INITIATIVES FOR SUSTAINABLE SEED SYSTEMS IN AFRICA
 World Bank (1)
Washington, D.C., USA

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1. INTRODUCTION

Seed (2), especially that of improved varieties, is an essential input for increasing crop productivity. Seed embodies the genetic potential of plants, determining the upper limits of plant yields. Thus, a reliable source of competitively-priced, locally-adapted, improved varieties, coupled with appropriate inputs and management practices, can greatly increase and sustain agricultural efficiency, productivity, and profitability.

Currently, less than 10 percent of land managed by smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is planted with improved varieties and several factors limit farmers' access to quality seed. In 60 percent of Africa's countries, governments completely control the seed industry, even though parastatal seed production and distribution has usually proven to be an ineffective system of seed supply. State involvement in seed trade has declined in many countries, but a viable commercial market is not yet filling the gap. In some cases, commercial monopolies have replaced the parastatals.

Farmer-to-farmer seed exchange and local seed markets function throughout Africa but are not adequately linked into systems for improved seed. This isolation has aggravated seed supply crises, in turn often requiring disaster relief efforts. And these efforts have not led to the development of sustainable seed systems. Locally-operating institutions, such as NG0s, extension services, and farmers associations, could play a role in improving farmers' access to quality seed, minimizing the risk of seed supply crises. If given an appropriate enabling legal framework, such organizations could help to link farmers to other farmer seed producers, research institutions, and, importantly, small commercial seed companies working in similar agro-ecosystems locally, regionally, nationally, and/or internationally.

Often a major constraint is national legislation that limits entry of improved varieties, constrains competition, restricts multinational involvement in African seed systems, and inhibits development of domestic seed companies. Restricting commercial development has also inhibited the formation of seed trade associations, which could provide substantial benefits to the African seed sector. Seed associations -- open to public and private seed company membership -- serve to lobby and influence governments, exchange information, and generally to ease barriers to efficient seed production and marketing and to the effective transfer of improved varieties.

2. WORLD BANK INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN SEED SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

The World Bank has financed substantial investment in African seed systems. Through the 1980's, these were frequently investments in parastatal seed companies, most of which proved unsustainable following completion of the projects. Other donors shared this experience, as have NGO programs that have provided seed in relief or development programs, but have not had a wide impact on establishing sustainable seed systems.

Many African countries have now substantially improved the policy environment for agriculture - liberalizing markets, rationalizing government commercial operations, and undertaking economic reforms reducing discrimination against agriculture. This, coupled with the critical need to increase agricultural productivity as a means of reducing poverty and feeding growing populations, provides a strong rationale for improving input markets to support a new wave of agricultural growth. The World Bank recognizes the potential growth from increased use of inputs and is ready to assist countries to improve input markets.

The World Bank continues a significant amount of support to seed system development in Africa. An annotated list of World Bank projects financing seed system development is attached as Annex 1. There is potential to increase lending in this sector, if viable project proposals can be identified within a facilitating policy environment. Annex 2 presents draft guidelines for analyzing the policy environment for sustainable seed sector development.

Investments in the seed sector are important as a vehicle for achieving the benefits of other Bank-financed programs - especially projects for development of national research and extension systems and investments in programs of the international agricultural research centers. Without efficient seed systems, improved germplasm and other agricultural production innovations will not have the intended impacts on small farmer production.

3. CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABLE SEED SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

The three major challenges in establishing sustainable and efficient seed systems in Africa are to: improve local seed production systems, develop regionally competitive seed industries, and reform governmental seed sector support programs.

Challenge #1: To Improve Local Seed production and Distribution Systems

Most planted seed in Africa comes from farmer self-saved seed or farmer-to-farmer seed exchange. These are cost-effective systems and are fully adequate in many cases. For open-pollinated cereal crops only a small proportion of seed need come from formal seed markets. This local production and distribution facilitates maintenance of crop bio-diversity by preserving in situ locally adapted varieties and by broadening the genetic base of production with multiple varieties adapted to specific micro-climates and production systems.

