FOOD AND SEED ASSISTANCE IN THE RECOVERY FROM CRISIS
Deborah Hines, Senior Policy Analyst, WFP
Sonali Wickrema, JPO, WFP
Leslie Van Straaten, Consultant, FAO

1. INTRODUCTION

Crises caused by conflict and natural phenomena profoundly affect the agricultural systems of rural people, destabilizing both their immediate food security and their ability to produce sufficient food for the future. Food and seed assistance in relief and recovery programmes can provide critical inputs for restarting production and for helping people to restore their livelihood systems. However, complementary programming is key if disaster-affected communities are to make optimal use of food and seed assistance.

When effectively programmed, the distribution of food, and then food and seeds, begins the process of strengthening coping strategies and moving towards recovery. The incorporation of development activities into relief and recovery interventions can help affected populations restore their traditional coping strategies sooner rather than later. Unfortunately, in many crisis situations, lack of continued access to land, insecurity or repeated natural crises impede crop production, making it necessary to continue to provide food and seed relief for a number of cropping cycles.

The effect of disasters on farmer seed systems was recognized by the 4^th Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) International Technical Conference for the Conservation and Sustainable Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, held in Leipzig, Germany in June 1996. A project entitled "Develop institutional agreements and capacity to assist farmers in disaster situations to restore agricultural systems" was subsequently launched, with funding from the Norwegian Government. From the first project-planning meeting, held in Rome, Italy, 2-4 February 1998 (FAO, 1998), a number of issues were identified as requiring further analysis. The issues relevant to this paper pertain to the relationship between food and seed resources, and their joint role in relief, recovery and development.

This paper considers the complementarity between food and seed interventions and presents an overview of the issues and measures needed for more effective joint programming. The paper begins with a review of the main stakeholders in recovery situations and their role in food and seed provisioning. Lessons about the operational aspects of joint programming are taken from both a literature review and case studies of three recovery situations - Burundi, southern Sudan and northern Uganda. The paper concludes with a discussion of the constraints to and opportunities for the joint programming of food and seeds.

For the purposes of this paper, the concepts of recovery follow those outlined in WFP’s policy, From Crisis to Recovery. In a relief situation, WFP's mandate is to save lives. Following this immediate concern, through its food-aid-assisted recovery programmes WFP aims "to enable people to restore their livelihoods in order to assure immediate and longer-term food needs" (WFP, 1998a).

2. STAKEHOLDERS IN THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND SEEDS IN RECOVERY

2.1 WFP, Recovery and the Link between Relief and Development

Recovery policy and operational guidelines stress that traditional short-term relief responses are often inadequate in addressing the real needs of people who are trying to stabilize and secure their livelihoods in a crisis situation. WFP’s approach emphasizes that:

• interventions need to move as quickly as possible from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and sustainable recovery;

• developmental approaches and activities must be introduced as early as possible into crisis interventions;

• crises resulting from natural disasters are often recurring, and longer-term approaches are therefore required, incorporating prevention, preparedness and early warning measures; and

• the transition to more development-based approaches is likely to be uneven, moving back and forth between relief/recovery and recovery/development, depending upon the security and stability of the area and the immediate needs of the affected population.

With a mandate for both emergency and development assistance, WFP is strategically placed to assist in the re-establishment of livelihood systems and the introduction of developmental approaches after a crisis. Through its three programme categories - emergency, protracted relief and recovery, and development - interventions start with immediate relief and move to more planned, longer-term investments in support of strengthening livelihood systems. WFP’s provision of food assistance in conjunction with other inputs, such as seeds, also contributes to disaster preparedness and mitigation activities. The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit provides information links with other early warning systems to help indicate when and where joint food programming is appropriate.

2.2 FAO's Emergency Response

FAO has identified eight distinct phases in the "disaster cycle", namely: prevention, preparedness, early warning, impact and needs assessment, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and sustainable recovery. FAO plays an important role in each of these phases, as shown below. Specifically, it:

• helps prevent and prepare for food and agricultural emergencies
• provides early warning of their approach;
• assesses the impact of natural and man-made disasters on agricultural production and local food supplies;
• evaluates needs for immediate relief and longer-term recovery;
• delivers agricultural inputs and services to farmers in affected areas;
• helps countries plan and carry out agricultural rehabilitation and construction work; and
• helps countries design programmes and projects that will lead to sustainable recovery and prevent vulnerability to future disasters (FAO, 1997a).

Within FAO, the Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR) takes the lead in conducting assessments of agricultural relief and rehabilitation needs and organizing and delivering FAO emergency assistance. TCOR policy is currently being reviewed and updated. The Policy Assistance Division of FAO is responsible for the development of FAO's strategy in relation to agricultural rehabilitation, reconstruction and sustainable development.

2.3 Other Major Stakeholders in Food and Seeds Provisioning

The primary stakeholders in joint food and seed programmes are the affected communities. Their role in the provision of food and seed resources depends upon the scale of the crisis, the extent to which their social structures have been affected, and the capacity of implementing agencies to involve them. Where capacity exists, representative committees are formed through which communities help identify those most in need and distribute food assistance and complementary inputs. These committees are especially useful in voicing communities’ needs for seed and other inputs to help them rebuild their livelihoods.

In most cases, the Government of the affected country is involved both at the national and local level in identifying the need for assistance and helping to coordinate the relief response. United Nations agencies provide support to governments and generally intervene within the areas of responsibility specified in their individual mandates. In most countries facing complex emergencies, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the immediate relief response. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the United Nations Resident Coordinator helps coordinate assistance in situations moving from recovery to development. WFP is the principal provider of food assistance, and FAO’s TCOR assists with the provision of agricultural inputs. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) plays a lead role in the provision of health support, water and sanitation, and supplementary feeding for children. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) focuses on the protection and other needs of refugees and their resettlement and reintegration.

Implementing Agencies The success of food and seed relief distribution depends on the effectiveness of the implementing agency: Food and/or seed distribution implemented by local Government structures have had mixed success. For example, the Zambian Government decided to rely on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), rather than on government agencies, to implement its "Programme to Prevent Malnutrition" in response to the 1991/92 drought. This decision was made for two reasons: to encourage donors to contribute generously to the programme; and to avoid the Programme from becoming "entangled" in the politics of the 1992 local government elections (Mukupo, 1994). Relief resources have been successfully distributed through community structures. In southern Sudan, Village Relief Committees have been involved in needs assessment and in the distribution of food aid provided by WFP with seeds provided by NGOs such as CARE (WFP, 1998c; USAID, 1996).

Donors provide support through their own programmes with the government, and by supporting the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Donors either provide inputs (food and non-food items) directly or facilitate the purchase and distribution of relief inputs as well as medium- and long-term rehabilitation and development activities.

International and national NGOs usually act as implementing partners with United Nations organizations or bilateral donors. NGO involvement includes raising funds, providing resources, assisting with food or seed distribution, and designing and implementing programmes. Some organizations are involved solely in relief interventions, while others carry out both relief and development activities.

Information concerning suitable crops and varieties is provided by the in-country National Agricultural Research System (NARS), by seed companies, or by International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs). National or regional seed companies, commercial suppliers, or local growers are the main sources of seed. Where FAO has a country presence, it helps implementing agencies identify appropriate seeds and seed suppliers and provides technical assistance on seed quality control and the timing of seed provision. If necessary, the IARCs may become involved in seed multiplication, where appropriate seed is not available commercially. Commercial suppliers are also providers of locally or regionally purchased food for food aid programmes.

3. FUNDING MECHANISM

3.1 Donors’ Funding Sources

Joint food and seed programmes tend to be financed through a mixture of funding mechanisms. Donors’ funding mechanisms are attached to specific budget lines, which reduce their flexibility in providing joint resourcing. Often donors will have separate budget lines for food and seeds in relief and in development programmes.

The current donor climate makes it extremely difficult to maintain responsive programmes outside the parameters of relief. Dividing resources into "development" and "humanitarian" precludes the funding of longer-term strategies in areas classified as humanitarian. For example, donors may use humanitarian funds to support the provision of food and seeds after a crisis. However, if an agency wishes to develop seed multiplication sites to establish local sources of seed, donors may be unable to provide funds as this is considered a "developmental" activity.

