Paper No. 4
Issues at stake relating to agricultural development, trade and food security
This paper discusses key issues relating to the development of agricultural production and trade and to enhancement of food security in developing countries in the context of the forthcoming WTO negotiations on agriculture.
For a large number of developing countries, especially the 82 low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs) currently identified by FAO,1 the agricultural sector remains largely underdeveloped, in respect of production both for the domestic market and for export. At the same time, in most of these countries, the agricultural sector lies at the centre of their economies. It accounts for a large share of GDP, employs a large proportion of the labour force, represents a major source of foreign exchange earnings, supplies the bulk of basic food required by the population and provides subsistence and other income for large rural populations (see Table 1). Thus, significant progress in promoting economic growth, reducing poverty and enhancing food security cannot be achieved in most of these countries without realising more fully the productive potential of the agricultural sector and its contribution to overall economic development.
Several factors have contributed, in varying degrees in different countries, to this underdevelopment of the agricultural sector. However, two key factors stand out: the past policy bias against agriculture in these countries and the major distortions on world agricultural markets due to the protection and subsidization of this sector in many developed countries. While progress has been made in both areas in recent years, much remains to be done. Developing countries have a crucial stake in the next round of WTO negotiations on agriculture, as these will largely determine whether meaningful reforms that address these issues are achieved.
The traditional policy bias in most developing countries against agriculture,2 reflected in direct and indirect taxation of agricultural production and exports, was due to a variety of reasons. Revenue considerations were one major factor, as agriculture was the only economic activity that could be relatively easily taxed in many countries in immediate post-independence years. A second important factor was the socio-political imperative of maintaining low food prices, most often through state-controlled marketing boards. Indirect taxation of agricultural exports occurred principally through overvalued exchange rates. These factors, taken together, had the unintended consequence of depressing farm prices and profitability, thus reducing incentives for investment.
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, many developing countries have implemented domestic policy reforms which have reduced the policy bias against agriculture3. Further agricultural reform remains high on the agenda of many developing countries. The common objectives of these reforms4 are to: i) enhance productivity; ii) increase domestic production of basic foods; iii) improve the quality and standards of products; and iv) diversify production and exports by promoting the development of new crops and the processing of primary products. Achieving these objectives requires building farming capacity, attracting new investment, promoting innovation and ensuring the provision of infrastructure, farm inputs and credit. While many challenges remain for these countries in achieving the full productive potential of their agricultural sectors, the main domestic policy impediments are being greatly reduced.
The second key factor constraining agriculture in developing countries, namely the high levels of subsidies and protection provided to agriculture in the developed world, continue to pose serious problems in several respects. Domestic support to agriculture in developed countries encourages over-production, which in turn increases supplies on world markets (by reducing import demand or increasing export supply) and depresses world prices. Low prices make it harder for producers in developing countries to compete in their home markets, as well as in international markets, thus reducing incentives for production and retarding the development of the agricultural sector.
Export subsidies further distort global markets and often destabilise world prices, as developed countries tend to use subsidies more when world prices are low, thus further depressing prices. On the other hand, subsidised exports tend to fall when world prices are high, just at the time when developing countries might be said to "benefit" from subsidised supplies.5 Developing countries thus have an interest in the reduction of both domestic support and export subsidies in the developed countries. They have a concomitant interest, however, in ensuring that disciplines intended to restrain the excesses of some developed countries do not interfere with their own ability to adopt appropriate development policies for the agricultural sector.
High levels of border protection in many developed countries are an additional impediment to exports from developing countries. However, because some developing country exporters benefit from preferential access to these markets in some heavily protected products, it is difficult to achieve consensus among developing countries on reducing the barriers in those cases. Trade preferences other than those under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are being challenged within the WTO, and there is growing pressure to convert these non-reciprocal programmes - e.g. the Lomé Convention - into free trade agreements. Furthermore, as multilateral trade reform proceeds, the value of trade preferences will continue to diminish.6 Thus, an export strategy based solely on preferential access is unlikely to be successful in the long run. Nevertheless, at present, several developing countries depend on trade preferences for a substantial share of their export earnings and their interests need to be taken into account. The reduction of border protection in the developed countries consequently needs to ensure that the current beneficiaries of preferential arrangements are compensated and assisted in adjusting to a more competitive environment.
The Agreement on Agriculture began a process of bringing the trade-distorting agricultural policies of developed countries under multilateral rules and disciplines7. However, much remains to be done before developing countries can benefit significantly. For this reason, the next round of negotiations will have a direct bearing on agricultural development, trade and food security in the developing countries. Issues arising from the implementation of the UR agreements, as well as those emerging for the forthcoming negotiations on agriculture, are outlined below from the perspective of the ability of developing countries to enhance their domestic food security and to take advantage of new trading opportunities.
In view of the overriding role of agriculture in the developing economies, enhancing the domestic capacities of the sector is crucial for their socio-economic development. While the Agreement on Agriculture acknowledges the need for special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries and has a number of provisions on the subject, these provisions have been seen by many developing countries as falling short of what is necessary and as failing to provide the requisite policy flexibility. In this context, developing countries have drawn a distinction between the protection and support measures used in developed countries that distort world markets and those used by developing countries to ensure food security, to promote broader economic development, or to diversify their agricultural exports. In developing countries where market institutions are not fully developed, or function only imperfectly, a degree of support and protection is considered necessary. However, their need for policy flexibility should not be used as an argument for the continuation of trade-distorting policies in the developed countries. This section addresses some of the issues at stake regarding domestic policy flexibility to develop the agricultural potential of developing countries.
The policy flexibility of developing countries under the Agreement on Agriculture involves four elements: reduction commitments on domestic support, exemptions under the de minimis threshold, special and differential treatment provisions, and "green box" policies. Most developing countries do not have reduction commitments on domestic support because, as noted above, they typically did not provide support to agriculture. Under the de minimis provisions, they may exclude from their calculation, and hence from their reduction commitments, support that would otherwise be subject to disciplines if such support constitutes less than 10 percent of the value of production.8 For product-specific programmes, the de minimis limit is based on production of the specified product, whereas for non-product-specific programmes, the limit refers to the value of total agricultural production.
Some of the particular needs of developing countries in the area of domestic support are taken into account in the provisions for special and differential treatment. Article 6 of the Agreement excludes from the reduction commitment some support measures that are considered developmental, namely measures taken in the context of programmes designed to encourage agricultural and rural development and constituting an integral part of national development programmes. Such measures include: investment subsidies which are generally available to agriculture in developing countries; agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing countries; and domestic support to producers in developing countries to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops.
Also exempt from reduction commitments, for all WTO members, are the "green box" measures outlined in Annex 2 of the Agreement. These are measures that are considered to have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. The "green box" includes, inter alia, general services to agriculture such as research and extension, and pest and disease control; public stockholding for food security purposes; structural adjustment programmes; environmental programmes9; crop and income insurance schemes; and certain direct payments and income supports that are not linked to agricultural production. Support must be provided through publicly-funded government programmes (including government revenue forgone), and must neither involve transfers from consumers nor have the effect of providing price support to producers.
The domestic support reduction commitments of developed countries were an important first step toward addressing the high levels of support and protection prevailing in many of them. Nevertheless, the global level of this "amber box" support remains quite high and the distribution is skewed against developing countries. The trade-distorting agricultural policies of developed countries impose significant costs on developing countries, as has been well documented,10 and further reforms are needed before the latter can benefit significantly.