Despite their strengths, traditional seed systems are not fully adequate to current farmer needs. Even traditional crops and varieties benefit from maintenance of sources of quality seed (with varietal purity and seed health). For "improved" or national varieties, links between farmer seed producers and sources of foundation seed are important. Even more critical are the linkages that allow farmer seed producers access to new varieties, hybrids, and high-value fruit and vegetable crops that are not available from traditional seed producers. And, finally, established linkages between the formal and informal seed sectors can help re-build seed stocks following disasters or crop failures and thus reduce dependence on external relief programs.

Farmer seed producers can be quite efficient and some will have potential to expand as specialized, small or medium-sized seed companies. Seed trade associations, government agribusiness promotion programs, and, especially, NG0s have a potential role in promoting improvements in production, marketing, and distribution systems for traditional farmer seed producers. This may involve an array of activities, including training in seed production and handling, establishing linkages to sources of foundation seed, developing marketing skills and approaches, and promoting the transformation into commercial seed companies. For these interventions to be sustainable, they must be based on training and market development and not on direct subsidies.

Challenge #2: To Develop Regionally Competitive Seed Enterprises Linked to the International Seed Industry

Reliable supply of a full range of modem seed technology to African farmers at reasonable (near

world-market) prices will require development of regional competitive seed industries linked to the world seed industry  (3). Key characteristics are:

Country markets, taken alone, are simply too small for a competitive and modem seed industry to develop. For any one crop - such as hybrid maize - farmers need access to seeds from a minimum of 5-6 companies to ensure that companies supply the best seed technology in the world and that markets are competitive. However, seed companies tend to specialize in selected crops, so that to cover all crops a competitive seed industry may require a minimum of 20-30 companies of a range of sizes-many small to medium in scale. Taken alone, national seed markets in many African countries are too small to support that many companies. Population is a good indicator of the potential size of seed markets. Only three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa - Nigeria, South Africa, and Zaire -have more than 40 million people, while the average country in Sub-Saharan Africa has only 15 million people. In contrast, the largest and most competitive seed markets - each with hundreds of seed companies - are in the US, with 250 million people, the European Union, with 3 5 0 million people, and India, with nearly a billion people. Taken together, Sub-Saharan Africa, with more than 600 million, offers a large potential market, but individual national markets are too small to support efficient, competitive seed enterprises.

Regionalization of seed industries and markets means that companies operate in two or more regional countries, selling seeds in markets defined by agro-climatic zones and cropping practices, not political boundaries. For this to take place, two policies are crucial: (a) governments allow companies to move varieties across borders and to introduce new varieties without timely and costly official tests and approvals; and (b) governments allow companies to import and export seeds (subject to reasonable phytosanitary controls).

To cover all crops, a regional competitive seed industry would have a variety of companies, including subsidiaries and joint ventures of research-intensive multinationals - for maize hybrids, vegetables, etc. - as well as small and medium local companies with low overheads for non-hybrid seeds of wheat, cassava, etc. Similarly, to develop and introduce new technology for all crops, public research - in international centers as well as national institutes - remains important and complements private technology transfer and research.

As regional seed industries develop, seed-growers and seed traders in the informal sector may join the formal sector by starting new companies or contracting with other formal seed companies. At the same time, the informal seed sector continues, enriched by a steady and expanded supply of new cultivars for local and informal multiplication.

Challenge # 3 Reform of Government Seed Sector Support Programs

Government seed programs have in the past been largely focused on seed production and distribution. These often involved subsidies-either direct or indirect-and in practice served to inhibit emergence of private seed enterprises. The focus on distribution, as opposed to marketing, did not force these programs to respond to producer demands. Operating under government regulations restricted program flexibility and efficiency and led to high costs and operating losses. Frequently, government finding of subsidized services (processing, distribution, certification, etc.) was inadequate and insufficiently flexible to enable the programs to meet farmer demand for seed.

Sustainable, competitive seed systems will require substantial re-orientation of government philosophies and programs involving seed. Rather than attempting to directly supply seed to farmers, government programs will need to provide support services that allow private seed enterprises to respond to market (farmer) demand for seed. This essentially seeks to offer farmers a greater range of choice in terms of varieties and sources of seed. Indirect subsidies may still be important, but should not minimize market distortions and ensure a "level-playing field" for competitive enterprises.