Most donors fund rehabilitation or transition components within their relief programmes but are careful not to label them as development activities. Many of the relief activities and implementation strategies supported by donors are in fact transitional in nature and are rooted in development. For example in the Sudan, the UNDP Area Rehabilitation Scheme is a good illustration of a transplanted development approach that has been introduced on a pilot basis in villages affected by war and in areas where returnees are concentrated. Thus transition activities are being implemented, albeit under the following major constraints:

• short-term funding windows - generally of 12 months or less - which involve projects that:
• can demonstrate quick impact and are administratively and technically simple; and
• have capacity-building potential (participatory, credit, training).

3.2 Resource Mobilization

Donors are willing to support NGOs or United Nations agencies in emergency agricultural relief. In some cases, where seeds are being programmed for food aid recipients, donors have provided additional funds to NGOs or other United Nations agencies to pay for WFP to transport seeds and tools with food aid deliveries (OCHA, 1998). In recovery situations, WFP encourages partners to submit project requests for seeds to enable WFP to commence a phase-out strategy. Such requests clearly state that seeds and tools will be jointly programmed with WFP food.

In general, FAO can only finance the provision of seeds and technical advice through its regular programme channels. However, in an emergency, FAO is able to access limited funds for the provision of a coordinator to provide implementing agencies with technical advice and coordinate agricultural relief operations. These funds can only be used within the first year of an emergency intervention. Beyond this, FAO is reliant on direct donor support, especially in the case of protracted emergencies.

WFP can mobilize resources both in-country and through its headquarters. At the onset of a crisis, the Immediate Response Account (IRA) can be used to mobilize resources quickly to start an operation, but funds must be repaid once contributions from donors are received. Contributions include food commodities or cash for the purchase of food. In addition, donors are required to meet the full project support costs of programming each ton of food.

Non-food commodities can be included as a project support cost if they increase the effectiveness of the food intervention. Funding is usually limited to cooking utensils and kerosene, and in a limited number of circumstances, seeds and tools. WFP prefers to mobilize funds for food to be provided in support of seed programmes undertaken by governments or partner agencies.

The extent of coordination in resource mobilization and joint programming depends on mutual need. For example, UNHCR and WFP often coordinate food and seed programming as UNHCR may provide seeds within a food aid phase-out or reduction strategy. In such cases, WFP’s future funding requirement for food is dependent on UNHCR’s success in the timely and effective provision of seeds. In contrast, FAO mobilizes funds for seed programmes and, if needed, requests food for seed-protection rations from WFP. Where inter-agency communication is effective and local institutions are involved in programming, agencies are better able to coordinate the joint provision of food and seeds.

3.3 Consolidated Appeal Process

Food and seeds can be provided in response to emergencies caused by either conflict or natural disasters. At the onset of a major emergency, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) provides a coordinating mechanism for the resourcing of food and seed programmes. Agencies request and receive funding mainly for the resources they distribute: food, seed, medicines. This allows transparency and accountability in the allocation of donor funds.

Consolidated Appeal Process The United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) is a formal mechanism for the joint planning of and appeal for emergency assistance. The CAP is overseen by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with the formulation of the appeal grounded in a country-level coordination process. In terms of resource mobilization, the CAP provides donors with a single intervention plan for all United Nations agencies working in a country, but each component of the plan has a separate budget. In this way, individual United Nations agencies have their own funding requirements corresponding to their commitments in the intervention plan. As an example, food and seeds may be jointly programmed but WFP will request food resources and FAO will request funds for seeds. The CAP allows donors to see how food and seed programming has been planned in relation to other United Nations activities in a given country. However, as funding is by component, one agency may receive funding for one component while another agency, with a complementary component, may receive insufficient or no funding. In most cases, WFP's relief food assistance receives funding. However, inputs such as seeds or training, which are provided by other agencies, are not always funded. A problem with CAPs has been that donors support budgets for the immediate humanitarian response, but exclude funds for the recovery portion of the intervention plan. This is one reason why food is generally more readily funded in CAPs than seed inputs. The CAP is currently under review, with the aim of making it a more effective and strategic tool for relief coordination. The intent is to decentralize the process further and increase planning, implementation and monitoring functions at country level. It is still too early to assess the potential benefits of the proposed revised CAP process. However, there is optimism that improved country-level planning will improve the complementarity between activities, and the revised CAP will be used to compile needs assessment information and incorporate NGOs' activities and funding requirements in the intervention plan.

4. REVIEW OF JOINT FOOD AND SEED OPERATIONS

A literature review and three in-country case studies (in Burundi, the Sudan and Uganda) were undertaken to develop a better understanding of effective coordination mechanisms for joint food and seed programming. This section highlights experiences that are relevant to the successful implementation of food and seed relief interventions and discusses operational considerations for the joint programming of food. Given the scarcity of literature relating to the joint programming of seeds and food in a relief/recovery context, many of the lessons are extracted from the three case studies.

4.1 Literature Review

A list of actions necessary for effective joint programming of food and seed relief interventions is presented in the following box. These actions have been summarized from a number of sources and are presented as a series of steps. The sources include:

• The Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 1996), which describes the components of seed provision during and after emergencies, highlighting where food assistance may be necessary;
• A United States Agency for International Development (USAID) review of seed interventions in the Greater Horn of Africa, which provides recommendations for seed provisioning in the context of moving from food aid to food security approaches (USAID, 1996);
• Campbell and Harvey (1998), who present the problems experienced in southern Sudan as agencies attempt to move from relief food aid to more "developmental" interventions; and
• Pottier (1996), who examines the different modes of food and seed provisioning in Rwanda after the crisis of 1994.

To ensure that food and seed programmes make a positive contribution to the food security of target populations, it is essential that the activities supported match with the priorities of communities in affected areas. In addition, selected crops should represent priority food crops of the region and the varieties must be appropriate to the agro-ecological zones targeted (ODI, 1996; USAID, 1996). Inappropriate activities, crops or unadapted varieties result in crop failure, the demoralization of beneficiaries, serious delays in the planned withdrawal of food aid, and can have negative long-term consequences on the cropping system (Richards and Ruivenkamp, 1997).

Although food and seed distributions are often an essential step in stimulating local food production, long-term interventions can have serious detrimental effects on local agricultural production, on traditional seed supply systems and on the local economy. Such negative effects were experienced in Zimbabwe following the prolonged blanket distribution of food, fertilizer and seed during the early nineties (Friis-Hansen and Rohrbach, 1993) and in Somalia during 1993 and 1994 when the continued arrival of food aid prevented farmers from selling their agricultural produce (Grunewald, 1996).

Sequencing of Joint Food and Seed Relief Interventions Important Steps include: evaluate the nature and extent of the crisis and review possible responses in a coordinated forum; determine the number of families affected, their needs and type of assistance required to meet these needs; determine if relief food and seed distributions are needed; determine for different target groups if it is more appropriate to provide food before/with/after the seed distribution or continuously until the following harvest; ensure that necessary, locally adapted, complementary inputs are provided (hand tools, non-food household items, health support, nutritional programmes); identify roles and responsibilities of implementing agencies for the provision of seed and food assistance; identify appropriate crops and varieties to be distributed and appropriate sources; give the beneficiaries prior warning about food and seed distribution, including information on the timing of deliveries and the commodities and crops/varieties to be distributed; explain that the distribution of seed is part of a strategy to reduce future food and seed distributions; implement the food and seed distributions according to the logistics plan; evaluate the effectiveness of the food and seed distribution, especially issues of timing; and monitor crop development and yields as a means of estimating future food requirements.

In southern Sudan, the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD, 1995) noted that during 1987/1988, food production in the town of Juba was depressed due to continued supplies of food aid. Learning from this experience Operation Lifeline Sudan began incorporating food security aspects such as developing seed systems to relief interventions.

