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Case Studies
EMERGENCY SEED SUPPLY IN AFGHANISTAN
N. S. Tunwar
FAO Senior Technical Adviser (Seed)
Herat, Afghanistan
Executive Summary
This paper describes a case study of the Seed Programme being implemented since 1988 in Afghanistan weakened already by years of war, and further stripped of personnel after the collapse of the communist government.
Afghanistan is a small, land-locked country and its strategic importance lies in its extensive border with various countries and its proximity to the Gulf. The climate over most of the country is arid and semiarid with rainfall ranging from 100mm to 400mm. Orogenic processes are still active as evidenced by time to time seismic vibrations taking place in Afghanistan. Recently, two major earthquakes hit Badakhshan and Takhar provinces killing more than 4,000 people and causing large scale damage to the property. The total area of the country is 65.2 million hectares and only 7.6 million hectares or 11.6% is cultivable. The total area under annual crops is approximately 3.7 million ha i.e. 5.6 % of the total land area.
The war has had a devastating effect on Afghanistan. It has killed at least a million people, maimed and disabled many more and created an army of orphans and widows. Agriculture has been the hardest hit by the perpetual internal conflict. By 1988-89, the total crop area declined by more than one-fourth (28%) and the aggregate production in real terms has fallen nearly by as much (25%). One of the war’s legacies is that, although food production was seriously reduced, growing of poppy flourished to such an extent that Afghanistan ranked first. Once thriving villages have become desolate ruins of mud; orchards, vineyards and terraced hillside fields are dead or overgrown; and farms are littered with millions of mines.
The importance of good seed was recognized in Afghanistan in early 1970`s. The Afghan Seed Company (ASC) was established in 1976 as a Government Joint Stock Company to help in developing seed industry in the country. Later its name was changed as Improved Seed Enterprise (ISE). The Headquarters of the Enterprise was in Kabul and it had several sub-offices in different provinces. The UNDP/FAO helped ISE through a Seed Production and Training Project, AFG/86/010 and established various facilities. The ISE functioned as an effective counter part in government controlled area up to April 1992. At the time of collapse of Dr. Najibulah government most facilities were lost due to large scale looting which followed the change in the regime. Following the signing of the Geneva Accord in 1988, a second focal point based in Pakistan was opened for across-border areas not controlled by government.
The programme was funded through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes for Afghanistan (UNOCA), now called UNOCHA. A number of international donors and UNDP supported the programme. Major contribution was received from the Governments of the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Norway and the EEC.
The main aim of the seed programme from its onset in 1988 was to create a situation in rural Afghanistan conducive to the return of refugees and displaced families and start to redress the damage wrought by the war and assistance for agricultural rehabilitation. Food production and security are the essential and fundamental starting point and seed security and food security comes one after another in the sequence of an agricultural rehabilitation programme. The FAO seed programme sought to expand and sustain the use of improved seed through various activities - on-farm trials, selection, production, outside procurement, in-country seed production, networking, distribution, and popularization of certified seed. Fertilizer was also distributed to maximize the benefits offered by the improved seed. It was not very easy to implement the programme under an ever-changing security and political situation. Such complex problems called for an imaginative implementation methodology of diversification and sustainability to remedy the situation rather than pursuing a typical programme. A vigorous and flexible calendar of operations for all stages had to be drawn up in advance and vigorously implemented. Even economic principle which dictates production of seed in a compact area was deliberately ignored to reach more farmers in isolated and inaccessible areas. The decentralization of the seed production was preferred. A diffuse approach consisting of large number of small seed producing pockets was adopted to ensure that farmers of every region and every stratum of society could benefit from the programme.
The FAO Programme has established in pragmatic ways that the provision of high quality seed and planting material (SPM) to Afghan farmers is one of the most cost-effective and economical forms of emergency aid. An integrated approach has been developed for marshalling, delivering and monitoring inputs. An informal back-up support network has been developed by the Programme. This encompasses the public and private sectors. Collaboration with another UN agencies proved very fruitful. Food-for-seed was designed in collaboration of the WFP. The wheat seed was exchanged at a rate of 1:1.25 for wheat grain supplied by the World Food Programme. This ensured that seed growers had enough food to feed their own families and that a large proportion of their seed crops would travel out of the production areas to other farmers specially in food deficit areas. It also helped to make considerable savings of funds. A Fund Management Committee and a Seed Review Group were constituted to manage funds generated as sale proceeds and to advise on all matters relating to seed. More than US $ two million have been generated as sale proceeds and deposited in a separate account in Pakistan.
A number of constraints had to be overcome. Despite these constraints, more than 97% of the inputs did reach the farmers. By 1997, the Programme had distributed more than 48,413 MT seeds, mainly through NGOs and private voluntary organizations. The programme has been extremely successful and innovative. It continues to play a vital role in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's agricultural production base after twenty years of conflict. As a result, it has been possible for many thousands of refugees and displaced families to return to their villages in Afghanistan with some expectation of being able to support themselves.
