PC
87/4 a) |
Eighty-seventh Session |
Rome, 6-10 May 2002 |
Independent External Evaluation of the Special Programme for Food Security |
The Strengths of the SPFS
Lessons From the Past
Alternative Future Approach1.1 Terms of Reference of the Evaluation
1.2 Evaluation Arrangements and Modalities
1.3 Outline of the Report2.1 Focus on Food Security
2.2 Development of the Programme Concept3.1 Role of the Partners
3.2 The Process of Project Formulation4. SPFS IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT
4.1 Role of FAO
4.2 Organization and Management Structures
4.3 Effectiveness of National Inputs
4.4 The Contribution of South-South Cooperation (SSC)
4.5 Role of Other International Agencies and Donors5.1 Selection of Sites
5.2 Selection of Target Beneficiaries
5.3 Selection of Technologies for Testing
5.4 SPFS Approach
5.5 Results Achieved in Pilot Field Operations6. OTHER GENERAL EFFECTS/ISSUES OF SPFS
6.1 Effect on National Policies
6.2 Effect on the Donor Community
6.3 Cost-Effectiveness of the National SPFS7. OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF SPFS
7.1 Lessons From the Past
7.2 Strengths of the SPFS
7.3 Alternative Future Approach for the SPFSANNEX 1: SPFS EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE
ANNEX 2: SUMMARY CURRICULUM VITAE OF SPFS EVALUATON TEAM MEMBERS
Table 1: LIFDC Countries in Membership of FAO by Region, Undernourishment, Income Per Caput and Participation in SPFS by Order of Entry into the Programme by Region
Table 2 Summary of Percentage Breakdown of Expenditure by Source of Funds 1995-2000 (Approximate Total US$ 60 Million)
Table 3 SPFS Funding from Extra-budgetary Resources (Disbursed through FAO; Showing Beneficiary Countries and Budgets Annually 2002)
Table 4: Status of SSC in Countries with Signed Agreements
Table 5: Evolution of the SPFS over time in Latin America as given by the FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean
The Evaluation Team wishes to express its appreciation to all those from FAO, Government and the International Community who were so helpful and willingly provided information and their thoughts on the SPFS during country visits. Similar thanks go to FAO senior and technical staff in Headquarters, Regional and Country Offices who were prepared to put at the mission's disposal the time needed to respond on the many questions we raised. The Evaluation Service provided full support to the team and a particular vote of thanks goes to Heather Young, Nadine Monnichon and Anna Carroll for their tireless patience and effort in organizing contractual and logistic matters, and to John Markie and Daniel Shallon for accompanying the team during field visits.
ADB |
Asian Development Bank |
ADG |
Assistant Director General (FAO) |
AfDB |
African Development Bank |
AGEP |
Agence d'Exécution des Projets (Senegal) |
AGSM |
Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance Service (FAO) |
AOAD |
Arab Organization for Agricultural Development |
ASIRP |
Agricultural Services Innovation and Reform Project (Bangladesh) |
ASPRODEB |
Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotions de Petits Projets à la Base (Senegal) |
BADEA |
Arab Bank for Agricultural Development in Africa |
BOAD |
West Africa Development Bank |
BRAC |
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee |
CA |
Constraints Analysis |
CADEF |
Comité d’Action pour le Département du Fogny (Senegal) |
CGIAR |
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research |
CIAT |
International Centre for Tropical Agriculture |
CIDA |
Canadian International Development Agency |
CNCR |
Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux (Senegal) |
CNSA |
Conseil National de Securité Alimentaire (Senegal) |
CORSINOR |
Development Corporation of the Northern Sierra (Ambuquí, Ecuador) |
CRM |
Centro de Rehabilitación de Manabí (Ecuador) |
CSA |
Cooperative Service Agreement (FAO) |
CSS |
Counter Seasonal Strategy |
DANIDA |
Danish International Development Agency (Denmark) |
DFID |
Department for International Development (UK) |
DG |
Director General (FAO) |
DGIC |
Directorate general for International Cooperation (Netherlands) |
DSA |
Daily Subsistence Allowance |
ECOWAS |
Economic Community of West African States |
FAO |
Food and Agricultural Organization |
FAOR |
Food and Agriculture Country Representative |
FECD |
Fondo Equatoriano-Canadiense de Desarrollo (Canada/Ecuador) |
FFS |
Farmer Field School (FAO) |
FIVIMS |
Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems |
FONGS |
Fédération Nationale des Organizations Non-Gouvernementales du Senegal (Senegal) |
GCP |
Government Cooperative Programme Trust Fund (FAO) |
GNI |
Gross National Income |
GNP |
Gross National Product |
GRS |
Group on Strategic Thinking (Senegal) |
HIPC |
Highly Indebted Poor Country |
HQ |
Headquarters |
ICRISAT |
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics |
IDA |
International Development Agency |
IDB |
Inter American Development Bank |
IFAD |
International Fund for Agricultural Development |
IFDC |
International Fertiliser Development Center (USA) |
IFI |
International Financial Institution |
IFSS |
International Fertiliser Supply Scheme |
ILO |
International Labour Organization |
INRA |
Institut National de Recherche Agronomique (France) |
IPM |
Integrated Pest Management |
IPNS |
Integrated Plant Nutrition System |
IITA |
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture |
IsDB |
