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Selection and Appointment Process for United Nations Resident Coordinators, Including Preparation, Training and Support provided for their work (JIU/REP/2013/3)

1. This JIU Report is accompanied by brief comments from the Director-General and more extensive joint comments of the UN system Chief Executives Board (CEB) for coordination (A/69/125/Add.1)

Comments from the Director-General of FAO

2. FAO endorses the JIU report, as well as the CEB comments on the “Selection and appointment process for the United Nations Resident Coordinators, including preparation, training and support provided for their work”. FAO supports the recommendations contained in the report, which captures the concerns expressed by specialized agencies and makes appropriate suggestions to undertake corrective measures.

3. As regards recommendation 2, FAO has taken steps to establish guidelines for the preparation of potential Resident Coordinator candidates and to promote Resident Coordinator positions as a career development possibility for its senior staff.

4. The Organization particularly welcomes the proposed changes under recommendation 3 for a more open nomination process for candidates who are already in the Resident Coordinators pool.

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Joint Inspection Unit

Selection and appointment process for the United Nations resident coordinators, including preparation, training and support provided for their work

Note by the Secretary-General

Addendum

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly his comments and those of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination on the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled “Selection and appointment process for the United Nations resident coordinators, including preparation, training and support provided for their work” (see [A/69/125](#)).

* [A/69/150](#).



Summary

In its report entitled “Selection and appointment process for the United Nations resident coordinators, including preparation, training and support provided for their work” (see [A/69/125](#)), the Joint Inspection Unit identifies and analyses the existing challenges faced in the selection and appointment of resident coordinators, along with the activities associated with their preparation, training and support, and makes recommendations intended to lead to improvements in the selection and appointment process.

The present note reflects the views of organizations of the United Nations system on the recommendations provided in the report. The views have been consolidated on the basis of inputs provided by member organizations of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, which welcomed the report and supported some of its conclusions.

I. Introduction

1. In its report entitled “Selection and appointment process for the United Nations resident coordinators, including preparation, training and support provided for their work” (see [A/69/125](#)), the Joint Inspection Unit identifies and analyses the existing challenges faced in the selection and appointment of resident coordinators, along with the activities associated with their preparation, training and support, and makes recommendations intended to lead to improvements in the selection and appointment processes.

II. General comments

2. United Nations system organizations welcome the report of the Joint Inspection Unit on the selection and appointment of resident coordinators and note that the Unit identifies most of the key issues and challenges pertaining to that particular selection and appointment process. Organizations appreciate the fact that the findings contained in the report are well-substantiated, balanced and offer possible solutions to improve the selection and appointment process. They indicate that even though the report does not always recommend a clear direction for overcoming the challenges identified, in many instances the Unit provides options to consider.

3. Organizations note that, while the report offers a positive view of the process of selecting and appointing resident coordinators, a considerable amount of effort goes into ensuring that the system of resident coordinators functions effectively. The Joint Inspection Unit suggests, and agencies concur, that the United Nations system has made progress in this regard, especially through measures that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has implemented to fulfil its responsibilities in accordance with the management and accountability framework of the United Nations development and resident coordinator system, including the functional firewall. These include establishing country director positions (where it makes financial sense to do so) and recasting the job descriptions of resident representatives, deputy resident representatives and country directors to clarify how the day-to-day management of UNDP business is conducted, so that resident coordinators can carry out their system-wide role.

4. Nevertheless, for some agencies, the functional firewall for the resident coordinator system remains less than fully effective and in their comments several agencies expressed concern about the functional role of the resident coordinators in general and about their relationship to UNDP in particular. These organizations agree with finding 1, in which the Joint Inspection Unit notes the lack of a genuine sense of common ownership among the members of the United Nations Development Group and suggests that the problem stems from a conflict of interest inherent in the role, noting that the resident coordinators both coordinate the work of the United Nations country team and, in their capacity as resident representatives, also compete for space and funding with country team members. While the Unit indicates that a properly functioning management and accountability system could address this issue, some organizations do not believe the existing management and accountability system goes far enough in ensuring a functional firewall. Furthermore, an agency suggests that the establishment of a better division of labour among members of the United Nations development system at the country level,

under the resident coordinators' leadership, needs to be addressed, in line with paragraphs 18, 117 and 120 of General Assembly resolution 67/226, in which the Assembly recognized the importance of promoting a better division of labour, as well as the need to improve coordination, taking into account the mandates, experience, expertise and strategic plans of United Nations system entities. All of these factors have an impact on the buy-in by agency managers and staff.

5. Several agencies suggested mechanisms to improve the functioning of the resident coordinator system. One organization suggested including seasoned and high-performing resident coordinators in a talent pool of senior United Nations staff, without administrative ties to their organization of origin, at the unique disposal of the Secretary-General. This would offer career opportunities to talented individuals from various United Nations organizations, render the resident coordinator function more attractive, create the conditions for truly managing talent at the inter-agency level and address the issue of grade-level retention for those who are promoted while serving as resident coordinators.

6. Another organization noted the difficulty of maintaining the impression that resident coordinators are impartial as long as they hold UNDP contracts. This could be avoided by centrally financing the resident coordinator system and by further breaking the link between them and any particular organization of the system, thereby allowing resident coordinators to act as facilitating and supporting entities for all United Nations agencies.

7. Several agencies noted that resource limitations would probably constrain their ability to address points raised in the report. For example, in paragraph 56 of the report, the Joint Inspection Unit calls for the Office of Human Resources Management of the Secretariat to be more proactive and supportive of United Nations Secretariat entities involved in the resident coordinator system. The Office notes the difficulty of responding immediately and directly owing to constraints on its capacity and because most of the Secretariat does not currently have resources earmarked for the purpose of identifying and preparing candidates for the position of resident coordinator. Nevertheless, it does plan to work with other parts of the Secretariat to review options that might enable the development and implementation of appropriate guidelines and/or coordination on the identification, screening and preparation of such potential candidates.

8. Some comments focused on the process for the selection and appointment of resident coordinators. One organization noted that the profiles for these positions focused on broad development work, which may prove a disadvantage to some entities, especially the specialized agencies, as most of their staff are specialized in a particular field rather than just in economics, international relations, international development etc. Some organizations noted that while the pool of resident coordinators may reflect diversity in terms of gender and geographical distribution, there is a lack of diversity in terms of the organizations of origin. Furthermore, organizations suggested that, even though UNDP strives to maintain a functional firewall, these efforts are complicated when a significant percentage of resident coordinators originate in UNDP. Organizations suggested that a wider representation of agencies within the resident coordinator community could mitigate this challenge.

9. While agencies expressed appreciation for the finding and the suggestions related to the appointment of resident coordinators, they also expressed regret that

the suggestions did not lead to more explicit recommendations on how the process could be improved. For example, while organizations appreciated that, as noted by the Joint Inspection Unit, “inspectors cannot make a substantive determination as to whether UNDP candidates are advantaged in any way in the final stage of the selection process”, they also noted that a comparison, by organization, between the number of candidates who passed through the Resident Coordinator Assessment Centre and the number of successful candidates who were appointed could have led to a more in-depth analysis.

10. Agencies also commented on portions of the text of the report. One agency sought to clarify an omission in paragraph 35, which contains information on the gender and geographical details of appointed resident coordinators, noting that some resident coordinators are also deployed to special political missions, and that these deployments should have been taken into account. It was also suggested that the paragraph could have benefitted from a further disaggregation of the data, particularly as regards peacekeeping, and it was noted that various officials were currently carrying out multiple functions (“double-hatting”). Of those officials, 15 were Deputies in peace operations, 13 were Assistant Secretaries-General and 2 were Directors at the D-2 level. One Assistant Secretary-General and one Director (D-2) were women. It should be noted that, in 2013, only one woman was nominated to “double-hat” in the position of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

11. In terms of cost-sharing, agencies noted that there appears to be little on this subject in the report except in regard to the training of resident coordinators, whereas the issue of centralized costs versus local cost-sharing does not appear to have been adequately addressed. For some organizations, there remains some confusion, at the field level, as to which costs actually fall within the domain of the 10 resident coordinator functions, how much of those costs are covered centrally and the extent to which local cost-sharing would be required. Organizations called for additional clarity as a matter of priority. Furthermore, one organization noted, in response to the conclusion of the Joint Inspection Unit contained in paragraph 116 that training costs be added to the resident coordinator cost-sharing arrangement, that organizations have limited budgets and true limitations on how much they can contribute to the cost-sharing arrangement and that other sources of funding should also be considered.

III. Comments on specific recommendations

Recommendation 1

The General Assembly, through the quadrennial comprehensive policy review process, should establish long-term targets to be achieved with regard to diversity among resident coordinators in terms of North-South balance and organization of origin. The Economic and Social Council should, within the quadrennial comprehensive policy review process, monitor the implementation of measures taken to attain such targets.

12. Noting that this recommendation is directed at legislative bodies, organizations of the United Nations system generally agreed with and supported it, along with the broad finding in the report that diversity among resident coordinators with respect to gender, source organization and North-South balance — although the highest ever

and on a positive trend — could be further enhanced. This message was reiterated by Member States in the quadrennial comprehensive policy review and prioritized in the relevant action plan of the United Nations Development Group. As mentioned in the general comments, many organizations noted that addressing the lack of diversity within the resident coordinator community from organizations of origin would also support the implementation of the functional firewall.

13. While supporting the recommendation, some organizations expressed concern with regard to the setting of targets and stressed their agreement with the opinion of the inspector that targets should not be achieved at the expense of the general principle that the most qualified candidates be selected for the post. In addition, some organizations emphasized the importance of having measures that promote resident coordinator talent from within the United Nations system and of ensuring that the selection process be independent of the size of the operational activities of the organization of origin and its willingness to bear the cost.

Recommendation 2

Executive heads of United Nations system organizations who have not yet done so should instruct their human resources management offices to develop and implement appropriate guidelines for the identification, screening and preparation of potential resident coordinator candidates as soon as possible.

14. Organizations of the United Nations system welcomed and accepted recommendation 2, and many indicate a willingness to put the suggested guidelines in place. Organizations also welcomed several of the associated suggestions embedded within the text of the report, citing in particular paragraph 51, in which other United Nations entities are called upon to undertake efforts similar to those undertaken by UNDP to further gender diversity, and paragraph 53, in which it is stated that all entities should nominate a greater number of qualified candidates and the increased number of nominations should better reflect the required appointment criteria. Furthermore, agencies also noted the issue of costs related to the assessments and welcomed the suggestions in paragraphs 60 and 61 on having a dedicated budget line to cover costs associated with the Resident Coordinator Assessment Centre and a mechanism for reimbursing successful candidates who participate in the Centre.

Recommendation 3

The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, should initiate, through the United Nations Development Group, the review and revision of the standard operating procedures of the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel, as needed:

- (a) **To ensure a more open nomination process for candidates who are already in the pool of resident coordinators;**
- (b) **To address the possibility of incorporating interviews for shortlisted candidates at the request of the Panel, to better advise the Chair of the United Nations Development Group on their suitability for a particular position;**
- (c) **To change the present voting system to establish a minimum required number of support votes (preferably 50 per cent of those voting) for a candidate**

to be shortlisted for consideration by the Chair of the United Nations Development Group.

15. Organizations of the United Nations system supported a review and revision of the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel, as called for in recommendation 3. Agencies shared the concern expressed in the report with respect to the perception that the selection process of resident coordinator candidates has resulted in a trade-off for organizations between professionalism and selecting the “agency candidate”, as expressed in paragraph 74. Therefore, organizations welcomed the opportunity to explore, through the workings of the Panel, ways to improve the overall quality of candidates nominated by the organizations, leveraging existing instruments for quality assurance. At the same time, while agencies supported an “open nomination process”, as called for in subparagraph (a) of the recommendation, some remained unclear about the specific issues driving this aspect of the recommendation.

16. Organizations also welcomed the proposal in subparagraph (b) to offer the option to interview shortlisted candidates so as to better inform the Chair of the United Nations Development Group of their suitability for a particular position, noting that this option already exists in the standard operating procedures of the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel with respect to candidates for the positions of executive representatives of the Secretary-General, deputy special coordinators or deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General, and that it could be expanded further.

17. While organizations generally supported subparagraph (c), they suggested that the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel consider the recommendation and present any changes as a recommendation to the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination through the United Nations Development Group.

18. More generally, agencies also expressed support for the suggestions in paragraph 67, notably the call for the Chair of the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel to discuss ways and means of giving more time and weight to the discussions on candidates.

**Selection and appointment process for United Nations
Resident Coordinators, including preparation, training and
support provided for their work**

Prepared by

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Geneva 2013



United Nations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Selection and appointment process for the United Nations Resident Coordinators,
including preparation, training and support provided for their work
JIU/REP/2013/3

Objective

The objective of the present report is to assess the operation of the current selection and appointment process of the United Nations Resident Coordinators (RCs) and the effectiveness and efficiency of the related institutional support mechanisms. It is expected that the identification and analysis of existing challenges pertaining to the selection and appointment of RCs, and the preparation, training and support provided for their work, complemented by recommendations, will lead to improvements in the selection and appointment process as well as in the ownership of the RC system.

Main findings and conclusions

The report contains three recommendations, one of which is addressed to the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one to the Secretary-General and the other to the executive heads of the organizations forming part of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). The report also contains a number of “soft” recommendations outlining the major directions for the proposed changes to improve the selection and appointment process, while leaving the development of specific methods for achieving these changes to the organizations concerned.

The report finds that the established framework for the selection and appointment of RCs has resulted in a more predictable, inclusive, participatory interagency process, with clear separation of the assessment, selection and appointment phases. The quality of the RC corps is perceived by most of those concerned to have improved and the composition is more diverse today in terms of gender, geography and organization of origin than at any time in the past. However, despite improvements in diversity, imbalances remain to be addressed, which, in addition to insufficient implementation of the mutual accountability provisions of the Management and Accountability (M&A) system by all entities concerned have resulted in most organizations questioning the extent to which common ownership of the RC system has been achieved.

The process of the Resident Coordinator Assessment Centre (RCAC) – in which candidates must be successful to be eligible to apply for RC posts – is recognized both by RCs and JIU Participating Organizations (POs) as an objective, impartial and highly professional competency-based examination and an excellent quality control measure which adds to the fairness, objectivity and transparency of the selection process. It nonetheless requires some fine-tuning and the report outlines the critical areas to which attention needs to be paid by the Interagency Steering Committee during the upcoming review of the assessment. More candidates should be nominated by the POs and the nominations should better reflect the required diversity in gender, geographical and organizational origin. POs should also develop appropriate guidelines for the identification, screening and preparation of potential RC candidates. To incentivize organizations to meet diversity criteria, the Inspectors call upon them to consider establishing a reimbursement mechanism from the soon-to-be-operational cost-sharing mechanism for the RC system, whereby an organization is reimbursed for all or part of the

assessment costs for a candidate who is successful in the RCAC and also belongs to one of the three targeted diversity categories.

The Inter-Agency Advisory Panel (IAAP) plays a determining role in the shortlisting of candidates for RC positions. It follows the basic provisions outlined in its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). However, the report identifies some critical observations on its operational practices that need to be addressed. The report calls upon UNDG, inter alia, to review and revise the SOPs of the IAAP as necessary to ensure a more open nomination process for candidates who are already in the RC Pool; to address the possibility of incorporating interviews with shortlisted candidates at the request of the IAAP; and to change the present voting system to establish a minimum required number of support votes (preferably 50 per cent of those voting) for a candidate to be shortlisted for consideration by the UNDG Chair.

The Secretary-General and the UNDG Chair – while taking into account the publicly stated criteria for furthering diversity of appointed RCs – overwhelmingly tend to follow the advice of the IAAP, generally appointing candidates who have received the strongest IAAP support. Despite this, most POs continue to see the appointment process as one that is not fully transparent and can thus be improved through the introduction of formal two-way communication and feedback between the UNDG Chair and the IAAP members on the post-IAAP stages of the selection process with due regard to confidentiality considerations.

While the RC position is generally viewed as an attractive, challenging career option enjoying a high level of prestige, the complexity and demanding nature of the RC function, its limited empowerment and underfinanced RC Offices make the post less attractive. Marketing of the RC career needs to be further improved and the talent management system in each United Nations system entity should pay more attention to promoting the RC position as a career possibility for their best performing staff members. The report calls for grooming of RC candidates at a much earlier stage in their careers, dealing with the issue of retention of grade held as RC upon return to the parent agency, strengthening interagency mobility and ensuring a mandatory role for RCs in the performance appraisal of United Nations Country Team (UNCT) members. As a possible additional incentive, the report calls upon UNDG to consider facilitating the career path of seasoned and accomplished RCs who have served two or three terms with outstanding performance appraisals, by making them independent from their parent organizations and considering them as potential candidates for special assignments by the Secretary-General or for very senior level posts in the United Nations system.

Significant improvements have been attained in the identification of the training needs of RCs, followed by reshaping and strengthening of training programmes and learning resources for first-time RCs at the pre-nomination and induction phase. Nonetheless, continuing training opportunities for RCs remain limited and financing of RC training remains a challenge. Recognizing that adequately trained RCs are fundamental for the effective operation of the RC system, the report calls upon UNDG to incorporate training costs for RCs into the operational costs of the RC system, to be absorbed by the United Nations development system as a whole. Given the experience of the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) in delivering high-quality training for RCs, the Inspectors call for better and wider use of UNSSC expertise and capacity in managing/coordinating continuing training for RCs.