The FAO's Afghanistan seed programme provides many useful lessons. The most significant lesson of all that FAO has learned in Afghanistan is the importance of trusting the individual’s own thrust for development. By keeping its intervention small and sharply focused on specific areas and problems it has provided the initial lift that the majority of Afghan farmers in need of before embarking on their own climb upwards to self-sufficiency.
In a world increasingly faced with human tragedies beyond the capabilities of governments to respond effectively, this Programme provides lessons that (with local modifications) will be relevant elsewhere.
1. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAMME / PROJECT ACTIVITIES
General description of Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a small, land-locked country and lies between 29
o40' and 38o40' northern latitude and between 60o31' and 75o00' eastern longitude on the mountainous and desert areas where the Iranian Plateau borders with the mountainous systems of Central Asia. Afghanistan's strategic importance lies in its extensive border with various countries and its proximity to the Gulf. These factors have also influenced the pattern of international relations and recent historical events.The climate over most of the country is arid and semiarid with rainfall ranging from 100mm to 400mm. The country is usually divided into four geographic regions. The northern plains at altitudes of around 400 m have a rainfall of 25 cm per year and provide the main agricultural lands. This area is watered by the Amu Daria and its tributaries. The central mountains reach an altitude of 5,700 m and the snow line in winter creeps down to 2,000 m. The eastern and south-eastern hills and foothills have elevations of 1,300 to 2,300 m and they contain the forest areas of the country. The southern and western lowlands are at altitudes of between 330 and 1,000 m and contain the western desert area of the country where rainfall is as low as 100 mm per year. Through this region flow two major rivers, the Hari Rud and Helmand. Topographical conditions have hampered the development of internal transportation and resulted in the physical isolation of village settlements.
Orogenic processes are still active as evidenced by time to time seismic vibrations taking place in Afghanistan. Recently, two major earthquakes hit Badakhshan and Takhar provinces killing more than 4,000 people and causing large scale damage to the property.
Cultivable area and crop production (Pre-War Era)
The total area of the country is 65.2 million hectares (ha) and due to too steep topography or dry deserts only 7.6 million ha or 11.6 percent is cultivable. The total area under annual crops is approximately 3.7 million hectares, i.e. 5.6 percent of the total land area. Though it is believed that 70 percent of this area is under irrigation but only a small part is under assured irrigation and capable to grow double crops and attain 200 percent crop intensity. Due to unreliable water supply only one crop is grown annually in the major area classified as irrigated. Nevertheless, irrigated area provides roughly 77 percent of all wheat and 85 percent of all food and industrial crops, according to pre-1978 statistics.
The country’s main crop is wheat (2.348 million ha in 1978 and 2.124 million ha in 1998). Maize occupies second place (0.482 ha in 1978 and 0.200 ha in 1998) and is grown in the eastern provinces. Barley and rice are also important cereal crops. Rice is mainly grown in the Logar, Laghman and Kunduz valleys while barley and leguminous plants are grown mainly in the mountainous areas. Cotton and oil seeds are produced in the north of the country. Orchards and vineyards can be found all over the country.
Nature of devastation during the war and situation under which the seed programme was implemented
Destruction caused by war was visible every where at the time of launching of the programme. Although no accurate information is available, the destruction caused by the war has been extensive and in some areas of the country extremely severe. Perhaps more than one million Afghans have been killed since 1978; another 250,000-300,000 have been seriously injured (a large number becoming permanently disabled). Over 5 million Afghans became refugees. The country has probably lost 90 percent of its intelligentsia. Some lost their lives but the majority went abroad. How many will return to Afghanistan is an open question. It is estimated that perhaps one half country’s population was uprooted at one time or another; the psychological damage to the young and old is said to be considerable. There has been a rapid rise in the rate of illiteracy. It is estimated that 80 percent of the young boys and 90 percent girls are now illiterate teenagers. Lack of food and high prices have reduced the level of nutrition of the population. Tuberculosis has shot up sharply. Most critical is the psychological and emotional disorder of the affected population.
It is the rural areas that have suffered the most severe economic losses. The destruction is not uniform; in some areas the damage has been more severe than others. It is estimated that one-third of the villages in Afghanistan have been destroyed or severely damaged. Heavy damage to the irrigation networks (both modern and traditional like the Karez), destruction of orchards along the main highways as a protection against attacks on military convoys is visible everywhere. Loss of commercial agriculture and resort to subsistence cultivation, leading to considerable decline in yields per hectare is another form of destruction. The country was self sufficient in food production but it has been devastated by over two decades of war. This sector has been the hardest hit by the perpetual internal conflict. By 1988-89, the total crop area declined by more than one-fourth (28%) and the aggregate production in real terms has fallen nearly by as much (25%).
