpretation of the data collected through the field work in Somalia, and facilitated the analysis by the qualitative analyst.

1.7 Limitations

125. This evaluation was hampered by a number of constraints. In particular, the international evaluation team members were not able to participate in the field work and directly interview beneficiaries and partners, nor to observe project implementation and achievements. This was due to deteriorating security conditions during the main phase of the evaluation, and lack of access to some parts of Somalia. The constraints, and the mitigation measures taken by the team, are summarized in Table 6.

126. As a consequence, the data gathered through the field work in Somalia was of neither the quality nor quantity originally intended. Moreover, because of the absence of direct supervision of the national team, the evaluation team missed the opportunity to pursue

some lines of enquiry based on the information gathered during the field work. Although the national team was trained by the team leader, they did not follow all of the guidelines provided. For example, they did not interview implementation partners, although this was part of their work plan. This is a significant weakness, which means that the analysis of partnerships with NGOs is based on the FAO perspective only.

127. Despite the mitigation measures, these constraints had an impact on the capacity of the evaluation to answer some evaluation questions with sufficient evidence and credibility. In particular, findings related to the second main evaluation question on programme impact are limited, and their quality is below initial expectations, resulting in some sub-questions being not or partially answered. The field work also included more discussions with (or better information from) beneficiaries from agricultural activities than on livestock, and no visit was made to beekeeping activities which remain fairly limited so far.
128. The weakness of the field work also explains in part why the report focuses more on processes than results, but this focus is also typical of a mid-term evaluation such as this one, undertaken at a time when the results are only beginning to coalesce.

Table 6. Field work constraints and mitigation measures

	Constraints	Mitigation
Team composition	In the original plan, the field work with a locally hired team of enumerators was to be supervised by two international team members (team leader and technical advisor). Due to the deteriorating security situation, no international staff could join the field work.	A national team training by the team leader was organized in Somaliland.
Team training	Due to deteriorating security, the team leader reduced field time to 2.5 days in Somaliland, with no field testing. The short duration of the training and the lack of field testing had a negative impact on the ability of the team to ensure quality standards in their field work.	The team leader kept as much contact as possible with the team during the data collection.
Data collection and analysis	Due to the complexity of the programme, the team experienced challenges identifying projects by site, partner, location and outcome; despite attempts from the evaluation team to get a clear overview of programme interventions in different regions, this information was not available in a concise and clear format. Some data provided by the field team appeared either rehearsed or generalized; thus data integrity was deemed to be questionable. The national team was unable to ensure that female focus group discussion members were separated from males in two of three regions; certain groups (implementing partners for example) were not met at all, with no valid justification from the field team. The national team was not able to complete the number of interviews and focus groups as requested; (a list of those expected to be interviewed vs. those interviewed is provided in Annex 5). Team capacities for translation and transcription were below expectations. Some locations became "off limits" during the period of data gathering, namely Iskushaban, Galkayo and Dungarayo. Although interviews with non-beneficiaries had been planned at an early stage, this was not possible due to the difficulty identifying the right respondent without proper supervision of the field team. The national team (none of whom were from Somaliland) confronted some resistance and hostility in the Somaliland region particularly, and voiced concern over the validity of some data from that region.	

1.8 Structure and dissemination of the report

129. The report is structured around three sections: 1) Introduction; 2) Findings and Conclusions; and 3) Recommendations. Findings are presented by main evaluation question, and include a number of conclusions, which are related when possible to the relevant sub question(s).
130. Based on the findings and conclusions, the evaluation provides recommendations for maximizing the strategic relevance of FAO's Resilience Sub-programme in Somalia, and towards improving its implementation modalities and effectiveness as well as the introduction of the programme approach at a broader scale within the organization.

The report will be shared with FAO Somalia as well as stakeholders, including donors, FAO HQ and other agencies implementing resilience programmes in Somalia.

2. Findings

2.1 Does the programme design adequately address the various elements that may affect the resilience of communities in Somalia?

131. At the time of the development of the JRS and the Resilience Sub-programme in 2012, FAO Somalia had been found by the 2013 country evaluation to be “in a leadership position within the international community” (FAO, 2013:42) in terms of resilience thinking. Building on research carried out by FAO Somalia’s senior management on resilience, and on dynamic leadership at the time, FAO Somalia was actively contributing to ongoing debates and advocacy on resilience focused on the Somalia context, the Horn of Africa, and beyond (FAO, 2013).
132. The Resilience Sub-programme was hailed as a shift in paradigm and implementation. It was seen as challenging the bifurcated aid architecture into development and humanitarian streams, which has long been recognised as being ill-suited to addressing complex patterns of acute and chronic vulnerability typical of protracted crisis contexts such as Somalia. Resilience was also seen as offering the foundation to more efficiently address both the immediate symptoms as well as the underlying structural causes of vulnerability so that ‘at-risk’ populations could better withstand future shocks. It also offered an opportunity to shift the focus to issues of poverty and vulnerability, thus re-balancing the long-standing preoccupation with state-building in Somalia (FAO, 2013).
133. There are increasing calls among policymakers and aid actors for the need to better support vulnerable households and communities affected by repeated crises in Somalia and elsewhere, while also reducing the need for repeated humanitarian assistance. The development of a multi-year, multi-sectoral programme focused on resilience was in line with these calls. The Resilience Sub-programme was, on one hand, very much needed for the population which has suffered numerous humanitarian crises, and on the other hand an extremely difficult task, in a context characterized by lack of access, security challenges and remote management.
134. The following definition of resilience has been adopted in a number of FAO Somalia programme documents: “Resilience is the ability to anticipate, absorb and recover from external pressures and shocks in ways that preserve the integrity of individuals, households and communities, whilst reducing vulnerability. This includes both the ability to withstand threats and the ability to adapt where necessary; utilizing new options in the face of shocks and crises” (see for example FAO, 2015: 1).

2.1.1 Resilience to what?

135. When related to programming, the above definition calls for an understanding of the pressures and shocks faced by the targeted population. Indeed, the kind of interventions and the target groups to include in the programme can be defined on the basis of the types of shocks faced by the population. The Resilience Sub-programme documents reviewed by the evaluation team however do not present a detailed discussion of exactly which pressures, shocks and crises the programme is expecting to make individuals, households and communities resilient to. As it stands, the programme and its many activities appear to work towards preparing households and communities against virtually any shock, both at the household and at the community level. As mentioned in the context section, these shocks can be as diverse as drought, conflict, loss of the main breadwinner, unemployment and so on. While the intention is commendable, it is virtually impossible to have a single programme making households and communities resilient to any shock that they may be exposed to.
136. An implicit assumption seems to be that the programme is prioritizing resilience to drought. This is coherent with the fact that drought is prominently mentioned as one of the major problems throughout community consultations, as well as during the fieldwork discussions for this evaluation. However, nowhere in the programme documents is this assumption made clear and its rationale explained.
137. With the absence of a precise definition of ‘resilience to what?’, there is a real danger that, unless premised on a robust problem analysis, initiatives may improve communities’ ability

to withstand one shock and at the same time increase their vulnerability to others. For instance, well-designed and technically sound investments in irrigation systems have the potential to support agricultural production, which in turn increases communities' ability to withstand erratic rainfall patterns; this in turn may increase their resilience to weather-related shocks. However, if critical institutional aspects, such as land ownership and use patterns, use and maintenance of irrigated systems and others are not sufficiently taken into account, irrigation systems can (re)ignite conflict (e.g. inter-clan, inter-ethnic groups or between different livelihood groups, such as farmers and pastoralists). In this way they may increase local communities' vulnerability to conflict.

2.1.2 An unclear theory of change

138. The Resilience Sub-programme results chain is articulated around four outcomes and related outputs, which together are expected to achieve the overall programme impact statement: "at risk households anticipate, resist and recover quickly from pressures and shocks". Outcomes and outputs, as well as underlying assumptions and external factors, are the key building blocks of a theory of change that typically underpins programme design. A theory of change articulates and makes explicit the thinking around the contextual conditions that influence the programme, the underlying assumptions of how and why change might happen and the causal pathways of outputs to outcomes, showing them in logical relationship to the others.
139. The evaluation recognizes that the analysis and thinking behind the formulation of the Resilience Sub-programme may be based on project reviews and evaluations, research studies in Somalia, as well as on the knowledge and long-standing contextual experience of FAO Somalia staff. However, nowhere in the document is the rationale behind the definition of the Resilience Sub-programme outputs, outcomes and activities explained; nor is it clear how the different sectors and activities can jointly contribute to the different outputs, and how these outputs can lead to the outcomes needed to build the resilience of the targeted population in Somalia, taking into account external factors and contextual challenges.
140. The articulation of a theory of change encourages the agency to think through and capture in a written document the assumptions underlying the programme. This is important, so that assumptions can be tested throughout the duration of the programme. Monitoring activities may reveal that assumptions were indeed correct and that the programme activities implemented are appropriate. Alternatively, it may become evident during the course of the programme that the assumptions were wrong or inaccurate. Failure to monitor assumptions carries the danger of rolling out activities over and over again without any real interrogation of the validity of the assumptions on which the interventions are based.
141. In addition to making the underlying assumptions explicit, a theory of change also usefully encourages the agency to make reference to existing research and knowledge, such as FSNAU data and trend analysis, thus also identifying knowledge gaps from the outset.
142. Furthermore, in a context of high staff turnover like Somalia (not only in FAO but also in partner organizations and donors), a clearly defined theory of change is critical to ensure a shared understanding of the programme's vision and theory over time.
143. Interviews conducted by the evaluation team with FAO staff and reviews of the project logframe and of programme documents all seem to point to one general underlying assumption that could be phrased as follows: ***"if households and communities have higher income levels and increased production capacity then they will be better able to withstand shocks and in turn will be more resilient"***. Indeed, the programme has a strong emphasis on activities that aim to diversify household income sources (Outcome 1), improve production capacity (Outcome 2), and sell produce at better prices (Outcome 3). While this assumption is broadly relevant in the context of Somalia (as also validated in the evaluation field work, see Box 3), a more detailed explanation on the specific target groups, possible livelihoods and diversification strategies in each livelihood zone could help the programme team to perhaps refocus some of the interventions. The following questions, for example, would deserve attention:
 - Is it better to invest in a second risky livelihood, or to invest in making the first one less risky?
 - What if the two are vulnerable to the same risks – in that case diversification may not reduce risk.

- Beyond diversification, is introducing or promoting an economic activity viable in that economic, security and institutional context?
144. The development of the Resilience Sub-programme offered an opportunity to think through these issues more systemically. For example, in the context of Somalia it would have been critical to also understand how some households and livelihoods have shown elements of resilience over time, and to learn from what has worked in the past (possibly, in some cases, irrespective of agency efforts and programming).
145. Similarly to the argument made above in relation to assumptions and the causal relationship between outputs and outcomes, the rationale for the choice of activities needed to achieve each output could be better articulated.

Box 4. Findings from field work on livelihood diversification

The issue of livelihood diversification was briefly discussed during a number of fieldwork discussions at community level conducted for this evaluation. A number of male and female respondents in both Somaliland and Dolow were of the view that livelihood diversification was a positive way to better manage and withstand shocks. Specifically, there were perceptions that households' reliance on one source of income only (e.g. livestock keeping or farming) was very risky. By the same token, households with different sources of income were seen as better able to prepare and withstand shocks, both weather-related (e.g. drought) and conflict, as explained below.

First, multiple and diverse income sources were indicated as a risk spreading strategy and as a way to increase household income levels. For example, in the event of drought, reliance on livestock keeping as the only livelihood strategy was perceived as risky because all animals, and therefore all households' assets, could be quickly wiped out. Second, increased income levels were perceived as enabling a number of coping strategies during war- and/or drought-induced household stress. These included purchasing food and other items of necessity from the market and migration, especially across the border to Ethiopia or Kenya, including to the Dadaab refugee camp to access assistance.

146. A review of the projects implemented under the Resilience Sub-programme indicates a decision-making approach based on project activities that respond to symptoms rather than the root cause of a problem. One example is found in the technical review of OSRO/SOM/126/EC: *"The project planned to support communal rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure including rehabilitation of canals. It was established that the need for such rehabilitation was great on the ground and FAO, through the project, contracted COMMORRAD to undertake communal canal surveys or measurements, and also to verify the need and canals' existence"* (CCORD, 2014: 13). The need in this case is canals, presumably not in operation, which require rehabilitation and the programme steps in to fill this gap by rolling out activities to rehabilitate those canals.
147. There is growing recognition among agencies, including FAO HQ (see FAO, 2011), that too often programme development starts from pre-identified activities that focus on needs and symptoms (e.g. canals in need of rehabilitation), rather than starting from a more robust and holistic approach focused on a deep understanding of resilience in that specific context, to understand why the canal is not rehabilitated. Other questions such as "what are the problems of the agriculture sector in the area, including issues related to the hydrology, ecosystem, land ownership patterns and use of existing water sources", and what are the linkages with other sectors (e.g. nomadic pastoralism) that should also be part of this reflection.
148. Time and resources were invested by FAO Somalia in collecting a range of information and data through baseline and other surveys, assessments, and other methods in different sectors. These efforts however seem to be limited to informing different projects and related activities, and to assessing existing needs or, as mentioned above, symptoms. They do not seem to be part of a more strategic approach developed at sector and cross-sector level where the problems at stake are identified, analysed and linked to tailored solutions as part of a programming process.
149. Limited attention to problem analysis seems to be also reflected both in the large number of activities implemented and their nature. Navigating through the programme logframe, outputs and activities give a sense that the programme is trying to cover a lot of ground,

through many interventions across several sectors. The activities implemented are not new. Provision of assets (seeds, tools, fertilizers, fodder); creation, expansion or rehabilitation of productive infrastructure (irrigation canals, grain stores, water pumps, land reclaiming); marketing infrastructure (livestock, meat markets, slaughterhouses); training activities (PFS or FFS, CAHWs, cooperatives support); and several others have all been implemented for decades by FAO and other government and non-government agencies in Somalia and in neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa. This also raises questions on whether the Resilience Sub-programme has resulted in a paradigm shift in programming.

150. There is no doubt that problem analyses are a complex, time-consuming process, especially in Somalia. But the systematic adoption of this approach to programming carries the potential to help rationalizing and prioritizing programming options or activities to make sure the options (or combination of options) chosen are the best to tackle the problem at stake.

2.1.3 Community consultations and programme design

151. In JRS areas, FAO together with WFP and UNICEF has invested in local consultation processes in the form of CCAPs and seasonal calendars. These community-based exercises are aimed at informing the development of activities (per livelihood group and per season), and ultimately improving the relevance of the programme and the coordination of its activities.
152. An examination of some of the reports (CCAPs and seasonal consultation workshop reports) generated through consultation processes provides a relatively good overview of the main socio-economic and environmental factors shaping resilience in a given area. It also shows that efforts were made by facilitators to collect and present findings and participants' views disaggregated by gender (men/women), age (youth/elderly) and livelihood or status group (IDPs, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists). This is positive, as it shows recognition for the socially differentiated nature of resilience and places the focus on individuals, households, or specific population groups, rather than on the more generic and rather abstract concept of 'community'. That said, the quality of information and structure of reports is not consistent. This is perhaps not surprising since different teams, possibly with different capacities, conducted consultations in different areas. The plans provide a list – often quite long – of no doubt useful activities that could be undertaken in a given area, but there is little explanation of how each activity can actually address the root causes of vulnerability.
153. This evaluation found evidence of *ad hoc* programmatic adjustment based on data collected through community consultations, but there is currently no systematic process to ensure CCAP and seasonal calendar data are fully incorporated into cyclical planning. This appears to be a missed opportunity, as the consultations have the potential to provide very useful information for programming. The community consultations are further discussed under section 2.4.2.

2.1.4 Resilience Sub-programme structure

154. Geographically, the Resilience Sub-programme targets different areas of the country using three main delivery modalities: FRP (JRS pilot areas), IHRA, and "other development-oriented activities"¹². According to programme documents and interviews with FAO staff, the decision to adopt different modalities of intervention is linked to the recognition that local needs and accessibility differ across the country, in particular "the same level of intensity is not possible all over Somalia, with current levels of funding and access" (FAO, 2015c). As outlined in programme documents and confirmed during interviews with FAO staff, FRP or JRS areas are targeted with 'resilience activities' or the 'full resilience package' (FRP), because they are more stable and accessible, and the needs are less acute than in other areas of the country, making them 'good candidates' for resilience building.
155. While this differentiation is clearly made in programme documents, technical officers are not always aware of the "implementation modality" their activities belong to. It is therefore difficult to access precise information on the various interventions and locations under each modality, and to map them across Somalia in any visual way. While the implementation modalities do manage to discourage silos (since none of them are sector specific), they appear not to be used in a way that makes their distinction purposeful.

