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WIN-Nepal Case Study
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| Background document providing
these lessons learned:
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Lessons learned by the WIN project on livelihoods diversification and enterprise development: An overview of WIN LDED-related activities in Cambodia , Nepal and Zambia , Livelihoods Support Programme (LSP), Working Paper 19
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| Author: |
Eckman, Karlyn
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| FAO Resource Persons:
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Daniel Renault (AGLW)
Dervla Cleary (AGSF)
Doyle Baker, Chief (AGSF)
Florence Egal (ESNP)
Omolade Dada (AGSF)
Siobhan Kelly (AGSF)
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| Applied Participatory Approaches:
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- Participatory Rural Assessments (PRAs)
- Grassroots mobilization
- Group development
- Group discussions
- Community action planning
- Participatory M&E
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Summary of the above mentioned document
The pilot WIN project (Empowerment of Women in Irrigation and Water Resources Management for Household Food Security) was an operational research project implemented by FAO from 2000-2003. The project was designed specifically to test a multi-sectoral approach to empowering women in irrigation management, and to address nutrition and health concerns associated with irrigation schemes. Although WIN was not originally foreseen as a livelihoods diversification project, a variety of income-generating activities (IGAs) emerged in Cambodia, Nepal and Zambia. A number of groups were successful in diversifying their livelihoods as a result of WIN’s intervention. However, it is still too early to fully assess the long-term viability and sustainability of these activities.
This document aims to identify some operational lessons learned as well as good practices from the WIN project. The paper reviews the processes which facilitated the emergence of livelihood diversification and enterprise development (LDED) activities, outlining lessons on what did and did not work, with recommendations for the future.
WIN-Nepal case study
A key focus of WIN Nepal was to build the capacity of local groups to manage their own economic diversification activities. To this end, the project began its LDED activities in 2001, with district planning workshops and Participatory Rural Assessments (PRAs). The national and district teams assisted the groups in the planning of their group and/ or community action plans, such that, by the end of 2001, the groups had produced 45 group plans for the following year. Altogether, 75 groups, from different ethnic and marginalized groups, were engaged in a variety of activities. It is anticipated that, in the future, these group plans will be integrated into the Village Development Committee (VDC) planning processes.
WIN has succeeded in reaching the most vulnerable communities in rural Nepal (WIN-Nepal, April 2002 Report on the Informal Mid-Term Review , Katmandu, FAO).
Membership of the groups has increased local women’s confidence, leading to a greater economic awareness and the emergence of a common vision. Their capacity for decision-making and planning has improved, as has their sense of civic duty and the project has helped them to increase their bargaining power in negotiating access to government services.
A national level steering committee was formed which encouraged the decentralization of decision-making processes. The national and district WIN teams (whose members were mainly drawn from line ministries) were trained in project management and gender-sensitive participatory planning. The relationships between staff of different ministries improved, leading to more effective cooperation. Multi-disciplinary WIN teams were established and trained in a wide range of socioeconomic and technical topics, in order to support the developmental initiatives of local groups. Partnerships were identified and developed with various international and local non-government organizations (NGOs), the national line ministries and donors (WIN-Nepal, April 2002 Report on the Informal Mid-Term Review , Katmandu, FAO).
What worked
- Diversified vegetable production increased incomes, improved nutrition and the surplus connected communities to local markets.
- Livestock production increased women’s incomes and improved household nutrition.
- Diversification into commercial fodder and seedling nurseries increased the availability of good quality planting materials to producers, brought an additional revenue stream, and reduced the risk to households in vulnerable rural areas.
The WIN project used a number of practices, such as PRAs, grassroots mobilization, group development, and others, which are not unique, either to WIN or to livelihoods and enterprise development activities. However, it is clear that had these methods not been used by WIN many of the income generating activities would never have emerged. Below are outlined some of the key factors which led to the emergence of IGAs:
- Targeting marginalized groups allowed them to begin realizing their economic potential and to enter the marketplace. WIN-Nepal deviated from the project document to reach out to those living in irrigation command areas without access to water or other productive resources.
- Iterative participatory rural appraisals (PRAs), facilitated by experienced national consultants, resulted in a comprehensive database and understanding of gender, labor and property relations at the production and marketing levels.
- Community action planning enabled the groups to identify an IGA, which the women had the resources to invest in, and to identify products/outputs with local market potential.
- Empowerment of groups by social mobilizers led to their increased solidarity and confidence, collective decision-making and sharing of tasks in the group enterprise.
