Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Project Evaluation Series
04/2020

# Final evaluation of the project "Strengthening institutionalized subnational coordination structures and harmonization mechanisms" in Ethiopia

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# Project code: GCP/ETH/089/EC

**FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS**
**Rome, 2020**

Required citation:
FAO. 2020. *Final evaluation of the project "Strengthening institutionalized subnational coordination structures and harmonization mechanisms" in Ethiopia.* Project Evaluation Series, 04/2020. Rome.

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ISBN: 978-92-5-132367-0

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# Acknowledgements

The FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) would like to extend its gratitude to all colleagues and partners who contributed to the final evaluation of the FAO-EU project 'Strengthening institutionalized subnational coordination structure and harmonization mechanisms'.

The Office wishes to extend a special note of gratitude to Ms Fatouma Djama Seid, FAO representative in Ethiopia, Mr Jacopo Damelio, FAO Deputy Representative in Ethiopia, and Mr Berhanu Taye, Task Manager in the Delegation of the European Commission to Ethiopia, for their guidance throughout the evaluation process.

The Office is particularly grateful to Mr Carlos Rodriguez Ariza, International Project Coordinator, and the project team in Addis Ababa for their tireless support of the evaluation process. The evaluation mission was equally supported by FAO Regional Coordinators based in project target areas and other FAO colleagues working in the FAO representation in Addis Ababa and in the Subregional Office for Eastern Africa. The evaluation mission would not have been possible without the excellent administrative support of Ms Borka Karbic and Ms Jerusalem Abebe.

The evaluation benefited from a consultative process involving a wide range of stakeholders, and sincere gratitude is extended to the development partners, government partners, EU RESET cluster consortia members at federal, regional and zonal levels for their availability and contribution to this evaluation process.

The evaluation was conducted by Ms Rym Ben Zid (Evaluation Team Leader) and Mr Moges Abebe (Evaluation Team Member); under the overall guidance and supervision of Mr Olivier Cossee, Mr Eoghan Molloy and Ms Maame Tabuah Duah from the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED).

# Acronyms and abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| DRM ATF/TF | Disaster Risk Management Agricultural Task Force/Task Force |
| DRM TWG | Disaster Risk Management Technical Working Group |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| LRRD | Linking relief, rehabilitation and development |
| NDRMC | National Disaster Risk Management Commission |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| RED&FS SWG | Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group |
| RESET | Resilience Building Programme in Ethiopia |
| SHARE | Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience Programme |
| SNNPR | Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region |

# Executive summary

## Introduction

1. This is the final evaluation of the project GCP/ETH/089/EC – "Strengthening institutionalized subnational coordination structures and harmonization mechanisms", implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and funded under the European Union "Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience" (SHARE) programme. The Project Budget is EUR 2.5 million. The project start-date was 19 December 2014. The original duration was 35 months but two no-cost extensions were approved by the donor, extending the end-date until 19 June 2019. The five intended results of the project are: i) Result 1: Decentralized (cluster, zonal and regional level) government-led coordination structures involving both relief and development endeavours supported; ii) Result 2: Regular communication and information flows and reporting between the coordination bodies institutionalized; iii) Result 3: Technical capacity of European Union consortium partners and the coordination structures at regional and zonal levels built; iv) Result 4: Linkages with universities and research institutions created to conduct applied research to improve resilience and linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) approaches; and v) Result 5: Forums organized to promote sector experiences sharing for all stakeholders (humanitarian and development actors).

## Context

2. The project was formulated as part of the European Commission's 'Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience' programme (EC SHARE) in response to a large-scale humanitarian crisis following the 2011 drought in the region. Following the 2011 food crisis in the Horn of Africa, 'building resilience' became a priority agenda for the international community to move from the historical division of emergency and development programming to a more holistic, integrated and complementary approach for addressing the root cause of disaster risk and vulnerability factors of recurrent drought that affect people's livelihoods and food and nutrition security. In this context, the "Strengthening institutionalized subnational coordination structure and harmonization mechanisms" project is one of the components of the EC SHARE Ethiopia programme, with the specific objective of establishing effective subnational coordination structures and harmonization mechanisms (covering both relief and development) with linkages to grass root and federal level coordination structures.

3. Climate-induced calamities like droughts and floods, resource-based conflicts, civil unrest and other political instability (restriction of movements) are recurrent in Ethiopia. The level of decentralization is high; local governments at various levels provide approvals for project implementation; while the federal level is not always aware of projects implemented at regional and zonal level. There is high staff turnover in government institutions at all levels. There are various coordination mechanisms at different levels with constantly evolving complex structures, and varying degrees of functionality. Overall, coordination mechanisms are not harmonized, and decisions made in coordination fora are legally binding but there was a lack of accountability. While there are strong humanitarian coordination mechanisms co-chaired by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at federal and regional levels, and by FAO at federal level, development coordination mechanisms are not adequately functional and tend to be fragmented. However, the Government is keen to move forward the resilience agenda in Ethiopia, and to move away from a pattern of repeated crisis-response.

## Findings

4. In this regard, the evaluation found that the project is highly relevant to the current context in Ethiopia, where preparedness and longer term resilience have become priority areas of focus for all actors in humanitarian and development initiatives. Furthermore, the project is aligned with the FAO Country Programming Framework (CPF) and with FAO's Strategic Objective 5 (Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises). The project result areas reflected a critical need on the ground and were therefore highly relevant and aligned with the national Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy and strategy. The interventions and the approach used (linking relief, rehabilitation and development) were relevant and appropriate to the needs of the stakeholders involved.

5. However, the project's collaboration with major donors involved in agricultural development was limited. Such collaboration could have helped move forward the resilience agenda at the federal level. In addition, the scope of the project was too broad, and no precise definition of resilience was provided: the scope of the project goes beyond FAO's mandate. The lack of common understanding of the objectives of resilience coordination created confusion amongst project stakeholders, and therefore affected the results.

6. In terms of results achieved, progress varied greatly between regions. Combined negative effects of climate extreme events, civil unrest, high government staff turnover and political instability negatively impacted project implementation in some areas. While there was an improvement in the flow of information from the regions to the federal level, no formalized communication system has been put in place and the project did not take advantage of existing information management systems.

7. The project carried out a series of trainings, using a 'training of trainers' approach. The trainings were highly appreciated, and the skills acquired are now being put to use by training participants; however, high staff turnover is likely to limit the sustainability of these results.

8. With regard to the research studies commissioned by the project, the evaluation found that while some of the research yielded interesting results, the research came late and would have been more relevant if it had focused on coordination mechanisms, rather than household dynamics.

9. The project organized a number of experience sharing forums involving a large number of stakeholders, at national and regional levels. While participants appreciated the opportunity to bring stakeholders together, there was inconsistent follow-up of the recommendations after each forum. At the closure of the project, many planned activities remained uncompleted, resulting in a low execution rate overall.

10. With regard to gender mainstreaming, the project team included gender mainstreaming as a core discussion topic in some of the forums and workshops throughout project implementation; however, overall women's attendance in the trainings and workshops was much lower than that of men.

11. Overall, since the start of the project, the demand for resilience coordination has increased and the project managed to raise expectations of partners and stakeholders at the federal level. Major impacts include the capacity enhancement of some individuals, strengthening

of regional coordination mechanisms although unevenly, emergence of a few resilience platforms at zonal level.

12. The evaluation had more critical findings relating to the efficiency of project implementation. The project was beset with delays which resulted in a series of budget modifications and amendments. Some activities were dropped, and some new activities included.

13. The project was subject to four separate budget revisions, and there were some instances of the project paying for FAO staff who had limited time to perform project activities. Financial reporting was sometimes delayed which impacted negatively on project implementation. Meanwhile, the absence of a robust monitoring and evaluation system hindered the follow-up of project implementation.

14. High staff turnover in FAO Ethiopia's internal management structure weakened FAO's ownership of the project. This affected FAO's credibility and relationship with the donor. Furthermore, responsibilities were unbalanced between various stakeholders because of the absence of a tripartite agreement between FAO, European Union and the Government: the European Union took over part of FAO's responsibility.

15. Overall, the evaluation found that the scope of the project was too broad to allow for efficient implementation, in terms of geographical coverage, but also in terms of its objectives.

16. While individuals will undoubtedly carry forward the trainings and skills they have received, the overall sustainability of the organizational capacity development activities is in doubt, without further committed funding from Government, projects or development partners. Resources to fund subnational coordination mechanisms after project completion are scarce. Some Ethiopia Resilience Building (RESET) cluster members are willing to support the Disaster Risk Management Agricultural Task Force (DRM-ATFs) to organize monthly coordination meetings, but no arrangements were formally made between government-led organizations and partners in this regard. FAO regional coordinators are still supporting the DRM-ATF in organizing coordination meetings in several regions.

## Conclusions

17. In conclusion, the evaluation gives credit to the fact that resilience coordination mechanisms have clearly been strengthened at regional levels. However, the sustainability of these efforts will depend on the commitment of Government and partners to continue strengthening the existing coordination mechanisms and their ability to convene development partners. The strengthening of regional coordination structures enhanced awareness on coordination for resilience and information-sharing but did not quite succeed in promoting joint planning and joint implementation. In this regard, the project was overly ambitious in its design. Meanwhile, there is strong demand for resilience coordination at federal level, but FAO could not manage to address this demand through this project.

18. Achieving the higher level objectives of the project required concomitant high level representation and advocacy in high level national level fora. In practice, coordinated collaboration between FAO and European Union management was missing when it came to higher level advocacy, in part due to a turnover of FAO Ethiopia senior management

during the project implementation period which induced a disruption in FAO's medium-term vision and strategy.

19. The absence of an agreement with Government at the federal level hampered the project's results. Furthermore, the absence of a project steering committee hampered project implementation and did not ensure effective oversight on project activities. While focusing on the EU RESET clusters was undoubtedly a good opportunity, it arguably may have distracted from what could have been a more sustainable enhancement of government-led coordination structures. As a result, the project was perceived as being an European Union-FAO project, rather than a nationally owned project, and this impacted on the level of engagement of other potential partners in the activities.

20. In terms of design, the lack of an in-depth analysis of the existing coordination mechanisms at design stage or before project start-up hampered project implementation and negatively affected the project implementation strategy. By not explicitly limiting the scope of the project to resilience in the agricultural sector, the project faced difficulties in coordinating across all different sectors. Nonetheless, despite major changes in the context (e.g. political instability, the El Niño crisis), the project approach was adaptive and flexible, but delays hindered project efficiency.

## Recommendations

21. If similar projects are designed and implemented in the future, the evaluation recommends that an agreement be signed with the federal Government from the start and a steering committee should be formed involving government representatives from different institutions. Stronger high level support to the project team is needed from FAO senior management, in collaboration with European Union senior management, in upcoming projects to carry forward the resilience discussion in high level fora.

22. For future projects supporting coordination, an in-depth analysis of existing coordination mechanisms and how they function has to be conducted at design stage or before project start-up. This analysis should then be updated every year during the course of project implementation, and it should in turn inform project implementation and help prioritize the activities to be implemented in what is a very dynamic context. Similarly, any future project of this nature must be based on an in-depth stakeholder analysis, as well as a participatory capacity needs assessment, either at design stage, or in the early stages of implementation.

23. In order to sustain the momentum of this project, FAO should adopt a coordinated approach to build on the project's results, for example in implementing the coordination subcomponents in the ongoing PROACT project and other upcoming projects. Without continued support through other projects, sustainability of the enhancements to the DRM-ATFs is questionable. To this end, major donors in the area of agricultural development need to back up such projects in high level forums to push the resilience agenda.

# 1. Introduction

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the final evaluation of the project GCP/ETH/089/EC – "Strengthening institutionalized subnational coordination structures and harmonization mechanisms", implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and funded under the "Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience" (SHARE) programme.

## 1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

1. The final evaluation aims to provide accountability to the European Commission, FAO, and the Government of Ethiopia (Federal and Regional Government) on outputs and outcomes achieved. It also seeks to draw lessons from the implementation processes that could inform future decision by the project stakeholders.

## 1.2 Intended users

2. The intended users of this evaluation report are: i) the European Union delegation in Addis Ababa. The findings of the evaluation will inform upcoming project designs and European Union coordination strategy in Ethiopia; ii) FAO Ethiopia senior management who will draw lessons on the strategic positioning of FAO among the development and humanitarian partners, to better understand the potential role of FAO in view of its mandate and strategic objectives; iii) FAO technical teams including the Subregional Resilience team, the PROACT implementation team that will also learn from project implementation and the federal Disaster Risk Management Agricultural Task Force (DRM-ATF) inter-cluster coordinator; iv) government officers and officials involved in coordination mechanisms at federal, regional and zonal levels (regional DRM ATF and Ethiopia Resilience Building [RESET] clusters). It will help them better understand challenges of resilience coordination and possible options to make it more effective and efficient; and v) organizations belonging to the EU RESET cluster consortia that will also better understand challenges of resilience coordination and inform upcoming action on internal coordination before the European Commission's 'Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience' programme (EC SHARE) programme comes to an end.

## 1.3 Scope and objectives of the evaluation

3. This final evaluation reviews the entire implementation period of the project, from December 2014 to the completion of project activities in June 2019. It covers all the key activities undertaken within the framework of the project across the five results areas, with a particular focus on outcomes.

4. This is a summative evaluation and is intended to provide a synthesis of the project's results, taking into account the different perspectives of various stakeholders. Furthermore, the evaluation seeks to identify implementation challenges or other contextual factors that positively or negatively affected the outcomes.

5. The objectives of the final evaluation are to assess the achievement of the project against expected results, and more specifically to: i) review the relevance of the project and its approaches in the context of the resilience coordination needs and existing structures;

ii) verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the results achieved, trace back to project activities any changes observed in the improvement of food security and resilience coordination mechanisms and structures, as appropriate, and identify implementation challenges or other contextual factors that positively or negatively affected the outcomes; iii) critically examine the continuing validity of the assumptions on which the project's impact hypotheses were based; iv) analyse the sustainability of project initiatives from the point of view of relevant partners and stakeholders, as well as the links and harmonization of project initiatives with other relevant government- and donors-led coordination platforms; and v) draw lessons and provide strategic recommendations for future similar actions.

6. The evaluation team shall furthermore examine the extent to which cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and environmental sustainability were taken into consideration at formulation and implementation stage.

7. The evaluation team has reorganized the detailed list of evaluation questions contained in the evaluation terms of reference to allow for a more structured analysis and presentation of the findings. The overarching evaluation questions are presented in the box below, while the fully elaborated evaluation matrix, along with detailed sub-questions, is presented in Annex 2.

**Box 1: Overarching evaluation questions**

- What were the expectations and understanding of the stakeholders (including FAO departments) of the project? Were these expectations coherent and aligned?
- To what extent has the project achieved or is expected to achieve its stated objective under the project results framework? How satisfactory are the results that have been achieved?
- How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?
- How efficiently and timely were resources and inputs made available for the implementation of activities, and was this monitored regularly to allow for cost-effective implementation of activities?
- What is the likelihood of the assumptions in the logframe being realized, so that project impact is not jeopardized by external factors?
- Wherever relevant, were cross-cutting issues such as gender equity and environmental sustainability appropriately accounted for and managed from the outset of the project?
- What will be the likelihood of sustainability of the project initiatives after the end of the project support?

## 1.4 Methodology

### 1.4.1 Approach

8. This evaluation used a theory-based approach to assess the changes induced by the project. Coordination is complex, and in Ethiopia there are a number of coordination mechanisms, at various levels: federal, regional and zonal. Some coordination mechanisms are government-led, others are donor-led and others are mixed. In order to fully grasp the intended focus of the project, and to understand the potential impact of the project, the evaluation team elaborated a theory of change (see Section 2.2 of this report) which was used as a frame of reference for the analysis and for drawing findings for this report.

9. The project aimed at strengthening coordination to enhance resilience with a particular focus on the regional level. Therefore, there is a need to analyse and compare how the project's results were achieved in various contexts: i) in agro-ecological zones or areas where resilience interventions are more prominent; and ii) in agro-ecological zones or areas where resilience interventions are less prominent than humanitarian interventions.

10. In all cases, data was triangulated using different sources and methodologies to ensure accuracy and objectivity of the findings.

### 1.4.2 Methodology

11. In the inception phase of the evaluation, a desk review of documents was conducted which included progress reports, mid-term reviews, the report on capitalization, annual reviews and work plans, Letters of Agreement (LOAs), communication outputs of the project, as well as research products. The full list of documents consulted can be found in the Bibliography.

12. A preliminary discussion took place with the project team before the field mission to finalize the arrangements for the mission in Ethiopia. The project team also assisted in providing an initial list of primary stakeholders to be interviewed, which was then supplemented and revised by the evaluation team.

13. An evaluation matrix was elaborated in an inception report, framing the evaluation questions and sub questions and outlining the methods for data collection (Annex 2). Interview guides were elaborated to conduct individual interviews or to be used in group meetings with: i) Disaster Risk Management Task Forces at regional level; ii) Cluster Chairs at cluster level; iii) donors (including World Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD], Department for International Development [DfiD], United States Agency for International Development [USAID]); iv) multilateral organizations (e.g. Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD], African Union, United Nations); v) FAO (project team and FAO Ethiopia management); vi) Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group (RED&FS) at the Ministry of Agriculture and Disaster Risk Management Technical Working Group [DRMTWG] at federal National Disaster Risk Management Commission [NDRMC]; vii) European Union (EC SHARE project and European Union delegation); and viii) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the coordination mechanisms.

14. The evaluation mission was undertaken in Ethiopia in May 2019, to meet with various stakeholders in Addis Ababa and at subnational levels in a sample of regions.

15. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the main stakeholders in Addis Ababa. Two modalities were used to collect information at regional and cluster levels: i) semi-structured key informant interviews with DRM ATF chairs, and other key stakeholders active in resilience programming at the regional level; and ii) group interviews conducted with groups of cluster partners (including NGOs).

16. A debriefing was held with a reference group including FAO Ethiopia, the European Union and RESET cluster partners. The debriefing presentation included a preliminary analysis on the relevance of the project, its effectiveness, the efficiency of implementation, likelihood of impact, gender and equity, and partnership and coordination.

17. An online survey was launched after the field mission took place to assess the satisfaction of the final beneficiaries, NGOs and government agencies. The survey questions were based on the evaluation matrix but were fine-tuned after the field visits. The survey had a limited number of respondents (21), however the results were used by the evaluation team to triangulate existing findings from the field visits and desk review.

18. This project evaluation was conducted concurrently with the FAO Ethiopia Country Programme Evaluation (CPE). As such, the findings from this project evaluation will inform certain aspects of the larger CPE, particularly regarding FAO's positioning towards its various partners and FAO's ability to play a catalytic role in the coordination of international/national stakeholders in the agricultural sector. In addition, this evaluation was conducted parallel to the final evaluation of the 'Pursuing Pastoral Resilience' (PPR) project which is also an European Union-funded project, and part of the EC SHARE programme. The European Union is a major donor for FAO and the European Union-funded portfolio of FAO projects is growing.

