by
Juan Prat y Coll
Director General for International Fisheries
Spain
The development of Spain's Fishing Industry can be traced back to a specific date, more than twenty years ago. On 8 September 1961, the freezer trawler LEMOS set sail from Vigo to fish off the coast of Argentina. A pioneer of Europe in waters of the southern hemisphere, it was followed a month later by the ANDRADE, this time headed for the coast of southern Africa. These were the fleet's first two long-range motor trawlers, which, equipped with fast tunnel freezers capable of preserving the entire catch, enabled the Spanish consumer to gain access to fish from those waters, delivered with all of its nourishment and flavour intact.
The leap forward represented by this event in the annals of the expansion of the Spanish fishing fleet was all the more noteworthy considering that up until then, except for whaling activity, fishing operations carried out by western Europe had centred on the North Atlantic, from the Barents Sea to Senegal. It seemed at the time that not even the low yield obtained using bottom trawls on the traditional fishing grounds, some already afflicted with overfishing, would prompt a change in attitude on the part of the ship owners concerned or bring about a change in perspective in their plans of action. As a result, the fishing areas in the southern hemisphere, both those fed by the Malvinas Current and those fed by the Benguela Current, were in practice closed to the fleets based from Spitzberg to Las Palmas, which did not venture to try their luck below the Equator.
Of course, this event was important not only because it meant the opening up of a completely new fishery as far as the geographical location of the fishing banks was concerned, but also because it ushered in the implementation of a new industrial process that ensured the effectiveness and success of this expansion and marked the way for others to continue development over the years.
At the beginning of the 1960's Spain was not yet an industrially developed country, but it did possess a deep-rooted tradition of long-distance fisheries. In the second half of the 1920's the cod fishery underwent a revival, though our fishermen had, as early as the sixteenth century, worked the waters of Newfoundland as a matter of course. This fishery was consolidated after the end of the Second World War, and in 1951 the Spanish fleet operating on the banks off Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Labrador, and Greenland was composed of 21 otter-trawlers and 57 pair trawl units, 135 ships in all, displacing a total gross weight of nearly 47 000 tonnes.
As was already mentioned, this salt cod era was followed by the era of industrial refrigeration, first in the form of crushed ice, then using slow freezing techniques, and most recently using fast and flash freezing methods, which has had a clear and direct impact on the geographical expansion of fisheries throughout the world. Thus, it can be stated unequivocally that the introduction of industrial freezing technology in vessel economy to preserve the catch in perfect condition for more than enough time to permit consumption at a later date has been the key to the most spectacular growth story ever recorded in the history of fishing.
Private initiative has undoubtedly been in the forefront of this process.
However, not even the panorama just outlined fully explains the vigorous thrust of technical progress and specialization undergone by the Spanish fishing fleet since the early 1960's. This was basically the result of two structural defects: the reduced extent of the private sector and private financial circles which were unable to discern, among the many options available to them, the fishing sector's true potential for development, together with the fact that the special characteristics intrinsic to this sector were ill adjusted to the existing system of credit.
In this situation, government assistance was decisive. It was embodied in a piece of legislation of enormous significance to the subsequent development of the fishing sector, which to a great extent owes its present structure to the Modernization and Protection of the Fishing Fleet Act (Ley sobre Renovación y Protección de la Flota Pesquera), promulgated on 23 December 1961, barely two weeks after the return to Vigo of the freezer trawler "LEMOS" previously referred to, following its first expedition to the fishing grounds in the South Atlantic.
It was effectively through this law that the Fisheries Administration set forth resolutely on the path of direct assistance to the private sector, with the clear goal of comprehensive development in mind. For this purpose it set out to provide, on extremely favourable financial and economic terms, the resources needed to expand the fishing fleet directly to the beneficiaries: actual or prospective ship owners, in such a way that the effect of such a policy would make themselves felt beyond the limited scope of the fishing sector itself. In this fashion, at a time when the Spanish economy was going through a clear-cut phase of reactivation, fishing would also contribute to the development of certain other economic sectors.
Ten years after the inception of the financing policy whose main characteristics have just been outlined, the most direct and obvious consequence was undoubtedly the creation of a well-equipped and outfitted long-range freezer fleet capable of attaining high levels of productivity. At the end of 1971, the fleet was composed of 261 fishing units: 236 trawlers directed preferentially at white fish, cephalopods, and shell-fish, and 25 purse seiners fishing for tuna and tuna like species, in all 141 000 GRT; plus 40 fish factory ships or refrigerator transports capable of handling frozen fish, for an additional 72,000 GRT.