12 Other development activities include fishing fleet renewal, construction of slaughterhouses, and equipment of veterinary laboratories.

156. Also, to call any implementation modality “other” tends to decrease the apparent importance or priority of those activities, and does not reflect the rationale for any activity to fall under “other” (except that it falls neither under FRP nor IHRA). Considering that a substantial portion of the Resilience Sub-programme activities falls into the “other” category, this is worth mentioning. Similarly, the term “full resilience package” implies that the other implementation modalities (IHRA and other) deliver only a part of a resilience “package”, which raises the question of their rationale within a Resilience Sub-programme. While this may seem a case of nothing more than semantics, it lessens the appearance of programmatic cohesion and clarity, and affects how FAO can communicate the programme to donors and partners.
157. In IHRA areas, needs are deemed to be more acute than in FRP areas and accessibility hindered. Indeed, the IHRA is defined in programme documents as the “humanitarian component” of the Resilience Sub-programme (*Ibid.*). Geographical targeting in IHRA areas is determined through FSNAU’s IPC data, typically Phase 3 (crisis) and 4 (emergency). In these areas, the idea is to provide rapid humanitarian response to communities whose food security has been affected by a shock (e.g. drought or floods).
158. The rationale underpinning the distinction between FRP and IHRA areas is important for programme design, since it should presumably inform different modalities of interventions in the two areas, different choices of activities, different targeting groups and so on. In turn it is not clear to the evaluation the difference (approach and nature of activities) in FRP and IHRA areas. The distinction between modalities did not exist in the original resilience programme document¹³ and was then established by FAO Somalia when realizing the importance of continued humanitarian assistance and the need to somehow “fit” all these “other” projects somewhere.
159. Issues related to stability, accessibility and needs, as outlined above on the basis of programme documents and interviews with FAO staff, appear to require much more attention and explanation in programme documents, precisely to more clearly differentiate and explain how the needs, vulnerabilities and risks of people living in FRP areas are different than those living in IHRA areas. If needs, as well as vulnerabilities, risks, shocks and so on are not clearly spelled out in the first place, it becomes difficult for the programme itself to objectively assess the appropriateness of interventions in FRP vs IHRA areas in responding to ‘different needs’. Also, the evaluation did not see, in practice, any difference between the IHRA activities and a conventional humanitarian assistance programme. For example, CFW and FFW interventions are not only implemented in IHRA areas, but also in FRP areas by FAO and WFP respectively.

2.1.5 Gender equality

160. Notwithstanding the acute vulnerabilities of Somali women, the baseline conducted for the Resilience Sub-programme in Dolow points to women’s changing economic and social roles, in a context of younger household heads, weakening customary authorities, conflict and intense mobility (FAO, WFP, UNICEF, 2013; see also FAO, 2013). Decades of conflict have prompted women to assume the role of main breadwinner in the household and to become involved in decision-making processes both within and outside the home (*Ibid.*). Echoing the finding of a Mercy Corps assessment of resilience in Somalia (Mercy Corps, 2013 in FAO, WFP, UNICEF, 2013), the Dolow baseline also underscores women’s resilience and their “formidable adaptive capacity” (*Ibid.*: 8).
161. These findings resonate with some of our fieldwork discussions in Dolow. When discussing avenues through which households could attain different sources of income, some respondents, both male and female, pointed to women’s changing economic and social roles and women’s increasing engagement in diverse economic activities. For instance, a number of female beneficiaries in Dolow explained how they started to work as cleaners and cooks for the first time in nearby urban areas to supplement the family’s income during the 2011 drought. They added that today they were still working and pointed to the benefits they had gained as a result. These included increased ability to contribute to the family’s income, to save, and to gain economic independence. Also in Dolow there were a few mentions that women are increasingly engaged in activities beyond their traditional areas of work, for example in the construction business.

13 FAO Somalia 2012-2015 - Resilience Programme, 30 October 2012, Final Version.

162. As discussed under section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, there are also indications that as a result of programme activities women have expanded agricultural production and sale activities. These dynamics warrant more attention and deeper understanding to make sure that the Resilience Sub-programme interventions adequately address women's changing needs and capacities.
163. Despite the critical importance of developing programmes that are gender-sensitive in this context particularly, the 2012-2013 FAO Somalia Country Evaluation found little or no evidence of gender issues being mainstreamed in FAO's programmes at the time (FAO, 2013). The evaluation recommended that FAO develops a "strategy for mainstreaming gender across the organisation, supporting staff to implement gender-sensitive programmes and to consider what gender equity means, and to develop an appropriate structure whereby addressing gender is everyone's job rather than just an adviser's job (for example, a gender focal team should be considered)." (*Ibid.* 81).
164. In response to the findings of the country programme evaluation, efforts have been underway since 2014 to ensure more attention on gender equality in the Resilience Sub-programme. One of the first steps taken by the management of FAO Somalia was to explore the possibility of using the gender specialist officer working under FSNAU as a shared resource. This led to a change in the scope of the work of this officer, who now spends 50 percent of his time with FSNAU and 50 percent with the Planning and Coordination Unit of the FAO Country Office, including (but not only) for the Resilience Sub-programme.
165. The gender specialist was indicated during interviews with FAO staff as providing a range of support to the different livelihood sectors to better incorporate gender issues into project activities. This includes the officer's involvement during the project development design phase to ensure that activities are planned with a gender perspective; provision of training and capacity building in gender-related issues for staff in Nairobi and in accessible areas in Somalia¹⁴; and technical support to programme activities (e.g. statistical data, rapid gender assessments (RGA), gender checklists and gender markers to assess the gender sensitivity of project activities). A Standard Operating Procedure for Integrating Gender into FAO Somalia (unpublished) has also been drafted.
166. Interviews with FAO Sector heads revealed mixed feelings as to the extent to which current project activities in their respective sectors were gender-sensitive. Some felt that progress was made in this regard, whereas others felt that attention to gender issues was extremely limited. There are however indications of changes as a result of the sector support provided by the gender specialist officer. For example, FAO has engaged in the rehabilitation of the Berbera port in Somaliland (OSRO/SOM/310/NOR). An RGA was conducted in Berbera and on the basis of the assessment findings, new activities (e.g. mending fish nets) were designed to involve women in rehabilitation activities (FAO Somalia, 2014a). As stressed by FAO staff interviewed, this activity had not been initially considered in the project design but was developed and included following the findings of the RGA. Another example is provided in the box below. Activities also appear to be incorporating women into beneficiary lists based on inclusivity criteria and to reach a threshold (30 percent of female beneficiaries), although it is unclear how much of a difference it makes at the household level.

14 The gender specialist initiated a capacity building programme targeting all FAO technical staff. Security concerns in 2015 prevented the completion of training sessions particularly to staff in Garowe and Dolow, but it is expected that training of technical staffs in those locations will resume once the situation stabilizes.

Box 5. Example of gender integration in CFW programming in Somaliland

An RGA was conducted in Beer village (Burao district, Somaliland) and on the basis of the findings, changes were made to ongoing CFW activities to facilitate the participation of female beneficiaries.

The findings of that study revealed that one of the reasons for the low participation of women in CFW projects was linked to working hours, which run from 6am to noon. Female beneficiaries were forced to wake up as early as 4am to complete their domestic tasks before the start of work on CFW project sites. The working hours for female beneficiaries were changed (to 8am to 11am) and in some cases a short afternoon shift was introduced to allow female beneficiaries to continue working in the afternoon when they reported having some time available. Taking into account women's practical gender needs, a mechanism was also introduced to give female beneficiaries priority for CFW opportunities near or in the village (when available) to minimize their travel time. Lastly, pregnant and lactating women were given the opportunity to appoint an individual (a relative or non-relative) to work on their behalf while retaining their right to collect CFW wages.

According to FAO staff interviewed, those steps led to increased rates of female participants in CFW. This is clearly positive as the limited attention to gender issues and low female participation in CFW projects was specifically highlighted as an area for improvement in a qualitative impact assessment of CFW activities conducted by the Oxford Policy Management (OPM, 2014).

167. Security risk and access constraints in different areas of the country were indicated as hindering the ability of the gender specialist officer to scale up training activities. So far gender training has only been delivered to FAO Somalia staff and implementing partners in a limited number of areas of the country, such as Hargeisa and Garowe. Field monitors across the country, who are responsible for collecting monitoring data on the ground, would greatly benefit from training to improve attention to gender dynamics and increase their knowledge on gender-sensitive project activities¹⁵. Investments in their gender analysis capacities could potentially improve the data collected through monitoring exercises, and help to better understand the differential impact of interventions on the lives of women and men. For the time being, ongoing issues of security and access in several areas of the country have put training of field monitors on hold.
168. An additional challenge relating to security and access constraints is that it has only been possible to conduct a limited number of RGAs. In the accessible areas where RGAs have been carried out (e.g. in Somaliland as outlined above), local livelihoods are predominantly pastoralist or agro-pastoralist. While there is a certain degree of confidence within FAO staff that RGA findings from these areas are relevant and may be used to understand gender dynamics in the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist areas that are currently inaccessible, the same cannot be said for riverine communities, for example. It has not been possible to carry out an RGA in riverine communities, which affected the understanding of gender dynamics in these livelihood systems, as well as the ability to make suggestions on how project activities could be adapted or new activities devised to incorporate a gender perspective.

2.1.6 Targeting

169. In each of the villages visited for this evaluation, community leaders were indicated by our respondents as the main decision makers for beneficiary selection. The use of community leaders as the entry point for targeting is prevalent in Somalia (and elsewhere). The majority of community-level respondents interviewed in all locations perceived the beneficiary selection process as fair, including influence of community leaders. Some explained that leaders have deep knowledge of community members, are well aware of the problems faced by different households, and are therefore best placed to select beneficiaries. However one must consider that non-beneficiaries were *not* interviewed and therefore this assessment may have limited validity.
170. A minority of respondents in Bosasso, for example, mentioned issues of exclusion and unfair targeting. The findings do not reveal the reasons behind perceptions of unfairness and this is a shortcoming of the evaluation. Perceptions of unfairness during targeting are typically related to exclusion from assistance, which is a well-known aspect of programme implementation.

¹⁵ Training reportedly completed as of end 2015.

2.1.7 Conflict analysis and natural resource management

171. Pastoralism and agro-pastoralism are the country's main livelihoods systems. As in other areas of the Horn of Africa region, livestock mobility restrictions, demographic pressures and encroachment on pastureland are among the key drivers of escalating conflicts (e.g. among pastoralists and between pastoralists and settled farming communities) over pasture and water sources (FAO Somalia, 2015a). High levels of displacement caused by decades of conflict and social upheaval have further compounded the situation, making issues such as access to land, land tenure, resettlement and natural resource use and management particularly urgent (FAO Somalia, 2015a).
172. Given the long-standing nature and complexity of conflict in this context, a sound understanding of conflict and its drivers is especially relevant for programme development in Somalia. This understanding is important so that it can be taken into account in programming to ensure that programme activities are designed and implemented in a way that is sensitive to conflict, and therefore at a minimum does not exacerbate it. It can also strategically inform programme development to ensure that activities are also geared to making households and communities more resilient to conflict. In this regard, attention to natural resource management and its relation to both conflict and drought shocks is critical.
173. In 2011, a conflict analyst was hired by FAO Somalia to support the Department for International Development (DFID)-funded Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme¹⁶ (2011-14 OSRO/SOM/203/UK), and a country-wide conflict analysis study was conducted with a focus on livestock, fisheries, fodder and honey value chains (Barasa Mang'eni, 2011). As a result, the design and implementation of the SEED programme was premised on a conflict analysis approach, as stated in the programme memorandum (DFID, 2010: 4 in Barasa Mang'eni, 2011; FAO Somalia, 2013). Specifically, the programme sought to ensure that activities did not unintentionally reinforce inter-clan power dynamics, interfere with ownership rights and inadvertently strengthen drivers of conflict (FAO Somalia, 2013). The fourth interim report notes that conflict sensitive strategies adopted in the implementation of programme activities include convening problem prediction and solving forums, and providing training to build the capacity of interest groups in governance and conflict resolution (FAO Somalia, 2014). As part of this programme, FAO has produced a number of documents, including a conflict sensitive framework to guide the implementation of SEED activities, a number of case studies, and a briefing note on livelihoods and conflict.
174. The conflict analyst that was hired at the start of the SEED programme is now working full-time for the livestock sector under the Resilience Sub-programme, providing support to activities implemented by the livestock sector, as well as other sectors, upon request from technical staff.
175. Unlike the case of SEED, a review of the Resilience Sub-programme documents does not indicate that a conflict-sensitive approach was reflected in the design of the overall programme. For instance, the creation of additional income and employment opportunities for young women and men is mentioned in programme documents under Outcome 1 as contributing to local peace-building efforts (FAO Somalia, 2015). However, why and how the creation of additional income and employment opportunities should carry peacebuilding gains, or exactly which job opportunities for young women and men are more appropriate to the achievement of peacebuilding objectives, is not explained.
176. This design weakness was only partially addressed during implementation. The Resilience Sub-programme 3rd interim report reveals a number of conflict management activities being implemented on the ground. For example the report states that in March 2014, 40 chiefs and village elders were trained for five days on conflict resolution and conflict-sensitive approaches in Dolow (FAO Somalia, 2015). This activity is indicated in the report as having been implemented specifically to minimize growing intra-community tensions, which were seen as posing a risk to the continuation of project activities in the area.
177. Perhaps more practically, FAO Somalia has established a call centre and hotline for communities to provide feedback/complaints on programmes, and to ensure that they receive a timely response. The hotline number is based in Hargeisa Field Office and handled by a female

16 The 3rd Interim Report includes the SEED programme (II phase) as part of "Other contributions aligned to the objectives of the Resilience Sub-programme" (FAO, 2015: 18).

Somali staff, so that marginalized groups such as women and the elderly can have a safe space to voice their concerns. Vouchers distributed by FAO to beneficiaries for collecting inputs are printed with the hotline number. Although it is not possible to avoid every kind of conflict, FAO Somalia is well equipped to detect cases and react in a timely manner.

178. Intra-community conflicts have already arisen as a result of the Resilience Sub-programme activities in some instances, although evidence is limited. For instance, one FAO staff mentioned conflicts between the communities of Baki and Garbo in Somaliland over the water sources rehabilitated by the programme (discussed further in section 2.2.2). An FAO staff noted that on one occasion, even with the full use of all conflict assessment tools available (e.g. call centre checks, use of elders and Ministries, risk management criteria) beneficiary identification turned out to be biased to the extent that a conflict between sub-clans ensued. This was solved only after negotiations and with FAO agreeing to a further distribution of resources.
179. Work on irrigation, natural resources and expansion of agricultural land is highly prone to giving rise to or re-igniting conflict. Beyond merely 'technical' aspects, the design and implementation of such interventions is inevitably confronted with existing local institutional and governance arrangements that determine management of and access to resources (e.g. water, agricultural land, pasture land). In turn, these arrangements determine how different users relate to each other (e.g. sharecropping arrangements, sharing of pastureland and water among pastoralist clans). This is why natural resource management – in Somalia as in other parts of the Horn of Africa – is intimately linked to social norms and relations. In turn, interventions in this area carry a high potential for conflict. This is an important point and should be taken into account in programme design and implementation.
180. The Resilience Sub-programme shows growing attention to natural resource management premised on an analysis of existing institutional arrangements, considerations of the social implications of project activities on these arrangements, and of the nexus between conflict and natural resource management. In Dolow and Somaliland, for instance, FAO is about to implement irrigation systems and land reclamations activities, premised on the Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development (PNTD) approach. This approach consists of an open process of diagnosis at the community level that seeks to understand existing relationships, institutions and mechanisms governing access to and use of land and resources, production and tenure systems in a given context. The ultimate aim of initiatives implemented through this approach is to redress power asymmetries at the community level and enhance the capacity and territorial rights of vulnerable groups (FAO, 2005)¹⁷.
181. According to FAO staff, conflict analyses were also conducted in the fisheries sector to understand the implications of providing fishing boats to the youth, and in particular in terms of fuelling intra-community tensions (e.g. between youth and elderly).

