Evaluation of FAO Strategic Objective 5: Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises
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## Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Accountability to Affected Populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGIR</td>
<td>Alliance Globale pour l’Initiative Résilience-Sahel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAHW</td>
<td>Community Animal Health Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSAM</td>
<td>Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILSS</td>
<td>Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Country Programming Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Climate-Smart Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECTAD</td>
<td>Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (FAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPRES</td>
<td>Emergency Prevention System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWEA</td>
<td>Early Warning Early Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFS</td>
<td>Farmer Field School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPAC</td>
<td>Climate Prediction and Applications Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPALD</td>
<td>Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRSI</td>
<td>IGAD’s Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIE</td>
<td>World Organization for Animal Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPIM</td>
<td>Operational Partners Implementation Modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSP</td>
<td>Office of Strategy, Planning and Resources Management (FAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Regional Office for Africa (FAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAU</td>
<td>Resilience Analysis Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLC</td>
<td>Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (FAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCE</td>
<td>Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (FAO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISDR</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Executive summary

ES1 The present report outlines the main findings and conclusions from an evaluation of Strategic Objective 5 (SO5) *increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises*, one of the five Strategic Objectives approved at the 38th session of the FAO Conference in June 2013 as part of the reviewed Strategic Framework.

ES2 The Strategic Objectives were later complemented with Strategic Programmes providing a four-year results framework and resources for delivering results against each Strategic Objective. The SO5 programme (also called ‘Strategic Programme 5”) is articulated through four Outcomes and nine Outputs, which build upon the components of the Hyogo Framework for Action. In this report, the terms ‘strategic objective’ and ‘strategic programme’ are used almost interchangeably.

ES3 The four Outcomes of Strategic Programme 5 are:

- **Outcome 5.1** Countries and regions adopt and implement legal, policy and institutional systems and regulatory frameworks for risk reduction and crisis management
- **Outcome 5.2** Countries and regions provide regular information and early warning against potential, known and emerging threats
- **Outcome 5.3** Countries reduce risks and vulnerability at household and community level
- **Outcome 5.4** Countries and regions affected by disasters and crises prepare for, and manage effective responses

ES4 At its 116th session in November 2014, the Programme Committee endorsed the *Indicative rolling work plan of strategic and programme evaluations 2015-17* which proposed to present, at each Programme Committee session, one thematic evaluation related to the Organization’s Strategic Objectives. This is the first such strategic evaluation conducted.

ES5 The evaluation was focused on four overarching evaluation questions:

i. **Strength of the conceptual and planning framework**: clarity of FAO’s strategy under SO5, its relevance to countries’ needs, and degree to which it is likely to be effective.
ii. **Capacity to translate the framework into action**: is FAO equipped to deliver against the Strategic Framework?
iii. **Progress achieved**: has the reviewed Strategic Framework and Objective already resulted in “intermediary results”, such as improved programming, more cohesive FAO support and better knowledge management?
iv. **Strategic positioning**: has FAO’s global positioning and comparative advantage at the confluence of the emergency and development agendas been strengthened by SO5?

ES6 The evaluation does not review the principles underlying the reviewed Strategic Framework nor its design or related corporate guidance, as these issues are beyond the scope of SO5. It however provides feedback on how corporate guidance was applied within SO5 and with what results, with a view to providing recommendations for the future.

ES7 Sources of data included administrative data analysis; a synthesis of evidence from past evaluations; interviews and survey of FAO staff and partners involved in resilience work; and five country case studies selected (Cambodia, Lebanon, Mali, Uganda and Pakistan) based on a review of their SOS-related portfolio and feedback from the Strategic Programme 5 core team. While conducting the country case studies, the evaluation team also visited the Regional Offices for the Near East, Asia and the Pacific and Africa, as well as the Sub-regional Resilience Teams in Nairobi and Dakar. The Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional and Sub-regional Offices, those of Europe and Central Asia, and the Pacific Sub-regional Office were interviewed by telephone. FAO partners and other stakeholders working on resilience were also interviewed, as well as a key donors and counterparts from relevant ministries in the countries visited.

An evaluation of the FAO Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) is undertaken separately, because the technical breadth and complexity of EMPRES are beyond the capacity of the present SOS evaluation. Moreover, the evaluation of EMPRES will benefit from greater consultation, and possibly cooperation, with a number of partners such as the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health, and the International Plant Protection Convention, and thus requires a different process.

Findings

This section extracts from the main body of the report a set of evaluation findings responding to the four evaluation questions. These findings form the basis for the conclusions and recommendations presented in subsequent sections.

Strength of the conceptual and planning framework

The concept of resilience speaks to a world in crisis. It starts from people’s strengths, and stresses the importance of addressing the root causes of disaster and crises rather than just their symptoms. The federative aspect of the concept can be a strength but also presents a risk: that of a “catch-all”, unwieldy concept hard to operationalize in practice.

The concept of resilience has programmatic consequences. It suggests that it is useful to respond to short-term crises, but inappropriate to repeat short-term emergency interventions year after year in a context of protracted crisis, where community-based and market-oriented approaches are more suitable than free input distributions, which may undermine the resilience of the rural societies concerned.

FAO works through governmental and non-governmental service providers to help them provide a series of ‘resilience-boosting services’ to communities and households affected by disasters and crises.

The theory of change for Strategic Programme 5 is logical and complete. However, there is a potential overlap between Output 1.1 (Improved capacities to formulate and promote risk reduction and crisis management policies, strategies and plans) and Output 4.1 (Improved capacities of national authorities and stakeholders for emergency preparedness to reduce the impact of crisis), which could be combined.

The current Strategic Framework’s scope and implementation span the entire Organization, from headquarters to decentralized offices, and provides them with a clear and common results framework. However, country office progress in implementing the reviewed Strategic Framework remains extremely varied, pointing to an uneven rollout of the Strategic Framework at country level.

Capacity to translate the Framework into action

While disaster risk reduction and management has historically been underfunded, resource partners are increasingly funding resilience programmes through specific, long-term financing mechanisms.

FAO could strengthen its strategic position by deepening its involvement in resilience. The Organization should not limit itself to a declining emergency crisis response portfolio, which in many cases (e.g. in protracted crises) relies on ill-adapted, short-term humanitarian funding.
ES17 The Strategic Programme 5 team is widely assessed in FAO and beyond as dynamic, flexible and supportive of country offices. It has also effectively “broken down silos”, notably through its weekly teleconferences and its country support process. These processes and supportive attitude make of Strategic Programme 5 one of the most present and visible Strategic Programmes at country level.

ES18 While silos were broken within Strategic Programme 5, there is potential for more collaboration between Strategic Programmes at headquarters. Collaboration with Strategic Programme 2 has focused on climate change, with Strategic Programme 3 on social protection and with Strategic Programme 4 on food chain safety. Some Regional Initiatives have generated collaboration between Strategic Programmes. At country level, the Strategic Programmes are seamlessly brought together under the country programming frameworks.

ES19 Among the range of approaches used by the regional offices in delineating and implementing the Regional Initiatives, the approach taken by the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean likely offers the best chance of success, with Regional Initiatives branded as ambitious flagship programmes, vehicles for knowledge sharing and awareness raising, funded from external resources, and implemented in collaboration with regional and national partners.

ES20 Countries under “active observation and coordinated support” derive significant benefits in terms of coordinated technical backstopping from all Strategic Programmes. So far, there is less value in the “focus countries” system, perhaps because “focus countries” represent two-thirds of all FAO programme countries.

ES21 The ‘Level 3’ protocols and the introduction of new partnership tools such as the Operational Partners Implementation Modality (OPIM) are a sign that long-standing operational difficulties are being taken seriously and progressively addressed.

ES22 Among the technical areas seen as key for resilience programming, FAO retains strong capacities in livestock health, Farmer Field Schools, locust control, water management, and to some degree in climate change adaptation. Capacities appear less robust in disaster risk reduction and management, insurance and cash-based approaches, and almost nil in conflict and political analysis.

Progress achieved

ES23 The various technical units engaged in resilience-building policies have not yet articulated their offer of services as a collective contribution, in spite of the opportunity offered by the Strategic Programme 5 ‘space’ to do so. Similarly, FAO still lacks an integrated One Health Strategic Action Plan taking into consideration all three EMPRES pillars.

ES24 Outcome 2 has contributed to the institutionalization of early warning and information systems such as the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA), and through the welcome development of the Early Warning/ Early Action system integrating data from different FAO systems. There is potential for deeper integration and further synergies through exchanges of data sets, integration of geographic information systems, and the sharing of data collection tools such as tablets and satellite data link services.

ES25 There is a large body of FAO community-based work on disaster risk reduction and management done through many small pilot projects. The review of past evaluations indicates that despite their quality, these small pilot projects often fail to influence national policy. However, encouraging examples exist of comprehensive and potentially useful policy support by FAO in disaster risk reduction and management.

ES26 FAO has made major improvements in its surge capacity and mechanisms, through the application of ‘Level 3’ Standard Operating Procedures that support a well-coordinated and well-functioning chain of support.
ES27 Developing a menu of “signature resilience services” could help FAO build a stronger, more diversified resilience programme at scale, by standardizing approaches and reducing programme design and roll-out time, while adapting the services to local particularities as required.

ES28 In terms of processes, the cohesiveness of FAO’s support has been improved and collaboration with national and local governments is now the rule in all projects; however, slow progress is reported against indicators relative to programme design and knowledge management.

Strategic positioning

ES29 FAO appears ideally positioned to contribute to the resilience agenda, due to the following external and internal advantages: a growing need for resilience support; a current reassessment of the humanitarian-development divide; FAO’s extensive experience in livelihood support, early warning and disaster risk reduction and mitigation; and the coherence of the resilience agenda with the FAO mandate.

ES30 In spite of the significant comparative advantages listed above, FAO has yet to make its presence felt in the “resilience space”, due to long-standing operational weaknesses and a lack of flexibility and speed in setting up new systems to address new needs.

ES31 FAO lacks an intermediate programmatic tool that could connect the country programming framework and the project document levels, in the form of thematic, sectorial or geographic programmes that would regroup several projects and facilitate flexible funding from multiple sources. A number of country offices have drafted resilience strategies as a way to address this gap.

ES32 Partnerships have been strengthened at the global and regional levels. At the country level, FAO has broadened its collaboration with ministries and departments beyond the ‘traditional’ FAO governmental counterparts, e.g. with Ministries of Environment, and FAO often assumes a coordinating role in its areas of expertise.

ES33 Joint programmes and initiatives have been signed with other United Nations organizations, globally and in a large number of countries, but actual collaboration in the field remains uncommon. Agencies frequently implement their component of a joint project separately.

ES34 FAO’s capacity to perform as an opinion leader in the field of resilience is improving, notably at the global level and in regions endowed with a Regional Initiative on resilience. At national level, the degree of engagement in Strategic Programme 5 still depends much on the profile, skill-set and preferences of individual FAO Representatives rather than on the relevance of Strategic Programme 5 to the country context and government priorities.

ES35 FAO is committed to integrating gender in resilience, as well as to protection from sexual abuse and exploitation and Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP). Guidance on these issues has been produced and disseminated, and programme design has afforded greater consideration to gender integration and AAP.

Conclusions

Conclusion 1. The renewed interest in resilience represents a historic opportunity for FAO, which is well positioned to contribute to the resilience agenda. Nevertheless, FAO has yet to make its presence fully felt and recognised in the “resilience space” especially at country level.

ES36 FAO is well positioned to contribute to the resilience agenda within its mandated areas of agricultural production, rural development and natural resource management, and to meet the growing demand from member countries to support the resilience of agricultural livelihoods to shocks and crisis. The current reassessment of the humanitarian-development
divide fits well with FAO’s mandate and its long engagement in both development and emergency contexts to support agricultural livelihoods. Specifically, the Organization’s experience in early warning and information systems, disaster risk management, locust control, transboundary animal diseases, and the length of its relationship with national and regional authorities put FAO in a good position to take advantage of the increasing support provided by key resource partners in resilience.

ES37 SO5 and its four Outcomes, as formulated, sit squarely within FAO’s mandate. Policy development, early warning and disaster risk reduction are eminently development-oriented. Outcome 4 that deals with preparedness and response to crises, is phrased as supportive of national authorities, and the response to Typhoon Haiyan and other similar successful emergency responses have proven the relevance and effectiveness of FAO’s emergency operations in response to sudden-onset crises. The concept of resilience also challenges development interventions to incorporate risk reduction measures and promote preparedness, recovery, resilient livelihoods and peaceful societies, while at the same time generating growth. This corresponds to the cross-cutting nature of resilience, which should in theory apply to all development processes, and calls for greater collaboration between Strategic Programmes.

ES38 FAO has yet to make its presence fully felt in the “resilience space”. Seizing the opportunity presented by the current interest in resilience requires continued and strengthened operational and technical capacity together with increased investment in resilience programming.

ES39 FAO has a comparative advantage in terms of livelihoods analysis and relevant technical capacity. However, its technical capacity would need to be expanded to respond to the increasing demand from member countries. FAO retains strong capacities in livestock health, Farmer Field Schools, locust control, water management, and to some degree in climate change adaptation. Based on feedback from country offices, capacities appear less robust in disaster risk reduction and management, insurance and cash-based approaches, and almost nil in conflict and political analysis. Efforts are being made to fill vacant positions and hire new staff in key technical units, but this may not be enough. More investment in FAO’s resilience programming and resource mobilization capacity appears necessary.

ES40 Operational capacity remains a limiting factor, including for resource mobilization, as noted in a number of past evaluations. The situation has improved, but not fast and systematically enough. While many decision-making processes remain centralized and lengthier than they should be, the “Level 3” protocols and the introduction of new partnership tools such as OPIM are a sign that operational difficulties are being taken seriously and progressively addressed.

ES41 SO5 is funded overwhelmingly by voluntary contributions. This is because as FAO expanded its portfolio in emergency and rehabilitation activities, the Organization used humanitarian resource channels that are relatively easier to access than development funding.

ES42 The Organization has never invested much of its core, regular resources in this area. This funding model continued to some extent with Strategic Programme 5 as well, in that the Strategic Programme has benefited from very limited Regular Programme resources. As a result, the implementation of the SO5 vision and philosophy, as described in the FAO Strategic Framework, relies largely on external, short-term funding over which FAO has little control.

ES43 The lack of predictable resources in Strategic Programme 5 deprives FAO of the ability to invest over the long term in promising resilience services and in its own personnel. Most of the personnel working on Strategic Programme 5 (national and international) are hired under consultancy contracts with extremely short contractual periods. This creates an unnecessary administrative burden, affects staff morale, efficiency and retention, and disrupts the durability of FAO’s support in resilience.

ES44 By pooling together the resource of agreeable donors into trust funds such as the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA), the Strategic Programme 5 team has been able to partially “cushion” the unpredictability of project funding and invest in
key strategic capacities and processes. Other United Nations agencies relying on voluntary contributions have created similar financial mechanisms to provide predictability and continuity to their donor-funded activities, partnerships, and staff.

ES45 Likewise, many agencies, FAO included, have found it possible and useful to build a development-oriented pipeline with a combination of successive short-term projects implemented with the same local partners in the same domain or geographic area. In Strategic Programme 5, the need to pursue long-term goals through short-term funding has led some FAO country offices to draft ‘resilience strategies’ or use other forms of programmatic documents (e.g. umbrella programmes) to document the programme resulting from the combination of several projects, and discuss it with partners. FAO lacks a formal programme level connecting the projects and the country programming frameworks, hence the recourse to country resilience strategies.

ES46 In spite of sporadic initiatives, programmatic collaboration remains weaker with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) than with governments. The relationship with the World Food Programme (WFP) is characterized by good collaboration on the food security cluster, but limited cooperation in the field.

Conclusion 2: There is a gradual evolution in the reviewed portfolio towards more genuine resilience programming, with closer coordination and collaboration with programme country governments and regional institutions, and away from unsustainable and disjointed interventions.

ES47 The review of past and recent evaluation reports highlights an uneven FAO track record in responding to crises in a development-oriented manner. In this context, Strategic Programme 5 is rightly seen by FAO Management as an effort to strengthen the development orientation of FAO’s work in preparation and response to crises.

ES48 Delimitating the domain of relevance of Strategic Programme 5 respective to that of other Strategic Programmes is relatively straightforward: Strategic Programme 5 should take the lead in countries affected by severe crises, while other Strategic Programmes should be more prominent in institutionally stable contexts with manageable levels of hazards and risks. Evidently, Strategic Programme 5 may also provide valuable inputs in the latter type of countries (e.g. on disaster risk reduction and mitigation policies).

ES49 The domain of relevance of emergency response versus that of resilience programming *stricto sensu* should be based on the duration of the crisis concerned and of the response required. Crisis-oriented interventions extending over more than two years should be designed and implemented with due considerations paid to the sustainability of achieved results. When a long-term intervention is required, community-based and market-oriented approaches are more suitable than free input distributions.

ES50 There is a gradual evolution in the reviewed portfolio towards more genuine resilience programming. Resilience programming, as defined in this report, responds to crises by starting from people’s strengths; it requires a solid analysis of the context in all its dimensions, and especially a good understanding of people’s livelihoods, taking into account the specific needs and priorities of men and women from different socio-economic and age groups; it provides support over the medium- or long-term; and it calls for attention to capacity development, sustainability and collaboration with governments and other partners.

ES51 In the portfolio analysis, the evolution towards closer coordination and collaboration with programme country governments and regional institutions is clear. The resilience portfolio includes more policy work, technical advice, investment support and capacity building than in the past, with some excellent work done at regional level in Africa with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and at national level in Asia and the Middle East for the control and prevention of highly pathogenic avian influenza.
ESS2 The major individual components of the FAO information and early warning systems (IEWS) are well established and have made significant progress on achieving results and adoption at country level. Much progress has been made towards institutionalizing the IPC in Africa and Asia. The Early Warning / Early Action system was developed by Strategic Programme 5 to consolidate available forecasting information and has started providing comprehensive risk analyses.

ESS3 The promotion of participatory and gender responsive approaches, put to excellent use during the response to Typhoon Haiyan, may require further support; a synthesis of past evaluations showed a lack of progress in the majority of evaluations reviewed.

ESS4 Some of the country offices visited as part of this evaluation’s field work were successful in raising resources for resilience-oriented activities by building a strongly contextualized, tailored intervention strategy before approaching donors, rather than vice versa, and by doing so in tight collaboration with the government rather than in isolation.

ESS5 In other cases, FAO has struggled to develop a technically sound programmatic offer in resilience, with response projects still implemented over short time frames without prospects for cumulative progress. While this may be adequate for one-off responses to sudden onset disasters, it has proven problematic when implemented recurrently, as is often the case in protracted crises.

Conclusion 3. The Strategic Programme 5 team has provided dynamic, flexible and supportive leadership and helped to “break down silos” in a useful and credible manner. However, there are still significant opportunities to merge or coordinate similar work implemented by different FAO units under Strategic Programme 5.

ESS6 The positive contribution of the Strategic Programme 5 team is recognised within FAO as well as by external partners and stakeholders. The new tools and ways of working described in this report (some of which have been piloted by Strategic Programme 5 and later expanded to other Strategic Programmes) are credited with changing the conversation between headquarters and country offices towards a more demand-oriented one, and with strengthening the systemic link between the FAO technical units in resilience.

ESS7 The Strategic Programme 5 Leader is also the Director of the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division, a specificity which allows him to mobilize significant human and financial resources behind Strategic Programme 5’s implementation and country support.

ESS8 However, there are still significant opportunities to merge or coordinate similar work implemented by different FAO units under Strategic Programme 5. Many technical units engage in resilience-related policies in a scattered manner. The different tools and systems developed by FAO for early warning and food security information are still managed in a disperse manner without much integration and synergies between them. Similarly, FAO lacks an integrated One Health Strategic Action Plan that would consider all three EMPRES pillars.

ESS9 There is also potential for more collaboration between Strategic Programmes. Collaboration with Strategic Programme 2 has increased on climate change (e.g. on El Niño), with Strategic Programme 3 on social protection and with Strategic Programme 4 on food safety. Some Regional Initiatives address issues involving several Strategic Programmes, and have generated collaboration among them. This is even truer at country level, where the Strategic Programme concerns are seamlessly brought together under the country programming frameworks, whenever there is scope for covering cross-cutting or complementary areas of work.

Conclusion 4: The Regional Offices have employed a variety of approaches to implement the Regional Initiatives. At country level, the Country Programming Framework is filling a real need, as it helps to articulate FAO’s programmatic offer in a concise and coherent manner.

ESS10 A range of approaches has been used to delineate and implement the new Strategic Framework at the regional level. Arguably, the Regional Office for Latin America and the
Caribbean has implemented the Regional Initiative concept in the most promising way: as large flagship programmes and vehicles for knowledge sharing and awareness raising, funded from external resources and implemented in collaboration with regional and national partners. This framing of the Regional Initiatives as regional flagship programmes requires a strong political commitment at the regional level. In the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, the Regional Initiatives were initially framed around narrow technical issues and are currently being revised to become regional flagship programmes around similar lines as the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean model. In Africa and the Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa, the Regional Initiatives are only funded by FAO resources and therefore rather small, and used to fund catalytic country-level initiatives.

ES61 Flexible support has been provided to country offices by the Strategic Programme 5 team and the resilience teams in regional offices, including with the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities. The system of “closer observation and support countries” is delivering increased and reasonably cohesive support from regional offices and headquarters to the few countries concerned. The system of “focus countries” has been less useful so far, primarily because too many focus countries have been selected.

ES62 The country programming frameworks (CPFs) are filling a real need at country level. They helped clarify the mutually agreed areas of work between government and FAO, attract the attention of donors, and identify possible areas of collaboration. In the staff survey, the CPF was rated as the single most useful FAO mechanism. In contrast, the new project cycle was poorly rated, due to its excessive complexity.

Conclusion 5: Resilience programming is not fundamentally new to FAO. The evolution towards development-oriented crisis surveillance, preparedness and response started before SO5. A number of so-called “signature resilience services”, anchored in decade-long FAO experience, were identified as having potential for upscaling.

ES63 Resilience programmes are not new to FAO. The evolution towards long-term, development-oriented crisis surveillance and response (highlighted in conclusion 2) started before SO5, under the previous Strategic Objective I and in some cases even earlier. Resilience is what good agricultural emergency responses – but also disaster risk reduction and management, early warning and sustainable development – have always been about.

ES64 A number of good practices were identified as having potential for upscaling in resilience programming, including: EMPRES, early warning, livelihoods-based information systems, community-based disaster risk reduction and management and climate change adaptation, community animal health workers, Farmer Field Schools, input trade fairs, networks of input shops and warrantage. These services and approaches are all anchored in significant FAO experience, adapted to both development and resilience, and they all require an investment over the long term while being easily scalable and de-scalable temporarily.

ES65 FAO could further promote and ‘brand’ some of these services as typical of FAO’s resilience programmes by treating them as “signature resilience services”. So far, many of these services, such as the community animal health workers or Farmer Field Schools, have not been aggressively promoted by FAO. The counterexample of the IPC, steadfastly promoted by FAO since its inception and institutionalized in a growing number of countries and regions, shows that FAO can bring good local experiences up to scale by constantly improving and promoting its good practices.

Conclusion 6: Insufficient attention has been paid to knowledge management so far. A reform of the type undertaken by FAO needs a strong knowledge sharing effort and infrastructure. This is especially important for SO5, which encapsulates a programmatic shift towards resilience.

ES66 A reform of the type undertaken by FAO requires a set of changes in objectives, organigrams, procedures and funding flows, as well as a change in mindset, a new conceptual framework,
almost a new value system, demonstrated in new ways of working. This is especially true of SO5, which encapsulates a programmatic shift towards resilience. Such a transition can certainly be assisted by a strong knowledge sharing effort, and may even falter without it. However, there has been no systematic staff training in resilience programming, and only modest efforts towards the development of knowledge sharing networks.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: While no major changes are required to the Strategic Framework, FAO should make a few adjustments to the Strategic Programme 5 result framework, clarify the concept of the Regional Initiatives, and promote greater integration of products and services across FAO units involved in Strategic Programme 5.