However, this new component of Spanish fish production is not the only reflection of the fisheries policy undertaken in 1961, when for the first time in its history Spanish catches reach the million-tonne mark (more exactly: 1 058 794 tons). From that point on, its growth rate surged. Thus, barely ten years later the total volume of catches had risen by more than half a million tons, making Spain the seventh-ranking fishing country in the world (inland fisheries excluded), the sixth in terms of primary earnings from fish products, and the fifth in relation to per capita fish consumption.
The regulations traceable to Law No. 147/1961 of 23 December, the Modernization and Protection of the Fishing Fleet Act, exerted a continuous effect on other economic sectors in addition to the fishing sector, even going as far as to take specific measures directly affecting these other sectors. This was the case, for example, of shipbuilding, as had already been considered, when in 1966 a new approach to financing the fishing fleet was adopted. After that year, in accordance with the regulations discussed previously, loans could be granted as described by both: private banks and the "Banco de Crédito a la Construcción" not just to ship owners, but to shipyards as well, thus enabling them to finance long-term ship sales. It should be noted that this, in turn, gave rise to considerable control problems for the Fisheries Administration, making it difficult to obtain an overview of development within the sector and the actual situation at any given time.
Other economic sectors directly involved in this processus included the refrigeration and freezing industry and certain other branches of activity that may be classed together under the category of subsidiary industries. Not forgetting, of course, what are termed "related industries", the wide variety of which attests to the many different ways of processing fish products: the whaling industry, the canning industry (the most important branch, with a number of different production lines), fish curing, land-based fish freezing, and the fishmeal industry.
In any case, the development of the fishing industry did not merely exert an effect on related sectors; rather, beyond the limited confines of the system of production, it has had, over the years, a significant impact on two macro-economic variables: domestic consumption and foreign trade.
Attention is called to a phenomenon which is not new but which, it is also true, has, in the course of the years, attained a new dimension, both quantitatively and qualitatively speaking. We are referring to the growing presence of Spanish vessels on international fishing grounds or in the waters of other countries. Clearly, this has been the result of the policy initiated in the 1960's, which has thus accomplished one of its major objectives: gaining access to fisheries located further and further away, in order to thereby reduce the dependence of domestic fish consumption on the resources of a narrow continental shelf already subjected to intensive exploitation. But two events were beyond the Spanish Administration's control and outside its influence and have brought about a dramatic shift in the status of the world's fisheries. The events were particularly telling for Spain, as they radically altered the context in which its fishing activity was being carried out. We are referring, naturally, to the oil crises and the widespread extension of the exclusive economic zones to 200 nautical miles by coastal countries.
To put this problem in its proper perspective, its dual scope must be recognized. On the one hand, these events directly affected the existing situation, which basically conflicted with the new set of circumstances; and, on the other hand, they called into question the goals and guidelines that had until then shaped the development of the Spanish fishing fleet, at a time when it had entered a second stage of re-organization aimed chiefly at modernization and technological improvement in function of the different types of fisheries and the varying states of the resources on the different grounds.
Thus, as a consequence of the oil crisis, it has become potently clear that the model described for the reorganization of the fleet is no longer appropriate today, simply because the cost of fuel is a factor that cannot be ignored by ship-owners when deciding on the type of investment to make, primarily with regard to relationship between vessel power and the level of productivity projected. This is also true for the Administration when issuing fishing policy guidelines.
With regard to the second event, widespread extension of the EEZ to 200 miles, three points should be noted by way of introduction:
(a) This came about in open opposition to the historical view of the freedom of the seas sustained by traditional sea powers as a common inheritance, a concept which went hand in hand with the view of an inviolable ocean which, in the words of Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth-century jurist, theologist, and historian and staunch defender of the principle of freedom of the seas, "may neither be owned nor enclosed", as it is "the seas that possess the land" rather than the other way around.(b) The controversy sparked following the Santiago de Chile Declaration in 1952 and encompassed later on a number of interlocking issues: navigation in territorial waters and strategic straits, sea fisheries, oil and mineral resources under and on the sea bed, exploitation of the continental shelf, the establishment itself of exclusive economic zones, and problems involving the defense against pollution of the sea.