### 1.4.3 Site mapping and sampling

19. The project targeted six regions: Tigray; Afar; Amhara; Oromia; Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR); and Somali. The criteria for selecting the sample of regions to be visited were the following:

i. the existence of resilience projects/programmes
ii. agro-ecological features (lowlands versus highlands)
iii. relevance
iv. results achieved
v. challenges in implementation
vi. accessibility

20. In **Tigray**, project field staff were still in place and flights were available for a round trip in one day. There is no EU RESET cluster in Tigray and the region is made of lowlands mostly.

21. In **Afar**, there are EU RESET clusters, but the project field staff were not in place anymore at the time of the evaluation mission as their contracts had ended. The FAO field office is

located in Awash, 374 km from the regional capital, Semera. Flights are available once a day. Afar includes both lowlands and highlands.

22. In **Amhara**, project field staff are in place and there is an EU RESET cluster. Amhara includes highlands in the centre and lowlands to the north west.

23. In **Oromia,** project field staff were still in place at the time of the evaluation mission. Oromia Regional Government Bureaus are based in Addis Ababa. There are two European Union RESET clusters in the Oromia region. The Oromia region includes highlands in the centre and lowlands to west and south.

24. In the **SNNPR** region, there are two EU RESET clusters. The SNNPR region is 278 km from Addis Ababa. Very few project activities were implemented and most of the activities dropped. The prominent agro-ecological zone is lowlands.

25. In the **Somali** region, there are two EU RESET clusters. The DRM TF is well-established and very dynamic. Field staff were no longer in place as their contracts had ended at the time of the evaluation mission. The prominent agro-ecological zone is lowlands.

26. Based on the criteria outlined above, and given the limited time available in-country, the evaluation team undertook field visits in:

    i. Somali Region and the Siti RESET cluster (Dire Dawa)

    ii. Amhara region

    iii. Oromia region

27. Telephone and skype interviews were conducted with FAO field office coordinators and/or project staff in the other regions (i.e. Tigray, SNNPR and Afar).

### 1.4.4 Limitations

28. The major limitation in conducting this evaluation related to challenges in assessing the project against what was originally designed, given that the project underwent significant revisions throughout its period of implementation. These changes, translated into budget modifications, distorted substantially the project rationale and logic. Evaluating project effectiveness and efficiency in this context was not easy.

29. The following table outlines specific limitations faced by the evaluation and the measures taken by the evaluation team to mitigate any negative effects these might have had on the process.

**Table 1: Limitations and risks for the evaluation**

| Limitation/risk | Mitigation measure |
|---|---|
| The expectations of main stakeholders might be not similar. | Conducting in-depth interviews with the European Union and the EC SHARE project team as well as with FAO Ethiopia management and Government officials to clarify as much as possible their expectations. |
| The context and its main features, namely the recurrence of extreme events, institutional instability and the multiplicity of coordination mechanisms in Ethiopia, in addition to the inherent complexity of coordination itself. | Conducting an analysis of the broader context at national level and meeting other international organizations, the United Nations partner agencies, donors and regional bodies such as the African Union and IGAD to better understand the development agenda in Ethiopia. |
| There were a large number of stakeholders to interview, while the time available in-country was limited to two weeks/ | Conducting an in-depth analysis of the coordination mechanisms that are in place at national, regional and local levels. |
| Evaluating impact of coordination projects is quite challenging as there is no tangible outcome that can be identified and evaluated/ | The theory of change shown in Section 2.2 helped the evaluation team to identify and assess project outcomes/ |
| The multiplicity of stakeholders with conflicting interests and various agenda was also a challenge and it was therefore difficult to make sure that would remain relevant in what is clearly a very fluid context with constantly changing relationships and interactions between different partners/ | The mission team was selective and conducted interviews with critical stakeholders that played a major role in project implementation to optimize the time allocated. The mission team by its composition (national and international consultants) was aware of the Development and Humanitarian agendas as well as of the complexity of the context. The evaluation team was well equipped to understand the processes and dynamics in this regard. |
| The evaluation team was not able to visit all the regions/clusters where the project was implemented. | A comparative analysis was conducted with the support of the project team to select the most appropriate regions based on criteria such as agro-ecological features (lowlands vs highlands) in addition to sub-criteria such as relevance, achievements, challenges, accessibility. The evaluation team decided to evaluate the project against the initial design and logframe. Telephone interviews were conducted with stakeholders from regions not visited, along with the e-survey to allow for results to be captured from these regions. |

## 1.5 Structure of the report

30. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the background and context of the project; Findings are described in Chapter 3, based on relevance; effectiveness; efficiency of implementation; likelihood of impact; gender and equity; partnerships and coordination; and lessons and sustainability. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter 4.

# 2. Background and context of the project

## 2.1 Context of the project

### 2.1.1 Description of the project

31. The EC SHARE programme in the Horn of Africa was formulated in response to a large-scale humanitarian crisis following the 2011 drought in the region. In line with the framework of the broader SHARE programme, the SHARE Ethiopia "Accelerating Resilience Capacity - ARC" programme was launched in 2012 with the overall objective of contributing towards building drought resilience of vulnerable communities in North East and Southern and South Eastern parts of the country. The SHARE programme is a joint initiative of the humanitarian – European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) - and development – Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) - services of the Commission. The SHARE Ethiopia ARC programme aims at addressing the underlying causes of disaster risk factors that affect food and nutrition security. The programme has been designed to be implemented strategically, integrating humanitarian and development actions through linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) approaches for better impact supporting the sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable communities in drylands and (agro) pastoral areas of the country as part of the Horn of Africa.

32. The SHARE Ethiopia programme (total EUR 50 million) is part of the ongoing European Union Ethiopia Resilience Building programme covering a number of complementary actions with funding above EUR 240 million since 2013 to address the recurrent humanitarian needs and long-term aspirations of approximately 2.8 million vulnerable people in eight geographical clusters, located in five regional states (Amhara, Afar, Somali, Oromia and SNNPR).

33. Following the 2011 food crisis in the Horn of Africa, 'building resilience' became a priority agenda for the international community to move from the historical division of emergency and development programming to a more holistic, integrated and complementary approach for addressing the root cause of disaster risk and vulnerability factors of recurrent drought that affect people's livelihoods and food and nutrition security. Resilience building is a long-term commitment that needs to be firmly embedded in national policies and strategies and should be well integrated in the overall development process. The capacities to implement such policies, strategies and programmes/projects need to be complemented with building synergies and reducing overlap between different frameworks to ensure new funding opportunities are maximized, and greater overall impact is achieved. In this regard, support for strengthening coordination structures and harmonized mechanisms was needed for a more collaborative effort between development and humanitarian actors and to reduce the need for humanitarian assistance in the long-term.

34. In this context, the "Strengthening institutionalized subnational coordination structure and harmonization mechanisms" project is one of the components of the EC SHARE Ethiopia programme, with the specific objective of establishing effective subnational coordination structures and harmonization mechanisms (covering both relief and development) with linkages to grass root and federal level coordination structures. The project therefore sought to offer the Government and development partners, including FAO, an opportunity

to contribute to aid effectiveness, effective coordination and information sharing among stakeholders at zonal, regional and federal levels and to reduce duplication of efforts and overlaps while enhancing complementarities and synergies. The project sought to build the capacity of coordination structures at regional state and zonal administration levels with a focus on the EU RESET cluster areas located in southern and eastern parts of the country, and link them with the relevant regional level coordination structures. The project also sought to improve alignment in targeting, indicators and monitoring and evaluation with flagship programmes implemented by the Government and by other actors such as NGOs. The project originally aimed to ensure that the Government of Ethiopia is involved at all levels and stages of the programme to assure ownership and learning.

35. The overarching goal of the project was to enhance the drought resilience and food and nutrition security of vulnerable populations in southern and eastern Ethiopia.

36. The specific objective of this project was to support and reinforce the existing coordination mechanisms at the regional states and zonal administration levels and particularly enhance linkages between short-term humanitarian interventions and long-term development initiatives. This project also intended to enhance effectiveness of linkages between the federal level coordination platforms with coordination mechanisms at the EU RESET eight clusters at zone and regional administrative levels. Moreover, the project sought to provide technical support to existing coordination platforms and partners and undertake ad hoc relevant studies and surveys for informed decisions, in line with the LRRD approach.

37. The five intended results of the project are:

**Result 1.** Decentralized (cluster, zonal and regional level) government-led coordination structures involving both relief and development endeavours supported.

**Result 2.** Regular communication and information flows and reporting between the coordination bodies institutionalized.

**Result 3.** Technical capacity of European Union consortium partners and the coordination structures at regional and zonal levels built.

**Result 4.** Linkages with universities and research institutions created to conduct applied research to improve resilience and LRRD approaches**.**

**Result 5.** Forums organized to promote sector experiences sharing for all stakeholders (humanitarian and development actors) and promote scaling up of good practices.

38. The results framework was revised in July 2017, and although the five overarching results areas remained as per the original project document signed between FAO and the European Union, the outputs/activities under each of these results were reformulated. The original logical framework from the project document is annexed to this report (Annex 3).

39. The project first sought to target the European Union/ECHO cluster areas. Accordingly, the project intervention areas included Amhara (Wag Hamra cluster), Afar (Afar cluster), Somali (Shinille and Liben clusters), Oromia (Bale and Borena clusters) and SNNPR (Wolayta and South Omo clusters). Second, it supported the zonal coordination structures of the areas covered by the European Union clusters; and third it supported the regional coordination

structures (DRM-ATFs) of Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali and Tigray regional states and linked these structures to national coordination structures. The project also sought to provide support at the federal level, for example to the government-led RED&FS platform under the Ministry of Agriculture, including through reinforcing horizontal and vertical links with other platforms at different levels.

### 2.1.2 Resources: human resources and budget, including contributions from FAO, other donors, other funding

40. The total budget of the project was EUR 2.5 million or USD 3 114 750. At design stage, the budget was not elaborated to the level of components/subcomponents or results/outputs. The anticipated disbursement from the project document is represented in Figure 1. The planning was relevant. In this chart it is clear that the initial intention was that activities such as establishing contracts with implementing partners, organizing training and workshops, and recruitment of consultants was to take place in the very first year of the project.

**Figure 1: Budget and distribution of budget by category and by year at design stage, USD thousands**




*Source: GCP/ETH/089/EC project document, 2014*

41. At design stage, the human resources allocated to the project were mostly internal FAO human resources, who were to contribute some of their time to project implementation as identified in the project document. Only a limited number of staff were supposed to work full-time for the project at design stage. Project staff dedicating their full-time to the project

and those who had to be recruited included: i) an internationally recruited project coordinator; ii) an internationally recruited consultant to carry out studies; and iii) a national coordinator.

### 2.1.3 Key partners involved in the project

42. Key partners involved in the project are: i) government organizations at federal, regional, zonal and district levels. At regional and zonal levels, this includes Bureaus of Agriculture, Bureaus of Economic Development and Finance; ii) coordination mechanisms such as the NDRMC and RED&FS at federal level, DRM-ATF at regional level and some zonal level coordination structures; ii) European Union Delegation; iii) the EC SHARE programme team and consortia of organizations of eight EU RESET clusters targeted by the project; iv) partners working in the humanitarian and development aid areas such as United Nations organizations (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], IFAD, UN Women, United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF]) but also development partners and donors (World Bank, DfID, GIZ, USAID, Italian Development Cooperation). Some of these partners such as OCHA and UNICEF are present at regional level and have direct interactions with the project team in the regions whereas other partners (e.g. IFAD, World Bank, DfID) are engaged in high level fora and their engagement with the project team is on ad hoc basis in meetings or workshops organized at regional level.

### 2.1.4 Description of the context

43. More than 22 million Ethiopians live in extreme poverty (UNDP, 2018). Each year, between 10 and 15 million people (13-19 percent of the population) are unable to meet their basic food needs. Of these, 7.8 million chronically food-insecure people receive assistance through the national safety net programme. The remainder are dependent on relief food assistance. Population growth is fuelling an increase in pressure on resources. The estimated current population of 110 million people is expected to rise to around 130 million by 2030 (UNFPA, 2019). Rapid urban growth is expected. Agricultural yields are struggling to keep up with the increased population and population density. Smallholder farmers generate 95 percent of agricultural production, which is highly dependent on rainfall. Only 6 percent of irrigable land is irrigated. In poor production years, markets are highly vulnerable to supply shortfalls. Rainfall has become erratic in recent years as a result of recurring El Niño and La Niña episodes which contributed to the 2011 Horn of Africa emergency and Somalia famine. Between 2000 and 2017, six drought episodes were registered in the country. The 2015-2016 El Niño-induced drought was recorded as the worst in 50 years, with devastating effects on pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods (FEWSNET, 2015). Ethiopia's climate is predicted to become significantly hotter and wetter over the next 50 years, with increasingly erratic rainfall damaging crops and reducing yields. Economic shocks, including fluctuating commodity prices, also have a significant impact on a vulnerable population.

44. In drought prone areas, food insecurity has become more frequent and widespread along with the depletion of the household's assets and natural resources basis of their livelihood. Over the course of 2011-2017, an average of 5 to 10 million people required emergency food assistance on an annual basis due to recurrent drought shocks or mild climate departures. In non-exceptional years, the number of people in need of emergency food assistance amounted an average of 2.9 million. Given the level of destitution following three consecutive years of drought, and in the absence of other food security mechanisms,

a minimum caseload of 5 million people for emergency food assistance might be expected in the coming years.

45. Equally important is the fact that current humanitarian support to agricultural and pastoral livelihoods tends to be primarily in the form of crisis response or relief and does not adequately address fundamental long-term development needs. The costs of humanitarian crises are growing, putting additional pressure on the humanitarian system – not only do disasters and complex emergencies result in significant economic losses, but they also require the mobilization of large amounts of humanitarian aid from the international community.

46. On top of this, the regional states and grass roots level coordination structures are often weak, the approaches and implementation modalities are often not harmonized, and the technical capacity of both the Government and NGOs is limited.

**National policies and strategies**

47. A National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management (NPSDRM) was endorsed in 2013 and includes general directions and major implementation strategies for Ethiopia. The overall objective of the National Policy and Strategy on DRM is to "Reduce disaster risks and potential damage caused by a disaster through establishing a comprehensive and coordinated disaster risk management system in the context of sustainable development."(Government of Ethiopia, 2013, "National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management", para. 3).

48. As part of its long-term programme for establishing a robust DRM system in the country, the Disaster Risk and Management Strategic Program and Investment Framework (DRM-SPIF) was developed and ratified in 2014, which aims at promoting a paradigm shift from response and recovery to a multi-sectoral and comprehensive approach that focuses on disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness.

49. The SPIF focuses on the creation of a comprehensive system for managing disaster risk that builds upon past lessons and works to increase cross-sectoral multi-agency integration. The main components of the DRM system already exist, and several of them have made important progress in effectiveness in recent years. However, the components do not function adequately as an integrated system and this limits the overall effectiveness. This requires scaling up efforts in the disaster risk management sector, further developing capacity and ensuring full synchronization.

50. The need for coordination was also given further attention in the recently launched Guideline for Mainstreaming Disaster Risks into the Development Planning Process and Future Investment Decisions in Ethiopia (October, 2019), which includes as its overall objective risk reduction and the reduction of the impact of disasters through the establishment of a comprehensive and integrated disaster risk management system within the context of sustainable development

**Government structures**

51. To implement the NPSDRM and DRM-SPIF, in 2015 the NDRMC was authorized to bring in multiple stakeholders including various sectoral ministries, donors, United Nations agencies, and various civil society organizations through the formation of structures to

address sectoral interventions. The structure is in place to address various disaster management aspects in holistic manners by facilitating convergence between disaster response and long-term resilience building. Under this structure, the National Disaster Risk Management Council, Strategic- Multi Agency Coordination (S-MAC) and Technical Working Groups and sectoral Task Forces are the main actors responsible for overseeing the shift towards a resilience or disaster risk reduction (DRR) approach. While government policies and documents call for a longer term resilience-focused approach to humanitarian coordination, these structures remain primarily humanitarian-response focused. See Figure 2 below for the full illustration of national level humanitarian coordination structures in Ethiopia.

52. The Ministry of Agriculture has established a national level coordination platform called the Rural Economic Development and Food Security Working Group with the objective of coordinating the efforts and resources of development partners. Development programmes are coordinated by RED&FS Sector Working Group (SWG) platforms (e.g. agricultural growth, disaster risk management and food security, sustainable land management), and each sector is supported by a technical committee and a number of task forces and technical working groups (TWGs). The coordination activities of RED&FS are limited to the national level, whereas FAO's coordination project was designed to support alignment, coordination and harmonization of approaches at subnational levels (i.e. regional states and zonal administration levels). See Figure 3 below for the full illustration of the national level coordination structures for development activities in Ethiopia.

53. Therefore, there are currently two parallel coordination mechanisms at the national level in Ethiopia – one for development-related activities, and the other for humanitarian or emergency response-related activities. These separate coordination structures are detailed in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. These coordination mechanisms are separate, do not interact with each other and there is no link between Committees, Task Forces and Technical Working Groups set-up at national level and those established at regional, zonal and district level. The structure of these coordination mechanisms is dynamic, and each has evolved since project start-up. Agencies or partners are appointed as co-chairs on a rotational basis in RED-FS (Ministry of Agriculture): the European Union was co-chairing the Executive Committee with USAID which is now co-chaired by the World Bank and GIZ. At project start-up, the European Union was in a good position to raise the resilience coordination agenda to the highest policymaking levels.

54. At regional, zonal and district level, the coordination mechanisms are not as differentiated as at federal level. There are no development coordination mechanisms at subnational level that are structured and operational. The only subnational coordination mechanisms that are operational in the agricultural sector are the DRM-ATF,[1] co-chaired by the regional Bureaus of Agriculture and FAO. These subnational coordination mechanisms are working in parallel at regional level with the humanitarian sector clusters such as Nutrition and Food Security, Wash, Education, Health, etc.

[1] In some regions, these are Disaster Risk Management – Agricultural and Pastoral Task Forces (DRM-APTF).

**Figure 2: Humanitarian coordination structure**




*Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2019*

**Figure 3: Development coordination structure**






*Source: OCHA, 2019*

## 2.2 Theory of change

55. The original concept for the project emerged following the 2010 drought in the Horn of Africa. The project design process was lengthy and included various partners and counterparts, which increased the complexity of the concept. The project was finally approved and signed in 2013, three years after its initial conception.

56. The Year 1 progress report did seek to elaborate a schematic for the achievement of project outcomes. In terms of objectives or intended impacts, the project intended to strengthen coordinated responses of relief and development partners to structural constraints such as recurrent droughts, multiplicity of parallel coordination mechanism and institutional instability of government structures at various level, and this, in turn, was expected to enhance the drought resilience and food and nutrition security of vulnerable populations in Southern and Eastern Ethiopia.