After the priority of saving lives is met, a first step in the transition process for WFP is to better focus food aid by: improved targeting and definition of population groups and geographical areas in need; distinguishing between different sets of needs; and tailoring food rations to need, for example by providing food aid on a seasonal basis. In order to avoid dependency, WFP, like most organizations, strives to move from blanket food distributions to more targeted distributions, without neglecting the provision of assistance to the more vulnerable groups. Food for work (FFW) is the most common mechanism for this.

A number of seed-related activities can be introduced as the transition process moves away from the need for relief assistance. NGOs with agricultural technical capacity tend to move quickly from seed distribution to development-oriented activities. In the early eighties the development programme of ACORD in Gulu District, Uganda, moved from the free distribution of hand tools through the Western Acholi Cooperative Union to support of the Union’s engineering workshop to help develop local capacity to produce agricultural equipment (ACORD, 1995). Seed multiplication activities also help to re-establish seed supply systems, while agricultural extension activities help to promote sustainable agricultural techniques and improved cultural practices (USAID, 1996; FAO, 1997b).

Variety Selection During the late eighties, agencies implementing emergency seed distributions to war-affected Mozambican families were reliant on imported seed. Although the imported varieties were acceptable, they were not always the most appropriate for local conditions. In 1991, World Vision (WV) together with the NARS, Instituto Nacional de Investigação Agronómica, initiated an on-station and on-farm research programme in parallel to its emergency interventions, to identify better adapted varieties. A wide range of varieties produced by the NARS, the national seed company, regional plant breeding companies, and IARCs were evaluated. Varieties were selected on the basis of early maturity, pest and disease resistance, drought tolerance, adaptation to low fertility, taste/cooking quality, as well as yield. The short season maize variety Matuba was shown to be particularly well adapted to the needs of the internally displaced and drought-affected farming families in central and northern Mozambique (Sperling et al., 1994). The longer-season variety Manica was shown to be appropriate to the higher rainfall upland areas (Sitch et al., 1996). As a result of this research programme, WV provided information on appropriate varieties to many NGOs planning seed relief interventions. Surveys concerning the fate of varieties disseminated by WV suggest that, as a result of WV's relief distributions and farmer-to-farmer seed exchange, more than 600,000 families in central and northern Mozambique are now growing Matuba. Source: Chapman, White and Nankam (1997)

4.2 Case Studies

The case studies that form the basis of this paper are part of two separate efforts looking at issues of rehabilitation and recovery. The case studies in Burundi and Uganda looked specifically at joint food seed programming issues in situations of conflict and natural disaster. The studies were undertaken by WFP with funding from FAO. The Sudan case study was part of a larger WFP effort looking at programme implementation issues in rehabilitation and recovery, of which seed and food programming was an important component. While all three countries combine relief and rehabilitation activities, the contexts in which food and seed resources are provided vary considerably. The main findings from the three in-country case studies are discussed below, followed by a discussion and summary of the main lessons learned from the literature and case studies.

Burundi case study

The programming of food and seed resources is relatively successful in Burundi, principally because FAO's Emergency Coordination Unit has established a coordination mechanism that fosters effective inter-agency relationships. The important elements of sound coordination, including joint needs assessment and targeting, are discussed with respect to the joint programming of food and seed resources.

Emergency Response Coordination in Burundi Context Prior to the conflict that began in October 1993, Burundi was generally food secure. The 1993 crisis led to the massive internal displacement of local populations (more than 600,000 people are currently internally displaced (WFP, 1997)). Families living in regroupment camps and recently displaced populations have limited access to their land due to rebel activity, and require intermittent food assistance. Although the long-term internally displaced persons (IDPs) have developed some coping strategies such as working on tea plantations, producing beer or negotiating access to local land, many remain vulnerable to fluctuations in agricultural productivity and ethnic attack. The hilly terrain and high population density of Burundi mean that IDPs often have to farm rainfed marginal lands and often have to negotiate access to land on a seasonal basis. The economic situation in Burundi degenerated after an embargo was imposed by neighbouring countries in June 1996. Market prices for food and agricultural inputs more than doubled as imports fell. Also, due to the volatile nature of conflict between factions, some provincial markets have disintegrated and marketed food and seed supplies have disappeared. IDPs face the dilemma that cash incomes are eroded by inflation and goods may not be available, while saved food and seed stocks may be raided by militants or have to be abandoned when fleeing attack. Coordination Mechanisms and the Role of Different Stakeholders The FAO Emergency Coordination Unit for Agricultural Relief Operations is responsible for the national coordination of the emergency response for agriculture. National coordination meetings are attended by the main United Nations and NGO implementing agencies as well as two government ministries - the Ministry of Agriculture and Research and the Ministry of Reinsertion, Reinstallation, and Regroupment. The meetings help build a consensus on provincial seed needs and allocations. Implementing agencies are encouraged to share resources to ensure a more complete coverage of the needs. A "lead agency", assigned to each province, is responsible for provincial level coordination. WFP is the largest provider of food assistance. Fluctuations in food insecurity have prompted WFP to adopt a strategy of ad hoc interventions as well as supplementary feeding to vulnerable groups. Ad hoc food distributions and FFW programmes are carried out either by WFP or by implementing NGOs. WFP partners with both UNICEF and UNHCR to support vulnerable groups. In addition, WFP provides logistical support for seed distribution, which is funded by UNDP/United Nations Office for Project Services. In collaboration with the national agricultural research system, ISABU, FAO provides guidelines concerning appropriate crops/varieties, seeds/tools quality specifications and recommended suppliers. FAO has also assumed responsibility for the quality testing of all seed purchased in Burundi. FAO monitors market prices to determine when and where bean seed (the principal emergency crop) should be purchased. Needs Assessment and Targeting Food assistance needs are determined by WFP through an adaptation of the Save the Children Fund (UK) Food Economy Approach (Boudreau, 1998; McDonagh, 1996). Information concerning the origin of children admitted to therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres helps WFP target the most food-insecure populations. Pre-harvest FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions also help identify the areas most vulnerable to food insecurity and estimate future food aid needs. Seed needs are coordinated through FAO. Seed distribution focuses on locally purchased bean variety mixtures and vegetables. Only food-insecure populations with access to at least half a hectare of land receive seeds. FAO liaises with WFP to determine where food rations need to be given with seeds. Joint programming of Food and Seed Resources Joint programming of food and seed resources occurs in three ways: Seed-protection food rations are provided to seed beneficiaries living in food-insecure areas. Such families are identified jointly by WFP, FAO and their implementing partners. Demonstrations of vegetable production are given at supplementary feeding health centres and vegetable seeds are provided to families when they are discharged. Food for work is also being used to encourage women's groups to cultivate vegetables. Food rations are provided for two months, covering land preparation and vegetable cultivation, and thereby helping to build up the health of the participants and maximize their input into vegetable production. Problems Encountered The needs assessment of WFP's Food Economy Approach is constrained by insecurity and lack of access to reliable informants. Logistical constraints caused by limited trucking capacity in-country, the narrow window of time in which to deliver seeds, and volatile insecurity have caused difficulties for the timely delivery of food with seeds and tools. The high turnover of NGO staff (particularly within the provincial "lead agency"). Although WFP-Burundi would prefer to provide a 30-day or 15-day seed-protection food ration, food pipeline problems during the last season limited the proportion of seed beneficiaries receiving seed-protection rations and reduced the size of such rations from 15 to 7 days. The local purchase of large quantities of bean variety mixtures is hampered by supply limitations, transport, and insecurity problems. The embargo has also caused pipeline problems for FAO in obtaining vegetable seed and agricultural inputs in time for scheduled food deliveries. As beans are often stolen in insecure areas and there is a strong export market for them in Rwanda, many farmers sell their produce rather than consume it or save seed. FAO is, therefore, considering whether it would be more appropriate to distribute another protein-rich crop as an alternative to beans.