ES67 The corporate definition of resilience should be edited to include: i) a reference to ‘households, communities and nations’ to be more explicit on whose resilience; ii) the ability of a society to transform as a result of a disaster or crisis; and iii) the principle that resilience starts from people’s strengths, assets and strategies.

ES68 The SO5 output and outcome structure could be simplified by combining Output 1.1 (Improved capacities to formulate and promote risk reduction and crisis management policies, strategies and plans) with Output 4.1 (Improved capacities of national authorities and stakeholders for emergency preparedness to reduce the impact of crisis), as the two seem highly connected but seen from different viewpoints.

ES69 More generally, there is potential for further integration of FAO services related to resilience, by promoting greater collaboration and coherence among concerned FAO units involved in policy advice (Outcome 1) and early warning (Outcome 2).

ES70 Output 3.2 (Improved access of most vulnerable groups to services which reduce the impact of disasters and crisis) deserves greater attention from the Strategic Programme 5 team, with promising resilience-building pathways through basic services in agriculture (extension and veterinary services) and agricultural insurance schemes.

ES71 There is potential for enhanced collaboration between Strategic Programmes, and for clarifying interfaces. Strategic Programme 5 shares significant common concerns with Strategic Programme 2 on climate change adaptation, and with Strategic Programme 3 on social protection and migration. There is also potential for more work with Strategic Programme 4 on value chains, given that food chain crises significantly affect value chains. Overlaps are not necessarily a problem as long as they are used to foster effective collaboration.

ES72 The concept of the Regional Initiatives under SO5 should be clarified and their purpose reframed to that of regional flagship programmes co-funded from external resources, and implemented in collaboration with regional and national partners. Regional Initiatives can also serve as useful vehicles for knowledge sharing and awareness raising (within and beyond FAO).

ES73 This framing of the Regional Initiatives as regional flagship programmes requires a strong political commitment behind them at regional level. From this standpoint, Regional Initiative 3 on African Drylands should be more formally anchored in the Malabo Declaration. The establishment of expanded Regional Initiatives on One Health and Resilience to Climate Change in the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific should be supported.

ES74 When introducing new systems for planning and reporting, FAO should try to keep the related transaction costs as low as possible, as such costs reduce FAO’s capacity to attain its members’ goals. This consideration applies to the new project cycle and to the two distinct channels for country reporting (annual FAO Representative reports and reporting against the outcomes and outputs of the Strategic Framework in corporate databases), which should be merged into one system so that country offices are not required to report twice.
Recommendation 2: Resilience presents FAO with a momentous opportunity to redesign its programmes in crisis monitoring, response and prevention, with strong political and financial support from member countries. To seize this opportunity, FAO needs to further promote an integrated financial model combining assessed and voluntary contributions, and invest more predictable resources in a limited number of areas that are key to establishing FAO’s presence in resilience, including staff. The return on investment in this area of work is likely to be significant.

ES75 The lack of predictable resources in Strategic Programme 5 affects FAO’s capacity to position itself strategically in resilience. The Organization has committed politically to this area of work by adopting SOS as one of its Strategic Objectives, and by advocating in global, regional and national fora for resilience development. To fulfill these commitments, FAO needs to invest more predictable resources in a few Strategic Programme 5 areas that are key to establishing FAO’s presence in resilience: (i) programming capacity, (ii) high quality “signature services”, (iii) knowledge systems, (iv) resource mobilization, and (v) regional and national teams. A scan of current and future funding trends in the area of resilience indicates that if FAO invests in resilience funding (in addition to, and beyond the humanitarian funding stream), this is likely to generate a significant return that will enable the Organization to further strengthen its work.

ES76 In particular, FAO and Strategic Programme 5 should find ways to offer better recognition and greater predictability in contractual arrangements to its technical and operational staff in the resilience area, in order to establish sustained FAO presence and capacity in this area. Short-term personnel may be adequate for short-term emergency responses, but not for long-term resilience building.

ES77 The creation of new regular posts appears unlikely in the face of overall resource constraints. However, FAO could expand on its use of trust funds to partially mitigate the unpredictability of project funding, allow longer-term contracts for its core resilience personnel, and invest in strategic tools and processes. In keeping with the ‘One Budget’ policy of the Organization, the current review of project support costs represents an opportunity to further promote an integrated financial model combining assessed and voluntary contributions into a coherent whole, in adherence with the principles agreed upon by the Finance Committee in documents FC 157/10 and FC 161/6.2

Recommendation 3: To strengthen resilience programme development and resource mobilization, FAO should strengthen and diversify its offer of high-quality resilience-enhancing services and better tailor its programmes to the type and duration of crises it tries to respond to.

ES78 A retooling of FAO’s resilience programming and resource mobilization capacity appears necessary. FAO should define a workable strategy to approach donors interested in resilience. This strategy should include the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities, which FAO has used strategically to establish its presence and assess needs at the start of a response.

ES79 Resilience strategies at national level provide a simple and tested way to acquire a body of knowledge about livelihoods, strengths and vulnerabilities, and programmatic entry points for resilience in-country. Country offices with significant opportunities in resilience programming may consider developing a resilience strategy as part of their country programming frameworks or separately, to guide their involvement in this area.

ES80 The prioritization of FAO Strategic Objectives in-country should be determined not by the interest of individual managers, but by the relevance of resilience programming to the country context and government priorities. Strategic Programme 5 should have a leading role in countries affected by severe crises, while other Strategic Programmes should be more prominent in institutionally stable contexts with manageable levels of hazards and risks. Strategic Programme 5 may still provide valued inputs in the latter type of countries (e.g. on disaster risk reduction policies).

Any crisis-oriented intervention of FAO that extends over more than two years should be designed and implemented with due considerations paid to the sustainability of achieved results. Generally, when a long-term intervention is required, community-based and market-oriented approaches are more suitable than free input distributions.

In order to upscale good practices, FAO should focus on a few good practices, keep improving and enhancing them, “champion” them systematically and couple them with solid capacity building in country. This could take the shape of a semi-standard menu of “signature services” – e.g. disaster risk reduction and management; climate change adaptation and mitigation policies; early warning and IPC; EMPRES-type surveillance and protection programmes; community animal health workers; Farmer Field Schools and their various versions including the caisses de résilience; different forms of input support (input distributions, input fairs, input shops, warrantage); cash-for-assets; and small-scale irrigation. This list includes approaches anchored in significant FAO experience and visibility, with proven impact and adapted to both development and resilience. Moreover, these approaches focus on local capacities, economic sustainability and market linkages, require an investment over the long-term, and can be scaled up or down as needed. Developing such a menu of signature resilience services could help FAO develop a stronger, more diversified resilience programme at scale, by standardizing approaches and reducing programme design and roll-out time, while adapting the services to local context as required.

Strategic Programme 5 should continue to integrate gender into its context analyses and monitor the implementation of gender-responsive programmes, in order to ensure that such programming translates into real benefits.

FAO delivers resilience-enhancing services to communities through a number of partnerships at different levels, e.g. with national and local governments and/or with NGOs. To maximise its impact, FAO should keep programming with and strengthening the capacity of a wide array of partners, including local, national and regional authorities, other United Nations agencies such as the WFP and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), international financing institutions, national and international NGOs, farmer organizations, the private sector (e.g. insurance providers) and academia.

FAO should initiate the development of an overarching information and early warning systems strategy, requiring the different systems to converge into a more homogeneous and strategic framework while maintaining the technical and institutional specificities of their area of action. The strategy should also address the partnership dimension and define a more corporate approach on how to support member countries across the relevant information and early warning systems areas.

**Recommendation 4:** Further strengthen FAO’s technical, operational and resilience capacity based on country offices’ demands and needs, so that the post profiles in FAO’s technical and administrative units progressively evolve to better serve the Strategic Programmes.

As evidenced by the skill mix assessment, and in a context of high vacancy rates, Strategic Programme 5 needs access to additional technical capacity in disaster risk reduction and management, insurance and cash-based approaches, as well as in conflict and political analysis in order to address the demand for resilience programmes. Increased capacities are also necessary in resilience programming and resource mobilization. This implies that FAO should continue its present drive to fill vacant positions and create new ones in key technical units, aiming to fill capacity gaps identified through the skill mix assessment and similar exercises so that the post profiles in technical divisions and administrative units will progressively evolve to better serve the Strategic Programmes.

Continuous improvements of operational capacity are needed. In particular, FAO should develop standard operating procedures for Level 1 and Level 2 emergencies, and simplify the project cycle to reduce redundant steps.

The tagging of projects to specific Strategic Objectives should be standardized and quality-assured, as the data is currently unreliable. This issue is particularly important to Strategic Programme 5 and its funding model, which is based almost entirely on voluntary contributions.
ES89 More could be made of inter-country offices knowledge exchange. Some FAO country offices are staffed with a stable cadre of national technical staff who can do technical work and contribute policy advice, and could provide assistance to country offices other than their own.

ES90 FAO should expand upon its current alliances with NGOs and other partners as a source of expertise and capacity. Stand-by partnership agreements with organizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, RedR Australia and the Danish Refugee Council provide capacity in critical, under-staffed areas of work (resilience advisors, gender or cluster coordination) and should continue.

ES91 The United Nations system offers significant capacity in areas where FAO needs to improve. Among others, FAO already leverages WFP’s logistics, collaborates with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in joint needs assessments, and liaises with the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) on disaster reduction. It could also approach the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), which offers excellent political and conflict analysis in countries where the United Nations facilitate elections or other political processes, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on qualitative resilience assessment. FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and WFP should operationalize their joint Conceptual Framework for Collaboration and Partnership on Strengthening Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition, through more frequent collaborations in the field based on a strong complementary engagement and building on each other’s comparative advantages.

ES92 In Africa, FAO has successfully allied with inter-governmental regional platforms such as the CILSS, IGAD and SADC, which suggests that FAO could usefully approach similar regional groups in other regions.

Recommendation 5: In order to accelerate the pace of innovation, FAO should create a strong learning environment and accelerate the development of tools and channels for knowledge management.

ES93 In a reform such as the one FAO is now enacting, knowledge management is critical. The transition to resilience programming requires a change in mindset. There is a need to accelerate the pace of innovation, dissemination and adoption of good practices. Better knowledge management would also help communication, advocacy, strategy development and fundraising.

ES94 FAO should develop training modules on resilience, resilience programming and resilience measurement and deploy them throughout the Organization, accelerate the development of knowledge sharing networks, and create knowledge management spaces in the Regional Initiatives, which are playing a valid knowledge management role that should be further developed.

ES95 There is a need to continue strengthening monitoring systems, post-distribution surveys and qualitative and quantitative impact assessments, and to learn from the information collected. FAO needs to learn more about how to promote resilience to threats and crises, and to do that it needs to experiment and monitor the results.

ES96 At all levels of FAO, there are reserves of technical talent that are currently applied to other tasks, such as planning and reporting, which could be more systematically mapped and utilized through the creation of virtual knowledge exchange networks.

ES97 (NGOs are often used as mere ‘implementing partners’ but the best of them form knowledge-rich environments with which FAO could interact more. In addition to NGOs, FAO should partner more with producer organizations, which are valid knowledge and implementing partners, endowed with complementary capacities to those of FAO, particularly relating to outreach, community mobilization capacity, extension and advocacy.
1. Introduction

1.1 The evaluation – scope and methodology

1 This report outlines the main findings and conclusions from an evaluation of Strategic Objective 5 (SO5) – Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises. SO5 is one of five Strategic Objectives approved at the 38th Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Conference in June 2013, as part of the Revised Strategic Framework 2010-19. At its 116th session (November 2014), the FAO Programme Committee endorsed the Indicative Rolling Work Plan of Strategic and Programme Evaluations 2015-17, which proposed to present, in each Programme Committee session, one thematic evaluation related to the Organization’s Strategic Objectives.

2 In effect, FAO started to deliver on its revised strategic framework during the biennium 2014-2015. Many resilience interventions need to be implemented over a longer timeframe before showing meaningful results, and the evaluation is therefore scheduled quite early in the implementation period. Besides, the evaluation timeframe was limited for such an ambitious task, which called for a well-defined and manageable scope. This evaluation limits itself to an examination of progress achieved toward a series of intermediary results, describing how the revised Strategic Framework and the ways of working established under SO5 have helped FAO (or not) to focus and improve its work on resilience. This review is complemented by an analysis of FAO’s strategic positioning in resilience.

3 The evaluation was focused on four overarching evaluation questions:

i **Strength of the conceptual and planning framework:** clarity of FAO’s strategy under SO5, its relevance to countries’ needs, and degree to which it is likely to be effective.

ii **Capacity to translate the framework into action:** is FAO equipped to deliver against the Strategic Framework?

iii **Intermediary results:** has the new Strategic Framework and Strategic Objective already resulted in intermediary results, such as improved programming, more cohesive FAO support and better knowledge management?

iv **Strategic positioning:** has FAO’s global positioning and comparative advantage at the confluence of the emergency and development agendas been strengthened by SO5?

4 The evaluation is not in a position to compare the ways of working of the different Strategic Objectives, since each of them will be evaluated separately. Likewise, this report does not review the principles underlying the revised Strategic Framework nor its design or related corporate guidance, as these issues go beyond SO5. Instead, the report limits itself to providing feedback on how corporate guidance was applied within SO5 and with what results, with a view to providing recommendations for the future. Finally, it should be noted that it is not always easy to attribute observed changes to SO5, because some of these changes may have started under interventions that predate SO5, or accrued from reforms that unfolded in parallel with the revised strategic framework, such as the decentralization of the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division.

5 Sources of data included administrative data analysis; a synthesis of evidence from past evaluations; interviews and survey of FAO staff and partners involved in resilience work; and five country case studies (Cambodia, Lebanon, Mali, Uganda and Pakistan) selected based on a review of their SO5-related portfolio and feedback from the core team of Strategic Programme 5.

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5 The OED Indicative Rolling Work Plan mentioned that the evaluation of FAO’s contribution to enhanced resilience of livelihoods would be presented to the Programme Committee in the second half of 2017. However, plans were subsequently made for the evaluation to be presented at the November 2016 PC meeting. This greatly reduced the time available for data collection and analysis, to about 6 months instead of a year. The change reduced the time available for data analysis. Some of the evidence collected so far has yet to be analysed.
The evaluation team visited the Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, and the Regional Office for Africa, as well as the Sub-regional resilience teams (ex-resilience hubs) in Nairobi and Dakar, while conducting the country case studies. The Latin America and the Caribbean Regional and Sub-regional Offices, those of Europe and Central Asia, and the Pacific Sub-regional Office were interviewed by telephone. FAO partners and other stakeholders working on resilience were also interviewed, including with the Comité permanent Inter-États de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Finance Institutions as well as a few key donors and counterparts from relevant technical Ministries.

An evaluation of FAO’s Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) will be undertaken as a separate but parallel assignment from the SO5 evaluation. This is partly because the technical breadth and complexity of EMPRES are beyond the capacity of the present SOS evaluation, scheduled to be completed in three months. Another reason is that the evaluation of EMPRES will benefit from greater consultation, and possibly cooperation, with a number of partners such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the International Plant Protection Convention, and thus requires a different process.

Box 1: Evaluation questions

1. Strength of the conceptual and planning framework
   a. Conceptual clarity: Is the concept of resilience clear to all? Useful to bridge the divide between development and humanitarian approaches and actors, or to stress long-term programming, sustainability and multi-sectorality?
   b. Clarity, completeness and relevance of the SOS theory of change: Is SOS an improvement over the past SOI in terms of strategic thinking? What is the underlying theory of change? Does it address actual problems and propose relevant and effective solutions in a range of diverse crises contexts? Does SOS help build synergies with other SOS, national priorities, and long-term development goals such as the SDGs?
   c. Planning and RBM: How do FAO staff involved in SOS plan strategically within an uncertain external and internal environment? Is programme planning and monitoring more coherent and more collegial than before, involving a greater sense of shared purpose across the Organization?

2. Capacity to translate the framework into action
   a. Resource mobilization: Has the new Strategic Programme affected FAO’s resource mobilization? Is FAO better able to influence resource allocations and plead for the food security and agricultural sectors through advocacy and information? Have adequate resources been secured across the four outcomes? Does SP 5 support FAO country offices and the governments of crises-affected nations in their own resource mobilization efforts?
   b. Financial management: Is this distribution of resources responsive to country/regional priorities and demands? How are the delivery mechanisms funded? Are SP 5 resources managed in ways that help bridge the “divide” between emergency and development?
   c. Institutional arrangements: How effective are the SP 5 planning and implementing arrangements? What is the role of regional and sub-regional offices, and is it consistent and coherent across different regions, or context-specific? How are the different delivery mechanisms working together? Do Regional Initiatives and the system of “focus countries” make an important difference? What is the added value of the “closer observation and support” system? How does SP 5 work with other SPs to identify potential synergies and minimize overlap across interventions and themes?
   d. Capacity management: are FAO capacities adequate to advocate for support to the resilience of agriculture-based livelihoods and to design and manage resilience-related programmes and emergency responses? How are the needs for technical assistance identified and is SP 5 helping to answer them? Does FAO have sufficient personnel experienced in resilience programming?
### 3. Intermediary results

**a. Improvements in programme design:** more in-depth contextual analysis; addressing root causes of crises and not just symptoms; with better exit strategies and stronger prospects for sustainability.

**b. Regular use of participatory, equity-based and gender sensitive approaches:** e.g. programme design increasingly based on community consultations; accountability to affected populations (AAP) is reflected in guidance and helps shape interventions; targeting of minority groups is explicitly addressed; gender mainstreaming and disaggregation is included.

**c. Spread of more sustainable forms of community support:** e.g. cash-based approaches, Community Animal Health Workers, Farmer Field Schools and Caisses de Résilience, etc.

**d. Better balance between “hardware” and “software”,** i.e. between the four SO5 outcomes, or within Outcome 4, between technical advice, coordination, capacity building and asset replacement.

**e. More cohesive FAO support, less work in silos:** Did SP 5 help bring together technical and operational units, various information systems, and varied resource channels into a more cohesive support to crisis-affected countries?

**f. Strengthened coordination:** Is FAO coordinating with governments and other stakeholders on resilience programming and strategies? Is the Global Food Security Cluster (co-chaired by FAO and WFP) delivering useful assistance to global, regional and country level actors?

**g. More systematic lessons learning and knowledge management:** Is SP 5 helping promote more systematic M&E and training of FAO staff on lessons learned, good practices, etc. in resilience?

**h. Improved monitoring and forecasting of risks, vulnerabilities and food security outcomes,** with early warning systems better linked to decision making.

**i. More action-oriented knowledge products:** Are the normative and knowledge products developed by FAO useful in promoting the resilience paradigm? Developed based on field experience and global policy processes? Used in support of concrete policy processes?

### 4. Strategic positioning

**a. Comparative advantage:** What are FAO’s specific comparative advantages and potentially unique contributions in resilience programming? Is SP 5 making use of these comparative advantages?

**b. Leadership capacity:** Is FAO able to lead in resilience and within its sectors, e.g. in promoting an understanding of what resilience means in practical terms, at global, regional and country levels?

**c. Partnerships:** How effectively has FAO chosen and forged partnerships to achieve SP 5 goals and intended results in food and nutrition security, agriculture and other sectors?

**d. UN values and humanitarian principles:** Have resilience programmes and strategies under SP 5 addressed UN values such as gender equality, good governance and environmental sustainability?

**e. Advocacy:** Has FAO strengthened its advocacy for food security and the resilience of agriculture-related sectors, as a result of the adoption of SO5? How does SO5 influence FAO’s relation to existing humanitarian coordination, planning and appeal systems and structures?

### 1.2 FAO’s Strategic Objective 5

FAO has been involved in agricultural relief operations for more than forty years, since 1973 when the Office for Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO) was established to help member countries affected by the drought in the Sahel. Efforts to support the development of early warning and food information systems began in 1974 with the establishment of the Global

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6 The Caisses de Résilience is an approach pioneered by FAO in Africa and Central America and that combines the Farmer Field School approach with savings and loans schemes, nutrition surveillance and inter-community dialogue for social cohesion.
Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS). The Desert Locust Information Service (DLIS) was established in 1978. Another early investment in the resilience agenda is constituted by EMPRES, launched in 1994. Work on Disaster Risk reduction and Management started in the early 1990s from a development perspective that focused on the risk reduction and livelihood coping strategies of pastoralists in the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, China and Mongolia.

9 The FAO emergency and rehabilitation portfolio has grown vigorously during the 1990s and 2000s, but has levelled off in the 2010s. It currently represents slightly less than 400 million annually in voluntary contributions (Figure 1).

![All voluntary contributions to FAO](image)

**Figure 1.** All voluntary contributions to FAO

10 The revision of the Strategic Framework 2010-2019, endorsed by the FAO Conference in June 2013, delineated five strategic objectives, including Strategic Objective 5 on resilience to threats and crises, and defines new ways of working for FAO stressing the importance of greater focus, collaboration across units to achieve corporate goals, and better response to country needs. Strategic Objective Programmes were designed in 2014 to provide a four-year results framework and resources for delivering results against each Strategic Objective. The SOS programme (also called Strategic Programme 5 or SP 5) is articulated through four Outcomes and nine Outputs, which build upon the components of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). The four outcomes are:

Outcome 1 Countries and regions adopt and implement legal, policy and institutional systems and regulatory frameworks for risk reduction and crisis management.

Outcome 2 Countries and regions provide regular information and early warning against potential, known and emerging threats.

Outcome 3 Countries reduce risks and vulnerability at household and community level.

Outcome 4 Countries and regions affected by disasters and crises prepare for, and manage effective responses.

11 A more detailed overview of the SP 5 result framework is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Strategic Programme 5 result chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective: Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1:</strong> Countries and regions adopt and implement legal, policy and institutional systems and regulatory frameworks for risk reduction and crisis management.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1:</strong> Improved capacities to formulate and promote risk reduction and crisis management policies, strategies and plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2:</strong> Enhanced coordination and improved investment programming and resource mobilization strategies for risk reduction and crises management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples: DRR/DRM plans for Ministry of Agriculture, coordination of actors in DRR/DRM.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2:</strong> Countries and regions provide regular information and early warning against potential, known and emerging threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.1:</strong> Mechanisms are set up/improved to identify and monitor threats and assess risks and to deliver integrated and timely early warning.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.2:</strong> Improved capacities to undertake resilience/vulnerability analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples: Mechanisms to monitor threats and deliver early warning, improved capacities for resilience and vulnerability analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 3:</strong> Countries reduce risks and vulnerability at household and community level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 3.1:</strong> Improved capacities of countries, communities and key stakeholders to implement prevention and mitigation good practices to reduce the impacts of threats and crises.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 3.2:</strong> Improved access of most vulnerable groups to services which reduce the impact of disasters and crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples: Scaling-up of agricultural practices that minimize risks, climate smart agriculture, social protection, insurance against climatic risks, community-based planning for risk management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 4:</strong> Countries and regions affected by disasters and crises prepare for, and manage effective responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 4.1:</strong> Improved capacities of national authorities and stakeholders for emergency preparedness to reduce the impact of crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 4.2:</strong> Strengthened coordination capacities for better preparedness and response to crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 4.3:</strong> Strengthened national authorities and stakeholders in crisis response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples: Post-crisis needs assessment, improved national capacities for disaster response, coordination for preparedness and response (e.g. food security clusters), emergency livelihoods support.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

12 In terms of sectoral remit, SP 5 addresses food and nutrition security, as well as agriculture-based livelihoods linked to production, transformation and trade of products and goods related to crop, livestock, fisheries, aquaculture, forestry and natural resources.