57. Through focusing on the five results areas, or intended outcomes, the project sought to achieve the following: i) at national level, the project will help coordinate approaches/address priorities in programming and promoting LRRD approaches; and ii) at regional and zonal level, the project will support coordination of programming and/or implementation with the objective to promote LRRD approaches through concertation at design and implementation stages and/or through joint design and implementation.

58. There was no elaboration of a theory of change (TOC) in the original project document. Having a theory of change could have helped to instil a common understanding on key issues. To begin with, there was no common or agreed understanding of what was meant by 'coordination', and coordination as an activity is by nature quite complex. Furthermore, the project document did not offer an accepted definition of 'resilience', which was a crucial oversight, one that stakeholders complained of during the evaluation.

59. For such a complex project, the objective of setting up coordination mechanisms must be clear, so that the project can be managed and implemented properly. Coordination work includes the management of many processes and sub-processes at various levels (federal, regional and zonal) and one has to be aware of the existence of these processes to be able to monitor them towards the achievement of the project objectives.

60. The Paris Declaration, signed in 2005 by over 100 developed and developing countries, was organized around five principles: i) developing countries set their own development strategies, improve their institutions and tackle corruption (Ownership); ii) donor countries and organizations bring their support in line with these strategies and use local systems (alignment); iii) donor countries and organizations coordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication (Harmonization); iv) developing countries and donors focus on producing and measuring results (Managing results); v) donors and developing countries are accountable for development results (i.e. mutual accountability) (OECD, 2005).

61. There is a need for a shared and clear understanding of the concept of coordination based on the principles of the Paris Declaration, particularly on principle iii). Having a common understanding of the concept of coordination would have helped implement the project and make progress towards the project objective. Clarity in understanding of concepts is key to avoid confusion at implementation stage and waste of efforts and time. Respondents

to the online survey administered by this evaluation identified the lack of a common understanding of resilience as one of the most important barriers to coordination in Ethiopia.[2]

62. Figure 4 below shows the theory of change reconstructed by the evaluation team. It relates context to outputs, outcomes and impacts. It includes the assumptions and risks to be addressed at implementation to reach project objectives. The risks included in the project LogFrame at design stage were very concise: i) Government interested in leading the coordination structures; and ii) regional governments interested in widening the scope of existing coordination structures.

[2] See Annex 1 of this report for the complete analysis of the online survey findings.

**Figure 4: Theory of change**




*Source: Evaluation team*

# 3. Findings

## 3.1 Relevance

**Finding 1. The project is aligned with the FAO Country Programming Framework and particularly with at least three of the cross-cutting issues, which are also priority areas of focus for the Government, namely: resilience building, coordination and knowledge management. The project is aligned with FAO's Strategic Objective 5 (Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises).**

63. The FAO Country Programming Framework is the principal instrument that defines the development priorities for collaboration between FAO and the Government of Ethiopia. The current CPF covers the period 2016-2020, and as such, aims to align with the second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), 2016-2020, and the Agriculture Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF). The FAO CPF identifies the following priority areas:

    i. crop production, productivity and commercialization improved;
    ii. livestock and fisheries production, productivity and commercialization improved;
    iii. sustainable natural resource management and improved livelihood resilience to threats and disaster.

64. Additionally, the CPF identifies several overarching areas of support including capacity development for policy monitoring and evaluation and facilitation of inclusive policy dialogues; promoting coordination, synergies and partnerships; and knowledge management to enhance the scaling up and replication of best practices.

65. In this regard, the project is most closely aligned with Priority Area III of the current CPF (2016-2020), while also contributing to several of the overarching areas of support. In terms of coordination, the project contributes to the streamlining of interventions at RESET cluster level and regional level through Result 1 and Result 3. In terms of knowledge management, the project contributes to the sharing experience through Result 4 and Result 5. In terms of promoting resilience-building, the project aims towards strengthening government-led coordination mechanisms at subnational level through Result 1.

66. Furthermore, Ethiopia is a focus country for two FAO regional initiatives (RI) for Africa, specifically Africa's Commitment to End Hunger by 2025; and Building Resilience in Africa's Drylands, through which the exchange of good practices and knowledge within the Africa region is facilitated. This project has an indirect contribution to these initiatives.

67. In terms of FAO's Strategic Objectives, the project is tagged under Strategic Objective 5I (Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises). In Ethiopia the largest share of delivery of FAO's programme has been under Strategic Objective 5 which suggests that the project is highly relevant to the existing portfolio. By strengthening the linkages between resilience and relief approaches, it contributes to preparing countries for natural and human-caused disasters by reducing their risk and enhancing the resilience of their food and agricultural systems (FAO).

### 3.1.1 Relevance to national policies/strategies

**Finding 2. The project result areas reflected a critical need on the ground and were therefore highly relevant and aligned with the national DRM policy and strategy. The interventions and the approach used (linking relief, rehabilitation and development) were relevant and appropriate to the needs of the stakeholders involved.**

68. The importance of linking relief, rehabilitation and development approach is well acknowledged by almost all humanitarian and development actors. However, existing coordination structures and mechanisms remain inadequate to ensure the LRRD approach through structured joint planning and implementation. Meanwhile, there is an absence of a clear strategy or guidance document on how best to integrate humanitarian interventions with ongoing long-term development initiatives.

**69.** The project interventions combined several actions drawn from FAO previous experiences and NGOs, government institutions and international organizations already active in the area. For example, the project builds on the lessons learned of the first phases of the EC SHARE programme, but also of the 'Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods project II (DRSLP -2)' (AFDB) and 'Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLRP)' (World Bank), and 'Pastoralists Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion PRIME' (USAID).

70. The main components of the DRM system already exists, and several of them have made important progress in terms of their effectiveness in recent years. However, the components still do not function adequately as an integrated system and this limits the overall effectiveness. This requires scaling up efforts in the disaster risk management sector, further developing capacity, and ensuring full synchronization and strategic complementarity of the numerous initiatives and interventions. There is still limited awareness and mainstreaming of the DRM policy and DRM-SPIF in government institutions – e.g. across federal ministries, at regional, zonal and woreda level government sector offices and others.

### 3.1.2 Relevance of the project to the coordination context

**Finding 3. The project is highly relevant to the current context in Ethiopia, where preparedness and longer term resilience have become priority areas of focus for all actors in humanitarian and development initiatives.**

71. The coordination context in Ethiopia is quite complex because of the multiplicity of partners and their various interests in engaging in humanitarian and development aid. Ethiopia is a huge country with differentiated situations going from extreme emergency situations to contexts where natural resources are available and can be used to build resilience and improve livelihoods.

72. The project is very much relevant to the coordination context: the last HRD reports 2019 show explicitly that the Government and partners want to address emergency needs by using the concept of preparedness. Government and partners would like to increase the resilience of communities and agro-ecosystems to external shocks to avoid continuous short-term and emergency response. The latter does not solve structural constraints in the medium- and long-term and maintains vulnerable categories in fragility and uncertainty. There is a multitude of stakeholders, the country is facing recurrent droughts and willing

to move out of humanitarian aid and donors (such as the European Union) are willing to move ahead with the resilience agenda.

73. Furthermore, the project is in line with the strategic objective of the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), initiated after the 2010-2011 drought in the Horn of Africa ('to strengthen coordination, institutional mechanisms, partnerships, coherence and capabilities for effective delivery of drought resilience'). The main activities that should contribute to this strategic objective are: i) mainstream drought resilience and sustainability mandate in the functions of the IGAD Secretariat; ii) effective coordination and alignment of development partners with Members States and IGAD Programmes; iii) formalize and promote protocols, partnerships, networks and collaboration for transboundary drought resilience interventions and ending of drought emergencies; iv) develop and promote common programming frameworks, indicators, targets and standards at national and regional level; v) support and promote need-based human and institutional capacity building at national and regional levels; and vi) strengthen coordination mechanisms, interaction and functional linkages between IGAD Secretariat, Member States and at all other levels (IGAD, IDDRSI).

74. A Review of Resilience Initiatives in Ethiopia (2011-2016) conducted by IGAD in 2017 found that there is still a need to strengthen national resilience coordination mechanisms for greater efficiency and results at community level. More specifically, there is a need for better alignment of coordination mechanisms under the NDRMC, Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment, Forest and Climate Change Commission (IGAD, IDDRSI). Although, the same review recognized that coordination mechanisms had been strengthened to some extent due to a strong political commitment and partly due to multi-sectoral flagship projects in agriculture, water, roads, energy, health and education.

**Finding 4. The project's collaboration with major donors involved in agricultural development was limited. Such collaboration could have helped move forward the resilience agenda at the federal level.**

75. There was a missed opportunity in terms of engaging with larger donors in Ethiopia, which limited the overall scale and impact of the project. For example, IFAD is not fully involved in coordination mechanisms although its portfolio amounts to almost USD 1 billion in Ethiopia. IFAD is funding three major operations in Ethiopia: i) the rural financial intermediation programme II; ii) pastoral community development project III; and iii) participatory small-scale irrigation development programme II. The project is indirectly aligned with the first IFAD strategic objective entitled 'Strategic objective 1: Enhanced resilience and productivity of ecosystems and livelihoods through improved management of natural resources, particularly water' (IFAD, 2016).

76. The World Bank is involved in the RED&FS coordination mechanism at federal level as a co-chair. The project is in line with the Focal Area 3 of the World Bank Partnership Framework in Ethiopia entitled 'Building Resilience and Inclusiveness' (World Bank, 2018). The World Bank is committed to improving coordination with the development partners. The project provided support to RED&FS through a Letter of Agreement that was signed in 2018, but services provided by the project - mainly capacity building and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) support - were below expected standards and had still not been completed two months before project closure.

### 3.1.3 Scope of the project

**Finding 5. The scope of the project was too broad, and no precise definition of resilience was provided: the scope of the project goes beyond FAO's mandate. The lack of common understanding of the objectives of resilience coordination created confusion amongst project stakeholders, and therefore affected the results.**

77. The project was overly ambitious in terms of the activities that could have been achieved in the original time frame. The experience sharing workshops of 2016 identified specific outcomes for streamlining the focus of the project, but these were not followed in subsequent implementation, nor was there a prioritization of activities that could more feasibly be implemented within the project time span. This hampered the project's outcomes.

78. Resilience building includes a range of sectors including health, education, sanitation, agriculture, food security and nutrition. In this sense, resilience in a broader understanding stretches beyond FAO's mandate. By not limiting the scope of the project to the area of food security and agriculture, project implementation was made more complex due to the multiplicity of partners playing in the aforementioned sectors and it was therefore difficult to conduct processes and sub-processes at regional and zonal level. Each partner working in a sector has its own approach, objectives and needs in terms of capacity building and coordination approach.

79. The expertise available within the project team in terms of process-facilitation, monitoring and evaluation, meeting-facilitation and operations was limited and did not allow for risks to be fully recognized during the course of project implementation. In this regard, the expertise available in the project team had some limitations and could not foresee the expected challenges that arose in strengthening coordination mechanisms nor assess that a differentiated implementation approach was needed at each level, namely zonal, regional and federal level.

### 3.1.4 Limiting contextual factors: extreme climate events, civil unrest and political instability

**Finding 6. Combined negative effects of extreme climate events, civil unrest, high government staff turnover and political instability negatively impacted project implementation in some areas.**

80. Climate-induced drought and flood disasters (particularly the 2015/16 El Niño – induced drought) and other humanitarian crises increased the costs and complexity of humanitarian support during the project period. As a result, the strong and urgent need for disaster relief shifted the attention and resources of the Government and development agencies to emergency response and this in turn affected project implementation at regional and zonal level. This was particularly the case in SNNPR (South Omo) where the evaluation learned that the priority of stakeholders was on mobilizing resources to respond to the overwhelming emergency in SNNPR. This led to reduced frequency of coordination meetings and fewer participants in the South Omo zone resilience coordination platform in particular, as government staff and partners were engaged in emergency response operations. It was even requested of FAO to revise this project to instead provide emergency response, rather than longer term capacity development support.

81. There were two main assumptions included in the logframe: i) Government interested to lead the coordination structures; and ii) regional Government interested to widen the scope of existing coordination structures. No risks were identified at design stage, despite the country having gone through extreme climate events and political instability that resulted in systematic changes in government institutions.

82. There were several humanitarian crises during the course of the project which diverted attention towards emergency response. Following the most devastating drought effect (due to the impact of 2015-2016 El Niño), there was a more complex and sudden onset political instability and conflict-induced crisis with needs to those arising from internal displacements and civil unrest caused by political instability and conflict (OCHA, 2016, 2018). Due to political instability (in 2017 and 2018), Ethiopia entered a period of political which uncertainty led to insecurity and civil unrest particularly in the regions. Old disputes between communities over natural resources (watering points, pastures, arable land, etc.) took on a new dimension[3] and led to severe conflict and massive displacement. As the security situation and social unrest escalated, the Government declared state of emergencies, imposed restriction travel/movement to those areas that were especially in turmoil. As of end 2018, 2.35 million people were internally displaced due to the violence (out of a total of 2.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country). This instability affected project implementation in some regions.

83. Meanwhile, there was considerable government institutional rearrangement and staff turnover during the lifetime of the project. For example, the federal level Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD), underwent major institutional rearrangements, first being split into two ministries (Ministry of Livestock and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and then subsequently being remerged into the current Ministry of Agriculture. This situation resulted in high staff turnover and impacted the institutional memory relating to the project. Furthermore, political changes in some of the regions resulted in high staff turnover – most notably in the Somali region. With each change in personnel and institutional structure, the project team had to begin anew with sensitization and awareness raising, which undoubtedly caused setbacks and hampered progress.

### 3.1.5 Project design

**Finding 7. Project delays resulted in the design of the project becoming less relevant to the dynamic context in Ethiopia as time went on, while a differentiated analysis of the context was missing at the design stage.**

84. The objectives of the coordination mechanisms were not clearly defined except as in the overall objective of the project. It is difficult to understand the concept of resilience coordination as it includes multi-level, multi-stakeholder, multi-timescale processes and sub-processes underpinned by at least two prominent types of operations: emergency operations and larger scale development/resilience operations.

[3] In 1991, the country delimitated its regional states based on ethnicity. This led to a rise in disputes in certain flashpoints, e.g. in Moyale at the border between the Oromia and Somali regions. While ethnic tensions have always existed, the new system tended to politicize the existing differences. The recent political liberalization trend has been mentioned as a possible factor in the resurgence in local tensions witnessed in 2018.

85. The design did not include impact/outcome indicators, activities are scattered and not articulated to achieve the objective of the project. It was then difficult for the project team to give priority to individual activities in the implementation process.

86. There was a lack of analysis of the existing coordination mechanisms and processes at design stage; there was a lack of understanding of the coordination mechanisms and processes at zonal, regional and federal level. Because of the lack of analysis of the existing coordination mechanisms and processes, neither the objective of the coordination mechanisms nor the scale of coordination had been clearly defined at design stage. As a result, the coordination mechanisms were not strengthened to streamline LRRD approaches, to come up with joint proposals for funding or to envisage joint implementation except at the lower level, at cluster (i.e. zonal and woreda levels) where the demand for coordination was highest.

87. There was no analysis of the coordination mechanisms at any level, i.e. woreda, zonal, regional and national levels. Such analysis would have shed light on the idea that coordination is more effective if it: i) is focused on a specific thematic area; ii) is conducted at grass roots level; iii) includes a limited number of partners; and iv) has clearly defined objectives and operational modalities from a very early stage.

88. It ought to be noted that the project was conceived initially in response to a need to strengthen EU-RESET clusters during Phase 1 of the REEST Programme. However, due to delays in project start-up as well as the rapidly changing context, the project adapted its scope as the implementation period progressed. In this regard, the original design, as it was conceived in 2011, was ultimately not entirely appropriate to the actual implementation because it did not stress on the double objective of the project: i) on the one hand, supporting the RESET clusters; and on the other hand ii) strengthening coordination mechanisms at regional level (cluster and national level). If this double objective had been clearly conceived in the design, it would have allowed for a different implementation strategy, with dedicated activities planned from the start date to strengthen coordination within the RESET cluster consortia, all the while differentiating between internal and external coordination, which are two separate aims.

89. The initial objective of the project was to strengthen coordination mechanisms at zonal and regional level which were weak, and the project was not targeted towards the federal level: in the original design, communication between coordination mechanisms at various levels was not envisaged, nor was the development of instruments/tools or formal information systems.

## 3.2 Effectiveness

90. The effectiveness of project activities has been assessed using the original logframe as the basis for analysis. As such, the findings are presented here across each of the five result areas of the project.

**Result Area 1. Decentralized government-led coordination structures involving both relief and development endeavours supported.**

**Finding 8. The process of strengthening coordination mechanisms varied greatly between regions, from the drafting of the Terms of Reference (TOR), the way the meetings were**

**organized and conducted and how meetings' recommendations are monitored and implemented. As a result, progress in terms of enhanced coordination varied greatly between regions.**

91. Letters of Agreement were signed with: i) Bureau of Agriculture of Oromia on 15 June 2016; ii) Bureau of Agriculture of Amhara on 20 June 2016; iii) Bureau of Agriculture of Somali on 15 June 2016; iv) Bureau of Agriculture of SNNPR on 10 September 2016; iv) Bureau of Pastoralism and Agriculture in AFAR on 1 July 2016; and v) Bureau of Agriculture and Pastoralism in Tigray on 1 July 2016. The LOA with SNNPR was cancelled in 2018 because FAO and the Bureau of Agriculture were not in agreement about the person to recruit as FAO's support officer: since project start-up, the Bureau of Agriculture wanted to oversee the recruitment of this FAO staff, the first person recruited left because another opportunity came up and the second person recruited based on FAO's procedures was not accepted by local government officers: he resigned in the fall of 2018.

92. The implementation periods covered by the LOAs varies from one region to another as shown in Table 2 below. The first Letter of Agreement signed off was for Afar at the end of 2015, whereas most of the other letters of agreements were signed off on or about mid-2016, more than two years after project start-up. This delay had negative consequences on project implementation and on the achievement of results. Furthermore, project duration was extended at no-cost beyond the validity period of the Letters of Agreement.