While the role of the United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office

(DOCO) in providing Secretariat support for IAAP operations is widely recognized, greater expectations were expressed with regard to strengthening its role as an impartial broker to promote issues important for the RC system at large. There is also insufficient clarity among stakeholders on the role of DOCO as it was reshaped following its functional realignment in 2011 and, in this context, DOCO needs to better communicate to POs and RCs the distinction between its role and that of the Regional UNDG Teams as regards support for RCs and UNCTs. Despite its limited financial and human resources, the role of DOCO in increasing the coherence of RC system operations at the country level is generally appreciated by the stakeholders.

Finally, while the multiple “hats” (functions) worn by the RC, of Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Designated Official (DO) for Security are increasingly better supported by established institutional linkages among the stakeholders concerned in the phases of selection, appointment, training and appraisal, there are areas that need to be improved, particularly as regards training and in-country support for the DO function and humanitarian coordination training for RCs who are not formally designated as HCs. The implementation of such changes requires ongoing attention and funding.

Recommendation for consideration by legislative organ

The General Assembly, through the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR) process, should establish long-term targets to be achieved with regard to diversity among Resident Coordinators in terms of North-South balance and organization of origin. ECOSOC should, within the QCPR process, monitor the implementation of measures taken to attain such targets (Recommendation 1).

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|---|
| ACC | Administrative Committee for Coordination |
| CD | Country Director |
| CEB | United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| DESA | Department of Economic and Social Affairs |
| DFS | Department of Field Support |
| DO | Designated Official |
| DPA | Department of Political Affairs |
| DPI | Department of Public Information |
| DSRSG | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| DSS | Department of Safety and Security |
| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council |
| EOSG | Executive Office of the Secretary-General |
| ERC | Emergency Relief Coordinator |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| HCS | Humanitarian Coordinators |
| IAAP | Inter-Agency Advisory Panel |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| IASMN | Inter-Agency Security Management Team |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| ICSC | International Civil Service Commission |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| ITU | International Telecommunication Union |
| JIU | Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations System |
| LCS | Leadership and Coordination Skills |
| M&A | Management and Accountability |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| NRA | Non-Resident Agency |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| POs | Participating Organizations |
| QCPR | Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review |
| RCs | Resident Coordinators |
| RCAC | Resident Coordinator Assessment Centre |
| RCO | Resident Coordinator Office |
| RDTs | Regional Development Teams |
| RD | Regional Director |
| RDTs | Regional UNDG Teams |
| RRs | Resident Representatives |
| SHL | Saville & Holdsworth Ltd. |
| SOPs | Standard Operating Procedures |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| TCPR | Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review |
| TMTF | Talent Management Task Force |
| UNCCF | United Nations Country Coordination Fund |
| UNCTs | United Nations Country Teams |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |

| | |
|------------|---|
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistant Framework |
| UNDG | United Nations Development Group |
| UNDOCO | United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UN-HABITAT | United Nations Human Settlements Programme |
| UNHCR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNIC | United Nations Information Centre |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organization |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNOG | United Nations Office at Geneva |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |
| UNSSC | United Nations System Staff College |
| UNWTO | World Tourism Organization of the United Nations |
| UN Women | United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women |
| UPU | Universal Postal Union |
| USG | Under-Secretary-General |
| WG-RCSI | Working Group on Resident Coordinator System Issues |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| WIPO | World Intellectual Property Organization |
| WMO | World Meteorological Organization |

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Origin, Objectives and Scope

1. A review of the selection and appointment process of the United Nations Resident Coordinators (RCs) including preparation, training and support provided for their work, was undertaken by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) from January to October 2013. The review was included in the JIU Programme of Work for 2013 at the suggestion of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Several JIU Participating Organizations (POs) subsequently commented that the review should take into account the key priorities pertaining to the Resident Coordinator (RC) System outlined in the 2012 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) resolution and the review was subsequently expanded.

2. The objective of the review was to assess the operation of the present selection and appointment process for RCs and the effectiveness and efficiency of the related institutional support mechanisms. It is expected that the identification of existing challenges pertaining to the selection and appointment of RCs and the preparation, training and support provided for their work, complemented by recommendations to the JIU's traditional addressees, particularly those belonging to the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), will lead to improvements in the selection and appointment process, and in the ownership of the RC system.

3. The scope of the present review is system-wide and focuses on United Nations system organizations and entities participating in the United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs). Several POs suggested expanding the study beyond selection and appointment to a review of the functioning of the RC system, its financing and the efficiency of its overall operation. While the Inspectors recognized the genuine interest of some POs to review these issues, it would have enlarged the scope beyond the capabilities of JIU. Additionally, various studies had already been prepared on some of these issues in preparation for the 2012 QCPR, with some approved measures still being introduced. An expanded review would thus have been premature at this point. The Inspectors therefore decided to maintain the limited scope of the review and to focus only on some key priorities outlined in the QCPR resolution (see para. 14).

B. Background

Establishment and guiding principles of the RC system

4. As part of the wider restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/197, by which it was decided that "on behalf of the United Nations system, overall responsibility for, and coordination of, operational activities for development carried out at the country level should be entrusted to a single official"¹ – the United Nations Resident Coordinator (RC). The Resident Coordinator System (RCS) that followed thus serves as the main mechanism for coordinating United Nations operational activities for development, as well as emergency, recovery and transition in programme countries.

5. The basic parameters outlining the functioning and scope of the RC system are derived from guidelines developed by the Administrative Committee for Coordination (ACC) in 1993,² together with further revisions on functioning and administrative management approved in 1998-1999.³ These guidelines have since been built upon by UNDG in line with priorities outlined in subsequent resolutions on the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCP) and QCPR. One of the two overarching principles of the functioning of the RC system is national ownership and leadership of the national development process, meaning that United Nations operational activities are carried out at the

¹ General Assembly resolution 32/197, annex, para. 34.

² See ACC statement on the role and functioning of the Resident Coordinator System (1995).

³ See ACC Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System (Approved: September 1999) & Administrative Management of the Resident Coordinator System – Guidelines for the Resident Coordinator System (approved: September 1998). The functions of the ACC have been taken over by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB).

request of, and in accordance with, the policies and priorities of governments. The second is the ownership of the RC system by the United Nations development system as a whole.⁴

Principal participants in the RC System⁵

6. The RC system includes all United Nations system entities engaged in operational activities for development at the country level, irrespective of whether they are a resident or Non Resident Agency (NRA). The principal participants include: the RC, the RC Office (RCO) and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) at the country level; the regional director and Regional UNDG Teams (RDTs) at the regional level; and UNDG, DOCO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at the Headquarters level.

Multiple roles of the RC and corresponding accountability lines

7. The role of the RC is complicated by the fact that he/she may fulfil as many as four or five functions at a time, accompanied by multiple reporting lines, which results in considerable demands on his/her time and pressure on his/her ability to deliver. First and foremost, all RCs also serve as the **UNDP Resident Representative (UNDP-RR)**, the highest ranking UNDP representative in a country, and are thus accountable for UNDP business.

8. General Assembly resolution 46/182 further stipulated that the “resident coordinator should normally coordinate the humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system at the country level”.⁶ As of September 2013, RCs were serving as **Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs)** in 31 countries. The designated HC reports directly to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and is responsible for leading and coordinating humanitarian action by relevant organizations in country with a view to ensuring that it is principled, timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer term recovery.⁷ The RC also serves as the **Designated Official (DO) for United Nations Security** for any given country, except in cases where a more senior United Nations official is resident in country. The DO is responsible for the effective coordination of country-level security, for the safety of all United Nations staff and dependents and for leading the Inter-Agency Security Management Team (IASMN). He/she reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General (USG) of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS).

9. In countries where a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) exists, the RC typically serves as **Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG)** under the overall authority of the SRSG. In addition to the aforementioned roles, the RC represents the interests of non-resident agencies. He/she also serves as the Director of the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) in countries where the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI) does not have its own designated Director.

10. The responsibilities and accountability of the above are set out in the UNDG approved (August 2008) *Management and Accountability (M&A) System of the United Nations Development and Resident Coordinator System, including the functional firewall for the RC system*, which defines who is accountable for what and to whom for the various levels of the RC system. Importantly, it outlines some key agreed principles on the expected status, role and responsibility of the RC, including an equal relationship with, and responsibility to, all UNCT member agencies; recognition by and accreditation to the host government; representation of the whole United Nations development system in country; empowerment via clear recognition from each agency of the role of the RC in strategically positioning the United Nations in each country; immediate access to agencies’ technical resources to

⁴ Functioning of the resident coordinator system, including costs and benefits (E/2008/60). Report of the Secretary-General, paras. 11-12.

⁵ See annex I for the roles of the key players in the RC System.

⁶ General Assembly resolution 46/182, para. 39.

⁷ Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator (endorsed by the 73rd IASC Working Group on 4 May 2009).

support the RC function; and access to flexible financing for start-up/preparatory activities of the UNCT.⁸

Major resolutions on the RC system determining its evolution and priorities

11. Priorities concerning the RC system and its subsequent evolution have largely been determined through resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. During the 1990s, resolutions 47/199, 50/120 and 53/192 strengthened the RC system by bringing to the fore issues related to the selection of RCs, the commitment from agencies to work together within a participatory RC system⁹ and the need for gender balance among RCs.

12. The primary subject of the present review – the issue of RC selection, appointment and training – has been on the radar of the General Assembly regularly since the beginning of the new millennium, with resolution 56/201 appreciating “efforts, including through the United Nations Development Group, to improve further the RC system and the progress achieved so far in broadening the pool of RCs, improving their gender balance, using competency assessments to select RC candidates, and implementing improved staff training and annual performance appraisals (...)”.¹⁰ The resolution also urged United Nations entities to go further in that direction “including through appropriate training and recruitment of qualified staff with the required professional skills and backgrounds”¹¹ and emphasized the role of the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) in this regard.

13. General Assembly resolution 59/250 urged the United Nations system to provide further financial, technical and operational support for the RC system and called for the development of a procedure for common assessment of RC performance by all members of UNCTs.¹² Resolution 62/208, in addition to recalling the aforementioned principles regarding the RC System in terms of selection, training, technical and financial support and gender balance, also recalled “the mandate of UNDP, within the existing programming arrangement, to appoint country directors (CDs) to run its core activities, including fund-raising, so as to assure that resident coordinators are fully available for their tasks.”¹³

14. Most recently, the report of the Secretary-General on the 2012 QCPR (A/67/93-E/2012/79) and the 2012 QCPR resolution (General Assembly resolution 67/226)¹⁴ outlines the following 11 specific issues that need to be dealt with in order to further strengthen the RC system:

- (a) Improving the way in which individuals are attracted, selected, trained, appraised and retained within the RC system;
- (b) Ensuring the equal participation of all United Nations entities in the process of nominating candidates to RC posts;
- (c) Achieving diversification in the composition of the RC system in terms of geographical distribution and gender;
- (d) Developing an integrated strategy of training and support for RCs;
- (e) Strengthening the capacity of Resident Coordinators’ Offices (RCOs);
- (f) Ensuring cost-effective country-level coordination on the basis of an efficient RCO;
- (g) Strengthening RC consultation/coordination with all development stakeholders;
- (h) Enhancing the planning and coordination function of the RC vis-à-vis UNCTs and relevant non-resident agencies;
- (i) Ensuring stable and predictable financing for the RC system by the United Nations development system;

⁸ Management and Accountability System for the UN development system and Resident Coordinator System including the “functional firewall” for the RC System (August 2008).

⁹ General Assembly resolutions 47/199 (paras. 37-39), 50/120 (paras. 36- 42), 53/192 (paras. 23-27 and para. 41).

¹⁰ General Assembly resolution 56/201, para. 67.

¹¹ General Assembly resolution 56/201, paras. 67-68.

¹² General Assembly resolution 59/250, paras. 54-55.

¹³ General Assembly resolution 62/208, para. 105.

¹⁴ General Assembly resolution 67/226, paras. 99-100.

(j) Ensuring full implementation and monitoring of the management and accountability of the RC system, including the functional firewall; and

(k) Strengthening the coordination role of RC/HC in countries in transition from relief to development and ensuring that the profiles of RCs in such countries also include the qualifications of HC.

15. The present JIU review tackles some, but not all, of the above-mentioned priority issues as highlighted in the 2012 QCPR, and its findings are intended to assist in the implementation of the QCPR resolution particularly as regards topic areas (a) to (d), which are covered in depth, while topic areas (e) to (k) are dealt with only on aspects where they relate to the first four topics.

C. Methodology

16. The approach of the present report is to review the consistency and extent to which relevant resolutions and agreed text outlining principles and policies governing the assessment, selection and appointment of RCs and the training and support provided for their work were being implemented in practice.

17. In accordance with the JIU standards and guidelines, the methodology followed in preparing the present report included extensive desk review and documentation analysis, including review and analysis of existing and primary data, and content analysis of qualitative data. Through the use of different data sets, including documentation received/collected, questionnaire responses, interview notes and survey results, the information obtained was triangulated and validated. Where there was contradictory information, the Inspectors used their expertise and knowledge to make clear their opinions/conclusions.

18. The views of the Participating Organizations (POs) were captured via written questionnaire responses and follow-up interviews, while those of the Resident Coordinators were collected via an online survey complemented by interviews with 29 RCs/HCs in Geneva, Montreux, Turin and New York on the side-lines of meetings, retreats and training sessions that they were attending. Information/views received via questionnaire responses, interviews and through the RC survey have been dealt with in accordance with the usual pattern of respect for confidentiality by JIU. The report primarily reflects aggregated responses and, where quotations are given for illustrative purposes, the source(s) are never cited.

19. A total of 30¹⁵ entities – including 10 United Nations Secretariat offices/departments – participated in the JIU review while nine¹⁶ entities opted out of the review due to limited or no field

¹⁵ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNDG (DOCO), UNDP, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UN Secretariat Departments and Offices [Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Department of Field Support (DFS), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Public Information (DPI), Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department for Safety and Security (DSS), Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM)], UNSSC, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO).

¹⁶ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

presence and little or no involvement/stake in the RC system. Written responses to the JIU questionnaires were provided by 21 entities. In-person interviews were held in Geneva, Montreux, New York, Paris, Rome and Turin. For other locations, organizations were interviewed by videoconference.

20. An electronic survey was sent out in late August 2013 to all 128 RCs. Responses to the survey were received from 83 recipients (64.8% of all RCs). In view of the spread of responses across the system and the high response rate, the survey should be considered to be representative. Interviews were also conducted with a number of resource persons, typically highly experienced former RCs, to benefit from their institutional knowledge and understanding of the evolution of the RC system. In total, 81 interviews were conducted with 188 individuals.

21. In terms of limitations, the Inspectors interviewed around 10 present and former UNCT members but the report does not attempt to provide an overview of the concerns of UNCT members in general as regards the topics reviewed, since UNCT members were neither systematically approached (due to budgetary limitations) nor surveyed during the review preparation process. Additionally, while the Inspectors interviewed a small number (fewer than 10) of candidates identified by their parent agencies as not having passed the Resident Coordinator Assessment Centre (RCAC) – many agencies do not maintain a compilation of all candidates ever presented to the RCAC – such a small and unscientifically obtained sample cannot be considered as representative of the total population of candidates who did not pass the RC assessment.

22. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors in order to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit. Comments from the POs on the draft report have been sought and taken into account in finalizing the report. To facilitate the handling of the report, the implementation of its recommendations and monitoring thereof, annex IV contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted for action or for information to the Governing Bodies and Executive Heads of the organizations reviewed.¹⁷

23. The Inspectors wish to express their deep appreciation to the United Nations Resident Coordinators, officials/staff of the United Nations system entities (particularly DOCO) and resource persons who participated in the review.

¹⁷ More information on the report, including the terms of reference, list of interviewees and list of documents reviewed during the report preparation process can be found on the JIU website.

II. OWNERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESIDENT COORDINATOR SYSTEM, ROLE AND PARTICIPATION OF UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES IN SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT

A. Ownership of the United Nations Resident Coordinator system

Finding 1: Policy documents approved by the Member States define clearly the system-wide ownership, objectives and principles on which the RC system should be built. Measures have been taken to implement these provisions but the results so far have not been sufficient to create a genuine sense of common ownership among the UNDG members.

24. Subsequent General Assembly resolutions have stressed time and again that the RC system, although managed by UNDP, is owned by the United Nations development system as a whole and that its functioning should be participatory, collegial and mutually accountable within that system. At the operational level, this policy has been translated into action through a series of concrete measures agreed to and implemented by UNDG, notable among which was the approval of the M&A System and the establishment of the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel (IAAP) in 1998, and the adoption of its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in November 2009 with the explicit aim of strengthening the selection of RCs by all organizations concerned. While the present report does not substantively review the implementation and functioning of the M&A system and the functional firewall, it is important to highlight that unless United Nations agencies meet their mutual accountability obligations under the M&A system (currently not the case), an ownership deficit will remain as regards the RC system.

25. Another key development that facilitated the post of the RC being seen as less UNDP-heavy and more orientated towards the United Nations Development System was the creation of UNDP Country Director (CD) positions – particularly in countries with large country teams, complex coordination situations or complex emergency situations – to oversee UNDP core activities including its day-to-day operations and UNDP-specific resource mobilization. However, the deployment of CDs may not always be cost effective, especially where there is only a small UNCT and UNDP country presence. While the RC, as UNDP-RR, still remains fully accountable for all UNDP matters, the establishment of the CD position allows for more space for the RC to attend to his/her system-wide tasks. In this regard, the UNDG-approved (January 2009) implementation plan of the Management and Accountability (M&A) System sets out steps to attain a clear division of labour and accountabilities between the UNDP-RR and UNDP-CD roles. To strengthen the firewall mechanism, and in accordance with the agreed M&A implementation plan, UNDP has also revised the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative (DRR) job description to enable the RC, as appropriate, to delegate management of UNDP business to the UNDP DRR, where a UNDP CD post does not exist.