Islamic Development Bank |
JICA |
Japanese International Development Agency |
LIFDC |
Low Income Food Deficit Country |
MOA |
Ministry of Agriculture (Eritrea) |
MOU |
Memorandum of Understanding |
NGO |
Non-Government Organization |
OXFAM |
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief |
PFL |
Programme for Prevention of Food Losses |
PMO |
Programme Management Office |
PRA |
Participatory Rural Appraisal |
SIDA |
Swedish International Development Agency (Sweden) |
SLA |
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (DFID, UK) |
SOFI |
State of Food Insecurity in the World (FAO) |
SPFS |
Special Programme for Food Security (FAO) |
SPIC |
Special Programme Implementation Committee (FAO) |
SPPD |
Support for Policy and Programme Development (UNDP) |
SSA |
Special Services Agreement (FAO) |
SSC |
South-South Cooperation |
SWOT |
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats |
TA |
Technical Assistance |
TCA |
Policy Assistance Division (FAO) |
TCDC |
Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (FAO) |
TCI |
Investment Centre Division (FAO) |
TCOM |
Field Programme Monitoring and Coordination Service (FAO) |
TCO |
Field Operations Division |
TCOS |
SPFS Coordination and Monitoring Service (FAO) |
TCP |
Technical Cooperation Programme (FAO) |
UDENOR |
Unitá para el Desarrollo del Norte (Ecuador) |
UN |
United Nations |
UNDP |
United Nations Development Programme |
UNFIP |
United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (Turner Fund) |
UNHCR |
United Nations High Commission for Refugees |
UNV |
United Nations Volunteer |
USA |
United States of America |
USAID |
United States Agency for International Development (USA) |
UTF |
Unilateral Trust Fund |
UJAK |
L’Union des Jeunes Agricultures de Koli Wirndé (Senegal) |
UK |
United Kingdom |
UMOA |
L’Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West Africa Monetary Union) |
WARDA |
West Africa Rice Development Association |
WB |
World Bank |
WFP |
World Food Programme |
WTO |
World Trade Organization |
WUA |
Water Users Association |
WIN |
Water Resources Management for Improved Household Food Security, Nutrition and Health |
1. The evaluation took place some six years after the initiation of country level work under the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS). It was undertaken both in response to the request of the Governing Bodies and to meet internal management needs, and was designed with two aims, namely to: (a) provide a credible accountability report on the SPFS, containing in-depth analysis and assessment of its continuing relevance, effectiveness in achieving results and overall cost-effectiveness; and (b) consolidate and enhance the knowledge base of the SPFS for the future by learning from the experience to date, especially by identifying emerging issues, strengths and weaknesses.
2. A representative team of nine senior external consultants undertook the evaluation. The FAO Evaluation Service provided operational support. The Evaluation Team visited FAO Regional Offices and 12 SPFS countries from each of the developing regions (i.e. Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Ecuador, Eritrea, Haiti, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia). Countries for visits were selected by the Evaluation Team from a short-list prepared by FAO of 18 countries representing each of the developing regions. In the short-listed countries, work had been ongoing in the field for at least three years, with at least three of the four components of the SPFS. The criteria for selection ensured that the team would be evaluating on the basis of substantial experience in implementing the SPFS. Approximately one week was spent in each country by groups, which normally consisted of four consultants. In each country the team held discussions with government, donors and FAO staff, and visited a sample of project sites using a checklist of points based on the terms of reference to facilitate their enquiries with farmers, national development and SPFS staff.
3. Chapter 1 of the report is the Introduction which summarises the Terms of Reference and discusses evaluation modalities and arrangements. Chapter 2 provides some background on the SPFS covering the rationale for a focus on food security and the development of the programme concept. Chapter 3 deals with the planning and design of specific SPFS programmes and the actual process of project formulation. Chapter 4 is focussed on SPFS implementation and management and considers the role of FAO, the organization and management structures, the effectiveness of national inputs, South-South Cooperation and the roles played by other international agencies and donors. Chapter 5 is devoted to assessing the pilot field operations in terms of selection of sites, target beneficiaries and technologies for testing. The approach used in implementing the SPFS field initiatives is also discussed, as are the results achieved. Chapter 6 considers the impact of SPFS on national policies and the donor community, and also briefly deals with the cost effectiveness of SPFS initiatives. Finally, Chapter 7 brings together the material presented in the earlier chapters by summarising the background and strengths of the SPFS as viewed by the Evaluation Team. This provides the foundation, which the Evaluation Team uses to propose the approach to be applied in planning and implementing the SPFS in the future.