**Table 2: Implementation periods covered by the letters of agreements with Government organizations at regional and zonal level**

| | Nov-15 | Dec-15 | Jan-16 | Feb-16 | Mar-16 | Apr-16 | May-16 | Jun-16 | Jul-16 | Aug-16 | Sep-16 | Oct-16 | Nov-16 | Dec-16 | Jan-17 | Feb-17 | Mar-17 | Apr-17 | May-17 | Jun-17 | Jul-17 | Aug-17 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afar Region Pastoral Agriculture Development Bureau | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Afar Region Pastoral Agriculture Development Bureau | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Borena Zone Pastoralist Development Office | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Oromia Bureau of Agriculture | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Amhara Region Disaster Prevention and Food Security Program Coordination Office | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Somali Regional Livestock and Pastoralist Development Bureau | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tigray National Regional State Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

*Source: FAO and EU, 2016 and 2017 (Letters of Agreement signed in 2016 and 2017)*

93. The volumes of funds allocated to the Bureaus of Agriculture were not equal across all regions (approximately USD 30 000 in the case of Amhara and more than USD 50 000 in the case of Tigray and Afar), as evidenced in Figure 5. One LOA was established at zonal level (Borena zone). These LOAs were meant to provide resources to the regional DRM-ATFs to support the organization of monthly meetings and their logistics.

**Figure 5: Volumes of funds allocated to Regional Bureaus of Agriculture through the Letters of Agreement (in USD)**




*Source: FAO and EU, 2016 and 2017*[4]

94. No detailed TORs were elaborated for the subnational resilience mechanisms apart from the regional DRM ATF TORs that were mirrored from the federal DRM ATF. Such TORs should ideally have defined the roles and responsibilities by member categories (Government, non-governmental organizations, and United Nations organizations) which could arguably have helped pave the way for more structured and organized collaboration.

95. Terms of Reference of Coordination mechanisms were not timely updated or established. Terms of Reference for Borena zone coordination forum were established and discussed on 17 July 2018. Nevertheless, key areas of coordination were defined such as information, scientific approach and expertise sharing, conducting experience sharing events and joint field visits before engaging in joint implementation. TORs remain vague as they do not include specific roles and responsibilities to make the coordination forum operational (some organizations should be appointed on a rotational basis as secretary of the forum, some should be responsible for conducting studies on specific thematic areas, some for facilitating coordination forum meetings) and no operational arrangements are mentioned (who calls for the coordination meetings? The frequency of coordination meetings, venues, etc). No detailed time frame of steps needed to organize the coordination forum meetings is included in the TORs.

[4] Letters of Agreements signed in 2016 and 2017. The exceptional LOA with Borena Zone is included here for comparison.

96. The TORs of the regional coordination forums (DRM-ATF) are clearer than the zonal level TORs. The TORs of the regional coordination forums (DRM-ATF) include operational modalities and define broadly what are the roles and responsibilities of main stakeholders such as in the case of Oromia region.

97. The number of monthly meetings at regional and zonal level is uneven over the project implementation period and over the years. The project did not manage to reach the frequency of one meeting per month in all target regions year-round. It seems the frequency of regional meetings is more established at regional level than at zonal level.

**Table 3: Frequency of Disaster Risk Management- Agricultural Task Force meetings at regional and zonal level, by year**

| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Regional level** | | | | | |
| Afar | 2 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 10 |
| Amhara | 0 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 2 |
| Oromia | 0 | 0 | 14 | 2 | 2 |
| SNNPR | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Somali | 4 | 4 | 9 | 16 | 17 |
| Tigray | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| **Zonal level** | | | | | |
| Oromia | 0 | 5 | 12 | 0 | 2 |
| Somali | 0 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| Amhara | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

*Source: FAO 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018*[5]

98. Table 3 shows that the frequency of regional DRM-ATF monthly meetings increased in all regions over the project implementation period, particularly in Afar and Somali and Tigray regions where there was a marked increase in the frequency of DRM-ATF meetings while the regularity of meetings remained steady until the end of the project. While there was an increase in the frequency of meetings in Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR in 2016 and 2017, this seems to have tapered off again in 2018.

99. By the time the project activities became operational in 2015 and 2016, Ethiopia was facing an emergency drought situation during the El Niño event. The El Niño crisis led to a dramatic increase in the frequency of coordination meetings in Oromia region, where El Niño effects were considerably more significant. An increase in the frequency of regional DRM-ATF meetings was also observed in Somali region, most likely due to fragility and recurrent droughts that impact negatively on livelihoods (particularly pastoralists).

100. Stakeholders from the various DRM-ATFs visited by the evaluation expressed appreciation for the support to the DRM-ATF coordination mechanisms, the effectiveness of which they found to have been particularly enhanced during emergency situations.

[5] Biannual and annual progress reports of 2014, 2015, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018.

101. However, there was no Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between a federal authority and the subnational coordination mechanisms to ensure they will still be functional after project closure.

102. The project team faced some difficulties in implementing the project in SNNPR such that the LOA with the regional DRM-ATF was cancelled. This impacted on the frequency of DRM-ATF meetings in SNNPR, especially when compared to Oromia, Afar or Somali regions. Organizing zonal DRM-ATF meetings was easier in zones where previous projects had already supported zonal coordination mechanisms or where organizations were physically present and used to collaborate with stakeholders and partners. FAO was running two offices in Borena and Guji zones in Oromia regions. Almost no DRM-ATF meetings were held in zones subject to insecurity or political instability as in Lieben zone in Somali region.

103. An analysis of the minutes of the DRM-ATF meetings shows that the definition of action points and their follow-up varies from one region to another. Action points are barely defined in some regional DRM-ATF meetings such as in the case of Tigray region (DRM-ATF meeting, 28 July 2016) or, conversely, they were extremely precise (DRM-ATF meeting, 25 March 2016). Action points are defined in regional DRM-ATF minutes of the last meetings (2017, 2018 and 2019) in the case of Oromia. These are sometimes a mix of action points to be implemented by the project team (such as capacity building activities) and others to be implemented by DRM-ATF member organizations. A timeline to implement these action points was sometimes included, such as in the minutes of the Oromia regional DRM-ATF meeting held on 30 June 2017. In some cases (as in the minutes of the Somali DRM-ATF on 18 April 2019), there is follow-up on the action points agreed upon in the previous meeting. Minutes of regional DRM-ATF meetings also shows: i) an update of the current situation (e.g. weather/climate conditions, a summary of a multi-agency assessment report); and ii) general recommendations including technical recommendations such as monitoring livestock feed and water situation in the lowland woredas for timely response (e.g. Oromia DRM-ATF, 15 July 2016 and 3 November 2017).

104. Minutes of DRM-ATF meetings show regional coordination structures are unevenly developed. In some cases, action points aimed at creating technical working groups under the DRM-ATFs on key thematic issues, such as the formation of a regional Cash Working Group in Somali region. This initiative was promoted by a group of development and humanitarian partners (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], OCHA, Livestock and Pastoral Development Project [LPDP],[6] International Organization for Migration [IOM] and World Food Programme [WFP]) because: i) '*cash related interventions in the region were increasing from time to time and implemented by many partners operating in different parts of the region'*; ii) '*the lack of coordination, modalities from project formulation to implementation, standard wage rates and operational modalities have not been set for the region so* far; iii) '*this lack of coordination has caused variation and differences in the standard of implementation by different partners'*; iv) *'the lack of coordination among partners has also caused poor cooperation among partners involved';* and v) '*there is no reliable data about the partners involved in cash-related interventions and the nature of the intervention itself'* (Somali DRM-ATF, 28 March 2019). In subsequent DRM-ATF regional meeting (e.g. Somali DRM-ATF, 19 May 2019), the LPDP team was appointed to draft the TORs of this technical working group. Otherwise, these action points remain

[6] LPDP is an IFAD-funded project.

qualitative and are more about further engagement in dialogue with government partners on specific issues. Action points are more operational in emergency situations when specific response actions need to be undertaken.

105. In Borena zone, discussions and consultations were made in DRM-ATF meetings to streamline and harmonize implementation strategies. An assessment was undertaken to: i) to assess the existing cash-for-work payment modalities for across the zone; and ii) to harmonize the uniform wage payment across the districts.

106. Mapping exercises were also undertaken at regional and zonal levels in order to take stock of the different resilience-related activities and projects being undertaken by all stakeholders. Mapping matrices were subsequently updated in most of the cases, e.g. in Oromia. The objective of the mapping exercise was either to map existing projects at regional or zonal level or to map coordination structures that are active at regional and zonal level. Table 4 below shows the nature of outputs of the mapping exercises undertaken at regional and zonal levels. Mapping reports describing the regional coordination space were drafted for each of the target regions. More detailed matrices on regional coordination structures were established in the case of Tigray and Amhara. These matrices give hints on how these regional coordination structures function (e.g. with information on reporting systems, the existence of TORs, main products, etc.).

**Table 4: Nature of outputs of the mapping exercises undertaken at regional and zonal levels**

| Region/Zone | Nature of mapping | Information gathered |
|---|---|---|
| **Tigray** | Projects | • Implementing organization<br>• Number of beneficiaries<br>• Area of intervention<br>• Start/end dates<br>• Amount and source of funds<br>• Government stakeholders |
| **Tigray** | Coordination structures at regional level | • Name and type of coordination structure and major topic<br>• existence of TORs<br>• Focus areas<br>• Sectors or actors working in 1. Relief, 2. Development, 3. Resilience (linking relief and development)<br>• Name and Address of Hosting Organization (Chair/Co-chair)<br>• Date of starting and current Frequency of meeting (monthly/weekly/ad hoc)<br>• Preconditions for membership (Government, NGOs, UN, donors)<br>• Amount of Financial Support Secured from (Donor),(relief, resilience and development) in USD<br>• Coordination/harmonization challenges in brief<br>• Quality of the attendance and proactive participation<br>• Quality of the effective joint planning and implementation<br>• Kind of planning ('Who, Where, When' maps, matrix of requirements matrix of availability, matrix of response, matrix of gaps, list of projects, road maps, annual work plan, operational plans)<br>• Type and Interval of reporting to the federal level (relief, development)<br>• Kind of reporting from the federal level to the regions |

| Region/Zone | Nature of mapping | Information gathered |
|---|---|---|
| | | • Existing self-assessments or monitoring guidelines<br>• Existing self-assessments or monitoring reports<br>• Main products / Main milestones |
| | Coordination space matrix | • Name of the coordination working group/platform<br>• Lead of the coordination (Chair/ Co-chair)<br>• Subject area of coordination (e.g. crop, livestock, natural resources, etc.), The objectives of the platform<br>• Zone/woreda of implementation<br>• Relevance in aligning with other coordination structures |
| **Amhara** | Coordination structures at regional level | • Same as for Tigray |
| | Coordination space matrix | • Same as for Tigray |
| | Resilience mapping matrix (not complete) | • Coordination/platform (level/region/ zone ATF or other DRM-TWG/RESET cluster)<br>• Implementation institution/organization (Government, NGO, etc.)<br>• Name of the project<br>• Sector/multi-sector<br>• Area of intervention: zone/woreda/number of kebeles<br>• Starting/ending date<br>• Amount of fund/in ETB/USD<br>• Source of funds |
| **Afar** | Project mapping matrix | • Coordination platform/level (Region/Zone ATF or other DRM-TWG/RESET cluster)<br>• Implementing Institution/Organization (Government, NGO, etc.)<br>• Name of the project<br>• Sector or multisector<br>• Area of intervention (Zone), Area of intervention woreda/number of kebeles)<br>• Starting/Ending days<br>• Amount of funds<br>• Source of funds<br>• Status<br>• Contact person |
| | Coordination space matrix | • Name of the coordination working group/platform<br>• Lead of the coordination (Chair/ Co-chair)<br>• Subject area of coordination (crop, livestock, Natural resources, etc.)<br>• The objectives of the platform<br>• Zone /woreda of implementation<br>• Relevance to align with other Coordination structures |
| **Oromia** | Project mapping | • Coordination/platform (level/region/ zone ATF or other DRM-TWG/RESET cluster)<br>• Implementation institution/organization (Government, NGO, etc.)<br>• Name of the project<br>• Sector/multi-sector<br>• Area of intervention: zone/woreda/number of kebeles<br>• Starting/ending date<br>• Amount of fund/in ETB/USD,<br>• Source of funds |

| Region/Zone | Nature of mapping | Information gathered |
|---|---|---|
| | Coordination space matrix | • Same as for Afar |
| **Somali** | Project mapping | • Same as for Somali |
| | Coordination space matrix | • Same as for Oromia |
| **SNNPR** | Coordination space matrix | • Same as for Somali |

*Source: FAO, 2016*

107. The project office took the initial handbook for training facilitators, the proceedings of the training of trainers (TOT) and the experience of the 2017-2018 trainings and developed a condensed ***"Practical Coordination Booklet for Resilience Building"*** which succinctly condenses the elements of the workshops into a useful reference (FAO, 2019).[7] The booklet has been edited three times and over 1 000 copies have been widely distributed.

**Result Area 2. Regular communication and information flows and reporting between the coordination bodies institutionalized.**

**Finding 9. While there was an improvement in the flow of information from the regions to the federal level, no formalized communication system has been put in place and the project did not take advantage of existing information management systems.**

108. Communication was very limited and activities that were supposed to disseminate information on a large-scale were cancelled (e.g. the project website). Minutes of DRM-ATF meetings held at regional level were shared with the DRM-ATF at national level. Nevertheless, there was limited information flow from the federal or regional level to the zonal and woreda levels.

109. The project team did not take advantage of the existing agricultural information management system put together by the ATA. Such existing channels could have been useful and more cost-effective as a means to disseminate information as no investment would have been required to develop a new communications system.

110. Ultimately, the project did not develop any formal communication system to disseminate information from federal level to regional, zonal and districts levels and vice versa. Information was flowing on an ad hoc basis when fora, training sessions or field visits took place.

**Result Area 3. Technical capacity of the coordination structures at regional and zonal level built.**

**Finding 10. The project carried out a series of trainings, using a 'training of trainers' approach. The trainings were highly appreciated, and the skills acquired are now being put**

[7] This refers to the capitalization report.

**to use by training participants. However, high staff turnover is likely to limit the sustainability of these results.**

111. Although this project, at its core, is a capacity development project, it was designed without a Capacity Needs Assessment or similar exercise, nor was such an exercise conducted during the implementation phase. This resulted in an ad hoc approach to the capacity development activities. Such an assessment would have helped to identify the differentiated needs of each stakeholder category, i.e. government agents at various levels (federal, regional, zonal and district/woreda), NGO staff and members of RESET cluster consortia, FAO staff and senior government officers.

112. However, the project coordinator did reach out to the FAO Capacity Development Team in Rome midway through the project, and reportedly received strong guidance relating to FAO's enhanced capacity development framework. It would have been better if such rigorous guidance had been included in the project design, along with a participatory Capacity Needs Assessment.

113. FAO's enhanced capacity development framework calls for the development of functional and technical capacities across three different 'dimensions': individual, organizational and enabling environment, with interactions between and across each dimension (FAO, 2018).

114. Six training workshops were organized on coordination for resilience at regional level in 2017 and eight training workshops were organized at EU RESET cluster/zonal level in 2018. Many of the trainings conducted by the project focused on the individual level. In this regard, the project adopted a 'training of trainers' approach, whereby key individuals from different organizations were given a master training which they were then to 'cascade' to others. Two training of trainers workshops were held at national level by two international consultants. A test workshop was organized in November 2016 with regional representatives and the main workshop held in May 2017 included six modules, namely: i) Module 1 on general background and coordination; ii) Module 2 on review of practice; iii) Module 3 on way forward; iv) Module 4 on capacity building; and v) Module 5 and 6 on strengthening facilitation skills. The modules were of good quality and participants highly appreciated the content of the modules and materials provided to them. Participants of these TOT workshops were staff of lead organizations of RESET cluster consortia, FAO regional support officers, and regional government officers/DRM-ATF members.

115. Eight training workshops were organized at RESET cluster level to trickle down the modules taught in the national TOT workshops.

116. Table 5 below shows the number of trainings that were held at zonal level, participants to trainings sessions and content of these training sessions. Most of the modules taught in the national TOT workshops were provided to zonal/district level participants. Coordination capacity building training was conducted in all RESET zones except in one zone with the support of FAO project staff at regional level.

117. The Annual Review of Practice was introduced in these workshops as well as annual planning. Because of cumulative delays, the annual review of practice and annual planning at zonal and district level came late. Follow-up activities have been defined at zonal/district level with a focus on the formation of a task force. Most of these trainings conducted at zonal level were held in late 2018 and most of the FAO support officers contracted by the

project left in the beginning of 2019, which did not allow for any follow-up of the agreed activities. Annual Review of Coordination Practices were conducted in five regions (Afar, Somali, Amhara, Oromia and Tigrai) and all but one EU RESET clusters (Afar, Siti, Waghumra, Bale, Borena, South Omo and Wolayita) zones.[8]

118. In the zonal/district workshops of capacity building in resilience coordination, some proceedings do not include the workshop evaluation by participants such as in the case of the 'Borana Zone Resilience Coordination Training' and in the 'Bale Zone EU_RESET-II Resilience Cluster Coordination Capacity building' or 'Coordination Capacity Building in Sekota' whereas some include detailed evaluations. In the latter, facilitation and content of the training sessions were generally well appreciated by participants. A post-training assessment showed that participants most appreciated interactive learning, discussion and facilitation approach of the training as well as DRM and resilience and coordination for resilience content.

119. At regional level, six training workshops on coordination for resilience were conducted in Afar, Amhara, Tigray, SNNPR, Oromia and Somali after May 2017. In Amhara, the post-training assessment found that participants valued most the modules on facilitation and meeting management and coordination management.

120. Trainings on coordination for resilience were, however, too standardized and the same materials were used at federal, regional and zonal level. The differentiated needs of stakeholders working at specific levels were not assessed nor analysed. Mixing stakeholders working at regional and zonal level such as in the training on coordination for resilience in Amhara is an issue. Coordination objectives are not the same at zonal and district level and at regional level: at zonal/district level, coordination tends to be about joint design and implementation; whereas at regional level, it is more about strategic decisions and the streamlining of development/resilience approaches.

121. Table 5 gives an overview of the training workshops conducted at regional level in coordination resilience after the main training of trainers workshop was organized at federal level.

**Table 5: Overview of training workshops conducted at regional level in coordination resilience**

| Region | Number of Participants | Affiliation of participants | Date | Content/Modules |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afar | 49 | APATF, DRM-TWG, EU RESET clusters Local NGOs, International NGOs and UN agency, government officials, regional research institute and Semera university. | 23-24 August 2017 | Introduction to coordination, DRM and resilience; Coordination for resilience: the role from APATF/RESET in ensuring the link from relief to development. Annual review of practice: successes and challenges on coordination in support to resilience. Annual review of practice: strengths, weaknesses, corrective actions. |

[8] Lieben Zone was not included.

| Region | Number of Participants | Affiliation of participants | Date | Content/Modules |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Annual review of practice: planning for the year ahead. |
| Tigray | 31 | UN agency, NGOs, flagship programmes and governmental agencies. | 11-14 August 2017 | Same modules+ one last module. Facilitation and Module management. |
| Oromia | 48 | Regional DRM-ATF members, DRM TWG, EU RESET clusters and relevant government offices at regional and zonal levels. Non-government participants were from UNOCHA (Oromia focal person) and six NGOs implementing EU RESET-II projects in Borena and Bale zones. | 16-22 July 2017 | Same modules+ one last module. Facilitation and Module management. |
| Amhara | 52 | DRM participants, Disaster Risk Management Agricultural Task Forces that are drawn from relevant Gos. | 4-7 August 2017 | Same modules+ one last module. Facilitation and Module management. |
| SNNPR | 31 | Government, UN agencies and NGOs from the region, federal and four zones level. Government staffs working for DRM sector at region and zone levels. | 18-23 November 2017 | Same modules+ one last module. Facilitation and Module management. |
| Somali | 16 | DRM-ATF members, DRM TWG, EU RESET clusters and relevant government offices at regional, zonal and woreda levels. | 20-21 September 2017 | Same modules as AFAR. |

*Source: Proceedings of regional training on Coordination for resilience, 2017*

122. Table 6 provides an overview of the training workshops conducted at zonal level in resilience coordination after the main training of trainers workshop was organized at the federal level. The content of the training on resilience coordination varied from one RESET cluster to another and some modules were in some cases skipped or shortened, such as in Borena RESET cluster, Afar RESET cluster and Bale RESET cluster.