26. Additionally, various General Assembly resolutions have pushed for the furtherance of the establishment of CDs,¹⁸ encouraging UNDP to do so where cost-effective.¹⁹ As of June 2013, 51 UNDP-CD positions had been established.²⁰ Most POs view the creation of the CD post as a positive step towards creating some level of necessary de-linkage between the RC and UNDP. Of RCs responding to the JIU survey, 59.7 per cent agreed (19.5 per cent disagreed) that CD appointments had contributed to improving the level of acceptance of RCs by UNCT members as genuinely representative of the entire UNCT.

27. Despite clear trends and widening formal recognition of the evolved role of the RC across the United Nations system, implementation calls not only for further concrete measures but also for efforts to change the longstanding perceptions among the POs that the ownership of the RC system continues to rest more with UNDP than with the United Nations development system. Such concerns emanate not only from the dual role of the RC as UNDP-RR but also from the practical operation of

¹⁸ General Assembly resolution 62/208, para. 105 (14 March 2008).

¹⁹ General Assembly resolution 67/226, para. 124 (h) (22 January 2013).

²⁰ UNDP response to JIU questionnaire received on 4 June 2013.

the RC selection and appointment process, which many POs perceive as insufficiently transparent at certain stages and as not creating a level playing field for all United Nations agencies. There were also perceptions of certain deficiencies as regards the assessment process.

Finding 2: The established framework for the selection and appointment of RCs has resulted in a more predictable, inclusive, participatory interagency process with clear separation of the assessment, selection and appointment phases.

28. The establishment of principles and a framework for system-wide participation in the assessment, selection and appointment of RCs significantly reshaped the earlier practice of a decision-making process, which was of an ad-hoc, non-transparent and non-inclusive nature. The approval and implementation of the IAAP Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have resulted in a more planned, regular and predictable mechanism for selection and appointment, providing, on the basis of clear rules, possibilities for the participation of the United Nations system organizations. The SOPs outline the overarching principles guiding the RC application, selection and appointment process, IAAP membership including members' roles and responsibilities, its operating procedures and its management and administration.²¹

As set out in the SOPs, the overarching principles to guide the RC application, selection and appointment process are as follows:

- (i) Nominations for RC positions reflect the best and brightest candidates.
- (ii) The selection process promotes transparency, participation and ownership by the United Nations System.
- (iii) Representation: to ensure that candidates being considered for RC positions reflect diversity in accordance with the following broad criteria:
 - (a) North-South balance: the composition of candidates is reflective of the principle of equitable geographical distribution, in accordance with Article 101, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter;
 - (b) Gender balance: every effort is made to achieve a 50/50 gender distribution, in line with General Assembly resolution 61/244;
 - (c) Representative of the United Nations system: efforts are made to ensure a broad representation of candidates from across the United Nations system, including candidates from specialized agencies, non-resident agencies and the United Nations Secretariat;
 - (d) Broadening the RC selection and appointment to external candidates from outside the United Nations System.
- (iv) Confidentiality of IAAP discussions on individual candidates.

29. On the basis of their findings, the Inspectors conclude that the basic provisions of the SOPs for implementing the principles are generally followed in practice (with certain limitations, exceptions or challenges to be detailed in forthcoming sections), resulting in standardized practices for the whole process. The pools of RC candidates are updated regularly and the forecasting of vacant positions, followed by the applications and selection process, are carried out as stipulated by the interagency agreement. As a result of the application of the SOPs, significant progress has been achieved in improving transparency and system-wide ownership of the process. Implementation of the SOPs is reviewed annually and experiences are discussed in policy debates at the IAAP, sometimes resulting in updates to the SOPs. However, these debates are more focused on practical challenges and there is a lack of dialogue, especially at the senior level, on issues of a more general policy nature in relation to the operation of the selection and appointment process.

²¹ IAAP: Standard Operating Procedures (UNDG approved, 30 November 2009).

B. Composition and quality of selection


Finding 3: As a result of the selection and appointment process in force, the quality of the RC corps is perceived by most of those concerned to have improved²² and the composition of the RC corps is more diverse today in terms of gender, geography and organization of origin. However, in spite of the improving statistical trends, there is still a strong perception across the system that the RC system remains “UNDP business”.

Quality of selection

30. The prevailing view among senior management in the participating organizations is that there has been a noticeable improvement in the quality of the RC corps appointed since the introduction of the new provisions for selection and appointment. Contrary views were expressed in very limited numbers. Satisfaction with the performance of RCs is also evident in their performance appraisals, conducted by Regional UNDG Teams. For 2012, 21 per cent of RCs were rated as outstanding, 39 per cent exceeded expectations, 37 per cent fully met expectations and only 3 per cent partially met expectations.²³ While these ratings are likely to be somewhat impacted by imperfections in the appraisal system, they coincide with the basic message received by the Inspectors as regards the high quality of selection during the report preparation process.

31. In spite of a few reservations expressed concerning the high RC performance ratings, most interviewees were of the view that the RCs had lived up to the expectations of a demanding job. The UNDG Chair was also of the view that the quality of the RCs globally was better today than five years ago. One PO representative who had worked with RCs for more than 30 years summed up the prevailing view of the present group of RCs as being “more broad-minded and inclusive with better people management skills, diplomatic skills and communications skills; less focused on development work; less of a technocrat and more of a bridge-builder who can get the UNCT to work together.”

32. Where concerns were raised, they tended to relate to the dual role of the RCs as UNDP-RR, while others noted the near impossibility for the RC of performing the multiple roles of UNDP-RR, HC, DO for Security and DSRSG without adequate support and resources. Specialized agencies, funds and programmes also complained of the insufficient knowledge of the RCs regarding the mandate and priorities of individual entities in the UNCT.



*As of end August 2013.

Source: Data e-mailed by DOCO on 19 September 2013

²² Apart from the views expressed by POs and RC performance appraisal ratings, no specific studies exist to date to verify and assess whether there have been improvements in the quality of the RC corps.

²³ Data received from DOCO on 7 October 2013.

33. While almost all RCs originated from UNDP in the early years of the RC system, this is no longer the case, with a lasting and increasing trend over the years as regards the proportion of RCs originating from non-UNDP entities. As of end August 2013, 40 per cent of all RCs originated from a non-UNDP entity, up from just 32 per cent in 2009²⁴ and only 28 per cent in 2004. While this general trend is viewed favourably in non-UNDP entities, there is a certain level of dissatisfaction with the speed of the change within UNDP. Senior UNDP management noted that it had to deal with discontent from its own senior field staff as well as some senior managers at headquarters who complained that, in the past 12 months, 60 per cent of UNDP-RR jobs went to individuals originating from non-UNDP entities. A few UNDP senior management personnel expressed the view during the interviews that development activities had suffered as a result of the most senior UNDP field jobs increasingly being held by personnel from other agencies, as they often lacked relevant work experience in the realm of development. Nonetheless, UNDP management at the most senior levels viewed the evolved role of the RC as going beyond just development-related responsibilities and welcomed the concrete achievements that had led to the composition of the RC corps being more reflective of the United Nations development system than at any other time in the past.

34. Despite these positive developments, the representation of non-UNDP entities remains uneven, whereby organizations with an extensive field presence – presumably a natural source of good RC candidates – only account for a minimal number of RCs. This is the case for the following nine United Nations entities: FAO, ILO, WFP, WHO, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR and UNICEF. Despite having a wide field presence through being represented in between 85 and 128 United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) as of 2010,²⁵ these entities have put forward only between one and six successful RCAC candidates as RCs in the last seven years. OHCHR (54 UNCTs, 3 RCs) has fared somewhat better, while OCHA has been more successful, putting through 8 RCs between 2006-2012, despite having a field presence in only 35 UNCTs. Having placed 136 RCs in the past seven years, UNDP remains the dominant player, while at the opposite end of the scale are IFAD, UN-Habitat and UNIDO with no RCs originating from these entities despite a modest field presence in 35-74 UNCTs. This uneven representation can in part be attributed to the limited number of non-UNDP candidates in the RC Pools, which in turn is related to the limited number of candidates being put forward by non-UNDP entities to the RCAC (see paras. 51-53).

Gender and geographical composition

35. The proportion of female RCs has also increased significantly in recent years, from 26 per cent in 2006 to 40 per cent as of end August 2013, though the RC system is still far from attaining 50/50 gender distribution in line with General Assembly resolution 61/244. The main challenges in the realm of gender diversity are in humanitarian and in senior leadership positions at the D2 and ASG level. While gender parity has largely been attained for “development” RC positions (i.e. all RCs and DOs who do not have HC and/or DSRSG functions), with 47 per cent of all such positions being held by women by end-March 2013, the vast majority (80 per cent) of these “development” positions are at D1 level. In contrast, in “humanitarian/peacekeeping” positions (i.e. posts where the RC also covers HC and DSRSG functions) women represent only 20 per cent of the total number of RCs. In the “humanitarian/peacekeeping” positions, 20 per cent of all RC posts are at D1 level, 46 per cent at D2 level, and 34 per cent at ASG level. For such positions, female RCs are heavily concentrated at the D1 level, accounting for 57 per cent of all HCs/DSRSGs, while at the D2 and ASG level the proportions drop significantly to 13 per cent and 8 per cent respectively.^{26,27} As regards geographical balance, the


²⁴ Synthesis of 2011/2012 Resident Coordinator Annual Reports, UNDG, p. 57.

²⁵ Synthesis of 2010 Resident Coordinator Annual Reports, p. 53.

²⁶ DOCO response to JIU questionnaire received on 13 May 2013.


²⁷ Of about 50 individuals who are RCs or are available for RC positions at the D-2 level or above, only ten per cent are female and 40 per cent are from the global South. In 2012, of the 23 individuals nominated for multi-hatted positions, only five (22 per cent) were female, of whom one was appointed for an ASG-level position and another for a D-2 level position. Eight candidates from the global South (35 per cent) were nominated, two of whom were ultimately appointed. (DPKO/DFS comments to JIU draft report received on 2 December 2013).

proportion of RCs from developing countries declined from 52 per cent in 2009 to 44 per cent as of end August 2013.



*As of end August 2013.

Source: Data e-mailed by DOCO on 19 September 2013.



*As of end August 2013.

Source: Data e-mailed by DOCO on 19 September 2013

36. Some POs have been slow to adapt to developments in the composition of the RC corps, alleging that rapid changes in diversity have resulted in lowering the quality of RCs, i.e. that less-qualified female candidates were sometimes selected (at the expense of better qualified male candidates) by the Secretary-General given his publicly stated priority of furthering gender parity in the RC system. Such assertions could not be verified by the Inspectors. Their overall personal impressions from interviews with 29 RCs (20 male, 9 female) were very positive. Despite some unevenness, the Inspectors did not see any negative correlation between increased diversity and RC quality.

37. While the figures clearly outline that the selection process has resulted in greater diversity of RCs and improvements in their quality, there is a strong perception across the system that the RC system remains “UNDP business”. To deal effectively with such perceptions, it would be useful for the Secretary General, with the involvement of UNDG, to outline the desirable long-term objectives or targets – based on clear criteria – as regards geographical and organizational diversity similar to the already clearly established goal of gender parity. **In the Inspectors’ opinion, the desired proportion of RC posts taking into account organizational origin should not be interpreted as a strict quota system, by organization, but viewed rather in terms of category of organization (for example, UNDP/non-UNDP, funds and programmes, specialized agencies) and could be on the basis of: the global proportion of operational activities for development at the country level borne by each category of organization, their readiness to share the operational costs of the RC system and their willingness to incorporate country-level cooperation requirements into business and governance practices at the headquarters level. Additionally, organization-related**

targets should not be achieved at the expense of the general principle of selection (most qualified candidates for the post).

38. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance accountability as regards furthering diversity in the Resident Coordinator system.

Recommendation 1

The General Assembly, through the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR) process, should establish long-term targets to be achieved with regard to diversity among Resident Coordinators in terms of North-South balance and organization of origin. ECOSOC should, within the QCPR process, monitor the implementation of measures taken to attain such targets.

III. ASSESSMENT OF RC CANDIDATES VIA THE RESIDENT COORDINATOR ASSESSMENT CENTRE (RCAC)

A. Functioning of the RCAC including strengths and challenges

Finding 4: The RCAC is recognized as an objective, impartial and highly professional competency-based examination for candidates for inclusion in the RC Pool. As an initial quality control of the candidates it serves as an important basis for ensuring the fairness, objectivity and transparency of the selection process. However, the overall positive assessment of the RCAC is fine-tuned by critical remarks from some of the candidates and by the organizations' representatives which merit consideration in the upcoming review of the RCAC by the established Interagency Steering Committee.

39. All the potential candidates to be nominated for an RC position must first pass an assessment process to be carried out by the Resident Coordinator Assessment Center (RCAC). The process of the RCAC has been designed, developed and delivered since 2001 by Saville & Holdsworth Ltd. Canada (SHL),²⁸ an international consulting firm, via contracts signed with UNDP, which have subsequently been amended and renewed several times over the years. SHL was selected by an Inter-Agency Steering Committee (SC),²⁹ which agreed upon the competencies to be assessed and provided input for the design of the assessment. RCAC assessments usually take place every year in the 2nd and 4th quarter. All United Nations agencies are responsible for covering the cost of assessment for their candidates, which averaged USD 11,470 (excluding travel and DSA) per person in 2012.

40. The RCAC evaluates candidates on the basis of competencies and behavioural indicators gathered through exercises and other "appropriate assessment methodologies". The evaluations have been designed to reflect the demands of the work normally performed by RCs, as well as their additional functions (such as humanitarian coordination and security management, inter alia)³⁰. According to SHL, its assessors are derived from an experienced, multi-national and gender-balanced group of independent consultants or associates from its global network of offices. Candidates receive a detailed written evaluation from the RCAC of their strengths and weaknesses relative to the RC competencies.

41. WG-RCSI provides oversight of the process of the RCAC, which has been revised several times since its establishment in 2001 – notably in 2006 and in 2010. At present there is an ongoing revision of the work of the RCAC led by an Inter-Agency Steering Committee in connection with the renewal of the contract for running the RCAC.

42. From the feedback from POs and RCs, the overwhelming view was that the RCAC served as a good initial filter for candidates nominated by the organizations on the basis of a unified set of competency criteria. Of the RCs responding to the JIU survey, 97.6 per cent agreed that the RCAC process was fair and objective, and was professionally run and managed; 90.1 per cent were satisfied with the feedback received from the assessment and that they had had sufficient scope to provide comments on aspects on which they disagreed; 91.3 per cent agreed that candidates were treated equally and fairly in the RCAC; and 91.3 per cent also agreed that the competencies tested in the RCAC were relevant to the day-to-day work they currently perform as RCs. Most RCs (80 per cent) also agreed that the RCAC process was organization neutral, i.e. that no benefits can be derived from originating from a particular organization. Similarly positive opinions were expressed as to the quality

²⁸ SHL – UNDP 2006 Contract, p. 16, point 3.3.

²⁹ Composition of Inter-Agency Steering Committee: UNDP (co-chair), UNDOCO (co-chair and secretariat), UNICEF, UNFPA, OCHA (representing the humanitarian community), WHO (representing specialized agencies), OHCHR (representing NRAs), DPA (representing the requirement for political skills and acumen, and the Secretariat) and UN Women. (UNDP response to JIU questionnaire received on 4 June 2013 and UN Women).

³⁰ SHL – UNDP 2010 Contract, annex 1 – ToR, p. 1, point a.

and professionalism of the RCAC by most managers of POs who observed the assessment process in situ.

43. **Critical opinions were expressed concerning the competencies, skills and abilities subject to the assessment as well as the fact that substantive knowledge was not tested in the RCAC.** UNDP senior management is highly concerned that candidates are getting through the RCAC without having a sufficient development-related background and it is a particular risk in light of the increasing number of non-UNDP candidates. UN Women was in favour of testing that covered all United Nations programming principles, particularly the normative (Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), gender and environmental sustainability). Other agencies were in favour of strengthening testing of certain skills/competencies and/or introducing testing on substantive knowledge on, inter alia, security (DSS), human rights (OHCHR, OCHA), humanitarian action (OCHA) and political acumen (DPA, DPKO), although some of these – as regards skills/competencies – need fine-tuning, rather than wholesale changes. Such views also coincided with those of the RCs: 45.1 per cent of RC respondents disagreed (43.8 per cent agreed) that the competencies necessary to perform the role of Designated Official (DO) for Security were adequately tested during the RCAC.

44. Another major issue brought to the attention of the Inspectors repeatedly during the review process was a perceived **cultural bias** in the assessment process towards the “Anglo-Saxon” education system, which favoured candidates from North America and Western Europe in terms of expectations with regard to behaviour. Of the respondents to the JIU survey, one in four (26.3 per cent) either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the RCAC process was culturally neutral (i.e. no benefits could be derived from originating from belonging to a particular cultural, ethnic, national, religious or linguistic group). As an example it was mentioned that while “salesman-like” traits such as being “direct”, “assertive”, “aggressive” and “pushy” were viewed as positive indicators by the assessors as they brought immediate results in the simulation exercises, such traits did not come naturally to candidates originating from societies where conflict-avoidance was placed at a premium. Other respondents noted that, given that the entire United Nations culture was very “Anglo-Saxon” oriented, the RCAC thus tested a candidate on the dominant system he/she needed to work in.

