Posted December 1997
|
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
United Nations Capital Development Fund | International
Fund for Agricultural Development | German Agency
for Technical Cooperation | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation | World Bank |
Rome
16-18 December 1997
Technical Consultation on Decentralization
The Promise and Limitations of Decentralization, Part 3
by James Manor
Institute of Development Studies
University of Sussex, UK
Assessing decentralization to the regional as well as the
local level
Questions from some policy specialists suggest that it is worth devoting
one part of this study to the advantages and disadvantages that attend decentralization
to a level between the national and the local levels - the regional or intermediate
level - as well as the local level. This is worth examining partly because
decentralization to both levels is extremely common, and partly because
it tends to offer greater promise than decentralization to only one of those
levels.
This analysis is inevitably somewhat crude and abstract. The degree and
character of regional variations differ greatly from country to country.
Power and resources have been decentralized to different regional levels
(some high and some low) in different countries. But most of the comments
below are true in most circumstances.
Bridging the distance between central and local levels
A huge conceptual and actual distance separates central governments and
the grass roots in all but the smallest countries. If only local-level authorities
are created, it is often well nigh impossible for elected members to comprehend,
communicate with or influence central governments and the upper reaches
of their administrative agencies. The simultaneous creation of regional-level
authorities provides a crucially important mechanism to integrate local
and central levels, as several of the points which follow illustrate.
Which responsibilities should be decentralized to which levels?
It is widely understood that it makes sense to decentralize those responsibilities
in which economies of scale cannot be achieved. We also note below that
it is unwise to devolve responsibility for complex development projects
onto local-level authorities because they tend to lack the inclination,
the sophistication and the administrative capacity to implement them. It
also makes sense to avoid devolving the control of projects which extend
spatially beyond a single local arena onto authorities in such arenas.
But responsibility for many complex programs and for projects extending
over more than one locality can usefully be devolved onto regional-level
authorities. This will enhance the chances of integrating local preferences,
local knowledge of particularistic needs, and the often quite creative local
methods and mechanisms for managing resources, resolving conflicts, and
the like, into the official decisionmaking process.
Local representatives can often play extremely creative roles in facilitating
the implementation even of technically complicated national programs. For
example, elected members of local and sometimes regional authorities can
explain to villagers the utility of national innoculation programs - and
because villagers trust them, this can increase the uptake on such services.
The existence of regional-level authorities can facilitate such things.
Protecting decentralization from the jealousy of higher-level leaders
When decentralization occurs not just to the local level, but to the regional
level too, it gives decentralized institutions a better chance to resist
attempts by national-level politicians and bureaucrats to take back powers
and resources devolved onto them. High-level leaders often do this because
they feel weakened by decentralization (even though it strengthens them
in many ways). Regional-level institutions have much more leverage in national
politics than do local-level institutions.
Decentralizers should be aware that politicians at the regional level often
experience the same pangs of jealousy towards local-level authorities as
central leaders do towards all authorities at lower levels (World Bank,
1997; Crook and Manor, 1994). They therefore need to ensure that local authorities
are adequately empowered, lest centralizers at the regional level undermine
them. But in most systems, this problem appears to have been minimized.
Enhancing the influence of decentralized bodies in national politics
For the same reason, regional-level institutions are better able to represent
the interests of the decentralized system in national politics than local
institutions alone - even where national politicians do not try to claw
back power.
Ensuring poor, remote regions of fairer representation in national politics
Decentralization to the regional level usually gives (often poor, remote)
regions which have lacked adequate representation in national politics a
chance to exert greater influence than before. It also gives under-resourced
regions a better chance to gain a fairer share of resources. These things
are much more difficult if only local-level institutions are created.
The greater complexity and cost of decentralization to both regional
and local levels
Decentralization to both regional and local levels is more complicated than
to the local level alone. More things can go wrong as a result. It is also
more expensive. There are, however, countervailing advantages (as all of
the other sections in Part 3 indicate.)
Facilitating local authorities' access to administrative resources at
the regional level
Regional institutions can assist local institutions with a chronic problem
- administrative incapacity. Local institutions may only have one or two
poorly trained bureaucrats, but regional-level bodies usually have sizable
administrative staffs. It is easier for locals to draw on regional staffs
if elected politicians enjoy some influence at the regional level.
The best way to ensure that they have such influence is to have members
of regional-level authorities elected by local-level councils. However,
this form of indirect election has two disadvantages. It deprives such politicians
of a strong electoral mandate directly from voters. And it makes regional
authorities only indirectly accountable to voters. As a result, direct election
of members of regional authorities is probably preferable, but both systems
can work reasonably well.