**Table 6: Overview of the training workshops conducted at zonal level in coordination resilience**

| Training event | Number of Participants to training sessions | Nature of participants | Date of the training workshop | Content/Modules |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU RESET II Borena Cluster and FAO Oromia Coordination Unit | 32 | Government zonal sectoral organizations, EU RESET Cluster consortium members, FAO. | 23-24 May 2018 | Modules 1 to 5: what is coordination and why it matters. Disaster Risk Management and Resilience. Coordination for resilience: the role of ATF/RESET in ensuring the link from relief to |

| Training event | Number of Participants to training sessions | Nature of participants | Date of the training workshop | Content/Modules |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | development. Annual review of practices: successes and challenges. Facilitation in practices for coordination spaces. |
| Capacity building on coordination for Lieben RESET cluster partners | 26 | Participants comprised of 15 government staffs and 11 from the humanitarian agencies. | September 2018 | Module 1 to 7: introduction to coordination, DRM and resilience. Coordination for Resilience: the role of ATF/RESET in ensuring the link from relief to development. Annual review of practice: successes and challenges on coordination in support of resilience. Annual Review of Practice (strengths, weaknesses and correctives actions), Review of Practices (Planning for the year ahead), Facilitation in practices for the coordination spaces. |
| Bale Zone EU_RESET-II Resilience Cluster Coordination Capacity Building | 42 (2 female) | Government offices /sectors who work on community food security and resilience both Woredas and zone, NGOs acting in the zone and RESET_II consortium. | 27-28 June 2018 | Module 1 to 6: introduction to coordination, DRM and Resilience. Coordination for resilience: introducing the Annual Review of Practices. Strengthening coordination capacity for resilience. Annual Review of Practice: step 3 Planning for the year ahead. |
| Joint Training on Coordination Capacity Building for Afar Zonal RESET cluster | 18 | EU RESET clusters members and other relevant actors operating and implementing FS – resilience building projects in Afar zonal RESET cluster 2. | 27-28 September 2018 | Module 1 to 6: introduction to coordination, DRM and Resilience. Coordination for Resilience: role to link from relief to development, ARP (Successes and challenges on coordination in support of Resilience), ARP (Strengths, Weaknesses, Corrective actions), Annual Review of Practices (planning for the year ahead). |
| Coordination Capacity Building Workshop at Waghimra zone, Sekota | 36 | Government Organizations, RESET cluster consortium NGOS, other NGOs and FAO. | 4-5 June 2018 | Module 1 to 7: introduction to coordination, DRM and resilience. Coordination for resilience: the role of the ATF/RESET in ensuring the link from relief to development. Annual review of practice: successes and challenges on coordination in support of |

| Training event | Number of Participants to training sessions | Nature of participants | Date of the training workshop | Content/Modules |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | resilience. Annual Review of practice: strengths, weaknesses, corrective actions. Annual Review of practice: planning for the year ahead. Facilitation skill practice for coordination. |
| Report on Resilience Coordination Capacity Building Training for Wolayita RESET cluster | 27 | Wolayita zonal line departments, and NGOs: EU RESET clusters members and other relevant actors operating in the zone. | 6-7 September 2018 | Module 1 to 7: introduction to Coordination, Disaster Risk Management and Resilience. Coordination for Resilience. Annual Review of Practice (steps 1-3). Facilitation in practice for the coordination spaces. |
| Resilience Coordination Training organized for South Omo RESET cluster | 25 | South Omo zone RESET cluster partners and government line departments. | June 2018 | Module 1 to 7: introduction to coordination, Disaster risk management and resilience. Coordination for Resilience. Introduction to Annual Review of Practices (steps 1 to 3), Facilitation. |

*Source: FAO, 2018*

123. The number of participants for these trainings was quite high (as many as 52 people in one instance). Participants complained that the time allocated to the trainings was insufficient, particularly given the participatory and inclusive approach adopted in the trainings, so as to ensure all participants express their views and opinions (Source: Post workshop assessment survey).

124. Two rounds of Monitoring and Evaluation/Knowledge Management Technical Support and Experience Sharing workshops were held in 2019 by an external service provider, Aline. RESET cluster consortia members were targeted. Tools for data collection, guidelines for elaboration of case studies, harmonized knowledge management indicators as well as for data analysis were provided to the members of the RESET consortia members**.** This set of training was reported to be particularly effective, and stakeholders met by the evaluation team attested to the usefulness of the skills acquired in relation to their day-to-day work. In between each round of training, the RESET cluster consortia members used the tools provided to them to elaborate case studies.

125. Specific steps for structured, evolving and organized coordination are included in the guidelines and applied by RESET cluster consortia members. The most important stage after the elaboration of the case studies is the stage entitled 'closing the loop' where presentations are made to various groups of stakeholders: inside the organizations of consortia members, external stakeholders including government partners, cluster organizations, beneficiaries (communities, women, youth, producers). One participant noted: "*closing the loop allows us to learn things that we would otherwise have missed by*

*getting the perspectives of key stakeholders. Though we discussed data with stakeholders, it was never so focused and lacked this kind of preparation. Closing the loop has allowed us to strengthen our coordination processes and build a joint understanding of issues and share action plans. This activity should be mainstreamed and properly budgeted in future work plans.*" (Aline, 29-30 May 2019).

126. The case study training provided by the project was particularly appreciated by participants as a simple means to summarize information and share with concerned partners/stakeholders. The RESET consortia members have committed to elaborating new case studies every quarter until the EC SHARE programme completion date. It is highly likely that the RESET consortia members will continue elaborating case studies after the EC SHARE project completion, because they recognize the value of sharing case studies. The different aspects of the resilience framework addressed in the case studies are: i) multi-sector, multi-stakeholder approach - integration, synergies, and complementarities; ii) inclusive/gender responsive; and iii) institutionalization and sustainability (Aline, 29-30 May 2019).

127. The evaluation team met with several consortia members who expressed particular appreciation for the case study training and the 'closing the loop' methodology training. For example, in Siti zone, participants were still actively using these techniques in their day-to-day work in their respective organizations, and had subsequently trained their colleagues on the same techniques so as to make them standard practice within the respective organizations. This is an important successful outcome of the capacity development training, with clear sustainability and utility.

**Finding 11. Information sharing was unanimously reported to have been very useful by stakeholders and partners, and in some instances helped build complementarities between interventions and avoid overlaps. Meanwhile, coordination facilitation skills were reported to have been the most useful skills acquired by project stakeholders as a result of the project.**

128. Overlaps have been avoided as a result of experience sharing and the elaboration of case studies, as promoted by the project. Such activities have informed stakeholders and in many cases helped avoid overlap or build complementarity between interventions, sometimes introducing new agricultural practices, for example: fodder growing along the riverbank in Somali region (SCI: Engine-Prime project).

129. In the case of the training in Coordination for Resilience in South Omo RESET cluster, 'About 50 percent of training participants noted that they will "apply the facilitation skills in the future", "cascade the training to the woreda level", "share the training experience" and practice "coordination, synergy and harmonization while working for the same locality for a common goal"' (FAO, 2018).[9]

130. In the post-training evaluation of the training in coordination for resilience conducted in Afar in 2017, participants were asked to rate their ability (on a scale of 1 to 5) to describe the main topics related to resilience coordination before and after the training. Before the training the average score was 2.74 out of 5, whereas after the training, the average score increased to 4.52 out of 5, which shows a high degree of confidence amongst training

[9] This information was taken from the proceedings of the training in Coordination for Resilience in South Omo RESET Cluster.

participants in their level of knowledge relating to resilience coordination following the training (FAO, 2017).[10]

131. Similarly, the evaluation of the training in coordination for resilience conducted in Amhara in 2017 shows how the knowledge of participants was enhanced. Table 6 below shows the self-assessed levels of knowledge of participants before and after the training. The dramatic 'improvement' in this self-assessed level of knowledge indicates a perception change in the concept of coordination for resilience, disaster risk management' (FAO, 2017). [11]

**Table 7: Percentage of participants comparing their level of knowledge before and after workshop on resilience coordination**

| **Knowledge level** | **Percentage of participants scoring their level knowledge** | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Start of workshop 1=low, 5=high** | | | | | **End of workshop 1=low, 5=high** | | | | |
| | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **5** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **5** |
| Existing coordination spaces in relief and development at regional and federal level | 76 | 20 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 52 | 40 | 8 |
| What disaster risk management is | 8 | 24 | 70 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 60 | 30 |
| What resilience is | 66 | 18 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 64 | 36 | 0 |
| What coordination for resilience is | 0 | 90 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 82 | 18 |
| Usefulness of project cycle management | 12 | 38 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 60 | 4 |

*Source: FAO, 2017*[12]

132. Participants also underlined the value of being brought together for the training workshops, with all participants learning the same skills (e.g. on knowledge management). This in itself enabled better coordination and allowed participants to gain an understanding of who was doing what.

133. While a large number of people have been trained, there are serious concerns as to the sustainability of the results, particularly given the high turnover of staff, both in government and in NGOs at regional levels. Several interviewees reported weak handover procedures for government staff, such that new staff were not made aware of any coordination procedures or systems in place. This was particularly evident in Somali region where a significant portion of government staff has been replaced in recent years.

134. Arguably, the project focused mostly on the individual and organizational level in terms of capacity development support. The functional capacities developed through the training workshops seem to have been widely taken on board by participants and in many cases incorporated into organizational practice. Similarly, there is increased awareness and momentum concerning the need for coordination of resilience actors in the target regions, and the project has served to highlight the importance of coordination amongst these actors. However, there are still gaps in the enabling environment, which have the potential to undermine the capacity development efforts across the other dimensions. For instance, without stronger commitment from donors (particularly the larger international financial institutions [IFIs]) on resilience support, and with continued prioritization of emergency

[10] This information was taken from the proceedings of the training in Coordination for resilience conducted in Afar in 2017 at regional level.
[11] This information was taken from the proceedings of the training in Coordination for resilience conducted in Amhara in 2017.
[12] Ibid.

humanitarian relief, any effort to prioritize the resilience agenda cannot move forward. Similarly, by not engaging formally with the federal level from the start of the project, the results of the project will be confined to regional and local levels, with national level influence on the enabling environment being limited as a result.

**Result Area 4. Linkages with universities and research programmes and activities to conduct applied research created to improve and LRRD approaches.**

**Finding 12. While some of the research yielded interesting results, the research came late and would have been more relevant if it had focused on coordination mechanisms, rather than household dynamics.**

135. Three research studies were conducted by Oxfam, International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and Tufts University, respectively. Service providers submitted proposals that were selected by a panel**.** The original intention was that the research studies would allow for an analysis of specific situations and come up with solutions to further interlink relief and development in the project target areas. The final research studies commissioned were the following:

i. The study conducted by ILRI was titled 'The dynamics of pastoralist 'households' – structure, assets, authority and social interactions within and between 'households' in one kebele in Afar, Somali and Oromia.

ii. The research study conducted by Oxfam was titled 'The assessment of resilience programme contribution to reduce adverse effects of drought on pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Siti zone, in Somali region.' Oxfam set-up a partnership with Jigjiga University to conduct the field work needed for the research study.

iii. The research conducted by Tuft University titled 'Assessment of DRM research academia and curricula in the Ethiopia Universities and their link with coordination.'

136. Overall, the research would have been more relevant if it had focused on coordination mechanisms, rather than household dynamics. Tufts research was more linked to strengthening coordination, whereas the other two studies focus mainly on household-level data, with no apparent relevance to coordination mechanisms, which represents a missed opportunity. The studies should have been conducted to inform the implementation of the other project components and subcomponents. Therefore, it would have been more relevant if the research studies had been aimed at analysing how the existing coordination mechanisms in Ethiopia function at different levels, to come up with suggestions to improve their effectiveness in linking relief and development/resilience.

137. In any case, the research studies were finalised very late in project implementation, which meant that the findings could not be used to inform the other project activities, irrespective of their thematic focus.

**Result 5. Forums organized to promote sector experiences sharing for all stakeholders (humanitarian and development actors) and promote scaling up of good practices.**

**Finding 13. The project organized many experience sharing forums involving a large number of stakeholders, at national and regional levels. While participants appreciated the opportunity to bring stakeholders together, there was inconsistent follow-up of the recommendations after each forum.**

138. Two rounds of National Experience sharing Forums (NESF) took place between 2016 and 2019. Table 8 shows the dates, number of participants and content of these fora. Conclusions and recommendations were more specific in the second forum cycle than in the first forum cycle.

**Table 8: Dates, number of participants and recommendations of National forums**

| Level/Regions | Date | Number of participants | Main recommendations |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***First round*** | | | |
| National Coordination and Experience Sharing Forum (NESF) in the area of Food Security & Resilience Building Programmes in Ethiopia | 7-8 December 2016 | 91 | Coordination mechanisms are disconnected from each other; Resilience and disaster risk management are cross-sectoral issues that are more complex to organize in a satisfactory coordination mechanism; Gender mainstreaming and transformation have a long way to go in resilience building programmes; The virtues of knowledge management (KM) connecting the capacities, insights, data, experience, transport and other logistical arrangements of the various resilience building and coordination initiatives would be a useful way forward, too little known across the panel, The main gaps highlighted lie at the junction between: i) humanitarian and development coordination; ii) federal and national coordination; iii) planning and implementation (the policy in terms of resilience building is sometimes there but not always applied). |
| ***Second round*** | | | |
| (National) Coordination for Resilience Building in Ethiopia | 9-10 May 2019 | 90 | Strengthen government ownership derived from constitution and legal mandate; Capacity development and guidelines; Strengthen communication tools; Strengthen coordination mechanisms at woreda and zonal level that are very weak. |

*Source: FAO, 2016*[13]

139. Table 9 shows the dates, number of participants and content of these forum. The nature of recommendations depended on the nature of the forums: some included presentations on coordination principles/coordination mechanisms or coordination platforms, group discussions, experience sharing by RESET cluster organizations or other organizations working in the region. Recommendations were made either on coordination issues or on specific subject matters related to a field visit or to a success story shared by one of the participants.

[13] This information was taken from the proceedings of National Experience Sharing Forums.

**Table 9: Dates, number of participants and recommendations of regional experience sharing forums**

| Forum | Date | Number of participants | Main recommendations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Coordination related | Operational/technical |
| ***First round*** | | | | |
| Amhara Regional Experience Sharing Forum (RESF) on Coordination for Resilience | 17-18 November 2016 | 109 | • Improve sectoral coordination.<br>• Create functional/nonexistence zonal/woreda coordination structure.<br>• Strengthen linkages between federal, regional, zonal and woreda levels.<br>• Define sectoral needs and make gaps analysis.<br>• Identify gaps in building common strategy and approach.<br>• Better define linkages between emergency, recovery and development. | |
| Oromia Regional Experience Sharing Forum on Coordination for Resilience Building | 3-4 December 2016 | 65 | • Supporting regional and zonal level DRM-ATF coordination spaces with coordination tools and strengthening capacity of chairs and focal persons for coordination and on communication of coordination outcomes.<br>• Mapping relevant stakeholders particularly universities and research institutes and influencing their engagement and support to coordination capacity development of regional and zonal government bureaus.<br>• Improve coordination and agreement among regional and zonal government sectoral bureaus, which will also help in strengthening the general coordination spaces that involves external stakeholders.<br>• Establish/strengthen joint planning, joint implementation and joint monitoring missions to operational areas followed by feedback and joint learning events.<br>• Improve vertical and horizontal communication with content of communication that includes coordination efforts at regional/zonal levels.<br>• Enhancing awareness leadership/management in | |

| Forum | Date | Number of participants | Main recommendations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | **Coordination related** | **Operational/technical** |
| | | | relevant regional and zonal bureaus on coordination.<br>• Working towards institutionalization of coordination and strengthening coordination for development and for resilience building during non–emergency periods.<br>• Improve collection and documentation of data/information at various levels and encourage information sharing between different coordination spaces.<br>• Cascading DRM-ATF/coordination to woredas.<br>• Organize participatory review and reflection platform. | |
| Afar Regional Experience Sharing Forum on Coordination for Resilience | 12-13 October 2016 | | • Existing regional coordination mechanism (APATF and EOC/ICP) to be cascaded down to woreda and kebele levels and their scope should be widened to include development issues too.<br>• The forum recommended the activities of the coordination structures like APATF not be limited to a monthly meeting and hence have to also include joint field monitoring and evaluation and experience sharing visits that would facilitate scaling out and scaling up of good experiences and timely handling of challenges and problems.<br>• Regional Government to organize similar events regularly every year<br>• Mainstreaming coordination forums in the regular government structure and assignment of human resource (focal person) and budget.<br>• Updating the TOR of coordination forums to include development issues as agenda. | • A coordinated and integrated effort to effectively use irrigation water resources in the region is very important for resilience building. |
| Tigrai Regional Experience Sharing Forum on Coordination for Resilience | 28-29 October 2016 | | • Establishing at woreda level Taskforce.<br>• Assigning of regular participant for DRM-ATF meeting from each participant.<br>• Having scheduled meeting programme.<br>• Diversification of members including research and learning | • Establishing taskforces that convene forage producers feed suppliers and transporters and middlemen, if any, to showcase the challenge and to |

| Forum | Date | Number of participants | Main recommendations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | **Coordination related** | **Operational/technical** |
| | | | institutions and private organizations when deemed necessary. Identification of taskforces and platforms and their thematic working areas and developing the networks (building upon the mapping started by FAO in the region).<br>• Government take the responsibility.<br>• Creating a coordination space for compiling, documentation and sharing of the good experience observed during the drought episode and for contingency planning. | agree on future collaborations.<br>• Establishing ad hoc taskforces that convene seed producers, transporters and middle men, if any, to showcase the challenge and to agree on future collaborations. |
| - ***Second round*** | | | | |
| Regional Experience Sharing Forum (RESF-II) (Somali) | 14-16 May 2018 | | • Creation of information centres that are accessible to partners.<br>• Clear plan of action annually or biannually or monthly etc.<br>• The meeting should be result-oriented to share relevant information to improve coordination.<br>• Provision of capacity building to all DRM-ATF members by assessing the existing capacity gaps.<br>• Government to take the lead to enforce fulfilment/accomplishment of agreed upon humanitarian and/ or development action points. | |
| Oromia Regional Experience Sharing Forum (RESF-II) and Joint Field Visit | 2-4 May 2018 | 33 | • Design and undertake a harmonized and regular joint planning and implementation support/supervision mission and reporting mechanism.<br>• Establish strong knowledge management system and feedback mechanisms among stakeholders engaged on drought, resilience building initiatives. From coordinating taskforces to Food Security Resilience Platform.<br>• Decentralization and implementation of DRM policy by national ministries, regional bureaus and at zonal/woredas level could make government ministries/bureaus coordinate | |

| Forum | Date | Number of participants | Main recommendations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | **Coordination related** | **Operational/technical** |
| | | | with each other and with various development partners. | |
| Biregional Experience Sharing and Joint Tours Missions (Amhara/Tigray) | 10-12 May 2018 | 42 | • Information sharing at all time throughout the year rather than only during the emergency occurrence.<br>• Strong follow-up from the backbone organization such as look for better coordination mechanism.<br>• The district offices and NGOs must try to scale-up the good practices to other localities through the experience sharing programmes, in addition to the existing NGOs and government sectors working together.<br>• Enhance Knowledge Management in terms of documentation (planning, implementation and M&E) for further reference.<br>• Conduct capacity building training on resource utilization (water, finance etc.) and coordination skill to all levels. | • Introduce improved varieties in order to obtain higher product from the small land size in the watersheds.<br>• Government attention on communication infrastructures (telecom connection and road).<br>• Establish coordination on market linkage mechanisms for honey, fatten goat and horticultural products.<br>• Strengthen integration among health, education, cooperative, etc. |
| Afar Regional Second Round Experience sharing Forum and Joint Tour (RESF II) on Coordination for Resilience | 30-31 August 2018 | 35 | • Strengthen the regional platforms to improve in terms of FS coordination, share such experiences or need to sell our experience to link RRD and align with PSNP.<br>• Mapping of interventions of such good practical experience also very important to share with donors and DPs.<br>• OCHA take the link to map what is happening (who is doing what); Government must take the leading role in strengthening those lead coordination structures down to the woreda and kebele level. | |

*Source: FAO, 2018*[14]

[14] This information was taken from the proceedings of the two rounds of the Regional Experience Sharing Forums.