45. Critical remarks were expressed concerning the **insufficient level of multilingualism** in the assessment process. While it was recognized that testing in French and Spanish was carried out, a number of respondents noted that the fluency of the assessors in these two languages needed to be carefully reviewed. Non-native English speakers complained that most of the testing was carried out in English by native English-speaking assessors who lacked understanding of the day-to-day realities of the RCs working in the field and had a limited appreciation of the fact that RCs also had to work in other languages. Several POs and RCAC candidates also expressed doubts as to the **relevance of the psychometric testing** component of the RCAC, which they noted was a form of testing more prevalent in Western countries. There was scope for candidates familiar with such testing to potentially “game it”, while candidates from developing countries unacquainted with such testing complained about not receiving sufficient advance information as to what such testing encompassed.

46. Overall, 65.1 per cent of the RC respondents were of the view that the RCAC was working well in the way in which it was structured and that they would not make major changes to the process. Of the rest, 23.8 per cent disagreed, indicating that room for further improvement certainly existed. **Taking into account that the RC assessment process is currently being reviewed by the Inter-Agency Steering Committee, the Inspectors have refrained from making specific suggestions concerning the RCAC. The Inspectors merely wish to draw the attention of the Steering Committee to a need for proper weighting of the suggestions of POs and RCs as regards enhanced testing on specific skills/competencies and a general knowledge of United Nations programming principles.**



47. It is however important to maintain knowledge and organizational neutrality in the testing process in order to continue to ensure that all candidates have an equal opportunity for success irrespective of their organization of origin. Consideration should also be given to achieving an

appropriate balance as regards the linguistic and cultural diversity of the assessors in order to better accommodate RC candidates from diverse backgrounds without compromising the rigour of the assessment process. Finally, the Inspectors underline that the RCAC assessment is a minimum requirement for RC posts and other important human resources criteria – namely experience, performance, personality, suitability and specific knowledge necessary for a specific RC position – should, as is currently the case, continue to be reviewed and dealt with at a later stage of the selection process.

B. Diversity in RCAC nominations not commensurate with diversity criteria applied in appointments

Finding 5: The diversity in terms of gender, geographical region, language and organization of origin of the candidates proposed by the organizations for the assessment does not match the criteria applied in the final stage of appointment. The repeated calls to diversify the candidates proposed for assessments have not resulted in significant results in terms of better matches in the pool with the criteria for appointments.

48. Despite repeated calls by the Secretary-General, the UNDG Chair and DOCO to further diversify the candidates nominated for RC assessments, such calls have not resulted in significant enhancements in the diversity of the candidates presented to the RCAC and consequently the diversity of the RC pool (composed of successful RCAC candidates) does not reflect the desired level of diversity, which may in turn negatively affect the diversity of future appointments.



Data source for graphs 4 & 5: UNDP response to JIU questionnaire received on 4 June 2013.

49. Diversity is further affected by the existing composition of the RC Pools and the declining success rate of candidates from the South in the RCAC. From 2006 to 2009, 47.8 per cent (45/94) of

Southern candidates had passed the assessment, compared with an overall pass rate of 54.3 per cent (113/208) for all candidates – a difference of only 6.5 per cent (see Annex III, Table 3). However, following the revamp of the selection process, the pass rate for Southern candidates from 2010 to 2012 dropped significantly to 35.3 per cent compared with the overall pass rate of 50.6 per cent – a far more significant difference of 15.3 per cent and indicative perhaps of Southern candidates finding it more challenging to negotiate the assessment process compared with their Northern counterparts than in the past. **The issue deserves further research, which goes beyond the scope of this report.**

50. When success in the RCAC is viewed in terms of gender, the difference is minimal, with 54.9 per cent of all male candidates passing the RCAC from 2006 to 2012, compared with 51.4 per cent of all female candidates, a difference of only 3.5 per cent. Similarly – and contrary to the widespread perception that UNDP candidates fare better in the RCAC compared with non-UNDP candidates and external (non-United Nations) candidates, the success rate for all three groups from 2006 to 2012 was identical: 52.6 per cent (non-UNDP), 52.8 per cent (UNDP) and 52.3 per cent (external, i.e. non-United Nations).

51. The RC Pools³¹ – the source for future RCs – are even more imbalanced in terms of gender and geographical diversity compared with serving RCs, with only 37 per cent of the candidates in RC Pool A (candidates available for immediate deployment) being female and only 35 per cent being from the South. While UNDP has done very well in recent years in furthering gender parity, with 62 per cent of all its Pool A candidates being female (accounting for 65 per cent of all female candidates in Pool A), non-UNDP entities have performed dismally in this respect with only 21 per cent of all non-UNDP candidates in Pool A being women. **It is advisable that other United Nations entities undertake similar efforts to those undertaken by UNDP to further gender diversity.** In terms of geographical diversity, both UNDP and non-UNDP entities have performed poorly, with only 35 per cent of UNDP Pool A candidates and an ever lower 30 per cent of non-UNDP Pool A candidates being from the South. Linguistic diversity in the composition of RC Pool A candidates also remains a challenge: while all 54 candidates speak English, and 39 per cent speak French and 26 per cent Spanish, only 3 candidates (5.5 per cent) can speak Arabic. The latter is an alarmingly low figure given the significant number of RCs in Arab countries. Not a single RC Pool A candidate speaks Russian or Chinese.

52. Both in terms of gender parity (UNDP: 41 per cent, non-UNDP: 38 per cent) and geographical distribution (UNDP: 41 per cent, non-UNDP: 36 per cent), both UNDP and non-UNDP entities fall well short of attaining gender parity with regard to their RC Pool B candidates (available for assignment in the near future). Linguistic diversity in the composition of RC Pool B candidates is only marginally better than is the case of RC Pool A: while all 90 candidates speak English, 42 per cent French and 32 per cent Spanish, only 6 candidates (6.7 per cent) speak Russian, 3 Arabic (3.3 per cent) and 1 Chinese (1.1 per cent). However, diversity in terms of organization of origin drops significantly for RC Pool B, with UNDP accounting for 57 per cent of all candidates, compared with only 39 per cent for RC Pool A.

53. Adding to the concerns of non-UNDP entities not nominating enough female or Southern candidates to the RCAC is the fact that they are not nominating enough candidates overall. In the seven years from 2006 to 2012, only three non-UNDP entities have sent more than 20 candidates to the RCAC, namely UNICEF (30), UN-OCHA (25) and WFP (24). Worryingly, six entities with a major field presence have sent only a minimum number of candidates to the RCAC: 12 from UNHCR, 8 each from WHO, UNAIDS and UNESCO and only 5 and 4 candidates respectively from ILO and UNFPA. **In addition to Recommendation 1, to address the issue of limited diversity in the nomination of candidates to the RCAC, all entities should nominate a greater number of qualified candidates and the increased number of nominations should better reflect the required appointment criteria.**

³¹ Data for RC Pool A and RC Pool B for February 2013.

C. Internal shortcomings and limitations in organizations' practices with regard to identifying and preparing candidates for the assessment

Finding 6: Internal shortcomings and limitations in organizations' practices need to be addressed with a view to improving their performance in the identification of candidates for assessment.

54. The Inspectors noted the lack of a consistent in-house system within most United Nations system entities for the identification of candidates for the RCAC, exacerbated by a perceived lack of commitment and attention to this issue from senior management. In most entities, guidelines for identifying potential RC candidates are not incorporated into human resources practices and identification often results from the personal initiative of candidates or as a result of individual ad-hoc decisions on the part of senior management. Of all non-UNDP originating RC respondents to the JIU survey, 57 per cent indicated that they had approached their organizations to sponsor them for the RCAC, while in only 32 per cent of the cases had the organization concerned proactively approached the candidate. The reverse holds true for RCs originating from UNDP with 73 per cent being approached by UNDP and 25 per cent approaching the organization themselves.

55. Some POs note that, while it was easy for UNDP HRM to identify potential RC candidates given that a clear career path existed for UNDP staff to become RCs from having served as either Deputy Resident Representatives (UNDP-DRR) or Country Directors (UNDP-CDs), such a clear career path did not exist for staff from non-UNDP entities, making potential RC candidates more challenging to identify. The Inspectors only partially accept this explanation and draw attention to the United Nations entities with a large field presence whose country representatives with experience in UNCTs could serve as a source for RC candidates. The Inspectors were informed of proactive measures undertaken by a number of agencies (ILO, UNIDO, and UN-DPA/DFS) in recent years to identify potential RC candidates.

56. The Inspectors are seriously concerned by the absence of a unified approach in the United Nations Secretariat for identifying and preparing RC candidates, with individual departments left to deal with the issue on their own, including financing the cost of participation in the RCAC and related preparatory support. **OHRM should be more proactive and supportive to United Nations Secretariat entities (departments, offices, programmes) involved in the RC system, including DESA, DFS, DPA, DPI, DPKO, DSS, OHCHR, UNCTAD and UNODC.**

57. Senior management in several organizations, particularly smaller ones, mentioned in interviews their reluctance to put forward female candidates and candidates from the global South to the RCAC as they themselves had a limited number of women and Southern staff in senior positions and were thus expected to increase diversity in senior level positions within their own organization. Subsequently, releasing the few women and Southern candidates they had to the RC system – whereby they would come under UNDP contracts – would lead to deterioration in their own internal diversity statistics. **To address this issue in the longer term, women and staff from the South who have leadership potential need to be identified and groomed from an early stage in their careers (P3– P4 level). Additionally, consideration could be given to revising the present rule of internal statistics such that the originating organization of an RC³² can continue to reflect the RC as one of its own senior staff members for statistical purposes.**

58. While satisfaction levels are high³³ among RCs with regard to the information they receive from SHL to prepare for the RCAC, the reverse holds true with regard to their level of satisfaction with their own organizations in terms of the adequacy of the support they receive to prepare for the

³² To avoid double-counting, this rule would apply to all entities except UNDP as UNDP staff becoming RCs remain on UNDP contracts.

³³ Of the RCs responding to the JIU survey, the vast majority (78.8 per cent) found the information received from SHL prior to the RCAC to be useful in adequately preparing for the RCAC, while only 10 per cent disagreed.

RCAC. Of the respondent RCs, 86.3 per cent had received no support (training/coaching/mentoring) from their organizations in preparing for the RCAC. Contrary to the widespread perception among non-UNDP entities that UNDP candidates are better prepared by their organizations for the RCAC, the JIU survey shows that the percentage of non-UNDP originating RCs receiving preparatory support from their organizations (21.4 per cent) is more than double that of UNDP originating RCs (9.6 per cent). It may however be noted that UNDP candidates can readily seek informal advice from a large number of UNDP colleagues who completed the RCAC. The Inspectors note that this situation is changing since several – but not all – agencies have started to take steps to better prepare their candidates for the RCAC (UNDP, WFP, ILO, OCHA, DPKO/DFS, UNHCR).

59. In line with paragraph 124(b) of the QCPR resolution (General Assembly resolution 67/226) which calls for improving the way in which individuals are selected for the RC system, the implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the RC assessment and selection process.

Recommendation 2

The Executive Heads of United Nations system organizations who have not yet done so should instruct their human resources management offices to develop and implement appropriate guidelines for the identification, screening and preparation of potential RC candidates as soon as possible.

60. One reason given by many organizations, particularly the smaller ones, as to why they have only put forward a limited number of candidates to the RCAC or none at all, is the high cost associated with sending a candidate to the RCAC. The cost of participation in the RCAC is borne by the organization (only two survey respondents noted that their RCAC participation costs were self-financed). Most of the organizations lack a dedicated budget for RCAC participation related costs, thus paying for such costs either through the generally limited training/staff development budget (UNDPKO, FAO, UNCTAD, UNODC, UNOPS) or from extra-budgetary funds (UN-DPA). UNDP, WFP, UN-OCHA and UNFPA have a budget line (regular or extra-budgetary) for candidates to be sent to the RCAC. **To the extent possible, organizations should avoid using organizational training funds to cover RCAC costs and, for those which do not already have one, explore the possibility of establishing a dedicated budget line to cover such costs.**

61. In addition some organizations noted that some of their best and brightest candidates had failed the RCAC and that this served as a disincentive in investing in sending candidates to the RCAC in the future. Others were frustrated that candidates passed but remained stuck in the RC Pool for years despite being nominated for various posts, which led them to reconsider the merit of investing in sending candidates to the RCAC. **The Inspectors conclude that attention should be paid to lowering the financial burden on smaller organizations and also to incentivizing diversity in RCAC nominations. The organizations may consider the establishment of a reimbursement mechanism from the shared budget, whereby an organization is reimbursed for the participation cost of a candidate who is successful in the RCAC and also belongs to one of the three targeted diversity categories.**

IV. SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR RC NOMINATIONS

A. Functioning of the IAAP³⁴

Finding 7: The IAAP is in practice playing its prescribed role in the shortlisting of nominated candidates from the pool for RC positions. This process is inclusive of the United Nations system and the SOPs ensure the flow of information on candidates, their appraisal and the decisions taken.

62. The Inspectors noted with satisfaction that the provisions of the SOPs are generally observed and, in addition to furthering inclusiveness, have injected a major element of regularity, predictability and clear planning into all stages of the RC selection process. These include regular updating of RC Pools, annual and five-year projection of future RC vacancies, periodic updating and dissemination of RC post profiles, quarterly IAAP meetings, regular updates on all relevant developments in the selection and appointment process, an annual review of SOP implementation and clear identification of the specific roles and responsibilities of all IAAP members. The shortlisting process is clearly defined and followed: namely, presentation of the post profile for the RC position by the IAAP Chair followed by the presentation of the candidates by nominating organizations and discussion of the candidates' background and/or qualifications. The IAAP thus provides an increasingly reliable basis for the UNDG Chair to make informed decisions on recommendations to the Secretary-General.

Advisory role of the IAAP

63. The IAAP is an interagency forum for the shortlisting of candidates nominated from the RC Pools by the United Nations entities for RC positions. Its title and the SOPs make it clear that it is at best an advisory body to review candidates and advise the UNDG Chair on their suitability for RC positions. It is not the final determinant on the appointment of the RC, which is the Secretary General's prerogative. The UNDG Chair also retains the prerogative to provide her own views to the Secretary-General on the candidates retained by the IAAP and as such the candidate she recommends does not necessarily have to be same as the one receiving the highest number of votes in the IAAP.

64. The Inspectors looked into the implementation of information flow provisions. According to a sample of eight IAAP meetings held between October 2011 and November 2012, the SOP provisions for information flow were fully observed except as regards the time frame, with the candidates' matrix being sent to the IAAP members an average of 11.75 days³⁵ in advance of the IAAP meetings, although the SOPs stipulate that they be sent two weeks in advance. The minutes of the meetings prepared by UNDOCO outlining pool changes and the candidates shortlisted for each RC post vacancy are to be circulated to the IAAP members within 5 days of the meeting date and/or prior to the subsequent meeting with the UNDG Chair. Based on a sample of eight IAAP meetings held between March 2011 and November 2012, the SOP provisions were respected, with minutes being sent to the UNDG Chair an average of 3.9 days after the completion of the IAAP meetings. The Inspectors point out that, in order to allow IAAP members sufficient time to consult with their constituents on the RC candidates and arrive at the meeting with an informed opinion, it is essential that the reasonable time frames for document circulation as laid down in the SOPs be met.

Finding 8: While the IAAP process follows the basic provisions of the SOPs, critical observations concerning the way it functions need to be addressed, including some aspects of the SOPs that need to be changed following substantial discussions in UNDG.

B. Challenges/criticisms pertaining to operational aspects of the IAAP

65. The prevailing view of the participants in the IAAP meetings was that in practice there **were insufficient or no substantive discussions** on the quality and suitability of candidates for a particular

³⁴ See annex II for details on the operational procedures of the IAAP.

³⁵ The matrix was sent 9-10 days in advance in 4 cases and 13-14 days in advance in 4 other cases.

post in the IAAP. While in theory there was nothing to stop such discussions, there was insufficient time available for that. For eight IAAP meetings held between March 2011 and November 2012, an average of 39.5 candidates³⁶ were reviewed for an average of 10 posts per meeting. Given that a large number of candidates are reviewed during each meeting and bearing in mind that there are several regular agenda items in an IAAP meeting (the review of RC candidates being the main agenda item), participants observed that in most cases, a 3-5 minute presentation by the sponsoring agency is directly followed by a vote without any substantive discussions on the candidates. However, some participants noted that the IAAP was already familiar with a number of candidates, particularly the incumbent RCs or those who had been considered earlier by the IAAP (only 12.5 per cent of the RCs responding to the JIU survey received an RC posting on the first occasion they were nominated).

66. Some IAAP participants questioned the possible impact of any dialogue, noting that several agencies submitted their votes electronically even before the IAAP meeting while most others came to the meetings with pre-determined instructions on how to vote. The rank of IAAP participants had also allegedly become more junior (below the agreed “D” level) in recent years, resulting in participants having less delegated authority to change pre-determined agency positions on a candidate. While the lack of discussion can be interpreted as the organizations having done their due diligence in coming prepared for IAAP meetings, in that they had screened the candidates through extensive consultations with their Regional Directors’, leading to an informed position on the candidates, the Inspectors noted that such due diligence varied greatly from one agency to another.

67. A perceived lack of trust among POs as regards preserving the confidentiality of IAAP discussions from the candidates was also highlighted as a factor inhibiting frank discussions. Participants noted that they were reluctant to make substantive comments on a candidate as they feared that the information would then be leaked out. One agency participant noted that, when there were concerns regarding a candidate, the agency principal would rather call the UNDG Chair directly than place the concern before the IAAP. Many RCs, for their part, complained that they had no means of defending their candidacy before the IAAP where unsubstantiated “heresy”, “rumours” and “reputation” would often play a role, especially given the lack of discussions. **To deal with these challenges in the dialogue process, the Inspectors call upon the IAAP Chair to discuss ways and means through which more time and weight can be given to the discussions on candidates and thereby minimize the mechanical nature of the voting process.**

68. In the view of the IAAP participants, informal bargaining and negotiations on candidates outside the IAAP were frequent practices, with most decisions on candidates being “pre-cooked” and “pre-determined” through bilateral discussions. The term “horse-trading” came up regularly during interviews with POs and RCs as the best way of accurately describing the IAAP selection process, with agencies not only lobbying heavily to push through their candidate of choice but also trading votes in exchange for support for other positions.

