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WIN-Cambodia Case Study
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| Background document providing
these lessons learned:
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Lessons learned by the WIN project on livelihoods diversification and enterprise development: An overview of WIN LDED-related activities in Cambodia , Nepal and Zambia , Livelihoods Support Programme (LSP), Working Paper 19
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| Author: |
Eckman, Karlyn
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| FAO Resource Persons:
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Daniel Renault (AGLW)
Dervla Cleary (AGSF)
Doyle Baker, Chief (AGSF)
Florence Egal (ESNP)
Omolade Dada (AGSF)
Siobhan Kelly (AGSF)
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| Applied Participatory Approaches:
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- Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA)
- Training of Trainers (TOT) workshops
- Participatory extension
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Summary of the above mentioned document
The pilot WIN project (Empowerment of Women in Irrigation and Water Resources Management for Household Food Security) was an operational research project implemented by FAO from 2000-2003. The project was designed specifically to test a multi-sectoral approach to empowering women in irrigation management, and to address nutrition and health concerns associated with irrigation schemes. Although WIN was not originally foreseen as a livelihoods diversification project, a variety of income-generating activities (IGAs) emerged in Cambodia, Nepal and Zambia. A number of groups were successful in diversifying their livelihoods as a result of WIN’s intervention. However, it is still too early to fully assess the long-term viability and sustainability of these activities.
This document aims to identify some operational lessons learned as well as good practices from the WIN project. The paper reviews the processes which facilitated the emergence of livelihood diversification and enterprise development (LDED) activities, outlining lessons on what did and did not work, with recommendations for the future.
WIN-Cambodia case study
In Cambodia, the introduction of diversification activities tended to be undertaken in a top-down manner, which led to weaker LDED outcomes. Although PRAs were undertaken at the beginning of the project, they were oriented to the Structured In-Service Training and Participatory Extension (SISTAPE) methodology and any diversification activities identified tended to have been initiated under the FAO Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS). This effectively represented an extension of the SPFS workplan using the WIN budget.
Between 2000 and 2001, the WIN and SPFS national coordinators identified better-off farmers and offered them one of the LDED activities on the PRA list. They were expected to demonstrate these activities on their land, and were periodically given free inkind inputs, such as seeds, latrines and fertilizers, by WIN and SPFS. This was the result of the national coordinator’s belief that financially stable farmers perform at a higher level. It was expected that the farmers could then be seen as models by visiting missions as well as other farmers, and that they would produce significant results for the progress reports. Poorer farmers were not identified or targeted unless the issue was raised by the chief technical officer (CTA) or other backstopping officers.
Further WIN sites were identified by the national coordinator, between 2002 and 2003, with farmer seasonal planning and PRA activities undertaken. During this time, missions fielded by FAO HQ (microfinance and food processing/ storage) identified two additional diversification activities. These followed the same process as the previous activities.
There is currently no data available to confirm whether any of the LDED activities undertaken through WIN-Cambodia led to increased incomes, value-added production, or sustained growth of micro-enterprises although there are some anecdotal reports which suggest diversification has occurred, primarily through the introduction of vegetables and livestock to the farming system. It would be premature to conclude that these activities have led to a sustained increase in income for a majority of the WIN participants.
Key successes
In spite of the less people-centered nature of the activities undertaken in Cambodia to identify key diversification activities, the WIN project was successful in adding value to the livelihoods of some of its participants.
- The diversification of vegetable production took place in many households, with nutritional benefits and surpluses created for markets.
- Livestock production increased among households, resulting in income from livestock sales
- Some individuals gained technical knowledge in food processing techniques
This success was due to a number of reasons, which have been outlined below:
- General economic recovery and the absence of conflict enabled farmers to resume production.
- A very intensive training programme oriented toward technical production and irrigation, which increased the farmers’ know-how.
- The technical orientation of the national team meant that most project resources were invested in an ambitious SISTAPE programme.
- Technical training provided by WIN-SPFS improved farmers’ knowledge of rearing livestock.
- Animals provided by the project as an incentive were sold.
- New training facilities and curricula were made available to district governments and selected farmers.
Another positive factor noted was the gender sensitization for staff and villagers provided by WIN. While gender sensitization did not directly lead to LDED activities being taken up by women, it did serve to raise the awareness of project and government staff regarding the economic and productive roles of women. It was also reported that male villagers came to regard women as important productive actors as a result of the training.