2.1.8 New governance context and its implications for the Resilience Sub-programme

182. A number of interviews with FAO staff and donors placed emphasis on the profound changes in the country's governance system underway since 2012. In August 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia was established following the end of the interim mandate of the Transitional Federal Government. The newly established Federal Government endorsed a provisional constitution which provided for the creation of a federal state and established two levels of government: the Federal Government and the Federal Member State, the latter comprising the local governments and the Federal Member State government (UNDP, 2012; Balthasar, 2014). The overall power of the state and governmental responsibilities are divided between these two levels¹⁸ (UNDP, 2012).
183. Since 2012 and following the enactment of the provisional constitution, Somalia has embarked on the implementation of the federal formula on the ground. The creation of Federal Member States is, unsurprisingly, proving to be a highly contentious process, marked by disputes over territorial boundaries, disagreements between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, and renewed inter-clan tensions (Balthasar, 2014). This is in part linked to ambiguities in the provisional constitution over which political entity should

¹⁷ The PNTD approach and the nature of planned activities are elaborated in section 2.2.2.

¹⁸ Except for matters related to Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Citizenship and Immigration, and Monetary Policy, which are part of the remit of the Federal Government (UNDP, 2012).

lead the establishment of new Federal Member States, centrifugal tendencies and clan-related cleavages that have long plagued the country (*Ibid.*).

184. According to programme documents, the FAO Somalia Country Programming Framework (CPF) is aligned with the building blocks of the Economic Recovery Plan (2014-15) and the Somali Compact (FAO, 2015c). However, the Resilience Sub-programme was designed before 2012, in the context of failed central government and at the height of the famine crisis. In that specific context, stepping in to provide services that would be typically delivered by the government (e.g. agricultural extension services, livestock vaccinations) was an appropriate modality of engagement (see also FAO, 2013). Today, however, the presence of the Federal Government and of Federal Member States, as well as the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG)¹⁹, which aim at rendering local governments as credible basic service providers, may call for a reflection by FAO Somalia on the role that emerging government institutions may assume in ongoing service delivery currently provided by FAO through NGOs.
185. Except for the indication that plans seem to be underway to engage with government institutions to identify and build the capacity of gender champions, this evaluation did not find evidence that the Resilience Sub-programme design and implementation processes have been adapted in response to the changing administrative landscape in Somalia. A number of FAO staff interviewed perceived the creation of Federal Member States as a new administrative and bureaucratic layer of government that has to be taken into account in programme implementation. Building the necessary working relations with government officials was indicated by some FAO staff as challenging, taking time, and not always being a straightforward process. The 3rd Interim Report also notes that the capacity of government institutions is weak and that frequent changes in government personnel results in delays in program implementation (FAO Somalia, 2015).
186. In case of ongoing divergences between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, implementation of programme activities was also found by a number of FAO staff interviewed to be difficult and often delayed under the new governance system. In Dolow for example, FAO has supported the establishment and training of the Barwako Tractor Board to take over the management of the agricultural equipment supplied by the programme, including four tractors and other agricultural inputs (FAO, 2015). FAO has faced difficulties and delays in the implementation of this initiative, because of disagreements with the Federal Government ministers on how the Board should operate.

2.1.9 Conclusions under Evaluation question 1

- A. The lack of a clearly understood theory of change, long-term vision and multi-year strategy of engagement for making households and communities more resilient to specific threats makes it difficult to answer the question whether the programme is addressing the various elements that may affect resilience in the Somalia context.**
- For example, understanding why livelihood diversification is an effective pathway to resilience in the context of Somalia, in what way (what kinds of livelihoods), for who (men, women, young, elderly, etc.) and, equally important, for which shock(s) (drought, war, etc.) seems a critical but overlooked aspect of the programme. In general, the conceptual underpinnings of the programme, underlying assumptions, causal linkages among outputs, and the rationale for the choice of programme activities – premised on rigorous problem analysis and geographical targeting – or the choice of IHRA vs FRP and other implementation modalities, are all elements that have not been given adequate attention in programme development. The programme offers a long list of activities; however, they do not seem to contain much novel implementation practices to take advantage of the transformative potential that the resilience agenda may have had. There seems to have been little reflection during programme design on which shocks, pressures, and crises the programme is expecting to make local households and communities resilient to, and there is limited attention to the underlying structural causes of vulnerability to improve the ability of ‘at-risk’ populations to withstand future shocks. This being said, recent corporate strategic documents on resilience, the results matrix of the current Somalia CPF, as well as the RIMA model all provide useful theoretical grounds for the development of a theory of change for the JRS, and the Sub-programme is paying increased attention to the specific vulnerabilities and needs of the targeted communities (e.g. through the RIMA surveys and community consultations).

¹⁹ http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/operations/projects/womens_empowerment/joint-programme-on-local-governance-and-decentralized-service-de.html

How are cross cutting issues (such as conflicts, power dynamics, inclusion of disadvantaged and discriminated groups, governance and gender equality) being addressed by the Resilience Sub-programme?

- B. Attention to gender within FAO is increasing and there is growing recognition of the changing social and economic roles of women in the country. However, the implications of these changing roles for the programme remain unclear.** Mainstreaming gender is a difficult and long-term process. This is especially so in a country such as Somalia, where prevailing gender inequalities, weak institutions and governance systems, chronic conflict, and insecurity coupled with the difficulties of remote management further complicate this process. A number of positive steps and initiatives are taking place to advance a gender analysis and perspective in the programme. These are significant improvements over the previous situation, which was highlighted by the 2013 evaluation. Currently, however, the gender specialist officer remains the only staff tasked with advancing a gender agenda within the programme. It is difficult to see how one officer, who is not even a full time staff member of the programme, can realistically provide the attention and support needed for a programme of such scale and complexity. Also, while projects are cleared by a gender specialist there does not appear to be team ownership of gender equity, where incorporation of gender issues is seen as everyone's responsibility. Exploring how programme activities (for example CFW) may be able, in certain areas of the country, to build on changing roles and involve female beneficiaries in different, less-traditional activities could be one area for further investigation.

How is conflict sensitive programming and implementation assured throughout the Resilience Sub-programme? Has the Resilience Sub-programme included initiatives to tackle the issue of sustainable natural resource use and management? In doing so, has it considered the socio-political implications of natural resource management in Somalia?

- C. Increased attention to natural resource management in programme design is a significant improvement. Basing the development of initiatives in Somaliland and Dolow on the PNTD approach was critical to addressing conflict at its root causes, and to understanding natural resource management as intimately linked to conflict. The nexus between conflict and natural resource management deserves further attention throughout the programme.** The 2011 country-wide conflict analysis study could have been more widely used to inform the design of activities under different sectors of the Resilience Sub-programme. The evaluation has found evidence that intra-community conflicts arose as a result of some programme activities focused on natural resource management. While FAO has built some capacity to react in case of conflict, it is also critical to focus on the prevention or minimization of potential conflicts that may be ignited (or re-ignited) by programme initiatives.

How has the context changed compared to the planning period? What are the implications for the programme implementation?

- D. Changes in the governance system underway since 2012 will affect the modalities of interventions on the ground. These implications have not yet been fully analysed and the programme has not adapted to take these changes into account.** There are difficulties associated with working in a complex environment such as Somalia, and in a context of shifting governance space. Notwithstanding the enormous challenges, a positive momentum for advancing a state-building process has been created for the first time in decades. This is an important opportunity for FAO and other UN agencies to step up their efforts in support of federal state structures, institutions and policies at all levels, including at municipal level for peri-urban areas.

2.2 To what extent has the Resilience Sub-programme made progress in strengthening the resilience of the participants and their communities, considering the short time frame (two years) since the beginning of the programme?

187. Because of the limited timeframe of this evaluation, it was not possible to undertake an in-depth assessment of each outcome, related outputs and programme activities. As

such, this section only explores a limited number of programme activities, concentrating on those that were mentioned by the field work respondents and/or for which the evaluation team could access sufficient secondary information. The challenges faced in collecting robust qualitative information, as outlined in section 1.7, have greatly affected the ability of this evaluation to provide a more in-depth analysis of the results achieved by the programme (especially in the livestock and fisheries sector). These shortcomings are highlighted throughout.

188. This section also presents, when relevant, information derived from the baseline and midline surveys conducted in Dolow, as described under the methodology section (1.6), together with data from other relevant impact studies.

2.2.1 Outcome 1: Targeted households and communities have diversified their livelihood strategies (FRP) or benefited from temporary employment (IHRA)

189. CFW projects providing temporary employment have been undertaken by FAO Somalia since 2007 as part of the wider portfolio of agriculture-related interventions aimed at strengthening livelihoods and improving income levels in rural areas (OPM, 2014). In 2011, CFW interventions were rapidly scaled up in response to the famine and the fact that FAO was the only UN agency with access to Al Shabaab-controlled areas in South-Central. In 2012 CFW represented 30 percent of total FAO programme expenditure (FAO, 2013).
190. In programme documents, CFW projects contribute to outcomes 1 and 2, through outputs 1.3 and 2.2²⁰, both of which relate to IHRA activities. CFW projects have a dual objective: on the one hand, they provide cash support to eligible households to guarantee the minimum food basket and offer an alternative source of employment to mitigate the impact of crises. On the other hand, they can be an effective way to rehabilitate and/or expand productive assets²¹ (e.g. water catchments, secondary and tertiary canals, feeder roads, or activities to reclaim land from invasive species, such as *prosopis*) (OPM, 2014; FAO Somalia, 2015). Labour opportunities under CFW arrangements are typically provided for a period of 54 days. The daily wage is USD 4–6, depending on location and role of the worker (OPM, 2014).
191. A recent qualitative impact assessment of CFW activities conducted by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) found a number of benefits at the community-level arising from the provision of temporary employment through CFW interventions. These included reduction of distress sales of livestock during the lean season, ability to maintain existing or build new household assets, increased households' food security and creditworthiness of beneficiaries (OPM, 2014). Our fieldwork discussions in Somaliland and Dolow also revealed that community-level respondents very much welcomed CFW interventions.
192. The 2012-2013 country evaluation included an in-depth study of FAO's CFW programme. The main underlying assumption tested by this study was that by disbursing cash to targeted poor and vulnerable individuals and rehabilitating communal productive assets, households and communities would experience short- and long-term positive gains. Among the most significant lessons emerging from the research were the need to: better coordinate with other agencies and acknowledge informal community redistribution mechanisms and local concepts of justice in planning; undertake a more careful assessment to understand the implications of choosing to rehabilitate one type of infrastructure over another; ensure the inclusion of those who are fit for work but marginalised; implement programmes over a longer timeframe, and employ more workers; and deliver CFW as part of a package of interventions, targeted according to categories and needs.
193. The injection of cash in the form of wages was frequently mentioned as increasing, albeit temporarily, household income levels. Cash wages were also indicated as having positive trickle down effects on the local economy. According to a number of respondents in Owdweyne and Baki in Somaliland, since 2013 a number of small grocery and tea shops had newly opened. They attributed this to cash wages, which had been invested by some CFW beneficiaries in these small businesses. This shows the potential of these interventions to diversify income sources over the longer term, when market conditions are appropriate.

20 While recognising their contribution to Outcome 1 and 2, CFW projects are included and discussed under Outcome 1 only.

21 Under the Resilience Sub-programme, expansion or rehabilitation of community assets is carried out either through contracts with private companies or through CFW activities, depending on the complexity of the project (FAO Somalia, 2015).

In Somaliland, local employment opportunities made available through CFW projects were also perceived as having temporarily reduced ongoing migration of youth – both male and female – to urban centres in search of job opportunities. This was indicated as positive. As a few respondents explained, with youth increasingly moving to urban centres, villages were at risk of permanently losing essential labour capacity. Ongoing outward migration was perceived as negatively affecting the sustainability and viability of livelihoods in rural areas. As further elaborated under Outcome 2 below, rehabilitation or expansion of community assets through CFW was also very welcome and, together with the provision of agricultural inputs, was indicated by our respondents in Dolow and Baki as having increased agricultural production.

194. Notwithstanding the positive effects outlined above, the temporary nature of employment opportunities and related benefits was frequently highlighted by our respondents as a source of concern. Some added that beneficiaries had not gained new skills to enable them to find jobs in the labour market. The OPM qualitative impact assessment also noted the short-term focus of CFW activities. According to the assessment, while CFW aims to ultimately move away from short-term support for food security to improving the resilience of vulnerable households in rural areas, in practice the project continues its focus on short-term interventions (OPM, 2014).
195. Our fieldwork findings indicate that on a number of occasions, CFW and FFW interventions have been implemented in the same areas (e.g. districts) during the same period. This is also confirmed in the 3rd Interim Report according to which the expansion of cultivable agricultural land in Dolow (a JRS area) is realised “*through cash and food for assets*”. WFP’s FFW programme supports the clearing of bush to provide access to land, while FAO’s CFW programme rehabilitates canals to provide water for irrigation (FAO Somalia, 2015: 24 emphasis added). This evaluation questions the appropriateness of implementing CFW and FFW projects in the same area, since if cash is deemed appropriate, then food typically is not. Specifically, cash transfers are considered an appropriate response in contexts where there is a failure in demand, or a demand shock brought on by a crisis where people’s economic access to commodities and services is compromised. For cash transfers to work, there must be a reasonable expectation that goods can be purchased in local markets, that supply is reliable at affordable prices, and that markets can respond to an increase in demand created by the cash injection into the local economy, without creating inflation or other negative distortions²². By the same token, cash transfers are not an effective response when the problem at stake relates to a failure of supply, or in other words, when there is a significant shortage of basic goods (e.g. food) or services that cannot be purchased in local markets. In cases of supply failures, in-kind assistance (such as food) will be more appropriate as it can fill the gap between demand and the availability of goods (see Harvey and Bailey, 2011).
196. As shown in project documents (and as is common practice with CFW interventions) the exit strategy of CFW projects typically consists of handing over created or rehabilitated infrastructures to a community-based committee. For example, for project OSRO/SOM/203/UK the canal’s management committee in Beer is tasked with operating, maintaining and managing the rehabilitated irrigation infrastructure (FAO Somalia, 2014). Similarly, the technical review conducted for project OSRO/SOM/108/EC noted that the formation and strengthening of farmers’ organizations and of canal committees was expected to play a key role in the sustainability of the project (SATG, 2014). The evaluation was not able to identify the committees in the areas visited, or to understand their membership, role, functioning, effectiveness, and so on, and therefore these aspects have not been verified.
197. In terms of livelihood diversification in FRP areas, the analysis of the quantitative baseline and midline surveys in Dolow showed that the average number of income sources per household increased from 1.97 to 2.59 between 2012 and 2015 in the treatment group, while it remained relatively stable in the control group (from 2.24 to 2.20 – all values are significant at one percent). This shows that the population in Dolow have had more opportunities to diversify their livelihoods between 2012 and 2015 than the population living in a non-programme area (Luuq).²³ This conclusion is also supported by the limited field work undertaken as part of the present evaluation.

22 If this happens, the value of the cash transfers will be eroded and rising prices will create negative spill over effects for the local community, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

23 Quantitative Evidence from Mid-Term Review of the Impact Evaluation for the “Building Resilience in Somalia” joint strategy, FAO/UNICEF/WFP (draft dated September 2015).

198. The same baseline and midline surveys in Dolow indicate an increase in the resilience of benefiting communities over the course of the Sub-programme, although the issue of whether or not this increase can be attributed to the resilience Sub-programme deserves additional analysis.
199. The fisheries sector is an underdeveloped sector in Somalia, characterized by weak capacity and low production levels. According to the OSRO/SOM/310/NOR project narrative, this is linked to a number of factors including lack of know-how (fishing technology), inefficient means of production (appropriate boats, engines and fishing gear) and restricted market access (both local and international) (FAO Somalia, 2015b). The same project narrative notes the potential of this sector for growth and for contribution to food security (*Ibid.*). The 2013 Country Programme Evaluation also noted that the fisheries sector promises expansion in the years to come (FAO, 2013).
200. Key informant interviews with government officials and other stakeholders in Puntland underscored the economic potential of this sector. They noted ongoing government efforts to increase local demand for fish consumption, also in terms of engendering changes in eating habits. This is because traditionally, fish is not part of the diet of Somalis (and is generally disliked), which is predominantly focused on meat consumption. As confirmed by a number of interviewees in Puntland, in recent years there seems to be a rise in the demand for fish as a result of a number of factors, including the return of the Somali diaspora community, and government and NGO awareness-raising efforts on the nutritional importance of fish. Similarly, fieldwork discussions at community-level in Bosasso pointed to widespread perceptions of high demand for fish, locally but also elsewhere, such as in Garowe.
201. FAO's engagement in the fisheries sector is relatively new. Most work was carried out in Puntland before the start of the Resilience Sub-programme. Between late 2013 and 2014, activities under the Resilience Sub-programme have concentrated on provision of fishing equipment, solar powered refrigerators, integral cold boxes and fish processing sets in Mogadishu and Dolow (the latter for riverine communities) (FAO Somalia, 2015). Equipment provision has been complemented by training on installation and use of refrigerators, basic hygiene, processing and maintenance of fish, and the provision of hygiene manuals and record keeping (*Ibid.*). These activities are important and relevant in support to the fisheries sector and people engaged in fishing as their livelihoods source, although in the absence of a clear description of the groups targeted (e.g. fishing or non-fishing communities), it is unclear how much they contribute to the expected results of Outcome 1 (livelihoods diversification).²⁴

2.2.2 Outcome 2: Targeted households and communities have increased their food production and consumption in a sustainable manner (FRP); or are able to restore/maintain their productive capacity when faced with chronic pressure or shocks (IHRA).