Historical background of the Afghan seed programme
At first, Afghanistan lacked the necessary seed industry infrastructure to make seed available to farmers in sufficient quantity with assured quality. During 1970`s, a significant start was made to setup a state run seed industry, leading up to formation of the Afghan Seed Company (ASC) in 1976 as a Government Joint Stock Company with a view to performing specified tasks as regards the production, processing, testing, certification, distribution and sale of seeds and granting official permits for any sale and distribution of seeds and laying down labeling requirements. Its management was vested in the then Supreme Council and the Executive Board. Later on its name was changed as Improved Seed Enterprise (ISE) and 21 farms were transferred for seed production of various crops. These farms had a total area of 11768.27 ha and 5504.87 ha area under cultivation. The Headquarters of the Enterprise was in Kabul and it had several sub-offices in different provinces. The Improved Seed Enterprise and the Department of Extension and Production started improved seed production of vegetables through the UNDP/FAO assisted Seed Production and Training Project, AFG/86/010 (Phase I and II). The project established various facilities such as seed testing laboratories, vegetable seed processing facilities, five small seed production and training farms and a training center. Great emphasis was placed on improving trained manpower in various aspects of seed production technology. The activities of this project were later taken over by Seed Improvement Programme of Northern Afghanistan (AFG/93/001) with the main objective to promote the production and multiplication of high quality cereal seeds and seedlings of vegetables and saplings of fruit trees for distribution to farmers with a view to increase supply of food, fresh vegetables and fruits necessary for improving the nutritional standard of the people.
The above arrangement continued up to April 1992. At the time of collapse of Dr. Najibulah's government, all facilities were lost due to large scale looting which followed the change in the regime and continued for several years. The linkage and coordination between central office and provincial offices was completely broken down and few provincial units are now working directly under the control of respective provincial authorities. Four provincial units of Improved Seed Enterprise namely Herat, Pulekhumri, Mazar and Kabul are still functioning as Implementing Partners (IPs) of the seed programme. The breeder and foundation seed are produced at different farms of ISE while quality seed is produced under the contract seed producer's scheme with the assistance from seed component of AFG/96/004. The sale proceeds of breeder and foundation seed is used by the individual ISE units to pay salary and wages of its staff and to meet day to day expenditure. It has created an extra enthusiasm to produce more seed so that more could be earned. Until further institutional support can be developed, these arrangements are likely to continue.
Following the signing of the Geneva Accord in 1988, a second focal point based in Pakistan was opened for across-border areas not controlled by government. The first seed orders were placed with seed growers in Pakistan during 1988. The base was set up in Islamabad. Sub-bases are in Peshawar (for access by the Khyber and through Khost) and Quetta ( for access by the Khojk pass). From then until the conclusion of the campaign December 1997, more than 48,413 MT of high quality seeds of various crops have been delivered to more than 1,000,000 rural families (approximately 7.50 million people) in Afghanistan, in almost all provinces. Up to 1995 the programme was funded through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes for Afghanistan (UNOCA). Later major contribution came from a core fund of UNDP. A number of international donors namely the Governments of the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Norway and the EEC also contributed generously. The life of the present programme is up to December 1999.
1.1. Objectives
The main objective of the Seed Programme has been to establish basic household food security in accessible areas of Afghanistan and, in the process, to develop an in-country sustainable capacity for seed multiplication to internationally accepted standards, in support of Afghanistan's agriculture rehabilitation and development process.
The Afghanistan Seed Programme could be divided into two phases namely: Emergency phase (1988- 1994) and Rehabilitation phase (1995 onward). Accordingly, objectives of both phases slightly differ from each other.
Emergency seed supply programme
The project was part of the operation Salam and from the outset, operation Salam and its UN Family Members recognized the importance of improved seed as a catalyst for agricultural, relief, rehabilitation, and development. Under FAO leadership, the team approach to emergency seed aid was further developed, and ultimately included in the UN Plan of Action, 1990. One apparent consequence of the breakdown of the agricultural system has been a degeneration in the genetic potential of principal field crops due to the lack of timely replacement with new seeds. The initial aim of the FAO programme was to get as much good seed of suitable varieties to as many farmers in the region as possible, depending on availability of resources. The Action Plan envisaged the following objective:
"The major thrust of the seed programme will be the reintroduction of improved seed, since there has been a drastic genetic deterioration of seed materials during war years. The supply of good certified seed of suitable varieties and in sufficient quantities will be assured. In parallel, assistance will be provided to strengthen the institutional arrangements for the production of improved seeds."
The emergency seed programme was based on the following premises:
- to support returnees, and
- to restore food production through a package of inputs.
To encourage displaced populations and refugees to return to formally productive agricultural area, two requirements were paramount:
. to help rehabilitate neglected and abandoned irrigation systems, because agriculture in these regions is particularly dependent on irrigation; and
. to ensure that, as far as possible, returnees and resident farmers have access to good quality seed of high yielding, disease resistant varieties of crops suitable for local conditions along with matching quantity of fertilizer.