The role of multidisciplinary district teams was key for all activities (including IGAs) introduced through WIN. District-based extensionists were provided with considerable training in agricultural production through the SISTAPE methodology, and their capacities built in providing technical extension support to farmers.
What didn’t work?
Although some LDED activities were taken-up through WIN, they were not all successful in achieving improved livelihoods outcomes for the participants.
- Farmers’ knowledge of markets, business skills, record keeping and IGA planning were not significantly improved.
- Successful IGAs failed to emerge on a group or individual basis.
- Unclear intra-household allocation of labor and incomes derived from sales.
- Limited level of off-farm sales due to weak market links
- Involvement of women in irrigation management at scheme level was very limited
- Food processing IGAs failed to take off.
- Uncertain outcome and sustainability of all IGAs
- Microfinance provided by SPFS and WIN Cambodia did not appear to build local resources or to create an effective local resource pool.
Some of the key reasons for this lack of success are outlined:
- Training needs assessments were not carried out.
- Major investment in training was based on a standardized production-oriented SISTAPE curriculum.
- SISTAPE training did not address skills needed to foster the emergence of small enterprises.
- Lack of IGA/ LDED expertise at district, provincial and national levels to support farmers.
- The national team was unaware of the normative work in LDED at FAO HQ and other organizations.
- Project staff did not have access to ‘how-to’ training materials and curricula on LDED.
- Weak entry-point (standardized PRAs and top-down selection of IGAs).
- Top-down targeting.
- Weak analysis of PRA data.
- No business planning was done by stakeholders.
- Insufficient PRA data analysis so that there was a limited understanding of the productive roles and responsibilities (according to age and gender)
- Gender impact assessment was not done.
- No market analysis was done prior to the introduction of LDED activities.
- A lack of support and leadership on the part of the project management
- IGA was imposed in a top-down manner with unclear targeting and lack of follow up support.
- The incipient nature of the activities and project termination meant that follow-up support and backstopping were not forthcoming.
- Poor record keeping and accounting practices.
- Weak, centralized management of funds and insufficient government infrastructure.
- Lack of national and district level experience.
- Confusion among participants about repayment of inputs distributed by the project.
Lessons learned in the use of participatory approaches
Decentralized targeting practices enabled marginalized groups to enter the marketplace as economic actors in their own right.
In Nepal and Zambia, the national teams additionally targeted other groups who had not been specified in the project document, including ethnic minorities and poorer households without access to water resources. As such, the national and district staff actively sought to reach the most vulnerable groups, consulting local governments, communities and NGOs in the process. This ensured the participation of the poorest groups in LDED activities.
The iterative PRA process used in Nepal and Zambia was facilitated by experienced staff, provided a broad database, and resulted in a better understanding of gender, labor and property relations in local production systems.
Community action planning enabled the project and groups to identify IGAs which the women had time to invest in, to form interest groups, and to identify products with market potential. This also led to the building of consensus and development of a sense of local ownership of the process.
Training of social mobilizers to empower local groups led to increased solidarity and confidence, collective decision making and sharing of tasks in the group enterprise. The social mobilizers remain active in their communities even after project termination.
Community seedling nurseries, community gardens and crop diversification schemes ensured that all households in the community had access to good quality planting materials year-round, reducing risk and building a sense of community independence.
Such community resources ensured that all households in a community have access to these resources.
Concluding remarks
A tentative conclusion is that a combination of practices and processes led to the more promising outcomes. Each in itself would not likely result in a successful outcome. For example, PRA and community action planning might not lead to a successful IGA. The presence of a well-trained multi-disciplinary team alone would not necessarily result in a cohesive local group managing their own enterprise. Capacity-building or business training in a specific IGA does not mean that a successful enterprise will materialize (as we saw in the Cambodia food processing example). It was the combination and integrated linking of these and other people-centered practices in a holistic process-oriented manner that led to the identification, start-up and operation of new economic enterprises by local people.
Most of the organizational practices used by WIN (PRA, community action planning, PM & E, etc.) are common to many Sustainable Livelihoods projects. Other practices are more specific to LDED initiatives (management training, leadership skills development, accounting, business and marketing training, feasibility assessments, etc,). The effective combining of these created the conditions for the pursuit of LDED activities.