Government objectives will likely best be served by policies that limit government controls and intervention in seed trade. The government role remains critical in: developing and providing open access to foundation seed of improved varieties and to improved genetic resources; providing training and information on seed production, processing, and marketing; providing extension information on improved seed and varieties; providing for optional varietal registration and seed certification; and monitoring seed sector developments.

Government programs and NG0s may focus efforts on the development of the informal seed sector - linking farmer seed producers to sources of improved foundation seed and helping to expand (where appropriate) marketing systems for farmer-produced seed. Programs will need to be vigilant in eliminating subsidized seed production, distribution, or import programs that restrict local development of sustainable commercial seed trade. Key to success in strengthening informal seed systems will be improving farmer and seed producer access to information on product and seed prices and market options.

4. THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN SEED INITIATIVE

The World Bank began the Sub-Saharan Africa Seed Initiative in 1997 with a small commitment of staff time to develop a strategy, build linkages, and initiate activities to promote emergence of efficient regional seed systems in Africa. This initiative was started in response to a request from leaders of African NARS and Sub-regional Organizations (SR0s) in October, 1997. The Initiative is in line with discussions and recommendations of a March, 1997 international conference on seeds in Zimbabwe (sponsored by ICRISAT, ICARDA, IITA, and GTZ) and addresses concerns of African research scientists and the Special Program for African Agricultural Research (SPAAR) about poor seed supply limiting the benefits from agricultural research.

Strategy

The Sub-Saharan Africa Seed Initiative (SSASI) seeks to improve the efficiency, productivity, and profitability of smallholder fanning systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and to achieve this goal by promoting the development of effective, sustainable seed systems. Sustainable seed systems provide farmers a reliable supply of quality seeds, well-adapted to local agricultural conditions. SSASI will implement a regionally-coordinated and country-driven process of policy reform, institutional strengthening, and innovation. The initiative will foster:

In turn, the above changes will contribute to the development of an institutionally-pluralistic, private (formal and informal) seed sector, encouraging: (i) the development and growth of seed companies in the formal sector; (ii) local capacity (through NG0s, extension services, farmers associations, small local seed companies, etc.) to support seed system development and the supply of improved seed technology to farmers; (iii) a sub-regional approach to seed production and marketing, thereby expanding seed markets; and (iv) the formation of seed trade associations. To this end, the initiative will unfold in two phases: a Pilot Phase involving information gathering and planning in two to four countries each from Western Africa, Southern Africa, and Eastern and Central Africa. Lessons learned in the pilot phase will then guide the Phase II program implementation and expansion to other interested countries in the sub-regions.

It is expected that SSASI will lead to the incorporation of seed system issues into relevant on-going projects supported by the Bank and other donors, as well as the initiation of investment projects focused on building sustainable seed systems. Essentially, SSASI would serve as a clearinghouse for information on seed system activities, fostering collaboration between African organizations, donors, and others working in seed system development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The SSASI strategy has evolved and remains flexible. Emerging elements of the strategy include:

  1. Assisting African governments to review and revise seed regulations to reduce barriers to entry for new companies - local and foreign - and cultivars. As a first step in this effort, the World Bank has drafted guidelines for regulatory reforms (Annex 2).

  2. Encouraging projects in the informal sector of farmer seed producers to improve marketing activities and access to quality foundation seed for traditional and "improved" varieties.

  3. Encouraging freer access to seeds of new lines and germplasm from international agricultural research centers. A draft paper (available from jkampen@worldbank.org or dgisselquist@ worldbank.org) recommends policy reforms to support small and medium private seed companies in African countries.

  4. Designing projects to support emergence of multi-country seed markets and industries in different parts of Africa and seeking support for such projects from the World Bank and other donors.

  5. Encouraging the emergence of seed trade associations - including national associations as well as a proposed African Seed Trade Association - to strengthen dialogue between companies, governments, and donors about how best to extend the benefits of regional competitive seed markets to African farmers.

This strategy remains flexible, so that other elements that contribute to the goal of sustainable, competitive seed systems linked to the world seed industry may emerge over time.

In implementing this strategy, SSASI will seek to facilitate: establishment of databases on the seed sectors of individual countries; analysis of domestic seed policies and programs; harmon\ization of relevant seed policies across countries; formation of seed trade associations; development of country level seed strategies and investment plans; cooperation between various actors in the seed sector; and local capacity development (through NG0s, extension services, farmers' associations, small local seed companies, etc.) to support seed system development and supply improved seed technology to farmers.