202. The programme explicitly recognises the importance of activities focused on natural resource management. With specific reference to pastoralist communities, the programme acknowledges that their capacity and resilience has been strained by environmental degradation, climate change, commercial charcoal production, severe drought and conflict (FAO Somalia, 2015). Activities aimed at improving natural resource management, including land, water and soil, are in turn seen as strengthening the resilience of pastoralist communities, as a long-term drought management strategy and as improving agricultural productivity (FAO Somalia, 2015).
203. In the villages that were visited by the field evaluation team in Somaliland and South Central, the programme has made substantial investments to improve irrigated and rain-fed agricultural production (activities falling under output 2.2). Programme interventions in both areas are discussed here.

Somaliland

204. In Somaliland, programme activities (OSRO/SOM/126/EC and OSRO/SOM/108/EC) have

²⁴ One issue frequently highlighted by fishing communities in Bosasso was what they defined as "illegal fishing" and "competition" by fishing vessels from other nations, which was in their opinion driving the depletion of fishing stocks. This issue deserves further investigations by FAO Somalia.

concentrated in the Awdal region (the districts of Baki, Garbo and Lughaya for irrigated areas and Boroma for rain-fed areas) and in the Togdheer region (a cluster of villages in Burao for rain-fed areas) (FAO Somalia, 2015). The rain-fed areas in Awdal and Togdheer regions (Owdweyne and Beer) have long been major areas for rain-fed production of cereal crops and related trading to the markets of Boroma, Hargeisa and village level markets (FSNAU, 2011a). Programme activities have focused on a wide array of initiatives aimed at intensifying and expanding agricultural production. These include creation or rehabilitation of shallow wells, weir walls, canals, gravel roads, storage sheds and training of canal committees. In Boroma and Burao, FFS were also implemented as part of OSRO/SOM/108/EC (FFS are also implemented elsewhere, under Outcome 4).

205. An analysis of FSNAU baseline reports also indicates that important shifts in livelihood patterns are underway in the areas that are the focus of the programme. In Togdheer, cultivation of cereal crops is reported as gradually decreasing because of limited access to farm inputs and increased opportunities in fodder production (FSNAU, 2011a). Because of the effects of disease and drought on herd size, a growing number of pastoralists and returnees are also found to be turning to rain-fed farming (*Ibid.*). In other words, FSNAU findings highlight that while more and more people are engaging in rain-fed farming as their main source of livelihood, rain-fed farming is faced with ongoing constraints such as limited access to farm inputs. As mentioned in Outcome 4, increasingly erratic rainfall patterns and repeated drought shocks are also, unsurprisingly, important constraints in the area.

Dolow

206. In Dolow, FAO has rehabilitated two primary canals in Bullo Qalloq and in Bantal villages and installed two water pumps (FAO Somalia, 2015). In both villages, FAO is planning to expand existing agricultural land through bush clearing (FAO Somalia, no date). The intervention seeks to facilitate access of sharecroppers and other vulnerable groups to the reclaimed land plots and/or ensure that these groups work under more equitable sharecropping agreements. FAO is planning to use the assets provided by the programme (water pumps, irrigation canals, tractor hours and other agricultural inputs) as incentives to convince landowners to allow access of sharecroppers and vulnerable groups to land in return for use of infrastructure and inputs provided by the programme (FAO Somalia, no date).
207. Unlike the approach described above in Somaliland, this evaluation has found evidence of programme investment in Dolow to gain an in-depth understanding of existing relationships, institutions and mechanisms that govern access to and use of land and resources, production and tenure systems in the two villages, and of the effects that the planned expansion could have on such arrangements. Land reclamation and expansion of agricultural land in Bullo Qalloq and Bantal villages are planned as a gradual and consultative process, premised on the Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development (PNTD) approach (see Box 5 below). The PNTD has been successfully adopted by FAO in other country contexts, such as Mozambique.
208. An assessment of the analysis that FAO has conducted (and which project documents indicate will be further refined during the consultative process as part of the PNTD approach) in Bullo Qalloq and Bantal villages in Dolow, and of the feasibility of the planned agricultural expansion is beyond the scope of this evaluation. But what is clear is that this initiative is premised on a sound analysis of the effects that reclaiming land for cultivation may have on local land tenure systems, and in turn on communities' relations (in this case between landowners and sharecroppers). It is encouraging that similar initiatives based on the PNTD approach are currently planned for Somaliland.
209. Land expansion activities premised on the PNTD approach had been put on hold by the Federal Government in some locations where FAO was planning similar interventions (FAO Somalia, 2015a). Having now received the green light by the Federal Government, plans are underway to start activities (land expansion premised on the PNTD approach) in Dolow and Somaliland.
210. These initiatives have significant potential for building resilience. Indeed, it puts emphasis on work that seeks to change 'the rules of the game', to bring about lasting, pro-poor changes in institutional arrangements around ownership and use of land (see also FAO Somalia, no date). At the same time, such initiatives are challenging, and it is important to take into account the inherently conflictual processes at play.

Box 6. FAO's Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development (PNTD) approach

The PNTD approach consists of an open process of diagnosis at the community level to understand existing relationships, institutions and mechanisms governing access to and use of land and resources, production and tenure systems in a given context (FAO, 2005). The PNTD can also be seen as a conflict management and prevention instrument, since it seeks to address the root causes of conflict arising from competitive access and use of land and natural resources.

Issues identified through this process are then discussed with all interested stakeholders to develop a Social Territorial Agreement (STA). The aim is for the STA to become an official document registered with relevant government administrations and recognised by all interested parties. The STA spells out agreed institutional arrangements (e. g. indigenous rights, recognition of customary tenure, land access, natural resource use and management) to make them legally recognised and respected. It also can provide inputs for adaptation or redefinition of national and local policies (Ibid.).

211. Our fieldwork in Somaliland and Dolow has highlighted a number of findings related to the effects of the programme's activities aimed at intensifying and expanding agricultural production. These predominantly included rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure (e.g. for irrigation, as discussed above) complemented with agricultural input packages, such as seeds (e.g. maize, sorghum and cowpea) and seedlings, fertilizer, irrigation vouchers and training (FAO Somalia, 2015).
212. In both Baki and Dolow, agricultural support activities were perceived by community-level respondents as having contributed to improved food production and consumption. In Baki, in the Awdal region of Somaliland, a number of female beneficiaries interviewed said that before the start of the programme their production was limited. Thanks to the agricultural support provided (specifically expansion and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure and provision of seeds) they felt that their production had improved and expanded. They added that they were cultivating more fruits (e.g. watermelon, grapefruits) and vegetables (e.g. tomatoes, onions, cabbage).
213. Similarly, the findings from Bullo Qalloq and Bantaal villages in Dolow indicate that rehabilitation of irrigation canals and provision of agricultural inputs was perceived as having expanded agricultural production. A number of respondents in both villages stated that before they were only relying on rain-fed farming. Since the rehabilitation of the two canals and availability of irrigation water, however, they had started to farm year-round. Some respondents in Bullo Qalloq stated that they were currently consuming three meals a day, with maize as the staple food, and were able to include fruits such as papaya and bananas in their diets.
214. The findings of the quantitative analysis in Dolow also point to positive effects of the programme on food consumption. Comparing the treatment and control groups between baseline and midterm reveals that the Food Consumption Score of the treatment group has increased by 7.94 percent, while that of control group increased only by 5.18 percent. Also, both the land cultivated (in ha) and the value of the crop production (in USD) increased in the treatment group, although the increase is not statistically significant.
215. In addition to the positive effects on agricultural production noted by our respondents, agricultural support activities were indicated by a number of respondents in Baki in Somaliland as having gender-related effects. Similarly to other areas in Somaliland, the division of household labour in Baki was described as being governed by strict gender norms where agricultural activities are typically considered as women's responsibilities, and livestock rearing activities as men's responsibilities. In Baki, there were suggestions that agricultural support interventions had therefore largely benefited women. The women interviewed expressed great pride and satisfaction at their enhanced agricultural production and, as discussed in the following section, also at their increased ability to also sell their produce, thanks to surplus production. Some noted that since agricultural production in the area had improved as a result of programme support, farming was increasingly perceived as a valuable activity, with some men starting to show interest in farming and increasingly engaging in farming activities.
216. In the livestock sector, the Resilience Sub-programme has focused on animal health interventions, small stock distributions and fodder production. In 2013-14, vaccinations

were conducted against CCPP, Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR) and Sheep and Goat Pox (FAO Somalia, 2015). In Dolow, the programme has trained 30 individuals for 42 days to become Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) (FAO Somalia, 2015d). CAHWs have also been equipped with veterinary start-up kits to enable them to provide community-based services (animal health, dehorning and hoof trimming) in their home areas (*Ibid.*). A recent FAO assessment of the impact of this intervention in Dolow showed that CAHWs had started to deliver the above services in their communities in exchange for in-cash and in-kind payments (*Ibid.*).

217. In both Somaliland²⁵ and Dolow, community members interviewed for this evaluation felt that livestock support activities, specifically CAHWs and vaccinations, had contributed to improving livestock health and reducing mortality. CAHWs in particular were mentioned as providing important services that, unlike before, could now be easily accessed at the village level. Community members also mentioned a recent increase in camel milk production in their area; this could be linked to the FAO Resilience Sub-programme interventions, in particular the fodder production, vaccination and treatment activities.
218. Restocking of small ruminants, training for fodder production and processing, and construction of fodder sheds were also widely mentioned as valuable interventions. In Dolow, respondents mentioned the distribution of 11 goats by the programme to each vulnerable household identified and selected by community leaders (see also section 2.1.6 on targeting). In Bullo Qalloq village in Dolow, the construction of the fodder shed for storage and fodder production activities were indicated as having enabled availability of fodder for use during the dry season (thus having a protective effect on animal health and body conditions), as well as sales of fodder (thus increasing households' income levels).
219. Quantitative data from the Dolow baseline and mid-term surveys show that despite a large increase in income from livestock, there is only a minimal increase in the quantity of livestock owned (from 4.73 TLU to 4.88 TLU in the treatment group, compared to a slight decrease in the control group, from 1.48 to 1.33, with all values significant at one percent). This could be due to higher productivity of the livestock owned.
220. An analysis of the restocking activities implemented by the programme (as found in the programme documents) leaves a number of questions unanswered. One question relates to the overall objective of restocking. Is the objective to provide households with a viable herd size in order to enable mobile pastoralism as a viable livelihood strategy for these households? If the objective is to support a viable livelihoods strategy, then the number and type of livestock handed out matters and should be premised on robust analysis aimed at quantifying the minimum number (and type) of livestock required to achieve this objective. Restocking activities in the Horn region are often targeted at so called 'drop-outs', or households that have suffered the effects of repeated drought events to the point that they have lost all their animals and therefore their assets. If they are indeed extremely vulnerable households, then a question may be raised in terms of the appropriateness of trying to support these households to 're-enter' a system (mobile pastoralism) that they had to leave in the first place and that is becoming increasingly fragile. These dynamics have been explored in recent research on commercialised livestock systems in the Somali region of Ethiopia (Aklilu and Catley, 2010). The findings suggest a growing wealth divide, as richer members of pastoralist communities capture markets and resources. The study finds that commercialization is raising the bar for poor pastoralists, making it more difficult for them to build or sustain herds, or withstand drought (*Ibid.* see also Catley et al., 2012 and FAO, 2013).

2.2.3 Outcome 3: Targeted households and producer organizations are able to sell their produce and obtain better prices

221. As discussed above, agricultural support activities were indicated by beneficiaries in Dolow and Somaliland as having improved their agricultural production. While the majority of our respondents in these areas stated that increased production was used predominantly for household consumption, a minority also stated that they had surplus production vegetables and crops such as maize, sorghum, onions and tomatoes that they could sell.

25 The training of CAHWs was mentioned by our respondents in both Dolow and in Somaliland, even though, as one FAO staff has confirmed, CAHWs training has not yet been conducted in Somaliland. It may be that respondents in Somaliland referred to CAHWs that have been trained in the past by other organizations.

222. A number of respondents in the villages of Bantaal and Bullo Qalloq in Dolow, placed emphasis on improved production and sales of onions and attributed this to FAO's agricultural support interventions. They explained that the bulk of onions in Dolow market originate from neighbouring Ethiopia through cross-border trade. Thanks to increased production and surplus, farmers stated that they had started to sell onions in Dolow at a cheaper price than the onions imported from Ethiopia and as such they saw themselves as competing with Ethiopian producers.
223. The surveys conducted in Dolow by the Resilience Sub-Programme itself show an increase of income from crops of USD 2.5 per week (rising from USD 0.92 to USD 2.29 in the treatment group) and of income from livestock of USD 0.16 per week (both values significant at one percent).
224. The findings of our fieldwork activities in both villages in Dolow indicate that sale activities were greatly facilitated by the villages' location. Bantaal and Bullo Qalloq are both located at 15km away from Dolow town, the terrain is flat and the condition of the road connecting both villages to Dolow is good. As such, access to Dolow town and its market was reported by our respondents as very easy. Furthermore, thanks to the close proximity to the international border with Kenya and Ethiopia, Dolow has long been a strategic market hub, and cross-border trade of agricultural produce, livestock and other goods is widespread. Indeed, respondents from Dolow indicated that they used the livestock market in Dolo Ado on the Ethiopian side to sell and buy livestock.
225. By contrast, in Baki, Somaliland, the findings of fieldwork discussions pointed to significant constraints to marketing faced by producers. A number of respondents noted high demand for fruits and vegetables in markets such as Buraao, Borama, Hargheisa and even beyond in Djibouti. However, their ability to sell their surplus produce was indicated as constrained by difficult market access. Baki is located at 40km away from the nearest market in Borama town, and the feeder road connecting Baki to Boroma is in bad condition. Given its remoteness, market access challenges include high transport costs and high perishability risks. A number of respondents in Baki mentioned that some preliminary rehabilitation work by FAO and WFP had been carried out (e.g. removing stones) but that no further progress had been made, and that due to the rainy season the road condition had deteriorated to its original state. The technical review of project OSRO/SOM/108/EC noted that the rehabilitation of the feeder roads in the area was still incomplete and was expected to improve market opportunities for local communities once completed (SATG, 2013).
226. In Baki, given its remoteness, challenges related to market access resulted in producers incurring high transport costs and high perishability risks. For example, some mentioned that if market prices were low, even if they had surplus production they would at times decide not to sell, because high transport costs would make the journey to the market expensive and ultimately not profitable. The high degree of perishability of fruits and vegetables was also mentioned as a problem, since fruits and vegetables could easily get spoiled on the way to the market. For example, some female respondents mentioned instances of tomatoes being crushed during transport to the market. In the village of Baki, female beneficiaries reported having decided to organize themselves into a group to transport their produce (by hiring a pick-up truck) to the market so that they could share and save on transport costs. There were no reports of beneficiaries having organised themselves in similar ways in other villages visited by the evaluation team, or of support provided by the programme to beneficiaries to overcome some of the above challenges and enhance their ability to market their produce.
227. In the villages of Beer and Owdweyne a number of respondents complained that WFP food distributions constrained their ability to obtain better prices at markets. They explained that in the days immediately following the arrival of WFP food shipments at Berbera port, the price of food items such as maize dropped significantly because the market became suddenly "flooded" with these items. Respondents indicated that they typically stopped selling their surplus production during these periods as market prices were unfavourable.