Rehabilitation phase
The main objective was to establish basic household food security in accessible areas of Afghanistan and, in the process, to develop an in-country sustainable capacity for seed multiplication to internationally accepted standards, in support of Afghanistan's agriculture rehabilitation and development process. This includes:
. expanding the in-country seed production and processing capabilities to meet farmers demand of various seeds;
. expanding the seed production and processing capabilities to meet national demands;
. establishing a contract seed distribution network in various provinces;
. promoting national enterprises to enter into seed business;
. assuring, through the provision of high quality seed (supplied with matching fertilizer), timely, in-country production of seed for major crops; and
. establishing a network of seed units in the areas not covered earlier, specializing in maintaining, securing and producing seed of various classes through appropriate implementing partners (NGOs).
1.2. Implementation Methodologies
Emergency phase
The Geneva Accord was signed in February 1988, and humanitarian and economic assistance programmes mounted soon after. Operation Salam was officially launched on October 12, 1988 coordinated by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. Following the signing of the Geneva Accord various aid agencies including Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) launched emergency seed programme in Afghanistan. It was clear at the outset that significant improvements in crop production were required to feed the resident and returnee population of the country and to reduce the necessity for food aid. Seed was one of the essential tools to achieve this goal, and was therefore a major priority in all agricultural rehabilitation programmes.
The first funds for the FAO seed programme based in Pakistan became available to the FAO through UNOCA during September 1988, resulting from a donation from the Government of the Netherlands. Follow up funds were also provided through UNOCA, by the Government of Japan, for various aspects of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme, of which the seed programme was part.
Immediately scanning of all available research and trial records was started to identify suitable cultivars so that seed of these could be procured from the country of origin. The cultivars were identified on the basis of: (a) previous trials conducted both inside Afghanistan, and other agro-ecological analogues, as well as, (b) international advice from Afghan specialists, FAO Experts, and the appropriate CGIAR Centers. Fortunately, there is considerable agro-ecological overlap between Afghanistan and other neighboring countries. Historically this has facilitated the systematic identification and import of seeds of new plant varieties. This made the task of identification of adapted varieties easy.
Naturally, in the beginning sufficient quantity of certified seed of "identified" crops and cultivars was not available any where in the world. Accordingly, a systematic "seed industry approach" had to be developed. Because of the agricultural calendar, this involved ordering seed, up to eleven months ahead of delivery. Considering the short period between harvesting and planting seed of many these crops and cultivars in the Northern Hemisphere, it was decided to order fresh seed from neighboring countries such as Pakistan, India and Iran so that it could be delivered to staging areas for Afghanistan well in time for onward dispatch, according to the local agricultural calendar. Peshawar and Quetta were selected as staging areas due to their proximity to Afghanistan and presence of more than three million refugees in these towns. "Recommended" wheat cultivars Pak-81 and PS-85 and Sonalika and HD-2285 for example, were developed in Pakistan and India respectively by leading wheat breeders, from CIMMYT material. Their participation, and that of concerned seed certification agencies considerably reduced the risk, and cost of developing a separate emergency seed infrastructure for producing early generation and certified seed in support of the Afghan seed programme.
From the beginning of the programme, it was known that there are numerous other national selections available in neighboring countries from material resulting from the CIMMYT wheat programme which also had/have a very good chance of performing as well as, if not better than identified varieties. Search for other varieties continued and small quantities were procured and tested inside Afghanistan. During 1988-89, a total of 2,300 MT of certified wheat seed was ordered/delivered to staging areas close to the Pak/Afghan border (Quetta and Peshawar) according to international standards and prices.
Considering that funds will be available for next four -five years orders for seed of selected crop species following recognized international seed industry standards and procedures were raised in the field as either Local Purchase Orders, or Purchase Requisitions. All seed was purchased according to international standards, at international prices, on the basis of guidelines cleared through FAO HQ, based on ISTA recommendations. These guidelines were, by design, suited to rehabilitating the seed industry in Afghanistan, as well as providing emergency seed aid.
In Pakistan, seed was produced on order both by the public and private sectors with the strict supervision of Federal Seed Certification Department (FSCD) under Pakistan's Seed Act, including the services of concerned:
(a) Officers of the Technical Division, FAO HQ;
(b) The consultants and trained Afghan graduate consultants; and
(c) Qualified international and national scientists and technicians, including concerned plant breeders from Pakistan Agriculture Research Council (PARC) and National Agriculture Research Council (NARC).
This seed was produced over and above the local targets to avoid any inconvenience to the host country and negative effect on its seed supply plan.
All seed was treated with fungicide and insecticide. The contents of bags were clearly marked on bags including warnings (in English and Persian) of the toxicity of seed to humans and animals. Seed was supplied double bagged, complete with a certificate of origin (including pedigree), FSCD quality certificates, a valid phytosanitary certificate, and independent superintendence, arranged by FAO HQ.