Linkages

The Initiative will seek to achieve its objectives, not by working independently, but by networking with other partners involved with the seed sector. It will allow countries and programs to share experiences across African sub-regions and with other regions of the world while also avoiding duplication of effort and will foster a regionally-coordinated and country-driven process of policy reform, institutional strengthening, and innovation.

These linkages are crucial to encourage cooperative action among ongoing and new seed-related projects and programs in Africa. Looking across all African countries, there are hundreds of donor, government, and NGO initiatives dealing with aspects of the seed industry from breeding through seed distribution. Many of these initiatives already support company entry and development of pluralistic, competitive seed markets. Others may easily be adjusted to do so.

Opportunities for linkages can be found in many projects and organizations. For example, NGO projects that distribute free seed after droughts could be redesigned to distribute vouchers, which farmers could use to buy seeds of their choice from competing seed companies and, to ensure competitive markets and reasonable prices, governments could allow seed companies from regional countries to enter and compete. Whereas distribution of free seeds undermines commercial seed markets, distribution of vouchers can support seed market development. Other innovative approaches may appear over time, as more donors and governments begin to promote regional competitive seed industries.

Although the Sub-Saharan African Seed Initiative started less than one year ago, already several projects are in various stages of discussion and development:

While the geographic basis for regional seeds markets depends on agro-climatic zones, project design may also be determined by existing political linkages, including tradebased organizations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) and regional research organizations such as the Conference des Responsables de la Recherche Agricole en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre (CORAF) the Association for Strengthening Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA).

5. NEXT STEPS

World Bank staff associated with the Sub-Saharan African Seed Initiative encourage participation and exchange of information, debate, and dialogue with representatives from African governments, donors, seed companies, and other organizations toward the development of regional competitive seed markets in Africa.

To clarify thought and action, the following specific targets are proposed: Within five years (by 2003) to achieve regional seed markets across 15 or more African countries with a minimum of 50 companies, including local as well as regional and multinational companies, many operating in multiple African (4)countries.

This should be feasible. As an example, in Turkey, after the government changed regulations and policies in 1983 to encourage private seed industry, within 10 years, the number of seed companies increased from about five to more than 75, with all major multinationals represented (mostly through licensing and joint ventures and with a few subsidiaries). A unified seed market across 15 or more African countries would serve a population over 200 million, considerably larger than Turkey's 60 million population. Also, Africa already has strong seed companies in many countries, and a competitive market exists in South Africa.

Many of the institutions and conditions are already in place for competitive regional seed industries and markets across large parts of Africa. Once regional markets begin to develop and African farmers in participating countries get access to better seeds, pressures may build among farmers and for neighbouring countries to join (to allow entry for companies and varieties).

Annex 1

PARTIAL LIST OF WORLD BANK FINANCED PROJECTS IN AFRICA WITH SEED COMPONENTS

 

 

Annex 2

GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING SEED REGULATIONS IN AFRICAN
COUNTRIES AND FOR ADVISING ON REGULATORY REFORMS (5)

This note sets guidelines for Bank staff dealing with countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) on the following:

A: best-practice seed regulations for Africa;

B: when to review seed regulations in a particular African country;

C: how to review seed regulations;

D: how to promote seed regulatory reforms.

This note does not advise how to design seed projects or project components. It also does not advise whether and how to privatize seed parastatals or how to deal with subsidies and other policy matters.

The overall intent of these guidelines is to promote a regional and competitive seed market with many local and multinational companies operating across a significant number of sub-Saharan African countries within five years. Seed regulatory reforms are central to this effort.

These guidelines are part of a process. Bank staff and others are encouraged to contribute to a continuing debate on workable seed markets and policies for African farmers.

A. What Are Best Practice Seed Regulations for Africa

If farmers in Africa are to have reliable access to the best seed technology in the world at competitive prices, then they need access to seeds from a regional and competitive seed industry that is linked to the world seed industry. How many companies are necessary for a competitive market? For any one crop, such as hybrid maize, 4-6 companies assure competition and introduction of the best genetics from around the world. However, since companies specialize, a multiple of that number is required to assure competitive markets for all crops. Also, if seed markets are to supply all crops, research-intensive multinationals that focus on high value seeds such as hybrid maize and vegetables are not enough. Low-overhead local companies are also required, especially for non-hybrid crops such as groundnuts, beans, and cassava.