69. Most agencies acknowledged the importance of lobbying, noting that for candidates to be successful, not only did the sponsoring agency have to lobby but the candidates themselves had to network and make themselves known to the IAAP. IAAP participants also noted that there would be cases when human resources management considerations allegedly trumped the suitability of a candidate for a post. Such practices made several entities question the merit of nominating candidates in the future, given the significant investments involved.

70. Several agencies asserted that the key humanitarian participants in the IASC would often (although not always) band together and lobby heavily to push through preferred candidates and vote as a block – particularly when it came to countries with humanitarian operations. A number of humanitarian participants themselves acknowledged prior coordination, noting that United Nations entities with full or partial humanitarian mandates would coordinate amongst themselves through their personnel officers prior to IAAP meetings to determine which countries were priorities for which

³⁶ This reflects the average of the total number of candidates nominated for all posts and not the total number of unique candidates as the same candidate is often nominated for several posts.

entity and for whom they would vote. **The Inspectors conclude that the exchange of information on candidates among the IAAP members, including lobbying and agreements on voting, should be considered as part of the normal practice to achieve the best possible shortlisting; however, such choices must then be substantiated through transparent and fair discussions at the IAAP meetings. The IAAP meetings should not be used as a “rubber stamping” forum for agreements concluded outside this framework.**

71. A possibly unintended consequence of the IAAP SOPs is the provision allowing for IAAP participants to abstain from voting, resulting in candidates **being shortlisted by the IAAP despite not receiving support votes from the majority of IAAP participants**. A particularly glaring example was highlighted, where a candidate with four votes of “support” and two votes of “no support” (plus nine “abstentions” from the other IAAP members) was designated by the SG for an RC post in 2012.³⁷ Agencies, for their part, noted that they typically abstained when they did not have enough information on a candidate or when they heard mixed observations on candidates. Repeated calls by the IAAP Chair to avoid “abstentions” appear not to have been enough to change the practice and to rectify this situation. Some POs have suggested that the IAAP SOPs be amended to specify the minimum number of “support” votes a candidate would require (e.g. 50 per cent of the quorum) in order to be shortlisted. **The Inspectors see merit in this proposal.**

72. Nearly half (47.5 per cent) of the RCs responding to the JIU survey disagreed that they were regularly updated on the status of their application during the selection process, although the IAAP SOPs clearly place such a responsibility on the sponsoring United Nations entity. What particularly aggrieved many RCs was the fact that they would typically receive no information when they were not shortlisted, although honest and transparent feedback would have helped them to identify not only post profiles better suited to their strengths for future applications, but also their competencies and skills requiring further development. When feedback was received, it was usually informal and word-of-mouth, and the amount and quality of feedback received often depended on how well the candidate knew his/her agency representatives participating in the IAAP. **The Inspectors urge the organizations to comply with their SOP obligation of keeping the candidates informed on IAAP decisions.**

73. A number of IAAP participants have severely criticized the existing “**gate-keeper**” system whereby a RC Pool member cannot apply for a RC post without formal nomination by his/her parent agency. Supporters noted that the gatekeeping system ensures that the organizations take responsibility for candidates they put through as RCs, in other words, if an RC is not performing up to expectations then the parent agency has a responsibility to take the candidate back.³⁸ They also noted that, as the current system limited each agency to nominating a maximum of two candidates per RC posting, allowing for self-nomination from the pools could result in an even greater organizational imbalance as UNDP candidates alone constituted 39 per cent and 57 per cent of all candidates in RC Pools A and B respectively. Supporters further noted that, were candidates allowed to self-nominate, and their own parent agencies voted openly against a candidate in the IAAP, this could potentially severely damage the candidate’s career within his/her own organization.

74. Critics noted that the gatekeeping aspect of the selection process had resulted in a trade-off between professionalism (selecting the candidate who was the best fit for a post) and ownership (nominating a candidate in line with an organization’s own interest). To redress the perceived imbalance and increase the number of candidates, several POs recommended that the RC selection process should be treated like all other United Nations selection processes: the RCAC and even more, RC posts, should be open to all qualified candidates, without a requirement for agency nominations. **While the Inspectors understand that opening the nomination process would have risks and**

³⁷ This particular post was advertised twice in 2012 due to a lack of suitable candidates. Only one candidate was put forward and reviewed by the IAAP.

³⁸ The latter argument does not hold true for RC appointments at the ASG level, as under the Secretary-General’s “non-reversion policy”, staff members forfeit the right of return to their home agency once they accept a Secretariat appointment at the ASG level.

advantages, they concluded that greater flexibility is needed when it comes to nominating RC Pool candidates for RC positions and call upon the UNDG to carefully consider how and to what extent the process can be made more open.

75. Several organizations were critical of the fact that RCs were being selected and appointed without having been interviewed for a particular post (except in the case of DSRSG appointments). These POs felt that a review of the post profile, performance evaluation and RCAC results was insufficient as the RCAC assessment was generic and not specific, whereas an interview could help to better determine the suitability of a candidate for a specific country context. The UNDP Administrator, ERC and the USG for the lead department presently have the option of interviewing DSRSG/RC/HCs candidates selected by the IAAP and the process has worked well, lending credence to the idea of having an interview option in the RC selection process.

76. Of the RCs responding to the JIU survey, 43.8 per cent were in favour of and 36.3 per cent were opposed to candidates being interviewed during the selection process. The majority of those responding positively were in favour of candidates being interviewed by a designated panel of the UNDG Chair once shortlisted by the IAAP. Several RCs noted that interviews would allow the UNDG Chair to get a better idea of “who they were really getting.” **While the Inspectors recognize that such interviews may run the risk of prolonging the selection process with more steps and bureaucratic hurdles, they consider it appropriate to introduce the possibility of interviewing first-time RCs or candidates receiving limited support during the IAAP shortlisting process.**

77. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the RC selection process.

Recommendation 3

The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination should initiate, through UNDG, the review and revision of the SOPs of the IAAP as needed to:

- (a) Ensure a more open nomination process for candidates who are already in the RC Pool;**
- (b) Address the possibility of incorporating interviews for shortlisted candidates at the request of the IAAP, to better advise the UNDG Chair on their suitability for a particular position; and**
- (c) Change the present voting system to establish a minimum required number of support votes (preferably 50 per cent of those voting) for a candidate to be shortlisted for consideration by the UNDG Chair.**

V. APPOINTMENT

A. Secretary-General's appointments overwhelmingly reflective of IAAP preferences

Finding 9: The Secretary-General's appointment practice relies heavily on the IAAP decisions on shortlisted candidates and takes into account the publicly announced diversity criteria. There exists a formal possibility of greater transparency in the final phase of the appointment process, but this has been underutilized in recent years.

78. After the IAAP shortlisted nominations are submitted to the UNDG Chair for her consideration, the Chair has the option of consulting – with the UNDG Principals (Executive Heads) inter alia – with regard to any shortlisted candidate prior to presenting them with her own recommendations/ observations to the Secretary-General for appointment. The presentation takes place at a formal meeting with the Secretary-General, who takes the final decision on appointment. The minutes of the meetings where appointment decisions are taken are prepared by DOCO and shared with the IAAP. The list of RCs selected by the Secretary-General is conveyed to the CEB and UNDG members with a three-day deadline for comments. There have been no cases in recent years when the decision of the Secretary-General has been challenged. The contractual arrangement with the selected RC is made after receiving clearance from the government of the host country.

79. As noted in Chapter IV, the IAAP is an advisory body. The Secretary General has the clear prerogative to make the final decision while the UNDG Chair also retains the prerogative to provide her own views to the Secretary-General on the candidates selected by the IAAP. **In practice, the Secretary-General and UNDG Chair overwhelmingly tend to follow the advice of the IAAP, as evidenced by the fact that, in 2012, 93 per cent of the Secretary General's selected candidates received the strongest IAAP support.**³⁹

B. Challenges/criticisms pertaining to the appointment process

80. Despite the fact that the Secretary-General's decision almost always prefers the candidate with the strongest IAAP support, there was a near universal opinion among the agencies that the final stage of the selection process was a "black box" wherein there was a **lack of clarity** with regard to whom the UNDG Chair was consulting in making her final recommendations to the Secretary-General, what recommendations she was making, what was actually being discussed in the meeting and on what considerations a candidate was being appointed or rejected for a specific post. Many agencies also expressed concern about an inherent conflict of interest as the UNDG Chair was also the UNDP Administrator and thus questioned to what extent she could remain neutral in making recommendations in cases when her own agency's candidates were competing against candidates from other agencies for RC posts.⁴⁰

81. Several agencies also expressed mixed views as to the role and influence of Regional UNDG Teams in the final selection process. Senior officials in two of the key agencies putting through RCs were of the view that given that the Regional UNDG Teams had regular contacts with RCs and were ultimately responsible for assessing RC performance, they should have a formal role in the selection process. However, several agencies were concerned that, informally, UNDP Regional Directors were able to significantly influence the recommendations that the UNDG Chair would make to the Secretary-General. One Regional Director (RD) interviewed by the JIU noted that the UNDG Chair would not go to the RDs but rather the RDs would approach the Chair when they had a genuine concern as regards a shortlisted candidate.

³⁹ DOCO response to JIU questionnaire dated 13 May 2013.

⁴⁰ The Inspectors cannot make a substantive determination as to whether UNDP candidates are advantaged in any way in the final stage of the selection process. It may be noted that, from 2006 to 2012, the total number of non-UNDP candidates (108) passing the RCAC outnumbered the total number of UNDP candidates who passed (84). During the same period, more UNDP candidates received RC appointments (139) compared with non-UNDP candidates (83).

82. OCHA is perceived as having a growing level of influence in the final stages of the selection process, with some POs highlighting consultations between the ERC and the UNDG Chair prior to her recommendations to the Secretary-General (action in line with SOP provisions). Consultations between the UNDG Chair and ERC have been acknowledged and described as regular and mutually satisfactory, particularly for countries with complex humanitarian challenges, with a view to having the confidence of the humanitarian actors who are vital to the success of United Nations operations in such countries. **The Inspectors are of the view that such regular consultations between the UNDG Chair and ERC are useful and indispensable to furthering the making of informed recommendations to the Secretary General.**

83. The IAAP participants were of the view that, while they were neither challenging nor questioning the prerogative of the Secretary-General in making the final selection, more transparent information on the selection outcome needed to be provided to the sponsoring agencies on the competencies, skills and comparative advantage one candidate had over others, leading to his/her selection.

C. Details of the appointment process according to the participants

84. With the exception of the Secretary-General, all key participants in the final stage of the selection process were interviewed by the Inspectors. These participants highlighted the following important characteristics of the post-IAAP stage of the selection process:

(a) Improving gender and geographical parity for RCs, on the basis of the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, is of high priority for the Secretary-General. The IAAP Chair regularly informs all agencies at the beginning of each IAAP meeting of diversity statistics/trends for RCs and encourages them to keep in mind such diversity-related considerations while reviewing groups of qualified candidates. Agencies are also regularly informed of these by the IAAP Chair when nominating candidates for the RCAC.

(b) In addition to the IAAP shortlist, DOCO also provides the UNDG Chair with statistics on gender and geographical balance and agency representation among current RCs, and information on any major issues that arose during the RCAC regarding a candidate. In reviewing the shortlist, the UNDG Chair typically consults with the ERC, OHR/UNDP Director and the IAAP Chair. Rather than merely looking at candidates on a post-by-post basis, the UNDG Chair also looks at diversity data for RCs. In most cases, the candidate receiving the strongest support from the IAAP is also the UNDG Chair's recommended candidate. However, there are a few occasions when she advises the Secretary-General to consider another candidate owing to diversity considerations.

(c) The EOSG prepares information for the Secretary-General, who personally reviews all material presented to him prior to meeting with the UNDG Chair and puts forth his own opinions and questions on the candidates. He also receives advice from his own cabinet, independently from the recommendations of the UNDG Chair. During the meeting with the Secretary-General, the UNDG Chair gives a presentation on the posts and the candidates, provides her own input and goes into the background of the candidates. The Secretary-General is also informally advised by the UNDG Chair and the EOSG as to who is the best candidate on the short list, which is done orally. When he perceives an imbalance in diversity, the Secretary-General considers alternatives from the shortlist. In the four cases (7 per cent) in 2012 when the Secretary-General appointed a candidate retained by the IAAP but with less IAAP support, three of the four appointees were women. DOCO takes the minutes and reports back to the IAAP, through the IAAP Chair, on the decisions of the Secretary General but not on the discussions.

D. Improving formal communication between the UNDG Chair and the IAAP

85. The Inspectors conclude that at the root of several of the aforementioned concerns is a lack of sufficient direct communication – both between the UNDG Chair and the IAAP, and between the Office of the EOSG and the IAAP. Despite clear provisions in the SOPs until the end of 2012, in practice, the IAAP did not receive any feedback from the EOSG on the final meeting with the Secretary-General. Through amendments to the SOPs approved in December 2012, the provision for EOSG feedback was dropped and a weaker provision is now in place, allowing for DOCO to provide additional clarification to the IAAP members and nominating agencies upon request on the outcomes of the Secretary-General's decision. There is a lack of clarity on the application and usefulness of this weakened formulation.

86. Additionally, while the role of the IAAP was to provide advice to the UNDG Chair, the SOPs do not make provisions for the UNDG Chair to reciprocate by providing any feedback to the IAAP, resulting in a one-way communication process. Given the fact that the UNDG Chair does not participate in the IAAP and thus has no formal communication with the Panel, this has added to the perception of a “black box”, with information going from the IAAP to the UNDG Chair but with little or no information coming back in return. **The Inspectors suggest that to address the existing trust deficit, the UNDG Chair should take steps to initiate a process of formal communication with the IAAP and provide feedback on developments pertaining to the post-IAAP stages of the selection process, with due regard to considerations of confidentiality. UNDG may also consider adopting the necessary amendments to the IAAP SOPs in this regard.**

87. While 52.5 per cent of the RCs responding to the JIU survey expressed satisfaction with the feedback received from the RC selection process with regard to why they were accepted or rejected for a specific post, there was a significant minority (38.8 per cent) who disagreed, indicating clear room for improvement. This was confirmed by a more even split on the statement that the RC selection process was working well and major changes were not needed, with 48.8 per cent of responding RCs agreeing and 43.8 per cent disagreeing.

88. It may be noted that RC appointments are affected by another factor beyond the control of the United Nations, namely a greater rate of rejection of appointed RCs by governments in the last three years, resulting in posts being re-advertised. In some cases, governments rejected candidates, arguing that they did not have a strong economic development background; in other cases candidates were rejected due to not having the desired language skills, particularly Arabic.

VI. ATTRACTING AND RETAINING A DIVERSIFIED POOL OF QUALIFIED RCS

A. Attractiveness of the RC post and achievements attained

Finding 10: Most RCs view their position as an attractive, challenging career option having high prestige, although the complexity and demanding nature of the RC function, its limited empowerment and underfinanced RC Office compared with the scope of the job is a challenge for the attractiveness of the post.

89. While 88.5 per cent of the RCs surveyed agreed that the RC post was an attractive one that senior and/or mid-level professionals would aspire to, only 57.7 per cent agreed (with a significant 42.3 per cent disagreeing) that such attractiveness outweighed the challenges of limited institutional support that an RC may receive in practice. Among the respondents, 93.6 per cent disagreed that the RC Office was adequately staffed and resourced and more respondents disagreed (43.6 per cent) rather than agreed (37.2 per cent) with the statement that the agencies were putting forward their best and brightest candidates to serve as RCs.

90. To improve the attractiveness of the RC post, a number of measures have been taken in recent years. A dedicated online platform – the RC Online website – was created to provide information both on the RC post as a career option as well as on recruitment steps to attract potential candidates. It includes profiles of serving RCs with their personal experiences, providing useful insights into their day-to-day work. The website has been used extensively (6,186 visits in 2012 including 68 per cent new visitors) and has become an effective tool for making RC vacancies more widely accessible (415 registered users by the end of 2012, representing a 46 per cent increase from 2011). Marketing materials for the RC career post have also been developed and distributed to all United Nations agencies, UNCT members and Regional UNDG Teams. To further promote the RC position and attract more suitable candidates, the Secretary-General and UNDG Chair wrote to the UNDG Principals to bring forward top candidates, particularly women.

B. RC Career path-related challenges

91. Many of the key challenges pertaining to attracting and retaining RCs are being dealt with by the UNDG Working Group on Resident Coordinator System Issues (WG-RCSI)⁴¹ and the Talent Management Task Force (TMTF),⁴² a sub-group of WG-RCSI. In January 2009, the TMTF released an assessment⁴³ dealing with many of the functional and managerial challenges which made staff hesitant to apply: the demanding nature of RC work; inadequate level of authority for the RC; limited institutional support – both in terms of substantive and operational matters; selection of candidates for RCAC uneven across agencies with a lack of common preparatory approaches; perception of appointment process as not being a “level playing field”; general lack of widespread available information on the RC post and recruitment steps; lack of incentives and imbalance in diversity. **According to the JIU survey and interview responses outlined earlier, apart from better marketing and some progress towards gender parity, the same challenges persisted in 2013.**

Finding 11: Career path issues for RCs received attention from the WG-RCSI but further progress is needed from the United Nations agencies to make the RC career attractive for their best performing staff members.