Sudan case study

Since 1956, the year of the Sudan’s independence, the country has experienced only a decade of relative peace, between 1972 and 1983. Concurrent to the war, drought and ecological disasters plague the Sudan; the resulting famines of 1973-74, 1984-85 and 1998 stand out as major natural disasters. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was established in April 1989 as a United Nations coordinated programme developed in agreement with the Government of the Sudan and southern independence movements.

The joint programming of food and seed resources has faced political, financial, and coordination problems, to a large extent caused by the uncertainty of how to respond to a complex humanitarian situation. Thus, the move to recovery is not uniformly supported by all donors, the Government and the different movements. The Sudan case study provides an interesting example of coordination, planning and implementation in a war situation exacerbated by natural disasters.

Experiences From Aweil East County, Bahr-al-Ghazal Context The province is intermittently affected by conflict (militia activity, incursions from the north, marauding from trains, inter-factional fighting) and certain locations are controlled by warring parties. Villages are periodically looted and burned, cattle raided, and crops stolen and burned. Natural disasters (drought, flooding and environmental degradation due to restrictions on cattle movements) also periodically disrupt crop harvests. This county is inaccessible during the rainy season and villages can only be reached by footpath in the dry period owing to limited infrastructure. Because of insecurity, airstrips are not always operational. Traditionally, Aweil East County was a surplus grain area. In recent years the area has experienced grain deficits and in 1996 there was a reduction of about 25-30 percent in harvest yields. In difficult times, communities are forced to expand their coping strategies and rely on collecting wild fruit, fishing and bartering livestock for grain (primarily sorghum or dura). Access to basic services and markets is poor and the area suffers from widespread food insecurity. Primary education and poor health facilities are available in most villages. Coordination Mechanisms and the Role of Different Stakeholders Through OLS, United Nations agencies and NGOs work in collaboration with the humanitarian agencies of the Government of the Sudan and the southern independence movements to ensure access and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all war-affected people. The operation is divided into a northern sector, serving civilians in government-held areas, and a southern sector for areas held by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the South Sudan Independence Movement and the SPLM-United. There are currently more than 40 international and Sudanese NGOs working under the umbrella of OLS. UNDP is the lead coordinating agency for the northern sector and UNICEF takes the lead in the southern sector. WFP has been providing emergency food assistance in both sectors through its country offices in Khartoum and Nairobi, while seed interventions are undertaken by UNICEF and NGOs. Where feasible, WFP delivers seeds for UNICEF. Village Relief Committees play an important role in ensuring that beneficiaries are represented in the various aspects of programming: needs assessment and identification of inputs, targeting, distribution, and monitoring. These committees - composed of seven women and six men - play a crucial role in establishing links between the affected community members, the donor agencies and the various local authorities representing groups within the SPLM. Security and logistical constraints limited WFP distributions in the country from January to April 1997; only 30 percent of planned deliveries were made and 42 percent of intended beneficiaries were reached. Insecurity limited the number of flights WFP was able to make and the locations in which it could operate. In addition to insecurity, flight capacity was a primary constraint during this period as WFP had only one Buffalo airplane for food distributions. These constraints forced WFP to reduce not only the number of items in the food basket (in order to deliver larger quantities of cereals), but also the ration size, to be able to reach more people with each food drop. In addition, support to seed programmes had to be cut as food was targeted to priority humanitarian needs. Needs Assessment and Targeting In the southern sector, WFP works with Save the Children Fund (UK) to assess household food economies. This gives a picture of how families cope with food insecurity and where food and seed provisioning may be appropriate. In the northern sector, WFP uses VAM in coordination with USAID's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) to assess communities' needs. The Village Relief Committees provide the most detailed information on areas and beneficiaries requiring food assistance. The committees visited appeared to understand their role of targeting the most needy for food assistance and were aware that they were accountable for their decisions. They also were quick to point out the other needs of the community and the fact that they were trying to secure other inputs for their villages. The possibility of setbacks and reversal is an accepted factor of working in the area. The local people know that their survival depends on their ability to restore their means of production in the long run. The committee process is considered more efficient than targeting through chiefs because: the share or tax taken for the Movement is less; the food is more equitably shared among those most in need; families now receive food through women, thus a husband does not have to distribute between all his wives - each wife receives according to her need; and there is less disruption by the civil authorities in the distribution process. Conditions impede follow-up monitoring to verify if and how much food or seeds were reaching intended beneficiaries or to determine the effect assistance had on household food security. Joint programming of Food and Seed Resources Seeds programmes have, in general, been developed independently of food aid although joint provision is increasing as agencies attempt to increase the population's food security despite the difficult political situation and recurrent natural calamities (Macrae et al., 1997). In the north, UNICEF, FAO, UNDP, and NGOs are all involved in seed and tool programmes. In the south, UNICEF and NGOs are the main providers of seeds and tools. Food and seeds are programmed together in relief interventions - especially where beneficiaries have few or no options for coping with food insecurity. However, donors are less willing to finance food and seed programmes that appear to be developmental. The line is fine and varies from agency to agency. In its Integrated Strategic Plan 1997-99, USAID allowed that funding seed research and the introduction of new crops was consistent with the humanitarian context of southern Sudan. The plan also supported the joint programming of food aid with seeds to ensure that food and seeds were delivered in a timely manner to enable target groups to build local capacities for food self-reliance. Problems Encountered Food aid to the Sudan is financed principally from humanitarian budgets. Donors are politically unable or unwilling to finance the provision of seeds, and especially seed multiplication projects, as these are not considered humanitarian. This has led to the development of seed programmes separately from food aid assistance. Since 1996, an effort to move from food aid to food security approaches has been made by OLS with mixed support from donors. Limited logistic capacity of WFP and partners (aircraft, for example) result in pipeline delays and the inability to reach the beneficiaries or in the need to reschedule non-food items within the distribution plan. This situation often disrupts planned joint seed and food deliveries. Lack of coordination between seed and food distributions. The Village Relief Committees emphasized that food was not just a tiding over measure during times of hunger gaps. They stressed that food should be distributed just before the seeds, to preclude the eating of seeds and ensure that beneficiaries have the energy to undertake productive activities such as preparing land and planting the seeds. Committee members also mentioned that seed varieties were not always appropriate and felt better technical advice was needed.

Uganda case study

The Uganda case study, from which a number of lessons can be learned, depicts a situation with deficiencies in the joint programming of food and seed resources. Emergency coordination mechanisms, needs assessment and targeting were identified as important issues in joint programming.