In contrast, the overwhelming majority of developing countries, as shown in Table 2, have reported zero or less than de minimis total base AMS levels. Most of these countries, constituting about two thirds of the current WTO membership, have no reduction commitments on domestic support but neither do they have WTO "rights" to use "amber box" support in excess of the de minimis level in the future. Although many of these countries are not currently constrained by the domestic support provisions of the Agreement, they may find their policy options limited in the future. Only 20 developing countries (out of more than 100) have reported positive total base AMS and, of these, only 12 reported that it was in excess of the 10 percent de minimis allowance. Furthermore, depending on the interpretation of Article 13 (b) of the Agreement, their rights to product-specific de minimis support could be further constrained if the support given in the 1992 marketing year was less than the de minimis level.
A second issue of concern for developing countries is related to the fact that product-specific support is generally devoted mainly to production of basic foodstuffs. On average, more than 70 percent of the Current Total AMS notified by developing countries during 1995 and 1996 was allocated to the production of cereals. For several countries, such support is near the allowed product-specific de minimis level. Thus, while the de minimis exemption is unused for many products in these countries, it may constrain their support of basic food production. Furthermore, the extent of flexibility in non-product specific support for developing countries may be inadequate.11 Sector-wide support in areas such as agricultural credit, transport, irrigation and fuel are important aspects of the development strategies of many countries, and additional flexibility in their use may be needed.
A third issue is that, because the base year AMS is expressed in fixed nominal prices, several developing countries have difficulties remaining within their currently allowed AMS levels on account of high inflation and currency depreciation, despite the fact that the real level of support to agriculture has not increased.12 Although the Agreement (Article 18, paragraph 4) recognises the need to "give due consideration to the influence of excessive rates of inflation" on the ability to abide by domestic support commitments, how that should be done and precisely what is meant by "excessive rates of inflation" are not spelled out. Some of these countries have therefore raised the issue of being allowed to maintain support levels in real terms.
The interpretation of certain other terms associated with domestic support may be an important issue for developing countries. In general, countries have not been consistent in their interpretation of the term `eligible production': some used total production, others used marketed amounts and still others used the amount procured by a parastatal. As a result, the AMS and its respective de minimis levels may change considerably if a different interpretation is made on what production level to include in the calculation. Other problems have arisen regarding lack of clarity in the definition of "low-income" or "resource-poor" producers. Most of the developing countries have referred to the exemption of input subsidies for poor farmers and excluded almost all of their input subsidies, a practice that has been intensively questioned at the WTO. For many developing countries, input subsidies are an essential component of their broader agricultural development strategies and are used to facilitate the adoption of improved farming technology. Therefore, how this issue is clarified is important for them.
A critical issue of concern to developing countries is the need for a more precise definition of measures that qualify for inclusion in the "green box". Although such measures are described as having, at most, only minimal distorting effects on production or trade, that is probably not the case, at least in the long run, for many policies currently justified under the green box. In view of the limited financial ability of many developing countries to provide such support, their expenditures remain insignificant compared with those of the developed countries (see Table 3). Since there is currently no WTO limit on the total amount of expenditure on green box measures, developing countries have an interest in clarifying, and perhaps tightening, the definition of such policies.
It is sometimes necessary to maintain a degree of border protection in order to implement a domestic support policy, particularly when there is an administered price support system. Even when there is no such system, producer prices may still be supported through tariffs. In general, the bound tariffs of developing countries are sufficiently high to allow for a considerable degree of protection at the border.13 However, there are issues in this area that need to be noted.
First, most developing countries chose to offer a uniform, single rate of binding for all agricultural products. With the tariffs now bound and facing further reductions in the next round, some of these countries might need to approach tariff reductions carefully. In particular, an across-the-board reduction could leave little room to provide a degree of protection for sensitive sectors, an aspect which needs to be taken into account in the choice of a reduction formula. Second, some countries have bound their tariffs at very low levels and consequently now have little room for manoeuvre in the use of the tariff as a contingency measure against price fluctuations on world markets. Third, there are some anomalies in the schedule of bound tariffs of some developing countries. For example, for some products the bound rates are very low (even zero) while for others - e.g. substitute commodities - they are very high, implying that the high bound rates have no practical significance. Some rationalization of tariff bindings seems necessary.
There are two main concerns regarding the export subsidy provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. One is that they legitimise the use of export subsidies in agriculture (such subsidies are prohibited in other sectors), and the other is that they effectively favour exporters that used subsidies in the past (predominantly developed countries), although the level of subsidy must be reduced, while prohibiting others from using them. Developing countries are, however, entitled to use subsidies (without a reduction commitment) for marketing costs and internal transport and freight costs. For developing countries, a primary rationale for the use of trade policies is the need to support infant industries. Thus, in view of their severe supply bottlenecks and technological constraints, agricultural export subsidy schemes could have relevance in some cases, as they would allow the targeting of incentives to specific, selected agro-industries. Few developing countries have the financial resources necessary to use export subsidies as a market-development tool, and what is generally more important for them is the need to discipline the use of export subsidies by developed countries.
The acquisition and adaptation of technology, particularly for production, is an issue of vital concern for developing countries, notably in respect of the requirement under the TRIPS Agreement to provide for the protection of property rights to plant and animal varieties, either by patents or by effective sui generis legislation. The issue of the patentability of plant and animal varieties, as well as of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), raises questions beyond the mere protection of intellectual property rights, such as the rights of local communities and indigenous peoples, sovereign rights over natural genetic resources, biosafety and food security. Developing countries face two sets of difficulties in this area. On the one hand, most of them, particularly the LDCs, lack the scientific capability to innovate and patent new materials - and are not even in a position to fully catalogue the natural resources of bio-materials that they currently possess. They also do not have appropriate legislation in this area. On the other hand, there is a growing concentration of transnational corporations in bio-tech industries, notably in the seed sector. This concentration or lack of competition (reinforced by global patentability) enables these industries to exact monopoly rents from farmers worldwide. In addition, aside from the issue of costs, many countries feel it is unsafe to rely entirely on external sources for an input as important as seeds.
The Agreement recognised these problems and addressed them through special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries. However, in the view of many developing countries, these provisions have not resulted in any concrete benefits to them, particularly regarding financial and technical assistance and access on favourable terms to new technologies.
As noted above, if developing countries are to develop fully their agricultural potential, they need to rectify their past policy bias against agriculture as well as seek a reform of policies in developed countries that distort world agricultural markets. While both sets of reforms are essential, their sequencing could be crucial in determining whether the situation of the developing countries progressively improves or worsens. As was also noted, there is a substantial imbalance in the remaining levels of domestic support and export subsidies allowed to developed countries, on the one hand, and developing countries, on the other, under the Agreement on Agriculture. The "standstill and roll back" principle underlying that Agreement consequently implies that developed countries have WTO "rights" to use their remaining high levels of support and protection, while developing countries' "rights" to similar support and protection are subject to their considerably lower levels. The issue of concern is that, unless the levels of support and protection of the developed countries can be brought down quickly, the imbalance in support levels, together with the constraints on developing countries' policies, could make adjustment in the latter much slower and more difficult.
The major markets for the agricultural exports of developing countries are in the developed world (primarily, Europe, Japan and North America). However, improved access is important for them not only in those markets but also in the markets of the higher-income developing countries.