140. The content of the experience-sharing forums was somewhat varied and described by one stakeholder as 'eclectic'. It varied between concrete examples of coordination mechanisms within projects that are implemented by different partners (e.g. the Village Savings & Loan Associations project in Tigray), and the presentation of existing coordination mechanisms at regional level. Some participants complained that the forum lacked focus and that the lessons learned and the recommendations were very broad and general and not adequately followed up after the forum.

141. The recommendations of experience-sharing forums were in some instances operational/technical and sometimes more coordination focused. Three main recommendations were not fully addressed by the project: i) the update of the Terms of Reference of Coordination mechanisms; ii) the institutionalization of the coordination mechanism in the government structures with dedicated staff and resources; and iii) strengthening of coordination mechanisms at woreda and kebele level where the project impacts were more likely and government staffing is the most substantial.

142. Several participants complained to the evaluation team that there were too many participants attending the experience sharing fora who were working for different categories of organizations: e.g. EU RESET cluster members, UN organizations, project staff, government organizations. Meanwhile, the objectives of the fora were not focused and too broad (e.g. 'sharing experience of development actors and partners who have best experiences in mitigating the potential consequences of natural disasters in the short- and long-term, both development- and humanitarian-related') which led to very broad recommendations that could not be operationalized. Furthermore, the process management did not include delivery of operational recommendations, nor the identification of lead organizations, responsible for implementing the recommendation within a specific time frame.

143. Overall, the project did not adequately assess the risks incurred in process management, particularly with regard to having too many participants in meetings/workshops.

144. The field visits organized as part of the experience sharing were successful because they helped participants understand the main challenges faced by beneficiaries, while also showing real world cases of how coordination on the ground could be enhanced (e.g. in relation to targeting and geographic focus of different organizations).

145. The lack of understanding of the multi-stakeholder, multi-scale dimension and time-scale of coordination by the project team hampered the coordination processes and had a negative consequence on project outputs and outcomes. The regional experience-sharing forums were well organized and included sessions on challenges/barriers for coordination, as well as on solutions to be implemented to move the coordination agenda forward. However, stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team complained that there were too many planning meetings for the national experience sharing forum such that stakeholders had to give a lot of their time to attend meeting after meeting for a workshop that had no follow-up. It seems that following the forum, feasibility of different solutions was not assessed, and no hierarchizing or prioritization of challenges or relevant solutions was conducted.

146. After the first round of experience sharing fora the project team did not understand that strengthening coordination mechanisms should be differentiated at each level:

district/zonal, regional and federal. In the end, the project team did not adjust project activities based on the lessons learned from the first round of fora and went on implementing the same activities, whereas specific types of activities should have been implemented at each level. An analysis of the proceedings of the experience sharing fora shows that needs at district/zonal level, regional and national level were not the same: at district/zonal level, joint implementation is more likely to take place, whereas at regional level, streamlining of approaches and geographic/thematic complementarities can be discussed and agreed upon. For example, drawing on the outcomes of the experience sharing fora, guidelines could have been developed to streamline approaches, with regard to the way grants are provided to grassroots organizations and individuals. Or common planning tools could have been developed to enhance joint implementation.

147. Some of the recommendations collected in the regional Experience Sharing Fora were operationalized by the project team, such as the recommendations that came out of the second round of the Oromia Forum. However, there was no coordinated nor structured follow-up of the recommendations between the first round and second round of knowledge-sharing forums, and only rarely were solutions implemented as a follow-up of the first round of the RESF and NESF.

148. In general, the recommendations of the experience-sharing forums evolved in content and nature between the first round and the second round. The first round of these forums was conducted in 2016 in the middle of El Niño crisis where emergency response had to be provided, whereas the second round was conducted in 2018 and recommendations from this round reflected more resilience building needs/issues. Furthermore, the formulation of recommendations was uneven from one region to another: in the case of Tigray, the organizations responsible for implementing a specific recommendation are identified in the first Regional Experience Sharing Forum.

### 3.2.1 Institutional and management capacity enhanced

**Finding 14. The demand for resilience coordination has increased and the project managed to raise expectations of partners and stakeholders at the federal level.**

149. The most positive unintended outcome of the project was the increasing demand for resilience coordination over the project implementation period at all levels. This demand was not properly addressed by the project, particularly at district and zonal level where impact would have been easier to achieve and where government staff are more qualified and stable: The Bureau of Agriculture at district level includes a whole team of technicians in various agriculture-related areas.

150. The project raised expectations of partners and stakeholders at federal level as well and tried to support the RED-FS through a letter of agreement. The expectations of the RED-FS team and the project team did not match: RED-FS was willing to strengthen its capacity in monitoring and evaluation and the project team wanted to access to high level decision-making forums through the support to RED-FS when FAO senior management wasn't engaged. This mismatch hindered the trust between RED-FS (co-chaired by the Government and the World Bank) and FAO.

### 3.2.2 Project execution

**Finding 15. At the closure of the project, many planned activities remained uncompleted, resulting in a low execution rate overall.**

151. Whereas many capacity building activities or experience-sharing forums have been conducted, critical activities were cancelled such as: i) Activity 1.4: Adopt a common monitoring and evaluation system with agreed indicators to enhance coordination and harmonization and build the institutional capacity; ii) Activity 2.1: Develop guidelines to strengthen effective communication and information flow; iii) Activity 2.4: Assist regional coordinating body members to attend federal policymaking platforms to share lessons learned in the region and help for effective implementation of resilience building programmes in target areas; iii) Activity 5.1: Identify, compile and organize good practices on harmonization and building institutional capacity at all levels; and iv) Activity 5.4: Support the capacity of the public sector to use web-based information for better coordination and harmonization at all federal, regional and local levels.

152. Table 10 below lists the activities as per the project logframe and their level of execution at project closure in June 2019.

**Table 10: Execution of project activities as at project closure (June 2019)**

| Result | Activity | Planned | Executed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***Result 1:*** *Decentralized (cluster, zonal and regional level) government-led coordination structures involving both relief and development endeavours supported.* | **Activity 1.1:** Conduct mapping of all government coordination structures at woreda, zone, regional state and federal level, especially those that contribute to improved coordination and harmonization of resilience building interventions in the project operational area. | Review document ready by month 8 from the start of the project. | Mapping at regional and zonal level completed; no mapping at woreda and federal level. |
| | **Activity 1.2:** Asses and propose widening the scope of the existing DRM ATF taskforces at zonal and regional state levels as well as increasing the zonal coverage of these taskforces. | At least five more zones have established a Government-led zonal coordination structure with regular monthly meetings as of month 6. | No government-led zonal coordination structure established. |
| | | TOR (with widened scope of regional and zonal DRM ATF) for the coordination structure adopted by Government. | TORs were established. |
| | **Activity 1.3:** Support the regular (monthly DRM ATF) consultative meetings and workshops to improve the institutional capacity in building resilience and to review performance of the planned activities at regional and national levels. | At least 10 coordination meetings conducted at federal (DRM ATF) and each regional level (Afar, Somali and SNNPR) per year.<br><br>50 percent of the EU cluster meetings attend by FAO staff based in the regions. | 174 meetings in 48 months (project duration). |
| | | 50 percent of the EU cluster meetings attended by FAO staff based in the regions | |

| Result | Activity | Planned | Executed |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **Activity 1.4:** Adopt a common monitoring and evaluation system with agreed indicators to enhance coordination and harmonization and build the institutional capacity to monitor these indicators. | M&E guideline adopted and shared to all relevant sectors. | 13 Annual Review of Practices trainings. |
| | **Activity 1.5:** Organize joint monitoring missions to assess the status of implementation of planned activities, harmonization of approaches and stimulate joint learning and drawing of lessons learned. | At least one joint learning mission per cluster conducted per year. | |
| | **Activity 1.6**: Strengthen the existing DRM-ATF at federal and regional levels to address the issues related to government resilience policy, strategy processes. | At least one two-day training conducted per regional state on resilience issues. | Two rounds of trainings at regional level. |
| ***Result 2:*** *Regular communication and information flows and reporting between the coordination bodies institutionalized.* | **Activity 2.1:** Develop guidelines to strengthen effective communication and information flow to improve effectiveness of coordination at the various levels. | Guideline developed and institutionalized by the end of year 1. | No guidelines for effective communication developed. |
| | **Activity 2.2:** Ensure the subnational coordination platforms are guided by mutually accepted guidelines and annual implementation work plans through regular follow-up. | Annual work plans agreed and in place by the start of each year. | Work plans are uneven and no follow=up of implementation of these work plans. |
| | **Activity 2.3:** Support for establishment of communication mechanism between regional and the federal coordination structures, between regional coordination structures and between regions and zones/woredas to be able to provide quality information. | Agreed communication mechanisms and email lists established by the end of year 1 and maintained during the rest of the project life. | Communication from regional DRM-ATF to federal DRM-ATF, but not from regional to zonal and woreda (district) levels. |
| | **Activity 2.4:** Assist regional coordinating body members to attend federal policymaking platforms to share lessons learned in the region and help for effective implementation of resilience building programmes in the target areas. | Number of members attending federal level meetings. | |
| | | At least 80 percent of the documented lessons learned shared at a federal platform. | Lessons learned shared in the two National Experience Sharing forums. |
| ***Result 3:*** *Technical capacity of the coordination structures at regional and zonal levels built.* | **Activity 3.1:** Provide technical backstopping for regional and zonal coordination structures in the area of programme design, implementation and monitoring of resilience projects and programmes. | At least two technical backstopping missions conducted per cluster per year. | Five training sessions Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL). |

| Result | Activity | Planned | Executed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***Result 4:*** *Linkages with universities and research institutions to conduct applied research created to improve resilience and LRRD approaches.* | **Activity 4.1:** Assess and review the resilience programmes and activities that are included in the curricula or research programmes of the various national universities and research organizations. | Assessment report ready by the end of year 1. | Assessment completed. |
| | **Activity 4.2:** Identify and prioritize three applied research topics for funding. | Three research topics identified and funded, at least one by the end of year 1 and the other two by the end of year 2. | Three research topics identified. |
| | **Activity 4.3.** Organize presentations of research findings in annual "resilience forum". | Research papers. | Presented at the closing workshop. |
| ***Result 5:*** *Forums organized to promote sector experiences sharing for all stakeholders (humanitarian and development actors) and promote scaling up of good practices.* | **Activity 5.1:** Identify, compile and organize good practices on harmonization and building institutional capacity at all levels. | At least two good practises identified, compiled and shared at the annual conference. | No good practices identified. |
| | **Activity 5.2:** Support and organize study tours/experience sharing visits for policymakers, senior level federal and regional public officials and stakeholders on institutional coordination and harmonization in resilience building. | At least one experience sharing visit conducted per year (five days for five officials). | 13 over 48 months. This includes the regional experience sharing forum and study tours and it is calculated over a period of 48 months. |
| | **Activity 5.3:** Hold stakeholder forums and promote sector experience sharing and dialogue in Ethiopia for cross-learning and scaling up of tested good practices. | One two-day Resilience Forum organized at national level per year | Two over four years. |
| | **Activity 5.4:** Support the institutional capacity of the public sector on the use of web-based information for better coordination and harmonization at federal, regional and local levels. Based on discussions with the various partners, FAO will support the establishment of a web page to upload information. The hosting of the information will be decided jointly with the Ministry (RED & FS, IGAD, Ministry of Agriculture or separate page with links in the former websites). | Web page and hosting agreed with the Government by the end of year 1. | None |

*Source: FAO 2019[15] and Findings of evaluation mission*

[15] Part of this information was taken from the project final report.

## 3.3 Efficiency of implementation

**Finding 16. The project was beset with delays which resulted in a series of budget modifications and amendments. Some activities were dropped, and other new activities included.**

153. There was a late start-up due to delays in signing the agreement between FAO and the European Union and late recruitment of project staff (more than one year). The project started in late 2015 after the European Union threatened to cancel the funding.

154. The project contract was signed on 19 December 2014 for a 35-month implementation period, but the inception workshop was launched later than anticipated on 27 and 28 April 2015 in Adama Town, Oromia. The International Project Manager arrived in mid-November 2015, an 11-month lag which delayed implementation of the project activities. This led to the project being extended by 12 months, from November 2017 up to November 2018, and again by a further 7 months up to 19 June 2019 (these two no-cost extensions increased the project duration from 35 to 54 months). Over the course of its implementation, the project deployed nine project staff (including one International staff - the project coordinator by November 2015 - two National and six Regional coordinators up to June 2015) and the total project budget was EUR 2.5 million (100 percent European Union contribution).

155. In addition to the initial delays, by the time the project implementation actively commenced in 2015-16, Ethiopia was experiencing a severe El Niño crisis, which diverted attention towards humanitarian response. This meant that the project suffered another series of delays as the FAO regional coordination staff were already overwhelmed with El Niño-related activities. To remedy this, dedicated project support officers based in the regions were recruited in 2016, more than one year after project actual start-up. Furthermore, there were lengthy delays in renewing the contracts of the FAO regional support officers at the beginning of 2017 and this negatively impacted on project implementation. In summary, from the end of 2016 and until April 2017, no activities were undertaken at regional level because of delays in contract renewals of the FAO regional support officers. This influenced the implementation of the project's activities.

156. The result of these delays was such that activities were not implemented as per the original time frame of the project. In reality, the bulk of project activities were implemented between 2016 and 2019, on the basis of the donor grating two no-cost extensions, one for a duration of seven months (in November 2017) and the second for a duration of one year (in November 2018).

157. The results framework was revised in July 2017, and although the five overarching results areas remained as per the original project document signed between FAO and the European Union, the outputs/activities under each of these results were reformulated.

158. A mid-term review workshop was held with all stakeholders in October 2017, from which recommendations were proposed and incorporated into the revised action plans of November 2017 and 2018. Recommendations included: providing support to the RED&FS (*although it was not explicitly mentioned in any of the documents that this support should be formalized)*; providing monitoring and evaluation support to RESET II partners by hiring a consultant; amongst others.

159. A series of budget modifications were made on 10 July 2017, 13 November 2018 and again in 2019. The analysis of the structure of the budget shows that at the design stage: i) very limited resources were allocated to trainings and workshops, whereas the project's main objective was to build the capacity of various stakeholders in resilience coordination; and ii) the share of the resources allocated to consultants and project staff is quite high (see Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Budget categories after the third amendment**




*Source: FAO, 2018*[16]

**Figure 7: Evolution of budget categories through addenda (Euro)**




*Source: FAO, 2018*[17]

160. Resource allocation has slightly evolved through budget modifications over the project implementation period as shown in Figure 8. Resources allocated to trainings, workshops

[16] The figures were taken from the financial report dated 31 December 2018.
[17] The figures were taken from the financial report dated 31 December 2018.

and travel have declined over time whereas resources allocated to contracts with partners and consultants have increased. The decrease of funds allocated to travel is important to note, as this arguably resulted in limited direct monitoring of project activities in the regions and zones by the project team based in Addis Ababa. At the same time, Figure 7 shows the share of the categories of project staff and consultants (almost 50 percent of the budget) and contracts with partners after undertaking the addenda.

**Finding 17. Most budget categories had exhausted the allocated resources on 31 December 2018, whereas about 40 percent of the category for trainings and workshops, the project's core activity, remained unspent at the closing of the project.**

161. The project was not very efficient in delivering some core activities. Figure 8 shows actual expenditures at project completion or on 31 December 2018. Most of the categories had exhausted the allocated resources on 31 December 2018, whereas about 40 percent of the funds allocated to trainings and workshops were as yet unspent.

**Figure 8: Total budget as of 31 December 2018 and cumulative expenditures from 20 December 2014 to 31 December 2018**




*Source: FAO, 2018*

162. In fact, the most effective activities, those most likely to strengthen the capacity of RESET cluster consortia members at zonal level, to enhance the EC SHARE programme's effectiveness - such as the Monitoring and Evaluation /Knowledge Management Technical Support and Experience Sharing workshops - started very late, at the end of 2018, a few months before project completion. Had these activities been conducted sooner, there could have been greater opportunities for the project to build on the new skills acquired by participants, and for these capacities to actively enhance the coordination of the RESET programme, as was originally intended.