(c) The disparity of interests existing between States, is enormous, but this is also an internal problem, giving rise to extreme tension even within individual delegations at the III Law of the Sea Conference, where military interests clashed with economic interests, mining interests conflicted with fishing interest, strategic interests ran counter to scientific interests, and so on.
The fact is that, from a fisheries standpoint, the situation ensuing from the revolution in the Law of the Sea has less straightforward repercussions than the oil crisis, yet it undoubtedly looms much larger. The direct effect of limited access to traditional fishing grounds has forced a process of selection to determine which vessels will be granted the right to operate. And this process extends not only to the vessels themselves, but also to the grounds and even to different types of fisheries.
Thus, the matter is extremely complex, and even more so bearing in mind that the objectives to be accomplished through the selection process are not always compatible. For example, what should have priority? Streamlining the fleet so as to obtain maximum economic yield per unit, or maintaining the highest level of employment? In other words, the best possible fleet or the largest?
The situation is even more pressing in view of the fact that the answer to these questions will affect a large number of coastal regions whose economic and social existence depends heavily on fishing. This obviously introduces a new factor which forces a reconsideration of the whole problem.
It is clear that these circumstances are quite distinct from the situation considered at the outset, when restructuring the fleet basically meant improving its level of technology, achieving higher yields and raising fishermen's living standards.
In other words, it is not enough today simply to acknowledge the fact that the generalized declaration of exclusive economic zones has thrust into a full-fledge crisis the traditional right to fish in what were until then international waters, nor that this immediately triggered a wave of negotiations between countries in an attempt to lay as quickly as possible the foundations for bilateral fishing relations, especially with regard to quotas, licences, joint exploitation of grounds, foreign trade, and so on.
Instead, this new problem, superposed on already existing ones, contains not only circumstancial elements but also a deeper, structural aspect. The former elements will be countered with greater or lesser success by emergency measures. It is the structural aspect of the problem which is by far the more serious, in that it demands a profound transformation of the fishing sector in order to adapt it to the new conditions.
In the case of Spain, these transformations have even penetrated into the organizational and operative structure of the Fisheries Administration itself in an attempt to adjust it to the complexity of the problems confronting the sector. And we stress the term complexity, because we are not faced with separate, unconnected problems that can, once they have been arranged in order of priority, be taken on one by one. Quite the contrary, we are dealing with interdependent issues which if viewed out of the context in which they have developed, will undoubtedly lead to erroneous conclusions and incorrect solutions.
For instance, it is evident that a large part of the problems encountered at the production level as well as at the marketing level are a projection of defects in the structure of the fishing companies, above all, those engaged in certain types of fisheries. Today, it must also be added that, confronted with the challenge of the 200 mile zone, this issue constitutes in many countries a further and particularly significant obstacle in the path of an effective foreign fisheries policy.
Looked upon from this perspective, present fisheries policies are an attempt to contend with the grave difficulties facing the sector, not merely on a temporary or conjunctural basis, but also to seek coherent long-term solutions so that they might serve as a basis for future development along qualitative rather than quantitative lines.
The scope of this policy in Spain can be summarized by the following six points:
- management of fisheries in our own fishing grounds;- reorganization of the fleet according to different types of fisheries in foreign and international waters;
- improvement of the internal fish marketing system;
- foreign trade policy for fish products;
- foreign fisheries policy, both multilateral and bilateral;
- expansion of the Fisheries Administration in order to adapt it to the needs of the new circumstances,
Worthy of note within this framework is Royal Decree No. 681/1980, of 28 March, concerning national fisheries management, the starting point for gradually establishing the corresponding management programmes which will ultimately make possible a restructuring of our fleets by fusing together two basic goals: regulation of fishing capacity and adaptation of vessels to the grounds.
To achieve these goals the fundamental and clearly defined principle of prohibiting any increase in fishing pressure on fish resources has been adopted. The prime objective will be to optimize the technical level of the fleets directed at each fishery in order to enhance the economic results obtained. This means that technological improvements will have to be compensated for by the reduction of at least an equivalent amount of fishing capacity. At the same time, the interaction of different kinds of fishing activity carried out simultaneously on the grounds will also be given due consideration, in order to achieve the optimum estimated equilibrium state.
To sum up, recognizing that fish resources are not unlimited and that rigorous conservation measures are needed, the logical consequence is that strict management and control of our fisheries is a prerequisite for restructuring the fleet, which will be possible only after the limits to our fish resources both national and international have been established.