Enhancing coordination of development administrators from different
line ministries
Regional institutions can and often do achieve impressive results at coordinating
administrative staff from different line ministries. This is almost impossible
if only local-level institutions exist.
Facilitating complex development projects
Regional institutions are much more able and willing to manage somewhat
complex development projects. Local institutions tend to undertake only
very simple projects. Many of these are valuable, but more complex projects
are also necessary.
Facilitating scaling up from the local level
Regional institutions make it much easier to scale up from the local level.
If only local institutions exist, it is much harder to ensure that successful
experiments in isolated localities are replicated elsewhere.
Facilitating the upward flow if information from the local level and
the responsiveness of central government
Regional institutions make it much easier to ensure that information from
below is fed effectively into the national administrative system, and that
responses are made to local-level needs. If only local institutions exist,
this is very difficult.
Combating absenteeism and irresponsible behaviour by government employees
In some decentralized systems, pressure has been brought to bear by decentralized
institutions on government employees (in, for example, schools and health
clinics) who do not turn up for work or who behave irresponsibly in other
ways. This is much more difficult if only local institutions exist, because
they often lack the leverage which regional institutions possess over such
employees.
Enhancing the accountability and responsiveness of regional-level bureaucrats
Regional institutions are also much more able than local bodies to apply
pressure to intermediate-level bureaucrats, to make them accountable, and
to prevent them from responding only to their national-level superiors in
line ministries.
Facilitating poverty alleviation and fairness for minorities
In many countries, elite prejudices against poor groups and minorities are
stronger at the local level than at the national level. When this is true,
such prejudices at the regional level tend to be less strong than at the
grass roots. In such circumstances, decentralization to the regional as
well as the local level can help prevent decentralization from damaging
the interests of the poor or minorities.
Facilitating fairness to women
Prejudices against women are also stronger in many countries at the local
level than at higher levels. Regional institutions therefore often give
women representatives a greater chance to achieve things.
Easing the problem of the foreshortened time perspective of local-level
politicians
People who gain power in local-level institutions often have a more foreshortened
time perspective than those at higher levels - and this affects their development
plans. If regional institutions are created, they can often ease this problem.
Facilitating collaboration between nongovernmental organizations and
decentralized authorities
Indigenous nongovernmental organizations often find it easier to collaborate
with decentralized institutions when they exist at both regional and local
levels rather than just the local level. This tends to be true both because
attitudes in regional institutions are sometimes more enlightened than at
the grass roots, and because regional institutions have much more administrative
capacity.
Integrating the efforts of local-level voluntary associations
Decentralization often causes political participation and the activity and
the number of voluntary associations to increase. It is much easier to integrate
such activities in different localities - and to strengthen democracy -
if decentralized institutions exist not just at the local level but at the
regional level too.
Overcoming authoritarian enclaves
Democratic decentralization can help to overcome authoritarian enclaves
in political systems making the transition to democracy. This is one reason
that the South African government has introduced it into the former "bantustans"
where hereditary chiefs dominated politics. But it is also a concern in
places such as the Philippines, Thailand and parts of Latin America where
"local (or regional) bossism" is a problem (Sidel,1997; and Fox,
1994). It is far easier to achieve this (and to consolidate democracy) if
democratic decentralization occurs not just to the local level, but to the
regional level too.
Facilitating the integration of local-level politicians into national
politics
One advantage of decentralization is that it gives aspiring politicians
many more openings into the political system. It therefore becomes a training
ground for democracy, and it eases the sometimes dangerous frustration of
people excluded from political careers. If regional institutions exist,
then successful politicians at the local level find it easier to gain promotion
to higher levels. Their entry into national politics therefore becomes easier,
and the promise that democracy offers will seem to them (and, indeed, will
be) greater.
Facilitating the integration of competing political parties into decentralized
institutions
If regional as well as local institutions exist, they facilitate the integration
of political parties into decentralized systems. Some people believe that
political parties should not play a role in these systems. But it is almost
impossible to keep them out, and the evidence suggests that party competition
in decentralized systems can make them healthier and more transparent.
Combating urban bias
Regional institutions can also help to combat urban bias in government development
policies, providing that representatives from an urban center do not dominate
the regional institution. (For more detail on this, see section IV.)
To: The promise and limitations of decentralization, Part 4