With a competitive seed industry, farmers in any one country would have access to seeds from a minimum of 20-30 companies. However, since country markets in Africa are often too small to support that many companies, many companies would not be able to cover costs unless they were able to operate regionally, introducing the same cultivars and selling seeds in several neighbouring countries. Hence, if African farmers are to have access to the world's best seed technology at competitive prices, regionalization of Africa's seed industry is crucial.

The following eight (proposed) best practice seed regulations have been prioritized. The first four provide the basis for a country to take part in an emerging regional seed industry and market. The next two are important for small-farmer participation in seed markets. The last two improve the efficiency of technology introduction, but impact depends on prior existence of a competitive market.

1. Market Entry: Governments allow foreign and domestic seed companies to enter the market based on simple objective criteria, without requirements for heavy investment in plant and equipment or specific preconditions concerning trained staff, etc. This is crucial to ensure e entry, particularly for low-budget local start-ups that might come from a small seed company in neighbouring country, NGO seed programs, government scientists going into business, etc.

2. Introduction of New Cultivars (except for transgenic plants): Clients (farmers) are in the driver's seat in deciding what is useful. Accordingly, governments allow companies and autonomous public institutes:

  1. to access varieties and germplasm from any source, including foreign companies, foreign public research organizations, CG institutes, in-country public research institutes, own research, etc (if germplasm must be imported, governments look at phytosanitary issues only, not performance); and

  2. to introduce new cultivars when they want, without waiting for official tests and approvals (i.e., governments allow voluntary variety registration); a second best solution here is to enforce compulsory registration for a limited list of crops only, but at the same time to register new cultivars automatically, based on DUS (Distinctive, Uniform, and Stable) data from any source (as in Chile) or prior registration in a list of other SSA countries (as in the EU).

These policies are crucial to allow cultivars to move regionally, so that when companies screen or breed cultivars for country they are able to introduce those same cultivars throughout the region wherever agro-climatic and other conditions are suitable, without regard to political boundaries (With these policies, procedures for public research institutes to release new varieties are not a regulatory issue, but rather an issue of research management.)

3. Seed Quality Control: Governments enforce truth-in-labeling (regulating what information seed companies must put on labels, and then spot-checking sold seed) and may also set minimum standards related to externalities (e.g., absence of weed seeds). Government offers seed certification and seed quality testing on a fee-for-service basis, but they are not legally required. Voluntary seed certification is crucial since compulsory certification entails compulsory variety registration (a seed cannot be certified to be of a particular cultivar unless that cultivar has previously been registered) which blocks introduction of new cultivars (see 2 above). Also voluntary certification reduces seed cost to farmers, which is particularly important for low overhead local companies producing 1 value seeds of non-hybrid crop .

4. Seed Export and Import Controls: Governments allow companies:

  1. to import seeds subject to science-based phytosanitary rules that are designed to identify and to hold out pests and diseases that are economically significant and that do not exist in the country, and to do so with efficient tests and procedures;

  2. to export seeds without permits or quantity controls and with only those phytosanitary and quality tests determined by the importing country.

These policies are crucial to allow seed companies to produce seeds in efficient volumes in selected countries and to move seeds across borders to regional markets. However, for some major crop (e.g., hybrid maize, cotton), experts may argue that regional markets are not yet dependable, so that import controls may be considered to ensure some level of domestic seed production (e.g., 50-70percent) for national security reasons. Seed security concerns do not justify export controls, since private seed production expands to meet demand, and any significant volume of private seed exports depends on development of export markets over time.

5. Retail Seed Sales: Governments allow stores to retail seeds without registering with the Ministry of Agriculture. This allows development of articulated marketing networks in low-volume seed markets, so that seed sales are convenient for small farmers.