2.2.4 Outcome 4. Targeted households and communities have access to knowledge and support services for productive activities and consumption

228. FFS (and PFS) are a form of extension that has long been adopted by FAO in Somalia and elsewhere. It is built on principles of education and learning and is seen as having

better potential for improving production than traditional extension approaches, which are more focused on provision of inputs and technical training. FFS also provides a useful forum for farmers or pastoralists to meet, discuss and find solutions for their own problems (FAO Somalia, 2015). A number of FAO staff also saw this approach as useful, with issues of sustainability, capacity building and resilience in mind. As one staff defined them, FFS and PFS, as well as CAHWs, are ultimately “community self-support mechanisms” that can support the capacity of communities to help themselves. They are therefore entirely consistent with the resilience approach.

229. Under the Resilience Sub-programme, FAO has rolled out FFS under a number of initiatives. For example both the SEED project (OSRO/SOM/203/UK) and the OSRO/SOM/108/EC project in Awdal and Togdheer regions include FFS activities (FAO Somalia, 2014, SATG, 2013).
230. The findings of the technical review of the OSRO/SOM/108/EC project indicate that FFS and related trainings that provided Good Agriculture Practices, including the introduction of new varieties of crops and vegetables, Integrated Plant and Pest Management and rural commercialization, were well-received by communities. The majority of beneficiaries interviewed (81 percent) reported that the training was useful and 31 percent reported that they had trained other farmers (SATG, 2013). FFS were found to have well-connected marketing committees linked to various markets, who were able to access information on prices and negotiate contracts with new buyers. Echoing our findings in Outcome 3, this was noted as benefiting female traders of agricultural products in particular. Women do most of the marketing of agricultural produce.
231. In Dolow, programme investments in FFS were welcome and perceived as useful interventions to improve local knowledge. A number of community-level respondents explained that the selection of lead farmers to join FFS had been conducted by village leaders, and this was generally indicated as fair.

2.2.5 Conclusions under Evaluation question 2

- A. CFW activities may contribute to household food security, have positive spill over on the local economy and support communal assets, but by their very nature, CFW interventions provide only temporary, short-term employment.** Efforts to link CFW beneficiaries to other programmes, such as livelihood support programmes (e.g. vocational training, access to microfinance) can provide CFW beneficiaries with the necessary skills and resources to increase their opportunities to find more sustainable employment or engage in income-generating in the longer term. The economic and agricultural impacts of the productive infrastructure (water catchments, irrigation and other infrastructure) are also potentially high. However, questions can be raised in relation to the sustainability of benefits of CFW interventions on community assets. Field assessments indicate much appreciation for the trainings offered on how to manage and maintain the infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated through CFW, but feeder roads, canals and water catchments, which are the focus of CFW projects in the areas under analysis, are assets that require continuous and costly maintenance. The likelihood that they will require repeated CFW project interventions is high. Likewise, land reclamation activities through CFW to remove invasive bushes can hardly be seen as a long-term solution to the problem²⁶. With regard to the choice of transfer modality, no documentation was found outlining the rationale and decision making processes underpinning the choice made by FAO and WFP to implement CFW and FFW activities respectively. This appears to be a gap, since the decision to implement CFW and FFW should be premised on robust market-based evidence.
- B. Agricultural support activities in the areas visited for this evaluation were very welcome and indicated as having contributed to enhanced agricultural production.** Our limited findings in Somaliland reveal that agricultural support activities have benefited females the most. This and the fact that agricultural support in the area is ultimately targeting women is an important aspect of programme design and implementation.
- C. There are positive gains linked to livestock support activities.** The 2013 Country Evaluation challenged the fact that during 2007-12 most of FAO’s activities in the livestock sector (approximately 80 percent of expenditures) had been allocated to

²⁶ Prosopis for instance is a well-known invasive species in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa region; it is extraordinarily drought resistant and recolonises very quickly. See for example <http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5507e/y5507e11.htm>

animal health initiatives. The same evaluation recommended the development of more holistic programming to complement animal health initiatives. Specifically, it suggested that in order to better address vulnerability and poverty, more substantial efforts were needed to improve livestock productivity across a range of production systems, and to rehabilitate degraded rangelands (FAO, 2013). Information provided by FAO Somalia staff to the evaluation team indicates that in addition to animal health initiatives, a range of activities – including training and establishment of PFS, livestock value chain development and rangeland rehabilitation – have been implemented by the Resilience Sub-programme to support the livestock sector more holistically. This is to be welcomed. However, very similar livestock support activities have been implemented by different actors (including FAO) in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa region for decades. The novelty of the interventions delivered as part of the Resilience Sub-programme may need to be better articulated (e.g. by highlighting synergies between improved animal health and the work on other production factors such as fodder or marketing).

- D. There is potential for growth of the fisheries sector and FAO's relatively new engagement in this sector seems to be well placed.** Government interest in this sector also offers the opportunity to align FAO's efforts and priorities with nascent institutions. FAO is well placed to contribute to building capacity on the ground, helping fishers add value to their production and, where feasible and with a livelihoods diversification approach in mind, supporting the capacity of people to join this sector.
- E. The ability of producers to market their surplus seemed to be highly dependent on access and price constraints, and this seems to have been insufficiently taken into account in the programme.** In Dolow, market access was much easier than in Baki, for instance, where long distances to markets and roads in bad conditions were indicated as key constraints to marketing activities. Also, seasonal WFP food distributions and their repercussions on grain prices represented additional constraints to the ability of agricultural producers to obtain profitable prices at the market.
- F. Farmer and Pastoralist Field Schools are a useful approach as part of a resilience-building agenda.** In general, FFS are well-received by communities as a form of extension, and the involvement of women in Dolow is welcome. A critical aspect is the ability of trained farmers or pastoralists to apply and transfer their knowledge to other farmers for years to come; in other words to maintain the 'schools' as fora for sharing ideas and innovations. There are indications emerging from the programme documents reviewed that in Somaliland lead farmers who attended schools struggled to transfer their knowledge to other community members; for example, during periods of drought. Lack of ongoing support was also found, not surprisingly, to have limited farmers' ability to sustain their engagement. Attention is required on knowledge transfer opportunities and scaling out these islands of success.

2.3 What is the added value of the programmatic approach adopted by FAO Somalia, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and results of the programme?

2.3.1 Definition of the programme approach in FAO

232. FAO has neither an organization-wide definition of the programme approach, nor a broadly agreed upon rationale as to why it might be an improvement over the project approach.²⁷ Because this evaluation is looking at the feasibility, appropriateness and replicability of the programme approach in FAO, for the purposes of this evaluation we will define the programme approach as "the use of the *Country Programme Framework in alignment with the national goals and corporate strategic objectives to develop, implement and monitor all activities under a single and coherent set of prioritized outcomes.*"
233. According to FAO Somalia documents, the programme approach will integrate "... short term needs with longer term priorities". Senior FAO Somalia management describe the programme approach as ensuring a "higher level of outcomes" while being more responsible, accountable, and flexible and as being more "proactive, consistent and coherent in how we support countries." Numerous respondents described the programme

²⁷ With the possible exception of one recent HQ document (The Umbrella Programme Approach, Project Cycle and Operations Support Team), where the programme approach was succinctly described as the "umbrella programme ... a programmatic set up based on a results matrix (a global programme, a CPF matrix or any other programme). The programmatic set up involves several components or several projects."

approach in contrast to the project approach in which each sector (agriculture, livestock, environment) worked in silos, accessing their own funding, designing their own activities and working towards their own sector specific goals, objectives and outcomes.

234. Throughout interviews with FAO employees in Rome, Nairobi and Somalia, the characteristics of the programme approach were described through three lenses:
- financial management;
 - planning/coordination mechanisms;
 - impact focused programme.
235. However, in interviews with the FAO Somalia team, terms such as “funding flexibility” or “un-earmarked funds” or “money” and “allocation prioritization” were most commonly repeated and show a perception that the programmatic approach is primarily a financial tool.
236. The more employees understood the programme approach, the more supportive they were and the more they were able to give examples of how it could raise the bar for results, outcomes and depth of impacts for the beneficiaries. Staff who were less able to articulate a clear definition of the programme approach were also less optimistic about the programme approach overall.
237. Some respondents defined the programme approach in negative terms. A number commented that the programme approach slows the process of implementation, indicating that lines of communication and approvals may have been adversely impacted. While they were in the minority, their comments need to be considered as they may present a challenge to the actual programme approach implementation.
238. While there is general support for the programme approach, the evaluation found that not all staff in FAO Somalia understand or have a clear vision of the rationale behind the shift. There was a lack of awareness among staff and other stakeholders as to what the programme approach meant regarding impacts and fundamental change in how FAO Somalia operates. This is not particularly surprising considering that even in HQ there is no clear definition of the programme approach, nor is there a systematic plan for supporting countries transitioning to the programme approach. In FAO Somalia, at a lower level in the organogram, the transition to the programme approach is perceived as having been handled in an ad hoc fashion instead of systematically and comprehensively. If the primary rationale is to better serve the beneficiaries, then all parts of the organization, at all levels, must accept and understand this approach.

2.3.2 Transition from project to programme approach

239. The original impetus for the FAO Somalia team to shift from a project to programme approach came from the Somalia senior management itself, and is in that sense a bottom up transition. However, at the same time, FAO as a global organization had been thinking about ways to ensure that country level activities are more cohesive and aligned with organizational, national and UN priorities.
240. The idea of working collaboratively as opposed to in silos is not an innovation; however in this case it should be viewed in light of FAO’s historical organizational approach. The fact that FAO has been primarily a technical organization aimed at eradicating hunger by providing services based on very specific technical sectors (agriculture, livestock, etc) has historically led to a culture of working in silos. A review of FAO documents over the years shows a trend moving from a focus on specific technical sectors (productive assets such as crops or pests/disease) to a more holistic vision of eradicating hunger through collaborative, cohesive approaches to complex problems, of which hunger is one. This move toward results-based management, the 2014-2017 Strategic Framework and the development of country programmes (FAO was one of the last UN organizations to do so) are examples of a global trend in FAO towards more cohesive and integrated operations.
241. A number of respondents said the transition really only came down to unearmarked funds. Planning or coordination terms such as “joined-upness” or “common”, “shared” or “linked goals” were also repeated often and indicate a more in-depth understanding of why the programme approach might be an improvement over and beyond fund allocation flexibility.

242. There were however numerous mentions that many sectors still worked mostly within their silos, only cooperating or collaborating situationally as opposed to systematically. Indeed, the Resilience Sub-programme structure in particular was mentioned as too “top heavy” yet “without proper leadership”. This matched comments that clearly stated the organogram has changed far too many times and yet still without final resolution. Such excessive tinkering with the organogram indicates a lack of clear vision.
243. Other stakeholders interviewed (partners, donors) showed less interest in, and optimism for, the transition to the programme approach having any real impact on results. There was a lack of awareness on the part of these stakeholders as to what the programme approach meant regarding impacts and fundamental change in how FAO Somalia operates. These respondents were also more inclined to confuse it with the development and implementation of the Joint Resilience Strategy. Indications were clear that this transition has not been well defined or explained by FAO Somalia, particularly for the donors. FAO Somalia may decide that external stakeholders are indeed not the audience they need to win over to support this transition. However donors still need to be convinced that the approach indicates a more effective use of their money.
244. Finally, many interviewees commented that the momentum for a transition from a project approach to a programme approach had been lost. It is clear that this perception is stronger as one works further down into the organogram, or closer to the field. FAO HQ and Nairobi senior management were eager to discuss the progress, success and challenges of this transition and many enthusiastically stated their support. In HQ particularly, there are various teams working to enhance the corporate instruments and there are ongoing discussions regarding which country programmes are ready to transition to the programme approach.
245. Many respondents mentioned a lack of leadership during a long and poorly planned transition after the departure of the last Somalia Head of Office, who was the main driver of the transition to the programme approach. The perspective of staff is that the change to the programme approach was being put through by sheer force of personality. Indeed, respondents report that the Head of Office provided dynamic leadership and was willing to push boundaries, but in his absence, motivation for change decreased. More generally, staff turnover (national and international) in FAO Somalia has negatively impacted the programme, as very few of the personnel who pushed for the changes FAO Somalia is currently undergoing are still on board with the FAO Somalia team. This is also true for the Resilience Sub-programme in particular.
246. Interestingly, the 2013 Somalia country evaluation stated in recommendations 14 and 15 the need to strengthen HR management capacities and specifically mentions the risk of transitions and loss of staff, and the need for better planning for succession. A donor respondent also mentioned that their internal risk management matrix for funding FAO included a perceived risk that FAO Somalia transitions were personality based and a change in leadership could leave a vacuum of ownership to see transitions through. In the end, the existence of a nearly two-year gap in a top leadership position has had negative impacts on the FAO Somalia programme in terms of funding, teamwork and capacity to forge change. Perhaps most pointedly, both donors and FAO Somalia respondents perceive that FAO Somalia have lost their position as a leader in the resilience field, as their momentum for critical thinking and innovation has slowed. According to the 2012-2013 country evaluation follow-up report, all agreed actions have been taken on human resources, however the evaluation team was not able to verify the information. The presence of a newly appointed FAOR is encouraging and presents an opportunity for FAO to re-establish its leadership in resilience programming.

2.3.3 Characteristics of the programme approach in Somalia

247. FAO Somalia staff was asked to describe the appropriateness of the programme approach specifically as it relates to the Somalia implementation environment, in order to understand whether the programme approach is more appropriate under this specific environment, which is characterized by recurring crises and a high level of extra-budgetary funds. They listed many advantages of the programme approach in the context of Somalia, including the idea that a flexible approach is more productive in a highly dynamic environment characterized by regular crises, multiple donors and multi-sector activities. Specific examples given include the quick response to the Puntland Cyclone, which may not have been possible without unearmarked funding. Also mentioned was the need to compete with the trend towards NGO consortia (which are in many cases implementing programmatically).

248. A number of respondents mentioned that if the programme approach requires unearmarked funds and donors are only inclined to give unearmarked funds in emergencies, this will hinder the transition to a programme approach in non-emergency countries. However there is no evidence that the programme approach is only appropriate in a context that includes unearmarked funds. To the contrary, various hybrid versions of the programme approach are already under development for countries that do not foresee the ability to get unearmarked funds. An example of this is the Kenya team which is developing an overall programme from which donors will be able to buy into packaged slices (projects) as per their own prioritization. Indeed, a programme may be developed without unearmarked funding in cases when there is a high level of trust with donors, and the organization has the ability to flexibly reprogramme earmarked funds.

2.3.4 Linkages between programme approach, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability

249. The FAO Somalia country office is currently structured around the following sectors (each headed by an international staff²⁸): Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, Environment, FSNAU, SWALIM, Cash Based Interventions, Infrastructure, Economic Development and Information Management. Under the project approach each of these sectors were responsible for developing, fundraising and then implementing their own projects and managing their own project teams. Under the programme approach, they are supposed to work in concert, with their input coordinated by the Resilience Sub-programme coordinator. However the position is vacant since May 2015.

250. Improvements in efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of FAO's interventions that can be attributed directly to the programme approach may be limited at this early stage. There is however evidence showing that FAO Somalia's effectiveness improved through increased internal coordination, and that the pattern of working strictly in silos appears to be no longer the case. Just over half of FAO respondents commented that they no longer work in silos and now they know what the other sectors are doing. A key example of this is the joining of agriculture and livestock teams to work on the Agro-Pastoral Field Schools, presented in Box 6. The joint training on rural commercialization training and fodder production and processing for community facilitators from three districts of Gedo, as well as Ministry staff and programme partners in Somaliland and Puntland presents another example.

251. The existence of unearmarked funding implies that the decision on the use of the funds should be taken by FAO Somalia: it is no longer a donor's decision. In other words, it moves the responsibility for prioritization to FAO Somalia, and it is therefore very important that FAO Somalia has the technical capacity and solid evidence base to make such decisions. Strong leadership is indeed essential at programme management level, in order to avoid perceptions that decisions may be based on personality or the convincing power of individual sector heads. Some comments that the prioritization and allocation of funds under the programme approach had been unfair, unsystematic and even "vicious" (creating disruptions) indicate current gaps in team vision for broader goals. In fact, while the programme approach is meant to help FAO Somalia be more proactive, there are indications that in many ways, fund allocation remains reactive to both external and internal forces that are not necessarily led by CPF priorities.

Box 7. Example of agriculture and livestock improved coordination

The agriculture and livestock sectors began working together under the programme approach in 2014 to capitalize on coordination and harmonizing standards, processes and other issues. Although the process of harmonization of the Field Schools is not yet over, the following are good outcomes achieved through the coordination of the two sectors so far:

- The training of five APFS Master trainers in Uganda 2014;
- Co-facilitating and conducting the APFS training for community facilitators by both the agriculture and livestock officers;
- Jointly implementing 70 APFS in three districts in Gedo region;

Establishment of Agro-pastoral Field Schools' task force.