13 In financial terms, SO5 is the largest of all SOs. Projects and programmes linked to SO5 amounted to 36% of all FAO programme expenditures during the biennium 2014-2015 (Figure 2). Expenditures incurred under SO5 during the biennium 2014-15 amount to slightly over USD 725 million, of which an estimated USD 46 million (6% of total expenditures) came from the FAO “assessed contributions”, the rest coming from “voluntary contributions” i.e. donor funding. SO5 stands out from the other FAO SOs in this regard, as other SOs’ share of Regular Programme funding tends to be larger, and their Extra-Budgetary resources smaller (Figure 3).

14 A majority of the resources linked to SO5 have been spent in Africa during the last biennium, with Asia and the Pacific representing 14% and the Near East 13% of the same resources (Figure 4). This reflects a combination of factors, including vulnerability to disasters but also the affected states’ capacities to respond.
Figure 2. Actual expenditure by SO

Figure 3. Expenditure of the SOs in 2014-2015

Figure 4: SO5 expenditure by region
The distribution of SO5 resources per outcomes is also uneven: Outcome 4 on response to crises represents half of all resources spent on SO5 in 2014-15, while Outcome 3 on risk reduction at community level reportedly consumed another 40% of total SO5 resources, the remainder (10%) being shared by Outcomes 1 and 2 on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and early warning, respectively (Table 2).

The Animal Production and Health Division (AGA) and Plant Production and Protection Division (AGP), the FAO units respectively in charge of animal and plant production, are the main technical units concerned by SO5, followed by the Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA) and the Natural Resource Department (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOS outcome</th>
<th>Million USD, biennium 2014-15</th>
<th>% AC/Total</th>
<th>% of SO5 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Risk governance and DRR</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Risk monitoring and early warning</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Prevention and vulnerability reduction</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>234.1</td>
<td>241.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Preparedness and response to shocks</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>299.2</td>
<td>304.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>573.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>611.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: iMIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead technical division (acronym)</th>
<th>% of total project expenditures*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters divisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Production and Health (AGA)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant Production and Protection (AGP)</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation (TCE)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Development Economics (ESA)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land and Water (NRL)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, Climate Change and Bioenergy (NRC)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total - headquarters divisions</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Decentralized offices                            |                                 |
| Africa (RAF, SFC, SFE, SFS)                     | 22.2                             |
| Asia and the Pacific (RAP)                      | 8.8                              |
| Near East and North Africa (RNE)                | 5.2                              |
| Latin America and the Caribbean (RLC, SLM)      | 2.8                              |
| Europe and Central Asia (REU)                   | 1.2                              |
| **Total - decentralized offices**               | **40.2**                         |
| Others                                          | 5.5                              |
| **Total**                                       | **100.0**                        |

*Expenditures of 1,009 projects linked to SO5 in FPMIS.
At the national level, the primary delivery channel is the Country Programming Framework (CPF), which is an agreement between the government and FAO defining where FAO should focus its activities over a period of four to five years. The CPF predates the revised Strategic Framework and SO5. In the past, a number of countries had Resilience Strategies as well as CPFs. Guidance has been issued on how to develop Resilience Strategies for integration into the CPFs.

At the regional level, the primary delivery mechanism is the Regional Initiatives, which respond to regional priorities as expressed by member-states at the FAO regional conferences. FAO is currently implementing a total of 15 Regional Initiatives. Although the Regional Initiatives are not SO-specific, lead Strategic Programmes have been identified for each Regional Initiative. Currently, SP 5 is in the lead for three regional initiatives in three regions:

a. Building resilience in Africa’s drylands. This initiative aims at improving institutional capacity for resilience and responding to disasters and crises at regional, national and community level. In addition, it strengthens and improves early warning and information management, as well as strengthening resilience at community and household level. Focus countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

b. Building resilience for food security and nutrition in the Near East and North Africa. The initiative covers a wide range of interventions: food security information and knowledge systems; reducing food losses and waste; access to safe, nutritious and diversified food; and resilience of households, communities and agro-systems to human-induced and natural shocks. Focus countries/territories: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen.

c. Sustainable use of natural resources, adaptation to climate change and disaster risk management in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a new Regional Initiative aiming to strengthen institutions, policies and information systems for sustainable use of natural resources, climate change adaptation and disaster risk management. Focus countries include Bolivia, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

At present, FAO does not implement resilience-oriented Regional Initiatives in the Asia-Pacific and in the Europe-Central Asia regions.

In consultation with Regional Representatives, a list of SP 5 focus countries was developed in early 2014 based on documented needs, political will, and a sizeable SO5-related portfolio in-country. Roadmaps were drafted in cooperation with these countries and dedicated support was provided. In June 2015, another set of focus countries was defined by the respective Regional Representatives for each Regional Initiative. Countries included in the sample for the Corporate Outcome Assessment 2014-17 were also selected as focus countries. Finally, a set of 13 countries under “active observation and coordinated support” was defined as a way to coordinate support to those countries selected as focus countries by more than one Strategic Objective or Regional Initiative. Priority in terms of corporate support is given to countries under active observation, then to Regional Initiative focus countries, and then to the other focus countries.
2. Assessment of FAO’s contributions

2.1 Strength of the conceptual and planning framework

2.1.1 The concept of resilience

22 For over a decade, the concept of resilience has increasingly been used in both humanitarian and development discourse, in the context of policy and programming around DRR and climate change adaptation. This section is devoted to an assessment of the concept and of how it might underpin an operational approach to resilience. Such an analysis was deemed potentially useful in this evaluation because of its formative character and its early timing relative to the SO5 roll-out.

Finding 1: The concept of resilience speaks to a world in crisis. It starts from people’s strengths, and stresses the importance of addressing the root causes of disaster and crises rather than just their symptoms. The federative aspect of the concept can be a strength but also presents a risk: that of a “catch-all”, unwieldy concept hard to operationalize in practice.

23 The renewed interest in ‘resilience’ is born out of the recognition that the frequency of natural disasters is growing, that a number of protracted crises have persisted for several decades despite efforts to bring about political settlements (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan, West Bank and Gaza, Sudan and South Sudan), and that investments in development, early warning and humanitarian aid have failed to prevent some countries from being struck by recurrent humanitarian crises. Together with the impacts of climate change, this has led to a realization that crises must be confronted as a permanent feature of the development landscape. The concept of resilience speaks to a world in crisis.

24 Resilience is a word in common usage. Most people would intuitively define it as the ability to recover from setbacks, adapt well to change, and keep progressing in the face of adversity. This definition emphasizes a dynamic view of resilience in which it should be possible and desirable to ‘build back better’, in contrast with a static and perhaps more prudent, conservative view of resilience as the ability of a system, after it has received some shock, to rapidly come back to its ‘situation of reference’ or ‘status quo ante’.

25 Valid arguments can be made about the risks of changing a system too drastically and rapidly after a disaster. Introducing any new, untested feature involves taking a risk. The bolder the innovation, the higher the transaction cost, and the larger the risk. These different aspects of resilience are combined in the most recent literature under a conceptual framework that incorporates absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity (Figure 5). (from Béné et al., 2012, cited in OECD-DAC: Guidelines for resilience systems analysis, 2014.

![Figure 5. The relationship between absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities for strengthening resilience](image-url)

FAO defines resilience as “The ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving food and agricultural systems under threats that impact agriculture, food and nutrition security, and food safety (and related public health).” The reference to disasters and crises is very generic, and there is no mention in this definition of whose resilience is being referenced.

The ability of a society to transform as a result of a disaster or crisis could deserve a mention in the FAO definition, in line with the generally accepted conceptual framework displayed above.

While the concept is well known among FAO staff, and overwhelmingly defined in positive terms, not all FAO documents use the corporate definition. The Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis Model (RIMA) uses a more static definition: “resilience is the capacity of a household to bounce back to a previous level of well-being after a shock”. This reduction of resilience to absorptive capacity is probably appropriate in a measurement index. Measuring transformative resilience would appear next to impossible. The reference to a “previous level of well-being” is supposedly only meant to facilitate measurement, not to deny the possibility of change.

The Uganda CPF 2015-2019 defines resilience as “the ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty”, borrowing from a 2013 scoping study for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). The reference to “households, communities and nations” is useful as it allows an articulation of FAO’s support to Uganda at these three levels in the CPF and emphasizes the policy advisory dimension.

The origins of the concept of resilience are to be found in system theory, where it refers to the ability of a complex system to maintain its functionality in a changing and uncertain environment. The concept stresses the importance of structural characteristics, and its use in development discourse signals a renewed attention to the structural causes of crises and disasters, the kind of deep-rooted problems that only development can resolve.

Resilience also emphasizes people’s and nation’s strengths and capabilities, offering more positive overtones than terms such as “vulnerability” or “fragility”. This is an important reason for the concept’s utility. Politically, it makes resilience support more palatable and potentially more nationally owned than disaster relief. Operationally, any effort to strengthen resilience has to start from an understanding of how communities and institutions are set up to cope with risks (i.e. the strengths and assets they can rely upon in case of hazard). In the words of a Malian Producer Organization leader met by the evaluation team, “the farmer is already resilient, otherwise he is dead, or migrating.”

The language of the Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises is also exemplary in that regard, and offers a welcome contrast with the often disempowering language used by humanitarians to describe those people and nations affected by crises as helpless, and depict themselves as vital rescuers. Some of this disempowering language still finds its way in FAO’s publications on SO5, as well as in other organizations’. This is unfortunate and reinforces the perception among some that resilience is just another code-word for relief.

The concept of resilience to crises allows for convergence between development and humanitarian thinking, in the context of widespread concerns about the disconnect in the...
More generally, resilience can be adopted as a useful integrative concept between Sustainable Human Development, climate change adaptation, DRR, food security and poverty alleviation, and even pest control and food safety. But therein lies a risk: that of resilience becoming a catch-all, unwieldy concept hard to operationalize in practice. How to reconcile the different objectives and values, the different time frames and geographic scales involved by economic development, DRR and Disaster Risk Management (DRM), emergency response, and climate change adaptation? How to define and maintain boundaries with other Strategic Objectives, e.g. with SO4 on transboundary diseases and SO2 on Climate-Smart Agriculture? How can roles be assigned for the different institutions and their various mandates, for instance in the area of One Health between FAO, the International Plant Protection Convention, the Codex Alimentarius, OIE and WHO?

The evaluation cannot answer all of these questions, but it can highlight that this form of people-oriented, development-minded resilience support is not new to FAO: it is what its best development and ‘emergency’ programmes have been doing for years. Among the services and approaches identified by this evaluation as having potential for upscaling in resilience programming are Community Animal Health Workers, who are a way to build a network of privately funded para-veterinarians in contexts with access constraints. FAO started supporting Community Animal Health Workers in Afghanistan and Somalia during the 1990’s. EMPRES, whose structure prefigures SO5, was launched in 1994. FAO designed the first Farmer Field Schools in 1989 in Indonesia. This extension approach which builds upon people’s knowledge and strength is extensively used in Climate-Smart Agriculture and has started to be applied in pastoral areas. FAO can thus rely on its significant experience to translate the concept of resilience into well-designed and relevant support.

Finding 2: The concept of resilience has programmatic consequences. It suggests that it is useful to respond to short-term crises, but inappropriate to repeat short-term emergency interventions year after year in a context of protracted crisis, where community-based and market-oriented approaches are more suitable than free input distributions, which may undermine the resilience of the rural societies concerned.

Table 4 represents an attempt at situating resilience programming vis-à-vis development support and emergency response. The distinction between different types of support made in Table 4 is somewhat theoretical. In Strategic Programme 5, emergency response corresponds to Outcome 4 and is therefore rightly considered a part of the broader agenda on resilience, not a distinct category. This makes pragmatic sense, since an emergency response always needs to be complemented by more development-oriented resilience building interventions.

The contrast made in Table 4 between resilience programming and emergency response in no way represents a critique of the SP 5 result framework and of the place of disaster response (which represents parts of Outcome 4) within a strategic objective dedicated to resilience. It is simply an attempt to translate the concept of resilience in precise programmatic terms, and also to define its domain of relevance (i.e. the types of contexts where resilience stricto sensu is most called for), and contrast those with the types of contexts where development support or emergency response may be more relevant.

In step with the FAO literature, the line of demarcation between resilience and development was drawn based on the frequency and severity of crises. From that standpoint, SP 5 should take the lead in countries affected by severe crises, while other Strategic Programmes should be more prominent in institutionally stable contexts with manageable levels of hazards and risks.

The line of demarcation separating resilience programming and emergency response is drawn based on the types of crises and the duration of the intervention required. Resilience programming is considered particularly relevant to chronic situations (protracted crises, recurring climatic hazards and those ‘slow onset’ food chain crises that remain controllable without a major surge in national response capacity), while emergency response is seen as most relevant in the aftermath of acute natural or man-made crises, or for those food chain crises (locusts, animal epidemics, invasive pests) that require a major and sudden surge in response capacity to be brought under control.
In this conceptual framework, the goal of development support is classically defined as “sustainable development”, including the development of new livelihoods. The goal of FAO’s resilience programming is presented as “saving livelihoods”. The specific objective of an agricultural agency such as FAO in emergency response can in most cases be defined as “saving one agricultural season or sub-sector” (i.e. to save a particular agricultural value chain from temporary collapse). For instance, a one-off distribution of farming inputs aims to save one crop (or a few) during one season. Emergency responses to food chain crises have a slightly broader goal of typically saving a food chain or economic sub-sector (e.g. poultry farming in a particular region). This is not to diminish the importance of emergency response. Saving one agricultural season or value chain can quickly reduce food insecurity and promote a rapid recovery after an acute crisis, even though it falls short of the kind of systemic support required to strengthen (or ‘save’) livelihoods, something only longer term resilience programmes can realistically aim to do.

Table 4: Resilience programming as compared to emergency response and development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Development support</th>
<th>Resilience programming</th>
<th>Emergency response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most relevant type of crisis</td>
<td>Safe, institutionally stable contexts with manageable levels of hazards and risks.</td>
<td>Protracted crises; recurring climatic hazards, lesser food chain crises (e.g. locusts, epidemics, pests)</td>
<td>Acute natural or man-made crises with severe risks to people’s lives, property and livelihoods, large food chain crises (e.g. locusts, epidemics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Sustainable development, including development of new livelihoods</td>
<td>Save livelihoods, address root causes of crises, develop coping strategies and mitigate risks sustainably</td>
<td>In agriculture: save an agricultural season (or food chain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO’s role</td>
<td>Mainly SP 1 to 4</td>
<td>Mainly SP 5, all outcomes</td>
<td>SP 5 Outcome 2 (early warning and information systems) and Outcome 4 (preparedness and response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link with national authorities</td>
<td>Governmental leadership, policy advisory work and capacity building are essential.</td>
<td>Engagement with Government often strong at technical level &amp; with local governments; governance is key for resilience e.g. for natural resource management; targeted capacity building is useful to restore/protect basic services &amp; capacities.</td>
<td>National response capacity often stretched, but a need to maintain good coordination. During conflicts, engagement with government may impinge on humanitarian neutrality principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored approaches at community level</td>
<td>Community-based and market-oriented approaches, social protection, capacity building to civil society</td>
<td>Preventive control, community-based and market-oriented approaches (e.g. input trade fairs, FFS, CAHWs…), conditional cash transfers</td>
<td>Direct distribution of physical goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples of deliverables</td>
<td>Tailor-made community support Broad-based, risk-informed policy advice and DRR Invest in institutions, standards and protocols for data collection and use</td>
<td>Broader menu of semi-standardized community-based services rapidly deployable (+ some tailor-made) Targeted policy advice in key areas for resilience Invest in early warning and information systems</td>
<td>Highly standardized goods and services rapidly deployable (kits) High quality information on damages, food security and unfolding agricultural season, early warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeframe</td>
<td>5-15 years</td>
<td>2-5 years</td>
<td>1-2 year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Caveats: In SP 5, emergency response corresponds to outcome 4 and is therefore rightly considered a part of the broader agenda on resilience, not a distinct category. The contrast made below between resilience programming and emergency response in no way represents a critique of this SP 5 result framework. Rather, it is simply an attempt to translate the concept of resilience into precise programmatic terms.

- The types of programming listed below (emergency response, resilience programming and development support) are not arranged in a time sequence, as used to be the case with the ‘relief-rehabilitation-development continuum’ or in the Disaster Risk Management Framework where each phase was supposed to happen consecutively. Instead, several types of programming can co-exist at the same time in the same national context. Moreover, the distinction between the three programming types should be seen as a simplified typology of more complex and context-specific modes of programming, with many intermediary states, combinations and idiosyncratic situations not depicted in the table.

14 In food chain crises, the distinction being made here between resilience programming stricto senso and emergency response corresponds to the classic distinction between preventive pest control e.g. against locusts in the pre-swarming phase which is a form of resilience building, and large pest control operations, e.g. large scale spraying against full-blown invasions of locust swarms, which belongs conceptually and operationally to the domain of emergency crisis response.
“Saving one agricultural season or sub-sector” is also an important humanitarian goal in its own right because it protects the right of a life with *dignity*, a life lived as successful bread-winners rather than in destitution and dependency. In countries highly dependent on agriculture, one bad season or the temporary collapse of an agriculture or livestock-based value chain can push millions one step closer to destitution through debt or decapitalization, make them dependent on governmental social protection systems and food aid when these are available, or thrust them into migration.

FAO – and specifically Strategic Programme 5 – has a strong role to play in resilience support, and a clear role to play in emergency response. Cases of successful FAO responses to sudden onset disasters or food chain crises – such as the responses to the typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, to the highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic or to the recent locust invasion in Madagascar – illustrate the potential utility of FAO’s emergency crisis response programmes for its Member Nations. As explained above, the two domains differ in terms of immediate goals and timeframe but they also share similarities and synergies, as reflected in the SP 5 result framework. In the Haiyan experience, FAO managed to raise significant resources for resilience building precisely because the Organization had established itself as a credible partner in the early days of the response through the timely delivering of emergency assistance.

However, the concept of resilience implies that it is inappropriate to keep repeating short-term emergency interventions (such as the distributions of agricultural kits or unconditional cash transfers) year after year in a context of *protracted* crisis. Doing so may even undermine the resilience of the rural societies concerned. Any crisis-oriented intervention of FAO that extends over more than two years should be seen as resilience programming and should be designed and implemented accordingly, with due considerations paid to the sustainability of achieved results. Where a long-term intervention is required, community-based and market-oriented approaches are more suitable than free handouts.

2.1.2 Theory of Change

A clear theory of change would help operationalize the concept. However, developing a succinct theory of change for a concept as multi-dimensional as resilience is notoriously difficult to do. The schematic theory of change figured below (Figure 5) was developed by the Evaluation Team and is provided in the spirit of clarifying FAO’s role in resilience support. The theory of change is too linear and can evidently not pretend to present an exhaustive depiction of FAO’s support. Similarly, it situates FAO very simplistically within the broader development context, the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other United Nations agencies and donors, whose own programmes and influences are not shown. Finally, the theory of change does not map SO5’s scope and interfaces with other Strategic Objectives.

**Finding 3:** FAO works through governmental and non-governmental service providers to help them provide a series of ‘resilience-boosting services’ to communities and households affected by disasters and crises.

The theory of change was built on a number of hypotheses or assumptions about FAO’s work on resilience, based on previous evaluations and born by the present one:

- The theory of change recognizes that FAO, like other United Nations agencies, is rarely a front-line provider of assistance, but instead tends to work through governmental and non-governmental service providers to help them provide a series of ‘resilience-boosting services’ to communities and households affected by disasters and crises.
- Only four such ‘resilience-boosting services’ are listed based on their relevance to FAO’s work: early warning; disaster risk reduction and mitigation; basic services; and asset replacement and protection. Many more ‘resilience-boosting services’ may deserve to be mentioned (e.g. investment by state actors in basic infrastructure).

15 FAO/PBEE: Evaluation of FAO Interventions Funded by the CERF, October 2010.
• In turn, FAO offers several types of support to front-line service providers: food security and threats monitoring / early warning (Outcome 2); technical and policy support to government and other actors in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, mitigation and preparedness (Outputs 1.1, 3.1 and 4.1); investment support to International Finance Institutions and governments (Output 1.2); coordination (Outputs 1.2 and 4.2); and asset replacement and protection (Output 4.3).

• FAO provides quality to the response by bringing to bear its technical expertise, e.g. in terms of procuring high quality and appropriate seed, ensuring that distributed livestock that do not carry disease, or availing quality data and analysis.

• The work on asset protection encompasses EMPRES-type protection of agricultural assets against emerging pests and transboundary animal diseases. “Asset replacement” refers to the kind of asset distributions through which FAO is helping build back livelihoods after a disaster.

• Much asset replacement is implemented through national NGOs, while asset protection programmes tend to work more through government structures (e.g. veterinary services).

• The body of work on DRR, DRM and Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) is more frequently implemented through government services (e.g. state extension services), and perhaps more rarely with NGOs, although there are a number of local level partnerships with NGOs for implementation of DRR and adaptation practices.

• FAO knowledge services are provided to several actors, as shown in Figure 6, although the figure only represents the main lines of communication. For instance, FAO’s early warning services also benefit donors and International Finance Institutions, as well as NGOs and other United Nations agencies, although this is not shown on the figure for simplicity’s sake.

Finding 4: The theory of change for Strategic Programme 5 is logical and complete. However, there is a potential overlap between Output 1.1 (Improved capacities to formulate and promote risk reduction and crisis management policies, strategies and plans) and Output 4.1 (Improved capacities of national authorities and stakeholders for emergency preparedness to reduce the impact of crisis), which could be combined.

The above theory of change appears logical to the evaluation team. There are no obvious missed opportunities, or additional services that FAO could offer to make its resilience programmes more useful. However, the theory of change attracts attention to the fact that basic services in agriculture (extension and veterinary services) are resilience-building and could be addressed by FAO to a greater extent in its resilience programmes. It also appears from this analysis that the Strategic Programme structure could be simplified by combining Output 1.1 (improved capacities to formulate and promote risk reduction and crisis management policies, strategies and plans) with Output 4.1 (improved capacities of national authorities and stakeholders for emergency preparedness to reduce the impact of crisis), as the two seem highly connected.
2.1.3 The roll-out of the strategic framework and SO5

In 2012 FAO embarked on a strategic thinking process to update the 2010-2019 Strategic Framework. The resulting “reviewed” Strategic Framework was seen as the keystone of a broader reform process for the Organization which included a decentralization process and a new management structure. The following evolutions are particularly noteworthy:

- FAO now has a more concise number of strategic objectives, each of which requires the collaboration of several technical departments. In contrast, older strategic frameworks typically had many more strategic objectives, and while there were efforts to promote cross-departmental collaboration, each of the strategic objectives was typically associated with one technical department or division. While SO5 takes stock of past thinking and efforts, e.g. building on the multi-disciplinary DRM approach of the pre-existing SO1 ("Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural emergencies") of the previous Strategic Framework (2000-2009), and while SO5 is intended to be more focused on resilience and food security, it is important to recognize the challenges and opportunities associated with the transition from a more comprehensive approach to a more targeted one.

16 The original version of the SF 2010-2019 (document C 2009/3) had 11 strategic objectives, as follows: A. Sustainable intensification of crop production; B. Increased sustainable livestock production; C. Sustainable management and use of fisheries and aquaculture resources; D. Improved quality and safety of food at all stages of the food chain; E. Sustainable management of forests and trees; F. Sustainable management of land, water and genetic resources and improved responses to global environmental challenges affecting food and agriculture; G. Enabling environment for markets to improve livelihoods and rural development; H. Improved food security and better nutrition; I. Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural threats and emergencies; J. Gender equity in access to resources, goods, services and decision-making in the rural areas; K. Increased and more effective public and private investment in agriculture and rural development. The previous one (2000-2009) had 12 “strategies”, including strategy A3. Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies.
Evaluation of FAO Strategic Objective 5

threats and emergencies”), it also structures the collaboration of many more FAO entities than SO I which was more closely associated with the FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE).\(^{17}\)

- Programmes and associated resources\(^{18}\) have been designed and led by the respective Strategic Programme Teams, and Service Level Agreements were prepared between the Strategic Programme leaders and technical divisions and regional offices; these agreements plan for technical support from technical divisions to Strategic Programmes and Regional Initiatives. This should make the current strategic objectives more easily evaluable than previous ones, which tended to be more aspirational.