6. Seed Producing Farmer : Governments allow seed companies to contract seed production with farmers of their choice, without government permission or screening, except for observation of physical conditions of fields growing certified seed. This allows competitive and efficient seed production, and also facilitates seed-growing by small farmers

7. Intellectual Property Rights: Governments have (or are taking steps to introduce) legislation allowing breeders to register ownership of new cultivars only (not traditional cultivars or land races), consistent with UPOV 1978 or 1991. Legislation allows sale of unregistered varieties. Legislation also recognizes that public description of new lines in a journal is sufficient to block any company from later registering ownership of that line (this can be useful to ensure that companies have open and equal access to cultivars from public research).

8. Transgenic Plants: Governments work with international organizations (FAO, UNEP and others) to establish laws and regulations that allow: (a) sale of products from transgenic plants; (b) testing of transgenic plants; (c) introduction of transgenic plants; and (d) patenting of genes, etc.

B. When to Review Seed Regulations

Bank staff in SSA are advised to review seed regulations in African countries at the first opportunity in each country in conjunction with the following Bank activities: (a) preparation of a project loan or credit for research, extension, agricultural services, agricultural sector investment (ASIP), or rural development (especially projects that promote crops, agricultural exports, or agro-industry); (b) preparation of a program loan or credit dealing, at least in part, with agriculture; or (c) ESW on research, extension, agricultural policy, or agricultural strategy.

C. How to Review Seed Regulations

The following steps are proposed for general use, though specific situations may call for another approach (e.g., collaboration with other donors).

1. Paying for the Review: A review can be paid for as part of preparations for a project or program loan or credit or as a component in agricultural ESW. As described below, a review - including taking part in discussions about reform options - would normally take one foreign expert with a local counterpart about four weeks, and would cost about $ 20,000. When local consultants can be identified and trained to carry out reviews in regional countries, the cost can fall below $ 10,000.

2. Initiating the Review. When a task manager for a specific project or ESW determines that a seed review is called for under these guidelines, the task manager:

  1. Contacts SSASI, reports the timetable and context for the Bank's review of seed regulations, submits a draft of task TORs, and asks for SSASI advice. SSASI provides a written response commenting on TORs and providing supporting information as available. SSASI also initiates a request to Fédération Internationale du Commerce des Semences (FIS) and American Seed Trade Association (ASTA) for information on company experience with seed regulations and policies in the specific country.

  2. Contacts the Ministry of Agriculture, stating the Bank's intention to promote regional and competitive seed markets in Africa, and asking for their cooperation in the Bank's review of seed regulations. At this point, the task manager clarifies that the report will be a public document circulated for discussion among all involved and interested parties, including seed companies, NG0s, etc.

  3. Appoints a reviewer, either a Bank staff or an international or local consultant along with a local assistant, who may be a Bank staff or local consultant.

  1. Fact-Finding: The reviewer:

  1. Reviews available written material from the Bank and other sources on seed industries in the country and in neighbouring countries.

  2. Collects seed laws and regulations and arranges translation if necessary; and also collects current export and import policy documents describing non-tariff barriers for seed imports and exports.

  3. Meets with representatives of 2-3 multinationals active in the market (if available) to ask:

  1. what is the process for a new company to enter the market?

  2. what is the process to introduce a new cultivar; is cultivar registration required; if so, how long does it take and how much does it cost; what has been the company's experience introducing new cultivars?

  3. is seed certification voluntary or compulsory; does government require seed quality tests in government laboratories; does government set minimum seed quality standards; does the company have any difficulties working with the government certification agency or seed laboratories?

  4. does the company have any difficulties with seed imports (phytosanitary rules and procedures, other non-tariff barriers) or seed exports?

  5. does the company have any problems protecting ownership of its germplasm?

  6. does the company have any problems introducing transgenic varieties?

  7. does the company have other advice and information that may be relevant to an effort to improve policies and regulations for a competitive, regional seed industry?

  1. Meets with representatives of 2-3 local private seed companies (if available), repeating questions (c) (i)-(vii) and also asking:

  1. where the company gets its cultivars; does the company buy or have access to germplasm or parent seeds from any government research institute or any CG institute, and are there any difficulties doing so; does the company have any link-up with a foreign company?

  1. Meets with representatives of the national seed association, if any. Ask the same questions as for multinational and local companies.