In principle, tariffication was intended to result in bound tariffs no more protective than the non-trade barriers that existed in the base period. And since all tariffs are being reduced, market access terms should have improved. However, a recent OECD study found that actual border protection to agriculture was higher in 1996 than in 1993 in eight of the (then) 10 member countries (EC being treated as a single country)14 and that tariff protection was substantially higher on food and beverages than on agricultural products as a whole. It should be noted that the study used production-weighted averages of applied MFN tariffs; since bound rates cannot be below the applied rates, border protection based on bound rates would be even higher.
The post-UR tariff profile of many developed countries is typically characterised by relatively high rates on temperate-zone food products and lower rates on tropical products. Tariff reductions were generally lower for temperate-zone products (cuts on tropical products averaged 43 percent; cuts were lower for other product groups, the lowest being 26 percent for dairy products).15 Developing countries as a whole have a high stake in the export of temperate-zone products as these are also the products where the market is still expanding. Tariff peaks in agriculture are most common in three product groups: major food staples; fruit and vegetables; and processed foods. For all agricultural and fisheries products taken together (HS chapters 1-24) the tariff lines for which duties exceed 20 percent constitute about one quarter of all tariff lines for both the EC and Japan and about one tenth for the United States (see Table 4).
Tariff escalation
Tariff escalation (i.e. progressive increases in tariffs as the processing chain advances) can result in significant effective protection to processed products, depending on the share of value added in the final output. Tariff escalation as a barrier to trade will matter more in the coming years as trade is rapidly shifting to processed products. The developing countries have a strong interest in this matter as they are trying to escape from the circle of producing and exporting primary products. As noted above, the post-UR bound tariffs are relatively very high on processed foods. Several studies have shown that although tariff escalation was reduced post-UR, it still prevails in several important product chains, notably coffee, cocoa, oilseeds, vegetables, fruit and nuts and hides and skins.16
The post-UR agricultural tariff structure of several major developed countries remains complex, contrary to the promise of a simple "tariff-only" regime. Apart from in-quota and above-quota duties, tariffs that are not ad valorem are used quite frequently. Often, they also vary for one or more technical reasons such as sugar content or alcohol content, making them even less transparent. Such tariffs are obviously more complex than ad valorem only and complicate the comparison of trade restrictiveness across products and countries which is essential for trade negotiations. Specific tariffs also weigh more heavily against lower-priced imports - their degree of restrictiveness varies inversely with the unit price of the imported product, while it remains constant in the case of an ad valorem tariff.
Some cases of more complex import arrangements continue. One notable example is the "entry price" system applied by the EC on fruit and vegetables. This regime also uses seasonal tariffs, complicating it further.17 The developing countries are increasingly becoming competitive in these products and so the regime is seen by many as a source of disguised protection.18 A second example is the cereal import regime of the Communities, which is operated in a way similar to the previous variable levy system. Several developing countries are important exporters of grains and rice.
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were intended to ease the process of tariffication. Thirty-six WTO members have tariff quota commitments in their Schedules, with a total of 1 370 individual quotas for agricultural products. The total volume of their TRQs in 1995 as a percentage of world trade in the products concerned typically ranged from 3 percent to 7 percent. For some product groups, e.g. dairy, meat and sugar, it exceeded 10 percent and so how the TRQs are used is a matter of great importance.
While TRQs have potentially created some new trading opportunities, a number of conceptual and implementation issues have arisen, including: the lack of transparency in their administration (e.g. not all the many ways of administering TRQs provide effective market access); allocation to traditional (historical) suppliers and not on an MFN basis, and counting existing preferential access schemes as part of minimum access commitments;19 counting allocations to non-members of WTO; allocation to state-trading enterprises and producer organizations, etc. All of these have presented difficulties for new entrants. Also, the broad product classification of TRQs that is permitted has prevented opening up minimum access in some sub-products of a product category.20 Finally, the setting of within-quota tariffs under the UR has been very uneven and, although many of the quotas have been opened at low or zero tariffs, some within-quota tariffs are so high that imports may not take place. All these problems have been responsible for an under-utilization of TRQs (some 60-65 percent overall), although market conditions have also sometimes been identified as the main reason.
The developing countries have a stake in reforming the TRQ system, but perhaps what is most important for them is ensuring that they have effective access. Data on quota utilization for 1995-98 have yet to be analysed to examine the extent to which the developing countries were able to access the new quotas. Such an analysis remains a priority.
The special safeguard (SSG) provisions allow an importer to increase tariffs above bound levels in response to a surge in imports or a decline in import prices. Because the agricultural SSG measures were reserved for countries undertaking tariffication, most developing countries do not have access to such measures (Table 5).21 Close to 80 percent of the tariffied items of the OECD countries are subject to SSGs.22 The right to have recourse to SSGs is more common in meat, cereals, fruit and vegetables, oilseeds and oil products and dairy products (Table 6).
Maintaining the SSG under present conditions (existing country and product eligibility) will perpetuate discrimination against WTO Members that do not have the right to safeguard measures, largely developing countries. Thus, some suggestions have been made for the elimination of the SSG altogether, also on grounds that resort is possible to the other WTO safeguards. However, the general WTO safeguards are not automatic. They require proof of "injury test", are costly and involve delays. Hence, in general, available WTO safeguards (set out in the Agreement on Safeguards) are not a viable option for many developing countries and for them the SSG option in the Agreement on Agriculture would be highly desirable. Thus, from the point of view of many developing countries it would be desirable for the SSG to become a permanent instrument in the multilateral trading system, but preferably limited to a specified number of basic foodstuffs, i.e. those that are considered sensitive on the grounds of domestic food security, as discussed above. At the same time, some tightening of "triggers" may be desirable so that the safeguards are not used too often.
The SPS and TBT Agreements define rules for setting national standards and regulations relating to sanitary and phytosanitary measures as well as technical requirements for food safety and quality so that such regulations do not unduly restrict trade.
A major challenge faced by the developing countries is raising the SPS/TBT standards of their exports to at least internationally recognized levels. For example, the import detention list for the United States for the period 1996-97 shows that the majority of detentions and rejections of products related to microbiological contamination and filth (Table 7) rather than to strictly technical considerations. Although the gap in the ability of those countries to meet such standards is wide, the lack of compliance with standards in the developed countries has not been the only reason for the detention and rejection of food imports from the developing countries. The latter face an additional challenge where the developed countries, on risk assessment grounds, adopt higher standards than those currently recognized by international standard-setting bodies. In addition, rising consumer concerns in the affluent countries over food safety and quality compound the difficulty of the developing countries in meeting ever higher standards.
It would no doubt be counter-productive for the developing countries to press for exemption from, or a weakening of, WTO rules relating to SPS/TBT or for that matter for lower international standards. That would merely have an adverse effect on consumer confidence in importing countries. Hence, a positive approach appears essential. However, many developing countries require assistance to meet these standards. Thus the support of the developing countries for the strengthening of the SPS/TBT Agreements could be predicated on effective mechanisms being put into place to assist them in upgrading their SPS standards. The SPS and TBT agreements contain promises of financial and technical assistance for the developing countries; translating these promises into concrete action would be one issue to pursue. In addition, some mechanism (e.g. an international ombudsman/arbitrator) may be required to minimize "trade harassment". Finally, the limited participation of these countries, in both number and effectiveness, in international standard-setting bodies remains an issue at stake.23
Although price instability on world markets affects all countries, the consequences can be much greater for developing countries for two reasons: i) much of the rural population still earns a living from food production; and ii) food accounts for a relatively large share of household expenditure (see Table 8). While the Agreement on Agriculture may contribute to stability in world prices because of the disciplines imposed on trade-distorting policies and the greater integration of markets, it may also lead to increased fluctuations in world prices because of reduced world stocks and a shift in the location of production from countries with high levels of support to those with low or no support. However, its net impact on world prices remains uncertain.