252. Thanks to the programme approach, FAO Somalia was able to procure unearmarked funds, which allowed for the opening of permanent offices in Somalia. The FAO team mentioned

28 some of the posts were vacant at the time of the evaluation

this would not have been possible under the project approach where only temporary project offices could be supported. The presence of field offices is a way to increase efficiency because it allows for consolidated use of resources across activities and reduces the need for costly movement of staff and assets when there is no base of operations. The evaluation has not looked into this matter closely in Somalia and is unable to confirm that Somalia-specific infrastructure has increased efficiency. However, the presence of a FAO field monitor permanently based in field offices in Somalia, and in charge of monitoring field activities and reporting to the head of the M&E unit in Nairobi, is clearly a measure that improves the M&E of the programme.

253. In recent years, FAO invested heavily in Mogadishu-based infrastructure, on the expectation that the FAO country office would be moving to Somalia. However, as mentioned in the introduction, FAO continues to have no country office in Mogadishu and could therefore not use this infrastructure. Those costs (both static investment costs and ongoing monthly upkeep costs) have raised questions about the effectiveness of this particular investment.
254. There is no indication that unearmarked funds could only be resourced under the programme approach, since joint funding is a common practice under the project approach. Indeed, many NGOs manage to cycle project budgets in such a way as to support remote offices (covered by multiple projects) when that is deemed preferable. Many UN agencies (including FAO) use a system of project-based funding, and simply use their administration overhead to cover the cost of non-project specific infrastructure. DfID, for example, has a package of unearmarked funds (programme partnership arrangements)²⁹ given to organizations that operate under a project approach, but have created a package of indicators across projects and processes that allows for funding towards more programmatic objectives.
255. Another area in which FAO Somalia indicated increased efficiency based on the programme approach is in procurement, such as joint procurement of assets across activities. While procurement procedures are certainly more efficient if done in a coordinated and consolidated manner, it is hard to state categorically that this cannot be done under a project approach.

2.3.5 Donor coordination and donor relations

256. There is no indication that donor coordination was impacted by the transition to the programme approach. Donors themselves state they saw no changes and were unaware of any nuances to the FAO transition from project approach to programme approach. One donor stated that their strategy also followed a programme approach and so they were glad FAO had moved this way, but there was no mention of improved coordination because of the transition. Many donors stated that intrinsically they saw the benefit to a programme approach (more cohesive nature of planning) but that it did not necessarily impact their direct relationship with FAO.
257. Regarding funding mechanisms, three donors (Canada, Switzerland and Denmark) provided some of their funding through unearmarked contributions to the Somalia Resilience Sub-programme. Only Canada and Switzerland provided solely unearmarked funds, as Denmark provided primarily unearmarked funds with a smaller allocation partially earmarked to emergency use only. This leaves seven or more donors with funding allocated through more traditional earmarked mechanisms (projects) and not against the programme as a whole. The balance of funds continuing to be provided through traditional earmarked funding indicates that many donors are either not convinced by the programme approach or unable to adopt it for procedural reasons.
258. Regarding relations with donors, some sector heads state that they have lost their primary contact due to the transition, since with the programme approach it is now a programme supervisor who meets donors instead of sector heads. However some of them still liaise directly with donors. This is an example of the transition from project to programme being ad hoc and not standardized within the country office.

2.3.6 Corporate tools and culture

259. The findings regarding corporate tools and culture were quite clear and indicate that great leaps have been made in improving tools, but there continue to be significant gaps. Nearly all employees regardless of location identified gaps in appropriate corporate instruments

29 <https://www.gov.uk/programme-partnership-arrangements-ppas>

and skills needed for FAO (HQ and Country Office) to transition to the programme approach. Most employees expressed equal concern that FAO (HQ and Country Office) lacks the right corporate culture for the transition to the programme approach. Investigation into each of these three areas (corporate instruments, skills and culture) resulted in numerous examples of challenges caused by these gaps and concise articulation of improvements needed.

260. Regarding corporate instruments, discussions focused on the Field Programme Management Information System (FPMIS). When FAO Somalia first began transitioning to a programme approach, the FPMIS was not able to handle the input or provide the output required under the new approach. For this reason, a parallel system (the PMSR, developed earlier in South Sudan) was implemented to assist teams with information management. Although progress has been made and HQ is committed to providing solutions adapted to FAO Somalia, many of those interviewed stated that more work is needed. Even though an umbrella programme has been created in FPMIS to facilitate the programme management in the country office, the PMSR is still in use. Many respondents explained that FPMIS continues to be too cumbersome for the needs of the programme approach. Another reason for this may be that the team is now used to PMSR and has no incentive to move to FPMIS. In any case, this indicates a continued inability of the country office to manage a programme approach solely through corporate systems.
261. Financial reporting under a programme approach requires flexibility and creativity. Because some donors provide unearmarked funding and some do not, and because some activities are multi-donor funded and some are not, the puzzle pieces can be challenging. However, this model is not new and many agencies and NGO's have working systems to handle this level of dynamics. Currently within FAO the Somalia team is working hard to lead the way in developing and implementing systems that provide programmatic managers, donors and administration teams with the information they need, when they need it.
262. In FAO HQ it is less clear whether the finance offices have any incentive to transition into new ways of doing things. Recent emails between the Country Office and HQ finance unit highlighted the continued challenges FAO Somalia faces in presenting programme level reports to the donors. Whereas the donors expect joint reporting (FAO Somalia has successfully lobbied to get this approved by donors) the mechanism to create/approve programme level reports appears to not be automatic nor under the control of the country office. When the country office requests such financial reports, there is significant push back from HQ which also does not have a systematic way to handle programmatic reporting.
263. FAO employees regularly mentioned human resource challenges that hamper a transition to the programme approach. Contracting employees continues to be problematic, as most employees are still tied fully to project budgets. Even with the use of unearmarked funds, employee contracts must be short-term as allocations are done cyclically and as funds come in. This limits employee incentives and makes FAO a less attractive employment option.

2.3.7 Conclusions under Evaluation question 3

Is there anything specific about Somalia and FAO's role in the country that made the programmatic approach appropriate and feasible (or not)? If so, what are these characteristics?

How does FAO define the programme approach? What do we mean by programme approach in this evaluation? What are the characteristics of the programmatic approach in FAO Somalia? How is it defined? What has changed in the way FAO is implementing the Somalia country programme since the adoption of the programme approach?

- A. FAO Somalia is paving the way, as FAO country teams globally shift from the project approach to the programme approach, and nearly everyone supports this shift.** FAO, as a global organization, is clearly moving towards programmatic (as opposed to project) thinking. However, there is no consensus regarding the rationale or corporate vision behind the shift, and there is no sense that the entire organizational structure or approach has changed. In some senses, indications were that the shift is superficial. Nevertheless, FAO Somalia has been at the vanguard of this change and is in many ways leading the pack in thinking about how this might work for FAO as an organization. This does not necessarily mean that Somalia is uniquely appropriate for the programme approach.

- B. There is no plan to transition systemically to the programme approach.** There has been no declared plan for the transition to a programme approach and this lack of clarity has left the transition in a holding pattern, with some departments continuing to forge ahead and others reverting back to the project approach. Though the teams in FAO Somalia know well that collaboration leads to a more cohesive programme, knowing how to do it concretely and really understanding the reasons why it is an improvement would better serve the organization and its beneficiaries. FAO staff might approve in theory of the programme approach, but in practice they have neither fully embraced the changes required nor been able to discuss and digest the rationale behind the transition. FAO is a large organization with a long history and to expect FAO Somalia staff to change their approach with no systematic plan, or to change management leadership would be unreasonable. The main risk is the shift failing to be understood, internalized and adopted.

How is the programmatic approach used by FAO Somalia improving the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of FAO's interventions? Is it facilitating donor coordination and reducing overlapping and duplication of initiatives?

- C. There is no clarity on how the programme approach better serves beneficiaries; so far, some improvements to efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability are visible but remain limited.** Following on the above, while most FAO respondents indicated that the shift to the programmatic approach is a *fait accompli*, there appears to be a question as to whether the rationale behind the shift to the programme approach is to improve operational tools (fund allocation, donor management, field admin systems) or to improve FAO's capacity to impact the food security of households and communities. In talking to FAO senior teams, the emphasis is on the former. FAO Somalia are developing the path for country teams to transition to the programme approach; however it is being done in too ad hoc and casual a way and without a clear link to impact. If the only goal is to improve financial flexibility, although it is a good outcome, this does not represent a change in approach but a change in how FAO sells packages to donors. A real change in approach would mean a change in results to the primary client (households/communities/governments) and that has not been made clear in the current phase. Also, FAO Somalia's transition to the programme approach shows early evidence of improving efficiency and effectiveness but there remains significant opportunity for major impacts on efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. More efficient procurement and funding for programmatic resources are easier under the programme approach. Some sectors are collaborating more and most respondents felt more broadly aware of other teams' activities.

Does FAO (HQ and Country Office) possess the right corporate instruments (e.g. programmatic, financial, HR, managerial, M&E, management information systems, reporting) and culture to implement programmes instead of separate projects, and if not, what needs to be improved or developed? Is the skill set available at FAO Somalia appropriate to implement the programmatic approach?

- D. FAO HQ has contributed to developing some programme approach tools, but there is much more to be done, as organizational structures, skills and culture need enhancement and adjustment to the new approach, at all levels.** Many of the corporate tools required to implement under a programme approach do not exist yet. Given their experience, FAO Somalia staff may be in a good position to take the lead in developing new tools, and then feeding these back to FAO HQ for enhancement and integration. Because of their tendency towards strict regulatory environments, finance teams (and to a lesser extent HR) are often the last to embrace change. Skills in FAO Somalia remain very strong in core technical areas (as per FAO historical structure and comparative advantage) but FAO Somalia is weak in "soft skills" such as team building, communication (particularly for internal behaviour change) and broad cross-sector theoretical knowledge related to their programme (in this case, resilience in particular). Internal capacity building seems to be someone else's problem as everyone felt it was missing but no one seemed to be addressing the challenge. While the JRS tries to break down technical silos, the organogram of the FAO Country Office is still structured around teams with technical speciality as opposed to programmatic outcomes. Some sectors remain territorial over projects, activities and funding, while others are clearly collaborating more. For the teams

that are not, there was indication that the new programmatic funding allocation process may have even discouraged collaboration. The nature of relationships between teams, donors, and sectors is ad hoc and personality-driven. However, since FAO HQ is clearly putting time and effort into critical thinking about the programme approach (of which even this evaluation is an example) there is obviously a desire for change, but the message is not filtering throughout the organization. This is also due to the lack of clarity in the message and lack of clear corporate definition of the programme approach. Corporate instruments in particular are lagging behind in the transition, and will require special attention as a change management plan is developed.

2.4 What are the potentials and opportunities of the partnerships developed in the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme?

264. This question asks how FAO Somalia is developing and managing partnerships in the Resilience Sub-programme. For the sake of clarity, this report will make the following three distinctions:

- Consortia Partnerships: this category covers peer relationships that are meant to improve or expand FAO's capacity to reach its goals. An example of this would be the Joint Resilience Strategy between FAO, UNICEF and WFP.
- Supporting Partnerships are those that FAO makes with local communities and are specifically meant to improve that community's capacity. An example of this would be the relationship between FAO and a Fishing Cooperative involved in a fishing improvement and marketing scheme.
- Contractual partnerships: these are strictly payment for service partnerships and may include some capacity building, but are focused on delivery of services or goods. Examples of this would be a LoA relationship between FAO and a local NGO hired to gather data, or a local company hired to deliver equipment for an infrastructure activity.

2.4.1 FAO-UNICEF-WFP Joint Resilience Strategy

265. There is no question that after the 2011 famine in Somalia, the creation of the JRS was a bold response to the realization that previous humanitarian and development efforts of the aid community were not enough to save many Somali households from regular cyclical shocks. With the development of the JRS, FAO Somalia made an important contribution by getting three UN agencies to think and analyse together, and helping to steer a conversation among aid actors in Somalia towards the longer term. The idea of the JRS itself was highly relevant and timely, both because of the need for a strengthened response, but also because of trends towards consortia in the development and aid fields.

266. The JRS as a funding mechanism was very successful in that it both attracted new donors while also encouraging old donors to contribute at higher funding levels and in some cases with more flexible funding. Donors were clearly very encouraged at the time of the development of the JRS. They were also interested in the relatively novel concept of resilience, and more inclined to provide funding following the 2011 famine. The JRS presented an excellent and well thought out joint strategy which met donor criteria and in-country needs at the same time.

267. Looking more deeply into field implementation, there are many indications that the JRS teams have succeeded in some key areas. Most notably, the JRS has improved each agency's capacity and scope on community engagement and impact evaluation. While each agency came to the table with its preferred methods for community engagement and impact evaluation, it is the compilation of each of their preferred methods into the JRS mixed methods approach that is leading to increased understanding of the drivers of vulnerability. For example, UNICEF brought their qualitative approach using focus groups and community consultations and FAO introduced the econometric quantitative approach (RIMA), and the mix of these will provide richer data to measure the impact of JRS programmes at household level. It remains to be seen however if this data is significantly different from that being gathered by other agencies/consortia, and more importantly how it is being used. This is further discussed under section 2.4.2.

268. Secondly, in some instances, the JRS has allowed for implementation staff in the field to broaden their scope, in terms of community engagement as well as adding value through synchronization of activities. Because food security initiatives are intrinsically linked to

agriculture they must be synchronized both with the seasonal calendar and with each other to have maximum impact. A simple example of this is the need to synchronize diversification of crops (seed distributions, agronomic training) with diversification of diet (nutritional training, cooking class) with marketing (training, pricing, awareness) for new products. There is evidence (see Box 7) that the JRS staff have attempted to synchronize certain components, but this has not been systematic and there was no evidence of direct results yet.

269. Also, there is clear evidence of efforts being made to change the modus operandi from working in agency silos to working collaboratively, which has the potential to significantly improve the results for beneficiaries; however, these results remain to be seen. For example, FAO and WFP made an effort to collaborate on two different activities to provide increased benefits to households through cycled activity planning and joint delivery. In both cases, the efforts failed due to the inability of the agencies to mesh their systems (in one case risk management systems, in the other case beneficiary lists). While this seems to be a significant fault line between the three agencies (failure to align corporate tools) the potential remains significant. The FAO agriculture team gave another example of an opportunity for increased outcomes under JRS with the introduction of the Orange Fleshed Sweet Potato (also see box 7). In this case, government interference has stalled activities.
270. In asking how successful FAO has been so far at delivering the JRS, the evaluation also looked at original intentions. The JRS strategy clearly states that the comparative advantage of FAO, WFP and UNICEF coordination is that the three agencies together provide all of the components necessary to build resilience in households and communities in Somalia. In interviews with senior management of FAO Somalia, it was clear that this was the key factor and that for this to happen, a common list of beneficiaries was required. Furthermore, the FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme Document 2012-2015 states on page 17: *“Joint planning of interventions: this area of work initiates the actual identification and coordination of resilience-building operations. Agencies will seek alignment, sequencing, and targeting of a set of resilience building interventions for the same vulnerable households”*. Indeed, many respondents, including donors, FAO employees (in both Nairobi and Somalia) and JRS partner employees stated that they perceived the Joint Resilience Strategy as being comprised of activities that were to be implemented in the same households.

Box 8. Opportunities for Improved Effectiveness

The following initiatives are all works-in-progress for the JRS and are likely to lead to improved results for Somali Households:

- Integrated support for primary education benefitting four schools and a total of 300 children, in which FAO will provide garden inputs and skills training to teachers and children; WFP supports school feeding, encouraging pupils to report to school; and UNICEF provides the learning materials for children and the teachers. All of these initiatives are geared towards creating a conducive environment for learning and limiting school dropouts.
- Promoting Orange Fleshed Sweet Potato (OFSP) production and consumption. The OFSPs are rich in nutrients and proven to address Vitamin A deficiencies in children under five and pregnant and lactating women in other parts of Africa. Through a joint initiative, FAO will support production through a farmers’ cooperative with inputs, training and marketing; WFP will use its fresh food voucher and school feeding programmes for targeted consumption; and UNICEF will promote consumption of nutrient rich OFSPs through nutritional education and training.
- Using a combination of unconditional and conditional cash transfers within communities in Afgoye and Lower Shabelle over three to six months, UNICEF and FAO plan to target 1 000 of the very poorest and labour constrained households with unconditional cash grants, and 800 households who are in a position to provide labour with conditional cash grants.