- Delivery mechanisms have been conceptualized, such as the Corporate Technical Activities\(^{19}\), the three Major Areas of Work (natural disasters, food chain crises and protracted crises), the Regional Initiatives (staffed with associated technical leaders and focal points in regional offices) and the Country Programming Framework.

- Additional objectives and themes have been formulated in the Reviewed Strategic Framework and the Medium Term Plan 2014-17: two cross-cutting themes on gender and governance, a sixth objective on technical quality and knowledge, and four Functional Objectives that provide the enabling environment for other elements of the framework, on outreach; information technology; FAO governance, oversight and direction; and efficient and effective administration.

- The new Strategic Framework was accompanied by a strong drive towards decentralization of operational and technical capacity from headquarters to Regional, Sub-regional and Country Offices. These have been tasked to take the lead in delivering the FAO mandate to Member Countries, with the rest of FAO in a more clearly defined supporting role.

- Governance arrangements, guidance, responsibilities and resources have changed significantly from the 2014-2015 biennium to the 2016-2017 biennium, with a significant amount of attendant guidance prepared and disseminated. The management of the five Strategic Objectives has been strengthened through the creation on Strategic Programme Teams and Strategic Programme Leaders. New positions of Regional Initiative Coordinators, since June 2016 designated as Regional Strategic Programme Coordinators,\(^{20}\) were placed in the Regional Offices.

Finding 5: The current Strategic Framework’s scope and implementation span the entire Organization, from headquarters to decentralized offices, and provides them with a clear and common results framework. However, country office progress in implementing the reviewed Strategic Framework remains extremely varied, pointing to an uneven rollout of the Strategic Framework at country level.

The current Strategic Framework’s scope and implementation span the entire Organization, from headquarters to decentralized offices. The CPFs and FAO Representatives’ Annual Reports are now expected to align with the Strategic Objectives. Arguably, earlier strategic frameworks were mainly designed by and for headquarters, with limited attention to country office needs and perspectives. The decentralization process, the introduction of the CPF, the concept of focus countries and the presence of a country support process within Strategic Programme 5 all testify to an enhanced attention to the country level in the current Strategic Framework.

This drive to support Country Offices is especially strong in Strategic Programme 5. The “country support process” introduced by SP 5 as early as 2014 broke new ground for the Organization by assembling a comprehensive picture of Country Office backstopping needs and a plan to address those needs.

\(^{17}\) TCE had a leading role, but all technical Departments were involved in the work of SO I, including AG, ES, FI, FO, NR, DOs and TCI. The multidisciplinary work on DRM had been initiated before the launch of SO I by the DRM Working Group, and previously by the PAIA on Rehabilitation.

\(^{18}\) Including regular programme resources, which had never been allocated to the pre-existing SOI.

\(^{19}\) Corporate Technical Activities are mandated areas of work that are managed directly under the responsibility of heads of organizational units, i.e. the way FAO used to operate historically prior to the Reviewed Strategic Framework. Resources for carrying out these activities are allocated directly by OSP to the Delivery Manager concerned rather than by the SP Leaders (“ring-fenced resources”). CTAs typically include high visibility products (e.g. statistics, flagship publications), partnerships with other organizations (e.g. the FAO Investment Centre) and FAO statutory bodies (e.g. regional conferences).

\(^{20}\) Since 2 June 2016 the RIC is designated as Regional Strategic Programme Coordinator (RSPC), with extended responsibilities outlined in administrative circular AC 2016/14, superseding AC 2016/09.
The importance of having a common results framework, with a number of shared outputs and outcomes that all FAO offices contribute to, cannot be understated. In the words of a staff survey respondent, “The new strategic framework has created a level-playing field to work as one FAO in order to achieve the goals of the Organization.”

According to the numerous audit reports on programmes and operations in Country Offices, the level of Country Office progress in implementing the new Strategic Framework remains extremely varied, pointing to an uneven roll out of the Strategic Framework at country level. The Office of the Inspector General identified a number of common weaknesses in its recent Country Office reviews, in liaison and advocacy, CPF feasibility and resource mobilization, and operations monitoring and reporting.

In the staff survey conducted as part of this evaluation, the CPF was rated as the single most useful FAO mechanism in resilience work (Figure 7). Among the elements of the new SF, the support provided by SP 5 management was highly rated, and so was the SP 5 country support process. Technical backstopping from regional and sub-regional offices is also well rated.

At the other end of the spectrum, some features such as audits, the new project cycle, the Resilience Teams in Johannesburg, Dakar and Nairobi, and Office of Strategy, Planning and Resources Management (OSP) guidance on strategic planning and reporting, while still rated positively overall, garner some negative feedback as well. The Resilience Teams in Johannesburg, Dakar and Nairobi suffer from a lack of visibility, as by design they interact only with a limited number of Country Offices. The situation is somewhat similar with audits: less than half of respondents were familiar enough with them to provide a rating. The issue of the new project cycle is addressed in greater detail in the next section on resource mobilization.

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2.2.  Capacity to translate the framework into action

2.2.1 Resource mobilization

Finding 6: While disaster risk reduction and management has historically been underfunded, resource partners are increasingly funding resilience programmes through specific, long-term financing mechanisms.

DRR and disaster resilience have historically been underfunded. DRR amounted to only 1% of the USD 150 billion spent in the 20 countries that received the most humanitarian aid in 2005-2009.22 Only 2.6% of all humanitarian aid from 2006 to 2011 was spent on disaster prevention and preparedness, although the proportion appears to be rising.23

The greatest proportion of humanitarian funding is issued on a 12-month cycle, even though the majority of humanitarian relief today takes place in contexts of protracted crises. These crises tend to be addressed through short-term approaches often focused on the most basic needs. Aid agencies find themselves presenting similar programmes to donors year after year with no long-term vision or exit strategy. For rapid onset disasters, once the immediate post-disaster period is over, the international community has often lost sight of longer-term resilience building initiatives.

However, there are signs that resource partners are becoming increasingly supportive of resilience. Longer term funding instruments – such as the three-year regional appeals in the Sahel region and in the Horn of Africa, as well as the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) 2016-2017 in response to the Syria crisis – have recently been designed to offer better inter-year predictability and hence enable implementing agencies to take a longer view than if they were funded by annual appeals. Similarly, the current FAO/Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency agreement covers a three-year period for the first time (2014-2016), with the objective of “enabling FAO to engage in longer term interventions with more sustainable and enhanced positive impact on food security and resilient livelihoods and addressing the root cause of vulnerability”. The “Grand Bargain” launched at the World Humanitarian Summit also pledged to expand the use of multi-year planning and funding instruments.

Representatives from some of the largest resource partners, such as the European Union (EU) or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), expressed their interest to fund resilience and presented numerous examples of resilience-oriented partnerships and initiatives, either already active or in preparation, including:

- The EU has been very supportive of resilience over the past five years, with large-scale programmes such as Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience (SHARE) or the Alliance Globale pour l’Initiative Résilience-Sahel (AGIR).
- USAID has launched the Global Resilience Partnership in 2012, and in 2014 partnered with the Rockefeller Foundation and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency to launch the Global Resilience Challenge, a grant competition calling for multi-sectoral teams to collaborate on innovative solutions to the toughest resilience challenges.

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23 Aid Investments in Disaster Risk Reduction – Rhetoric to Action, briefing paper, by Dan Sparks, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, October 2012.
• The World Bank and the Africa Development Bank have invested massively in the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI),26 as well as in various regional programmes developed under the aegis of CILSS in West Africa, such as the "Projet Régional d’Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel".

58 Another sign that resilience increasingly lends itself to fund raising is that from 2014-2015, almost half of all project resources related to SP 5 were “tagged” to Outcomes 1 (risk governance and DRR), 2 (risk monitoring and early warning) and 3 (prevention and vulnerability reduction), the most developmental outcomes of SP 5. Outcome 4 (response to crises) received the other half (see Table 2).

59 Emergency donor funding to FAO has stagnated over the past decade, while total humanitarian funding was growing fast (Figure 7). FAO’s share of total humanitarian funding, always very small, is currently declining. Moreover, the percentage of humanitarian funding allocated to agriculture has decreased significantly since 2012. This may be due to the fact that some core humanitarian donors, such as ECHO, are disengaging from livelihood support to refocus on life saving activities.

60 Some of the country offices visited as part of this evaluation’s field work have been quite successful in raising significant resources for resilience by:

• building a strongly contextualized, tailor-made intervention strategy before approaching donors, rather than vice versa (a good example of this was the DFID multi-year funding to FAO in Pakistan); and
• doing so hand in hand with the government rather than in isolation, as resilience is inherently a development process and can only succeed if pursued with national stakeholders.

61 In other cases, FAO has struggled to put forth a technically solid programmatic offer in resilience. For instance, a lack of quality and contextual specificity in programme design was presented as the main explanation for the so far limited FAO access to resources under the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) 2016-2017 and to DFID’s proposed multi-year resilience funding in response to the Syria crisis.

Finding 7: FAO could strengthen its strategic position by deepening its involvement in resilience. The Organization should not limit itself to a declining emergency crisis response portfolio, which in many cases (e.g. in protracted crises) relies on ill-adapted, short-term humanitarian funding.

62 As explained in the preceding chapter, the concept of resilience implies that it is useful to respond to short-term crises but inappropriate to keep repeating short-term emergency interventions year after year in a context of protracted crisis. The review of past and recent evaluation reports highlights an uneven FAO track record in responding to long-term crises in a development-oriented manner. In this context, SP 5 and the resilience agenda are rightly seen by FAO management as an effort to strengthen the development orientation of FAO’s work in preparation and response to crises. It would however be misleading to state that FAO is transitioning from emergency response to resilience programming. A more correct formulation would be that FAO is broadening its offer of services towards resilience programming that is more encompassing than just emergency response, but also includes emergency operations as a possible and legitimate modus operandi for FAO in response to acute crises.

63 A sizeable resilience-building field programme would buttress the Organization’s capacity to test new approaches and ‘learn by doing’ in resilience. It would also lend additional credibility to FAO’s policy advice in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction or mitigation. Last but not least, the FAO personnel working on resilience are almost

26 Following the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa, a heads of state summit held in Nairobi in September 2011 mandated IGAD to coordinate regional interventions to build drought resilience in the Horn. This led to the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), developed with close support from FAO’s Investment Centre (TCI).
entirely funded out of Administrative and Operational Services (AOS) charged on the field programme. However, the development of such a resilience field programme will require a concerted investment. Core resilience programming is qualitatively different from emergency programming. The latter relies typically on standardized approaches and project documents of less than 10 pages funded through a United Nations appeal process. In contrast, improving resilience to disaster requires a deeper analysis of the context in its agronomic, environmental, economic, political and security dimensions, and especially a deeper knowledge and understanding of people’s livelihoods. FAO has a comparative advantage in this domain – most crises are protracted crises where FAO has been present for many years and where the staff usually has a certain knowledge and understanding of local livelihoods – but one which was only occasionally brought to bear in past emergency responses.²⁷ Resilience programming also calls upon more sophisticated technical approaches emphasizing sustainability and market linkages (see Table 4).

A retooling of FAO’s programming and resource mobilization capacity appears necessary. While FAO has developed training modules on access to humanitarian financing and has continued to train country office staff on humanitarian financing channels in 2014 and 2015, the evaluation notes with regret that FAO still lacks a workable strategy to approach resilience-oriented donors.

A related issue is that of the new project cycle²⁸, designed in 2014 to ensure consistency between resource mobilization efforts and the reviewed Strategic Framework. This development is not specific to Strategic Programme 5. However, it is relevant to this evaluation because SP 5 is funded primarily from voluntary contributions and because the new project cycle was one of the tools used to bring greater control to the emergency portfolio, which was seen as including projects whose alignment with FAO’s mandate was arguable.

The new project cycle has been in operation for only one year. While the basic principles behind the project cycle make sense and are broadly accepted, their implementation led to a system that is significantly more complex than it once was, with unnecessary steps which, according to Country Offices, are negatively impacting resource mobilization. For instance, the project’s alignment with the strategic framework is now verified several times, and no project is ever rejected at the initial “short project proposal” stage²⁹, calling into question the usefulness of that stage. The tagging of projects to specific strategic objectives is also the locus of much subjectivity, pressure, and sometimes perverse incentives. The new project cycle would therefore deserve to be simplified and the tagging procedure streamlined.

2.2.2 Headquarters-based arrangements

Finding 8: The Strategic Programme 5 team is widely assessed in FAO and beyond as dynamic, flexible and supportive of country offices. It has also effectively “broken down silos”, notably through its weekly teleconferences and its country support process. These processes and supportive attitude make of Strategic Programme 5 one of the most present and visible Strategic Programmes at country level.

The SP 5 team is widely recognized within FAO and beyond as dynamic, flexible and supportive of Country Offices. It has also effectively “broken down silos”, notably through its weekly teleconferences involving a variety of actors and units. The SP 5 country support process and roadmaps, as well as the Service Level Agreements defining the products and services to be provided to SP 5 by technical divisions in exchange for earmarked SP 5

²⁷ The FAO response to the 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan was one of the very few cases where a livelihoods-based approach was used consistently from damage and needs assessment to programming, and to coordination, with good results. Probably as a result, the FAO response included a well-funded and relevant rehabilitation programme. See: FAO: Evaluation of the FAO Response to the Pakistan Earthquake, February 2009.

²⁸ The Director-General’s Bulletin 2014/53 sets out the policy, roles and responsibilities in relation to resource mobilization and the project cycle.

²⁹ The new project cycle introduced a new step at the onset of the project formulation process, whereby a “short project proposal” (up to two pages) is developed by the project formulator, entered in a corporate database (FPMIS), and pre-screened regarding its alignment with the Strategic Framework and political risks. At later stages, the project is delineated into a “concept note” and then finally in a “project document”. At this stage it is “tagged” to particular SOs and outcomes.
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funding, are also appreciated, and indicate that things are actually changing in the way FAO conducts its business. Reportedly, the Service Level Agreements have “changed the conversation” with technical units, many of which are now more service-oriented than they used to be.

The SP 5 Leader is also the Director of the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE), a specificity which allows him to mobilize significant human and financial resources behind SP 5 implementation and country support. This is not the case with other Strategic Programmes.

In terms of cross-SP collaboration, SP 5 shares significant common concerns with SP 2 on climate change adaptation, with SP 3 on social protection and migration in protracted crises and with SP 1 on information systems. There is also potential for more work with SP 4 on value chains, given that food chain crises strongly affect value chains. Overlaps are not necessarily a problem as long as they are utilized proactively to foster effective collaboration. Such collaboration between SPs is of significance especially at headquarters and regional levels; at country level, the CPF is the defining framework. All SPs are brought under it and collaboration tends to happen whenever there is scope for covering cross-cutting or complementary areas of work.

Finding 9: While silos were broken within Strategic Programme 5, there is potential for more collaboration between Strategic Programmes at headquarters. Collaboration with Strategic Programme 2 has focused on climate change, with Strategic Programme 3 on social protection and with Strategic Programme 4 on food chain safety. Some Regional Initiatives have generated collaboration between Strategic Programmes. At country level, the Strategic Programmes are seamlessly brought together under the country programming frameworks.

At headquarters, the current links between SP 5 and technical units are particularly strong on domains where TCE has had well established programmes in the past: the Plant Production and Protection Division (AGP), the Animal Production and Health Division (AGA), the Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA) and the (EST). Relations with other technical units – e.g. with the Fisheries and Forestry Departments or the Climate, Energy and Tenure (NRC) and Nutrition (ESN) Divisions – have had focused but less extensive collaboration, as this has been led by a few individual officers contributing to SO I or SP 5 single activities rather than based on a division-wide programmatic one.

However, the overlap with climate change is leading to some interesting collaboration with NRC and SP 2, for instance on El Niño. Already, many of the requests for support on climate change adaptation emanating from Country Offices come through the SP 5 team, perhaps due to their strong links with the country level.

The evaluation also found encouraging collaboration between SP 5 and SP 3 on social protection. The cash transfer work carried out under SP 5’s emergency response activities has been framed under SP 3 in the broader and more comprehensive area of social protection. FAO, under the overall guidance of the social protection team, is now advocating for the importance of social protection programmes for the rural poor, in which incremental and/or complementary support can be sustained in contexts of crises to rebuild the productive and resilience capacities of vulnerable households whenever possible.

FAO actively engaged in the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board on social protection and resilience, contributing to develop a common approach on this area with partners such as DFID, UNICEF, WFP, World Bank, and ECHO. The agencies prepared a joint statement for the World Humanitarian Summit.

Collaboration with SP 4 focuses on the complementarities of the standard setting, research and policy work on food safety and transboundary animal and plant pests and diseases under SP 4 and the development of risk analysis, early warning systems and response

30 An SLA is a framework document for the relationship between two FAO units, creating a common understanding about the services to be provided and each party’s responsibilities. They were introduced first for administrative units such as the Shared Services Centre (SSC) in Budapest or CASP, and have been used to formalize the relation between SPs and technical units, as part of the matrix management introduced by the new SF.

31 SP 2 has a Major Area of Work on “Climate Smart Agriculture”.

capacity that use the SP 4 work as the trigger for risk analysis, communication and response activities under EMPRES, GLEWS, the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) and other related platforms. Examples include the Codex standard setting and research on food safety done by the FAO Office of Food Safety and the work done on antimicrobial resistance.

2.2.3 Regional-level arrangements

Finding 10: Among the range of approaches used by the regional offices in delineating and implementing the Regional Initiatives, the approach taken by the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean likely offers the best chance of success, with Regional Initiatives branded as ambitious flagship programmes, vehicles for knowledge sharing and awareness raising, funded from external resources, and implemented in collaboration with regional and national partners.

A range of approaches has been used in delineating and implementing the new Strategic Framework at the regional level. The Regional Office for Africa (RAF) and the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (RLC) have been particularly proactive. Governance arrangements have been put in place in accordance with the corporate guidelines. The structure, role and responsibilities for the new Strategic Framework implementation have been established and communicated, and staff members with the relevant experience and technical knowledge have been appointed in 2015.

Arguably, RLC has implemented the Regional Initiative concept in the most promising way: as flagship programmes and vehicles for knowledge sharing and awareness raising, funded from external resources (often mobilized regionally), and implemented in collaboration with regional and national partners.

The Regional Initiatives in Africa are currently only funded by FAO resources and therefore rather small. The Regional Initiatives in Africa are supported by the Regional Strategic Programme Coordinator, the Regional Initiative Delivery Managers and their teams, consisting of SP and technical staff from the Region, Subregion and headquarters. Country roadmaps are developed which aim to ensure maximum impact of the ongoing programmes and projects within the focus countries and regional partnerships are developed. There is one Regional Initiative related to resilience and SOS in Africa: Regional Initiative 3 - Building Resilience in Africa’s Drylands. This initiative supports countries in the development of resilience strategies and plans, and provides programmatic support, guidance and funding to country-level initiatives. This is similar to the typical modus operandi of a regional Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), and in fact the Regional Initiative’s meagre resources (about USD 100 000 per year) have been complemented by a regional TCP (TCP/RAF/3507 - Support to the regional initiative on resilience in the Sahel and Horn of Africa – USD 495 000) that aims to establish effective knowledge platforms between the CILSS and IGAD. This knowledge sharing dimension was missing so far in Regional Initiative 3, and the approval of the TCP is therefore a welcome development as well as a useful boost in resources. The RAF Resilience Team rightly see their role as in part to support the design of national and local projects; however, there is no regional resilience strategy or dedicated fundraising capacity to shape these efforts.

Another important element of some Regional Initiatives in Latin America, such as Hambre Cero, is a clear political commitment at regional level. In RAF, the situation is promising for Regional Initiative 1 (Africa’s Commitment to End Hunger by 2025), initially framed within the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Its objectives have recently been edited to reflect faithfully the language of the Malabo Declaration. Since the declaration commits to “enhancing resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability

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33 See the FAO Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance 2016-2020 (http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5996e.pdf)
34 The Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) draws from FAO’s assessed contributions to provide flexible technical assistance to governments’ priority needs in the areas of FAO mandate, through short-term, catalytic projects.
35 The Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, adopted at the African Union Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in June 2014, reconfirmed that agriculture should remain high on the development agenda of the continent.
and other related risks” by “mainstreaming resilience and risk management in policies, strategies and investment plans” and working on “social security for rural workers and other vulnerable social groups”, it provides ample opportunity to anchor an FAO resilience building programme as well. While the Regional Initiative 3 concept note makes it clear that the initiative will be implemented within the framework of the Malabo Declaration, the mechanisms need to be further articulated. Furthermore, policy support as well as social security are mentioned as focal areas in the Regional Initiative 3 concept note, but remain to be addressed by the Regional Initiative at the country level.

In RAF, a large resilience team was assembled to support the many SO5-related programmes in the region. This team of six people, funded from voluntary contributions, is progressively finding its place and role in the FAO structure. Two senior members of the team travel frequently to provide temporary support to Country Offices: one as FAO Representative a.i. (Liberia, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the other as Surge Response Team Leader (Central Africa Republic, Ethiopia). The RAF Resilience Team in Accra is complemented by three other Resilience Teams for East, West and Southern Africa located in Nairobi, Dakar and Johannesburg, entirely funded out of voluntary contributions from the projects they help generate through their own resource mobilization efforts. These are the remainders of what used to be called the ‘Sub-regional Emergency Offices’ or ‘Hubs’ prior to the decentralization of TCE. They remain in a precarious institutional and financial position in spite of recent efforts to clarify their reporting lines and budget holding responsibilities.

The Resilience Teams in Africa have contributed valued technical support, as acknowledged by many Country Offices and survey respondents. The West Africa Team supports the CILSS and the countries of the Sahel on the Cadre Harmonisé, a set of food security early warning decision tools and processes using the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC). The East Africa Team supports three IGAD units involved in the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI): the Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD); the Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), and the Resilience Analysis Unit (RAU). The Southern Africa team supports the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and helps develop the Regional Inter Agency Standing Committee Action Plan to address the impacts of El Niño.

The Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa (RNE) used its Regional Initiative on resilience (Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition) in a similar way to RAF: to fund catalytic initiatives but not as a flagship programme, a knowledge sharing platform or a resource mobilization vehicle. The 2014-2015 biennium was a period of establishment and adjustment period for the resilience team in Cairo, which is only now gaining ground amongst regional staff.

The implementation of the Strategic Framework may have been slower in other regions. In the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (RAP), the pace of adoption has recently quickened with the nomination of a new Assistant Director-General. Since then, RAP has restructured its office in early 2016 to facilitate implementation, with eight officers selected to serve in functional roles as Regional Initiative Delivery Managers and Strategic Objective Focal Points, and is currently proposing a reformulation of its three existing Regional Initiatives – originally defined around rather narrow technical issues such as rice farming and aquaculture – based on the discussions and the outcome of the Asia Pacific Regional Conference in March 2016. One of these newly proposed Regional Initiatives would be about resilience to climate change and the other about One Health, two issues topical to SO5.

The Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia has had scant contacts with SP 5 but this is improving. Very few projects are tagged to SO5 in Europe and Central Asia, apart from some locust control Technical Cooperation Programmes in Central Asia and a few emergency projects in Serbia and Ukraine. The effects of the Syria crisis on Turkey are dealt with by the Sub-regional Office for Central Asia in Ankara. This being said, there are also projects that the Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia tags to SO2 or SO4, which other regions could tag to SO5 (e.g. on Influenza A virus subtype H1N1 (“swine flu” virus)). The Regional Office is considering further work on Climate-Smart Agriculture and DRR for the Western Balkans and in Central Asia.
Finding 11: Countries under “active observation and coordinated support” derive significant benefits in terms of coordinated technical backstopping from all Strategic Programmes. So far, there is less value in the “focus countries” system, perhaps because “focus countries” represent two-thirds of all FAO programme countries.

