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ARCHIVE H5N8 HPAI GLOBAL situation update

10 November 2017, 18:00 hours; Rome

The next update will be issued on 13 December 2017

Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last H5N8 situation update appears in red. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE]) as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

 

 Overview

Situation: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 2016 virus in Africa, Asia, Europe and Middle East with pandemic potential.
Confirmed countries*: Austria*, Belgium*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*,Bulgaria*, Cameroon*, China, Croatia*, Cyprus, the Czech Republic*, Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Denmark*, Egypt*, Finland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary*, India*, Iran (Islamic Republic of)*, Ireland, Israel*, Italy*, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea*, Kuwait*, Lithuania, Luxembourg*,Nepal*, the Netherlands*, Niger*, Nigeria*, Poland*, Portugal, Romania*, Russian Federation*, Serbia*, Slovakia*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, Uganda*, Ukraine* and Zimbabwe*.

 Number of human cases: None reported to date.

 

x Reports of H5N8 HPAI events in Taiwan, Province of China, are not included in this update since the virus belongs to a genetically different strain.

* Countries in which the virus was detected in poultry.

Map 1. H5N8 HPAI events officially reported in Asia, Europe and Africa by onset date

H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia, Europe and Africa by onset date, since 1 January 2017
Click to enlarge - Note: The large map shows confirmed H5N8 HPAI events observed since 01 October 2017; the small map in the insert shows confirmed events observed between 01 June 2016 and 30 September 2017

 

Birds Species affected by H5N8 HPAI

Domestic birds species affected

Duck (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus)

Goose (Anserinae sp.)

Chicken (Gallus gallus domesticus)

Turkey (Meleagris gallopavo)

 

 

Captive birds species affected
(Private collections, displays or production)

Emu (Dromaius novaeollandiae)

Blue Crane (Grus paradisea)

Common Guineafowl (Numida meleagris)

Indian Peafowl (Pavo cristatus)

Partridge (Perdicinae)

Common pheasant (Phasianus colchicus)

Greater Rhea (Rhea americana)

Ostrich (Struthio camelus)

 

Wild Birds species affected

Involved in transmission

Northern Shoveler (Anas clypeata)

Common Teal (Anas crecca)

Falcated Duck (Anas falcata)

Eurasian Wigeon (Anas penelope)

Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos)

Gadwall (Anas strepera)

Yellow-billed Duck (Anas undulata)

Greater White-fronted Goose (Anser albifrons)

Greylag Goose (Anser anser)

Pink-footed Goose (Anser brachyrhynchus)

Been Goose (Anser fabalis)

Common Pochard (Aythya ferina)

Tufted Duck (Aythya fuligula)

Ferruginous Pochard (Aythya nyroca)

Wild Duck (Aythyinae or Anatinae sp.)

Common Goldeneye (Bucephala clangula)

Tundra Swan (Cygnus columbianus)

Whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus)

Mute Swan (Cygnus olor)

Marbled teal (Marmaronetta angustirostris)

Red-crested Pochard (Netta rufina)

Common Shelduck (Tadorna tadorna)

 

 

Accidental hosts

Egyptian Goose (Alopochen aegyptiaca)

Lesser white-fronted goose (Anser erythropus)

Great Egret (Ardea alba)

Grey Heron (Ardea cinerea)

Black-headed Heron (Ardea melanocephala)

Crowned crane (Balearica regulorum)

Eurasian bittern (Botaurus stellaris)

Canada Goose (Branta canadensis)

Western Cattle Egret (Bubulcus ibis)

 Muscovy Duck (Cairina moschata)

 Little stint (Calidris minuta)

 Kentish Plover (Charadrius alexandrines)

 Little ringed plover (Charadrius dubius)

 Common ringed plover (Charadrius hiaticula)

 White-winged Black Tern (Chlidonias leucoptera)

White Stork (Ciconia ciconia)

 Stork (Ciconiidae sp.)

 African rock pigeon (Columba guinea)

 Common Wood-Pigeon (Columba palumbus)

 Pigeon (Columbidae sp.)

 Black Swan (Cygnus atratus)

Little Egret (Egretta garzetta)

 Common Coot (Fulica atra)

 Common Moorhen (Gallinula chloropus)

 Common Crane (Grus grus)

 Red-crowned Crane (Grus japonensis)

Black-winged Stilt (Himantopus himantopus)

Munia (Lonchura sp.)