In any case, world agricultural market instability remains a major problem for LIFDCs because of their high dependence on imports and the weakness of their agricultural sectors. Thus, access of these countries to WTO-compatible safeguard measures remains an issue of great concern to them. Three possibilities are worthy of consideration in this respect. First, for basic foods, many developing countries favour having access to the SSG, which is simpler to use, rather than the general WTO safeguard mechanism, which is not easy to apply in practice. Second, price bands provide an appropriate and tested instrument for these countries.24 It is, however important to ensure that domestic markets are not thereby fully insulated from movements in world prices. Also, the legality of a price band policy is not entirely clear: applying a duty within the bound rate is permitted, but the Agreement in Agriculture prohibits "variable import duties". This is an issue on which developing countries could seek clarification in the next round. Third, risk management instruments are yet another option to hedge against market instability. Market-based instruments such as forward and futures price contracts and options are fully compatible with the WTO régime.
Another issue relating to world market stability concerns possible disruptions in world supplies for a variety of possible reasons: food exporters may restrict exports, trade embargoes may be imposed, large changes in exchange rates can make imports extremely expensive and wars, civil conflict or natural disasters can disrupt supplies. Thus, strengthening the provisions on export prohibition (Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture) would be highly desirable.
The implementation of the Marrakesh Decision in favour of LDCs and NFIDCs is a matter of concern, particularly for potential beneficiaries. To date, the Decision has not been implemented, despite the fact that food aid has dropped to very low levels and food import bills of these countries have risen (see Paper No. 1). Implementation has so far been hampered by several factors which include, the requirement of undisputed proof of the need for assistance (and whether the need resulted from the reform process under the UR) and the variety of instruments called under the Decision to respond to such needs, without precise specification of the respective responsibilities of all concerned. More basically, however the Decision addresses a transitional problem whereas the food security problem in the countries concerned is long-term and complex and encompasses broader development issues that go beyond just trade.
The overwhelming concern of developing countries not yet members of WTO has been the terms of accession to the Organization. Treating countries on the basis of the most recent three years for which data are available and imposing hard terms in the negotiation of tariff ceiling bindings and access to special and differential treatment appear to be tighter conditions than those of previous negotiations, and may impose undue restraint on their flexibility to design domestic food and agricultural policies.
Finally, new issues such as state trading, competition policy, environmental considerations and labour standards present a multitude of challenges to developing countries. What is important is that legitimate concerns should be divorced from the increasing invocation of these issues by some countries for protectionist purposes.
In conclusion, there are many issues at stake for the developing countries in the forthcoming WTO negotiations. Possible solutions to some of the problems are discussed in Paper No. 6. In many cases, improvements could be straightforward, while in others they may entail some hard negotiations and bargaining.
Table 1 - Relative importance of agriculture in developing countries
| Country | Share of agricul-ture in GDP, 1997 (%) | Country | Agricultural population a/ as % of total population (1995-97) | Country | Share of agricultural in total merchandise exports, 1995-97 (%) |
| LIFDCs | LIFDCs | LIFDCs | |||
| Congo, Dem Rep. of | 64.0 | Bhutan | 93.3 | Burundi | 95.3 |
| Burundi | 58.0 | Nepal | 93.3 | Sudan | 94.2 |
| Ethiopia | 56.0 | Burkina Faso | 92.3 | Ethiopia | 93.1 |
| Albania | 55.0 | Rwanda | 90.9 | Malawi | 74.6 |
| Central African Rep. | 54.0 | Burundi | 90.8 | Chad | 67.8 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 54.0 | Niger | 88.7 | Guinea-Bissau | 64.9 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 52.0 | Guinea | 85.3 | Guatemala | 62.4 |
| Lao PDR | 52.0 | Ethiopia | 84.0 | Afghanistan | 62.3 |
| Cambodia | 50.0 | Guinea-Bissau | 83.8 | Tanzania, Uni. Rep. of | 61.6 |
| Mali | 49.0 | Mali | 83.1 | Mali | 59.2 |
| Tanzania, Uni. Rep of. | 48.0 | Gambia | 80.2 | Togo | 56.7 |
| Ghana | 47.0 | Tanzania, Uni. Rep of | 79.9 | Cuba | 55.7 |
| Nigeria | 45.0 | Malawi | 79.4 | Côte d'Ivoire | 54.8 |
| Armenia | 44.0 | Papua New Guinea | 78.9 | Kenya | 54.5 |
| Sierra Leone | 44.0 | Chad | 78.7 | Comoros | 52.0 |
| Nepal | 43.0 | Eritrea | 78.7 | Somalia | 50.9 |
| Haiti | 42.0 | Kenya | 77.1 | Nicaragua | 49.1 |
| Cameroon | 41.0 | Lao PDR | 77.1 | Benin | 47.4 |
| Togo | 40.0 | Mozambique | 77.1 | Madagascar | 45.4 |
| Chad | 39.0 | Central African Rep | 75.9 | Burkina Faso | 40.6 |
| Mozambique | 39.0 | Madagascar | 75.9 | Gambia | 40.0 |
| Rwanda | 39.0 | Comoros | 75.2 | Honduras | 38.5 |
| Benin | 38.0 | Senegal | 75.0 | Rwanda | 37.1 |
| Niger | 38.0 | Solomon Islands | 74.6 | Ghana | 36.9 |
| Malawi | 36.0 | Angola | 72.9 | Kyrgyzstan | 36.0 |
| Burkina Faso | 35.0 | Somalia | 72.9 | Ecuador | 34.5 |