271. In light of this, it is clear that at the very least, intentions in the early days of JRS development were to ensure each target household had access to the services provided from the three agencies. The intention was somewhat downgraded by September 2013 when the JRS Operational Guidelines were released, which stated in Section II Principles of Resilience Programming, Multi-Sector Interventions: “targeted communities should, where possible, benefit from a combination of these three types of programmes.” While there is no explicit statement that implementation will shift from household to community level, this may have been an attempt to modify and decrease expectations that household

implementation of all three agency inputs was feasible. Indeed, not all three UN agencies work at the same level (household, community, schools), and targeting the same people is a highly complex exercise, especially as each agency already had ongoing operations before the development of the JRS, and the JRS did not result in new programmes, but only the reformulation of existing interventions.

272. The JRS is therefore not yet able to take this one crucial step on the same households or even communities. Interviews with FAO Somalia IT and Resilience Sub-programme staff indicate that there were some discussions and efforts made to create a joint activity database (which is now available on the website through the Information Portal³⁰). However, efforts to create joint beneficiary data sets have not been successful. In the eyes of some respondents (donors and FAO/WFP/UNICEF staff) this represents a shortcoming of the primary impetus behind the JRS. On the other hand, although all UN agencies' senior staff interviewed stated that the construction of the joint beneficiary database is a part of the vision, it does not appear to be on anyone's agenda.
273. It is important however to mention that not only is the JRS not over (the strategy is dated through 2015 but is being extended to 2016), but it is also undergoing a review and redesign process meant to address various challenges so far. In a recent paper documenting lessons learned through the JRS³¹, the lack of a joint beneficiary database is noted. The document outlines next steps, including moving from a joint strategy to a joint programme with jointly implemented activities. Furthermore, the document notes that in the future "a process of joint registration and management of beneficiary and household data in the new Joint Programme will facilitate the coordination of activities and ensure that eligible families receive multiple inputs, trainings and services as they need them in a timely fashion, as well as to be able to link the level of programming to possible impact at the community and household levels." This is encouraging, as it could lead to real joint implementation, beyond the strategy level.
274. The original documentation describing the Joint Resilience Strategy stated that it was a "paradigm shift." This was presented as a package of activities that were customized and composed specifically to build resilience. The FAO Somalia 3rd Interim Progress Report lists the JRS innovations, which can be simplified to the following points:
- Improved coordination (among all resilience partners/agencies) and communication (public information portal);
 - Common Results Framework, with agreed roles and responsibilities and established operational guidelines;
 - Joint funding/payment methods for consultations and evaluations.
275. Implementation in 2013-2014 included the incorporation of all three of these innovations. Cyclical coordination meetings appear to be happening, although to a lesser degree over time. The public information portal has been developed and is available to the public; although it is not clear to what extent it is being used. The Common Results Framework has been developed but is not a public document, leaving questions about accountability and, more importantly, utility. There were also instances cited of cost sharing for CCAPs and the RIMA surveys. While these improvements remain modest so far, even these seemingly small changes can be challenging for large organizations such as WFP, FAO and UNICEF.
276. There is a disconnect, however, between donors and JRS implementers regarding the JRS as an innovation. To the three agencies involved, the JRS may have felt innovative and starkly in contrast to how things were done before. To outsiders, donors most notably, there has always been an expectation that UN agencies are collaborating in the field to ensure no duplications occur and all comparative advantages are taken. More than one donor mentioned the expectation that agencies will not only work together but show evidence of increased cost efficiency by doing so. To date, this has yet to be proven. Each agency keeps working on its agency-specific programme, with unique funding and administration mechanisms.
277. Senior staff from all three agencies voiced concern that the JRS not only did not meet its vision, but also that it had lost some momentum. This was evident from various levels including JRS staff in the field and donors in Nairobi, where comments indicated that the early push was very much personality based and this was lost when the personalities moved on.

30 www.resilienceinsomalia.org

31 Not yet published

2.4.2 Joint evaluation mixed method approach

278. Together with the development of the Joint Resilience Strategy, a mixed method impact evaluation methodology was jointly defined among the three UN agencies. This method is based on the use of the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) developed by FAO, and includes qualitative methods such as community consultations and a seasonal calendar. Baseline surveys were conducted in 2013 and 2014 in the JRS pilot districts, and midline surveys have been conducted in 2015. In addition to measuring the results on resilience, these surveys are meant to provide decision makers with actionable information to inform response planning and targeting. This section looks at the perceptions of partners on the various components of the mixed method approach and how they are being implemented and used.
279. Many FAO staff stated strong support for and confidence in the ability of RIMA to not only measure resilience, but more importantly to measure change in resilience levels in households in Somalia attributable to the JRS. Comments about the need to be patient and give FAO time to prove this method were common. Interviewed donors and JRS partners were often less positive, with some commenting that RIMA was labour intensive, complex to use and/or difficult to interpret. This perception must be alleviated if FAO wants to gain broader consensus on its use for measuring resilience in Somalia.

“The RIMA needs to be translated to something visual or useful or we risk losing the argument” – Donor

280. Setting aside measurement and investigating the mixed method approach as a community engagement tool provided some interesting evidence of both successes and challenges. While the JRS may not have accomplished all of its goals regarding the use of the mixed method approach in community engagement, there have been some clear wins in terms of improved analysis of the context, environment and dynamics within which activities take place.
281. The Somalia Resilience Information Portal shows that 15 CCAPs and two seasonal consultations have so far been held (and reports released) under the JRS. These reports contain extensive information, and the seasonal consultations in particular provide local level information that would be difficult to obtain without in-depth community engagement. An example of this is the input on linking seasonality to programme support, month-to-month programming implications by livelihood and seasonality, and linking all of this to the three pillars of the Joint Resilience Strategy.
282. That the JRS has invested in this level of community based interaction is a strong step forward, especially in light of Recommendation 1 from the Evaluation of the FAO Somalia Country Programme in 2013: to “strengthen culture and practice of community consultations”. Both CCAP and seasonal consultation reports have sections on the implications for programming, which have significant potential to improve programming. Page 19 of the 3rd Progress Report of the Resilience Pillar Sub-Programme states: *“In April 2014, validation workshops were organized in Burco and Odweyne in order to disseminate the CCAP results and to present some key areas of intervention that are believed to enhance the resilience of the community in the cluster (s) of the districts... The interagency team initiated a work planning process for 2014, based on priorities identified at the cluster level and in line with the three agencies’ (and partners’) comparative advantages.”* A PowerPoint presentation created to encapsulate the CCAP process in Dolow stated that data should be “input into programming where possible, show consciousness of issue where not.”
283. The extent to which data was used systematically for programming design input however is not clear. There was evidence of ad hoc programmatic adjustment based on data, but no evidence of widespread or systematic processes to ensure CCAP and seasonal calendar data is fully incorporated into cyclical planning. As an example of ad hoc adjustments, community consultations in one village indicated a need for pest management where only basic agricultural inputs were planned. Specifically, CCAPs indicated that while the farmers were quite agronomically advanced, they were struggling with pest management. Due to that consultation, inputs were adjusted to better meet the needs of the farmers. The CCAP and seasonal consultation reports abound with programmatic implications similar to this, but it is not clear if they were always put to use.

284. The findings from our fieldwork in JRS areas indicate good awareness within communities of the consultation processes that have taken place in their area. In general, these consultations were indicated as inclusive, with involvement of the different segments of the community (e.g. young and old, women and men). The overwhelming majority welcomed the opportunity that consultations provided for different community members to be included in discussions, and to express their views on the challenges they faced and the solutions they felt could redress those challenges. Some also expressed appreciation for these consultations because they allowed communities to know in advance that they would be assisted by UN agencies and the activities that would be implemented. There were also mentions that activities delivered through the programme were in line with the priorities put forward during the consultation process, which is encouraging.

2.4.3 Partnering and capacity building

285. In conducting interviews with FAO staff, there was some confusion in terminology regarding various types of partners. This lack of differentiation was noted in the Evaluation of FAO's Cooperation in Somalia 2013 (see Recommendation 10) and continues into the present day. For the purpose of this document, implementing partners will be defined as local contractors, NGOs or registered non-profit organizations with whom FAO signs an LoA and from whom FAO expects specific services rendered or deliverables completed. The term "community groups" for the purposes of this section will mean cooperatives, committees or associations/CSO's (not registered as NGOs) with whom FAO develops a relationship, works in partnership and with whom FAO may sign a MoU. Unfortunately, no FAO implementing partners were interviewed in the field. The information used in this section is therefore only from the FAO perspective, and although it is informative in its own way, this is a major flaw of the analysis.

286. Most FAO respondents stated that there was capacity development occurring for the implementing partners with whom FAO is signing LoAs. However, on further investigation this primarily consisted of training to do FAO specific work on FAO specific guidelines, regulations and software. While this may indeed build NGO capacities, the long-term impact and result is unclear. While FAO Somalia has put in place a new Risk Management Framework which was developed to ensure higher levels of accountability and more rigorous checks and balances, there does not appear to be a consistent plan or criteria for working with implementing partners specifically for capacity development.

"It's not a capacity development plan, it's so they can do the work" — FAO Nairobi

287. Regarding community groups, there is substantial evidence that when FAO works directly with community groups these groups are capacitated in various ways. While some respondents felt that FAO needs to do much better by developing a systematic plan to capacitate communities, most staff were able to give examples of ways in which their interactions with communities showed various levels of capacity building. On the lower end of the spectrum, some communities are capacitated, like implementing partners, only to do a specific task for FAO. For instance in one case a FAO respondent stated that mostly what they do is train community groups to learn how to "work with us better." However in more cases, community groups were capacitated in broader ways. FFS, Water Committees and Fishing Cooperatives are all examples of community groups with whom FAO is working directly and building capacity that is not only for the sake of improved relationships with FAO but also for the sake of the community group itself to better perform for its constituents or members.

288. Another example of this is the work the FAO livestock sector is doing with CAHW's in the South Central region. The CAHW's are drawn from the communities and were traditional animal healers, already active in their communities. Following the initiative their expertise will remain within the community. The recently published Impact Assessment of the CAHW Intervention in Dolow District indicates that these CAHW's are having a positive impact on communities. The impact evaluation methodology included two stages: i) call centre data gathered from beneficiary lists; and ii) household surveys by FAO field monitors in target villages. Data gathered indicates that CAHWs are accessing drugs and services through linkages to the South-West Livestock Professional Association (SOWELPA, supported by FAO) agro-vets; are charging fees for services and drugs, and therefore increasing their chances of sustainability in a private sector market; and are improving the health of herds (camels, goats, cattle) through services and simple surgery (e.g. dehorning). Enhancing the

entrepreneurial skill of CAHWs will further strengthen their service delivery capabilities and sustainability of their operations for the betterment of their communities.

289. FFS are another way in which community capacity building is occurring. FFS use a cascading model whereby a master trainer (lead farmer) is trained (often along with Ministry of Agriculture extension workers, where appropriate) and those master trainers, usually a farmer from a particular district, then train community farmers. In some cases the cascade goes even further, with community farming representatives passing on knowledge to their neighbours. In general, sustainability is ensured through strong farmer association building. The empowerment process, rather than the adoption of specific techniques, is what produces sustainability. There is a wealth of best practice evidence on FFS, much of which has been either developed or published by FAO³². FAO Somalia has a strong history of establishing FFS in the country and has been training master farmers since 2006.

2.4.4 Conclusions under Evaluation question 4

How successful has the Resilience Sub-programme been in delivering the Joint Resilience Strategy? Does the combination of the three agencies working together add up to a better, more efficient, cost effective, durable response? Is this kind of partnership sustainable? Is there less duplication? What are the challenges and opportunities for the coordination partners? Are the coordination mechanisms (in Nairobi and field level) efficient?

- A. The JRS was a bold, timely and relevant initiative, but there is agreement that the resilience paradigm, as laid out in the strategy, has not yet been proven.** When the JRS was developed, a “perfect storm” existed (increased crisis, decreased access for some agencies, three agencies with strong, innovative leadership, and international interest in resilience) that provided the imperative, the innovation and the funding for a new type of response to a desperate famine situation. The idea of moving away from the short-term emergency mode of intervention (that has long characterized operations in Somalia) and toward a longer term vision to better address risks and shocks was well received. The JRS makes bold claims about building resilience in households and communities. This includes claims that the comparative advantage of the three agencies working together provides nearly all the building blocks necessary to achieve improved resilience at household level. However, the lack of a joint beneficiary database or other mechanism (e.g. joint planning feeding into programmes and field level coordination among agencies) that allows for assurance that all households received the inputs from each agency makes it impossible for the claim to be proved. Since the development of the JRS, an increase in resilience-focused consortia combined with a change in leadership at all three agencies have coincided with donor fatigue (or decreased funding), causing additional challenges and a potential lowering of the motivation across leadership and implementation teams in the JRS. Although there are mixed feelings regarding the results of the initiative so far, indications of the preparation of a joint programme and a comprehensive document on the lessons learned clearly shows that improvements are underway. Respondents from all three agencies mentioned plans to feed those lessons into the development of a new and improved JRS where the agencies truly work together, which is encouraging. The question now is what would make the next stage of the JRS transformational and do FAO, WFP and UNICEF have the leadership and initiative to make that happen?

What are the lessons learned from the application of the evaluation model (mixed method approach) and the M&E system? How helpful is it for measuring results? How and by whom is the information used?

- B. The mixed method approach has improved FAO Somalia’s community consultation practice and culture to some extent. However, partners still need to be convinced about the utility and cost effectiveness of RIMA.** FAO Somalia has made steps towards improving its culture and practice of consultation as recommended by the Evaluation of FAO Somalia Cooperation in 2013. Engagement with communities has improved for field staff in particular, who indicate they have a better understanding of community vulnerabilities and needs. However, engagement by management and Nairobi level staff

32 For Example <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/ad487E/ad487E00.pdf> and <http://wle.cgiar.org/blog/2012/10/01/fao-launches-new-training-handbook-for-farmer-field-schools/>

is missing, and the extent to which these consultations are integrated into programming is limited. Linking programme design decision making to CCAP and seasonal calendars remains challenging. There remains a lack of understanding and confidence in RIMA among some partners. FAO must be careful not to forge ahead without responding to challenges, as this may further erode confidence.

Is the Resilience Sub-programme building capacities of the communities? To what extent is FAO partnering with local implementing partners? What can be done to improve ownership by national partners? What are the challenges faced by national partners in planning, implementation, monitoring and sustaining results, and how can they be overcome?

B. Confusion exists regarding definitions of “capacity building” and “partners”. FAO Somalia teams are not clear on definitions of either “capacity building” or “partners”. The reason for this appears to be a misunderstanding about what constitutes capacity building. When FAO Somalia trains contractors or LoA recipients to do a job for FAO, this should not be considered capacity building unless FAO is performing this training under an employment focused initiative. However there is a wealth of evidence that capacity building is occurring with various types of community groups with which FAO works, and the training of CAHWs or master farmers to assist their communities in improved animal health or agronomic techniques are good examples of capacity building. On the other hand, there has been little effort to monitor the longer term impact or sustainability of capacity building efforts. With respect to the definition of “partners”, as highlighted in Recommendation 10 in the Evaluation of FAO Somalia Cooperation 2013, there is confusion in the understanding of, and contracting with, implementing partners/contractors (driven by an LoA) and genuine partnerships (with principles of partnership articulated in an MoU). FAO Somalia rightly pointed out that FAO HQ must take the lead in developing appropriate partnership frameworks, as they are not in the Manual Section and guidance is lacking. Also, as the Somali Federal structure solidifies, FAO Somalia will need to develop specific policies and procedures for capacity building in ministries. Linking with UNDP, as mentioned in the 2013 Evaluation of FAO Somalia Cooperation, seems the most direct and cohesive choice, particularly in light of the current One UN environment, the PSGs and the Joint Programme on Local Governance.

3. Recommendations

290. Based on the findings and conclusions, the evaluation provides recommendations for maximizing the strategic relevance of FAO's Resilience Sub-programme in Somalia, and towards improving its implementation modalities and effectiveness, as well as the introduction of the programme approach at a broader scale within the organization.

3.1 R1. A more in-depth understanding of the varied Somali contexts would help inform programme design and improve relevance.