Finally, the evaluation looked at the value of arrangements for “focus countries” and “countries under active observation and coordinated support”. From the limited sample of country case studies, it appears that countries under “active observation and coordinated support” derive significant benefits in terms of coordinated technical backstopping from all Strategic Programmes, and even some support in resource mobilization. So far, there is less value in the “focus countries” system, primarily because there are many focus countries and many different types of focus countries, which defeats the purpose (Table 5). Two-thirds of FAO programme countries are considered focus countries.

The SP 5 focus countries were identified in 2014. The original list included 11 countries in RAF (Burkina Faso, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Zimbabwe); 8 countries and territories in the RNE (Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen); 5 countries in RLC (Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent); and 6 countries in RAP (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines). Selected through the application of strict criteria, they are supported through a dedicated Country Support Process, which as already explained gives SP 5 a comparative advantage over other SPs in its relation with country offices.

Table 5. Focus and non-focus countries (all strategic programmes and regional initiatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAO regional offices</th>
<th>Countries under active observation and coordinated support</th>
<th>Focus countries</th>
<th>Non-focus countries</th>
<th>Total number of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Coordinated Support Arrangements - Regional Initiatives and focus countries, April 2016

2.2.4 Capacity management

The evaluation looked at technical capacities, trying to assess if SP 5 has helped mobilize the capacity of technical units so as to enrich the technical content of its resilience programmes. Another line of enquiry was about operational capacity, with a view to assess if the numerous constraints identified in this area in past emergency programmes are progressively being addressed.

Two caveats are in order. First, the new Strategic Framework was accompanied by a strong drive towards decentralization of operational and technical capacity from headquarters to Regional, Sub-regional and Country Offices. The Evaluation Team is not in a position to assess the impact of this aspect of the reform on FAO’s capacities to deliver its resilience programmes, as this would require a more in-depth analysis. Second, operational and technical capacities are not specific to SP 5. However, SP 5 has been described as the most operational of all Strategic Programmes, as the one relying the most on extensive field operations, providing surge capacity and helping place operations officers in country offices. The reason these issues are mentioned here is because they affect SP 5 to a disproportionate extent as compared to other Strategic Programmes.

36 Countries facing multiple hazards and/or recurring crises; countries where FAO can demonstrate impact within 2 years in terms of scale, speed and visibility; countries with capacity to implement and deliver results; Country Office demand; and presence of a CPF.
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Finding 12: The ‘Level 3’ protocols and the introduction of new partnership tools such as the Operational Partners Implementation Modality (OPIM) are a sign that long-standing operational difficulties are being taken seriously and progressively addressed.

Operational capacity has long been a limiting factor for FAO emergency operations, as noted in a number of past and recent evaluations. The situation has improved, but not fast and systematically enough. While many decision-making processes remain centralized and lengthier than they should be, the Level 3 protocols and the introduction of new partnership tools such as the Operational Partners Implementation Modality (OPIM) are a sign that operational difficulties are being taken seriously and progressively addressed. The Level 3 surge protocols have been applied to Central Africa Republic, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Sudan, Yemen and the El Niño response in Southern Africa and Ethiopia. These do provide marked improvement in FAO’s operational readiness by regrouping decision-makers, technical divisions and administrative support units into result-oriented teams who are empowered to explore the existing flexibility in FAO procedures and make them work for the field programme. Standard Operating Procedures have been drafted, providing all FAO staff with clear, uniform administrative guidance. The Level 3 protocols (and Level 3-type surge support) are therefore an encouraging sign that FAO operational difficulties are being addressed. The drawback is that not all countries can be given the same amount of priority. FAO needs to develop Standard Operating Procedures for non-Level 3 countries as well.

Finding 13: Among the technical areas seen as key for resilience programming, FAO retains strong capacities in livestock health, Farmer Field Schools, locust control, water management, and to some degree in climate change adaptation. Capacities appear less robust in disaster risk reduction and management, insurance and cash-based approaches, and almost nil in conflict and political analysis.

Technical units have been reorganized, asked to enter a geographic mobility scheme, had some of their positions kept vacant for long periods of time, and some of their technical staff have been recruited by Strategic Programme teams to work on the new Strategic Framework. As this is not a specific SP 5 issue and since there is a parallel ongoing process assessing the technical capacities of the Organization, the evaluation focused only on the technical gaps within SP 5.

It appears from this analysis that FAO retains strong capacities in livestock health, Farmer Field Schools, locust control, water management, and to some degree in climate change adaptation. Based on feedback from Country Offices, capacities appear less robust in DRR, DRM, insurance and cash-based approaches, and almost nil in conflict and political analysis. These gaps relate to areas which are either new (e.g. the relations between peace and Food Security) or where the demand from member countries increased in relation to the adoption of the Sendai framework (i.e. DRR/DRM) and other changes on the global development agenda. These deficit areas are key for resilience programming:

- Countries in various situations of protracted conflict represent a majority of humanitarian assistance worldwide, and the same will probably apply to resilience programming. Even for a technical agency like FAO, some capacity in conflict and political analysis is required to ensure that FAO keeps abreast of the complex security environments in which it sends its staff, and that its programmes “do no harm”, e.g. that they do not lead to population displacement or resource grabbing.
- In cash-based approaches, the expertise exists within the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) but the unit is understaffed to backstop and expand a small but promising programme of work. It would benefit from expertise being located at the decentralized level (for example in the Regional Office for Africa).
- The deficit in disaster insurance schemes was highlighted by the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean.

‘Level 3’ (L3) refers to the United Nations humanitarian system’s classification for the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises requiring the mobilization of global response capabilities, i.e. a corporate response. In 2013, there were three L3 designations – for the responses to the conflicts in Syria and Central African Republic and to the Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. In 2014, there were two additional L3 declarations, for South Sudan and Iraq. Level 1 responses are defined as those lying within the response capabilities of the relevant UN country team. Level 2 responses are those operations requiring regional augmentation of country-level response capability.
• The deficit in DRR/DRM was confirmed by the skill mix assessment conducted for the first time this year to determine the skills required to deliver against the outputs of SP 5 and hence the skill gaps to be filled through new recruitment, learning and development, and partnerships. The exercise identified the need for two more Disaster Risk Reduction Officers (with climate change and resilience competencies) at headquarters and four more in regional offices.

90 The SP 5 team is optimistic that through the skill mix assessment and similar exercises, the post profiles in technical divisions will evolve to better serve resilience programmes. Efforts are being made to fill vacant positions and hire new ones in key technical units. In the meantime, Country Offices are being inventive and rely more and more on inter-Country Office knowledge exchange. Some FAO Country Offices are staffed with a stable cadre of national technical staff who can do technical work and/or contribute policy advice in coordination and policy spaces.

91 More generally, there are in FAO reserves of technical talent that are currently applied to other tasks such as planning and reporting, and that could be more systematically mapped and utilized over and beyond their present terms of reference and geographic remit. The creation of virtual knowledge exchange networks would help utilise this untapped talent.

2.3 Review of progress achieved

92 It is probably too soon to evaluate the results achieved at country level and to attribute them to SO5. However, using simple, qualitative process indicators about the type of evolution one would expect to see as a result of SO5, it may be possible to trace FAO’s trajectory in resilience programming, to evidence recent improvements, and to attribute them (or not) to SO5. Such a systematic review of expected intermediary results (or process results) would have the additional advantage of establishing a baseline for future evaluations. This approach is taken in section 3.3.2 below, while section 3.3.1 presents an overview of the most recent progress achieved under each outcome.

2.3.1 Progress under each outcome

Outcome 1 – Countries and regions adopt and implement legal, policy and institutional systems and regulatory frameworks for risk reduction and crisis management.

93 FAO’s strategic programme on resilience is strongly anchored in the global platforms on risk reduction. For instance, the FAO DRR Framework Programme for Food and Nutrition Security is aligned with the priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. Similarly, the next iteration of global DRR platform, the Sendai Framework 2015-2030, expands the DRR agenda to focus on risks, including risk sensitive development and climate change adaptation. Global priorities on the impact of climate change and the increasing severity and impact of disasters have influenced FAO’s Resilience Agenda (SO5), which balances shared objectives of DRR, Climate Change Adaptation and the Sustainable Development Goals addressing resilient livelihoods.

94 This alignment of FAO’s objectives with the global platforms provides an opportunity to directly contribute to the achievement of global priorities and primes FAO to support country level resilience in the agriculture sector. FAO has also adjusted to the evolution of risk reduction programs, where the FAO Resilience Objective addresses both the traditional risk reduction aspects with those that are more developmental in nature. Despite this, FAO needs to continue to promote and incentivize joint DRR and resilience programs across technical units and Strategic Programmes. Currently, most technical units engage in policies contributing to resilience but these are not yet articulated as a collective contribution.

95 For Food Chain Crises, SP 5 utilizes the “One Health” concept as a policy framework to support initiatives that require the synergistic management of ecosystem, human and animal health. New thinking over the last decade in how to predict crises and prevent them from having significant impact is now largely accepted as part of this approach. FAO has had a significant role in developing One Health collaborations and formulated its own One
Health Strategic Action Plan (FAO 2011). The current plan focuses on the animal health sector and does not appear to be clearly aligned with National One Health Platforms, where they exist. SP 5 should take steps to broaden the One Health Strategic Plan so that it encompasses the other two EMPRES pillars and more clearly supports national and regional partners’ interests.

Finding 14: The various technical units engaged in resilience-building policies have not yet articulated their offer of services as a collective contribution, in spite of the opportunity offered by the Strategic Programme 5 ‘space’ to do so. Similarly, FAO still lacks an integrated One Health Strategic Action Plan taking into consideration all three EMPRES pillars.

96 In the context of protracted crises and conflict, which represents the setting for the majority of FAO’s country level work, FAO has only recently been stepping up much-needed policy work. The development and dissemination of the Committee on World Food Security’s Framework for Action in Protracted Crises constitutes a significant and much needed building block to better unpack the policy dimension of the relationship between protracted crises contexts, food and nutrition security and agriculture. Further work is reported to be underway in exploring the policy dimensions and guidance tools around conflict, migration and the areas of FAO’s work. Interesting examples were found in the course of the evaluation, such as a study exploring the linkages between livestock, pastoralism and conflict in South Sudan, but FAO needs to increase the lessons and analytical reviews needed to inform and guide the strategic choices and directions that need to be made at the programmatic level.

Outcome 2 – Countries and regions provide regular information and early warning against potential, known and emerging threats.

97 SO5 is found to have made a positive contribution to increasing the adoption of early warning systems in FAO and by partners. SO5 targets for 2016-2017 compile 136 Outcome 2 projects implemented by regional or country offices across 82 countries. Outcome 2 has contributed to the institutionalization of Early Warning and Information Systems such as IPC and the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis Model (RIMA) and in Food Chain Crises. This was found to have created new opportunities to implement these systems at national level where there is strong evidence of demand.

98 The categorization of threats and crises is functional and appropriate from the standpoint of information and early warning systems. However, the three broad categories (natural hazards, food chain crises, protracted crises) should be supported by a more detailed taxonomy. From the standpoint of information and early warning systems, this would contribute to associate sets of systems with specific crises and support FAO in identifying potential synergies, overlaps, and gaps.

Finding 15: Outcome 2 has contributed to the institutionalization of early warning and information systems such as the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA), and through the welcome development of the Early Warning / Early Action reports integrating data from different FAO systems. There is potential for deeper integration and further synergies through exchanges of data sets, integration of geographic information systems, and the sharing of data collection tools such as tablets and satellite data link services.

99 The Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) system was developed by SP 5 to: consolidate available forecasting information; develop plans when a warning occurs; and make the case for investing in early action. Such consolidation of the different early warning and information systems created and managed by FAO is a welcome development clearly attributable to SP 5. At global level, The EWEA system produces a quarterly report with a list of countries at high-risk of food insecurity. In addition to providing warnings, the report includes recommended early actions. At national level, FAO is working with national authorities to establish early warning systems and to develop indicators and evidence-based triggers for prompt action. A pilot system is running for the 2015–2016 El Niño event. A number of countries have expressed demand for an integrated EWEA system but are confronted by a lack of funds to implement it and to coordinate the chain of actors (from national to local levels) needed for the systems to work.
The evaluation found that, beside the EWEA initiative, SO 5 did not necessarily lead to joint planning among the established information and early warning systems. Previous evaluations or reviews have highlighted the need for stronger integration of FAO’s early warning tools, both internally and with the ones operated by external partners. This need is still acute today. EMPRES, GLEWS+ and GIEWS report improved cross-communications but without a translation into their respective plans or more coherent data collection, data analysis and data sharing. In effect, EWEA represents a ‘soft’ and relatively inexpensive solution to the problem of data integration, by weaving different datasets, monitoring systems and alerts together into one single quarterly report. There is potential for a much deeper integration than allowed by EWEA, through exchanges of data sets, integration of GIS data, and the sharing of data collection tools such as tablets and satellite data link services.

Until SO5, the focus of IPC was more on the development of tools and delivery of trainings while Outcome 2 is referred as having leveled-up IPC with strategic programming, stronger recognition and sustainability, improved learning from best practices, thereby enhancing governments’ ownership and national sustainability. Similarly, RIMA points out that Outcome 2 has formalized data needs that have facilitated the adoption of the methodology in selected countries as well as to forge partnerships for data collection (e.g. with World Vision and the Norwegian Refugee Council in Somalia).

Since the introduction of FAO’s new strategic framework in June 2013, the Food Chain Crises area of work, its three EMPRES Pillars and its response mechanisms – such as the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases, the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Plant Pests, the Crisis Management Centre for Animal Health and the FAO Nuclear Energy Crisis Network – have been incorporated into SP 5 management and financial systems. Key staff have been funded through the SP 5 budget on the basis of service agreements negotiated with division heads. The evaluation found no significant alterations to the FCC or EMPRES strategy or operations since 2013, or to the formulation of the new strategic framework. Relevant technical divisions and their respective EMPRES lead officers still largely determine how each pillar is managed. This status quo should be seen as a testament to how visionary FAO has been in establishing mechanisms to prevent, prepare for and respond to food chain crises caused by pests and diseases. In many ways, EMPRES could be seen as a precursor in resilience programming. The EMPRES Pillars are well aligned toward the SO5 outcomes.

The evaluation found strong and growing demand within the international community, regional bodies and countries for FAO support in addressing food chain crises. This remains an area where FAO is valued and where FAO has a recognised comparative technical and normative advantage (FAO 2007). The evaluation found that addressing food chain crises is also a sphere of activity in which FAO lacks adequate human and financial resources to fully meet increasing demand. This evaluation and the ongoing EMPRES evaluation provide an opportunity for SP 5 to reorganise, focus and strengthen FCC activities.

FAO has been addressing livelihoods support and resilience for a long time. This evolving body of work is reflected in FAO’s 2013 strategic paper “Resilient Livelihoods: Disaster Risk Reduction for Food and Nutrition Security”, which outlined the key areas FAO needs to address to build resilient livelihoods, including:

- A focus on the geographic/territorial context from the sub-national to sub-regional scales, understanding wide-ranging hazards and risks including food and nutrition, watersheds, and agro-ecological factors;
- Adopting integrated and inter-disciplinary approaches that combine technologies, approaches and sectors for a coherent approach to building resilience among small-scale producers, and;
- Taking an ecosystems perspective to ensure integrated land, water and wider resource management that promotes equitable access and sustainable use.

These elements became the core of FAO’s ambitions under Outcome 3 of what became the SOS resilience framework in 2014 – Applying Prevention and Mitigation Measures. This framework is correct in recognising that resilience building almost always requires the
integration of a range of technological, social, financial and resource factors, and operates within the political and environmental realities of particular contexts.

Finding 16: There is a large body of FAO community-based work on disaster risk reduction and management done through many small pilot projects. The review of past evaluations indicates that despite their quality, these small pilot projects often fail to influence national policy. However, encouraging examples exist of comprehensive and potentially useful policy support by FAO in disaster risk reduction and management.

106 In practice, much of FAO’s community-based disaster risk reduction work is the result of small projects, mostly piloting approaches in integrating DRR in agriculture practices at the community level. A key feature of this approach is the Farmer Field School model, community disaster risk assessment, and some work on village level preparedness and small water catchments and management systems.

107 A recent evaluation\(^{38}\) found that many interventions were implemented without prior analyses and considerations of local contexts and vulnerability assessments, particularly where projects were spin-offs of emergency interventions, such as in Central America. In most cases, and across both regions, the effectiveness of interventions was limited to restoration of livelihoods, without addressing the root causes of risks and structural food insecurity. The evaluation highlighted an insufficient staff capacity in DRR at country and regional levels, and found that short project durations were a key limiting factor, as they did not allow sufficient time for proper project preparation, testing, implementation, and capacity development.

108 Many pilot projects do not influence policy and institutional capacity. A positive exception is provided by Pakistan, where DRR/DRM has been a significant component of FAO programmes in Pakistan from 2011 and where a critical mass of support seems to be effective. The policy component supports different levels of government, including strong contributions to the National Agriculture and Food Security Policy, an institutional assessment for integrating DRM into the agriculture sector, and a number of contingency plans at provincial, district or agency level. New technologies relevant to DRR were also successfully promoted (e.g. sunflower cultivation in Sindh, new rice varieties, direct seeding of rice, mixed cropping, ridge cultivation). Similarly in the Karamoja region of Uganda, district capacity has been strengthened considerably in a range of domains from drought early warning system to animal health and risk reduction and contingency planning. The critical test for such national and local contingency plans will be whether they are utilized when needs arise.

109 The synthesis of past evaluations shows that the use of participatory approaches are improving across FAO projects. Much of the participation has been at community level, mostly around consultations and participatory needs assessments. Some good practices in community level participation were observed in Uganda and Cambodia, where community groups have taken over management of infrastructure or livelihood projects. The participation of women in these activities is also notable.

110 There is a need to go beyond consultation at the community level by involving institutions in local planning and response processes. Positive examples to build upon and replicate include hazard and vulnerability mapping/preparedness planning and participatory surveillance and reporting for highly pathogenic avian influenza. Community-based models for resilience in the form of Farmer Field Schools (FFS), Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction, and Community Animal Health Workers (CAHW) have been implemented, but once again with limited capitalization of experience across FAO projects.

111 There are signs that FAO is adopting a multi-pronged livelihoods approaches in its support to DRR/MDR. This reflects an institutional shift under its current Strategic Framework toward more county-led, collaborative and focused ways of working. In headquarters and the regional and sub-regional offices, SOS has clearly been supporting this culture shift by helping countries and regions access a range of livelihoods support from across FAO units.

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\(^{38}\) Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Executive Summary, November 2013
Evaluation of FAO Strategic Objective 5

112 A main caveat of the work carried out under this Outcome is that it focused far more on natural hazards than man-made hazards, such as conflict-induced risks or commodity price peaks. Other domains requiring attention are the interactions between peace, security and sustainable resource access, and the need for socially cohesive approaches around water and land tenure and at the interface between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist livelihood systems.

Outcome 4 – Countries and regions affected by disasters and crises prepare for and manage effective responses.

113 Under Outcome 4, the period 2013-14 certainly tested FAO’s capacity to engage in large-scale surge and response operations. FAO responded to three Level 3 crises declarations and, in the subsequent years, has activated a number of surge support mechanisms for a number of critical situations (including Yemen, Ethiopia, South Pacific, Southern Africa and Nigeria). Overall, the evaluation found that SP 5 has been making good advancement in its humanitarian response work, with possibly still a gap in the area of preparedness, where the roll-out of tools and guidance has been slower.

Finding 17: FAO has made major improvements in its surge capacity and mechanisms, through the application of ‘Level 3’ Standard Operating Procedures that support a well-coordinated and well-functioning chain of support.

114 The synthesis of the three Level 3 Emergency Responses (Philippines, Central Africa Republic and South Sudan) shows that FAO has made major improvements in its surge capacity and mechanisms. The Standard Operating Procedures that were developed supported a well-coordinated and well-functioning chain of support. High level surge support was mobilized for all three locations. FAO was able to position itself effectively to lead in the agriculture and food security components of the response by having highly qualified teams in the country from the early days of the crises.

115 One major finding is that context determines the nature of the Level 3 response. There were significant differences between the Philippines on the one hand and Central Africa Republic and South Sudan on the other. It would be important to adapt the Standard Operating Procedures, guidelines and policies to fit better the different contexts (natural disaster vs. conflict or protracted crisis). These should encompass areas such as:

- The relationship with the Government;
- The presence (or absence) of and reliance on the private sector, and the implications for seeds and other agricultural supplies;
- The presence/absence of infrastructure (roads, transport, storage).

116 Based on the Central Africa Republic evaluation, future responses to complex crises should consider conducting an in-depth analysis of the origins of conflict, in addition to the preliminary context assessment. This would help to base the response on a thorough understanding of the local and historical context, while considering the preventative factors and risk reduction strategies contained in FAO’s SOS.

Finding 18: Developing a menu of “signature resilience services” could help FAO build a stronger, more diversified resilience programme at scale, by standardizing approaches and reducing programme design and roll-out time, while adapting the services to local particularities as required.

117 A number of services and approaches were identified which exemplify resilience programming: e.g. Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), FFS and their various versions (including the caisses de resilience which adds a saving component to the FFS), different forms of input support (input distributions but also input fairs, networks of input shops, warrantage), small-scale irrigation and cash-for-assets (see Table 6).

118 These are all anchored in significant FAO experience, adapted to both development and resilience, they all place a premium on local capacities, economic sustainability and market
linkages, and they require an investment over the long-term while being easily scalable and de-scalable temporarily, if need be.

Some of these services or approaches have not been aggressively promoted by FAO through a corporate-wide engagement. As a result, their spread though the FAO network of Country Offices was very slow, and happened mainly by chance and through staff mobility. For instance, input trade fairs started in Southern Africa 20 years ago and remained there ever since. FAO support to CAHWs started in the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan at about the same time in the early 1990’s, but the CAHWs were never systematically promoted by FAO in West Africa. Even the FFS have no institutional home in FAO. There are of course exceptions: EMPRES is solidly institutionalized; and the IPC was steadfastly promoted by FAO since its inception in Somalia in 2004, and has since been adopted in a growing number of countries and regions around the world. This shows that FAO can bring good local experiences up to scale by improving and promoting its good practices, and by building capacities in-country.

Table 6. Examples of resilient services that FAO promotes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services as originally conceived</th>
<th>Relevance of the service to the resilience agenda</th>
<th>Possible evolution towards greater resilience</th>
<th>Relevance of the evolution to the resilience agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)</td>
<td>Evidence base for coordination and decision-making by a broad set of actors in the sector. The acute analysis includes a capacity for early warning.</td>
<td>IPC 2</td>
<td>Better codification of the technical consensus behind IPC classes, leading to improved consensus with partners on the result of the analysis and to better coordination of response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs)</td>
<td>Good approach to extend basic veterinary coverage in areas difficult to access and among nomads.</td>
<td>Sustained support to CAHWs networks and profitability</td>
<td>CAHWs networks require long term investments and support, with frequent re-training (as opposed to CAHWs “trained and dropped”). More attention to the self-financing aspect of CAHWs and networks leads to better financial sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-off vaccination campaigns</td>
<td>Allows for some control of animal epidemics and thus helps prevent food chain crises.</td>
<td>Support to veterinary services, privatization</td>
<td>In most contexts, the best long-term solution to the problem of animal diseases is to invest in a strong national network of public and private veterinarians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Seeds and tools&quot; distributions</td>
<td>Help save an agricultural season after a disaster or crisis has affected households’ seed, tools and input stocks.</td>
<td>Seed fairs, voucher schemes, input shops, seed multiplication schemes</td>
<td>These approaches are less disruptive of the private sector and of farmers’ networks and practices for seed production and transfer, and promote a more sustainable supply of good-quality inputs than one-off free distributions of inputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer Field Schools (FFS)</td>
<td>A participatory extension approach that promotes and starts from farmer’s knowledge.</td>
<td>Agro-Pastoral Field Schools (APFS)</td>
<td>Pastoralism is a resilient livelihood in drylands, and important to resilience e.g. in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of FFS for Climate Change Adaptation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Climate Change Adaptation is relevant to resilience, and results in new varietal and pest challenges which FFS can help explore.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving &amp; credit FFS such as the Caisses de Résilience</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saving and credit schemes provide a form of insurance against bad years/droughts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
<td>Injects cash in a community affected by some disaster or crisis, while helping rebuild community infrastructure</td>
<td>Cash for Assets</td>
<td>Not just about creating work; greater emphasis on producing durable assets for community resilience. E.g. the irrigation canals need to work and help secure agricultural production, the roads should be durable, etc.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
2.3.2 Review of intermediary results

The overall question in this section is in essence: using a set of tailor-made indicators, how much of an evolution in FAO’s ways of working in resilience can be evidenced during the last biennium? In particular, has the new Strategic Objective already resulted in improved programming as compared to the situation under SO I, or as compared to the situation prior to SO I? Table 7 summarizes the results.