### 3.3.1 Monitoring and Evaluation systems

**Finding 18. The absence of a robust monitoring and evaluation system hindered the follow-up of project implementation.**

163. The project team did not develop a proper monitoring and evaluation system. Annual work plans were included in the annual progress reports. FAO support officers would transmit weekly/monthly monitoring sheets that were consolidated at federal level by the project coordination unit.

164. The project team did not provide to the European Union a narrative and financial report every six months as was stipulated in the original project document. Revised work plans, against which additional funding requests were made in order to meet the planned work schedule were also to be submitted to the European Union.

165. Table 11 shows that progress reports were mostly drafted and submitted to the European Union on an annual basis. Progress reports were submitted to the European Union with some delays. There is an overlap in some project progress reports (e.g. the first and second progress reports) which adds to the complexity and confusion of project implementation. The only six-month biannual report was the fourth progress report; having a biannual reporting system would have helped monitor project activities more closely. In this case, close monitoring was a necessity because of the dynamic context, and recurrent extreme events in some regions that affected the dynamics of DRM-ATF, the high government turnover in the last three years, and the changes in FAO staff.

**Table 11: Project progress reports submitted to the European Union**

| Report | Period |
|---|---|
| First progress report | October 2014 – December 2015 |
| Second progress report | December 2014 – September 2016 |
| Third progress report | October 2016 to – June 2017 |
| Fourth progress report | July 2017 – December 2017 |
| Fifth progress report | January – December 2018 |

*Source: FAO, 2016, 2017, 2018*

166. There was only limited monitoring of project activities at regional and zonal levels. Monthly monitoring reports are available only in the case of Amhara region from May to December 2018. These reports show the progress made as well as planned activities for the following months.

167. A mid-term review workshop was conducted close to the end of the project, on 10-11 October 2017. It was not an external evaluation but rather a gathering of the project stakeholders. However, the MTR's recommendations were not very strong, and the most tangible outcome of the MTR workshop was the preparation of national and regional project work plans.

### 3.3.2 FAO internal management

**Finding 19. High staff turnover in FAO Ethiopia's internal management structure weakened FAO's ownership of the project. This affected FAO's credibility and relationship with the donor.**

168. The absence of a steering committee had a negative impact on project management and implementation. Management decisions were made by FAO and the European Union, without consulting a government partner. As there was no formal agreement with the Government from project start-up, FAO and the European Union were not accountable to the Government in terms of submitting progress or financial reports for approval, nor in terms of the timeliness of reports submission.

169. Relations between project management and partner institutions improved in the last two years of project implementation, when there was a change in FAO Ethiopia senior management. However, prior to this, a high frequency of turnover in FAO staff and country office management led to the European Union becoming heavily engaged in day-to-day project management activities, sometimes making decisions that should have been under FAO's responsibility. This situation was highly irregular and caused frustration on the part of the European Union, resulting in a lack of clarity in terms of accountability and reporting lines amongst project staff.

### 3.3.3 Unbalanced responsibilities between various stakeholders

**Finding 20. Responsibilities were unbalanced between various stakeholders because of the absence of a tripartite agreement between FAO, the European Union and the Government: the European Union took over part of the responsibility that should have been FAO's.**

170. Even at inception (Ref. Minutes of Project Launching Workshop conducted, 27-28 April 2015, Adama Town) there was no discussion/recommendation on the institutional framework to be set-up for project implementation, nor on a potential tripartite agreement between the Government, FAO and the European Union at federal level. Furthermore, because of the absence of a steering committee, the responsibility of the Government to the project was diluted and FAO and the European Union were managing the project and making decisions on an ad hoc basis without any accountability to the Government or even without complying to the contractual requirements in terms of reporting and planning.

171. Because of the high turnover in FAO senior management staff, the European Union assumed some of the responsibility that should have been FAO's. This implied the European Union was involved in operational matters which is normally not expected. In this regard, FAO, which received the funding, cannot be taken fully responsible for decisions made over the project implementation period.

### 3.3.4 Scope of the project

**Finding 21. The scope of the project was too broad to allow for efficient implementation, in terms of geographical coverage, but also in terms of its objectives.**

172. With regard to overall management, the support from senior management in both FAO and the European Union did not reach the appropriate level, especially when advocacy was

needed in high level fora; as mentioned above, there were substantial management changes in FAO over the project period.

173. Regarding the implementation strategy, the project was implemented in six regions and across eight RESET cluster areas at zonal level. This wide area of implementation resulted in high transaction costs that negatively impacted on the project's effectiveness.

174. The recruitment of the six regional support officers activated project implementation at regional level, although by this stage, it was two already years after the project start-up (in 2016). Nevertheless, coordination of project activities at regional level by the project management unit based in Addis Ababa was somehow limited: joint visits for monitoring were sometimes cancelled and budgets were moved to other budget lines. Coordination meetings between Regional Support Officers and the project management unit did not take place on a regular basis but rather on an ad hoc basis when there were joint activities, such as a national workshop. This implied that there was no streamlined project implementation strategy and there were therefore discrepancies between regions in terms of results/outputs.

### 3.3.5 Financial management

**Finding 22. The project was subject to four separate budget revisions, and there were some instances of the project paying for FAO staff who did not have time to perform project activities. Financial reporting was sometimes delayed which negatively impacted on project implementation.**

175. With regard to financial management, although six full-time FAO support officers were recruited in 2016, an additional 30-40 percent of the salaries of the FAO regional coordinators was charged on the project after the recruitment of the support officers. This meant the project was overpaying for staff presence in the regions, leading to a budget revision to rectify the situation in 2017, as demanded by the European Union. Meanwhile, the project's administrative support officer also provides administrative support to other FAO projects.

176. During the course of the project, four budget revisions/modifications were made that had implications on project implementation, some with addendum, and some without.

177. With regard to financial reporting, there was late submission of financial reports to the European Union (April instead of January): in 2017, this reporting delay resulted in a further two-month delay in recruiting the M&E support staff and regional support officers.

## 3.4 Likelihood of impact

**Finding 23. Major impacts include the capacity enhancement of some individuals, strengthening of regional coordination mechanisms although unevenly, emergence of a few resilience platforms at zonal level.**

178. The overall objective, or intended impact, of the project was rather generally defined as enhancing the drought resilience and food and nutrition security of vulnerable populations in Southern and Eastern Ethiopia. The more specific objective of achieving this was through the establishment of effective subnational coordination structures and harmonization

mechanisms (Relief and Development) with linkages to grass roots and federal level coordination structures.

179. In assessing the extent to which this specific objective has been achieved, the evaluation focused on the capacity development outcomes of the project, as elaborated in the theory of change in Section 2.2 of this report.

180. In this regard, the regional coordination mechanisms/structures have been unevenly strengthened: in Amhara and Oromia, resilience platforms were formed which will be instrumental in the implementation of the new European Union-funded project DRM. In Amhara, a resilience platform is being formed including all partners members of DRM-ATF, the TORs for which are near finalization, while DRM-ATF and cluster mandates at regional level will be modified. In Somali, no resilience platform could be formed either at regional or zonal level. In SNNPR, the Bureau of Finance and Economics resisted the creation of the regional resilience platform promoted by the project because there was no legal directive from the federal Government: the Bureau of Finance welcomed the platform but insisted that first there be a policy/directive from the federal Government.

181. Resilience platforms emerged at RESET cluster in Afar and at zonal level in South Omo with meetings organized on a quarterly basis, led by the Bureau of Finance in Afar and the Bureau of Agriculture in South Omo. In SNNPR, a zonal resilience platform was formed but it is still in its very early stages: the steering committee of the platform has met three times but TORs and a work plan still need to be elaborated.

182. Coordination with other players at RESET cluster level was more active: for example information was provided by the RESET cluster organizations in Somali region to UNICEF, who is leading the WASH cluster, in order to identify the right organizations/community groups or associations to consult before digging boreholes to avoid conflicts.

183. The evaluation team saw evidence of good coordination results, largely attributable to DRM-ATF coordination meetings. For example, in Borena, guidelines to streamline cash-for-work payment modalities across districts were elaborated. In Jijiga, the same discussion is ongoing, although the guidelines were not yet finalized at the time of the evaluation. These guidelines are used by organizations making cash-for-work payments. The guidelines outline eligible activities and targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries. While the guidelines are appreciated by stakeholders as a very positive step towards harmonization and better coordination, no follow-up mechanism is envisaged to ensure these modalities are enforced by organizations making cash-for-work payments, particularly with regard to the proper application of the beneficiaries targeting criteria.

184. Results such as these indicate that the project has already had a positive effect on coordination amongst resilience actors. What remains to be seen is whether the coordinated efforts of development partners will in turn enhance the drought resilience and food and nutrition security of vulnerable populations.

## 3.5 Gender and equity

**Finding 24. The project team sought to include gender mainstreaming as a core discussion topic in many of the forums and workshops throughout project implementation. However, overall, women's attendance in the trainings and workshops was much lower than men.**

185. The Terms of Reference for this evaluation called for an assessment of the projects contribution to the outcomes of the FAO Policy on Gender Equality.[18] However, given the specific nature of this project's activities, which tend to be more focused on soft skills enhancement and capacity development activities relating to functional capacities, it was not feasible for the evaluation team to assess the project's results against each of the five objectives of the FAO Policy. Instead, the evaluation team has sought to assess the extent to which gender was mainstreamed throughout the project design and capacity development activities.

186. In formulating the project, no clear gender analysis was carried out nor was a gender action plan developed. However, gender mainstreaming was introduced in training workshops in monitoring and evaluation and in the training on case study development targeting the RESET cluster consortia. For example, in the EU RESET partners' Annual Experience Sharing Workshop held from 11 to 15 February 2019, the findings of a study on gender responsiveness were presented during a session dedicated to gender. Main recommendations of the participants who attended the session were: i) to analyse and report on sex-disaggregated data from a gender perspectives to guide programme implementation, and capture and share success stories and good practices; ii) to develop the capacity of staff and partners to identify and address inequalities in the main thematic areas of the programme, and to increase the use of gender transformative approaches when appropriate; and iii) to develop cluster-level gender and social inclusion strategies which set out clear objectives for promoting gender equality and social inclusion, including the appointment of cluster-level gender focal points and revisiting targets (FAO, 2019). As this project is now completed, it will be the responsibility of the European Union and RESET cluster partners to follow-up on these recommendations in the final stages of the EC SHARE programme.

187. The project team also made a strong effort to ensure that gender mainstreaming was a core discussion topic in the national experience sharing fora, such that Day 1 of the 2019 National Experience Sharing Forum included a dedicated session on gender mainstreaming. In order to place gender front and centre as a key issue for discussion, it was decided to hold the gender mainstreaming session during the first day of the forum when participation was likely to be highest, particularly amongst higher level officials.

188. Nevertheless, the gender balance of attendees of national and regional knowledge sharing workshops and the training workshops was uneven; women were poorly represented in these events.

[18] The five objectives of the FAO Policy on Gender Equality are: 1. Women participate equally with men as decision-makers in rural institutions and in shaping laws, policies and programmes. 2. Women and men have equal access to and control over decent employment and income, land and other productive resources. 3. Women and men have equal access to goods and services for agricultural development, and to markets. 4. Women's work burden is reduced by 20 percent through improved technologies, services and infrastructure. 5. The share of total agricultural aid committed to projects related to women and gender equality is increased to 30 percent.

189. The project did not take any positive action to improve the gender balance amongst participants of the workshops and forums. Table 12 illustrates the low ratio of female to male attendance in a sample of project workshop events. It should be noted, however, that in some instances the attendance levels of female participants were not reported.

**Table 12: Women's participation in project workshops and forums**

| | Total number of participants (male and female) | Number of female participants | Percentage of female participants (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Knowledge sharing forums** | | | |
| Oromia Regional Experience Sharing Forum (RESF-II) and Joint Field Visit | 33 | 2 | 6 |
| **Training workshops in Resilience Coordination** | | | |
| Oromia Regional Workshop on Coordination for Resilience Building and Joint Visiting Tour | 48 | 6 | 12.5 |
| Bale Zone EU RESET-II Resilience Cluster Coordination Capacity building | 42 | 2 | 4.7 |

*Source: FAO, 2018*[19]

## 3.6 Partnerships and coordination

**Finding 25. Partnerships with development partners were not adequately envisaged at the design stage nor were these enhanced over the project implementation period. The choice to partner with the NDRMC remains questionable.**

190. Although some of the development partners were involved at regional level (e.g. through the experience sharing fora), there was limited structured/organized engagement with development actors (e.g. World Bank, IFAD). Despite a LOA having been signed with the RED&FS and despite the European Union being the co-chair of the Executive Committee at federal level, the project could not engage further with major development partners. As a result, FAO did not capitalize on the project to position itself as a key player in resilience coordination and in coordination in the agricultural sector.

191. Because of changes in management over the last five years, FAO was not always participating actively and on a regular basis in the DAG meetings while the development partners and key donors were discussing major issues related to development, and shaping their strategies. Participation in high level forums needs a high level of engagement in the medium-term because there is a need to clearly understand the evolving political and economic context, to build trust with the other partners, and to assess carefully how the Organization can position itself taking into consideration its specific mandate. It should be noted, however, that FAO's presence in higher level fora has increased notably in the past

[19] This information was taken from the proceedings of training workshops in coordination for resilience and knowledge sharing forums.

two years, and the current FAO Representative is recognized by partners as playing a key role in coordination of actors, particularly in the UN country team.

192. While there is no one correct entity the project could have aligned itself with, the decision to align with the DRM-ATFs/DRMC chaired by the Bureau of Agriculture at regional level should be considered carefully, as these mechanisms were created to deal mostly with humanitarian aid and do not have resilience on their agenda. In contrast, the Bureau of Finance and Economics chairs the development group and, therefore, could arguably have been more likely to push the resilience agenda; in Amhara and Oromia, this constraint was overcome by the formation of the resilience platforms.

193. As discussed elsewhere, there was no formal partnership with the federal Government at the project start-up. This created problems, particularly in regard to SNNPR. At a certain point, a Letter of Agreement was established with the RED&FS, but by this stage stakeholders had grown frustrated with the project approach and the LOA activities had to be revised and some cancelled, jeopardizing the valuable partnership that FAO holds with the RED&FS Secretariat. The partnership arrangements of future projects should be carefully considered, partiality with regard to high level national stakeholders.

## 3.7 Lessons and sustainability

**Finding 26. There was no formal agreement signed between the Government and FAO and the European Union, largely because the Government was not very much involved in project design. This impacted negatively on the national ownership and longer term sustainability of the project and created confusion amongst partners.**

194. The Government was informed about the project after it had already been formulated, although Government welcomed to because the activities addressed actual coordination needs.

195. Regular review of project progress was undertaken in the annual reviews of practice, but there were also reviews of the project effectiveness during the training workshops on coordination for resilience. These review processes included government partners at federal, regional and zonal levels and were useful, although priority action points were not operationally defined, in terms of a time frame or designation of responsible organizations for implementation of the action points.

196. Partners and stakeholders, such as government agencies and NGOs (including the RESET cluster member organizations) were involved de facto in project implementation because of the nature of the project which included many capacity development activities. However, project teams managing other flagship national programmes (e.g. PSNP, SLM) were not so involved in project implementation, and this limited the approach of linking relief and development, as the project's focus was mostly geared towards smaller NGO-operated activities.

197. The changing context in Ethiopia is an opportunity to think which ministry should supervise coordination mechanisms at federal, regional, zonal and district level. As the Ministry of Finance is working with all Ministries and plays an active cross-sectoral role in approval and implementation of Humanitarian and Development projects/programmes all over Ethiopia (highlands and lowlands) and has branches/representations at all levels, a consultation

should resume on the opportunity to assign the Ministry of Finance as the lead Government Organization, responsible for coordination.

### 3.7.1 Sustainability

**Finding 27. While individuals will undoubtedly carry forward the trainings and skills they have received, the overall sustainability of the organizational capacity development activities is in doubt, without further committed funding from Government, projects or development partners. Resources to fund subnational coordination mechanisms after project completion are scarce. Some RESET cluster members are willing to support the DRM-ATFs to organize monthly coordination meetings, but no arrangements were formally made between government-led organizations and partners in this regard. FAO regional coordinators are still supporting the DRM-ATF in organizing coordination meetings in several regions.**

198. The sustainability of project results is in doubt, particularly with regard to the organizational capacity development efforts at regional level. Undoubtedly, the trainings and capacity development of individuals will have a lasting impact on those individuals, while there has been positive spillover of these skills to other individuals and uptake of new techniques by participating agencies and organizations. However, given high staff turnover in Government and in international organizations, especially at subnational levels, there is a high probability that these skills will be lost over time. Respondents to the online survey for this evaluation rated 'staff turnover' as the single most critical challenge to improving coordination on resilience.

199. Meanwhile, the capacity of Government to maintain the same level of coordination and leadership for the DRM-ATFs as was enjoyed during the project period is questionable in most regions.

200. No financial resources are available to fund the emerging resilience coordination mechanisms except in Oromia and Amhara where the European Union will finance the DRM programme and will be able to support the emerging resilience platforms; for the time being, in South Omo, the RESET cluster will continue to finance the resilience platform meetings at zonal level. Despite these constraints, 85 percent of respondents to the online survey for this evaluation thought it was likely that the coordination mechanisms would be sustained in the future.

201. Other FAO projects – such as PROACT - include coordination subcomponents, but these operate in limited geographical target areas - e.g. PROACT is implemented in two regions only. Furthermore, sustainability depends on the willingness of FAO Ethiopia Management to capitalize on the lessons learned and effects of the project through the work of the FAO regional coordination efforts. As such, institutional arrangements within FAO need to be enhanced to ensure that coordination for resilience remains a core responsibility – for example under the responsibility of the 'Resilience' team leader in the FAO Ethiopia Country Office.

202. The project team elaborated an exit strategy at completion stage. This exit strategy is very much descriptive and did not include instruments such as a memorandum of understanding with implicated partners or funding commitments to ensure the sustainability of the coordination mechanisms. No commitment was taken by government

bodies at any level to carry on the monthly meetings. In some cases, NGOs (e.g. Caritas Switzerland in Oromia) mentioned that monthly zonal meetings will be hosted on a rotational basis by RESET cluster members or other partners. There is no indication that arrangements were made with partners at zonal level (amongst RESET cluster consortia members for example) to maintain the frequency of the DRM-ATF meetings at regional and zonal level.

203. At the regional level, hand over notes were drafted and transmitted to government partners in four regions: Oromia, Somali, Tigray and Afar, while no hand over notes were prepared in SNNPR and Amhara. Key sensitive processes have been identified in handing over the process to government partners at regional level, such as providing support to the regional DRM-ATF, supporting the undertaking of Regional Experience Sharing Forums and joint visits, and updating the mapping. However, no oversight arrangements are envisaged in these hand over notes as a means to enforce these processes and ensure the sustainability of project outcomes.