Seed deliveries were made as a package with fertilizer. Suitable national and international NGOs were appointed as Implementing Partners (IPs) to distribute seed and fertilizer inside Afghanistan. All seed was distributed on the basis of formal project documents, including a project proposal, letters of agreement and shipping papers. Back up support, training, and planning for the future were integral parts of all sub projects signed with IPs. World Food Programme (WFP) moved the seed and fertilizer both inside Pakistan and across border, under formal agreements with FAO and NGOs respectively.
Within the first two years a well-defined system of seed production, procurement and distribution was specified and continued till throughout the emergency phase. Seed for the next year across border programme was ordered during the fall of previous year. The programme of the subsequent year included several additional varieties that showed promise inside Afghanistan. As well as producing certified seed this phase of the programme included an important element of "early generation" seed starting from progeny rows through breeder/ nucleus and pre-basic, to basic seed to ensure the independent continuity of the programme and provide the basis of a rehabilitation programme in Afghanistan, as soon as the situation allowed.
Rehabilitation phase
Ensuring food security in the entire country in general and in chronically food deficit areas in particular became a paramount consideration of the implementation strategy. It is well known that seed security and food security comes one after another in the sequence of an agricultural rehabilitation programme. Accordingly, seed security and food self-sufficiency became a central theme of all activities.
The Afghanistan Rehabilitation Strategy - Action plan for Immediate Rehabilitation recommended that high priority might be given to increase the in country seed production to meet farmers demand and to increase food production. For this purpose, the EU provided more than US $ five million for the project- Seed Supply and In-country Seed Production Programme in Afghanistan. Though funds were available but it was not an easy task to produce seed inside Afghanistan. Physical and administrative infrastructures are prerequisite to produce seed. There was no problem with regard to physical facilities. Afghanistan has dry and cool climate which is considered ideal for quality seed production and Afghan farmers had sufficient land, water and labor to grow their own seeds. Therefore, necessary physical facilities were available for initiating an in-country seed production programme. However, administrative infrastructure was badly hit by years of war, the central administrative and technical arms of government have suffered high levels of physical destruction and staff losses during the internecine fight in the country. Governmental institutions, having lost nearly all vehicles and equipment, and fraught with staff uncertainties, officials have understandable difficulties in delivering the level of technical assistance and physical support to deal with the problems effectively with which they are confronted. The strict enforcement of the policy devised by various commanders hardly a formal operative government system exists. Besides, the social processes and local customs were required to be taken into consideration when initiating the in-country seed programme. The security of staff and equipment was another major problem. Frequent evacuations and suspension of activities were common.
Under such a situation it was very difficult to adhere to a specific time schedule while timeliness of all operations is an important aspect of seed production. If even a single operation is missed, the quality or quantity, if not both, of seed may suffer. A vigorous and flexible calendar of operations for all stages had to be drawn up in advance and vigorously implemented. The experience gained by project staff and IPs in the emergency phase proved very useful. The implementation strategy was devised on the basis of experience gained in the past and prevailing situation in Afghanistan.
Such complex problems called for an imaginative implementation methodology of diversification and sustainability to remedy the situation rather than pursuing a typical programme. Therefore, an unorthodox approach was followed. Instead of depending on one organization to produce seed, four different institutions were used. These include:
- Parastatal organization: Provincial units of ISE to multiply breeder and foundation seed under direct supervision of the project.
- State farms: To produce Quality declared seed and testing of new varieties.
- NGOs: Five well-established international and one national NGOs were given production targets of quality declared seed under contractual obligations. Wide spread presence of these NGOs helped to cover more area under seed production and distribution.
- Community: In PEACE Initiative districts seed was produced directly with communities. Under this scheme, communities were asked to form seed groups to produce and distribute seed directly under supervision of the project.
Due to food insecurity local commanders did not permit movement of seed from their region and it was next to impossible to move seed from an area controlled by rival commander. Therefore, economic principle which dictates production of seed in a compact area was deliberately ignored to reach more farmers in isolated and inaccessible areas. Therefore, decentralization of the seed production was preferred. The centralized approach envisages concentration of the seed production, processing and storage in the most favorable areas from the point of view of agro-climatic conditions, high yields, and low prices, and the provision of the technical services of the highest order with large-sized modern processing plants. However, in contrast a diffuse approach consisting of large number of small seed producing pockets was adopted to ensure that farmers of every region and every stratum of society could benefit from the programme.
The problems did not end with the successful production of seed in a decentralized manner. The procurement of seed from seed growers posed a serious problem. In a country where sense of insecurity is always present, purchasing seed against cash was difficult. Besides, hyperinflation made it difficult to fix prices for a given time. Seed growers refused to hand over the seed against cash payment on earlier agreed procurement price due to the fear of food shortage. To overcome this problem, a scheme known as Food-for-Seed was launched with the collaboration of the Word Food Programme (WFP). Under the scheme, seed growers were given food wheat at 1:1.25 seed - food ratio. The seed so procured was processed, packed and sold at reasonable price. The sales price was decided in consultation with Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). The sale proceeds was kept in a separate account and its further use is required to be made only for strengthening of seed activities. More than US $ two million have accumulated as sale proceeds till date.