### Table 7. Progress against intermediary results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediary results</th>
<th>Relevance to SOS</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvements in programme design: more in-depth contextual analysis; addressing root causes of crises and not just symptoms; with better exit strategies and stronger prospects for sustainability</td>
<td>Resilience is about addressing the root causes of crises, and doing so sustainably.</td>
<td>Slow progress – the resilience strategies help bridge the gap between CPF and projects – there is a need to retool FAO programming and resource mobilization in resilience; the new batch of CPFs is a programming opportunity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular use of participatory, equity-based and gender sensitive approaches: programme design increasingly based on community consultations; AAP is reflected in guidance, helps shape interventions; targeting of minority groups addressed; gender mainstreaming and disaggregation.</td>
<td>Resilience is about building up people’s strengths and mitigating the risks they are exposed to; and thus it cannot be done without a people-centred approach.</td>
<td>Continuation of previous progress: AAP was promoted in FAO since 2011/2012; It was applied in the response to typhoon Haiyan; there is growing use of Community-based Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment; the Somalia resilience programme has formal participatory processes; targeting and gender remain ad hoc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread of more sustainable forms of community support: e.g. cash-based approaches, Community Animal Health Workers, Farmer Field Schools and Caisses de Résilience, etc.</td>
<td>Cash-based approaches (including CAHWs who sell their services) connect households to the private sector more sustainably than asset distributions.</td>
<td>Slow progress: cash approaches were not promoted aggressively; good practices are spread informally by staff movements from one country to the next; FFS was used extensively by default, due to a lack of other tools; there is a need to invest in more “FAO signature services” in resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better balance between “hardware” and “software”, i.e. between the four SOS outcomes, or within Outcome 4, between technical advice, coordination, capacity building and asset replacement.</td>
<td>FAO’s role in resilience is to provide material assistance and knowledge and policy advice, as befits a UN technical agency.</td>
<td>Significant progress: the SOS outcomes recognize the need for more policy work, which has picked up in Latin America-Caribbean, Cambodia, Mali, Pakistan, IGAD IDRSSI, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More cohesive FAO support, less work in silos: Did SP 5 help bring together technical and operational units, various information systems, and varied resource channels into a more cohesive support to countries?</td>
<td>An explicit goal of the new SF is to break down silos and make FAO support more cohesive.</td>
<td>Clear area of progress: SP 5 weekly conferences are useful, TCE decentralization led to one FAO in country; the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases and sub-regional resilience teams are still slightly detached from Country Offices, but reporting lines were recently clarified; there is however little cooperation with other Strategic Objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened coordination: Is FAO coordinating with governments and other stakeholders on resilience? Is the Global Food Security Cluster (co-chaired by FAO and WFP) delivering useful assistance to global, regional and country level actors?</td>
<td>Resilience support is more developmental than humanitarian aid, and calls for greater collaboration between partners, and national ownership of coordination.</td>
<td>Good progress with governments, which are more involved in FAO resilience programmes and coordination forums than in the past. FAO and WFP have shared the Food Security Cluster lead since before SOS; there is a patchwork of collaborative and competitive cases with WFP, in spite of the RBA agreement.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Evaluation of FAO Strategic Objective 5

### Intermediary results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance to SO5</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **More systematic lessons learning and knowledge management**
  does SP 5 promote systematic M&E and training of FAO staff on lessons learned, good practices, etc. in resilience? |
  Resilience is at least partially new to FAO and SP 5; there is an obvious need for lessons learning and knowledge dissemination. | Slow progress: post-distribution surveys are done the same way as 10 years ago; training on resilience was weak or non-existent; INFORMED has yet to deliver; webinars are picking up; insufficient attention was paid to knowledge management so far. |
| **Improved monitoring and forecasting of risks, vulnerabilities and food security outcomes**, with early warning systems better linked to decision making. |
  Resilience is “risk-informed development”, thus risk information is key; SP 5 tries to strengthen the link between early warning and early action. | Significant progress was made towards institutionalization of IPC in Africa and Asia (which started before SO5); there is a need to improve forecasting and get more real-time data, and a recurrent demand to aggregate the many different early warning platforms, with some progress through the Early Warning Early Action reports. |
| **More action-oriented knowledge products**
  Are knowledge products developed by FAO useful in promoting resilience? Developed based on field experience and global policy processes? |
  Similar to g and h, this is an indicator of connectedness, i.e. “breaking down silos” between knowledge products and field realities. | A few very good knowledge products were produced (e.g. FMD progressive pathways, El Niño publications) but far from enough; some key guidance materials dates to 2000s and it is important to update them for the promotion of “signature services” and to share knowledge with staff and partners. |

### Finding 19: In terms of processes, the cohesiveness of FAO’s support has been improved and collaboration with national and local governments is now the rule in all projects; however, slow progress is reported against indicators relative to programme design and knowledge management.

121 The general picture is evidently mixed. Good progress was made in the following three areas: i) better balance between “software” (policy and technical advice, coordination, capacity building) and “hardware” (material support); ii) contributing to the cohesiveness of FAO support, an area where the leadership, flexibility and ease of access of the SP 5 team is recognized by all; and iii) coordination and collaboration with programme country governments, which is now the rule rather than the exception prior to the reform. However, coordination is weaker with other partners, with significant room for progress with WFP. There are two further areas for which the progress achieved during the last biennium is a continuation of previous efforts: participatory and gender sensitive approaches, extensively used during the response to typhoon Haiyan; and early warning and food security monitoring tools, where much progress has been made towards institutionalizing the IPC in Africa and Asia.

122 Slow progress is reported against indicators relative to programme design and knowledge management. The evolution towards more long-term, development-oriented crisis surveillance and response started before SO5, under the previous SO I or in some cases even earlier. Resilience is what good agricultural emergency responses – but also DRR, early warning or sustainable development – have always been all about.

123 However, not enough efforts have been made to systematically promote best practices. The INFORMED platform has been set up for this purpose but has yet to produce its deliverables. Although there have been a number of conferences, webinars are picking up since 2016, and a few well designed brochures have been published, the general impression is that insufficient attention has been paid to knowledge management so far. Some key guidance materials date back to the 2000s.

124 The staff survey conducted as part of this evaluation confirmed these findings (Figure 8 below). With the exception of “better programme design”, where other evaluation sources (e.g. the project document review) found only slow progress, the data from the staff survey triangulates well with other sources used to collate the information in Table 6.
Such staff surveys tend to be optimistic. Of all the dimensions tested, only two are rated negatively: the time spent by staff on administrative vs. substantive tasks, and the length of staff or consultancy contracts. The survey also highlights other issues mentioned throughout this report which constrain FAO’s engagement in resilience, such as procurement processes, resource mobilization, and access of field staff to technical assistance.

Figure 8. Staff survey 2
3. Assessment of FAO’s strategic positioning

3.1 FAO’s comparative advantages in resilience programming

Finding 20: FAO appears ideally positioned to contribute to the resilience agenda, due to the following external and internal advantages: a growing need for resilience support; a current reassessment of the humanitarian-development divide; FAO’s extensive experience in livelihood support, early warning and disaster risk reduction and mitigation; and the coherence of the resilience agenda with the FAO mandate.

3.1.1 A growing need for resilience support

126 The need for resilience support is rising. Each year millions of people dependent on agriculture, forestry and fisheries are confronted by droughts, floods, plant pests or animal diseases, and/or conflict, with severe effects on livelihoods, while disruptions to food production and distribution undermine the food security of nations.

127 The past two decades have seen an increase in the number of reported large-scale natural disasters, driven mainly by a growth in climate-related events as a result of global warming, and by rising population densities in vulnerable areas. From 2004 to 2013, natural disasters have on average killed 100 000 people per year, affected about 200 million people every year, and led to economic damages estimated at USD 163 billion per year.39 As highlighted in a recent FAO publication,40 the agriculture sectors (including crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry) absorb approximately 22 percent of the economic impact caused by medium- and large-scale natural disasters in developing countries.

128 While large-scale wars have declined over the last 25 years, many countries are still enmeshed in recurring crises, caught in civil war, placed under foreign occupation or facing various situations of political instability. The global economic costs of insecurity generated by conflicts amounts to an estimated USD 400 billion each year.41 The 2010 edition of “The State of Food Insecurity in the World”42 focused on food security in protracted crisis, found that more than 166 million people were undernourished in 22 countries identified as being in protracted crisis, representing nearly 40 percent of the population of these countries and nearly 20 percent of all undernourished people in the world. In 2011, the World Development Report, dedicated to “conflict, security, and development”, estimated that about 300 million people now live amidst violent insecurity around the world.43 It has been estimated that from 75% to 80% of all resources spent in humanitarian assistance concerns countries in protracted crises.

129 A rising number of migrants make the journey to Europe from Syria, Afghanistan or Africa, in a context of ongoing conflicts in several Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries, which increased the total number of forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2015 to 65.3 million, the highest level since World War II.44 The case of Syria highlights the fact that natural disasters and conflicts are sometimes connected: years of protracted drought led to a massive migration of people from rural areas to cities in the run-up to the country’s civil war.45


40 The impact of disasters on agriculture and food security, FAO, 2015.


45 Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought, by Kelleya et al.
Of course, disasters and development are also linked. The recurrence of disasters and crises undermines national efforts to sustainably eradicate hunger and malnutrition. Development processes can also lead to disaster directly by increasing exposure or susceptibility to hazard (e.g. through rapid urban growth, depletion of forest cover, or lowering of the groundwater table). Moreover, disasters frequently result from, or are worsened by failures of development and/or failure of institutions governing development at all levels. For instance, the lack of investment in development in certain areas of a country can strengthen the likelihood of a political crisis. For food chains, lack of investment in regulatory frameworks, risk assessment, early warning and response systems can allow disease outbreaks and food safety threats to spiral out of control.

All climate-related crises also have in essence a long-term dimension. Climate change is expected to result in an escalation in the frequency and intensity of tropical storms, hurricanes and resulting flash flooding, rising sea levels, and disruptions in rainfall and freshwater supply. There is an obvious need, strongly expressed at national level, to strengthen DRM policies, plans and infrastructures, and to invest in Climate-Smart Agriculture through techniques such as drip irrigation, improved watershed management, new varieties with increased resistance to diseases and pests, in collaboration with SP 2.

3.1.2 A rethink of the humanitarian-development divide

This realization that disasters and development are linked lays at the root of the Secretary-General’s report “One Humanity: Shared Responsibility”, prepared for the World Humanitarian Summit. The report states the need to “change people’s lives — from delivering aid to ending need”. Treating humanitarian and development goals as a single global challenge was also the main message of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s report to the World Humanitarian Summit, and is amply reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Resilience is vital to achieve the SDGs and is acknowledged, directly or indirectly, in numerous SDG targets.

Resilience as a concept is also referred to in numerous regional initiatives in Africa. These include the launch in 2013 of the Global Alliance for Resilience in the Sahel and West Africa (AGIR as per its French acronym), which offers a regional policy framework for 17 West African countries to be translated by the participating countries into their National Resilience Plans; and the African Risk Capacity (ARC) established as a Specialized Agency of the African Union in 2012 to help Member States improve their capacities to better plan, prepare and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters.

This reassessment of the humanitarian-development divide in global discourse should in theory benefit FAO, which has pleaded essentially the same case for years, including in SOS. Most recently, the message that investing in development and notably in food security can help build sustainable peace and even ward off looming conflict, was emphasized in the Director-General’s address to the United Nations Security Council on 29 March 2016.

In the position paper presented at the World Humanitarian Summit, FAO presents its unique positioning in terms of resilience work, building on decades of experience working both in the development and humanitarian arenas across a range of food-security and agriculture-related actions. These include risk reduction, prevention and mitigation, early warning and risk analysis and measurement to preparedness and response — both at the policy and normative levels as well as with the community and household levels. FAO also signed the World Humanitarian Summit Commitment to Action on “Transcending humanitarian-development divides, changing people’s lives: from delivering aid to ending need”.

46 Resilience is directly mentioned in 4 SDG targets: 1.5, 2.4, 11.5 and 13.1.
49 http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/newsroom/docs/COMMITMENT.pdf
3.1.3 Longevity of FAO’s experience and country presence

Respondents to the staff survey conducted as part of this evaluation highlighted FAO’s technical expertise and the length of its experience in resilience as key strengths of the Organization. FAO’s extensive experience in food security information systems, early warning, disaster prevention systems such as EMPRES, and livelihood support in the aftermath of a crisis, as well as its long-term relations in this domain with local, national, regional and global authorities, are recognized by many partners as important comparative advantages.

FAO has for instance supported the CILSS since its inception in 1973, forged strong links with IGAD, helped found the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR), and supported the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) from the start. FAO has supported the capacity for vulnerability analysis and measurement of SADC for a long time and was instrumental in setting up the Regional Vulnerability Analysis Centre of SADC and its national versions, the National Vulnerability Analysis Centres. In fact, the longevity of FAO’s collaboration with some national governments and the significant role governmental institutions tend to play in FAO disaster responses has set the Organization apart from most classic humanitarian actors. This is particularly so for food chain crises, which commonly impact the public good nationally and regionally. Although the necessary implication of governments in disaster response has been rightly stressed many times, classic humanitarian agencies and NGOs often remain at a greater distance from national authorities than FAO.

3.1.4 Coherence with FAO’s mandate

SP 5 and its four outcomes, as formulated, sit squarely within the FAO mandate. Policy development, early warning and disaster risk reduction are eminently developmental. Outcome 4, which deals with preparedness and response to crises, is phrased as supportive of national authorities. The response to Typhoon Haiyan and other similar successful emergency responses have proven that it is feasible and useful for FAO to respond to a sudden-onset crisis through an emergency operation. This includes seed distributions, which can have significant impacts as long as good quality seeds are distributed on time to the right people. Thus, FAO is an Organization that primarily supports long-term agricultural development, while also providing temporary emergency assistance within a resilience perspective when disasters and crises occur.

The concept of resilience also challenges development interventions to incorporate risk reduction measures and promote preparedness, recovery, resilient livelihoods and peaceful societies, while at the same time generating growth. This corresponds to the cross cutting nature of resilience, which should in theory apply in all development processes, and calls for greater collaboration between Strategic Objectives.

The philosophy behind the design of SO5 is that FAO addresses development needs in stable, “normal” situations as well as in countries affected by crises. The Strategic Objective includes classic development work that takes years of policy and capacity development such as support to early warning systems (Outcome 2) or disaster risk reduction and preparedness (Outcomes 1 and 3), as well as a response component (Outcome 4) framed in strong development language. While the response to acute crises may require different approaches than regular development work, they are essentially about the same thing: protecting and expanding development gains.

3.1.5 An insufficient operational capacity

Finding 21: In spite of the significant comparative advantages listed above, FAO has yet to make its presence felt in the “resilience space”, due to long-standing operational weaknesses and a lack of flexibility and speed in setting up new systems to address new needs.

In spite of the significant comparative advantages listed above, FAO has yet to make its presence felt in the resilience space. The field programme under SO5 – financed almost

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50 See: Philippines Prepares for First Rice Harvest Since Haiyan, by Simone Orendain for VOA, 11 March 2014
exclusively through voluntary contributions—has not grown significantly since the adoption of SOS. In a few countries where FAO was initially perceived as a key resilience actor, the Organization seems to have lost ground to other partners involved in resilience, such as NGOs, WFP or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

In Somalia for instance, FAO’s Somalia Resilience Sub-programme (2013-2014) was characterized by a shift from the traditional multi-project donor driven response to a more coherent programme approach structured along thematic pillars implemented under a joint FAO-WFP-UNICEF Joint Resilience Strategy. This approach broke new ground in resilience programming and was originally very successful in attracting un-earmarked, multi-year donor funding (with a total budget of USD 102 million). The Joint Resilience Strategy presented a well thought out joint strategy which met donor criteria and in-country needs at the same time. It also made an important contribution by getting three United Nations agencies to think and analyze together, by helping steer the conversation among aid actors in Somalia towards the longer term,51 and by providing to each participating agency a strong programmatic framework.52 Today, the funding situation is less positive: donors want to see evidence of impact, while FAO finds itself competing with three NGO consortia that have emerged around resilience in Somalia. The Evaluation Team became aware of several other examples where FAO could have seized a particular opportunity but did not, or was originally well positioned to receive some resilience funding that ultimately went to another organization instead.

FAO’s ability to seize the opportunity offered by the increased global attention to resilience is constrained by a weak capacity to transform its ideas and plans into concrete results, due to its poor operational capacity, its inability to rapidly set up new systems to address new needs, combined in certain Country Offices with an insufficient programmatic capacity in resilience.

Historically, FAO has approached emergency operations with administrative and operational resources ill-designed for the fast-paced situations it operated in. This poor operational capacity has been lamented in a large number of past evaluations, as early as the 1990s, usually in terms of criticism directed towards FAO’s slow procedures in procurement, personnel and contractual matters. The situation has improved since the 1990s, according to an evaluation report dedicated especially to the subject and dating from 201053, but not enough and not systematically.

The recent Level 3 protocols help to improve the usual bureaucratic impediments of the Organization and are a sign that operational difficulties are being taken seriously. According to the concerned administrative personnel however, FAO does not have the administrative capacity to apply them to more than a handful of countries. There is also a lack of Standard Operating Procedures for Level 1 and Level 2 responses.

Most of the personnel working on SOS in the field are under some form of consultancy contract, often with extremely short contractual periods and numerous successive contracts during the same year. Needless to say, this amounts to an unnecessary administrative burden. It also negatively impacts staff morale and staff retention. Many decision-making processes remain centralized. Procurement, finalizing Letters of Agreement and bank transfers were often highlighted as too lengthy, which negatively affected the timelines and effectiveness of numerous interventions.

3.1.6 Evolving programme design skills

In terms of programmatic capacity (i.e. the capacity to design and implement relevant and potentially useful programmes), FAO’s performance was found mixed, although generally improving. The evaluation undertook a desk review of 64 project documents selected within the portfolio of each country case studies, as a way to assess whether the quality of project documents has evolved since the adoption of SOS.

52 Resilience strategies have been developed by FAO in other contexts, e.g. FAO prepared a “Subregional Strategy and Action Plan for Resilient Livelihoods for Agriculture and Food and Nutrition Security in Areas Affected by the Syria Crisis” in 2014.
The results, presented in Figure 9, show a high degree of inter-country and inter-year variability. The general trend is positive. However there was a decline in project document quality in the sample during the biennium 2014-2015, noticeable in the data from Mali, Pakistan and Uganda. This period corresponds to the introduction of the Reviewed Strategic Framework, although it is possible that the perceived decline be due to other factors, such as 2014-2015 being a period of response to crises in both Mali and Uganda. Response project documents tagged under Outcome 4 tended to be succinct and generally of lesser quality than projects tagged to other outcomes, due to the time criticality of certain types of projects.

Many projects reviewed were conceptually weak, lacking a clear context analysis – especially with respect to conflict – and failing to introduce longer term sustainability strategies such as market development or institutional capacity building. Too many project documents lacked transition thinking for a shift beyond short-term distributions.

Finding 22: FAO lacks an intermediate programmatic tool that could connect the country programming framework and the project document levels, in the form of thematic, sectorial or geographic programmes that would regroup several projects and facilitate flexible funding from multiple sources. A number of country offices have drafted resilience strategies as a way to address this gap.

With SP 5 support, a number of Country Offices have recently taken steps to strengthen the quality of their resilience programming by developing country resilience strategies. This trend started in Somalia after the 2011 famine, when FAO convinced WFP and UNICEF to craft a Joint Resilience Strategy. This represents a good practice, and is now being followed by other FAO country offices (e.g. Guatemala, Lebanon, Niger, Uganda and Sudan). Resilience strategies are potentially useful because they fill a gap in FAO’s programming architecture: the “missing middle” between the CPF and the project level.54

The CPFs helped clarify the mutually agreed areas of work between the government and FAO, and have been useful to attract the attention of donors and facilitate the identification of additional funding.

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of possible areas of collaboration. In the staff survey conducted as part of this evaluation, the CPF was rated as the single most useful FAO mechanism in resilience work. However, the CPF remains by design a rather synthetic document. There appears to be a need for an intermediate programmatic tool in between the CPF and the project document level: thematic programmes that would regroup several projects and facilitate flexible funding from several sources.\(^5\) This is the need that resilience strategies are trying to address. One positive example is the South Sudan Emergency Livelihood Response Programme which was an annual programmatic document, inclusive of both emergency and longer term development activities. Similarly, FAO Lebanon convened a range of specialists and stakeholders to help formulate its “Plan of Action for Resilient Livelihoods 2014-2018”. This document helped to secure stakeholder buy-in, and ensured alignment with existing regional frameworks for addressing the Syria Crisis.

### 3.2 Partnerships

**Finding 23:** Partnerships have been strengthened at the global and regional levels. At the country level, FAO has broadened its collaboration with ministries and departments beyond the ‘traditional’ FAO governmental counterparts, e.g. with Ministries of Environment, and FAO often assumes a coordinating role in its areas of expertise.

152 Resilience is multi-dimensional and cross-sectoral, reflecting the range of livelihood dimensions and coping strategies of households and communities, as well as the concurrent requirements, standards and policies that need to be put in place by local, national and global institutions to ensure the protection and progression of development gains. Agencies working on resilience recognize that their efforts need to be strongly underpinned by collaboration and partnerships with a range of other actors and partners. SOS correctly frames the range of convening and brokering, facilitation, collaboration and partnership work it needs to engage in, to deliver on resilience. Despite this formal recognition, operationalizing partnerships and collaborative efforts is not a seamless enterprise for the organization and some areas of this work may need further attention.

153 National governments are traditionally the primary partners for FAO and SOS correctly places the emphasis of its work on strengthening the capacities of governments and institutions. As described earlier in the report, the CPFs are the main strategic tool to support government priorities and to frame joint activities.

154 The synthesis of past evaluations highlighted that FAO is playing a significant role in coordinating technical work in its areas of expertise, in close partnership with ministry technical departments and other stakeholders (WFP, NGOs, research institutions, other development organizations). Positive examples were identified in a number of countries, especially for food security monitoring, early warning systems, livestock health and policy work. In countries where FAO’s role in coordination was declining because of capacity erosion, this was highlighted as an issue, both by FAO colleagues and by external stakeholders.

155 Progress was also evident in FAO’s engagement in government-led risk reduction work. This focuses on mainstreaming agriculture and food security issues and concerns in national risk reduction platforms, as well as providing support to national institutions in the development of agricultural sector risk reduction plans.