204. FAO regional coordinators are now trying to carry on the work of the regional project staff in some regions – e.g. in Somali and in Tigray. In Tigray, the FAO Regional Coordinator is supporting the coordination structure by acting as secretary, producing minutes. Hand over notes have been drafted and transmitted to FAO regional staff in five regions - Oromia, Somali, Tigray and Afar and Amhara. However, rather than being strategic work plans for the sustainment of coordination activities, the hand over notes to FAO regional staff after project completion were more a list of activities that originally planned for the project implementation period, however they were not yet accomplished at project closure.

205. The project team elaborated a capitalization report showing lessons learned from project implementation as well as main successes/achievements. The overall objective of the capitalization exercise was to identify experiences 'leading to learning and identification of good practices which can then be adapted, improved or adopted by others and upscaled, leading to a greater impact' (FAO, 2018). The capitalization report is comprehensive, highlights the project's achievements and draws some lessons learned from project implementation. Still, it did not go in-depth into the analysis of the coordination mechanisms and has not drawn specific lessons on how coordination mechanisms were strengthened or how FAO could carry forward this support into the future.

# 4. Conclusions and recommendations

## 4.1 Conclusions

**Conclusion 1.** Resilience coordination mechanisms have clearly been strengthened at regional levels. Capacity development efforts have been most effective at the level of individuals: i.e. individuals have been capacitated in resilience coordination, how to elaborate case studies and are equipped with skills for enhancing coordination. In terms of capacity development at the organizational level, the sustainability of these efforts will depend on the commitment of Government and partners to continue strengthening the existing coordination mechanisms, and their ability to convene development partners. There has been only a limited contribution to enhancing resilience coordination at the federal level except through the flow of information channelled from the DRM-ATF at regional level to the DRMTF at federal level. Meanwhile, zonal and woreda coordination mechanisms were not supported adequately, although this was beyond the scope of the project.

**Conclusion 2.** The strengthening of regional coordination structures enhanced awareness on coordination for resilience and information-sharing but did not quite succeed in promoting joint planning and joint implementation**.** However, the strengthening of coordination structures of EU RESET clusters at the zonal level resulted in a more structured and organized system that in some cases allowed for the streamlining of implementation strategies, and for geographic and thematic complementarities between implementing agencies.

**Conclusion 3.** This project was overly ambitious in its design. To achieve the higher level objectives of the project required concomitant high level representation and advocacy in high level national level fora. In practice, coordinated collaboration between FAO and the European Union management could have been better when it came to higher level advocacy to move forward the resilience/development agenda and set-up a strategic partnership, in part due to a turnover of FAO Ethiopia senior management during the project implementation period which induced a disruption in FAO's medium-term vision and strategy.

**Conclusion 4.** The project had a double objective: i) strengthening the subnational resilience coordination mechanisms; and ii) strengthening the internal coordination mechanisms of RESET clusters. This double objective can be translated as follows: i) on one hand, strengthening the ownership and leadership of government-led structures; and ii) on the other hand, strengthening operationally the RESET clusters. These two objectives are not mutually exclusive, but addressing each requires a differentiated approach, with specific activities and focused targeting of stakeholders at a given level (regional, zonal or district). While focusing on the EU RESET clusters was undoubtedly a good opportunity, it arguably may have distracted from what could have been more sustainable enhancement of government-led coordination structures.

**Conclusion 5.** The absence of an agreement with Government at the federal level hampered the project's outputs, outcomes and impacts; changes in the mandate of any entity at regional and zonal level should be dictated by the federal level. For example, the project team and FAO did not have the leverage for policy change at federal level when the Bureau of Finance in SNNPR refused to create the Regional Resilience Platform.

**Conclusion 6.** Consultation at design stage with other donors was limited. The project was perceived as being a European Union-FAO project, rather than a nationally owned project, and this impacted on the level of engagement of other potential partners in the activities. The lack of

inclusiveness at design stage as well as delays in design and implementation hindered the project's momentum.

**Conclusion 7.** The lack of an in-depth analysis of the existing coordination mechanisms and their interaction at design stage or before project start-up with the perspective of moving forward the resilience/development agenda hampered project implementation and negatively affected the project implementation strategy. There was no gap analysis, or mapping of humanitarian and development interventions at design stage nor at start-up. The coordination context is very complex in Ethiopia because of the coexistence of two types of coordination mechanisms - the development/resilience coordination mechanisms and the humanitarian mechanisms, the latter under the oversight of OCHA, being more active and structured at various levels.

**Conclusion 8.** The scope of the project went beyond FAO's mandate. By not explicitly limiting the scope of the project to resilience in the agricultural sector, the project faced difficulties in coordinating across all different sectors. For example, stakeholders of other clusters attended many of the regional and zonal meetings/training workshops which diluted/broadened the scope of the meetings and trainings. Furthermore, the project targeted DRMTF, i.e. a forum coordinating emergency/early recovery interventions whose members are mostly NGOs dealing with limited funds, whereas building resilience requires massive investments from large IFIs and bilateral donors. As a learning exercise, the project did serve to highlight the complexity and scale of the gaps and needs in Ethiopia with respect to resilience coordination, and highlighted the challenges faced by the Government and development partners in addressing these needs.

**Conclusion 8.** There is strong demand for resilience coordination at federal level but FAO could not manage to address this demand through this project. This is a missed opportunity for FAO which, through this project, was not able to position itself at the centre of resilience and agriculture development coordination efforts in Ethiopia. One of FAO's main strategic objectives is resilience building which means the Organization should be ideally placed to play a major role in coordination of agricultural development/resilience interventions and policies. At corporate and regional level (in the Resilience Hub based in Nairobi and in the FAO Subregional Office for Eastern Africa based in Addis Ababa), experience, competencies and skills are available and could have been utilized to strengthen the Organization's position in this area.

**Conclusion 9.** Despite major changes in the context (e.g. political instability, the El Niño crisis), the project approach was adaptive and flexible, but delays hindered the efficiency of the project. Nevertheless, some flagship activities intended to enhance communication were abandoned and cancelled which had a negative consequence on the visibility of project outcomes and interaction with partners. At the same time, given the dynamic and volatile context, the project team was not able to effectively manage the resources available (e.g. time, staff and expertise) and set-up priorities at appropriate levels such as at zonal/district level where coordination efforts could have implied more tangible results. The project team stuck too closely to the project design whereas more flexibility was allowed, especially given the time lag between design and eventual implementation.

**Conclusion 10.** The absence of a project steering committee hampered project implementation and did not ensure effective oversight on project activities. Project implementation was further hindered because of the unsatisfactory reporting system, the limited resources available for monitoring missions of the project team based in Addis Ababa and the lack of structured and organized monitoring activities.

## 4.2 Recommendations

### 4.2.1 Recommendations to Government

**Recommendation 1.** If similar projects are designed and implemented in the future, an agreement should be signed with the federal Government from the start; there is a need to ensure that organic reporting lines are consistent between the federal level, the regional level and the zonal/district level. A coordination project cannot be successful unless there is an institutional consistency and articulated delegation of authority among the various levels to induce institutional change and to move forward the resilience agenda. In the future, signing a tripartite agreement between the federal Government, FAO and the donor will enhance the partnerships with federal coordination mechanisms such as RED&FS and those at regional and zonal levels.

**Recommendation 2.** For future projects of this nature, to ensure proper involvement and ownership from the Government side, the project has to be anchored to national institutional organizations at federal, regional and zonal level**.** A steering committee, chaired by a representative of the government line Ministry, has to be formed at project start-up. This will ensure smooth implementation and informed and inclusive decision-making. Sustainability of project impacts will hence be reinforced as government-led structures will take ownership of project results. Reporting project results and progress on the basis of contractual agreements is key to ensuring smooth implementation and the achievement of project objectives. Close monitoring is needed in such projects implemented in complex and evolving contexts.

### 4.2.2 Recommendations to FAO

**Recommendation 3.** Stronger high level support to the project team is needed from FAO senior management, in collaboration with European Union senior management, in upcoming projects to carry forward the resilience discussion in high level fora. A common shared vision for mainstreaming the promotion of resilience coordination between the two organizations has to be defined at project start-up. FAO should conduct, as part of its core activities, a continuous follow-up and analysis of the coordination context and the positioning of major players with respect to resilience.

**Recommendation 4.** For future projects supporting coordination, an in-depth analysis of existing coordination mechanisms and how they function has to be conducted at design stage or before project start-up. This analysis should then be updated every year during the course of project implementation, and it should in turn inform project implementation and help prioritize the activities to be implemented in what is a very dynamic context.

**Recommendation 5.** The FAO regional resilience team at SFE has a role to play in future coordination-support projects by: i) better defining the scope of the project at design stage, with regards to resilience; and ii) informing the project team about the ongoing discussions taking place in the Horn of Africa among the regional institutions (IGAD, African Union).

**Recommendation 6.** FAO should adopt a coordinated approach to build on the project's results, for example in implementing the coordination subcomponents in the ongoing PROACT project and other upcoming projects. Without continued support through other projects, the sustainability of the enhancements to the DRM-ATFs is questionable. In this regard, FAO should take advantage of the outcomes of the current project and build a programmatic approach with regard to resilience

coordination and allow for the use of resources for greater impact and for strengthening its role among the development/humanitarian partners.

**Recommendation 7.** If similar projects are implemented in the future, a proper monitoring and evaluation system should be elaborated and made operational. Such projects require close follow-up of activities on the ground by the project coordination team based in Addis Ababa. A project such as this is complex by its nature, and the project coordination team needs to participate on a regular basis in the implementation of activities on the ground, including the DRM-ATF meetings. The project coordination team based in Addis Ababa need to understand the evolution of the coordination demands in each of the sub processes to be able to prioritize and strategize project interventions.

**Recommendation 8.** The exit strategy should include operational arrangements to sustain project activities: i) roles and responsibilities of the FAO regional coordinators have to be defined in this regard; ii) project activities to be implemented through newly-funded projects such as PROACT need to be defined and identified; and iii) partners willing to take over for funding the coordination mechanisms at regional and zonal level and organizing monthly DRM-ATF meetings need to be identified in each region.

**Recommendation 9.** If similar projects are designed in the future, the scope of the project should be better defined at the design stage to focus on resilience coordination in the agricultural sector to avoid the challenges posed by multi-sectoral coordination and reduce the number of stakeholders at zonal, regional and national level. In this regard, the focus of the project should be more clearly defined at the design stage. Each stakeholder has specific needs and the selection of relevant participants is key to achieving the expected objectives. As such, any future project of this nature must be based on an in-depth stakeholder analysis, as well as a participatory capacity needs assessment, either at design stage or in the early stages of implementation.

**Recommendation 10.** At design stage and based on the in-depth analysis undertaken, a participatory conceptualization of coordination in agricultural development/resilience needs to be elaborated and an appropriate time frame for full-scale interventions needs to be established, in consultation with the relevant partners (including major donors). Coordination is a multi-timescale process that requires differentiated activities for the short-, medium- and long-term.

### 4.2.3 Recommendations to the donors

**Recommendation 11.** Major donors in the area of agricultural development need to back up such projects in high level forums to push the resilience agenda. The project could have benefited from the 'privileged position of the European Union as co-chair of the Executive Committee to influence the LRRD agenda at a higher level and provide back-up support'.

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# Appendix 1. People interviewed

| No. | Name | Gender Male/Female | Role/Title | Organization |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Meetings with FAO staff** | | | | |
| 1 | Abebe, Jerusalem | F | Project Assistant | FAO EC SHARE Coordination Project team |
| 2 | Asaminew, Dereje | M | Crop Officer and FAO filed office coordinator | FAO SNNPR Field Office, Awassa |
| 3 | Atsede, Hailemicheal | F | Field Monitor and Coordination Support Officer | FAO EC SHARE Coordination Project team |
| 4 | AwDahir, Mohamed | M | SFE Partnerships LTO of project | FAO Ethiopia |
| 5 | Beyera, Desta | M | Field Office Coordinator | FAO Oromia Field Office, Addis |
| 6 | Damelio, Jacopo | M | FAO Deputy Representative | FAO Ethiopia |
| 7 | Fantalle,Roba | M | Field Monitor and Coordination Support | FAO Oromia Field Office, Addis |
| 8 | Gela, Adugna | M | Field Monitor and Coordination Support | FAO Amhara Field Office, Bahir Dar |
| 9 | Mekonnen, Gedlu | M | Operations and Programme Coordinator | FAO Ethiopia |
| 10 | Mengiste, Amare | M | Resilience and NR Team Leader | FAO Ethiopia |
| 11 | Mohammed , Ahmed | M | Field Office Coordinator/ Livestock Officer | FAO Somali Field Office, Jigjiga |
| 12 | Mossisa, Yadesssa | M | Field Monitor and Coordination Support Coordinator | FAO EC SHARE Coordination Project team |
| 13 | Rodríguez-Ariza, Carlos | M | International Project Coordinator | FAO EC SHARE Coordination Project team |
| 14 | Sachez Cuadrado, Joaquin | M | International Operations Officer | FAO Ethiopia |
| 15 | Seid, Fatouma | F | FAO Representative | FAO Ethiopia |
| 16 | Tami, Farshad | M | DRM ATF/Agriculture Cluster Coordinator | FAO Ethiopia |
| 17 | VantKlooster, Gijs | M | ECTAD Team Leader | FAO Ethiopia |
| **Meetings with external Partners** | | | | |
| 18 | Ahmed, Hadis | M | Programme Officer, Somali Region | WFP |
| 19 | Cullis, Adrian | M | Former FAO staff in Ethiopia Office | Independent Consultant |
| 20 | De Sousa, Alexandra | M | Deputy | OCHA |
| 21 | Demirag, Ulac | M | Country Programme Manager | IFAD |
| 22 | Kassa, Abera | M | Director, DRR Directorate | NDRMC, DRR Directorate |
| 23 | Ling, Andre | M | Technical Director | ALINE Impact |
| 24 | Muluken, Yilma | M | Resilience Programmed Coordinator | Oxfam GB, Addis Ababa Office |
| 25 | Rusow, Courtney | F | DRM Program Manager | UK Department for International Development (DfID) |
| 26 | Zerfu, Elias | M | Independent Consutlant | DAB Development Research and Training |
| 27 | Abdullahi, Hassan | M | Former DRM ATF chair | Ethiopian Somali Region Livestock And Pastoralist Development Bureau |
| 28 | Abesha, Dejene | M | Secretariat Coordinator | RED&FS Secretariat |
| 29 | Aden, Hamdi | M | Livelihood Task team leader, Somali Region | NRC |
| 30 | Ali, Million | M | Livelihood Technical Team Leader | Oxfam, Somali Region |

| No. | Name | Gender Male/Female | Role/Title | Organization |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | Azaria, Berhe | M | WASH specialist | Oxfam, Siti Zone, Dire Dawa Field Office |
| 32 | Bekele, Angaw | M | MEAL Officer | Cordaid, Lieben Cluster, Field Office |
| 33 | Cumar Cali, Abshir | M | Deputy head of the bureau. | Ethiopian Somali Region Livestock And Pastoralist Development Bureau |
| 34 | Daud, Mahet | M | Regional Programme Manager, Somali Region | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) |
| 35 | Delelgn, Shanko | M | Director, Research, Development, Indoctrination and Resource Mobilizations | Ministry of Peace, Research, Development, Indoctrination and Resource Mobilizations |
| 36 | Genfors, Marten | F | Resilience Specialist | UNDP |
| 37 | Hashi, Abib | M | PWO Field coordinator | ECC-SDCOH, Siti Zone, Dire Dawa Field Office |
| 38 | Hassan, Tarik | M | Water Supply Specialist | UNICEF |
| 39 | Ibrahim, Muhammed | M | Former DRM ATF chair | Ethiopian Somali Region Livestock And Pastoralist Development Bureau |
| 40 | Kebede, Mesfin | M | South Omo Cluster, Consortium Coordinator | Vita, Addis Office |
| 41 | Ketema, Welela | F | Project Manager | RED&FS Secretariat |
| 42 | Mahamoud, Hussien | M | RESET II, Sr. Project. Manager- | SCI, Siti Zone, Dire Dawa Field Office |
| 43 | Mektel Weli , Abdurehman | M | Academic and Research V/President | Jijiga University |
| 44 | Mengestie, Sosena | F | Early Warning Expert | Amhara Region Disaster Prevention Food Security Program Coordination Office, Bahir Dar |
| 45 | Messel, Tigist | F | MEL Officer | RED&FS Secretariat |
| 46 | Minlarglih, Azmeraw | M | EC SHARE Project focal person and Sr. DRR expert | Amhara Region Disaster Prevention Food Security Program Coordination Office, Bahir Dar |
| 47 | Mohammed, Houda | M | Sit Cluster Consortium Coordinator | Oxfam, Siti Zone, Dire Dawa Field Office |
| 48 | Mohammed, Omar | M | DRM TF Chair | Ethiopian Somali Region Livestock And Pastoralist Development Bureau |
| 49 | Molla,Habtamu | M | Director, Gov't Cooperation Directorate | Amhara Region Bureau Of Finance and Economic Cooperation, Bahir Dar |
| 50 | Muluken, Fisseha | M | Project Manager, Field Office | ECC-SDCOH, Siti Zone, Dire Dawa Field Office |
| 51 | Negashe, Fiseha | M | Nutrition Officer, Emergency Nutrition Unit | Amhara Region Disaster Prevention Food Security Program Coordination Office, Bahir Dar |
| 52 | Scott, Nathaniel | M | USAID, Resilience Coordinator RED&FS and PAPTF Co-chair | USAID/Ethiopia; |
| 53 | Silke, Ciara | F | Resilience Coordinator | UK Department for International Development (DfID) |
| 54 | Taye, Berhanu | M | DEVCO Desk officer of the Coordination Project | EUD (EUD (DEVCO+ECHO) |
| 55 | Tekola,Sisay | M | RESET II, MEAL Specialist | SCI, Addis Office |

| No. | Name | Gender Male/Female | Role/Title | Organization |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 56 | Temesgen, Berhanu | M | Early Warning Expert | Amhara Region Disaster Prevention Food Security Program Coordination Office Bahir Dar |
| 57 | Tesfaye, Mulu | M | Sr Program Manager | Save The Children/SCI, Addis Office |
| 58 | Wallace, Gary | M | Consultant, Experience Capitalization | Independent Consultant |
| 59 | Willa, Abera | M | Deputy Head | SNNPR DRMFSS Office, Awassa |

# Annexes

The report is published with the following annexes:

Annexes 1-3: http://www.fao.org/3/ca7915en/ca7915en.pdf

Annex 1. Online survey findings
Annex 2. Evaluation Matrix
Annex 3. Logical Framework (as per the original project document)

Annex 4. Terms of Reference: http://www.fao.org/3/ca7916en/ca7916en.pdf

Office of Evaluation
E-mail: evaluation@fao.org
Web address: www.fao.org/evaluation

**Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations**
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00153 Rome, Italy

CA8455EN/1/04.2020