Considering that substantial funds will be generated, transparency and efficient management of funds were essential. Accordingly, a Seed Review Group (SRG) was constituted to review the progress of the project twice a year. The SRG meets every six months and includes representatives of all the UN, NGO and Donors Organizations with a stake in the seed programme in Afghanistan. Similarly, a Fund Management Committee (FMU) composed of seed producers, FAO, WFP and UNDP was constituted and use of funds was authorized by the committee after evaluation of each proposal submitted by IPs. IPs are required to maintain a separate account to deposit sale proceeds and furnish account in each SRG meeting. All NGOs have their accounts in Pakistan thus there was no problem of banking but ISE, a parastatal organization is based in Afghanistan where no proper banking facilities exist and hyper inflation is integral part of economy, has problem to manage the funds. Efforts were made to invest the funds to create and improve seed facilities but still it could not use total sale proceeds. To avoid the diversion of funds to war machine by local authorities, an ISE fund management account was opened in Islamabad and unutilized funds were converted into dollars and deposited in this account. So far, more than US $ 120,000 have accumulated in this account. The funds could be used to rehabilitate seed facilities as soon as a proper government becomes a reality.
The polycentric approach, food-for-seed, sale of seed and fertilizer, generation of funds and its deposit outside the country and several other non conventional steps taken to meet challenges posed by natural or man made disasters ensured a fail safe mechanisms needed in a stalled system. It also increased cost effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery system.
2. EXPECTED VERSUS ACTUAL RESULTS
Expected
Actual
Emergency Phase.
To provide emergency support to returnee farmers for their agricultural re-settlement in Afghanistan and to restore agriculture for increased food production through the provision of a package of agricultural inputs (seed, fertilizer, farm equipment, etc.)
By 1995, more than 27,372 MT of winter crops seeds and 6,571 MT of summer crop seeds (including 2,400 MT sugarcane) had been distributed (Table 1). In addition, fertilizer (Table 2) and root-stock, cuttings, and saplings of commercially important trees (Table 3) were also distributed.
Rehabilitation Phase.
The project was designed to procure 1,500 MT seed internationally and produce 3,000 MT seed inside the country. Thus, distribution of 4,500 MT seed of various crops was envisaged. Besides, required quantity of foundation and breeder seeds was to be produced. The following targets for seed and fertilizer were fixed for 1995-96 and 1996-97.
In comparison to targets the project could succeed to procure and produce more than 8,665.50 MT seed, 192% more than the target (Appendix I). Similarly, against procurement of 3,500 MT fertilizer, the project procured 5,318 MT i.e., 152% more than the target (Appendix-II). The project imported only less than 100 MT seed and balance quantity was produced inside the country itself.
SEED
SEED
Crop Target (MT)
Wheat 4,000
Barley --
Rice 100
Maize 350
Pulses 150
Crop Achievement (MT)
Wheat 5,895
Barley 271
Rice 696
Maize 1,135
Pulses 579
FERTILIZER
FERTILIZER
DAP 1,500
Urea 2,000
DAP 4,118
Urea 1,200
2.1. Were expected results achieved?
No other report can provide an answer better than the evaluation reports prepared by various external evaluation missions fielded by UNDP and FAO. The main conclusions relating to seed are quoted below:
Quote:
- In spite of the poor security situation, project Seed Production and Training (AFG/86/010) was able to accomplish its objectives. In fact, it has exceeded its set targets.
- For project Programme for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan Agriculture (AFG/92/008) the procurement of seed has had a major positive impact in Southern/Eastern regions. The efforts of the project have been monumental, in view of the difficulties encountered in the process of seed distribution, a fact which is recognized and appreciated by the farmers and NGOs involved in the process.