156 FAO’s engagement in Climate Change Adaptation is leading to broader partnerships with Ministries and departments other than the traditional FAO counterparts (agriculture, livestock and fisheries). These include partnerships with the Ministry of Water and Environment in Uganda, the *Agence Nationale de la Météorologie* in Mali, The Ministry

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\(^5\) With the possible exception of one recent document (The Umbrella Programme Approach, Project Cycle and Operations Support Team), where the programme approach is succinctly described as the “umbrella programme … a programmatic set up based on a results matrix (a global programme, a CPF matrix or any other programme), FAO has neither an organization-wide definition of the programme approach, nor corporate management tools that would be able to support it. When FAO Somalia first began transitioning to a programme approach, they could not reflect it in FAO automated financial management tools such as FPMIS. See: FAO/OED: Evaluation of FAO Somalia Resilience Sub-programme (2013-2014).
of Climate Change in Pakistan and the Ministry of Environment in Cambodia. The findings from the current evaluation corroborate the findings from the evaluation of FAO’s role and work on climate change, which reports that “one of FAO’s greatest comparative advantages lies in its expertise-based alignment of the strategies of different ministries and departments involved in climate change adaptation and mitigation and DRR in agriculture”.

While a number of positive examples were found at country level in terms of support and engagement with government-led processes, there were also other examples of Country Offices with limited capacity, where FAO was not able to provide support or engage in resilience and disaster risk reduction platforms and technical coordination. For example, Lebanon has not been able to play an active role in the development of the National DRR policy, as FAO is expected to conduct the agriculture hazard and risk assessment but has not been able to do so due to a lack of technical capacity. The assessment is the first step to developing the DRR plan within the Department of Agriculture, which would feed to the national policy. At the time of the visit, FAO Lebanon was waiting for technical assistance from headquarters.

Beyond the national level, the evaluation found that FAO has very successfully engaged with regional and sub-regional institutions. From interviews and documentation, it was evident that engagement at this level has been growing and is of particular importance for FAO’s resilience work. As described in section A3 of this chapter, FAO has established key and long-standing partnerships with sub-regional bodies in Africa working on resilience measurement, monitoring and related aspects of food security. Beyond the above mentioned partnerships with NEPAD, IGAD, AU-IBAR and CILSS, further evidence was found of fruitful collaboration with SADC, jointly with other United Nations agencies (OCHA, WFP and UNDP) to support work on preparedness.

The current evaluation also identified a number of positive examples from the Latin America and Caribbean region, where FAO has been engaging in political dialogues on disaster risk reduction, agriculture and natural resources management through regional parliamentarian organizations (Parlatino, Parlacen and Mercosur).

In Asia, FAO did not prioritize its work on resilience until recently and, as a consequence, did not actively invest in regional cooperation and partnerships in this field. Lately, there has been a shift in focus, following the Asia Regional Conference in March 2016, with newly proposed regional initiatives on climate change and One Health. As a result, it is very likely that FAO will become much more present and proactive in regional platforms and will seek to forge a number of partnerships around these two areas of work. External partners interviewed in Asia would welcome a greater engagement from FAO in DRR and resilience to climate change.

Under EMPRES, a good example of partnerships is the Commissions for Controlling Desert Locusts at sub-regional level, which are generally viewed as effective and endowed with proven capacity. Many consider them a model for sustainable regional crises prevention systems. Member states provide regular support and financing to the commissions.

Finding 24: Joint programmes and initiatives have been signed with other United Nations organizations, globally and in a large number of countries, but actual collaboration in the field remains uncommon. Agencies frequently implement their component of a joint project separately.

Global level partnerships and collaboration have been key to position and promote FAO’s work on resilience. A number of agreements, joint strategies and collaborative documents and events have been developed since the adoption of SO5. These are all very important to

56 FAO/OED: Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation, October 2015.

57 There are three such commissions for controlling the Desert Locust: one in the “Western Region” (CLCPRO, for West and Northwest Africa), one in the “Central Region” (CRC, for East Africa and the Middle East), and one in South-West Asia (SWAC, for Afghanistan, India, Iran and Pakistan). FAO HQ maintains an oversight role on the Western and Central Commissions and provides the secretariat for the South-West Asia Commission. FAO also collaborates with the Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa (DLCO-EA) and with the International Red locust Control Organization for Central and Southern Africa (IRLCO-CSA).
establish FAO as a significant player and contributor to global resilience thinking and work and ensure that due attention is given to agriculture and food security within the broader context of resilience efforts.

Nevertheless, as has often been documented in development literature, for any number of substantive and operational cooperation there are also counter-examples of de facto competition amongst agencies.58 The evaluation found cases where positive and substantive efforts were in place to operationalize coordinated activities and collaboration, as well as cases of reported competition and encroachment around funding opportunities, mandates, leadership and technical capacities. These cases generally happen in contexts where FAO has been unable to occupy, manage and lead the spaces of its organizational mandate, usually as a result of not having sufficient operational, financial and technical capacities at national and subnational level.

The Rome-based agencies (WFP, IFAD and FAO) have developed a conceptual framework for collaboration and partnership on resilience for food security and nutrition (April 2015)59. The framework sets out a comprehensive basis for collaboration both at the country level and for the development of joint policy, analysis and monitoring tools and documents. It sets out a number of principles, amongst which national ownership and collaboration with other organizations and development actors which are useful to further consolidate collaborative approaches to resilience-building interventions. The framework does not, however, analyze the potential disincentives for collaboration and set out mitigating measures; likewise, it presents some examples of country level collaboration but does not provide lessons or guidance on how to operationalize collaboration more systematically at national level. Recent FAO country programme evaluations have covered joint resilience strategies or programmes in Niger, Guatemala and Somalia (some of which also include UNICEF). The findings from each of the three evaluations assess positively the strategies in terms of objectives and context analysis; however, they also highlight difficulties in carrying out joint or complementary programming and implementation on the ground. United Nations agencies frequently implement their component of a joint project separately, each targeting different sets of beneficiaries. In other countries covered by the evaluation, there was little awareness of the Rome-based agencies’ resilience conceptual framework or of how it should be utilized.

There is strong collaboration between FAO, WFP and other United Nations agencies around resilience measurement, assessments and monitoring (at least globally and in Africa, less so in the other regions), as well as constructive joint work on frameworks and tools such as the IPC, Crop and Food Security Assessment Missions (CFSAM), the Food Security Information Network, the Cadre Harmonisé and the RIMA. However, the agencies still rely on their individual analytical tools when it comes to gathering data to inform the programming and design of interventions at the local level. To some extent this is probably unavoidable.

FAO’s partnerships on One Health do appear relevant to SO5 and continue to expand at agency and national level. Building on the existing (2010) collaborative agreement with the OIE and the WHO, partnerships now include the United Nations Environment Programme and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The evaluation found evidence of FAO promoting a One Health approach at national level in Cambodia, Lebanon and Egypt. The One Health approach is most developed in the project work of the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases, the Emerging Pandemic Threats Programme and the growing body of work on anti-microbial resistance.

A number of other partnerships or collaborations were identified during the evaluation: the work on Safe Access to Fuel and Energy with UNHCR; the collaboration with UNISDR on the preparation of a number of tools, documents and platforms, such as the United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience60, the SDGs, the Sendai indicators and the Regional Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction; and analyses with UNICEF, OCHA and the Peacebuilding Fund on the role of agriculture and food security in peace-building.

60 United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience, Chief Executives Board for Coordination, May 2013.
Partnerships with international and national NGOs are improving under SP 5. One of the main factors that has brought about this improvement is the engagement through the jointly led WFP-FAO Global Food Security Cluster (approved in 2010 and operational since 2011) and related country-level clusters and other coordination mechanisms. The FAO-WFP joint evaluation of Food Security Cluster coordination (2009-2014) found that the cluster mechanisms had made positive contributions by building trust amongst partners, facilitating networks and reducing duplication. Reporting and dissemination of standards had also improved. The cluster is also a good platform for engaging partners in FAO’s watch to safeguard (e.g. IPC, GIEWS, CFSAM) to produce evidence-based response plans.

One of the emerging findings from country programme evaluations where clusters are present is that the two lead agencies tend to dominate the coordination space and, as many of the stakeholders are also implementing partners, tend to use the cluster space as a programme management tool more than supporting a truly common agenda.

Other key partnerships at the global level and established under SP 5 include joint work with IFRC around early warning/early action and forecast-based financing, as well as around specific resilience tools such as the *caisses de résilience*. With World Vision International, FAO is stepping up its work at country level on Climate Smart Agriculture and nutrition sensitive resilience programming. Finally, stand-by Partnership Agreements with organizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, RedR Australia and the Danish Refugee Council are key, insofar as they provide human resources capacity in critical and under-staffed areas of work, such as resilience advisors, gender or cluster coordination. NRC in particular has expressed a strong interest in resilience, and is supporting Resilience Experts in Senegal, Philippines, Kenya and Samoa, recognizing FAO as one of the lead UN agencies in this field.

A problematic area of partnerships remains the relationship with NGOs who act as implementing partners in FAO projects. The issues have been well documented in other evaluations and will only briefly be described here: FAO uses Letters of Agreement as a legal tool to contract international and national NGOs, tasking them to deliver on FAO projects. LoAs are usually too short in length and/or too small in size to enable NGOs to implement good quality projects on behalf of FAO. Despite significant efforts in the last biennium to provide trainings and establish feedback and learning mechanisms between FAO and implementing partners, the relationship remains largely contractual in nature. While some of this is necessary, it would be useful for FAO to invest in longer term and more equal relationships with some of the better quality organizations (especially the national ones), in order to build up their capacities in technical areas of FAO’s work. Fortunately, a tool was recently developed for this purpose: the Operational Partners Implementation Modality (OPIM). OPIM is meant to support partners implement their own programmes rather than obliging them to become service deliverers for FAO’s programmes. The use of this tool is spreading rapidly. There are currently 35 OPIM agreements signed for a total value of USD 88,423,371.62. This is in keeping with World Humanitarian Summit commitments to increase the funding for national NGOs, and to empower local actors to build their capacities (World Humanitarian Summit Charter4Change).

### 3.3 Advocacy and United Nations values

Advocacy has frequently been highlighted as an area of weakness for FAO. Most recently, the Office of the Inspector General country programming and operation reviews found that the area of advocacy and communications showed a marked downturn compared to the previous audit cycle, noting in particular the limited visibility and sporadic presence of FAO in key country-level fora. This section first explores how FAO’s leadership capacity and how Country Offices have been able to promote the role and visibility of FAO in resilience. Next, it addresses the promotion of two key United Nations values in resilience work: gender and accountability to affected populations.

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61 Director-General’s Bulletin 2015/35: Operational Partners Implementation Modality (OPIM), November 2015.
62 As of 9 September 2016. See FAO Manual Section 701 for details.
3.3.1 Leadership capacity

FAO’s leadership capacity on resilience has seen a significant improvement at the global level, as evidenced by the work undertaken at the Geneva level on spearheading system-wide Inter-Agency Standing Committee/UNDG principles on advancing resilience. FAO has provided strong inputs on the global resilience agenda, including the Sendai Framework 2015-2030, the COP21 and the World Humanitarian Summit. Progress has been made on defining the difficulties of bridging the humanitarian/development divide through resilience, including a paper developed by FAO and the World Bank for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee principals (“Making the nexus work”); in developing the Inter-Agency Standing Committee/UNDG principles on advancing resilience, undertaken by FAO, UNDP and OCHA, and in launching the Global Preparedness Partnership with the World Bank, WFP, UNDP and OCHA. Coordination among partners has also improved through mechanisms such as the Food Security Cluster and the IPC.

**Finding 25:** FAO’s capacity to perform as an opinion leader in the field of resilience is improving, notably at the global level and in regions endowed with a Regional Initiative on resilience. At national level, the degree of engagement in Strategic Programme 5 still depends much on the profile, skill-set and preferences of individual FAO Representatives rather than on the relevance of Strategic Programme 5 to the country context and government priorities.

Various evidence sources for this evaluation outlined a positive and exponential trend in terms of FAO becoming a major player and innovator in the resilience debates as well as leading current thinking and analysis of data and trends within the Organizational mandate. Contributing to this positive trend, the Organization’s senior management teams and SP 5 team worked to raise the profile of FAO’s technical work and expertise, framed by stronger communication and advocacy. Specific examples that illustrate this improved positioning include the FAO Director General’s address to the Security Council on Food Security, Nutrition and Peace (29 March 2016); the recent flagship publication on the impact of disasters on agriculture and food security (November 2015), and the El Niño-La Niña high-level events hosted in 2016, amongst others.

This improving global leadership capacity is only partially reflected at the regional, sub-regional and country levels. The regional and sub-regional levels recognize the need for the Organization to enhance its leadership role in resilience, but some of them have been constrained by lack of capacity and later starts. The regions that have an SP5-related Regional Initiative are inevitably faring better in terms of leadership on resilience.

FAO is playing a significant role in a number of regional and sub-regional fora in Africa (as analyzed in other sections of this report), and is a well-respected partner by the majority of other actors. The establishment of the resilience hubs are supporting corporate efforts towards increased visibility and presence. Despite this, the lack of predictability and continuity in work-flows and staffing was identified as a major constraining factor by some of the resilience teams in the region.

The Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean is also contributing to increase the visibility and credibility of the Organization, through active engagement with governments and inter-regional bodies on climate change related risk reduction and natural resource management. Significant examples of this are the work being carried out on the Corredor Seco of Central America, and in the Caribbean with the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency.

In the Near East, FAO has good strategic leadership in some areas of SO5 (mainly in food chain crises, locusts and animal health-related work), but needs to strengthen its role in climate-related risk reduction and also on the response strategies to the Syria crisis and other conflict contexts. This would require better guidance from the regional office to the country offices than has been availed so far.

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64 FAO is among one of the nine UN agencies involved in shaping policy on discussions on resilience within the Inter-agency Standing Committee, which is the equivalent of the UNDG for all humanitarian issues.
In Asia and the Pacific, FAO is starting to invest time and effort to strengthen its leadership role in terms of climate-related risk reduction. The Organization is broadly recognized by external partners as well-positioned to lead on important regional issues, such as agricultural-based livelihoods and social cohesion in areas with displacement. Nevertheless, missed opportunities were evident in the limited knowledge and utilization of FAO’s early warning and risk assessment products in the region, and the limited presence of FAO in regional policy dialogue. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Council recently signed the Declaration on Institutionalizing the Resilience of ASEAN and its Communities and Peoples to Disasters and Climate Change in 2015. It is also set to sign the One ASEA: One Response declaration in 2016. There was limited presence and influence of FAO in the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), a major policy lobby opportunity for resilience work in the ASEAN region. AADMER recently launched its new Work Programme for 2016-2020, but FAO has not been active in the AADMER Partnership Group or in any of the bodies developing the work programme.

In Europe and Central Asia, lack of capacity has compounded FAO’s ability to lead on a number of areas, e.g. on the Syria crisis response which has a strong focus on resilience. For the rest of the region, FAO has some leadership capacity on locust control in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and on animal health-related activities. The Organization has less capacity on climate-related risk reduction and food security early warning, the latter being a lower concern in the region.

At country level, the evaluation found mixed evidence of leadership on resilience, with some excellent examples as well as others where it failed to act as lead partner, advisor and coordinator under areas of its resilience mandate. Countries and sub-regional offices trying to step up their role in this area generally reported receiving excellent support from the SP 5 team. In this respect, the evaluation notes that there is still too much dependence on the profile, skill-set and programmatic preferences of individual FAO Representatives and/or senior managers at country level. If SO5 is a Strategic Objective of the Organization, its prioritization should be determined based on the relevance to the country context and government priorities, rather than the influence and interests of individual staff.

3.3.2 Gender mainstreaming

Finding 26: FAO is committed to integrating gender in resilience, as well as to protection from sexual abuse and exploitation and Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP). Guidance on these issues has been produced and disseminated, and programme design has afforded greater consideration to gender integration and AAP.

FAO produced the Gender in Emergencies Survey in 2011, the FAO Gender Policy in 2013 and in 2015 a Stocktaking Good Practices in building resilience through addressing gender inequalities. More good practices have been reported under Outcomes 3 and 4, around local risk and vulnerability reduction activities and emergency preparedness and response. This is not matched in Outcomes 1 and 2, despite the need to address gender concerns in these areas. Both the Gender in DRR brief and the Gender Stocktaking provide different entry points to gender sensitive programming.

Gender integration in programme design, policies and female-targeted interventions have gradually improved (from the baseline observation), but these remain patchy across the evaluated FAO programmes.

Some positive examples were found in the Regional Initiative on Small Scale Agriculture (RNE) which has a strong focus on women and gender relations in family farms. At project design and strategy level, positive examples include Uganda, where deeper and context-specific gender analysis translated into clearer outcomes, and in South Sudan where the Resilience Strategy articulated a programmatic approach on gender. FAO published a detailed analysis of “Women in Agriculture in Pakistan” in 2015 and has effectively utilized female social mobilization officers and women’s FFS.

The Turkish Government has recently solicited FAO’s support in relation to the migrant crisis. As a result support missions have been deployed.
On the other hand, the synthesis of past evaluations evidenced a lack of progress in inclusion of gender analysis, gender-sensitive programming and implementation in the majority of evaluations reviewed. Country visits evidenced a mixed situation: apart from the positive example in Uganda, the Lebanon programme had little reference to gender while the Cambodia CPF made good use of a recent World Bank study on gender and agriculture.

At the global level, FAO has been working on gender-based violence guidance (based on Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines), but little evidence was found in the countries visited that these have been systematically operationalized and mainstreamed. There is some evidence of positive applications of gender-based violence principles in the work on access to fuel wood and cooking stoves in South Sudan.

### 3.3.3 Accountability to affected populations

FAO committed to Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) in 2011 and subsequently released its corporate policy for AAP. While AAP was developed primarily within the context of response to disasters and conflict, FAO went further to commit to AAP in both humanitarian and development programs, and integrated it throughout the programme cycle. FAO expanded the commitments to include Protection from Sexual Abuse and Exploitation and collaboration with partners in the delivery of the commitments. An AAP support team in headquarters works with AAP Focal Points in-country by providing guidance documents and cross-referring good practices which may be replicated or improved. The commitment and operationalization of AAP complements FAO’s commitments on durable solutions, gender and vulnerable groups, participation and Do No Harm, among others.

By 2013, FAO had produced several models/case studies for AAP in response projects (Cambodia for flood response and FAO Pakistan for Cluster Coordination), mostly focusing on community consultations and feedback mechanisms.

Most strikingly, AAP was completely mainstreamed in the Haiyan emergency programme, with FAO initially investing in AAP for the first phase of the Level 3 emergency and later committing to mainstreaming AAP across the programme. The commitment from management and equal investment in human resources and processes were instrumental in the Haiyan experience.

### 3.3.4 United Nations values and humanitarian principles

While resilience programmes and strategies under SP 5 tend to address United Nations values, such as gender equality, accountability and good risk governance, the following issue arises occasionally in contexts of violent conflict: Should FAO align itself with a government that is part of said conflict, or should humanitarian principles such as neutrality and impartiality supersede FAO’s traditional partnership and proximity to the government? This issue arose in South-Sudan, where the question of the appropriate level of cooperation with the government was raised by a recent evaluation. The general principle may be that FAO needs to disengage from the political echelons in situations of civil war, although not necessarily from the technical cadre.

In order to apply the “do no harm” principle to which FAO is committed, as well as minimize political risks, a capacity for political economy analysis is necessary; this capacity would help to chart the implications of specific conflicts on agriculture, natural resource and rural livelihoods, and to support FAO’s positioning in countries affected by civil strife.

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66 Organization committed to promoting and operationalizing accountability to affected populations within the organization, among partners and clusters in the following: 1) leadership, 2) transparency, 3) feedback and complaints, 4) participation, and 5) design, monitoring and evaluation.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

192 This chapter combines the most salient findings of the evaluation into overarching conclusions, leading to a number of recommendations and possible adjustments to the concept of resilience, the theory of change, the delivery mechanisms, the programming arrangements used by FAO to plan and implement SO5, as well as the management of knowledge as an integral part of the reform.

193 Such a rapid assessment of FAO’s global performance under a strategic objective adopted merely three years ago was always going to be imperfect and incomplete. Its value may be less in its precision as a reporting instrument than in its formative nature, and in its ability to provide rapid feedback to allow for the required course correction early enough to make a significant difference.

194 Some of the conclusions and recommendations below pertain to issues that are in essence broader than SP 5, and should be addressed at the corporate level rather than at the level of SP 5. The Evaluation Team wishes to point them out because it believes that they are particularly important in the specific case of SP 5.

4.1 Conclusions

**Conclusion 1.** The renewed interest in resilience represents a historic opportunity for FAO, which is well positioned to contribute to the resilience agenda. Nevertheless, FAO has yet to make its presence fully felt and recognised in the “resilience space” especially at country level.

195 FAO is well positioned to contribute to the resilience agenda within its mandated areas of agricultural production, rural development and natural resource management, and to meet the growing demand from member countries to support the resilience of agricultural livelihoods to shocks and crisis. The current reassessment of the humanitarian-development divide fits well with FAO’s mandate and its long engagement in both development and emergency contexts to support agricultural livelihoods. Specifically, the Organization’s experience in early warning and information systems, disaster risk management, locust control, transboundary animal diseases, and the length of its relationship with national and regional authorities put FAO in a good position to take advantage of the increasing support provided by key resource partners in resilience.

196 SO5 and its four Outcomes, as formulated, sit squarely within FAO’s mandate. Policy development, early warning and disaster risk reduction are eminently development-oriented. Outcome 4 that deals with preparedness and response to crises, is phrased as supportive of national authorities, and the response to Typhoon Haiyan and other similar successful emergency responses have proven the relevance and effectiveness of FAO’s emergency operations in response to sudden-onset crises. The concept of resilience also challenges development interventions to incorporate risk reduction measures and promote preparedness, recovery, resilient livelihoods and peaceful societies, while at the same time generating growth. This corresponds to the cross-cutting nature of resilience, which should in theory apply to all development processes, and calls for greater collaboration between Strategic Programmes.

197 FAO has yet to make its presence fully felt in the “resilience space”. Seizing the opportunity presented by the current interest in resilience requires continued and strengthened operational and technical capacity together with increased investment in resilience programming.

198 FAO has a comparative advantage in terms of livelihoods analysis and relevant technical capacity. However, its technical capacity would need to be expanded to respond to the increasing demand from member countries. FAO retains strong capacities in livestock health, Farmer Field Schools, locust control, water management, and to some degree in climate change adaptation. Based on feedback from country offices, capacities appear less
robust in disaster risk reduction and management, insurance and cash-based approaches, and almost nil in conflict and political analysis. Efforts are being made to fill vacant positions and hire new staff in key technical units, but this may not be enough. More investment in FAO’s resilience programming and resource mobilization capacity appears necessary.

199 Operational capacity remains a limiting factor, including for resource mobilization, as noted in a number of past evaluations. The situation has improved, but not fast and systematically enough. While many decision-making processes remain centralized and lengthier than they should be, the ‘Level 3’ protocols and the introduction of new partnership tools such as OPIM are a sign that operational difficulties are being taken seriously and progressively addressed.

200 SO5 is funded overwhelmingly by voluntary contributions because FAO’s involvement in this area grew out of the opportunity it was given over the years to expand its portfolio in emergency and rehabilitation using humanitarian resource channels that are relatively easier to access than development funding. The Organization has never invested much of its core, regular resources in this area. This funding model continued to some extent with Strategic Programme 5 as well, in that the Strategic Programme has benefited from very limited Regular Programme resources. As a result, the implementation of the SO5 vision and philosophy, as described in the FAO Strategic Framework, relies largely on external, short-term funding over which FAO has little control.

201 The lack of predictable resources in Strategic Programme 5 deprives FAO from the ability to invest over the long term in promising resilience services and in its own personnel. Most of the personnel working on Strategic Programme 5 (national and international) are hired under consultancy contracts with extremely short contractual periods. This creates an unnecessary administrative burden, affects staff morale, efficiency and retention, and disrupts the durability of FAO’s support in resilience.

202 By pooling together the resource of agreeable donors into trust funds such as the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA), the Strategic Programme 5 team has been able to partially “cushion” the unpredictability of project funding and invest in key strategic capacities and processes. Other United Nations agencies relying on voluntary contributions have created similar financial mechanisms to provide predictability and continuity to their donor-funded activities, partnerships, and staff.