| Georgia | 35.0 | Equatorial Guinea | 72.3 | Swaziland | 33.0 |
| Nicaragua | 34.0 | Cambodia | 71.6 | Cameroon | 32.4 |
| Madagascar | 32.0 | Zambia | 71.6 | Bolivia | 29.6 |
| Mongolia | 31.0 | China | 70.0 | Mozambique | 28.7 |
| Bangladesh | 30.0 | Liberia | 69.5 | Macedonia, FYR of | 27.5 |
| Kenya | 29.0 | Afghanistan | 68.3 | Congo, Dem. Rep. of | 24.4 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 27.0 | Congo, Dem Rep. of | 65.1 | Central African Rep. | 24.2 |
| India | 27.0 | Haiti | 64.8 | Syrian Arab Rep. | 22.2 |
| Guinea | 26.0 | Sudan | 64.6 | Haiti | 21.5 |
| Pakistan | 26.0 | Sierra Leone | 64.3 | Sri Lanka | 20.8 |
| Papua New Guinea | 26.0 | Togo | 62.1 | Lao PDR | 18.5 |
| Mauritania | 25.0 | Bangladesh | 59.6 | Morocco | 17.9 |
| Guatemala | 24.0 | Benin | 57.9 | Papua New Guinea | 17.4 |
| Azerbaijan | 22.0 | Ghana | 57.1 | Nepal | 17.3 |
| Sri Lanka | 22.0 | Cameroon | 56.8 | Solomon Islands | 17.1 |
| China | 20.0 | India | 56.8 | Georgia | 16.7 |
| Honduras | 20.0 | Yemen | 54.6 | Niger | 16.5 |
| Morocco | 20.0 | Mauritania | 53.8 | Mongolia | 16.5 |
| Philippines | 20.0 | Côte d'Ivoire | 53.6 | India | 16.5 |
| Senegal | 18.0 | Pakistan | 52.6 | Bhutan | 16.0 |
| Yemen | 18.0 | Sri Lanka | 47.5 | Egypt | 13.8 |
| Egypt | 16.0 | Indonesia | 46.7 | Pakistan | 13.4 |
| Indonesia | 16.0 | Congo, Dem. Rep. of | 44.0 | Cambodia | 13.2 |
| Zambia | 16.0 | Bolivia | 43.6 | Sierra Leone | 13.1 |
| Lesotho | 14.0 | Philippines | 41.8 | Albania | 12.2 |
| Bolivia | 13.0 | Morocco | 40.3 | Indonesia | 11.7 |
| Ecuador | 12.0 | Egypt | 39.3 | Azerbaijan | 11.5 |
| Macedonia, FYR of | 11.0 | Honduras | 39.1 | Senegal | 10.3 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. of | 10.0 | Lesotho | 38.8 | Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of | 9.0 |
| Angola | 7.0 | Nigeria | 37.1 | Philippines | 8.9 |
| Korea,Dem. People's Rep. of | 6.0 | Swaziland | 36.2 | Mauritania | 8.6 |
| Eritrea | na | Korea, Dem. People's Rep of | 33.2 | Guinea | 7.1 |
| Afghanistan | na | Ecuador | 30.3 | Equatorial Guinea | 6.8 |
| Bhutan | na | Syrian Arab Rep | 29.8 | Lesotho | 5.9 |
| Comoros | na | Mongolia | 27.2 | Liberia | 5.8 |
| Cuba | na | Nicaragua | 25.4 | Armenia | 5.5 |
| Equatorial Guinea | na | Cuba | 18.0 | China | 5.1 |
| Gambia | na | Albania | na | Zambia | 3.6 |
| Liberia | na | Armenia | na | Bangladesh | 3.4 |
| Solomon Islands | na | Azerbaijan | na | Nigeria | 3.2 |
| Somalia | na | Georgia | na | Yemen | 2.9 |
| Sudan | na | Guatemala | na | Eritrea | 2.7 |
| Swaziland | na | Kyrgyzstan | na | Congo, Dem. Rep. of | 0.7 |
| Syrian Arab Rep | na | Macedonia, FYR of | na | Angola | 0.1 |
| Other Developing Countries | 13.2 | Other Developing Countries | 29.1 | Other Developing Countries | 22.9 |
| Uganda | 44.0 | Uganda | 80.8 | Uganda | 76.3 |
| Zimbabwe | 28.0 | Myanmar | 71.5 | Paraguay | 72.1 |
| Viet Nam | 27.0 | Viet Nam | 69.0 | Costa Rica | 61.9 |
| Paraguay | 23.0 | Zimbabwe | 64.9 | Cyprus | 56.7 |
| Turkey | 17.0 | Namibia | 52.0 | Uruguay | 56.2 |
| Colombia | 16.0 | Thailand | 52.0 | Panama | 53.0 |
| Costa Rica | 15.0 | Botswana | 45.3 | Dominican Rep. | 47.7 |
| Brazil | 14.0 | Gabon | 43.1 | Zimbabwe | 46.1 |
| Namibia | 14.0 | Paraguay | 42.7 | Argentina | 45.2 |
| Tunisia | 14.0 | Fiji | 42.0 | Myanmar | 41.1 |
| Dominican Rep | 13.0 | Oman | 39.4 | Colombia | 32.9 |
| El Salvador | 13.0 | El Salvador | 36.1 | El Salvador | 30.1 |
| Malaysia | 13.0 | Turkey | 33.2 | Brazil | 29.9 |
| Algeria | 12.0 | Peru | 32.0 | Mauritius | 25.1 |
| Lebanon | 12.0 | Iran, Islamic Rep. of | 29.3 | Viet Nam | 23.2 |
| Thailand | 11.0 | Tunisia | 26.1 | Jamaica | 21.0 |
| Mauritius | 10.0 | Mexico | 26.0 | Turkey | 20.0 |
| Uruguay | 9.0 | Panama | 25.3 | Chile | 15.2 |
| Jamaica | 8.0 | Algeria | 24.7 | Lebanon | 15.0 |
| Panama | 8.0 | Costa Rica | 23.2 | Namibia | 14.6 |
| Peru | 7.0 | Colombia | 23.1 | Thailand | 14.1 |
| Argentina | 6.0 | Jamaica | 22.2 | Mexico | 10.2 |
| Korea, Rep. of | 6.0 | Dominican Rep | 20.7 | Jordan | 10.1 |
| Jordan | 5.0 | Malaysia | 20.6 | Malaysia | 10.1 |
| Mexico | 5.0 | Brazil | 18.7 | Peru | 9.4 |
| Venezuela | 4.0 | Chile | 16.5 | Tunisia | 8.0 |
| Gabon | 2.0 | Mauritius | 13.3 | Botswana | 5.0 |
| Botswana | na | Saudi Arabia | 13.1 | Iran, Islamic Rep. of | 4.8 |
| Chile | na | Jordan | 12.8 | Iraq | 3.7 |
| Cyprus | na | Iraq | 12.2 | Oman | 3.5 |
| Fiji | na | Uruguay | 11.5 | Venezuela | 2.2 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. of | na | Argentina | 11.4 | Un. Arab Emirates | 2.2 |
| Iraq | na | Korea, Rep. of | 11.2 | Fiji | 1.6 |
| Libyan Arab Jam. | na | Venezuela | 11.2 | Korea, Rep. of | 1.3 |
| Myanmar | na | Cyprus | 10.4 | Saudi Arabia | 0.8 |
| Oman | na | Libyan Arab Jam. | 7.6 | Algeria | 0.8 |
| Saudi Arabia | na | Un. Arab Emirates | 5.9 | Libyan Arab. Jam. | 0.5 |
| Un. Arab Emirates | na | Lebanon | 4.9 | Gabon | 0.4 |
| Developing Countriesc | 26.3 | Developing Countriesc/ |
50.4 | Developing Countries | 27.3 |
| - LIFDCsb/: | 32.5 | - LIFDCsb/: | 63.2 | - LIFDCsb/: | 29.7 |
| Developed Countries c/: |
3.0c/ | Developed Countriesc/ |
8.7 | Developed Countriesc/ |
8.3 |
Source: GDP: Oxford University Press for the World Bank (1999), World
Development Report 1998/89; Population and exports: FAOSTAT (1999).
a/ The agricultural population is defined as all persons depending for
their livelihood on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry. It comprises all persons
actively engaged in agriculture and their non-working dependants.
b/ Simple average of the countries listed.
c/ As defined by the World Bank, see above source.