- Project Seed Improvement Programme of Northern Afghanistan (AFG/93/001) has implemented activities in new areas as well as devise the application of new programme such as:
- New sites in Northern and Western Afghanistan
- Farmers to Farmers Seed Exchange Programme
- Creation of funds for counterpart management from the sales proceeds of seeds and fertilizers. (1994)
Integrated Crop and Food Production in Afghanistan (AFG/94/002)
Seed
(i) This component is making excellent progress. The quality of seed crops varied from good to excellent with likely yields ranging from 3-5 MT/ha. (1996)
Food Security through Sustainable Crop Production (AFG/96/004)
Seed
(ii) The component has set and maintains high technical standards and its results are impressive by any measure. The seed production system is technically sound and commercially viable. (1998)
Unquote
The seed/fertilizer delivery and distribution programme has been a remarkably successful one. Approximately, 1,000,000 Afghan farm families have received direct inputs of high quality seed plus fertilizer since the programme started in the autumn of 1989. The incremental benefits were much more than the production, procurement and distribution of quality seed and fertilizer. The seed distributed under the project has serviced the area earlier sown under old and traditional varieties. Yield in these areas, is assumed to have declined considerably over the years of constant use of seeds of old and degenerated varieties. A minimum yield of 2-3 MT/ha has been achieved by the shift from traditional seed (low technology) to new improved seed (high technology) farming in comparison to existing average productivity of 0.8- 1.0 MT/ha. The high technology is based on a package of inputs of which seed is but one. It is difficult to determine empirically the proportion of the yield increments due to each element of the input package distributed under the project. The assumption used here, that 50 percent of the yield impact is due to seed and fertilizer supplied under the project, is believed conservative. By bringing large area under improved seed created opportunity for seasonal employment. Though it is difficult to translate the benefits exactly into dollars and incremental food production in MT and it could be a matter of discussion but certainly production and distribution of quality seeds and fertilizer has made significant impact on crop yield and food security in target areas. The seed was used nationwide. Improved seed supplies and reduced prices have markedly improved small farmers access to essential inputs.
The achievements should not be measured only in terms of the crop yields being obtained and arable land abandoned during the war, brought back into production, but also in terms of successfully delivery and distribution of these inputs in a country that has been and continues to be in a state of civil war.
2.2 Why the expected results achieved
The important aspects for achieving desired results are explained below:
Resilience
Shock and pessimism are natural-aftermath of any disaster or catastrophe. However, one of the most important things to remember when planning for the revival and rehabilitation of agricultural production systems after a major catastrophic or destructive event, is that unless the systems had exceeded their human support capacities, and if the basic resources of land and water have not been affected, the human and agro-ecological systems are likely to be highly resilient. This is particularly true if the production system was previously robust. Actual recovery rates very often outstrip desk-top projections, even more so if strategic inputs are supplied. This has been true with respect to the seed programme under study.
The agricultural production systems of Afghanistan can only be described as robust and resilient. For twenty years, from 1978 to 1998, rural production systems in Afghanistan have continued to support the remaining rural population under conditions of extreme difficulty. Although malnutrition and hunger were reported, this did not degenerate into a situation as catastrophic as in the African countries of Somalia, Mauritania or Ethiopia for example.
Unorthodox approach
The country has long been known for its independence, for its aggressive and xenophobic warrior farmers and pastoralist, for rulers renowned in court cunning and cruelty, and for an ability to maintain a unique balance between independence and outside influence and dominance (Toynbee, 1969). Afghanistan, therefore, is considered a most difficult place to work with. Nothing is quite as straightforward as it may seem in Afghanistan, it is a very complex situation. Such a complex problem called for an imaginative seed programme of diversification, sustainability and collaboration with other UN agencies to remedy the situation rather than pursuing a typical seed development programme. Therefore, an unorthodox approach was followed. Instead of depending on one organization to produce seed, different institutions were used. Inputs were sold. Non-conventional procedures were followed to manage the funds and direct contact and confrontation with local commanders was avoided.
Decentralization
To reach more farmers in isolated and inaccessible areas, decentralization of the seed production was preferred.
Food-for-seed
A new scheme known as food-for-seed in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) was launched. The in-country seed production oriented programme requires tapping of local resources supported by new techniques. Accordingly, thousands of seed growers were registered to produce seed throughout the country. Hyperinflation made the purchase of raw seed against cash problematic and, therefore, Food-for-seed scheme was developed. Contract seed producers received food wheat at a 1.25: 1 exchange ratio for the seed they handed over (there are variations for other crops). This ensured that seed growers had enough food to feed their own families and that a large proportion of their seed crops would travel out of the production areas to other farmers specially in food deficit areas. It also helped to make considerable savings of funds. Food-for seed began in 1994 with 300 MT; 2,607 MT in 1995; 6,905 MT in 1996 and 6,578 MT in 1997.
Mobility
The contract seed producers were scattered over a wide area in various provinces. It was highly unlikely that seed growers would take their produce long distance for threshing, processing and treating, therefore, threshers and seed cleaners needed to be mobile. More than 15 mobile seed cleaners were used for processing seed.
NGOs
Before 1978, there were few NGOs working inside Afghanistan. However, following the war several international organizations came to help the Afghans. NGOs operate in all provinces of Afghanistan and mostly based in rural areas. The Seed Programme in emergency phase has been a mosaic of hundreds of NGO-run micro-projects, ranging from a five-ton seed scheme to a Jerib of fruit trees nursery. At present, one national and five international NGOs are assisting the programme to meet its seed production and distribution targets. The contribution of NGOs has been very vital and the programme could not have done what it has done without them. All NGOs working with Seed Programme have been advised to privatize the seed business and survive on their own, either as commercial development organization or individual entrepreneurs.