4. The Evaluation Team found that the SPFS, as it currently exists, has a number of positive characteristics or strengths, not always shared by other donor and FAO-supported programmes, that deserve recognition and can be usefully built on in designing and implementing future SPFS related initiatives. The major ones are as follows:
5. When the SPFS started it had what the Evaluation Team regards as a rigid and inflexible design. It also required that it initially be implemented in those areas where there was the potential for rapidly increasing production. These areas were characterised as being where there were irrigation possibilities. It was envisioned that the production focus would help solve food security problems both at the household and national levels. It soon became apparent that the early `micro' oriented production focus was insufficient to ensure progress in solving the food security problem and that `meso' and `macro' type issues were important in enabling production increases to occur, and in ensuring benefits accrue to the producers. Thus, over time the implementation of SPFS has become `less rigid' and `more flexible'. The Evaluation Team is in agreement with the changes.
6. Another problem of a more conceptual nature became apparent to the Evaluation Team during the visits to the case study countries. This relates to the likely tradeoffs between fulfilling the goals indicated in the guidelines for the SPFS for addressing food security at both the national and household levels. In general, the stipulation of initiating SPFS activities in higher potential areas is likely to be better in addressing the issue of improving national food security. Poverty, and hence individual household food insecurity, is likely to exist in such areas but by the same token it is likely to be less acute than in less promising agricultural areas. As a result, the sites selected for SPFS activities in the case study countries, have in general been of relatively high productivity, compared with the more marginal areas where the degree of malnourishment in rural areas is higher but the potential for increases in agricultural productivity are lower. Thus, although in the opinion of the Evaluation Team the areas selected for SPFS activities are likely to be the best as far as potentially improving national food security is concerned, in terms of improving individual household food security the impact of SPFS type activities was likely to have been higher in the marginal areas. This suggests trade-offs between the stated laudable goals of improving both household and national food security.
7. Another issue which became apparent during the visits of the Evaluation Team to the case study countries was that the time initially planned for the pilot part of Phase I of the SPFS, namely two or three years, was too short, and the selected sites too small, to have any major impact on production and food security strategies. Success of the SPFS type of approach is very dependent on the strength of the institutional structures, including extension, credit, input distribution and product marketing systems. Where there are deficiencies in this, it is very unlikely that a two to three year period will be sufficient to demonstrate impact. Evidence of implementing the expansion part of Phase I (i.e. extending SPFS activities to all agro-ecological zones of a country) was only found in Senegal, although plans do exist on paper for other countries. Also there is no country that has entered Phase II of the SPFS.
8. The Evaluation Team was somewhat surprised to note that the sets of technical guidelines designed to help in implementing the four components of the SPFS were not more frequently used in the field. Although there appear to be good reasons for this, the Evaluation Team believes that there would be merit in setting up a Guideline Technical Committee with the responsibility of rationalising the approach to planning, producing, approving, and updating the guidelines as a whole. However, the Evaluation Team believes the Guidelines should be viewed as `guidelines' and nothing more. Slavish adherence to them could be counter productive and inhibit creativity in designing/adapting the methodologies to local situations.
9. Systematic evidence of the degree of adoption/uptake of the technologies demonstrated by the SPFS was not available, partly because the SPFS has not generally collected such information and partly because many of the projects are ongoing, or have only recently ended. The Evaluation Team therefore had to form impressions from interviews with stakeholders during its field visits. Although there was some evidence of adoption by farmers who had participated directly in the demonstration of the technologies or had attended FFSs, and to a lesser extent by non-participant farmers during project implementation, there was relatively little evidence of continued use of technologies after project demonstrations, or of adoption by farmers who had had no association with SPFS. The Evaluation Team believes that the SPFS should make an effort to systematically document evidence of the uptake of the demonstrated technological packages.
10. The SPFS has made extensive use of subsidies to encourage technology adoption. This has taken two forms: providing inputs free to farmers and/or giving inputs at subsidised rates. This needs to be re-examined particularly since it does not bode well for the sustainability of the technologies after direct SPFS support to initiatives ceases. Giving inputs free should be discontinued and subsidised interest rates should only be used if it is part of national policy. Also, for sustainability reasons, credit should be administered by competent credit institutions rather than being administered directly by SPFS projects.
11. In general, to date, the impact of SPFS on national policies relating to food security, and on the donor community in terms of strategies for enhancing food security in Low Income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs) and resource mobilization for SPFS follow-up, has been limited.
12. Having evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the SPFS, the Evaluation Team recommends that FAO and its partners should consider an alternative future approach for the SPFS which would involve the following:
13. At the onset of every SPFS project, FAO should also explicitly design an exit strategy in terms of handing over responsibility at the end of the implementation period. It is recommended that a participatory log frame approach is used in the design exercise and that during the implementation phase it becomes a participatory dynamic logframe, which is periodically revisited to facilitate monitoring and evaluation with respect to the objectives, indicators, means of verification/measurement, and hypotheses/assumptions/risks associated with the project.
14. Finally, it is recommended that the SPFS develops three complementary strategies, namely: (a) increasing the effort devoted to food security mapping in order to facilitate the identification of food insecure areas; (b) introducing systematic, simple and efficient monitoring systems to improve management at different levels and independent evaluation at the project level; and (c) after carefully assessing the true needs of each country in terms of the level of expertise needed (i.e. low, medium or high), and matching those needs with available technical and human resources of other countries in the South, introduce South-South Cooperation programmes that use small numbers of cooperants with adequate language skills, to give hands-on training to, and mentor local experts and technicians.