- Capacity building of the groups in literacy and numeracy, business skills, management, record keeping, participatory monitoring and other skills enabled the groups to plan financially and to keep their own records.
- Multi-disciplinary district-level teams of extensionists from several line-agencies provided technical training and backstopping in a variety of areas.
- Asset creation (group savings and expansion of land under cultivation) enabled women to diversify their production strategies and invest in small-scale technologies.
- As a result of their technical training, groups were able to harvest good quality vegetables for sale in local markets.
- Feasibility studies and the experience of WIN’s partners helped in assessing the relative cost-effectiveness and financial viability of IGAs, as well as in testing the technologies before they were promoted to the groups.
- Periodic district workshops, focused on building consensus and the capacities of local stakeholders, resulted in transparency, a local sense of ownership of the process, and clarity of roles and responsibilities of the various partners.
- Collaboration with partner agencies enabled strong synergies, built on previous experiences and avoided duplication.
- Building effective support and linkages at the policy level has helped to sustain the LDED efforts and to raise awareness of the impact of policy decisions at the upper levels of government.
What did not work?
- Off-farm sales remained limited due to low production during the first year the IGAs were operational.
- The increased involvement of women in the management of OFWM irrigation schemes did not take place, and IGAs did not emerge at some of the OFWM sites.
- There is a degree of uncertainty around the long-term future and sustainability of the new IGAs.
- Weak links between the groups and the local government structures
Some of the key factors behind these are outlined below:
- During the project phase, a restructuring of the local government system was being undertaken.
- The Ministry of Local Development was not included on the project steering committee.
- At the beginning, OFWM was unsure about the added-value that could be added by the WIN project.
- Too much attention was paid to technical production aspects during training and too little to post-production, socio-economic and marketing aspects.
- Prevailing socio-economic and gender patterns at the OFWM sites were not effectively transformed.
- There was a lack of technical expertise in LDED/ IGAs at the scheme level.
- WIN’s short project timeline threatened on-going support to group capacity building efforts.
- A lack of a bridging phase and the failure to undertake a second phase.
- Strongly participatory initiatives need time to take off as the groups build their capacity, learn new production techniques, and identify markets.
- Weak links and knowledge about markets, coupled with the weak marketing infrastructure in rural areas (public and private)
- Limited technical backstopping capacity in LDED/ IGAs at district and national levels.
- The national teams were unaware of the normative work in LDED at FAO and other organizations.
Lessons learned in the use of participatory approaches
Decentralized targeting practices enabled marginalized groups to enter the marketplace as economic actors in their own right.
In Nepal and Zambia, the national teams additionally targeted other groups who had not been specified in the project document, including ethnic minorities and poorer households without access to water resources. As such, the national and district staff actively sought to reach the most vulnerable groups, consulting local governments, communities and NGOs in the process. This ensured the participation of the poorest groups in LDED activities.
The iterative PRA process used in Nepal and Zambia was facilitated by experienced staff, provided a broad database, and resulted in a better understanding of gender, labor and property relations in local production systems.
Community action planning enabled the project and groups to identify IGAs which the women had time to invest in, to form interest groups, and to identify products with market potential. This also led to the building of consensus and development of a sense of local ownership of the process.
Training of social mobilizers to empower local groups led to increased solidarity and confidence, collective decision making and sharing of tasks in the group enterprise. The social mobilizers remain active in their communities even after project termination.
Community seedling nurseries, community gardens and crop diversification schemes ensured that all households in the community had access to good quality planting materials year-round, reducing risk and building a sense of community independence.
Such community resources ensured that all households in a community have access to these resources.
Concluding remarks
A tentative conclusion is that a combination of practices and processes led to the more promising outcomes. Each in itself would not likely result in a successful outcome. For example, PRA and community action planning might not lead to a successful IGA. The presence of a well-trained multi-disciplinary team alone would not necessarily result in a cohesive local group managing their own enterprise. Capacity-building or business training in a specific IGA does not mean that a successful enterprise will materialize (as we saw in the Cambodia food processing example). It was the combination and integrated linking of these and other people-centered practices in a holistic process-oriented manner that led to the identification, start-up and operation of new economic enterprises by local people.
Most of the organizational practices used by WIN (PRA, community action planning, PM & E, etc.) are common to many Sustainable Livelihoods projects. Other practices are more specific to LDED initiatives (management training, leadership skills development, accounting, business and marketing training, feasibility assessments, etc,). The effective combining of these created the conditions for the pursuit of LDED activities.
