SYNTHESIS NOTE FOR THEME 2: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Theme coordinator: Geert Diemer, World Bank, Washington

Most comments from Conference participants about Theme 2 related to five of the ten topics listed in the theme note: organizational options, determinants of organizational type adopted, organizational features of WUAs, the change process and the impact of IMT on poverty.

The first topic on which I will report is that of organizational options. It is often said that the model of farmer managed irrigation systems is not applicable to modern schemes. One participant reminded readers however, that Japan’s post-war modern irrigation systems have institutions and water management rules similar to those of the country’s community based irrigation systems. In Japan, the roles of the central and prefectural governments are limited to providing financial assistance and legal support. New projects must be initiated and managed by the farmers, because by law irrigation system operations and maintenance (O&M) is a farmer responsibility. This policy has resulted in viable and sustainable schemes. It contrasts with government-centered approaches to irrigation development elsewhere that resulted in today’s maintenance and governance problems.

Discussions focused primarily on situations where WUAs are dominant, but also paid some attention to situations where they are not dominant or where a combination of organizations occurs, such as where WUAs exist at the lower hydraulic levels (such as tertiary or secondary levels) and a Water Supply Company manages at a higher hydraulic level (such as the main canal and headworks). A model from Morocco was described where an autonomous and professional body, that may be in the public or private sector, is put in charge of management of the country’s government owned schemes. This model is gaining popularity in response to the dismal performance of local WUAs, which may be due to, among other reasons, a rural illiteracy rate of 67 percent and legislation that is inappropriate because it is geared primarily to farmer management of farmer built, smaller, traditional schemes located in the mountains and oases. In this model, the new management entity will sign a management contract with the Government. WUAs will represent user interests. Government will supervise management through the contract and continue to invest in agricultural development, but through a separate agency.

The remarks on Japan reminded participants that financing is the key process upon which the viability of irrigation institutions depends. One participant posited that the manner in which water is allocated and charged to intermediate and end users determines the organizational structure, but that in some IMT cases organizational, managerial, financial and legal considerations push this basic fact to the background. As water management moves from administrative allocation to the wholesale and retail volumetric purchase and sale of water, the need for accountability will shape the type, conduct and performance of the new organizations.

These and other determinants of organization were a second popular topic. One contribution provided an example of where Michels "Iron Law of Oligarchy" seems to apply, which was in transferred schemes in Mexico, where better trained and informed ‘elites’ exercise numerically disproportionate influence. This was compared to similar oligarchy building processes in worker-managed factories in former socialist Yugoslavia. Another participant posited that in Africa, where land is owned either by the Government or the community, land reform is a prerequisite for the establishment of WUAs. By implication, other types of organizations (other than WUAs) would be needed as long as land reform has not been implemented. This seems to describes the situation on several large irrigation schemes in Africa. Another participant stressed how irrigation infrastructure constrains what kinds of organizations are suitable for irrigation management. His example came from Nepal, where rigidly structured irrigation designs, in his view, cannot be made to perform by any organization, due to their low flows and rigid system of continuous flow in the main canal and rotation on the lower levels.

The third topic of choice was organizational aspects of WUAs, especially the role of women farmers in WUAs. It was felt that a quota approach to membership of WUA boards of directors was insufficient, and that a deeper study of gender issues would bring into focus rights to land and water, by men and women. IMT may promote improvements in gender equality if special arrangements are adopted to empower women farmers to perform their specific roles in irrigated agriculture.

Another participant introduced a useful distinction between male and female farming systems. She noted that the inclusion of women in WUA boards usually meets no resistance from male farmers in the context of female farming systems, dominant in large parts of Southern Africa, and in some locations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In such cases, however, some resistance to female participation may originate from government agencies. In situations where a minority of women function as decision-makers in male farming systems (as in India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and elsewhere), women face exclusion from WUAs. In such cases affirmative action may be called for and can be effective, as is purported to be the case in Nepal’s West Gandak scheme.

In Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, two thirds of women farmer decision-makers cultivate land that they do not own. Where tenants are excluded from membership, this forms another barrier to democratic participation of the full set of stakeholders. It was pointed out that officials tend to see leasing and tenancy as the causes of problems for WUAs, whereas others may view these arrangements as opportunities for those who hold land or water rights, but are not interested in cultivating directly, to obtain income from their land and water property rights and at the same time give access to these resources to those who need them for their livelihoods.

In the discussion on the multi-functionality of WUAs, it was remarked that often WUAs take on non-water functions for two reasons: the modernity of the schemes requires more cash for maintenance than can readily be raised by farmers who are subsistence oriented. The second reason often is that there are gaps in the provision of support services that the WUAs need to fill in order to raise farmer capacity to pay the costs of irrigation. An example is found in Niger, where farmers within modern pump schemes do not have access to essential agricultural inputs and credit. The need for WUAs to play the role of providing such inputs may be temporary, until other agri-businesses can take over these functions. A third reason for multi-functional WUAs was discussed using the example from Romania, where it is proposed that WUAs will marshall business support services to help farmers become more entrepreneurial.

The practice of many WUAs to take on non-water functions raises the new issue of start-up capital. It seems to be assumed that a reserve fund will accumulate if the fee is computed to exceed costs, and that the organization will be able to undertake capital investments of its own after a few years. However, this margin is usually spent on maintenance, and without adequate capital the WUA business will always be weak. In these matters, approaches borrowed from micro-credit programs may point the way out of the trap of inadequate capital.

The fourth topic was the strategic change process. It was proposed that such processes should be continuous and should motivate stakeholders to participate. It was signaled by others that agencies, by themselves, should not be allowed to determine their own mandates nor to set policy without public consultation. Risk of capture by vested interests would arise if decision-making would be consensual. Timing, decision rules and representation are therefore important issues in the design of such a process. Another participant noted that even where the law prescribes a one-farmer-one-vote right, as in Andhra Pradesh, this right needs to be realized on the ground, since after two years of implementation of the IMT program, 58 percent of small farmers in Andhra Pradesh were unaware of the WUA, as opposed to 31 percent of the larger farmers.

Regarding the impact of IMT on poverty, one participant observed that canal water is more important to small farmers than to large ones. A higher percentage of small farmers takes water from the canals, and takes more waterings from it, than larger farmers growing the same crop. The reason is simple: a larger percentage of small farmers do not have wells, than is the case with larger farmers. It was also stated by some participants that IMT has little impact on the productivity of land and water.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Participants voiced no recommendations. As theme coordinator, I suspect that they would appreciate information on the following themes:

• Organizational arrangements where WUAs do not have an executive role but represent farmer interests. Increasingly, the emphasis in the ‘design’ of irrigation organizations is turning towards the introduction, primarily through contracts, of professional management expertise in combination with new forms of accountability and transparency towards users, and, perhaps, more flexibility in delivery.
• Multi-functionality and creditworthiness of WUAs;
• Impact of infrastructure on the range of institutional options.

Contact: imt-moderator@fao.org