- An explicit theory of change should be supported by the development of a long-term vision and multi-year strategy of engagement that the programme envisages for each sector and in the areas that currently fall under FRP and IHRA categories. This analysis should also serve to make a realistic assessment of what is possible to achieve in FRP and IHRA areas and make explicit the different modalities of intervention in different areas. More generally, agricultural support activities, both in rain-fed and irrigation areas, should be premised on a robust analysis of the context, and an understanding of the potential winners and losers of some interventions. The PNTD is a useful tool to support this process.
- The Resilience Sub-programme should be given a more explicit focus on the institutional and structural causes that drive and reproduce vulnerability and risk, establish clearer pathways for moving out of vulnerability and into a development pathway and, where possible given ongoing challenges to operations, prioritize initiatives that more strategically intervene at the structural level.
- Changes in the country's governance landscape and the implementation of the federal formula on the ground have been underway since 2012. The shift from a context of failed government to one where government authorities can be increasingly considered as key stakeholders in interventions at the community level makes the issue of revisiting the possible synergies between these two CPF pillars a particularly pressing and timely one.
- The programme should take into account changing administrative and governance dynamics and, specifically, gain a finer understanding of the possible hotspots of the country where conflict and insecurity could arise. As such, the programme should consider revisiting the 2011 country-wide conflict analysis study and/or conducting another study to map at-risk areas, understand how programme activities and resources provided may affect the likelihood of conflict, and outline the steps that should be taken to minimize this risk.
- To better operationalize the resilience concept, the role of CFW activities should be rethought and must be seen as part of a more strategic and holistic approach in the agriculture sector, or any other sector where CFW interventions are rolled out. Beyond the "cash" dimension (wages), the quality and use of the "work" (i.e. rehabilitated agricultural assets), need to be prioritized. CFW must contribute to the advancement of a broader agenda of engagement and a more systemic approach in each sector. A viable and well defined exit strategy for infrastructure developed through CFW activities is especially relevant with issues of sustainability and resilience in mind. Exploring how nascent government institutions could be involved in maintaining these assets could also be reflected upon in this regard.
- FAO and WFP should determine, on the basis of robust market evidence (e.g. from the FNSAU), the appropriateness of FFW and/or CFW in a given area. The negative effects of seasonal WFP food distributions on agriculture producers' abilities to sell at profitable prices must be taken seriously by both WFP and FAO.
- In the context of fisheries development, advocacy is particularly important. To complement its role in supporting fishing activities, the programme and FAO in general could engage in advocacy. Illegal fishing and foreign concessions seem to be priority areas for advocacy work.

3.2 R2. A more structured and well-staffed effort, as well as dedicated corporate support and tools are required for the programme approach to succeed.

- FAO Somalia must prioritize immediate action on filling vacant senior management positions to provide the programme with much needed leadership. In particular, a Resilience Sub-programme coordinator should be recruited in order to ensure that the vision is clear and shared among technical colleagues.

- FAO HQ must develop or adapt corporate HR and finance tools, including FPMIS, that can be rolled out to country teams as they transition from a project approach to a programme approach. The approach must in the very least include continuity (honouring the rich history of FAO), vision (clarifying the rationale behind the transition) and action (systematic steps to be taken, roles and responsibilities). Once the plan, vision and rationale are clear, FAO can articulate this as necessary to donors and other stakeholders.

3.3 R3. Partnerships should be strengthened between the three agencies, as well as with national stakeholders.

- The three agencies are developing a new roadmap to reflect a new, dynamic, innovative perspective on taking the JRS to the next level. The donors are eager to see this and the JRS itself promised improved coordination. The JRS should develop a mechanism to provide evidence showing how targeted Somali households are benefiting from each of the three components, considering that synergies are necessary to build resilience. An important step will be to develop a joint community database (a concrete list of each village, mapped geographically and with clear population data) from which each of the three agencies commit to at least 80 percent coverage; thus the JRS could state that the three agencies' inputs were received by 80 percent of the communities.
- The JRS needs to show how it is using data from the mixed methods approach to adjust implementation. A link from CCAP, seasonal calendars and baseline/midline data to activity review redesign should be clear. There also needs to be more clarity on how non-JRS components of the Resilience Sub-programme are improving their culture and practice of community consultation. The CCAP and seasonal calendar process can be rolled out to all initiatives.
- The JRS should strengthen its focus on the collaboration with local governments, including district councils and municipalities in peri-urban areas, and ensure that the support provided will enable them to sustain the results achieved by the programme, in a context of strengthened local government institutions. The Joint Programme for Local Governance – which supports the planning and management capacity of selected district councils and in which UNICEF is already a partner – provides an opportunity for FAO to involve local governments (i.e. municipalities and district councils) in the planning, delivery and subsequent management of some medium-sized infrastructure rehabilitated through the Resilience Sub-programme.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Documents consulted

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Appendix 2: People interviewed

Last name	First name	Title	Organization
Donors			
Abdi	Kunow	National Programme Officer	Swiss Embassy
Barre	Mohamed	Programme Manager, Somalia Team	Embassy of Denmark
Bloch	Marc	Programme Manager for Food Security	Swiss Embassy
Fouquet	Sebastien	Senior Humanitarian Advisor	DFIF
Grimm	Franziska	Project Manager (email only)	Germany/KfW
Kilwake	Liliane	National Programme Officer, SIDA	Sweden Embassy
Mohamed	Abdulahi	Regional Programme Specialist	USAID (OFDA)
Mungai	Kumani	Senior Development Officer	Canadian Embassy
Nyachieo	John	National Programme Officer	Swiss Embassy
Oberhaus	Lars	Head of ECHO Office for Somalia	ECHO (EU)
Shaw	Anne	Food For Peace Advisor	USAID (FFP)
UN organizations			
Foyouzat	Foroogh	Deputy Representative	UNICEF Somalia (Nairobi)
Gordon	Mark	Head of Programme	WFP Somalia (Nairobi)
Mangulenje	Isaac	Programme Officer, Dolow	UNICEF Somalia
Rumbidzai	Chitombi	Head of Sub Office, Garowe	UNICEF Somalia
Singh	Amit	Programme Officer	WFP Somalia (Nairobi)
Snuggs	Jason	Programme Manager, South Central	WFP Somalia
FAO			
Agarwal	Rajiv	Senior Admin Officer	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Alinovi*	Luca	Officer-in-Charge, FAO Somalia	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Bagnardi	Maria Angela	Programme Officer, TCS	FAO HQ
Barasa	Edwin	Conflict Analyst - Livestock sector	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Barkhad	Mohamed	Burao Field Monitor	FAO Somalia
Biaou*	Cyprien	Senior Livestock Officer / livestock sector coordinator	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Boualam*	Bahkta	Compliance Officer	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Capone	Luca	Security Officer	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)

FAO			
Cipolla	Dario	Head of Agricultural Inputs and Knowledge Unit	FAO Somalia
Diop	Bouna	Animal Health and Policy (email only)	FAO HQ
Dupont*	Camilla	HR Officer	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Grosso	Paolo	Technical Officer, NRL	FAO HQ
Gujral*	Aruna	Head of Programme Planning and Coordination Unit	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Hinrichs	Angela	Liaison and Operations Officer, TCE	FAO HQ
Hussein	Abdifitah	National Programme Officer, Dolow	FAO Somalia
Jaqueson	Patrick	Senior Programme Officer, TCE	FAO HQ
Khan	Ruby	Resilience Programme Coordinator	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Lopez*	Jose	Senior Agriculture Officer / agriculture sector coordinator	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Malik	Amin	Head of M&E Unit	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Olesambu	Emmanuella	Liaison and Operations Officer, TCE	FAO HQ
Oyat	Michael	Programme Officer (former)	FAO Somalia
Read	Andrew	Fisheries office / Fisheries sector Coordinator	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Russo	Luca	Programme coordinator, ESA	FAO HQ
Sawyer	Asha	Cash for Work Operations Coordinator	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Shibru	Mulugeta	Field Programme Manager in Somaliland	FAO Somalia
Simeon*	Giuseppe	former Coordinator, Cash Based Interventions (email only)	FAO HQ
Tremblay*	Nicolas	Programme Coordinator in Programme Management Unit	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Trenchard	Dick	Acting head of office (until July 2015), then FAOR Somalia	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Van Aaken	Rudi	Head of Programme	FAO Somalia (Nairobi)
Vinet	Rodrigue	Senior Programme Officer, TCS	FAO HQ
Warsame	Mohamed	FFS Specialist/Senior agronomist	FAO Somalia
SomRep			
Jordan	Georgina	Quality Assurance & Knowledge Manager	World Vision (SomRep)
Lanyon	Andrew	Programme Coordinator	World Vision (SomRep)

*The asterix means that the person is no longer in that position as of November 2015

Appendix 3: 2012 Country Evaluation analysis of the resilience sub-programme

Date: 22/11/2012

Evaluation team's analysis of the FAO Somalia Resilience Strategy, and of the proposed shift in paradigm and implementation

Opportunities associated with the resilience strategy

- FAO is in a strong leadership position to develop resilience thinking and programming, intellectually, within the UN system and within the wider international community in Somalia and beyond, for example also inputting into the DFID strategy on resilience
- As donors and other agencies currently express much interest in resilience, there is a window of opportunity right now to develop more effective ways of programming, and to challenge and change the current aid architecture eg pushing for longer-term time funding cycles
- The changing political context and end of the transition period in Somalia means that there is an opportunity opening to work more closely with government and to engage in governance issues. This needs to be monitored carefully in order to identify opportunities
- This is also an opportunity to move away from a purely state-building paradigm to refocus on issues of poverty and vulnerability
- If the new government in Mogadishu signs up to the IGAD strategy/ platform on resilience, there will be an opportunity to engage with the IGAD strategy and to bring conflict more centrally into that strategy
- The joint FAO/ WFP/ UNICEF resilience strategy is an opportunity for these three UN agencies to work much more closely together than has traditionally been the case, and to have a significant impact on the ground
- At community level, people do not think in terms of agency mandates, so this is an opportunity for holistic programming according to community needs and priorities rather than driven by agency mandates and priorities. It is thus an opportunity for more integrated analysis at field level
- This presents an important opportunity to learn about Somali resilience and traditional coping strategies at household and community level
- FAO's CFW experience is an opportunity to be capitalised upon in terms of building household and community resilience, by building assets and distributing cash at household level

Conceptually and strategically – issues and gaps identified by the team

- Drawing on the presentation at the resilience workshop re the history of the resilience concept from ecology (which looks at resilience over decades), and the experience of the PSNP in Ethiopia (which has contributed to resilience very slowly), the temporal dimension of FAO's resilience strategy is too short and needs to be revisited. NB the timescale for IGAD drought resilience strategy is 15 years
- The 'system' that FAO is addressing in its resilience strategy – household and community level – is too narrowly defined. In order to build resilience governance issues must be addressed at all levels, from national to local.
- Local authorities are key stakeholders in interventions at the community level (and in the changing political context in Somalia it may be unacceptable NOT to be involving government authorities centrally in the resilience programme). This means working with agencies and projects that are working to strengthen governance.
- Importance of making connections across systems in the resilience strategy, ie linking livelihoods systems with agro-ecological zones/ marine resources and with social systems in terms of resilience thinking
- The resilience thinking and strategy has been developed and devised by the leadership of FAO Somalia and has therefore been driven from the top-down. It is not yet 'owned' or taken on board at the field level.
- The strategy has some gaps in terms of analysis, specifically: o It is clear re the vision, but is lacking an analysis of FAO's ability to deliver that vision and the distance that

needs to be travelled for that to be possible, especially in terms of FAO's resources and skill-sets on the ground

- Much of what the resilience strategy is attempting to achieve has been tried before in Somalia, albeit not always successfully. The strategy is lacking acknowledgement of previous work done by other agencies, of good practice examples and of what can be learned from earlier efforts
- The strategy also needs to be clearer that the most immediate factor affecting resilience in Somalia is violent conflict, and needs to acknowledge that one of the key factors building resilience has been diaspora remittances (note forthcoming FSNAU research analysis of this)
- It should also be noted that what is being offered as innovation in the FAO strategy is not necessarily 'new'. It is recognised good development practice, although FAO and others may have struggled to follow this practice in the past
- There is an acknowledged (although not in the strategy) lack of research and understanding of how Somali society has transformed and adapted over the last decade, in other words of trends in how livelihood systems and settlement patterns have changed (eg with displacement and urbanisation), and of trends in vulnerability and resilience within different livelihood and population groups. This is a major gap that the resilience strategy needs to address urgently
- The reality and implications of power dynamics, within and between communities and livelihood groups, between clans, and including gender inequalities, are currently missing in the strategy, yet are likely to be a critical determinant of vulnerability, and a critical factor to be taken into consideration in efforts to build resilience

Challenges in implementing the resilience strategy in practice

- There is a significant gap between the vision set out in FAO's resilience strategy and the current reality of what FAO is doing and how it is working, and therefore its current skill-sets, e.g. FAO does not have a comparative advantage or skill sets suited to community development work.
- The lack of research and trend analysis of how local communities and households have developed their own resilience, right now and over time, is a major challenge to the programme, and means it must draw upon the knowledge of Somali civil society as much as possible, as well as FSNAU's historical database
- The FAO programme has an important role to play in helping to develop measures of resilience. The challenge is to ensure that these are appropriate to the context, accessible and easily understood
- Insecurity and lack of access means that FAO may not be able to reach those who may be most vulnerable and most in need of being supported in terms of building their resilience as they are currently most affected by ongoing conflict
- Volatility and unpredictability of the Somalia context are likely to be key challenges for some years to come
- The roll-out of the strategy from the top-down and the fact that the three UN agencies are mostly not working together at field level is a challenge that will require a change in organisational culture in all 3 agencies, including FAO
- The mode of implementation of FAO's resilience strategy is still unclear: to what extent is FAO planning to implement directly versus working with NGO partners, government authorities etc?
- FAO does not have a track record of real partnership with NGOs, yet such partnerships may be crucial to implementing the resilience programme and to ensure that this new paradigm is not imposed on FAO's implementing partners
- FAO's administrative procedures are often slow and cumbersome, and there are already examples of how these are not in synch with the other UN agencies it is partnering, hampering joint programming on the ground

Recommendations

1. Extend the FAO resilience strategy to 15 years, broken down into 3 year programming cycles, for funding and ongoing review purposes, with clear milestones identified
2. FAO's strategy on resilience should be broadened from the community and household level to incorporate and address governance issues. Implications: a. FAO's capacity-development component of the strategy should be more explicitly related to its resilience programme.

FAO should work closely with agencies and programmes addressing governance issues in Somalia, and should pro-actively seek out partners on governance now.

3. The FAO strategy should be explicitly broadened across sectors, to link livelihood systems with agro-ecological zones/ marine resources and to incorporate environmental analysis.
4. Whilst recognising that any resilience programme needs to be large and robust if significant impact is to be achieved, as pointed out by ODI there is no research evidence yet to demonstrate how resilience programming will deliver and be more effective than other types of programming. There is therefore a need to manage expectations, to be clear that this first phase is experimental, to point out the challenges and the required time-scale to have an impact. In other words, it is important to be realistic and not to promise too much.
5. FAO must urgently define its proposed mode of implementation for the resilience programme (eg direct implementation, through NGOs, mixed modes etc).
6. A programme of roll-out is needed to the field level to ensure that all FAO staff are fully on board with the resilience strategy and understand the implications of working in this way with other agencies (esp with UNICEF and WFP in the first instance).
7. In order to deliver the vision set out in the resilience strategy, FAO must review its human resources and existing skill sets to assess how these must change. Implementation of the resilience programme is likely to require bringing in new skill sets.
8. There is an urgent need to build a deeper understanding of how Somali society and livelihoods have transformed, and how they built their own resilience over time. Maximum use should be made of FSNAU's historical database in carrying out trend analysis. Research is also needed to look in detail at what happened during the recent famine, how people coped and survived, and how they survived in other crises.
9. There also needs to be investment in research from the beginning of the programme that is ongoing alongside the programme, and openness in terms of the current gaps in knowledge.
10. FAO's experience of CFW should be coordinated with UNICEF's experience of UCTs as a potential safety-net, and their respective impacts need to be further understood in terms of provoking sustainable change. Both need to be predictable and implemented over a sustained timeframe to contribute to resilience. This means that governments should be involved and alignment sought with their social and agricultural policies.
11. The resilience programme must address cross-cutting issues, in particular power dynamics (including clan dynamics) and gender equality.

1 While the plan included interviews with non-beneficiaries, the field work team did not include any in the discussion, mainly because of the difficulty in selecting appropriate non-beneficiary groups