Painted Stork (Mycteria leucocephala)

Eurasian Curlew (Numenius arquata)

House Sparrow (Passer domesticus)

Pelican (Pelecanus sp.)

Great Cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo)

Pygmy Cormorant (Phalacrocorax pygmaeus)

Ruff (Philomachus pugnax)

Greater Flamingo (Phoenicopterus roseus)

Eurasian Spoonbill (Platalea leucorodia)

Spur-winged Goose (Plectopterus gambensis)

Glossy Ibis (Plegadis falcinellus)

Southern Masked-Weaver (Ploceus velatus)

Great Cested Grebe (Podiceps cristatus)

Pied avocet (Recurvirostra avosetta)

Eider (Somateria mollissima)

Common Tern (Sterna hirundo)

Laughing Dove (Streptopelia senegalensis)

Eurasian Collared Dove (Streptopella decaocto)

Common Starling (Sturnus vulgaris)

Little Grebe (Tachybaptus ruficollis)

Sacred Ibis (Threskiornis aethiopicus)

Wood Sandpiper (Tringa glareola)

Green Sandpiper (Tringa ochropus)

Eurasian Blackbird (Turdus merula)

Song Thrush (Turdus philomelos)

Fieldfare (Turdus pilaris)

Scavenger birds and birds of prey:

Northern Goshawk (Accipiter gentilis)

Eurasian Sparrowhawk (Accipiter nisus)

Long Eared Owl (Asio otus)

Spotted Eagle-Owl (Bubo africanus)

 Eurasian Eagle-Owl (Bubo bubo)

 Common Buzzard (Buteo buteo)

 Black-headed Gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus)

 Crow (Corvus sp.)

 Pied Crow (Corvus albidae)

 Common Raven (Corvus Corax)

 Hooded Crow (Corvus cornix)

 Rook (Corvus frugilegus)

Saker Falcon (Falco cherrug)

Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus)

 Common Kestrel (Falco tinnunculus)

Red-footed Falcon (Falco vespertinus)

White Tailed Eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla)

 Gull (Laridae)

Herring Gull (Larus argentatus)

Armenian Gull (Larus armenicus)

 Mew Gull (Larus canus)

Lesser Black-backed Gull (Larus fuscus)

Great black-backed Gull (Larus marinus)

 Yellow-legged Gull (Larus michahellis)

Common Magpie (Pica pica)

Owl (Strigiformes)

Common Barn-Owl (Tyto alba)

Note: For each bird species, common name, genus and species name are listed. Species in subcategories are listed in alphabetic order, by their Latin name.

 

 

 FAO's support to countries

Global level

  • A webinar titled Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza – Analysis of the current situation and recommendations for preventive action, targeting national veterinary services and FAO regional and country teams, was conducted by FAO on 24 November 2016 [link]
  • A teleconference on H5N8 HPAI and wild birds has been held by the OFFLU wildlife group on 22 November 2016
  • EMPRES Watch, September 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) of clade 2.3.4.4 detected through surveillance of wild migratory birds in the Tyva Republic, the Russian Federation – potential for international spread [link]
  • EMPRES news, 4 November 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting September 2016 [link] and March 2017 [link]

Regional level

  • FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, November 2016: Highly pathogenic avian influenza spreading in Europe, South Asia [link]
  • FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, September 2016: Emergent Avian Influenza virus detected in surveillance of migratory birds in Russian Federation (FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news [link]
  • FAO organised an Expert Consultation on Contingency Planning for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the Near-East and North Africa (NENA) region on 18-19 December 2016 in Cairo, Egypt. The consultation brought chief veterinary officers, veterinary epidemiologists and lab experts from NENA countries. FAO experts and partners (OIE and WHO) facilitated the sessions.

 

Recent Publications

Yuk SS, Lee DH, Park JK, Tseren-Ochir EO, Kwon JH, Noh JY, Song CS. Experimental infection of dogs with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N8). Journal of Veterinary Science. 2017 Aug 31;18(S1):381-384. doi: 10.4142/jvs.2017.18.S1.381.[reference] To investigate the possibility of adaptation and transmission of H5N8 HPAI  to dogs, we experimentally inoculated dogs with H5N8. Although the H5N8 virus did not induced severe clinical signs to dogs, the results suggest that surveillance of farm dogs should continue as a species in which the avian influenza virus may acquire infectivity to mammals through frequent contact with the virus.