Support to IDPs and Refugees in Uganda Context Food insecurity has become an increasingly serious problem in Uganda, fuelled by drought, flooding and rebel insurgency. Northern (Gulu and Kitgum) and western (Bundibugyo and Kassesse) districts have been particularly affected by rebel attacks (WFP, 1998b). The majority of the IDPs are living in camps or protected villages, and receive food aid and seeds. Many of these IDPs were surplus-producing farmers before insecurity prevented them from farming. Uganda's refugee population is beginning to be phased out of food assistance. Meanwhile, economic activity and market development flourishes in southern Uganda with entrepreneurs constantly looking for potential market expansion in more secure areas of North and West Uganda. Wholesalers of agricultural inputs and seeds can be found in most secure trading centres. However, only input markets in southern Uganda are well established. Uganda has a reasonably well-developed agricultural sector producing a small surplus of food and seed for local purchase by aid agencies for use in the country and other Great Lakes countries. Coordination Mechanisms and the Role of Different Stakeholders Emergency responses are coordinated monthly at the national level. UNHCR hosts meetings addressing refugee issues. An OCHA office has been opened in Kampala to facilitate United Nations inter-agency coordination for relief interventions. District-level responses are coordinated by the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC). The effectiveness of the DDMC depends upon the capacity of the chairperson (generally a government representative) and on the degree of agency participation in meetings. In cases where district-level coordination is problematic, district-specific meetings are also held in Kampala. WFP is the principal provider of food assistance, operating through implementing partners. The main supplier of seed is the government-based Uganda Seed Project, which produces certified seed of improved and hybrid varieties developed by the NARS at Kawanda and Namulonge. Seeds and tools are generally distributed by ICRC, NGOs or church organizations, although FAO and WFP have both distributed seeds in response to government requests. WFP has distributed seeds to populations living in the less secure, isolated areas where NGOs are unable to operate. Needs Assessment and Targeting Requests for assistance come from the Government or the DDMCs. A United Nations Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) is responsible for needs assessment in the case of new emergencies. UNDMT decisions are based on a joint rapid assessment mission which gathers information on population movement, crop production levels, household food and seed reserves, coping mechanisms, the availability/price of food on local markets and health status. Additional data generated by WFP's implementing partners and food monitors are used to determine the food requirements of vulnerable populations. Seed requirements are determined by the District Agriculture Officer and collaborating NGOs, on the basis of the success of the cropping season and the availability of seed stocks. Joint programming of Food and Seed Resources Seed and tool distributions are being widely implemented to reduce the need for affected populations to rely on food assistance. Refugees resettled in early 1998 were provided with seeds and tools in March/April as part of an exit strategy in which food assistance will be gradually reduced to zero over a period of four successive cropping seasons. However, post-harvest food assessment missions will determine whether planned reductions in food rations can be implemented. In most cases, seeds are distributed after a WFP food distribution, to avoid consumption of the seed and to encourage planting. In some instances, seeds have been provided to populations not normally targeted by WFP. At the request of Action Contre la Faim, WFP provided seven-day food rations to non-displaced, drought-affected populations of eastern Kitgum District targeted to receive seeds, to avoid seed consumption. Seed consumption was reported when Christian Children's Fund distributed seeds without seed-protection food rations to a drought-affected community. However, World Vision (WV) distributed seed to families hosting IDPs even though these families were not receiving food assistance, as WV considered them to be sufficiently food secure. In Gulu, WFP supports a FFW seed multiplication project implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Technical assistance is provided by a district agricultural extension officer and a CRS agricultural technician. Problems Encountered FAO's guidelines concerning appropriate crops/varieties, seed/tool quality specifications and recommended suppliers have not yet been made available. FAO's technical support to seed programmes is undertaken by an international consultant based in Kenya. Consequently, implementing agencies have no in-country technical advice or coordination for seed and tool programmes. As a result, poor quality hoes and inappropriate sorghum variety mixtures were distributed by NGOs in Kitgum District; there was no technical backstopping for FAO-purchased seed delivered to Gulu and Kitgum districts, resulting in distributions being poorly timed; and poor quality seed has delayed the planned phase-out of food assistance to refugee populations in Adjumani District. The geographical area and population type (IDPs, host community, drought-affected) to be targeted by NGOs are determined during proposal preparation, without the involvement of the DDMC. This can lead to gaps in the provision of support to some needy populations. The procurement and distribution of seeds by aid agencies has not adequately considered market impacts, such as the draining of local seed supplies or reductions in the demand for seed from nascent district wholesalers. Pipeline and security problems have delayed food deliveries to IDP camps by more than one month. A lack of capacity of local government departments has led to the poorly timed distribution of FAO-purchased seeds in Gulu District and to the distribution of seed to non-targeted, peri-urban populations in Fort Portal, rather than to the targeted, food-insecure IDPs in Bundibugyo District. In Gulu, inadequate District funding for agricultural extension has limited the amount of technical support provided to the FFW seed multiplication project reducing the quality of seed produced.

4.3 Summary of Issues

When to provide food and seed resources

The complementary provision of both food and seed resources is appropriate when populations are food insecure, and when they do not have their own seed stocks. The duration of food assistance provided and the timing of food provision relative to the distribution of seed depend on: the degree of food insecurity of the target populations; the availability of food and seed supplies; and the degree of security, which will affect the recipients’ access to land.

When farming families have lost both their food and seed stocks, it is necessary to provide food assistance immediately and seeds prior to the following cropping season. Food assistance would generally be continued until the newly planted crops are harvested. At harvest, crop yields should be evaluated and estimates made of the number of months the newly harvested food supply will last. This information can then be used to determine whether crop production is sufficient to warrant the phase-out of food assistance or if food assistance should be continued.

Joint food and seed distributions are necessary when:

• farmers have suffered total crop loss as a result of conflict or natural disaster;
• farmers were displaced as a result of conflict and were not able to harvest their crops;
• farmers were unable to sow their crops the previous season owing to emergency-related disruptions;
• farmers’ food and seed stocks were stolen as a result of rebel attacks; or
• IDPs are returning to their homes or refugees are settling on land allocated to them.

In targeting food and seeds, agencies generally prefer to give seeds with food protection rations even when distributing to communities not targeted for food assistance. Under normal conditions, farmers do not eat their seeds. In the case of an emergency, however, implementing agencies have found that when seeds are distributed without food rations, a proportion of seed is often eaten. In Uganda, fears of increased food insecurity led some beneficiaries to wash and consume the seed obtained from distributions. Consumption of small quantities of bean seed distributed by aid agencies is common in Burundi, especially where access to secure land is tenuous.

Not all emergency situations call for the complementary provision of both food and seed. The provision of seeds is not appropriate for food-insecure populations that do not have access to land and therefore have no hope, in the short term, of restoring their own food security through crop production. This situation commonly applies to refugee populations living in transit camps where population density is high. IDPs living in camps with inadequate access to land are also likely to remain reliant on food assistance unless non-agricultural income-generating opportunities are introduced.

As families become more food secure, seeds may be provided without food assistance. Populations that have lost a particular type of crop (for example, following floods or localized pest attacks) may benefit from the provision of seeds to enable them to replant the affected crop and re-establish their own seed supply. In Mozambique, widespread flooding caused the loss of only one of a range of crops that were in the field at the time. UNHCR provided funds for the provision of seed of Matuba, an early maturing maize variety, to flood-affected families, enabling them to plant a second crop of maize during the following dry season and regain their maize seed stocks (World Vision, 1996). Although the affected populations were former refugees, they were considered to be largely food secure. Therefore, food assistance was unnecessary.

The food ration

The relative timing of food and seed distributions was identified as a crucial issue in all countries studied. Food rations before planting help improve the physical fitness of affected families and give them the strength required to prepare their land for planting. This type of situation is common within a one or two-year period after an emergency, when families have begun to re-establish their agricultural activities, but have not yet opened up sufficient land to guarantee food self-sufficiency. Populations that are receiving seeds, but are not receiving regular food assistance, may benefit from the distribution of a seed-protection food ration just before seed distribution. The objective is to encourage beneficiaries to plant the seeds rather than consume them.

Populations that have suffered partial crop loss the previous season and therefore have limited food and seed stocks need less support, but it should be properly focused. Such populations will be short of food during the pre-harvest "hungry period" or "lean period". They should be provided with an appropriate number of months of food rations to bridge the "hungry period" and also with seed prior to planting. The decision of how many months of food rations to provide before planting must be made on the basis of a careful needs assessment, taking into consideration food and income sources and coping mechanisms. In Uganda, food pipeline problems and district-level security problems resulted in delays in the delivery of food aid to IDP camps. Under such conditions, it is crucial that the seeds are not distributed at a time when the beneficiaries are waiting to receive food rations, as seed consumption must be expected.

In Burundi and Uganda, WFP sometimes used a 15-day food ration for "seed protection". Such rations are minimal only, providing extra food for a very limited period. These rations are provided mainly to prevent seed consumption and to enable beneficiaries to plant the seeds. If planting is delayed for any reason, for example owing to delays in the onset of the rains, food rations of 15 days may be consumed before planting. In addition, where families fear continuing food insecurity, a 15-day ration may not reduce the pressure to consume seeds. Seed-protection rations of 15 days cannot be expected to have a significant effect on the health status of the beneficiaries or on their ability to prepare their land or maintain their crops during the early stages of crop development. It therefore seems more appropriate to distribute at least a one-month seed-protection food ration to avoid such situations.

When food and seed distributions are implemented simultaneously, it is important that the seed is clearly distinguishable from the food. Preferably, the seed should be dyed, packaged and clearly marked. In some cases, NGOs purchase "seed" from local markets, bring it to the distribution site in 50 kg sacks and distribute it by ladling the "seed" into containers or sacks brought by the beneficiaries. If this type of distribution occurs, it is likely that the beneficiaries will confuse the "seed" received from the NGO with other stored food stocks and consume the "seed" by mistake. This should be avoided whenever possible.