Table 2. - Base Total AMS as reported by selected developing countries (by region)
| Region | Reported Base Total AMS | ||
| Above de minimis | Positive but less than de minimis | Zero or negative | |
| AFRICA | Morocco, Tunisia | Mauritius | Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe |
| AMERICA | Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela | Argentina, Panama, Uruguay | Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago |
| ASIA | Republic of Korea, Thailand | India, Pakistan, Philippines | Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Kuwait, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates |
| EUROPE | Bulgaria, Cyprus | Turkey | Malta, Romania |
| OCEANIA | Papua New Guinea | Solomon Islands, Fiji | |
| Number of countries | 12 | 8 | 80 |
Source: Compilations based on background documentation of the WTO Secretariat.
Table 3. Total expenditure on green box measures by WTO members in 1995 and 1996
| WTO member | 1995 | 1996 | ||
| Amount (US$ million) | Percentage share in total reported expenditure of WTO members | Amount (US$ million) | Percentage share in total reported expenditure of WTO members | |
| Total reported expenditure of WTO members: | 129 440 | 100.00 | 126 735 | 100.00 |
| Developed countries | 110 173 | 85.10 | 110 958 | 87.60 |
| Developing countries | 19 266 | 14.91 | 15 776 | 12.50 |
| Developing countries | ||||
| Argentina | 0.00 | 137 | 0.11 | |
| Bahrain | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | |
| Botswana | 11 | 0.01 | 0.00 | |
| Brazil | 4 883 | 3.77 | 2 600 | 2.05 |
| Chile | 176 | 0.14 | 170 | 0.13 |
| Colombia | 318 | 0.25 | 578 | 0.46 |
| Cuba | 908 | 0.70 | 1 090 | 0.86 |
| Cyprus | 130 | 0.10 | 128 | 0.10 |
| Fiji | - | 0.00 | 16 | 0.01 |
| Gambia | n.a. | 0.00 | ||
| Guyana | 0.00 | 0.00 | ||
| India | 2 196 | 1.70 | 0.00 | |
| Jamaica | 0.00 | 7 | 0.01 | |
| Kenya | 53 | 0.04 | 66 | 0.05 |
| Korea, Rep. of | 5 174 | 4.00 | 6 443 | 5.08 |
| Malaysia | 244 | 0.19 | 300 | 0.24 |
| Malta | 1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| Mexico | 1 626 | 1.26 | 0.00 | |
| Mongolia | n.a. | n.a. | ||
| Morocco | 157 | 0.12 | 378 | 0.30 |
| Namibia | 50 | 0.04 | 0.00 | |
| Pakistan | 440 | 0.34 | 392 | 0.31 |
| Paraguay | 23 | 0.02 | 9 | 0.01 |
| Philippines | 136 | 0.11 | 282 | 0.22 |
| Romania | 730 | 0.56 | 756 | 0.60 |
| Thailand | 1 353 | 1.05 | 1624 | 1.28 |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 61 | 0.05 | 98 | 0.08 |
| Tunisia | 30 | 0.02 | 39 | 0.03 |
| Uruguay | 18 | 0.01 | 33 | 0.03 |
| Venezuela | 539 | 0.42 | 618 | 0.49 |
| Zimbabwe | 14 | 0.01 | 12 | 0.01 |
| Developed countriesa/ | ||||
| Australia | 707 | 0.55 | 740 | 0.58 |
| Canada | 1539 | 1.19 | 0.00 | |
| Czech Republic | 132 | 0.10 | 197 | 0.16 |
| EC | 24 110 | 18.63 | 28 378 | 22.39 |
| Hungary | 105 | 0.08 | - | 0.00 |
| Iceland | 30 | 0.02 | 50 | 0.04 |
| Israel | 292 | 0.23 | 414 | 0.33 |
| Japan | 32 859 | 25.39 | 25 020 | 19.74 |
| New Zealand | 128 | 0.10 | 136 | 0.11 |
| Norway | 647 | 0.50 | 638 | 0.50 |
| Poland | 436 | 0.34 | 549 | 0.43 |
| Slovak Republic | 1 | 0.00 | 1 | 0.00 |
| Slovenia | 85 | 0.07 | 91 | 0.07 |
| South Africa | 763 | 0.59 | 525 | 0.41 |
| Switzerland-Liechtenstein | 2 299 | 1.78 | 2 404 | 1.90 |
| United States | 46 041 | 35.57 | 51 815 | 40.88 |
Source: See Table 2. a/ Including the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (other than Romania). Note: Countries are listed in the alphabetical order and categorization used by WTO.
Table 4. Distribution of tariff peaks by agricultural product group in the European Community, Japan and the United Statesa/
| Product group b/ | Number of tariff items | Tariff peaks | ||||
| Total | 20-29 % | 30-99 % | >100 % | No. of peaks | Share in total (%) | |
| European Community (EC) Meat, live animals (1-2) Fish and crustaceans (3) Dairy products (4) Fruit and vegetables (7-8) Cereals, flours etc. (10-11) Veg. oils, fats, oilseeds (12,15) Canned and prep.meat, fish (16) Sugar, cocoa and prep. (17,18) Prepared fruit, vegetables (20) Other food industry prod. (19,21) Beverages and tobacco (22,24) Other agri.prod (5-6, 9, 13-14, 23) All agri., fishery products (1-24) Japan Meat, live animals (1-2) Fish and crustaceans (3) Dairy products (4) Fruit and vegetables (7-8) Cereals, flour etc. (10-11) Veg. oils, fats, oilseeds (12,15) Canned and prep.meat, fish (16) Sugar, cocoa and prep. (17,18) Prepared fruit, vegetables (20) Other food industry prod. (19,21) Beverages and tobacco (22,24) Other agri. prod (5-6, 9, 13-14, 23) All agri., fishery products (1-24) United States Meat, live animals (1-2) Fish and crustaceans (3) Dairy products (4) Fruit and vegetables (7-8) Cereals, flour etc. (10-11) Veg. oils, fats, oilseeds (12,15) Canned and prep.meat, fish (16) Sugar, cocoa and prep. (17,18) Prepared fruit, vegetables (20) Other food industry prod. (19,21) Beverages and tobacco (22,24) Other agri. prod. (5-6, 9, 13-14, 23) All agri., fishery products (1-24) |
351 373 197 407 174 211 105 75 310 90 202 231 2 726
136 189 146 209 132 161 101 80 231 232 65 208 1 890