 

Kwon JH, Lee DH, Jeong JH, Yuk SS, Erdene-Ochir TO, Noh JY, Hong WT, Jeong S, Gwon GB, Lee SW, Choi IS, Song CS. Isolation of an H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Strain from Wild Birds in Seoul, a Highly Urbanized Area in South Korea. J Wildl Dis. 2017 Jul;53(3):630-635. doi: 10.7589/2016-07-161. Epub 2017 Mar 21. [reference] The complete genome of H5N8 HPAI virus isolated in Seoul, South Korea was analyzed and its origin was estimated using a phylogenetic analysis. The Seoul H5N8 isolate clustered phylogenetically with strains isolated from migratory wild birds but was distinct from Korean poultry isolates. This H5N8 virus was likely introduced into the urbanized city by migratory wild birds. Therefore, wild bird habitats in urbanized areas should be carefully monitored for HPAIV.

 

Pantin-Jackwood MJ, Costa-Hurtado M, Bertran K, DeJesus E, Smith D, Swayne DE. Infectivity, transmission and pathogenicity of H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4 (H5N8 and H5N2) United States index viruses in Pekin ducks and Chinese geese. Vet Res. 2017 Jun 7;48(1):33. doi:10.1186/s13567-017-0435-4. [reference] The H5 HPAI viruses can infect domestic waterfowl and easily transmit to contact birds, with geese being more susceptible to infection and disease than ducks. The disease is mostly asymptomatic, but infected birds shed virus for several days representing a risk to other poultry species.

 

Fusaro A, Monne I, Mulatti P, Zecchin B, Bonfanti L, Ormelli S, Milani A, Cecchettin K, Lemey P, Moreno A, Massi P, Dorotea T, Marangon S, Terregino C. Genetic Diversity of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N8/H5N5) Viruses in Italy, 2016-17. Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Sep;23(9):1543-1547. doi:10.3201/eid2309.170539. [reference] In winter 2016-17, H5N8 and H5N5 HPAI viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 were identified in wild and domestic birds in Italy. We report the occurrence of multiple introductions and describe the identification in Europe of 2 novel genotypes, generated through multiple reassortment events.

 

Kapczynski DR, Pantin-Jackwood MJ, Spackman E, Chrzastek K, Suarez DL, Swayne DE. Homologous and heterologous antigenic matched vaccines containing differentH5 hemagglutinins provide variable protection of chickens from the 2014 U.S. H5N8 and H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Vaccine. 2017 Nov 1;35(46):6345-6353. doi: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.04.042. [reference] These studies suggest that existing vaccines when used in a single immunization strategy may not provide adequate protection in poultry against the 2.3.4.4 HPAI viruses. Updating the H5 hemagglutinin to be genetically closer to the outbreak virus and/or using a prime-boost strategy may be necessary for optimal protection.

 

Xu W, Dai Y, Hua C, Wang Q, Zou P, Deng Q, Jiang S, Lu L. Genomic signature analysis of the recently emerged highly pathogenic A(H5N8) avian influenza virus: implying an evolutionary trend for bird-to-human transmission. Microbes Infect. 2017 Sep 7. pii:S1286-4579(17)30121-1. doi:0.1016/j.micinf.2017.08.006. [reference] Based on the paper’s findings, the newly emerged H5N8 HPAI isolates show an evolutionary trend toward gaining more HLS and, along with it, the potential for bird-to-human transmissibility. Therefore, more extensive surveillance of this rapidly spreading H5N8 HPAI and preparedness against its potential pandemic are urgently needed.

 

Selim AA, Erfan AM, Hagag N, Zanaty A, Samir AH, Samy M, Abdelhalim A, Arafa AA, Soliman MA, Shaheen M, Ibraheem EM, Mahrous I, Hassan MK, Naguib MM. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (H5N8) Clade 2.3.4.4 Infection in Migratory Birds, Egypt. Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Jun;23(6):1048-1051. doi: 10.3201/eid2306.162056. [reference] We isolated H5N8 HPAI virus of clade 2.3.4.4 from the common coot (Fulica atra) in Egypt, documenting its introduction into Africa through migratory birds. This virus has a close genetic relationship with subtype H5N8 viruses circulating in Europe. Enhanced surveillance to detect newly emerging viruses is warranted.

 

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

Please refer to the Update published on 11 October 2017 for a list of recommendations.