Risk
Working in Afghanistan is full of risk. No body knows how many Kalashnikovs are in the country. A traveler is always on a hair-trigger. When one enters the field, he struggles against 'sleeping enemies' left behind the war which stand ready to maim a trespasser whether he is a seed technologist or a farmer. More than 10 million mines exist in the country. Radical local customs introduced recently have added another dimension to the list of potential danger. FAO had been unusually lucky in this respect, no lives were lost due to shooting or mines. However, project staff (an international staff member along with national staff) were once taken hostage for several days. Such risks were always present. The national and international staff was psychologically prepared for these risks and therefore, able to achieve the targets.
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED
The decision to include a Seed Programme as one of the short-term emergency relief programmes launched under Salam Operation by UN has proved beyond any doubt that seed and fertilizer were as important to returnee and resident farmers as any other inputs such as cash, ration, shelter material and medicine. It has also confirmed that seed availability and food security comes one after another in the sequence of an agricultural emergency/rehabilitation programme.
Successful implementation has also demonstrated that in spite of a series of unsatisfactory security situations, serious risk to the lives and property of the staff of the project, irreparable physical damage to the various facilities, a complete blockade of certain provinces, time to time temporary suspension of activities due to evacuation or other reasons, difficulties in importing supplies and equipments and their transfer across the border, most project activities were completed on schedule and a very good base has been established for a viable in-country seed production and distribution programme in accessible areas of the country. No where in the world had such as a large quantity of specially selected, high quality seed and fertilizer been delivered so successfully in a country still in the throes of a civil war.
The most significant lesson of all that FAO has learned in Afghanistan is the importance of trusting the individual’s own thrust for development. By keeping its intervention small and sharply focused on specific areas and problems it has been able to provide the initial lift that the majority of Afghan farmers are in need of before embarking on their own climb upwards to self-sufficiency. In the present case, the programme could not distribute seed and fertilizer equally in all provinces, rather the difference was from 10 MT to a high of 7000 MT, but still the effect on crop productivity was quite significant at national level.
Emergency seed supplies are made in response to a food crisis. In such a situation the speed of response is critical, and blanket distribution of commercial/certified seed is the only practical solution. However, any provision of such seed must not only be well selected and appropriate to the environment into which it is being sent, it must also be of the highest possible quality. This is essential if agriculture is to get off to a flying start, to delay the process of degeneration as long as possible and protection against exotic pests and diseases.
It was also realized that only effective way to operate the seed programme of this kind on the ground is for the field implementation to be carried out by Afghans.
Interventions and inputs must be kept to the most essential and to a level of technology well within knowledge, experience and skills of the rural population. Introduction of hybrids and varieties excessively dependent on high doses of fertilizer, pesticides and insecticides should be avoided.
After farmers receive improved seed (together with other associated inputs) as emergency assistance, their requirements quickly progress from the emergency, to rehabilitation and into a development mode. Often this occurs even before the end of the first production cycle. Farmers themselves do not differentiate between these various phases of emergency relief, rehabilitation and development. On this basis, the programme also treats them as a continuum under its integrated strategy.
The FAO's Afghanistan seed programme provides many useful lessons that might be adopted and/or adapted to other situations elsewhere in the world.
Table 1: Seed distribution (tons) under the FAO programme, 1988/89 to 1994/95.
Winter crops Season Wheat Barley Peas Vegetables Berseem 1988/89 2665 - - - - 1989/90 3825 - - 0.228 - 1990/91 2408 - - 0.975 - 1991/92 3888 8.0 - 0.635 - 1992/93 5141 8.0 - 0.475 - 1993/94 3622 9.7 - 2.000 1.70 1994/95 5780 8.6 0.5 0.700 1.85 Total 27329 34.3 0.5 5.013 3.55
Summer crops Season Rice Maize Green gram Ground nut Sugarcane Sesame 1988/89 - 43 - - - - 1989/90 - 233 - - - - 1990/91 25.5 284 - - - - 1991/92 36.2 916 10 - - - 1992/93 38.0 581 17 2 800 - 1993/94 50.5 311 34 - 800 0.5 1994/95 51.5 1505 30 3 800 - Total 201.7 3873 91 5 2400 0.5
Table 2: Distribution of diammonium phosphate (DAP) and Urea fertilizer, 1989/90 to 1994/95.
Season DAP (t) Urea (t) 1989/90 - 5500 1990/91 - - 1991/92 1853 1500 1992/93 3229 - 1993/94 2000 2000 1994/95 2050 3550 Total 9132 12550
Table 3: Distribution of saplings, apple root stock and popular cuttings, 1989/90 to 1994/95.
Season Saplings (1) Apple root stock Poplar (Populus nigra) cuttings 1989/90 - - - 1990/91 207770 16510 120000 1991/92 414650 10000 - 1992/93 359650 6000 10000 1993/94 309600 11000 40000 1994/95 52800 - 50000 Total 1344470 43510 220000 (1). Saplings of apple, pear, apricot, peach, cherry, almond, and persimmon trees
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