203 Likewise, many agencies, FAO included, have found it possible and useful to build a development-oriented pipeline with a combination of successive short-term projects implemented with the same local partners in the same domain or geographic area. In Strategic Programme 5, the need to pursue long-term goals through short-term funding has led some FAO country offices to draft ‘resilience strategies’ or use other forms of programmatic documents (e.g. umbrella programmes) to document the programme resulting from the combination of several projects, and discuss it with partners. FAO lacks a formal programme level connecting the projects and the country programming frameworks, hence the recourse to country resilience strategies.

204 In spite of sporadic initiatives, programmatic collaboration remains weaker with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) than with governments. The relationship with the World Food Programme (WFP) is characterized by good collaboration on the food security cluster, but limited cooperation in the field.

**Conclusion 2:** There is a gradual evolution in the reviewed portfolio towards more genuine resilience programming, with closer coordination and collaboration with programme country governments and regional institutions, and away from unsustainable and disjointed interventions.

205 The review of past and recent evaluation reports highlights an uneven FAO track record in responding to crises in a development-oriented manner. In this context, Strategic Programme 5 is rightly seen by FAO Management as an effort to strengthen the development orientation of FAO’s work in preparation and response to crises.
206 Delimitating the domain of relevance of Strategic Programme 5 respective to that of other Strategic Programmes is relatively straightforward: Strategic Programme 5 should take the lead in countries affected by severe crises, while other Strategic Programmes should be more prominent in institutionally stable contexts with manageable levels of hazards and risks. Evidently, Strategic Programme 5 may also provide valuable inputs in the latter type of countries (e.g. on disaster risk reduction and mitigation policies).

207 The domain of relevance of emergency response versus that of resilience programming stricto senso should be based on the duration of the crisis concerned and the response required. Crisis-oriented interventions extending over more than two years should be designed and implemented with due considerations paid to the sustainability of achieved results. When a long-term intervention is required, community-based and market-oriented approaches are more suitable than free input distributions.

208 There is a gradual evolution in the reviewed portfolio towards more genuine resilience programming. Resilience programming, as defined in this report, responds to crises by starting from people's strengths; it requires a solid analysis of the context in all its dimensions, and especially a good understanding of people's livelihoods, taking into account the specific needs and priorities of men and women from different socio-economic and age groups; it provides support over the medium- or long-term; and it calls for attention to capacity development, sustainability and collaboration with governments and other partners.

209 In the portfolio analysis, the evolution towards closer coordination and collaboration with programme country governments and regional institutions is clear. The resilience portfolio includes more policy work, technical advice, investment support and capacity building than in the past, with some excellent work done at regional level in Africa with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and at national level in Asia and the Middle East for the control and prevention of highly pathogenic avian influenza.

210 The major individual components of the FAO information and early warning systems (IEWS) are well established and have made significant progress on achieving results and adoption at country level. Much progress has been made towards institutionalizing the IPC in Africa and Asia. The Early Warning / Early Action system was developed by Strategic Programme 5 to consolidate available forecasting information and has started providing comprehensive risk analyses.

211 The promotion of participatory and gender responsive approaches, put to excellent use during the response to Typhoon Haiyan, may require further support; a synthesis of past evaluations showed a lack of progress in the majority of evaluations reviewed.

212 Some of the country offices visited as part of this evaluation’s field work were successful in raising resources for resilience-oriented activities by building a strongly contextualized, tailored intervention strategy before approaching donors, rather than vice versa, and by doing so in tight collaboration with the government rather than in isolation.

213 In other cases, FAO has struggled to develop a technically sound programmatic offer in resilience, with response projects still implemented over short time frames without prospects for cumulative progress. While this may be adequate for one-off responses to sudden onset disasters, it has proven problematic when implemented recurrently, as is often the case in protracted crises.

**Conclusion 3.** The Strategic Programme 5 team has provided dynamic, flexible and supportive leadership and helped to “break down silos” in a useful and credible manner. However, there are still significant opportunities to merge or coordinate similar work implemented by different FAO units under Strategic Programme 5.
214 The positive contribution of the Strategic Programme 5 team is recognised within FAO as well as by external partners and stakeholders. The new tools and ways of working described in this report (some of which have been piloted by Strategic Programme 5 and later expanded to other Strategic Programmes) are credited with changing the conversation between headquarters and country offices towards a more demand-oriented one, and with strengthening the systemic link between the FAO technical units in resilience.

215 The Strategic Programme 5 Leader is also the Director of the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division, a specificity which allows him to mobilize significant human and financial resources behind Strategic Programme 5’s implementation and country support.

216 However, there are still significant opportunities to merge or coordinate similar work implemented by different FAO units under Strategic Programme 5. Many technical units engage in resilience-related policies in a scattered manner. The different tools and systems developed by FAO for early warning and food security information are still managed in a disperse manner without much integration and synergies between them. Similarly, FAO lacks an integrated One Health Strategic Action Plan that would consider all three EMPRES pillars.

217 There is also potential for more collaboration between Strategic Programmes. Collaboration with Strategic Programme 2 has increased on climate change (e.g. on El Niño), with Strategic Programme 3 on social protection and with Strategic Programme 4 on food safety. Some Regional Initiatives address issues involving several Strategic Programmes, and have generated collaboration among them. This is even truer at country level, where the Strategic Programme concerns are seamlessly brought together under the country programming frameworks, whenever there is scope for covering cross-cutting or complementary areas of work.

Conclusion 4: The Regional Offices have employed a variety of approaches to implement the Regional Initiatives. At country level, the Country Programming Framework is filling a real need, as it helps to articulate FAO’s programmatic offer in a concise and coherent manner.

218 A range of approaches has been used to delineate and implement the new Strategic Framework at the regional level. Arguably, the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean has implemented the Regional Initiative concept in the most promising way: as large flagship programmes and vehicles for knowledge sharing and awareness raising, funded from external resources and implemented in collaboration with regional and national partners. This framing of the Regional Initiatives as regional flagship programmes requires a strong political commitment at the regional level. In the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, the Regional Initiatives were initially framed around narrow technical issues and are currently being revised to become regional flagship programmes around similar lines as the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean model. In Africa and the Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa, the Regional Initiatives are only funded by FAO resources and therefore rather small, and used to fund catalytic country-level initiatives.

219 Flexible support has been provided to country offices by the Strategic Programme 5 team and the resilience teams in regional offices, including with the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities. The system of “closer observation and support countries” is delivering increased and reasonably cohesive support from regional offices and headquarters to the few countries concerned. The system of “focus countries” has been less useful so far, primarily because too many focus countries have been selected.

220 The country programming frameworks (CPFs) are filling a real need at country level. They helped clarify the mutually agreed areas of work between government and FAO, attract the attention of donors, and identify possible areas of collaboration. In the staff survey, the CPF was rated as the single most useful FAO mechanism. In contrast, the new project cycle was poorly rated, due to its excessive complexity.
Conclusion 5: Resilience programming is not fundamentally new to FAO. The evolution towards development-oriented crisis surveillance, preparedness and response started before SO5. A number of so-called “signature resilience services”, anchored in decade-long FAO experience, were identified as having potential for upscaling.

221 Resilience programmes are not new to FAO. The evolution towards long-term, development-oriented crisis surveillance and response (highlighted in conclusion 2) started before SO5, under the previous Strategic Objective I and in some cases even earlier. Resilience is what good agricultural emergency responses – but also disaster risk reduction and management, early warning and sustainable development – have always been about.

222 A number of good practices were identified as having potential for upscaling in resilience programming, including: EMPRES, early warning, livelihoods-based information systems, community-based disaster risk reduction and management and climate change adaptation, community animal health workers, Farmer Field Schools, input trade fairs, networks of input shops and warrantage. These services and approaches are all anchored in significant FAO experience, adapted to both development and resilience, and they all require an investment over the long term while being easily scalable and de-scalable temporarily.

223 FAO could further promote and ‘brand’ some of these services as typical of FAO’s resilience programmes by treating them as “signature resilience services”. So far, many of these services, such as the community animal health workers or Farmer Field Schools, have not been aggressively promoted by FAO. The counterexample of the IPC, steadfastly promoted by FAO since its inception and institutionalized in a growing number of countries and regions, shows that FAO can bring good local experiences up to scale by constantly improving and promoting its good practices.

Conclusion 6: Insufficient attention has been paid to knowledge management so far. A reform of the type undertaken by FAO needs a strong knowledge sharing effort and infrastructure. This is especially important for SOS, which encapsulates a programmatic shift towards resilience.

224 A reform of the type undertaken by FAO requires a set of changes in objectives, organigrams, procedures and funding flows, as well as a change in mindset, a new conceptual framework, almost a new value system, demonstrated in new ways of working. This is especially true of SOS, which encapsulates a programmatic shift towards resilience. Such a transition can certainly be assisted by a strong knowledge sharing effort, and may even falter without it. However, there has been no systematic staff training in resilience programming, and only modest efforts towards the development of knowledge sharing networks.

4.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: While no major changes are required to the Strategic Framework, FAO should make a few adjustments to the Strategic Programme 5 result framework, clarify the concept of the Regional Initiatives, and promote greater integration of products and services across FAO units involved in Strategic Programme 5.

225 The corporate definition of resilience should be edited to include: i) a reference to ‘households, communities and nations’ to be more explicit on whose resilience; ii) the ability of a society to transform as a result of a disaster or crisis; and iii) the principle that resilience starts from people’s strengths, assets and strategies.

226 The SOS output and outcome structure could be simplified by combining Output 1.1 (Improved capacities to formulate and promote risk reduction and crisis management policies, strategies and plans) with Output 4.1 (Improved capacities of national authorities
and stakeholders for emergency preparedness to reduce the impact of crisis), as the two seem highly connected but seen from different viewpoints.

227 More generally, there is potential for further integration of FAO services related to resilience, by promoting greater collaboration and coherence among concerned FAO units involved in policy advice (Outcome 1) and early warning (Outcome 2).

228 Output 3.2 (Improved access of most vulnerable groups to services which reduce the impact of disasters and crisis) deserves greater attention from the Strategic Programme 5 team, with promising resilience-building pathways through basic services in agriculture (extension and veterinary services) and agricultural insurance schemes.

229 There is potential for enhanced collaboration between Strategic Programmes, and for clarifying interfaces. Strategic Programme 5 shares significant common concerns with Strategic Programme 2 on climate change adaptation, and with Strategic Programme 3 on social protection and migration. There is also potential for more work with Strategic Programme 4 on value chains, given that food chain crises significantly affect value chains. Overlaps are not necessarily a problem as long as they are used to foster effective collaboration.

230 The concept of the Regional Initiatives under SO5 should be clarified and their purpose reframed to that of regional flagship programmes co-funded from external resources, and implemented in collaboration with regional and national partners. Regional Initiatives can also serve as useful vehicles for knowledge sharing and awareness raising (within and beyond FAO).

231 This framing of the Regional Initiatives as regional flagship programmes requires a strong political commitment behind them at regional level. From this standpoint, Regional Initiative 3 on African Drylands should be more formally anchored in the Malabo Declaration. The establishment of expanded Regional Initiatives on One Health and Resilience to Climate Change in the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific should be supported.

232 When introducing new systems for planning and reporting, FAO should try to keep the related transaction costs as low as possible, as such costs reduce FAO’s capacity to attain its members’ goals. This consideration applies to the new project cycle and to the two distinct channels for country reporting (annual FAO Representative reports and reporting against the outcomes and outputs of the Strategic Framework in corporate databases), which should be merged into one system so that country offices are not required to report twice.

Recommendation 2: Resilience presents FAO with a momentous opportunity to redesign its programmes in crisis monitoring, response and prevention, with strong political and financial support from member countries. To seize this opportunity, FAO needs to further promote an integrated financial model combining assessed and voluntary contributions, and invest more predictable resources in a limited number of areas that are key to establishing FAO's presence in resilience, including staff. The return on investment in this area of work is likely to be significant.

233 The lack of predictable resources in Strategic Programme 5 affects FAO’s capacity to position itself strategically in resilience. The Organization has committed politically to this area of work by adopting SO5 as one of its Strategic Objectives, and by advocating in global, regional and national fora for resilience development. To fulfill these commitments, FAO needs to invest more predictable resources in a few Strategic Programme 5 areas that are key to establishing FAO’s presence in resilience: i) programming capacity, ii) high quality “signature services”, iii) knowledge systems, iv) resource mobilization, and v) regional and national teams. A scan of current and future funding trends in the area of resilience indicates that if FAO invests in resilience funding (in addition to, and beyond the humanitarian funding stream), this is likely to generate a significant return that will enable the Organization to further strengthen its work.
234 In particular, FAO and Strategic Programme 5 should find ways to offer better recognition and greater predictability in contractual arrangements to its technical and operational staff in the resilience area, in order to establish sustained FAO presence and capacity in this area. Short-term personnel may be adequate for short-term emergency responses, but not for long-term resilience building.

235 The creation of new regular posts appears unlikely in the face of overall resource constraints. However, FAO could expand on its use of trust funds to partially mitigate the unpredictability of project funding, allow longer-term contracts for its core resilience personnel, and invest in strategic tools and processes. In keeping with the ‘One Budget’ policy of the Organization, the current review of project support costs represents an opportunity to further promote an integrated financial model combining assessed and voluntary contributions into a coherent whole, in adherence with the principles agreed upon by the Finance Committee in documents FC 157/10 and FC 161/6.69

Recommendation 3: To strengthen resilience programme development and resource mobilization, FAO should strengthen and diversify its offer of high-quality resilience-enhancing services and better tailor its programmes to the type and duration of crises it tries to respond to.

236 A retooling of FAO’s resilience programming and resource mobilization capacity appears necessary. FAO should define a workable strategy to approach donors interested in resilience. This strategy should include the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities, which FAO has used strategically to establish its presence and assess needs at the start of a response.

237 Resilience strategies at national level provide a simple and tested way to acquire a body of knowledge about livelihoods, strengths and vulnerabilities, and programmatic entry points for resilience in-country. Country offices with significant opportunities in resilience programming may consider developing a resilience strategy as part of their country programming frameworks or separately, to guide their involvement in this area.

238 The prioritization of FAO Strategic Objectives in-country should be determined not by the interest of individual managers, but by the relevance of resilience programming to the country context and government priorities. Strategic Programme 5 should have a leading role in countries affected by severe crises, while other Strategic Programmes should be more prominent in institutionally stable contexts with manageable levels of hazards and risks. Strategic Programme 5 may still provide valued inputs in the latter type of countries (e.g. on disaster risk reduction policies).

239 Any crisis-oriented intervention of FAO that extends over more than two years should be designed and implemented with due considerations paid to the sustainability of achieved results. Generally, when a long-term intervention is required, community-based and market-oriented approaches are more suitable than free input distributions.

240 In order to upscale good practices, FAO should focus on a few good practices, keep improving and enhancing them, “champion” them systematically and couple them with solid capacity building in country. This could take the shape of a semi-standard menu of “signature services” – e.g. disaster risk reduction and management; climate change adaptation and mitigation policies; early warning and IPC; EMPRES-type surveillance and protection programmes; community animal health workers; Farmer Field Schools and their various versions including the caisses de résilience; different forms of input support (input distributions, input fairs, input shops, warrantage); cash-for-assets; and small-scale irrigation. This list includes approaches anchored in significant FAO experience and visibility, with proven impact and adapted to both development and resilience. Moreover, these approaches focus on local capacities, economic sustainability and market linkages, require an investment over the long-term, and can be scaled up or down as needed. Developing such a menu of signature resilience services could help FAO develop a stronger.

more diversified resilience programme at scale, by standardizing approaches and reducing programme design and roll-out time, while adapting the services to local context as required.

241 Strategic Programme 5 should continue to integrate gender into its context analyses and monitor the implementation of gender-responsive programmes, in order to ensure that such programming translates into real benefits.

242 FAO delivers resilience-enhancing services to communities through a number of partnerships at different levels, e.g. with national and local governments and/or with NGOs. To maximise its impact, FAO should keep programming with and strengthening the capacity of a wide array of partners, including local, national and regional authorities, other United Nations agencies such as WFP and UNICEF, international financing institutions, national and international NGOs, farmer organizations, the private sector (e.g. insurance providers) and academia.

243 FAO should initiate the development of an overarching information and early warning systems strategy, requiring the different systems to converge into a more homogeneous and strategic framework while maintaining the technical and institutional specificities of their area of action. The strategy should also address the partnership dimension and define a more corporate approach on how to support member countries across the relevant information and early warning systems areas.

Recommendation 4: Further strengthen FAO’s technical, operational and resilience capacity based on country offices’ demands and needs, so that the post profiles in FAO’s technical and administrative units progressively evolve to better serve the Strategic Programmes.

244 As evidenced by the skill mix assessment, and in a context of high vacancy rates, Strategic Programme 5 needs access to additional technical capacity in disaster risk reduction and management, insurance and cash-based approaches, as well as in conflict and political analysis in order to address the demand for resilience programmes. Increased capacities are also necessary in resilience programming and resource mobilization. This implies that FAO should continue its present drive to fill vacant positions and create new ones in key technical units, aiming to fill capacity gaps identified through the skill mix assessment and similar exercises so that the post profiles in technical divisions and administrative units will progressively evolve to better serve the Strategic Programmes.

245 Continuous improvements of operational capacity are needed. In particular, FAO should develop standard operating procedures for Level 1 and Level 2 emergencies, and simplify the project cycle to reduce redundant steps.

246 The tagging of projects to specific Strategic Objectives should be standardized and quality-assured, as the data is currently unreliable. This issue is particularly important to Strategic Programme 5 and its funding model, which is based almost entirely on voluntary contributions.

247 More could be made of inter-country offices knowledge exchange. Some FAO country offices are staffed with a stable cadre of national technical staff who can do technical work and contribute policy advice, and could provide assistance to country offices other than their own.

248 FAO should expand upon its current alliances with NGOs and other partners as a source of expertise and capacity. Stand-by partnership agreements with organizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, RedR Australia and the Danish Refugee Council provide capacity in critical, under-staffed areas of work (resilience advisors, gender or cluster coordination) and should continue.

249 The United Nations system offers significant capacity in areas where FAO needs to improve. Among others, FAO already leverages WFP’s logistics, collaborates with the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in joint needs assessments, and liaises with the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) on disaster reduction. It could also approach the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), which offers excellent political and conflict analysis in countries where the United Nations facilitate elections or other political processes, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on qualitative resilience assessment. FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and WFP should operationalize their joint Conceptual Framework for Collaboration and Partnership on Strengthening Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition, through more frequent collaborations in the field based on a strong complementary engagement and building on each other’s comparative advantages.

In Africa, FAO has successfully allied with inter-governmental regional platforms such as the CILSS, IGAD and SADC, which suggests that FAO could usefully approach similar regional groups in other regions.

**Recommendation 5:** In order to accelerate the pace of innovation, FAO should create a strong learning environment and accelerate the development of tools and channels for knowledge management.

In a reform such as the one FAO is now enacting, knowledge management is critical. The transition to resilience programming requires a change in mindset. There is a need to accelerate the pace of innovation, dissemination and adoption of good practices. Better knowledge management would also help communication, advocacy, strategy development and fundraising.

FAO should develop training modules on resilience, resilience programming and resilience measurement and deploy them throughout the Organization, accelerate the development of knowledge sharing networks, and create knowledge management spaces in the Regional Initiatives, which are playing a valid knowledge management role that should be further developed.

There is a need to continue strengthening monitoring systems, post-distribution surveys and qualitative and quantitative impact assessments, and to learn from the information collected. FAO needs to learn more about how to promote resilience to threats and crises, and to do that it needs to experiment and monitor the results.

At all levels of FAO, there are reserves of technical talent that are currently applied to other tasks, such as planning and reporting, which could be more systematically mapped and utilized through the creation of virtual knowledge exchange networks.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are often used as mere ‘implementing partners’ but the best of them form knowledge-rich environments with which FAO could interact more. In addition to NGOs, FAO should partner more with producer organizations, which are valid knowledge and implementing partners, endowed with complementary capacities to those of FAO, particularly relating to outreach, community mobilization capacity, extension and advocacy.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Persons interviewed

FAO at headquarters

1. Ahmed, Shukri, Senior Economist, SP5 Team
2. Baas, Stephan, Natural Resources Officer, SP5 Team
3. Burgeon, Dominique Leader, SP5 Team
4. El Idrissi, Ahmed, Senior Animal Health Officer, SP5 Team
5. Jacqueson, Patrick, Senior Programme Officer, SP5 Team
6. Marchesich, Rosanne, Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, SP5 Team
7. Russo, Luca, Programme Coordinator, SP5 Team
8. Gustafson, Daniel, Deputy Director-General - Operations, ODG
9. Pineiro, Martin, Advisor to the Director-General, OSP
10. Haight, Boyd, Director, OSP
11. Dowlatchahi, Mina, Deputy Director, OSP
12. Pinto, Julio, Animal Health Officer, AGAH
13. Ankers, Philippe, Chief, AGAS
14. Briac-Warnon, Vincent, Livestock Specialist, AGAS
15. Chaya, Mona, Senior Coordinator, AGDD
16. Dusunceli, Fazil, Agricultural Officer, AGPM
17. Menon, Dominique, Agronomist, AGPM
18. Olivero, Lucio, Seed Expert, AGPM
19. Blancato, Davide, Procurement Officer, CSAP
20. Boditis, Theodoros, Contract Officer, CSAP
21. Ferrara, Luigi, Purchasing Officer, CSAP
22. Malo, Meshak, Project Coordinator, DDND
23. Otto, Halka, Senior Advisor, DDND
24. Semedo, Maria-Helena, Deputy Director-General - Knowledge, DDND
25. Martucci, Antonio, Information Systems Officer, GFIMS, DDNS
26. D’Errico, Marco, Economist, RIMA, ESA
27. Holleman, Cindy, Senior Economist, ESA
28. Jackson, Julius, Technical Officer, ESA
29. Kiermeier, Michèle, Programme Coordination and M&E Specialist, FSIN, ESA
30. Matras, Frederique, Consultant, Knowledge Management, ESA
31. Wuestenberg, Andreas, Programme Officer, EWEA, ESA
32. Dufour, Charlotte, Nutrition Officer, ESN
33. Kauffmann, Domitille, Nutrition and Resilience Senior Consultant, ESN
34. Mustalampi, Unna, Associate Professional Officer, ESP
35. Sisto, Ilaria, Gender and Development Officer, ESP
36. Winder-Rossi, Natalia, Senior Social Protection Officer, ESP
37. Caprazli, Kafkas, CountrySTAT Manager, ESS
38. Karlsson, Jan, Senior Statistics Governance Expert, ESS
39. Drechsler, Denis, Project Manager, AMIS, EST
40. Racionzer, Paul, Crop Assessment Officer, GIEWS, EST
41. Senahoun, Jean, Economist, GIEWS, EST
42. Zappacosta, Mario, Economist, GIEWS, EST
43. Poulain, Florence, Fisheries and Aquaculture Officer, FIAP
44. Moore, Peter, Fire Management, GFIMS, FOA
45. Sathyapala, Shiroma, Forestry Officer, FOA
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46 Ramasamy, Selvaraju, Environment Officer, NRC
47 Thulstrup, Andreas, Natural Resources Management Officer, NRC
48 Lincke, Friedrich, Senior Auditor, OIG
49 Mukhitdinova, Malika, Internal Auditor, OIG
50 Smith-John, Marjorie, Senior Auditor, OIG
51 Dela Puerta, Rodrigo, Director, OSD
52 Gilmozzi, Dario, Senior Programme Officer, OSD
53 Conte, David, Programme Coordinator, SP3 Team
54 Davis, Benjamin, Senior Economist/Strategic Programme Leader, SP3 Team
55 Thomas, Laurent, Assistant Director-General, TC
56 Battista, Federica, Operations Officer, TCE
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