116 114 251 269 59 124 90 144 169 156 126 161 1 779 |
68 45 21 10 29 0 17 34 70 27 9 4 343
3 0 45 1 37 1 21 26 52 113 8 0 307
6 0 29 13 0 0 1 6 3 11 1 0 70 |
79 0 77 5 75 8 8 6 39 8 15 14 334
19 0 57 2 24 1 3 19 5 2 0 0 132
0 0 58 0 0 2 1 13 2 18 3 2 99 |
14 0 9 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 4 33
7 0 22 7 10 3 3 6 2 15 0 0 75
0 0 9 0 0 2 0 2 3 2 8 0 26 |
161 45 107 16 104 10 25 40 110 35 26 22 701
29 0 122 10 71 5 27 51 59 130 8 0 514
6 0 96 13 0 4 2 21 8 31 12 2 195 |
46 12 54 4 60 5 24 53 35 39 13 10 26
21 0 84 5 54 3 27 64 26 56 12 0 27
5 0 38 5 0 3 2 15 5 20 10 1 11 |
| a/ Tariff peaks are defined as MFN tariff
rates that are 20 percent or more. b/ HS chapters are shown in parentheses. Source: Calculations by the FAO Secretariat based on data in UNCTAD/WTO (1997), "The post-Uruguay Round tariff environment for developing countries" (TD/B/COM.1/14), tables 1-3. |
||||||
Table 5 - Special safeguard measures for agriculture (SSG): potential application and action by WTO members
| Member | Potential application of SSG | Grounds for action taken and number of tariff items
involved, 1995-98 |
||
| Number of tariff items | Number of product groups (HS 4-digit headings) | Price | Volume | |
| Developed countries* | ||||
| Australia | 10 | 2 | ||
| Bulgaria | 21 | 9 | ||
| Canada | 150 | 37 | ||
| Czech Republic | 236 | 29 | ||
| EC | 539 | 72 | 26 a/ | 47 a/ |
| Hungary | 117 | 117 | ||
| Iceland | 462 | 121 | ||
| Israel | 41 | 14 | ||
| Japan | 121 | 27 | 4 b/ | 73 b/ |
| New Zealand | 4 | 2 | ||
| Norway | 581 | 141 | ||
| Poland | 144 | 133 | 10 /b | 1 c/ |
| Slovak Republic | 114 | 28 | 1 c/ | |
| South Africa | 166 | 75 | ||
| Switzerland-Liechtenstein | 961 | 134 | ||
| United States | 189 | 26 | 24 a/ | 6 a/ |
| Sub-total | 3 856 | 967 | 64 | 128 |
| Developing countries | ||||
| Barbados | 37 | 24 | ||
| Botswana | 161 | 71 | ||
| Colombia | 56 | 55 | ||
| Costa Rica | 87 | 24 | ||
| Ecuador | 7 | 1 | ||
| El Salvador | 84 | 23 | ||
| Guatemala | 107 | 35 | ||
| Indonesia | 13 | 4 | ||
| Korea, Rep. of | 111 | 34 | 8 c/ | |
| Malaysia | 72 | 12 | ||
| Mexico | 293 | 83 | ||
| Morocco | 374 | 46 | ||
| Namibia | 166 | 75 | ||
| Nicaragua | 21 | 14 | ||
| Panama | 6 | 2 | ||
| Philippines | 118 | 36 | ||
| Romania | 175 | 14 | ||
| Swaziland | 166 | 75 | ||
| Thailand | 52 | 23 | ||
| Tunisia | 32 | 13 | ||
| Developing countries | ||||
| Uruguay | 2 | 1 | ||
| Venezuela | 76 | 63 | ||
| Sub-total | 2 216 | 728 | 8 | 0 |
| All WTO members | 6 072 | 1 695 | 74 | 128 |
Source: see Table 2. Note: Countries are listed in the alphabetical order
and categorization used by WTO.
a/ HS 8-digit.
b/ HS 9-digit.
c/ HS 6-digit.
*Including the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (other than Romania).
Table 6 - Special safeguard measures (SSG) for agriculture: potential application and action by WTO members by product category
| Product category | Potential application of SSG | Grounds for action taken and number of
tariff items involved, 1996-98 |
||
| Number of tariff items | Percentage of total number of tariff items | Price | Volume | |
| Cereals | 1 087 | 17.9 | 7 | 2 |
| Oilseeds, fats and oils and products | 706 | 11.6 | 5 | |
| Sugar and confectionery | 291 | 4.8 | 23 | |
| Dairy products | 715 | 11.8 | 15 | 20 |
| Animal and products thereof | 1 327 | 21.9 | 5 | 47 |
| Eggs | 74 | 1.2 | 1 | |
| Beverages and spirits | 329 | 5.4 | 1 | |
| Fruit and vegetables | 809 | 13.3 | 1 | 48 |
| Tobacco | 73 | 1.2 | ||
| Agricultural fibres | 13 | 0.2 | 5 | |
| Coffee, tea, mate, cocoa and preparations; spices and other food preparations | 277 | 4.6 | 6 | 1 |
| Other agricultural products | 371 | 6.1 | 8 | |
| All product categories | 6 072 | 100.0 | 72 | 123 |
Source: See Table 2.
Table 7 - United Stated imports: Number of contraventions cited for import detention by the Food and Drug Administration and their relative importance, July 1996-June 1997
| Reason for contravention | Africa | Latin America and Caribbean | Europe | Asia | Total | |||||
| Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | |
| Food additives | 2 | 0.7 | 57 | 1.5 | 69 | 5.8 | 426 | 7.4 | 554 | 5.0 |
| Pesticide residues | 0 | 0.0 | 821 | 21.1 | 20 | 1.7 | 23 | 0.4 | 864 | 7.7 |
| Heavy metals | 1 | 0.3 | 426 | 10.9 | 26 | 2.2 | 84 | 1.5 | 537 | 4.8 |
| Mould | 19 | 6.3 | 475 | 12.2 | 27 | 2.3 | 49 | 0.8 | 570 | 5.1 |
| Microbiological contamination | 125 | 41.3 | 246 | 6.3 | 159 | 13.4 | 895 | 15.5 | 1 425 | 12.8 |
| Decomposition | 9 | 3.0 | 206 | 5.3 | 7 | 0.6 | 668 | 11.5 | 890 | 8.0 |
| Filth | 54 | 17.8 | 1 253 | 32.2 | 175 | 14.8 | 2 037 | 35.2 | 3 519 | 31.5 |
| Low-acid canned food | 4 | 1.3 | 142 | 3.6 | 425 | 35.9 | 829 | 14.3 | 1 400 | 12.5 |
| Labelling | 38 | 12.5 | 201 | 5.2 | 237 | 20.0 | 622 | 10.8 | 1 098 | 9.8 |
| Other | 51 | 16.8 | 68 | 1.7 | 39 | 3.3 | 151 | 2.6 | 309 | 2.8 |
| Totals | 303 | 100 | 3 895 | 100 | 1 184 | 100 | 5 784 | 100 | 11 166 | 100 |
Source: FAO (1999), "The importance of food quality and safety for developing countries", Committee on World Food Security (CFS: 99/3).