92. Among the principal challenges as regards increasing the attractiveness of the RC post was the lack of a **career path**, particularly for non-UNDP RCs, and the need to increase the predictability of such a path. Apart from the uncertainty as to whether they would return to a reasonable/respectable position in the parent organization, unpredictability and no guarantees for an RC of being granted a

⁴¹ WG-RCSI ToR, final version (3 March 2011).

⁴² The TMTF was created in May 2008. TMTF ToR, Final Version, 16 December 2011.

⁴³ UNDG WG-RCSI, RC TMTF, Assessment of RC Talent Management, Executive Summary, final draft, March 2009.

second posting on the basis of positive performance appraisals, led many to view the RC post as a “one-way ticket” and they consequently deferred from applying until they were close to retirement. The aforementioned uncertainties as regards a career track not only deterred qualified candidates from coming forward but it also deprived the system of more seasoned RCs, as many could only serve one term. **Most POs thus felt the need to groom RC candidates at a much earlier stage in their careers** and in this context the Inspectors welcome efforts undertaken by the UNDG WG-RCSI, including its proposal to create an RC career track whereby all interested staff from United Nations system entities can join a special programme early on (e.g. at the P3-P4 level) to gain inter-agency experience via assignments with different agencies to cover the full range of United Nations operations.⁴⁴

93. HR policies pertaining to the talent management system in all United Nations agencies should pay more attention to promoting the RC position as a career possibility for their best performing staff members. The RC career path can be further strengthened if exceptionally well-performing RCs are recognized by being prioritized for assignments to other RC posts in countries where there are larger United Nations operations and greater challenges, including receiving preference over other pool candidates with no RC experience when applying for an RC post.

94. The issues of right of return (to the agency of origin upon completion of RC term) and retention of grade⁴⁵ (i.e. maintaining the same grade the individual enjoyed as RC upon return to parent agency) were highlighted in connection with the career path. In July 2012, UNDG WG-RCSI and the HR network endorsed the following policy option: “For all organizations, mandatory right of return for RCs to their home agencies and, to the extent possible, retention of grades received while serving as RCs”.⁴⁶ Although it is a step forward, this is not regarded by UN-OHRM as an official policy and serves only as guidance. Most organizations thus continue to refer to the Inter-Agency Mobility Accord (IAMA),⁴⁷ approved by the HLCM in November 2005, which contains some limitations as regards return rights compared with the WG-RCSI endorsed policy.

95. POs responding to the JIU questionnaire confirmed that, in principle, they respected the right of an RC to return to his/her releasing organization at the same grade level at which he/she left it – which could mean a lower grade level than the RC post. Only WHO noted that its staff retained any promotion in grade earned on secondment as RC upon return to the organization. Most POs noted that it was not possible for them to create a special policy for RCs to return at a higher grade as this would have policy implications for their entire workforce. The smaller entities also noted that they simply did not have enough D1-D2 posts to accommodate returning RCs. However, in practice, very few RCs have returned to their parent agency, particularly in small organizations, with most reaching retirement age at the end of their terms.

96. To deal with the challenges RCs face regarding inter-agency mobility, the HLCM Working Group on Inter-Agency Mobility and RC Issues was established to facilitate the implementation of the revised Inter-Organizational Agreement concerning transfer, secondment or loan of staff by analysing implementation modalities and to promote inter-agency mobility by removing bottlenecks. In accordance with its terms of reference (TOR), the Working Group had to present a final report to the HLCM during the report writing period.⁴⁸

97. Most RCs were of the view that the attractiveness of the RC post was also affected by the unbalanced/uneven **performance appraisal system**. Presently, UNCT members can assess the performance of RCs but it is up to each individual agency to determine whether or not to allow an RC

⁴⁴ UNDG WG-RCSI, draft discussion note on incentive mechanisms for Resident Coordinators, 6 March 2012.

⁴⁵ In accordance with existing policies, if an RC serving at the D1 level was on a P5 post in his/her parent agency prior to being seconded to UNDP to serve as RC, he/she would have to return to his/her parent agency at the P5 level.

⁴⁶ DOCO response to JIU questionnaire received on 13 May 2013.

⁴⁷ CEB, Inter-Agency Mobility Accord, November 2005, article 4.5.

⁴⁸ Terms of Reference, Working Group on Inter-Agency Mobility and Resident Coordinator issues.

to rate or even to give input on the performance of UNCT members. **Mutual accountability mechanisms are necessary for the RC to have the necessary level of empowerment to perform his/her role and in this context the RCs stressed the need for the M&A system to be fully implemented (this was also emphasized by the General Assembly in the QCPR resolution)⁴⁹ as this is currently not the case.** Close to half of the RCs responding to the survey (44.2 per cent) as well as many RCs interviewed indicated that they have never been requested to provide inputs for the performance appraisal of agency representatives. **The Inspectors, in line with similar priorities expressed by the QCPR resolution,⁵⁰ consider that inputs from RCs for the appraisal of UNCT members would have a useful impact on the accountability of the agency country representatives as regards their UNCT obligations and empower the RC to the extent necessary to effectively perform his/her coordination functions.**

C. Need for improvements in the working methods of UNDG WG-RCSI

98. While the WG-RCSI (and its subsidiary TMTF) serves as an important forum for substantive interagency engagement to deal with issues affecting the ability to attract and retain RCs, participants noted that deliverables were often not clear, the work-plan was too packed⁵¹ and that discussions were unnecessarily lengthy. They emphasized that outcomes taken forward to the Advisory Group and the full UNDG should accurately and fully reflect the comments and priorities of the WG-RCSI. Some felt that participation in the working group was very inconsistent with regard to the level of participation and specialization, making it difficult for everyone to be “on the same page”. Consequently, small sub-groups would often be formed to deal with specific issues but these sub-structures had no secretariat support from DOCO.

99. Several participants also criticized the requirement in the terms of reference whereby not only do decisions have to be reached by consensus, but there are also provisions allowing for those who are unable to attend meetings to reserve judgment on a decision item until two working days after the draft note for the meeting is issued. Such dependence on a minimum common denominator owing to consensus requirements often resulted in overly lengthy documents where the agreed language was so vague that it was difficult to implement at the country level. **The Inspectors agree with the view expressed by various participants that there is a need for better balance between inclusiveness and efficiency.**

100. The Inspectors conclude that further progress to address the challenges in attracting and retaining RCs requires greater attention at senior management level and a more flexible attitude at the headquarters level, particularly as regards talent management and the career development of middle level managers, inter-agency mobility, retention of grade and non-financial incentives. **As a possible incentive, UNDG may consider facilitating the career path of seasoned and accomplished RCs (particularly at the D1 and D2 level) who have served two or three terms and have regularly received outstanding performance appraisals, by making them independent from their parent organizations (as is the case for RCs in ASG-level positions, who automatically lose their lien with their organizations of origin) and utilizing them as potential candidates for special assignments by the Secretary-General or for very senior level posts in the United Nations system.**

⁴⁹ General Assembly resolution 67/226, para. 130 (a).

⁵⁰ General Assembly resolution 67/226, para. 130 (c).

⁵¹ See 2013-2014 work plan of UNDG WG-RCSI, draft version (11 March 2013).

VII. INDUCTION AND TRAINING OF RESIDENT COORDINATORS

A. Strengths and weaknesses of current training and learning offerings for RCs

Finding 12: Significant improvements have been achieved in the identification of the training needs of RCs. There has been good progress in reshaping the training programme at the beginning of the selection and appointment process but the life-long learning programme for RCs is still a work in progress with significant uncertainty as to its financing.

101. Since 2009, systematic work has been carried out in the WG-RCSI to identify the managerial and thematic areas to be covered by RC training. An integrated learning programme for new RCs was developed and approved in September 2011. It covers RC assessments, training for RC pool members, RC induction training and mentoring, as well as other training needs.

102. The **UNCT Leadership and Coordination Skills (LSC)** course organized by UNSSC in Turin was attended by 73 per cent of the JIU survey respondents with 91 per cent finding it to be relevant to the work they performed as RC.⁵² The course focuses on leadership and coordination skills, competencies and behaviours necessary on the basis of competencies listed in the RC job description. Given the high level of satisfaction with the course, the **Inspectors conclude that all RCs – particularly those who had entered the system prior to the course becoming mandatory in 2011 – should complete the course as soon as possible.**

103. Since 2011, an **Agency Specific Information Package** has been put in place as part of the RC learning continuum. The Package is designed to provide RC candidates with basic and substantive information on the main entities of the United Nations system in terms of their mandates, structure, work and how they operate. A guidance note was also developed to provide United Nations entities with suggestions on how the information could be structured. The package developed by the United Nations agencies is available on the UNDG RC Online website.

104. **The Resident Coordinators Induction Programme** has been redesigned, taking into account the evaluation conducted in 2011 by an inter-agency group of learning experts. UNSSC was contracted to assist in the design of the agenda and lead facilitation of the programme. The redesigned induction course received positive assessments from the participants. Of the JIU survey respondents, 95 per cent agreed that the induction course was relevant to the work they performed as RC. Most RCs also appreciated the possibility to meet with agency heads and network and exchange views with others RCs. They also rated highly the trainings delivered by OCHA and recommended that it should be made mandatory for RCs to complete the training on International Humanitarian Law.

105. With regard to possible improvements, RCs and POs noted that skills/competencies should be either introduced or further strengthened during the induction training on security, mediation, advocacy, political acumen, human rights, working with UNCT members and interaction with the host Government on sensitive issues. There was also a suggestion that DO training be more substantive and less focused on administrative questions. RCs additionally called for greater involvement of former RCs with significant field experience and seasoned current RCs for sharing of lessons learned and personal reflections. RCs originating from non-UNDP entities noted that they would have benefited from additional training during the UNDP-RR (one week duration) induction, particularly as regards the financial architecture of UNDP and project-based work methodology. DPKO, DFS and DPA called for a more systematic and coordinated approach to the induction/in-briefing of multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HCs, among the lead departments of the United Nations, UNDP and OCHA, with a view to receiving coherent guidance since, presently, separate briefing allowed for little room to discuss possible challenges or tensions between these functions.

⁵² An impact assessment has never been conducted with regard to whether participation in the course has been effective in improving participants' behaviour in UNCTs.

106. RCs and POs agreed that adequate time needed to be set aside during the induction training to allow RCs to meet with the New York-based heads of key departments, funds, programmes and agencies. United Nations entities headquartered in Europe are dissatisfied with the cancellation of the Geneva segment of the induction following its revamp and they suggested revisiting these changes. Although the induction programme has its time and cost limitations, **the demand of the non-New York based organizations should be addressed and not be left entirely to the individual initiatives or interests of the RCs.**

107. The **country-specific orientation briefing** for the RCs has been identified as a key priority. It aims at providing newly appointed RC/HC/DOs with relevant information on development, political, economic, social, humanitarian, peace and security issues pertaining to a specific country context. Briefings on all areas relevant to the RC job description and United Nations policy and programming principles should also be covered to the extent feasible. Such briefings also provide the opportunity for United Nations agencies to interact with newly appointed RCs. In the long term, it should be centrally funded in the context of the overall cost-sharing mechanism. However, in order to address the needs of the new RC/HC/DOs for 2013, it was agreed that agencies would indicate to DOCO the desired briefing modality they wished to provide to the appointed RCs bearing in mind the costs associated with such decisions.⁵³

108. As an agreement was yet to be finalized on a centralized funding mechanism and as United Nations agencies had not yet provided information on their briefing modality, DOCO noted that it was too early to provide an assessment on the country-specific orientation. However, 81 per cent of the JIU survey respondents had received such orientation and 80 per cent considered it useful to their work. Proposals for improvement from POs and RCs included the need to develop a better system-wide common methodology for such orientation so that the information received was less fragmented, and to involve external partners and donors. OCHA, for its part, noted that it had been organizing single country orientations for RCs/HCs for several years. Given the positive early feedback indicating the clear value added of such orientations, the **Inspectors suggest that pending issues pertaining to funding and briefings modalities should be finalized as soon as possible.**

109. As part of the Competency Development Initiative, it was recommended in July 2012 that mentoring would be mandatory for all first time RCs/HCs/DOs and that a proposal for a mentoring mechanism would be developed by the TMTF. Mentoring will constitute one of the learning methods envisaged in the development of the lifelong learning proposal for incumbent RCs. The cost of ensuring mentoring for all new RCs will therefore be included in the overall budget presented by TMTF to WG-RCSI. Strong support for mentoring also exists among the RCs. Of the survey respondents 70 per cent agreed (only 12.8 per cent disagreed)⁵⁴ that mandatory mentoring for first-time RCs would be useful. Of RCs responding, 85.9 per cent also noted that they would be willing to volunteer to mentor first-time RCs. While a few RCs indicated that they had informally reached out to seasoned RCs for advice, the Inspectors received no information on the systematic operation of a mentorship programme except for one organized by OCHA for RCs serving as HCs. **The Inspectors strongly recommend that the UNDG implement a mentoring programme as soon as possible for all first-time RCs.**

110. At present, apart from the training available prior to or immediately after the appointment of a RC, **regular and/or continuing training/learning opportunities** for RCs in office are limited and not systematic. The TMTF is working on developing a lifelong learning programme for RCs covering regular training and refresher courses designed specifically to support the various aspects of the RC function including – inter alia – leadership, development issues, strategic planning, change and impact, security, human rights, political crises, mediation, negotiations and diplomacy. It was brought to the Inspectors' attention that ongoing work is nearing completion on the concept of continuing

⁵³ DOCO response to JIU questionnaire received on 13 May 2013.

⁵⁴ Of RC respondents, 16.7 per cent had no opinion on whether mandatory mentoring for first-time RCs would be useful.

training for RCs, although serious concerns were expressed concerning its viability, primarily due to uncertainty as to its financing.

111. RCs also noted the need for training on the policies and procedures of NRAs represented by them in country, joint coordination training for RCs and UNCT members, including training for UNCT members on the RC function, UNCT accountability and security.⁵⁵ Some RCs also recommended specialized training for female RCs focused on exposure to the experience of other women leaders within and outside the United Nations. Most RC candidates and some POs interviewed regretted the fact that there was no follow-up to the comprehensive assessment provided in RCAC reports. Such reports should serve as the basis for developing follow-up training programmes for candidates in their identified areas of weaknesses.⁵⁶ There is too much emphasis on the individual being responsible for his/her own training and career development, and HR personnel have to play a more proactive role in recommending or designing relevant training for RCs.

112. UNSSC, as the training arm of the United Nations system, plays an important role in providing training programmes for RCs. Such training programmes were rated highly by the participants and include, inter alia, the UNCT-LCS course, UN Leaders Programme, UNSG/ASG Leadership Exchange and UN Leadership Conference.⁵⁷ **The Inspectors suggest that UNSSC expertise and capacity be substantively utilized in managing/coordinating continuing training for RCs.**

B. Training-related financing challenges

Finding 13: The present practice of financing the induction and continuing training for RCs is fundamentally a system inherited from the past and the increase in the representation of the United Nations system entities in the composition of the RC corps necessitates review of how such training should be financed in the future.

113. While participation in the induction programme is currently financed by UNDG through cost sharing and participation in the UNCT-LCS course is financed by the parent agency, for all other training, RCs need either to secure funds from their RC Office budget or to seek support from UNDP. Most RCs were unequivocal that given the small budget of the RC Office – which was barely sufficient to cover minimum coordination costs – it would be impossible to pay for training. Nor does UNDP have a dedicated budget for continuing training for RCs.

114. Although the draft life-long, role-based learning programme (currently being finalized by TMTF), encompassing mentoring, shadowing and leadership training for incumbent RCs would theoretically address many of the concerns of RCs regarding lack of regular training, POs expressed serious doubts as to whether it would ever get off the ground, owing to the fact that to date there was no agreement as to how the Programme would be financed. Some felt that it was too “ambitious”, despite the fact that an actual costing was yet to be produced. POs also expressed concern that the TMTF did not have an alternative “Plan B” for what could be done with the limited amount of funding that actually existed.

115. The Inspectors conclude that, given that RCs represent the entire United Nations development system and work for the common benefit, expecting the parent organization to bear the financial burden of RC training represents an unjust imposition upon the parent organization in principle and

⁵⁵ The TMTF adopted the induction and orientation of UNCT members as a priority in December 2012. (Strategy for RC/UNCT Competency Development, TMTF Work Plan, December 2012).

⁵⁶ Based on average scores received per RCAC competency area for the past 12 years, candidates performed poorly in organizing, planning and coordination and relatively well in the realms of resilience, managing conflict and stress and coping with pressure and setbacks. In recent years, candidates have also scored well in communications (including advocacy, engagement and influence). Source: UNDP.

⁵⁷ UNSSC commissioned an independent evaluation of the senior leadership programmes (UNCT-LCS, UN Leaders) in 2013 that confirmed that the programmes are relevant and provide quality learning experiences for United Nations staff.

also causes practical and financial difficulties for smaller organizations. Additionally, given the major financing challenges that are faced by most RC Offices, the burden of financing continuing training for RCs must be borne by those who benefit from the work of the RCs – the UNDG members. Finally, taking into consideration the increasing number of RCs originating from non-UNDP entities, it cannot be expected that UNDP alone should bear the cost of RC training. Cost-sharing of RC training by UNDG members therefore appears to be the most feasible solution for moving forward.

116. The Inspectors conclude that the training costs for RCs should be made part of the operational costs of the RC system and should be absorbed on an agreed basis by the United Nations development system as a whole in the longer term. UNDG should arrive at such a decision in the run-up to the 2016 QCPR, duly taking into account the experiences of the ongoing cost-sharing exercise.