It should be noted that beneficiaries who are given seed are less likely to consume it if they have advance notice of the planned seed distribution and have been encouraged to prepare land for planting. They should also be told that the seeds are being provided so that they can produce their own food, and that food rations will be reduced following harvest. If possible, these explanations should be provided by a local government official rather than by implementing agency staff. Where possible, an agricultural technician should also provide advice concerning optimum crop management practices and the importance of selecting and saving seed.

Planning issues

Effective joint programming of food and seed depends on coordination and capacity. Coordination needs to begin early and was most effective when agencies decided together how and where to intervene. The coordination process should begin before programmes and budgets are fixed. This was the case for the OLS in the Sudan and for Burundi. In Uganda, needs assessment and detailed coordination took place at the district level through the DDMC. However, discussions concerning NGO relief programmes and resource allocations were made at the national level, where inter-agency coordination was weak. As representatives of NGOs participating in the DDMC did not have the authority to commit resources or to change programmes to meet emerging needs, NGO programmes tended to be relatively inflexible. In some cases, this resulted in the incomplete coverage of vulnerable populations.

Coordination is also affected by implementing capacity. For example, in Uganda, insufficient local government capacity led to poorly timed delivery of seeds and, in one case, delivery of seeds to non-targeted communities. Also, a lack of FAO technical advice on demand meant that technical support was limited to periodic visits by an international consultant and NGOs were required to seek their own technical advice. In the Sudan, security problems hindered WFP’s logistical capacity and some situations resulted in WFP being unable to provide food rations and seeds according to plan. Limitations in capacity may jeopardize the success of joint distributions and should be considered when implementing partners are selected.

Alternatively, in areas where an agency has a comparative advantage for logistics or implementation this advantage should be used. In Uganda, WFP was able to undertake relief seed distributions and ensure the provision of seeds to communities not reached by other implementing agencies. Similarly in Burundi FAO was able to coordinate information on beneficiary needs, markets and seed quality control for all agencies wishing to implement seed distributions.

Needs assessments and targeting

Innovative approaches to needs assessments and targeting are possible despite the difficulties often inherent in working in a crisis situation. In both Burundi and the Sudan, the household food economy approach helps WFP and its partners assess where joint provision of food and seeds is appropriate. In addition, other information sources such as VAM, FEWS and FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions help identify areas of vulnerability and target resources.

In contrast, in Uganda, despite the availability of various data sources, season-by-season food and seed needs are based largely on district-level estimates collected by implementing agency field staff. For example, although World Vision (Gulu) and Action Contre la Faim (Kitgum) measure crop yields, this information is not always shared with other organizations. Similarly, Investment in Developing Export Agriculture (IDEA) Project publishes information on seed availability that is not regularly used by other agencies when determining seed needs.

Introducing development approaches

In the countries studied, it is hard to ignore a need for rehabilitation and recovery activities given zones of stability exist. These areas have remained outside the conflict for years, but could be brought in at any time. Assistance is needed to meet: basic needs and rebuild livelihoods; the high cost of assistance delivery and the longevity of the crisis, both of which have produced long-term financing concerns, particularly in the Sudan; and, the need to strengthen social and economic capacity, with the aim of laying the foundation to rebuild livelihoods in the event of renewed conflict. In many of these areas aid agencies are unable to maintain a permanent presence because of the threat of insecurity.

Opportunities for introducing development approaches in relief and recovery programmes depend on: the political environment and the degree of security in which programmes are implemented; the willingness of donors to fund development activities; and the innovative capacity of implementing agencies. In Burundi, where reversals in security are frequent, small development aspects have been introduced in joint programmes. For example, one of WFP’s implementing partners has created demonstration vegetable plots and provides vegetable seeds at health centres. Similarly, support to a women’s group FFW scheme combined vegetable gardening techniques with information on the importance of vegetables for nutrition.

In Uganda, WFP and USAID have begun cooperating in monitoring food and seed market prices to provide information on food market developments and where food or seed aid may hinder developing markets. Although agencies have the opportunity to use this information to help nurture district markets by procuring seeds from district wholesalers instead of from national suppliers, they have not yet done so.

Seed multiplication programmes can be established to increase local seed supplies, multiply selected varieties (local and improved) and facilitate germplasm conservation. These activities require a high level of technical management and a secure environment to be effective. Therefore they can only be undertaken in the later stages of recovery. While seed multiplication can be supported initially through FFW projects (at the pilot stage), this activity should move as quickly as possible to a financially viable enterprise, supported preferably by credit.

FFW may be used to implement a range of agricultural development interventions. It can be used to create pilot farms using improved seed varieties. The food provides participants with the energy to work on the land and the farm promotes agricultural technology dissemination. FFW programmes can also be used to help construct local seed stores, seed banks, grain banks or warehouses, with the objective of maintaining seed supplies and improving food security. Fruit tree nurseries or agro-forestry tree nurseries can also be initiated and maintained through FFW.

4.4 Technical considerations

The Uganda case study highlighted a situation where poor seed quality and inappropriate varieties resulted in the failure of relief seed distributions and delays in the programmed reduction of food assistance to resettled refugees. On the other hand, the Burundi case study showed how the provision of technical guidelines and seed quality control helped guarantee the success of seed relief interventions.

The choice of food and seed distributed depends on a variety of factors:

• In relief situations, the choice of seed crop often complements the food aid basket. In Burundi, WFP’s food basket consists mainly of maize, which is less susceptible to theft and raiding. Simultaneously, FAO has focused seed relief on the principal staple crop - beans - and on vegetables, for their nutritional value and potential to generate income. Although farming families in Burundi grow a wide range of crops, beans are universally grown and represent the preferred food source. Beans also have a short growing season, making it possible to plant three crops a year. They can be grown on limited land areas, therefore they are the most appropriate choice for re-establishing agricultural production. In southern Sudan, staple crops such as maize and groundnut are distributed to help people cope with lean periods and gaps in food assistance.
• In many cases, implementing agencies may choose to distribute seeds for a range of crops as a way of helping to restore diversity to the farmers’ cropping system. In Burundi, NGOs would like to begin distributing a wider range of seeds and/or location-specific crops, such as rice for the low-lying areas. FAO is currently reviewing the options in terms of crops to be distributed. In Uganda, an improved maize variety developed by the Uganda Seed Project is being widely distributed as it produces higher yields while requiring no additional inputs and it fits in with the Government’s "Modernization of Agriculture" strategy. Although hybrid maize is commercially available, it is not considered appropriate for seed relief interventions, as seed must be purchased each season.

The provision of guidelines by FAO's Emergency Unit concerning the choice of crop and variety, appropriate seed quality specifications, recommended suppliers, and the regular implementation of seed germination tests prior to seed delivery has helped to ensure that seed distributed in Burundi is appropriate and of good quality. Although similar technical expertise is available in Uganda from the Kawanda Agricultural Research Institute, a lack of agency and donor consensus on the need for technical guidelines has meant that technical inputs are insufficient to ensure both the quality and timing of seed deliveries.

Funding issues

Differences in donor requirements and funding mechanisms can cause difficulties in funding food and seed programmes. For example, the funding of food and seed is often undertaken through different funding channels and ministries. Agencies are therefore required to submit separate funding proposals and meet different requirements.

In Uganda, the European Commission provides food assistance through the European Community Humanitarian Office and funding for seed programmes is limited to relief seed needs, and does not cover developmental activities such as support to developing seed systems. Meanwhile, the United States Government supports relief activities through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Title II Food for Peace funds and development activities through USAID, especially with IDEA Project funds. OFDA has specific technical requirements for NGOs undertaking seed programmes, including ensuring food protection rations in food-insecure areas. However, OFDA funds are limited to a year. Beyond this, Title II or other funds must be accessed.