  2. Meets with representatives of 2-3 NG0s active in seeds (if applicable), repeating questions (c)(ii)-(iv), (c)(vii) and (d)(viii) and also asking:

  1. has the NGO formally registered as a seed company or helped any local entrepreneur or farmer to do so and to begin selling packaged seed under a brand name; what is the process of getting established as a seed seller; are there difficulties in the process?

  1. Meets with officials in the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for seed policies, variety testing and registration, seed certification, and phytosanitary controls on seed imports to ask about all policies listed in A above (depending on area of responsibility), and also to ask for comments on difficulties reported by seed companies, NG0s, etc.

4. Report Preparation: The objective of the report is to describe - concisely - the country's seed regulations, with specific attention to what reforms are required to allow the country to take part in a competitive regional seed industry. The report would normally follow the outline in Section A, above, on best practice seed regulations.

The reviewer submits a first draft (10+ pages, plus attachments including all existing and draft laws and regulations) to the task manager. SSASI, upon request, reviews and comments based on internal evidence and other information (e.g., from SSASI contacts with seed associations). The reviewer revises and resubmits the report, and the process continues until the report is acceptable to the task manager.

The final report would be no more than 4-6 pages, and would normally be published as an annex in a project or ESW document.

D. How to Promote Seed Regulatory Reforms

By the time the report has been prepared, SSASI, the task manager, and the reviewer should have come to an agreement about the reforms required to allow the country to take part in a competitive regional seed market. The question then becomes one of how to promote those reforms.

1. Distribute the Report: The report should be circulated to the government (formally) as well as to all government officials, seed companies, NG0s, and associations contacted during the review, and also to other interested parties. It is a public document (see C[2][b], above). Special care may be taken to send the report to public sector researchers and to Bank, CG, and other donor staff who work with public sector researchers to enlist their support for seed policy reforms.

2. Ask Government to Arrange Further Discussions on Reform Proposal The task manager (or another Bank staff involved in agricultural policy dialogue with the government) asks the Ministry of Agriculture to suggest a course of action to review proposals for seed regulatory reforms. These meeting(s) provide an opportunity to address confusion, to agree on specific reforms and steps to implement them, as well as to identify real problems (where proposed reforms meet solid objections).

In many countries (India, Turkey, Bangladesh, Romania), the main opposition to seed reform has come from public sector breeders, who apparently fear loss of prestige and jobs. The Bank has access to many channels (through CG centers, public sector research projects, SPAAR, etc) to assure scientists that seed reforms are consistent with continuing and even increasing support for public research and breeding, and persons in these organizations can be brought into the discussion.

3. Negotiate Agreed Reforms and Guide Government to Implement Them: After discussions, the task manager negotiates with the Ministry of Agriculture to achieve a list of accepted reforms, and to define a time-bound process to implement them.

During negotiations, prioritization is crucial, which means focusing on the first four points in section A: allowing companies to enter; allowing voluntary variety registration and seed certification; and reducing import barriers to science-based phytosanitary concerns.

Governments may not want to accept some or all proposed reforms. Trying to promote seed reform through heavy external pressure has often been counter-productive. Politicians and populations are sensitive to anything that they see as threatening food security or major export crops. Hence, politicians can be loath to change seed regulations without support from at least some national experts, including crop scientists and other agricultural experts. Discussions in D2, above, should have gotten some of these people involved in debates about seed regulations and alerted them to the issues. However, agreement cannot be forced.

In some cases, it might be possible to make strategic compromises. For example, government may not be willing to accept compulsory variety registration for all crops, but may be willing to do so for all crops except a few major ones. In 1990, Bangladesh accepted voluntary variety registration for all crops except rice, wheat, jute, sugarcane, and potatoes. In 1996, Malawi accepted voluntary variety registration except for hybrid maize and tobacco. These reforms were not ideal, but they were a beginning. Further dialogue can chip away at remaining barriers, and this dialogue can often be joined by seed companies that are able to enter on the strength of partial reforms.

After negotiations, often a sub-group of proposed reforms will be sufficiently non-controversial to be implemented immediately. These seed reforms can be considered in two categories:

  1. Reforms that the minister of agriculture (or sometimes commerce) can implement by changing policies or regulations with the stroke of a pen (and agreement from the cabinet). Ministers usually have sufficient authority, without going to legislatures, to deal with all of the reforms required for best practice seed regulations in AI-A6, above, including voluntary variety registration, voluntary seed certification, science-based phytosanitary rules and procedures, etc. For such reforms, the Bank can clarify which regulations can be changed in what way, and may even suggest some specific wording.