VIII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION OFFICE (DOCO)

A. Expectations from DOCO pertaining to the RC system

Finding 14: The role of DOCO in the operation of the IAAP is widely recognized by the participating United Nations entities but more expectations were expressed to strengthen its role as an impartial broker to promote issues important to the United Nations system organizations at large.

117. There was general appreciation for the role of DOCO in the operation of the IAAP as an important advocate of the RC system which effectively communicated the priorities and concerns of the UNDG to its various stakeholders and would at times assume a strong and vocal role when it came to ensuring that the guiding principles and SOPs were observed by all concerned. While the impartial technical role of DOCO in managing/coordinating the different aspects of the selection and appointment process was noted, a few organizations expressed the expectation that DOCO should be more proactive in formulating and representing common concerns or opinions on behalf of the IAAP.

118. Given the intimate involvement of DOCO with the RC selection process, and its role in the management of the RC Pools, **a number of POs recommended that talent management for the RC track should be one of the top priorities for DOCO**, which could be doing much more to groom and prepare RC Pool candidates, similar to what OCHA was doing for HC Pool candidates. POs also noted that the lack of learning specialists at DOCO diminished its ability to play a more substantive role on RC training related issues. More substantive engagement by UNSSC could serve as a possible means to strengthen the capacity of DOCO in this regard.

119. A number of organizations expressed the desire for more support from DOCO for the various subsidiary bodies of UNDG WG-RCSI. Currently such a responsibility falls entirely upon the Chair of the sub-groups. DOCO is only responsible for organizing WG-RCSI meetings but has no obligations to provide such support for the meetings of its subsidiary bodies. **The Inspectors conclude that given the volume of the work entrusted to WG-RCSI sub-groups, well-defined and organized DOCO support would increase the efficiency of the work done by these sub-groups.**

B. Varying levels of satisfaction with services offered by DOCO and Regional UNDG Teams

Finding 15: There is insufficient clarity among the stakeholders on the role of DOCO as it has been reshaped and there is a need for differentiated expectations by the RCs and organizations with regard to DOCO and the Regional UNDG Teams.

120. The *Management and Accountability (M&A) System of the UN Development and Resident Coordinator System including the “functional firewall” for the RC System*, adopted by the UNDG in 2008, clearly specifies for what and to whom DOCO is accountable.⁵⁸ A subsequent functional review of DOCO was conducted between 2009-2010, following which it was functionally realigned by UNDG, including changes to its structure and staffing. The functions of DOCO and the Regional UNDG Teams have thus been redefined. These changes have not been fully understood or absorbed by a number of RCs and PO representatives, often resulting in their expectations not fully matching

⁵⁸ In accordance with the Management and Accountability (M&A) System, DOCO is accountable to the UNDG Chair/AG through the UNDG ASG for performing the following five functions: (i) Effective support to: the full UNDG and its working groups; UNDG Chair; Regional Managers Teams; Advisory Group (ASG + Principals); ad hoc RC/UNCT (second line trouble shooting); providing technical guidance, training and financial support on coordination issues to UNCTs & RMTs; and supporting MDTF oversight committees including establishment of database on MDTFs; (ii) Close liaison with other CEB mechanisms; (iii) Close liaison with OCHA, DPA + DPKO; (iv) Proper use of resources; (v) Management of dispute resolution mechanism.

the new distribution of functions among DOCO and the Regional UNDG Teams. It is not the mandate of this review to deal with the causes of such misunderstandings but some aspects of this situation have implications on selection, training and the attractiveness of the RC post. The Inspectors therefore find it appropriate to draw attention to some of these issues.

121. The JIU survey of RCs as regards their satisfaction with DOCO and Regional UNDG Teams revealed significant differences. The majority disagreed (65.4 per cent) that they regularly referred to their Regional UNDG Team when they needed support or had a question on RC system issues. More RCs disagreed than agreed that they were satisfied with the provision of the following support/services by Regional UNDG Teams: technical and operational support services (57.7 per cent disagreed; 27 per cent agreed); quality support and advice on UNDAFs (44.8 per cent disagreed; 39.7 per cent agreed); and provision of troubleshooting support (44.9 per cent disagreed; 26.9 per cent agreed). Only on performance management of RCs and UNCTs were the numbers of satisfied/dissatisfied respondents equal (42.3 per cent disagreed; 42.3 per cent agreed).

122. Survey results on support from DOCO were more positive, albeit showing considerable room for improvement. Half of all responding RCs agreed that they regularly referred to DOCO when they had questions on RC system issues and when their Regional UNDG Team had not responded to their concerns (50 per cent agreed; 38.5 per cent disagreed). Most RCs also agreed that they were satisfied with advice and technical support received from DOCO⁵⁹ (52.6 per cent agreed; 34.6 per cent disagreed) as well as the responsiveness of DOCO in providing information and other guidance materials developed by UNDG (64.1 per cent agreed; 25.6 per cent disagreed). Additionally, more RCs agreed than disagreed that they were satisfied with DOCO support for knowledge management (e.g. contributing to sharing lessons learned and good practices through UNDG tools) (48.7 per cent agreed; 33.3 per cent disagreed).

123. Most POs also acknowledged the value added of the activities of DOCO and the commitment and professionalism of its staff, particularly in terms of providing a valuable service in bringing a large and disparate system together around RC system issues, noting that without a central coordinating entity, recent policy advances would not have seen the light of day. However, they also noted that insufficient resourcing of DOCO, including reduced staffing following its realignment, not only limited its ability to provide effective support at desired levels but also placed additional burdens on staff of POs.

C. Guidance Notes

124. Of RC respondents, 74.4 per cent agreed (19.2 per cent disagreed) that information and other guidance materials developed by UNDG with active support⁶⁰ from DOCO were relevant to their work. Among the numerous UNDG guidance notes four can be highlighted as being of the utmost importance, and directly relate to the functioning of the RC system: (i) Guidance Note on RC and UNCT Working Relations (January 2009)⁶¹ (ii) Dispute Resolution Mechanism for UNCTs (January 2009) (iii) Explanatory Note on the RC/HC/DO and UNCT performance appraisal process (October 2012) and (iv) Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions clarifying the role of the SRSG and the DSRSR/RC/HC (February 2006).

125. The prevailing view of the RCs and POs was that the guidance notes served as useful reference

⁵⁹ Such advice and technical support included – but were not limited to – issues relating to programme effectiveness, UNDAF development and enhancement, support in crisis and transition context, etc.

⁶⁰ In developing the guidance notes, DOCO provides technical advice and support to the working mechanisms as well as clarification and support on their possible use.

⁶¹ The UNCT Working Relations document is currently being revised by UNDG WG-RCSI. Source: UNDP.

documents, which, apart from furthering accountability and providing practical support for the RCs,⁶² also served to improve system-wide coherence of RC system operations. Several RCs and POs however cautioned that too much time/resources were spent on guidelines, in view of the fact that resources for their implementation generally lagged far behind. A number of POs also commented that their field offices found it difficult to keep track of all the existing policy guidelines and thus recommended – along with many RCs – that **the issuance of new guidance should be kept to a strict minimum to focus only on critical issues**. RCs also emphasized that such documents should also allow sufficient flexibility to take into consideration the particularities of country and situational contexts.

126. DOCO also provides technical guidance in the global roll-out of the RC/HC/DO and UNCT performance appraisal system to support Regional UNDG Teams. It supports UNDG in developing policies and updating specific guidance notes and ensures coordination with other departments to develop an integrated approach to the assessment of the performance of HCs, DOs, RCs, and DSRSGs. While the Inspectors recognize the importance of the operation of the personal appraisal system by UNDG Regional Teams and its impact on the issues above, the review of the appraisal system goes beyond the scope of the present report.

127. While RCs find policy guidance from DOCO to be of great importance in increasing the coherence of RC system operations, they also noted that DOCO should have the necessary financial⁶³ and human⁶⁴ resources, both in terms of staffing numbers and the degree of specialization of its staff, in order to effectively perform its role. DOCO should also better communicate to POs and RCs the distinction between its role and that of the Regional UNDG Teams as regards support for RCs and UNCTs. While DOCO is formally separate from UNDP, given that the bulk of funding for DOCO comes from UNDP, a number of POs highlighted the importance of ensuring that DOCO remains impartial in its dealings on RC matters and that it acts independently from UNDP. A number of NRAs also noted that there was room for improvement with regard to the efforts of DOCO to further its engagement and participation in the RC system.

⁶² One PO representative noted that before such guidance notes existed, RCs were often left to figure out things for themselves (as they came from different backgrounds), resulting in the conduct of some individuals not being in line with what was expected of an RC.

⁶³ While DOCO total annual programme resources averaged approximately USD 40 million between 2005-2013, there have been since significant fluctuations over the years. The budget increased steadily from USD 32.74 million in 2005 to USD 51.2 million in 2010. However in 2011 the budget was cut significantly by 27 per cent to USD 37.3 million and has since increased in 2012 (USD 44.4 million) and 2013 (USD 46.5 million). The annual DOCO budget supports UNCTs and RC Offices in 134 countries, 6 Regional UNDG Teams and UNDG global work, which includes the UNDG Working Mechanisms and DOCO (Information provided by DOCO via e-mail on 22 October 2013).

⁶⁴ DOCO previously had 47 staff; however following its realignment UNDG endorsed 39 fixed-term appointments (FTAs). Owing to a severe financial crisis in 2011, only 31 FTA positions could be maintained. As of October 2013, DOCO has a total of 31 positions, of which 3 are funded by the Human Rights Mechanism Trust Fund. One position is funded by DOCO extra-budgetary resources and 27 positions will be funded as of 1 January 2014 by the UNDG through cost sharing for the RC System (Interview notes and information provided by DOCO via e-mail on 22 October 2013).

IX. INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES BETWEEN THE RC, HC AND DO FUNCTIONS

A. Proliferation of multi-hatted RCs

Finding 16: The multiple “hats” (functions) of RCs are supported by established institutional linkages among the stakeholders concerned in the selection, appointment, training and appraisal phases. The organizations are aware of the areas to be improved but the implementation of any improvements requires ongoing attention and funding.

128. As of September 2013, of 130 RCs, 110 also served as Designated Officials (DOs) for Security, 31 as Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs),⁶⁵ 13 as Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSGs), 1 as Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG),⁶⁶ and 2 as Deputy Special Coordinators (DSCs).⁶⁷ With one exception,⁶⁸ all RCs also served as the UNDP-RR. Accepting the reality that multiple hats for RCs have become the norm rather than the exception, the present RC assessment, selection, training and appraisal processes have been adapted and continue to be modified accordingly. The RC Job Description clearly outlines the specific DO and humanitarian assistance functions of the RC, including the corresponding competencies and critical success indicators. The “Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator” (2009) specifies the responsibilities and accountabilities of the HC, while the DO Handbook (2012) prepared by DSS, outlines how to carry out DO responsibilities and the support to be provided by DSS for this function. Changes and adaptations to take into account the skills and competencies needed to perform these roles have led to tangible results, although some concerns remain with regard to their adequacy.

B. DO and HC competencies reflected in assessment and selection processes

129. The **RCAC assessments** were designed to reflect the demands of the additional functions of humanitarian coordination and security management, with a view to validating appropriate behavioural indicators, simulations and exercises.⁶⁹ DSS has suggested strengthening testing on security-related competencies and is currently moving along a process to design case studies, with a view to having more such competencies tested in the RCAC. For humanitarian coordination functions, survey respondents agreed by a ratio of nearly 5:1 that the competencies necessary for this function were adequately tested during the RCAC. In the view of OCHA, testing on the humanitarian component does not need to be wholly revamped but merely adjusted, particularly to better test candidates’ ability to advocate for compliance with international legal frameworks.

130. In the **selection** phase UNDP, DPA, DSS and OCHA were consulted on the post profiles (for upcoming RC vacancies), which have been replaced as of 21 May 2013 by the Resident Coordinator Annual Report (which contains information about the country context and the main priorities for the United Nations system) and an enhanced country checklist (to include specific reference to the requirements of a particular RC post). The IAAP SOPs outline a specific role for OCHA to focus on countries where the RC is expected to perform humanitarian coordination functions (irrespective of formal HC designation) and for DSS to review RC posts from a security management perspective. The positions of these two entities as regards the ability of a candidate to perform the above two roles are respected and taken seriously into consideration in the IAAP. For the final selection of a candidate by the Secretary-General as an RC,⁷⁰ while OCHA and DSS do not have formally designated roles, the UNDG Chair regularly consults with the ERC prior to making her recommendation to the Secretary-General, a practice that is considered as positive by both parties.

⁶⁵ In addition to the 31 RCs/HCs, there are two stand-alone Regional Humanitarian Coordinators and one stand-alone Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator.

⁶⁶ Sierra Leone

⁶⁷ Lebanon and Palestine. 10 of the 12 DSRSGs and both DSCs are also HCs.

⁶⁸ The RC in Palestine does not serve as UNDP-RR.

⁶⁹ SHL – UNDP 2010 Contract, annex 1, ToR, p. 1, point a.

⁷⁰ Where an RC also serves as HC, such a designation is made by the ERC following consultations with the IASC.

131. In nominating candidates to the IAAP, United Nations entities can nominate candidates from the RC Pool, which also includes candidates from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Humanitarian Coordination Pool who have passed the RCAC. In recent years, for RC/HC positions as well as for RC positions in disaster-prone countries, many successful candidates⁷¹ have emerged from the Humanitarian Coordination Pool, which is a roster of humanitarian professionals (65 candidates as of March 2013) derived from United Nations and non-United Nations (Red Cross, IOM, non-governmental organizations) entities, who are screened, interviewed and qualified for humanitarian coordination leadership positions. **The Inspectors conclude that, while the HC Pool can serve a useful purpose through providing an added layer of professional scrutiny, all RC Pool candidates must receive fair consideration for RC/HC vacancies – i.e. irrespective of whether they are also in the HC Pool or not – during the selection process.**

132. DOCO has noted that the RC pools are regularly shared with OCHA and DFS for the identification of qualified candidates for advertised RC positions. Regular interactions also take place between the Humanitarian Leadership Strengthening Unit in OCHA, Country Support Leadership Development and Coordination team in DOCO, and the Senior Leadership Appointment Section in DFS/DPKO. DOCO, OCHA and DFS also hold coordinating meetings to ensure synergies in the management of upcoming vacancies.

C. Training and support for DO and HC functions

133. DO and HC issues have received increased attention and time in the 2013 RC Induction Programme (see Chapter VII). While these changes have been welcomed and well received, RCs emphasized the need for further training particularly on the DO function and called for more integrated training taking into account the various RC “hats”. The Inspectors were informed that increases in training related to both DO and HC functions are being considered by the inter-agency group of learning experts tasked with the design and development of the induction programme for 2014.

134. The Inspectors were particularly impressed with the continuing training for RCs/HCs provided by OCHA. Individualized orientation briefings, periodic retreats and courses, regional workshops, a RC/HC Handbook on Preparedness and Response, mentorship and shadowing are good practices regularly employed that are reflective of dedicated attention and adequate resources. While 51 out of 53 RCs who had received humanitarian coordination training agreed that it was relevant to their work,⁷² only 36 RCs agreed (18 disagreed) that training received was adequate for performance of the HC function at the expected level and/or for dealing with humanitarian challenges.⁷³ In terms of support received, 48 RCs agreed and 11 RCs disagreed that they were adequately supported by humanitarian entities to perform the HC function.⁷⁴

135. Concerns pertaining to the adequacy of OCHA training and support related primarily to the lack of preparedness of RCs who had to perform humanitarian activities without formally being designated as HCs, as well as insufficient knowledge of RCs in non-crisis prone countries on humanitarian coordination issues (experiences connected with the Arab Spring were mentioned as

⁷¹ In 2013, 10 of the 42 senior leaders who were deployed as RCs, RC/HCs or DSRSG/RC/HCs were HC Pool members. Out of 9 HCs designated in 2013, 5 were HC Pool members. In total, at present 11 out of 32 HCs (34 per cent) are HC Pool members as compared with 3 out of 27 HCs (11 per cent) in July 2009. Source: OCHA.

⁷² Of the 20 RCs also designated as HCs responding to the survey, 17 had received dedicated training from OCHA and all of them agreed that such training was relevant to their work as RC.

⁷³ Of the 20 RCs also designated as HCs responding to the survey, 15 (75 per cent) agreed that such training was adequate to perform the HC function at the expected level while 3 (15 per cent) disagreed and 2 (10 per cent) noted they had not received any training on humanitarian coordination issues.

⁷⁴ Of the 20 RCs also designated as HCs responding to the survey, 18 (90 per cent) agreed while 2 (10 per cent) disagreed that they were adequately supported by humanitarian entities to perform the HC function at the expected level.

obvious examples). In the event of the outbreak of a humanitarian crisis, while several POs and RCs welcomed the existing capability to rapidly place experienced humanitarian coordination personnel to assist the RC and/or replace an RC inexperienced in this area with a seasoned HC, they emphasized that safeguards should be introduced such that the career prospects of the RC being replaced were not prejudiced in any way. Some measures have already been developed in this regard, notable among which is the HC Pool, which includes a separate roster of individuals at the D2 level and above who can be deployed within 72 hours when a major emergency occurs.

136. Apart from the pre-deployment training of RCs, DSS carries out a number of initiatives, including, *inter alia*, online Security Management Team (SMT) training for all SMT members including the RC/DO serving as the SMT Chair, issuance of the DO Handbook, specialized training modules for personnel operating in high-threat environments, as well as other case studies and training developed and used by the training and development section of DSS. With regard to support for DOs,⁷⁵ DSS presently has its own security advisers for 182 countries (some with regional responsibilities) and places them on the basis of assessed risk in country. For countries without a security adviser, in addition to having access to a remote regional security adviser, the DO designates an international staff member as security focal point.