As far as the Spanish fleet in other countries' waters is concerned, the private fishing sector has been compelled to acknowledge in some instances the existence of excess capacity - though this of course varies according to the fishery. This means that, on the basis of totally new and different conditioning factors, and as a direct consequence of the 200 mile limit, fisheries policy has had to conceive a programme for restructuring the fleets that goes beyond the normal modernization process. Such a programme is not easy to devise, because, due to the broad geographical extension of the fisheries and the different operational and technical levels of the corresponding fleets, it must contemplate the possibility of alternate access to different fishing grounds. That is, it has to analyze the degree of "mobility" of vessels and consider fishing gears that could be used on an alternating basis.
Nevertheless, the most original and effective Spanish response, swiftly implemented following the establishment of 200 mile zones, has been the creation of joint fishing ventures, authorized by the Royal Decree of 8 October 1976, which provided for the maintenance of fishing vessels in operation in the EEZs of those countries which would no longer allow vessels under foreign flags to operate and which were not yet ready to replace them with vessels and crews of their own.
Article 1 of this decree defines joint fishing ventures as companies formed in a foreign country and subject to the laws of that country by Spanish fishing companies qualifying as such under the definition contained in Law No. 147/1961 (the Modernization and Protection of the Fishing Fleet Act) in association with citizens or juristic persons of the said country, or, where appropriate, of other countries, for the purpose of jointly exploiting marine fish resources.
In order to achieve this end, combined with the need to ensure an adequate supply of fish for the domestic market, which was threatened by the new international situation, the above mentioned Royal Decree established norms for:
(a) regulating the effects of Spanish capital investment in fishing countries through joint ventures;(b) regulating the transfer and sale of Spanish vessels to joint venture companies;
(c) regulating the importation into Spain of fish caught by such companies.
Spanish companies participating in joint ventures were granted the usual incentives provided in the case of exports: tax, credits, special credits to purchasers, underwriting of non-business risks, and the like.
In view of the special nature of this type of activity and the particular circumstances involved, other incentives granted included the possibility of importing, free of taxes, countervailing duties, or other charges, part of the catch made by Spanish vessels transferred or sold by Spanish fishing companies to joint ventures companies.
Therefore, after estimating the expected production of each joint venture, the Fisheries Administration establishes for every six-month period a total global quota of authorized duty free imports in function of domestic demand and estimated catches by the Spanish fleet.
The private fishing sector responded very favourably to this initiative. We have previously referred to the Spanish fleet's high degree of dependence on a number of fishing grounds suddenly placed under the jurisdiction of other countries. Just two years after the issuance of the decree, 80 fishing units from this fleet were already operating in waters of Morocco, South Africa, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Haiti and Mexico, under the respective flags of these countries. It should also be noted that the vessels involved were generally large, on average some 900 CRT, 1 700 BHT, with a crew of 30. Today there are in all 182 vessels involved in joint ventures in 14 countries totalling a CRT of 95 748 tons.
An additional benefit of these joint ventures has been the removal of a growing number of large-capacity vessels from traditional fishing grounds presently subject to severe restrictions, thus helping the fleet to adjust to the new situation.
Subsequently, Royal Decree No. 2.209/1981, of 20 August, issued complementary regulations eliminating construction date restrictions on vessel that could be transferred, which, in conjunction with a scrapping requirement, further facilitated the removal of obsolete units while at the same time promoting shipbuilding.
In the final analysis, joint ventures represent a special modality of overseas investment which brings immediate results by ensuring a substitute supply of fish previously filled by "domestic" sources which are not longer available to the same extent.
In the short and medium term, Spanish legislation dealing with joint ventures actually translates out into indirect assistance for exports of fishing technology. This contributes to the fisheries development of countries lacking in experience, technical infrastructure, and distribution systems and thus forms an important part of Spain's policy of cooperation with those countries.
Lastly, the economic effects of Spanish legal regulations concerning joint ventures have also been important with respect to employment policy, by preserving crew member's jobs.
In accordance with the world economic and political situation of the sixties, Spanish legislation was expansionist, whereas, that on the second half of the seventies has become more cautious, leading up to the last few years, during which, following a general trend, Spain has started a policy of structural adaptation to the new circumstances.
This adaptation is focussed on a reduction of the medium range fresh fish trawler fleet in benefit of the remolding of the long distance freezer trawler and purse seiner fleets that still have a future for a certain limited expansion and that will need some transformation in order to adapt themselves to the higher cost involved in their exploitation.