Table 8 - Food expenditure as a percentage of household consumption expenditure in low-income food-deficit countries and other developing and transition economies
| Country | Share of expenditure on food in total household expenditure | Year/period | Country | Share of expenditure on food in total household expenditure | Year/period |
| (%) | (%) | ||||
| Low -income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs): | Other developing countries: | ||||
| Rwanda | 80.6 | 1982/83 | Uganda | 68.0 | 1989/90 |
| Zambia | 80.2 | 1974/75 | Peru | 54.5 | 1985/86 |
| Albania | 75.0 | 1997 | Algeria | 52.6 | 1988 |
| Togo | 69.2 | 1988/89 | Mexico | 50.6 | 1984 |
| Ghana | 66.4 | 1987/88 | Morocco | 50.6 | 1984/85 |
| India | 65.4 | 1986/87 | Jamaica | 50.5 | 1984 |
| Bangladesh | 63.4 | 1988/89 | Seychelles | 49.4 | 1983/84 |
| Tanzania, U.R. of | 62.5 | 1969 | Latvia | 49.0 | 1997 |
| Sri Lanka | 61.4 | 1985/86 | Fiji | 45.9 | 1977 |
| Egypt | 60.1 | 1981/82 | Mauritius | 45.8 | 1986/87 |
| Nepal | 59.4 | 1984/85 | Iran, Islam Rep. of | 45.2 | 1989 |
| Indonesia | 56.8 | 1987 | Colombia | 44.5 | 1972 |
| China | 56.2 | 1990 | Tunisia | 44.0 | 1985 |
| Samoa | 55.2 | 1971/72 | Macao | 42.7 | 1981/82 |
| Guatemala | 54.8 | 1979/81 | Thailand | 41.7 | 1988 |
| Philippines | 53.9 | 1988 | Jordan | 40.4 | 1986/87 |
| Haiti | 53.6 | 1986/87 | Uruguay | 39.2 | 1982/83 |
| Nigeria | 50.6 | 1980/81 | Hong Kong, China | 39.0 | 1989/90 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 49.1 | 1979 | Costa Rica | 38.7 | 1987/88 |
| Pakistan | 44.5 | 1987/88 | Malaysia | 38.6 | 1980/82 |
| Lesotho | 37.8 | 1986/87 | Singapore | 37.3 | 1987/88 |
| Swaziland | 31.6 | 1985 | New Caledonia | 36.3 | 1980/81 |
| Bahamas | 30.5 | 1973 | Botswana | 36.2 | 1985/86 |
| Sierra Leone | 30.3 | 1969/70 | French Guiana | 33.3 | 1984/85 |
| Panama | 33.3 | 1983/84 | |||
| Transition economies: | Other developing countries: | ||||
| Martinique | 33.2 | 1984/85 | |||
| Romania | 58.6 | 1997 | Turkey | 33.0 | 1987 |
| Bulgaria | 54.3 | 1997 | Rep. of Korea | 32.0 | 1990 |
| Lithuania | 52.2 | 1997 | Guadeloupe | 30.9 | 1984/85 |
| Croatia | 40.1 | 1991 | Kuwait | 29.7 | 1986/87 |
| Estonia | 39.9 | 1997 | Cyprus | 29.4 | 1984/85 |
| Slovakia | 37.3 | 1997 | Brazil | 28.7 | 1987/88 |
| Czech Republic | 30.5 | 1996 | Trinidad & Tobago | 28.3 | 1981/82 |
| Poland | 28.0 | 1995 | Netherlands Antilles | 27.9 | 1981 |
| Slovenia | 22.5 | 1997 | Reunion | 23.3 | 1986/87 |
| Hungary | 17.7 | 1995 | Cayman Islands | 22.1 | 1983/84 |
| Bermuda | 18.8 | 1982 | |||
Source: Data on LIFDCs and other developing countries are from FAO (1994)
"Compendium of food consumption statistics from household surveys in developing
countries", volumes 1 and 2, (FAO Economic and Social Development Paper 116);
data for the transition economies are from OECD (1998), Agricultural policies in
non-OECD countries: monitoring and evaluation 1998, statistical annex, annex table 10.
Note: The FAO data are based on national household surveys which differ
significantly in terms of survey coverage, concepts, definitions and year and mode of data
collection. Hence, this table should be taken to reflect the broad range across the
selected countries.
1 For the definition and an annually updated list of low-income food-deficit countries see the FAO Special Programme for Food Security Website ( www.fao/orgs/spfs/lifdc). See also Table 1 below for the current list.
2 See, for example, Kruger, A., M. Schiff and A. Valdes (1988), "Agricultural incentives in developing countries: measuring the effects of sectoral and economy-wide policies". World Bank Economic Review 2(3): 255-71.
3 These reforms were initiated mainly in the context of structural adjustment programmes. Some were launched as part of policy adjustments to implement regional trade agreements, while some reflected the Uruguay Round negotiations and commitments.
4 See FAO (1997), "National agricultural development strategies towards 2010," for a number of the LIFDCs.
5 See Tangermann, S. and T. Josling (1999), "The Interests of Developing Countries in the Next Round of WTO Agricultural Negotiations", paper prepared for UNCTAD (http/ www.unctad.org/en/docs/agwto.pdf).
6 See Yamazaki, F. (1996), "Potential erosion of trade preferences in agricultural products," Food Policy, 21 (4/5).
7 Other Agreements with a specific bearing on agriculture include: the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least Developed Countries and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries is also highly pertinent.
8 For developed countries the corresponding de minimis limit is 5 percent.
9 It is important to note that all these "green box" policies refer to a wide array of measures that are considered to have little effect on production and trade, and that are therefore permitted to continue. Such policies are not necessarily environmentally "green". Considerable confusion can arise because while environmentally "green" policies are included in the "green box", the box contains many other types of policy measures as well.
10 See for example Tyers, R. and K. Anderson (1992), Disarray in World Food Markets: A Quantitative Assessment, Cambridge University Press; and Valdes, A. and J. Zietz (1980), "Agricultural protection in OECD countries: its costs to less developed countries," IFPRI Research Report, Number 21, IFPRI, Washington, D.C.
11 FAO country case studies covering both WTO members (e.g. India, Turkey and Bangladesh) and non-WTO members (e.g. Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Sudan) have shown that the chances for expanding non-product-specific support are much more limited than those for product-specific support.
12 To overcome this problem, some countries notified their current AMS in dollars, at the same time revising the base AMS levels also in dollar terms, while others have adjusted their external reference prices to accommodate changes in exchange rates. These corrections have been questioned at the WTO.
13 Nevertheless, for several temperate-zone products, tariffs are much higher in developed countries.
14 "Preliminary Report on Market Access Aspects of UR Implementation", (COM/AGR/APM/TD/WP (99) 50), June 1999, OECD, Paris.
15 See WTO (1999), Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements, Kluwer Law International and WTO Secretariat, Table III.2. Although tariffs on tropical products were reduced the most, the reductions were from a very low base (e.g. 5 - 10 percent). The effect on trade can thus be much less than a 26 percent reduction from a very high base.
16 See, for example, J. Lindland (1997), The Impact of the Uruguay Round on Tariff Escalation in Agricultural Products, FAO, (ESCP No.3) and OECD (1997), The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and Processed Agricultural Products, OECD, Paris.
17 For a detailed analysis of the EC's entry price system for fruit and vegetables, see, for example, Swinbank, A. (1996), "The Impact of the GATT Agreement on EU Fruit and Vegetable Policy," Food Policy, 20(4).
18 In some cases, e.g. cucumber and tomatoes, market access terms are said to have worsened following the adoption of the entry price system.
19 See Tangermann, S., "Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture by major developed countries", (UNCTAD/ITD/16), Geneva, 1995.
20 For instance, the EC, in its minimum access commitments, has aggregated all vegetables into one category and all fruit into another. As a result, the quantities of EC imports in each of the two categories during 1986-88 was more than 5 percent of base year internal consumption and hence the minimum access commitment was not applicable. The situation could have been different if a product-by-product approach had been followed.
21 By virtue of their tariffication, only the 22 the developing countries listed in Table 5 have reserved the right to invoke the special safeguard clause for some of their agricultural products. As at the end of May 1997, none of them, apart from the Republic of Korea, had invoked this right.
22 UNCTAD (1995), "Identification of new trading opportunities arising from the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements in selected sectors and markets" (TD/B/WG.8/2).
23 As a priority for more universal acceptance of its standards, the Codex Alimentarius Commission encourages greater developing country participation in its committees, but funding for such participation is very limited.
24 The use of this instrument allows countries to vary their applied rates of duty as long as they keep the maximum rate at a level no higher than the bound rate. Countries with fairly high bound tariffs thus may be able to offset variations in import prices by reducing tariffs when prices rise and raising them when prices fall.