137. Overall satisfaction with DSS support was high in terms of the relevance of training and generally positive in terms of the adequacy of training and support received. Of the RCs responding to the JIU survey, 66 had received dedicated training from DSS on the DO function, of whom 94 per cent found such training to be relevant to their work. On adequacy, 58 RCs agreed and 13 RCs disagreed that this training was adequate to perform the DO role at the expected level. On support, 58 RCs agreed and 18 RCs disagreed that they were adequately supported by DSS and its security advisers to perform the DO function.

138. One of the main criticisms from RCs in the area of DSS support received was that Security Advisers in country often lacked the analytical capacity and training to anticipate and forecast security situations and identify possible security scenarios. RCs noted that such staff were focused more on rules and regulations and reporting on events and clearances, when a major part of the RC DO role had to do with providing guidance on future security developments and mitigating risks. RCs also complained that DSS would downsize staff in country offices without any prior consultation with RCs and replace them with Country Security Focal Points.

D. Performance appraisal for HC and DO functions

139. The performance appraisal of all RCs/HCs/DOs is an interagency process, which includes OCHA, DSS and DPA and DPKO in the case of integrated missions for DSRSGs/RCs/HCs and is managed by the Regional UNDG Teams. For the DO performance appraisal, the ASG for Safety and Security regularly participates in the panel meetings of all five Regional UNDG Teams to assess the performance of all DOs and provides personalized feedback on any RC who has underperformed in his/her DO role.

140. For each HC, a yearly performance appraisal is carried out by the ERC with input from the IASC and is prepared on the basis of his/her Compact⁷⁶ priorities and standard indicators of humanitarian performance. The ERC subsequently presents the appraisal during regional UNDG meetings. OCHA noted that such appraisals were broadly consistent with the overall appraisal given by Regional UNDG Teams (taking into account the multiple hats of RCs), albeit with slight regional variations (for example, when an RC performs well on development aspects but less so on

⁷⁵ More on DSS support can be found in the Handbook for United Nations Designated Officials for Security, United Nations Department of Safety and Security, 2012.

⁷⁶ Each HC signs a compact with the ERC at the beginning of each calendar year, or upon designation, outlining his/her key priorities for the year.

humanitarian aspects). At the informal level, HCs also received real-time feedback on their performance during monthly telephone meetings with OCHA senior management.

141. Overall, DOCO, OCHA and DSS were of the view that the performance of RCs in their HC and DO roles varied greatly depending on the individual and the country context. While the **Inspectors have not assessed the quality of the individual appraisals, they received positive feedback on the established institutional mechanism for appraisals, which may ensure – if it operates well – a coordinated and balanced appraisal of the performance of RCs in their different hats.**

X. THE WAY FORWARD

142. The selection and appointment process for RCs can be considered to be fundamentally **objective and fair and to some degree transparent**. With some fine-tuning, the established process is capable of identifying and selecting suitable candidates for RC positions, and significant progress has been achieved so far. However, further improvements in the diversity of the RC pools call for concerted efforts on the part of senior management. Addressing the procedural weaknesses identified in the report and making the existing rules of operation more functional would yield results; however there is a need to address the gap between the increasing trend of system-wide ownership of the RC system and the lingering perceptions of UNDP domination and the lack of a level playing field among the United Nations system organizations in the form of proactive and high-level dialogue within UNDG.

143. The present selection and appointment process is based very much on the privileged role of the candidates' parent organizations but there is good reason to transition gradually towards a more flexible practice through strengthening the interagency nature of the RC career path. A stronger and more organized mobility scheme for RCs after their term in office, as well as the establishment of an interagency or United Nations status for RCs who have successfully served several terms should be examined, with a view to their serving not only as RCs but as a potential reserve of senior professionals for high-level appointments across the system. There is a need – and the possibility exists through a better defined career path – to increase the attractiveness of the RC post and to strengthen the motivation for organizations to present highly qualified candidates for assessment, selection and appointment.

144. While the overall positive opinions as regards the value added of the RCAC have encouraged several POs to use the assessment process in their own human resources practices to review candidates for senior in-house managerial posts, the development of such capacity, either in house or via external contractors, carries significant financial implications. The Inspectors conclude that the CEB HR Network should analyse the feasibility of harmonizing such efforts (on the basis of existing assessment capacities forming part of career development/succession planning initiatives within the United Nations system), including the possibility of establishing a common assessment centre at UNSSC to provide this service for the United Nations system organizations.

145. While the new financing and cost-sharing mechanism of the RC system (to be gradually applied from 1 January 2014 onwards) should bring about greater stability and predictability as regards financing, only a part of the RC system costs (mainly coordination costs) will be covered. With increasing joint ownership of the RC system, it is imperative that the cost-sharing mechanism also covers costs related to assessment and continuing training. Once the new financing mechanism has been consolidated, it will then need to be furthered in the stated direction. While the Inspectors are aware that this can only be achieved through an ongoing voluntary undertaking by the POs, such increased cost sharing and strengthened ownership – as reflected, inter alia, by a more diversified pool of incumbent RCs – can only go hand in hand, which takes time. At the same time, such development should lead to an RC system which is perceived as belonging to the entire United Nations system.

146. The general operation of the Management and Accountability system and the functional firewall is under continuous review by the various substructures of UNDG. Although it was not part of the focus of the present review, the Inspectors received a variety of opinions on its operation and effectiveness. The Inspectors conclude that this issue, as mentioned in the QCPR resolution (General Assembly resolution 67/226), deserves priority attention from UNDG since it has a direct impact on the efficiency of the work of the RCs (including the attractiveness of the RC position) and UNCTs.

147. While the organizations consulted expressed their interest in and support for a well-functioning RC system belonging to all United Nations system organizations, there was a wide range of views on what kind of empowerment was needed to allow the RC to operate more effectively and on how the different United Nations agencies/RCs should change or reconcile their present ways of operation at

the organization and country level. The differences result from the fact that each United Nations system entity has its own governance and budget model, which is determined by the officials of various line ministries who represent their respective countries in the governing body of each organization. However the positions of these line ministry officials (in the governing body of each organization) are not always consistent with the positions of the same governments' representatives at the United Nations bodies dealing with United Nations country level cooperation. Any progress in this regard will be feasible only when the Member States follow a more consistent position in determining their policy both at the organizational and at the country level.

Annex I

Select Key figures in the Resident Coordinator System

United Nations Resident Coordinator (RC): As the principal subject of the current review, the RC is the leader of the UNCT and serves as the designated representative of – and reports to – the United Nations Secretary-General (in his/her capacity as Chairman of the Chief Executives Board (CEB)) through the UNDP Administrator (in his/her capacity as UNDG Chair). Accredited by a letter from the Secretary-General, usually to the Head of State or Government, the RC is meant to act impartially on behalf of the United Nations System, leading/coordinating all operational activities for development in country in support of national priorities and capacity-building in the context of internationally agreed treaty obligations and development goals, and place the United Nations centrally in development and international cooperation in the country. The RC also serves as the UNDP Resident Representative (UNDP-RR). The RC is supported by the Resident Coordinator Office (RCO), comprising a minimum of one person and an average of three persons with the numbers increasing in complex, post-crisis settings. As of September 2013, 128 United Nations Member States (plus one non-member State and one other entity) had an established RC post.

Regional UNDG Teams (RDTs): The key role of the RDTs is to provide leadership, strategic guidance and support to RCs and UNCTs for the achievement of country level results. Specifically, they are tasked with performing the following four core functions as per the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) of the General Assembly of United Nations operational activities for development: (i) quality support and advice of UNDAFs; (ii) technical and operational support services; (iii) performance management of RCs and UNCTs; and (iv) troubleshooting in country-specific contexts. RDTs are composed of representatives of United Nations system funds and programmes, specialized agencies and other United Nations agencies with country-level operational activities.

United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO): DOCO serves as the technical support unit of UNDG, helping it to develop and introduce simplified and harmonized policies and procedures for country office operations. It advises RCs on how to make country programmes more efficient and effective and on how to align them with national priorities. DOCO partly funds the RC Office (RCO) and also administers the United Nations Country Coordination Fund (UNCCF), which provides RCs with resources to improve their coordination capacity. DOCO receives its funding from the UNDP core budget as well as from contributions from donors.

Inter-Agency Advisory Panel (IAAP): The IAAP is an inter-agency mechanism to review candidates and advise the UNDG Chair on their suitability for RC positions. It was established with the objective of improving transparency and competitiveness in the RC recruitment process and is managed and administered by DOCO, whose Director also chairs IAAP meetings. IAAP membership is drawn from that of UNDG and also includes United Nations entities with a significant country presence, level of funds committed or provided to country level and/or mandates covering country level operations.

UNDP: UNDP serves as the manager of the RC system (on behalf of the United Nations system) with management oversight responsibility entrusted to the UNDP Administrator. The UNDP Administrator serves as the UNDG Chair and in this capacity receives advice from the IAAP (which also includes UNDP) on RC candidates and subsequently makes recommendations to the Secretary-General on candidates for RC positions.

Annex II

Nomination and voting procedure in the IAAP

Once candidates have passed the RCAC, the parent United Nations agency sends a formal written notice to the IAAP Chair putting forward their nominated candidate(s) for inclusion in the RC pool, which serves as an interagency roster of candidates eligible to take up RC positions. The written notice is accompanied by supporting documentation including the candidate's curriculum vitae, performance appraisal ratings for the past three years, the RCAC report and any competency development plans on the basis of RCAC results. The nominations are subsequently discussed as a regular agenda item of the IAAP and a decision is taken on whether or not the candidate(s) is accepted into the RC pool.

Once Vacancy Announcements (VAs) for specific RC posts have been disseminated, sponsoring agencies can either identify qualified RC pool candidates or the RC Pool candidates can approach their parent agency to nominate them for a specific post. The agency then screens the potential candidate against the requirements of the specific post profile and a country checklist. Candidates meeting all required criteria can then be formally nominated by their agency to OHR/UNDP via e-mail attaching the agreed supporting documentation. An agency can nominate a maximum of two candidates per vacancy and can submit the same candidate for multiple vacancies with the indication of an order of preference. When insufficient applications are received for RC vacancies, DOCO may forward suitable candidates from the Pool to the concerned United Nations entity for consideration. If agreeable, the agency can then nominate the candidate to the IAAP.

All IAAP members as well as United Nations entities putting forward candidates receive an invitation two weeks prior to the agreed meeting date from DOCO along with the following supporting documentation: matrix of posts and nominated candidates; post profile for each country being reviewed; matrix of United Nations entity presence in each country; updated RC Pool list and a list of proposed changes to the Pool; RCAC Ranking Results Matrix; list of serving RCs; and, for each nominated candidate: curriculum vitae, RCAC report, completed country checklist, competency development plans (if any) and related progress reports.

The IAAP meeting is chaired by the Director of DOCO and attended by all IAAP members as well as United Nations entities putting forward candidates. Once candidates have been introduced and discussed for RC vacancies, each IAAP member casts a vote on each nominated candidate in one of three ways: support, no support or abstain. For IAAP members absent from the meeting, the SOP makes a provision for them to send their voting preference for each candidate to the IAAP Chair in advance of the meeting.

Candidates are nominated on the basis of the total number of support votes received, with "no support" votes subtracted from the total number of support votes received. A candidate with support from at least 50 per cent of IAAP voting members (i.e. not taking into account participating IAAP members who chose to abstain or IAAP members who were absent and did not vote) is submitted for consideration to the undg Chair. For candidates selected by the IAAP who had received a no support vote(s), this is reflected in writing in the presentation to the undg Chair. The same applies if the candidate is selected for presentation by the undg Chair to the Secretary-General. Following the completion of voting, the IAAP Chair summarizes the nominated candidates for a given country and identifies the shortlisted candidates to be presented to the undg Chair. The voting results are reflected in the minutes of the IAAP meeting.

Annex III

Table 1: Diversity in the composition of Resident Coordinators⁷⁷

| Serving RCs | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|------|-----|----------|-----|
| Year | Total No. of incumbent RCs | Women | | Men | | South | | North | | UNDP | | Non-UNDP | |
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| 2004 | 120 | 31 | 26% | 89 | 74% | 55 | 46% | 65 | 54% | 87 | 73% | 33 | 28% |
| 2005 | 114 | 30 | 26% | 84 | 74% | 51 | 45% | 63 | 55% | 86 | 75% | 28 | 25% |
| 2006 | 121 | 38 | 31% | 83 | 69% | 60 | 50% | 61 | 50% | 86 | 71% | 35 | 29% |
| 2007 | 113 | 35 | 31% | 78 | 69% | 56 | 50% | 57 | 50% | 81 | 72% | 32 | 28% |
| 2008 | 117 | 37 | 32% | 80 | 68% | 61 | 52% | 56 | 48% | 81 | 69% | 36 | 31% |
| 2009 | 108 | 37 | 34% | 71 | 66% | 56 | 52% | 52 | 48% | 73 | 68% | 35 | 32% |
| 2010 | 121 | 44 | 36% | 77 | 64% | 62 | 51% | 59 | 49% | 78 | 64% | 43 | 36% |
| 2011 | 124 | 43 | 35% | 81 | 65% | 55 | 44% | 69 | 56% | 80 | 65% | 44 | 35% |
| 2012 | 128 | 50 | 39% | 78 | 61% | 57 | 45% | 71 | 55% | 78 | 61% | 50 | 39% |
| 2013* | 126 | 50 | 40% | 76 | 60% | 55 | 44% | 71 | 56% | 76 | 60% | 50 | 40% |

*As of end of August 2013

Table 2: Composition of candidates presented to the RCAC (2006-2012)⁷⁸

| | 2006 | | 2007 | | 2008 | | 2009 | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2012 | | TOTAL |
|----------|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|-------|
| | No. | % | No. |
| Total | 59 | 100 | 69 | 100 | 44 | 100 | 36 | 100 | 60 | 100 | 44 | 100 | 52 | 100 | 364 |
| Female | 31 | 53 | 24 | 35 | 16 | 36 | 11 | 31 | 19 | 32 | 15 | 34 | 26 | 50 | 142 |
| South | 34 | 58 | 31 | 45 | 17 | 39 | 12 | 33 | 29 | 48 | 17 | 39 | 22 | 42 | 162 |
| UNDP | 21 | 36 | 26 | 38 | 25 | 57 | 14 | 39 | 34 | 57 | 19 | 43 | 20 | 38 | 159 |
| Non-UNDP | 38 | 64 | 43 | 62 | 19 | 43 | 22 | 61 | 26 | 43 | 25 | 57 | 32 | 62 | 205 |
| Non-UN | 8 | 14 | 9 | 13 | 7 | 16 | 4 | 11 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 16 | 4 | 8 | 42 |

Table 3: Pass rates of candidates presented to the RCAC (2006-2012)⁷⁹

| | 2006 | | 2007 | | 2008 | | 2009 | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2012 | | TOTAL |
|----------------|------|----|------|----|------|----|------|----|------|-----|------|----|------|----|-------|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. |
| All candidates | 33 | 56 | 39 | 57 | 21 | 48 | 20 | 56 | 30 | 50 | 20 | 45 | 29 | 56 | 192 |
| Male | 16 | 57 | 25 | 56 | 16 | 57 | 15 | 60 | 20 | 49 | 16 | 55 | 14 | 54 | 122 |
| Female | 16 | 52 | 15 | 63 | 9 | 56 | 5 | 45 | 10 | 53 | 4 | 27 | 14 | 54 | 73 |
| South | 18 | 53 | 14 | 45 | 6 | 35 | 7 | 58 | 10 | 34 | 5 | 29 | 9 | 41 | 69 |
| UNDP | 14 | 67 | 14 | 42 | 12 | 48 | 7 | 50 | 22 | 65 | 4 | 21 | 11 | 55 | 84 |
| Non-UNDP | 19 | 50 | 25 | 58 | 9 | 47 | 13 | 59 | 8 | 31 | 16 | 64 | 18 | 56 | 108 |
| Non-UN | 5 | 63 | 3 | 33 | 4 | 57 | 1 | 25 | 3 | 100 | 5 | 71 | 1 | 25 | 22 |

⁷⁷ Data received from DOCO via e-mail on 19 September 2013.⁷⁸ UNDP response to JIU questionnaire received on 4 June 2013.⁷⁹ UNDP response to JIU questionnaire received on 4 June 2013.

Annex IV

Overview of actions to be taken by participating organizations on the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit

JIU/REP/2013/3

| | | Intended impact | United Nations, its funds and programmes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Specialized agencies and IAEA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | | | CEB | United Nations* | UNCTAD | ITC | UNDP | UNEP | UNFPA | UN-Habitat | UNHCR | UNICEF | UNODC | UNOPS | UNRWA | UN Women | WFP | FAO | IAEA | ICAO | ILO | IMO | ITU | UNAIDS | UNESCO | UNIDO | UNWTO | UPU | WHO | WIPO | WMO |
| Report | For action | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | For information | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Recommendation 1 | | a | | L | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Recommendation 2 | | f | | E | E | | E | | E | E | E | E | | E | E | E | | | E | | | | E | E | E | | | | E | | |
| Recommendation 3 | | f | E | E | E | | E | | E | E | E | E | | E | E | E | | | E | | | | E | E | E | | | | E | | |

Legend: L: Recommendation for decision by legislative organ E: Recommendation for action by executive head

: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: a: enhanced transparency and accountability b: dissemination of good/best practices c: enhanced coordination and cooperation d: strengthened coherence and harmonization e: enhanced control and compliance f: enhanced effectiveness g: significant financial savings h: enhanced efficiency i: other.