  2. Reforms that require changes in laws (and hence legislative action). For example, introduction of IPRs for cultivars or genes normally requires legislatures to pass a new law or to amend an existing one. This can take several years. For these reforms, the Bank can advise what laws or amendments are required. Although the Bank is not currently able to give countries detailed legal advice about drafting such legislation, we can refer questions to other public and private organizations (e.g., seed companies, IPPC, FAO, UPOV, etc).

Although seed regulatory reforms are essentially costless - opening the door for private companies to operate - there are some cases where government investments may support seed reforms. For example, paying for more national and regional research on seed-borne diseases strengthens the basis for rationalizing phytosanitary controls and also supports expansion of regional seed exports to OECD markets. The Bank may fund such activities in conjunction with government seed reforms.

4. Dealing with Incomplete Seed Reforms: In some cases, governments will not agree to key reforms, or reforms may not be possible on a timetable that is set by Bank processes (project preparation or ESW). The Bank may set the basis for further reforms as follows:

  1. Revise the Bank's seed review, taking account of agreed reforms, Bank proposals for further reforms, and comments on government concerns.

  2. Broaden the dialogue to include other donors, seed companies, FIS, ASTA, African Seed Trade Association (if available), etc, by sending them copies of the Bank's revised seed review and by involving them in seminars and other fora where seed regulations can be discussed. These other parties may have more success than the Bank in pushing dialogue and reform.

Over time, the Bank can also use or create opportunities to push hard for seed reform. For example,

Conclusion

Reforms to allow a regional seed market in Africa can be introduced one country at a time. Each government is able on its own authority to allow new companies and varieties to enter, to revise seed import and phytosanitary rules, etc. Each country does not have to wait for others to sit and agree to harmonize regional regulations, etc (although regional cooperation may help in some respects, such as for reducing intra-regional phytosanitary barriers on seed trade).

Also, building regional seed markets does not depend on any one country, so that we do not need to think that seed reform in country X must be achieved at all costs within a specific timetable. For best results, we can focus effort on the quality of our persuasion and on extending discussions to more countries, rather than on conditionalities and pressure on any one country.

If we can initiate discussions in 30-40 countries, we can aim within 1-3 years to achieve sufficient reforms in 10- 15 countries to allow a competitive regional seed market to emerge, which would be a tremendous success.

Dialogue about seed reforms can continue in non-reforming countries. Reforms through persuasion will take more time in some countries than in others. Evidence from reforming countries--- where competitive markets operate and where farmers get better seeds- may build a strong case for reform in neighbouring countries.

Following this strategy (with support from CG institutes and other donors), a regional and competitive private seed industry may begin to serve a majority of African farmers within five years, although it will take some time longer for foreign and domestic seed companies (including new start-ups) to respond with research, expanded sales, etc.

 

(1) Prepared by the Sub-Saharan Africa Seed Initiative Team of David Gisselquist, Jacob Kampen, J. Trevor Sykes, and Gary Alex (SSASI Team, World Bank).

 

(2) "Seed" in this paper is taken to include vegetatively-propagated crops such as cassava, potato, and sweet potato.

 

(3) While this is a necessary condition for African farmers to have access to good seeds, it is certainly not a sufficient condition. Many other problems discourage or block farmer access to good seeds, including poor roads, low output prices, and others. Without debating the relative importance or other issues or the sequencing of solutions, this paper focuses on factors affecting the development of seed industries and seed trade.

 

(4)  This target focuses on formal commercial seed industries, not because of an exclusive concern with these, but because this is a sensitive and monitorable indicator and the emergence of such companies relies on and reflects progress with the transformation of informal seed systems and government seed sector support systems.

 

(5) This note has been prepared as a first draft of policy guidelines that AFTAE could distribute to all staff to promote seed policy and regulatory reforms in African countries as opportunities arise. This policy was proposed and discussed in a 1 September meeting among representatives from AFTAE and private industry. This draft has been prepared by David Gisselquist on the request of SSASI and circulated on 8 September to SSASI participants.

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