





Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever in Europe

under the GF-TADs umbrella

Thirteenth meeting (SGE ASF13) - Paris, France, 29 May 2019

Recommendations

1. Selection of previously adopted ASF SGE recommendations

Transparency¹ (Tallin, February 2015)

1. It is essential to ensure transparency and full compliance with reporting to OIE. The Standing Group reiterates that trust and cooperation can only be built when full access to the relevant information is provided.

Biosecurity² (Tallin, February 2015)

2. Biosecurity is of crucial importance to prevent the entry and spread of ASF in pig holdings, both in the commercial and so-called backyard pig sectors. There are minimum biosecurity measures that need to be and can easily be implemented even by smallholder pig owners, such as restricting access to visitors, preventing contact between domestic pigs and wild boar, using separate shoes and clothes when entering the pig house, and having disinfectants ready on site. Precondition to achieve this is for the Veterinary Services to provide basic information to pig holders by way of appropriate communication campaigns.

¹ Second meeting (SGE2), Tallinn, Estonia, 11 – 12 February 2015. http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/Regprog/docs/docs/SGE2/SGE2%20(Tallinn;%20Feb2015)%20-%20Conclusions%20and%20recommendations%20(final) EN corrigendum.pdf

² Second meeting (SGE2), Tallinn, Estonia, 11 – 12 February 2015.

Surveillance ^{3, 4 and 5} (Moscow, March 2016; Chisinau, September 2017; Prague, March 2019)

- 3. In view of defining surveillance strategy, a risk assessment be carried out including the identification of:
 - a. Risk areas in the country.
 - b. Risk production sector (domestic pigs / wild boar).
 - c. Risk areas in the adjacent territories.
- 4. Countries implement passive surveillance (cornerstone for controlling this disease), based on PCR; active surveillance should come into play in a second instance only. For disease purpose management the PCR is fundamental as it allows for early warning. Serology has only secondary research-oriented value.
- 5. Surveillance of dead wild boar and carcass removal (passive surveillance) should be enhanced as the most efficient tool to reinforce early detection in case of introduction or re-introduction of ASF. An efficient and detailed surveillance system for ASF should be put in place in free countries and free areas of affected countries.

Hunting practices ⁶ and ⁷ (Vilnius, Nov. 2016; Chisinau, September 2017)

- 6. Hunting methods should minimise movements of wild boar. Increased hunting pressure by non-trained personnel ("Kalashnikov killing") is counterproductive in terms of ASF eradication.
- 7. Hunted wild boar should remain in the premises of the hunting ground until tested; only negative carcasses must be released. The carcasses should be individually identified.
- 8. Unless a specific hygienic removal protocol is in place, offal from hunted wild boar should not be removed from the animal in the field, which should be brought to dedicated authorised dressing facilities in the hunting ground equipped with water, waste collection equipment and freezers. Transport of hunted animals to the dressing facility should be carried out using only properly equipped vehicles. Dressing rooms should have sufficient effective disinfectants available.
- 9. Countries review their wild boar management options in light of the experience brought by the Czech Republic, highlighting the benefits of good communication with hunters. The specific measures applied in the infected area (such as ban on hunting, active search of wild boar carcasses by authorised people only), in the surrounding higher risk area (such as active hunting and disposal of the carcasses without evisceration) and in the lower risk areas around (such as intensified hunting) should be assessed in order to learn from this new experience and adapt the approach consequently to wild boar management in case of occurrence of ASF.

³ Third meeting (SGE ASF3), Moscow, Russia, 15-16 March 2016. http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/Regprog/docs/docs/SGE3/SGE3%20(Moscow%20%20March%202016)%20-%20RECs%20(Final%20EN).pdf

⁴ Eighth meeting (SGE8), Chisinau, Moldova, 20-21 September 2017. http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/Regprog/docs/docs/SGE%20ASF8/SGE%20ASF8%20(Sept%202017)%20-%20recommendations%20(Final).pdf

⁵ Twelfth meeting (SGE ASF12) Prague, Czech Republic, 11-12 March 2019. http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/Regprog/docs/docs/SGE%20ASF12/SGE ASF12 March2019 Recommendations.pdf

⁶ Sixth meeting (SGE ASF6), Vilnius, Lithuania, 28-29 November 2016. http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/Regprog/docs/docs/SG6/SGE%20ASF6%20(Nov2016)%20-%20Recommendations%20(Vdef).pdf

⁷ Eighth meeting (SGE8), Chisinau, Moldova, 20-21 September 2017.