In a typical situation, WFP seeks funding for food for its main caseload, adding an estimation of the food required solely for seed-protection rations. NGOs raise funds separately for seed provisioning. As NGOs are often budget constrained, few are able to undertake programmes if they do not have money in their accounts. Yet donors’ regular funding mechanisms have to go through several layers of audit control, which means that once a project is approved, funds may not reach an NGO for a further six months. For this reason, NGOs tend to submit annual project proposals, which limits their ability to respond to unexpected increases in need during the year.

In Burundi, owing to the fluid nature of rebel incursions and insecurity, donors and agencies are more willing to support the pooling of funding for seeds and the provision of food assistance on an ad hoc basis. Although TCOR’s funds in support for the Emergency Coordinator last for a year, bilateral donations have already been received to allow FAO to continue to play a coordinating role.

4.5 Appropriate Roles of Major Stakeholders

Where possible, the role of the different United Nations agencies in an emergency should reflect their mandates. WFP would normally assume responsibility for the provision of food assistance. WFP also has a comparative advantage when it comes to logistics, and is able to provide such support (warehouse facilities and/or transport) to other United Nations agencies or to NGOs planning to implement either food or seed distributions.

According to FAO's Mission Statement, "FAO may field an Emergency Coordinator, for up to one year, to coordinate monitoring and assessment activities, provision of agricultural inputs, and planning for recovery and rehabilitation of rural production systems if the nature of the emergency so requires" (FAO, 1997a). In countries where FAO does not have an Emergency Coordinator, other United Nations agencies have become involved in the purchase of seed and its distribution to support populations not targeted by other organizations. For example, WFP was involved in the distribution of seeds purchased by the Ugandan Government in 1998. UNICEF has also distributed seeds and tools in a number of emergencies, including those that occurred in Rwanda, Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Sudan. It is not clear whether, in such situations, it is more appropriate for other United Nations agencies to become involved in seed relief, or for FAO to ensure that an Emergency Coordinator is in place in countries that require emergency support. Even in situations where FAO does not have an Emergency Coordinator, it should seek to provide in-country capacity for technical advice to organizations implementing agricultural relief interventions.

Appropriate government ministries are usually involved in requesting emergency assistance and in the coordination of emergency interventions. In some cases, they are also involved in implementation. However, a lack of resources and capacity are the main limitations to their direct involvement in food and seed distribution. Successful counterpart relationships between implementing agencies and government staff are relatively common at the national level, where national capacity is the greatest. At the local level, however, local government capacity can be limited and implementing agencies are usually under pressure to deliver relief resources as quickly and efficiently as possible while meeting appropriate standards of accountability. Often the situation-specific circumstances can mean that developing counterpart relationships and building capacity receives much less attention than it deserves. Implementing agencies should work as closely as possible with national and local government counterparts to strengthen their capacity to respond to emergencies in the future.

Some NGOs programme food and/or seed through local partners. Such arrangements offer valuable experience in partnership issues, help to develop indigenous capacity for emergency response and development planning, and encourage community participation in the programming of aid. However, local partners are generally not able to handle large volumes of relief supplies, have limited administrative and reporting capacity, and require close monitoring and control. Nevertheless, United Nations agencies and international NGOs should be encouraged to develop partnerships with local organizations. Working with local NGOs is particularly important as a relief programme becomes reoriented towards recovery, as such partnerships can be instrumental in encouraging beneficiary participation in problem identification and in the definition and development of appropriate responses.

Although some NGOs can have a strong geographical focus, they should be encouraged to "buy-into" national emergency programmes and to provide resources that can be used by themselves in their own area of intervention, as well as by other agencies operating in other provinces. For example, in Burundi, FAO, Christian Aid and the Ministry of Agriculture purchased seed that was distributed by NGOs throughout the country.

The involvement of affected communities in the planning and implementation of relief interventions is generally limited in large-scale emergencies, particularly where the relief programme is well-coordinated at the national level. In Burundi, for example, decisions concerning the crops to be included in the "seed relief package" were made by the FAO Emergency Coordination Unit. Although NGOs expressed interest in diversifying the seed relief package, they sought approval from FAO first before making such modifications. In the case of Uganda, however, where clear guidelines on crop choice were not available, implementing agencies first consulted the beneficiaries concerning their preferences and then confirmed this selection with the District Agriculture Officer and finally with the NARS. Although guidelines are important, they should not be too rigid.

In some cases, beneficiaries have been involved in identifying their basic needs, in developing their own solutions and in carrying out the relief response. Such community participation can result in a locally relevant response with effective, transparent targeting, and also contributes to longer-term development objectives, such as capacity-building, women’s empowerment and community empowerment. Community participation in relief interventions is most effective when relationships between the implementing agency and the target communities are well established, and when the agency has a large team of local field staff. The OLS operation in the Sudan is a good example of a large operation working effectively with local communities in situations of inadequate local implementing capacity.

As an emergency situation begins to stabilize, beneficiaries are able to increase their participation in recovery and rehabilitation programmes: in terms of organization, management and commitment; and, to contribute to the activity, for example in the form of labour, local materials, seeds, etc. This increased participation promotes a sense of "community ownership" of the programme. Indeed, beneficiary participation is seen as an essential ingredient to successful implementation and the effectiveness of rehabilitation activities.

Agencies implementing emergency relief and rehabilitation interventions have a responsibility to help build local capacity at all levels: government and national authority counterparts, NGOs, beneficiary communities and the beneficiaries themselves. Unfortunately, the short-term nature of funding for relief and rehabilitation activities makes it difficult to include capacity-building, a long-term activity, as a project objective. Nevertheless, capacity-building should be an unwritten objective of all implementing agencies’ activities. New working relationships must be adopted to give more responsibility to the affected populations and their leaders.

5. CONSTRAINTS TO JOINT PROGRAMMING OF FOOD AND SEED RESOURCES

The slow response to support recovery and rehabilitation is in part influenced by decreasing donor budgets and by concerns about the ability to sustain the high level of emergency assistance required to meet basic survival needs. Constraints to providing support for rehabilitation include:

• instability and the risk of activity reversal. There is also a fear that the creation of assets will encourage attacks by any of the parties engaged in conflict;
• the lack of continual and timely access to needy areas;
• the lack of markets and limited trade possibilities;
• short-term funding arrangements (as mentioned above);
• weak implementation capacity of counterparts and their intimidation of NGOs and communities; and
• a weak information base including little socio-economic data with which to identify transition needs and potential responses.

The principal constraints to joint food and seed programming, highlighted by the case studies, are related to: planning, needs assessment and targeting, funding, and technical issues. Major constraints include:

5.1 Planning issues

• poor coordination of the two resources, particularly when each resource is being provided by a different organization, resulting in their untimely delivery;
• deterioration in security, logistical problems such as cuts in WFP’s pipeline or flooded roads, and lack of transport result in irregular food provisioning and reductions in the size of seed-protection rations, or their cancellation; and
• limited capacity to implement community-based development activities.

5.2 Needs assessment and targeting

• poorly coordinated assessment and targeting procedures with different agencies using different approaches; and
• improperly assessing the needs of communities and providing free food and seeds at inappropriate times, impeding coping strategy recovery and market development.

5.3 Technical considerations

• inadequate warehouse facilities may result in the need to store food and chemically treated seed in the same warehouse, and inadequate seed and food storage conditions may adversely affect seed and food quality; and
• limited availability of seed of the most appropriate varieties, which may result in: the distribution of poorer quality seed or of seed of less appropriate varieties; a reduction in the quantity of seed distributed per family; or, a reduction in the number of beneficiaries.

5.4 Funding issues

• relief funds are time-limited and funds for longer term activities, such as seed multiplication and testing of new varieties, are more difficult to obtain; and
• complications regarding who obtains funds and how quickly reduces responsiveness to needs as there is a very narrow window of time in which to propose projects for funding, receive the funds, and then deliver the resources.

6. OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE EFFECTIVE AND COMPLEMENTARY programming

The review of the literature and the case studies identified a number of opportunities for improving the joint programming of food and seed resources. These opportunities span a number of technical and financial areas, including programme planning, needs assessments, targeting and funding arrangements and involve all stakeholders. WFP and FAO can strengthen their coordinating relationship, particularly at the field level. Improved coordination will ensure that food and seed assistance are complementary and that beneficiaries optimize the potential of the two resources.

6.1 Planning Issues

• Where FAO has an Emergency Coordination Unit, it should take the lead among the UN agencies in coordinating seed relief in response to emergency situations. Where FAO does not have an Emergency Coordination Unit, another means of coordination should be sought. The provision of food rations should be coordinated with WFP.
• As WFP often has a comparative advantage in terms of logistical capacity, it is advisable that FAO seeks this support from WFP for the distribution of seeds, particularly in insecure areas.
• Emergency distribution plans for the coming season should be discussed with the local coordination committee as soon as possible to ensure effective coordination of the distribution of all complementary relief supplies (food, seeds, tools and non-food items) and to maximize the efficiency of their distribution. Although not always logistically feasible, an attempt should be made to distribute the hand tools before the seeds, to enable the farmers to use the tools to prepare their land for planting.
• Where feasible, project proposals should cover more than one cropping season and be as flexible as possible in terms of their geographic focus. In this way:
• funding can be secured for more than one season;
• the joint provision of food and seed resources can be programmed in advance; and
• the second season seeds can be purchased in a timely manner.
• Implementing partners should be selected on the basis of prior experience in the delivery of seed and/or food relief. When it is necessary to work with a new implementing partner, including the local Government, it is advisable to consult other donors/agencies working in the area concerning their capacity to implement relief distributions, and to provide close initial monitoring.

6.2 Needs Assessment and Targeting

• Where the joint programming of food and seed resources is considered appropriate, an assessment should be made to determine when food resources should be provided to maximize the impact of the seed distribution on the food self-sufficiency of the target populations.

• Needs assessment information should be developed at the provincial/district level. United Nations assessment missions should be involved in needs assessment and the definition of appropriate responses. Such missions should assess the needs of the affected populations in terms of food and non-food resources (including seeds and tools) to ensure more effective joint programming of all resources.

• There is a need to look objectively at the data being generated by different mechanisms such as WFP’s VAM, USAID’s FEWS, and NGOs to identify ways of making better use of this information. For example, implementing agencies should be encouraged to measure crop yields at harvest, particularly in food-insecure regions. The data obtained can then be used to give a dynamic picture of changes in regional food supply. By sharing information, agencies can better determine if and when assistance will be required, and for how long.

• WFP should continue to be flexible in providing seed-protection food rations to populations not normally targeted to receive WFP food assistance. However, adequate coordination between the seed distributing agency and WFP is essential.

• Village relief committees are an important mechanism for improving the effectiveness of assistance. Efforts should be made to avoid duplication of committees and to coordinate their participation in planning, targeting and distribution of all resources.

6.3 Integrating Development Approaches

• Implementing agencies should attempt to replace free food and seed distribution as soon as possible with more sustainable activities that strengthen livelihoods and build self-reliance and resilience against future shocks. Examples include a variety of production-based activities, FFW asset creation and rehabilitation activities that satisfy the need for seeds, such as seed exchanges, seed loans, seed multiplication, seed banking, seed sales, and the establishment of seed agents. Seed produced by seed multiplication projects could be purchased by NGOs to satisfy relief needs.

• Where NGOs have the capacity to implement agricultural development activities, they should be encouraged to initiate simple agricultural development programmes in parallel to their relief interventions. Appropriate development activities may include: the evaluation of improved agricultural technologies together with farming communities; the initiation of seed multiplication activities; the promotion of fruit and horticultural crops; and the promotion of appropriate seed storage technology. FFW could be used for seed multiplication schemes involving farmers’ organizations or women’s groups, for the planting and maintenance of fruit-tree nurseries and for the construction of seed stores, grain banks or grain warehouses.

• One of the problems that farmers face while attempting to re-establish their agricultural production following an emergency is a lack of opportunity to market their produce. Many NGOs implementing agricultural development programmes work with farmers’ organizations to help them sell their produce. WFP could play a role in such programmes by establishing links with such farmers’ organizations as part of its local purchase programme.

• Activities designed to raise awareness among families attending therapeutic or supplementary feeding programmes of the importance of vegetables in the diet represent a good opportunity for the joint programming of food and seed resources. While therapeutic/ supplementary food rations are provided to restore the nutritional status of individuals attending feeding centres, vegetable seeds can be purchased to plant vegetable production demonstration plots and for distribution to care providers as they are discharged from such centres.

6.4 Technical Guidelines and Quality Control

• A set of guidelines should be prepared and made available to implementing agencies, specifying appropriate crops/varieties by agro-ecological zone, seed quality specifications for each crop and tool quality specifications. Seed quality specifications should include information on the minimum percentage germination, minimum purity percentage, and maximum moisture content, by crop. These guidelines should be prepared by local experts with input from either the FAO Emergency Coordination Unit or by the designated lead agency, as appropriate.

• A list of recommended suppliers of seeds and tools should also be made available to implementing agencies. Suppliers should be recommended on the basis of their performance in terms of timely delivery and the provision of high quality inputs. The list of suppliers should be regularly reviewed and updated, if necessary. Purchasers should be prepared to reject the lowest bid, in cases where quality may be prejudiced.

• Phytosanitary certificates provided by seed suppliers as part of their bid for the seed tender do not guarantee that the seeds supplied will meet the seed quality specifications. To ensure that the seed delivered is of good quality:

• procedures to test seed quality (purity, percentage germination and humidity) should be established and appropriate facilities identified;
• seed samples should be taken by the purchasing agency, either during the transfer of the seed from the supplier’s warehouse onto their trucks or, if this is not possible, immediately upon delivery in the implementing agency’s warehouse; and
• seed samples should immediately be sent to the recommended seed testing facility(ies) for purity, germination and humidity tests.

• All agencies purchasing seed for relief interventions should be encouraged to include the following in their seed contracts/tenders:

• a delivery date for each destination;
• a clause that states that they have the right to carry out an independent evaluation of seed quality either during the transfer of the seeds from the supplier’s warehouse to the trucks or upon delivery; and
• penalties for late delivery and poor seed quality.

• When certified seed is available, implementing agencies should be encouraged to purchase it rather than commercial seed. When certified seed is not available, commercial seed rather than uncleaned food grain should be purchased.

• Implementing agencies should be encouraged to place their seed orders with the supplier as early as possible, to guarantee delivery of the correct quantity of good quality seed and thus enable joint food and seed operations to be carried out successfully. Relief agencies should consider contracting seed companies or professional growers to multiply specified quantities of seed of selected varieties proven to be adapted to the target environment.

• Agricultural research organizations should attempt to generate more information concerning low-input agricultural systems as a disaster preparedness and mitigation strategy. Whenever possible, this work should be done in collaboration with NGOs implementing agricultural development programmes, as a way of exchanging information and sharing research results.

6.5 Funding Mechanisms

• Recovery funds should be made available to support livelihood systems and the re-establishment of local and national seed supply systems. Such activities could be carried out as part of a relief/recovery proposal, or as part of a parallel development programme.

• Special relief funds, which can be accessed relatively quickly, are particularly useful to the joint programming of food and seeds. While these funds are limited to relief interventions they enable agencies to supply both food and seeds in a timely manner.

• More flexible and longer-term funding mechanisms will allow implementing agencies to incorporate both emergency relief and simple "development" activities, such as seed multiplication schemes in their funding proposals.

6.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

• The complementary distribution of food and seed resources can be appropriate during all phases from relief to development. Simple monitoring of joint food and seed operations should be carried out to determine whether the resources have been effectively used and to identify ways to improve ongoing and future interventions.

• Monitoring and evaluation must go beyond simply monitoring the logistical performance (quantity of food distributed, number of beneficiaries receiving food and/or seeds), and examine the effect of food and seed resources on the target communities, considering issues of timing, appropriateness of the food ration, seed varieties, and distribution mechanisms.

7. References

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