Long-term management of wild boar ⁸ and ⁹ (Warsaw, September 2018; Prague, March 2019)

- 10. Wild boar populations are growing, with severe socio-economic impacts; efforts in ASF free areas should be undertaken to partially reduce this grow (hunting management, ban of supplementary feeding, agricultural practises).
- 11. The risk and the consequences of any new invasion of ASF in a ASF-free wild boar population should be effectively minimised through preventive and long term management of wild boar population aimed at reducing wild boar density and size in ASF-free areas. This long term management requires coordination with forestry management bodies and hunters.
- 12. In case of a first detection of ASF in a previously ASF-free area, the eradication of infection is a challenging and delicate process, due to the high number of infectious wild boars present; while the risk to provoke further geographical spread of the virus is high. Hence any attempt to hunt or depopulate when the first carcass is detected should be banned, while carcass removal should be carried out systematically, under strict biosecurity and by trained staff.
- 13. Any dispatch of live wild boar must be banned because of the high risk for transmitting the disease.

Awareness campaigns¹⁰ and ¹¹ (Chisinau, September 2017; Kiev, March 2018)

- 14. Countries develop/update a risk communication strategy for the eradication of ASF, identifying target groups (farmers; hunters; travellers; public at large; as well as policy makers; and all other groups that could positively influence ASF eradication), key tailored messages, and communication channels; the OIE Focal Point for communication is a key resource person to do so;
- 15. Tailor made information campaigns¹² should be organised targeting:
 - a. Travellers moving in back and forth (such as tourists, workers and truck drivers) at border checkpoints. These should be designed also for addressing travellers before the beginning of the journey (using channels such as consulates, official websites, media and international transporters, travel agencies). The content of campaigns should highlight the prohibitions in force, the possible consequences of any breach to the rules and the penalties in the event of any infringement, voluntary or involuntary.
 - b. Border Inspection posts, or relevant services, and customs officials in order to promote understanding of the risks related to African swine fever and the tools available to enforce the legislation in place.

⁸ Eleventh meeting (SGE ASF11) Warsaw, Poland, 24-25 September 2018. http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/eng/Regprog/docs/SGE%20ASF11/SGE%20ASF11%20(Sept2018)%20-%20Recommendations%20(final).pdf

⁹ Twelfth meeting (SGE ASF12) Prague, Czech Republic, 11-12 March 2019.

¹⁰ Eighth meeting (SGE8), Chisinau, Moldova, 20-21 September 2017.

¹¹ Ninth meeting (SGE ASF9) Kiev, Ukraine, 22-23 March 2018. http://web.oie.int/RR-

¹² http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/Regprog/en_ASF_depository.htm

Border controls¹³ (Kiev, March 2018)

- 16. Coordinated border management among border Inspection posts and customs officials should be encouraged in order to tighten the cooperation among these two bodies across the border and within the country.
- 17. In order to optimise the use of available resources, risk analysis and risk profiling for borders control personal luggage and vehicles should be carried out.
- 18. Within ASF infected countries, measures should be taken to ensure that the movement of pigs and pig products complies with the ASF prevention requirements. Awareness campaigns suited to this end should be undertaken by using different communication channels targeted to reach the intended audiences (e.g. travellers, farmers, hunters, traders).

GF-TADs "Handbook on ASF"14 (Warsaw, September 2018)

19. The GF-TADs "Handbook on ASF in wild boar and biosecurity during hunting" should be distributed electronically (GF-TADs website) as soon as possible and the process for its printing and publication should continue. The Handbook should be regularly updated in order to reflect new scientific findings, technology innovation and best practises.

2. Additional recommendations

20. The fourteenth meeting (SGE ASF14) of the Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever in Europe under the GF-TADs umbrella should be held in Sofia, Bulgaria on 10-11 September 2019. It will focus on 'outbreak investigation and related data collection'.

¹³ Ninth meeting (SGE ASF9) Kiev, Ukraine, 22-23 March 2018.

¹⁴ Eleventh meeting (SGE ASF11) Warsaw, Poland, 24-25 September 2018.