5. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES

5.1 Strengths and constraints

5.1.1 Main points in this section

• Three elements act as a deterrent to potential transgressors:

  - high enough sanction on breaking the rules,

  - high enough probability of being caught, and

  - high enough chance of the sanction being applied.

• The enforcers need to have a vested interest in upholding the fisheries management measures, otherwise illegal incentives and corruption will undermine the measure.

• Homogenous, easily distinctive and small groups of fishers tend to be more effective in applying local rules and regulations to themselves than general rules covering a variety of fisher groups, applied by non-fishers.

5.1.2 The cases on controls at landing sites

The analysis of the four cases on control at the landing site (see table below) reveals that their main strength is the relatively high probability of being caught when cheating. In addition, the country reports repeatedly mention the fact that the negative social consequences of cheating tended to be highly deterrent.

The cases on controls at landing sites

The cases on control at landing sites seemed to work best where there was a direct interest and therefore a commitment by committee members. More specifically this was the case when there were direct economic benefits to be had for those in the committee. The restriction on landings small pelagics by the Commission des sennes tournantes and of demersals for export by the Comité de Pêche (both in Kayar, Senegal) increased price for fish landed and increased income for boat owners.

Interestingly, the field visit and some extra interviews in Senegal revealed that the limitation of catch landed (as in the Comité de Pêche and the Commission des sennes tournantes) was tried in a number of other communities for various fisheries in Senegal. It did not, however, work everywhere. It was a failure for the squid fisheries in the intensely fished Petit Côte region. Local fishers feel this is because of the presence of too many different fisher groups in their community and great yearly variation in catches due to natural causes. The variety of groups makes consensus difficult and undermines the use of control measures. The natural yearly variation in the abundance of squid also makes fishers wonder whether restricting landings will affect the stock at all.

The cases of control at the landing site also have constraints. Firstly, most of the committees depend very much on the existence of a handful of influential individuals. Although the presence of such individuals is a strength in the short run, in the long run the sustainability of the committee is undermined when these individuals leave the committee if they are not replaced. Secondly, the area covered by local committees is limited: it only covers (a section of) one community. It therefore also tends to apply to only a limited number of (in-group/local/resident) fishers. This hypothesis is reinforced in the Ghanaian cases. The Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders (in the community of Mumford) and the Community fisheries management committee (in the community of Egyan) have difficulty in enforcing local rules on non-community members, even if they fish in the community’s waters. They are not sensitive to the community’s social pressure, as they move on to elsewhere. The community itself has no means by which to enforce rules on outsiders.

An important constraint is therefore that there is no support of the local system of rules or of enforcement by formal or national authorities and laws. Egyan’s Community fisheries management committee ended up confiscating undersized mesh nets used by migrant fishermen in Egyan’s community waters. This is forbidden not just by Egyan’s committee, but also by national law on mesh-sizes. The migrant fishers filed an official complaint and won the case that Egyan’s committee stole their nets. Egyan’s local system and sanctions were thus undone through the more formal legal system of conflict settlement. This case shows that, even in a context where the Government of Ghana is committed to promoting community-based fisheries management committees, a lot of work still needs to be done on clarifying what powers those community-based management committees have to apply local and national rules and sanctions.

5.1.3 The cases on surveillance at sea

The analysis of the case studies on surveillance at sea^[36] (see table below) is more difficult because surveillance is a more complex activity than control at landing sites. Most of the strengths of the case studies tend to be snowed under by the constraints. One of the main strengths of the case studies is that they show an increasing willingness of governments to invest in artisanal fisheries management, and not just in industrial fisheries. However, this willingness is countered by malfunctioning of surveillance posts, breakdown of equipment and dishonesty of some surveillance staff. There where local fishers and government officials do work hard to do an honest job, the cases they pass on to the national level come to a grinding halt in bureaucratic procedures.

THE CASES ON SURVEILLANCE AT SEA

Why is this so? Overall, the case studies on surveillance show that the probability of an intruder into a forbidden zone being caught is low. This is especially so during certain periods: bad weather, rough seas, night time, etc. In the case studies, of the intruders that were caught, very few are prosecuted. Of those that are, convictions or actual payment of fines are rare.

First of all, at the level of running the surveillance posts the equipment is not always adapted to local conditions. Radars do not function due to unreliable electricity supplies, vessels are not fit to go out to sea at times when industrial vessels can still fish (bad weather, rough seas, night). Secondly, there are financial and other constraints for the running of the surveillance posts: lack of funds to pay for the fuel for patrol vessels, equipment is not maintained and breaks down, posts are understaffed, and so on.

As far as the patrol activity itself is concerned, there is a third point: the patrollers and sanctioners often have more incentives in breaking than in applying the rules. This is true for both the government surveillance posts and the fisher committees’ surveillance activities. For example, in the case study Surveillance Project in Bonfi and Koukoudé, Guinean fishers are convinced that officers take incentives from captains of industrial fishing vessels intruding into the “artisanal fishing zone” not to report them. It is therefore in the officers’ interest that industrial vessels keep intruding into the zone to keep this extra source of income. For the fisher committees, family and friends use social pressure to encourage committee members not to apply the rules to them. For example, in Kayar’s Comité de Surveillance gill nets found in the zone destined for line fishing are simply left where they are or returned to the owners under pressure from local leaders who own the gear.

But most of the problems with the case studies on surveillance exist at the level of enforcement. Even if an formal complaint is made, the procedure for prosecution of industrial transgressors is too long and expensive for artisanal fishers. The procedures are often not very clear, they may take years to go through bureaucratic systems and tend to require the fishers to travel to the regional or national capital on various occasions. Once at national level, cases are often not even heard, but rather become blocked somewhere between different competent agencies. This is because mandates of formal agencies either overlap or do not cover responsibilities for prosecution of issues linked to artisanal fishing, leading to non-enforcement. There tend to be different agencies responsible for fisheries, navigation, sea safety, etc. and it is often not clear (or there is disagreement over) who is responsible for cases of intrusion or accidents between artisanal and industrial craft.

Even where official institutes are willing to resolve such cases, another problem crops up: the evidence gathered by artisanal fishers is often insufficient to hold as proof in the formal law system. Evidence tends consist of the artisanal fishers’ word against that of the industrial vessel’s captain as to where and how an intrusion or accident took place. This generally means that the best government officials can do is arrive at a settlement involving a low compensation to the artisanal fisher for damages done. However, such a settlement is generally not binding, so whether the payment is made or not is, in practice, up to the discretion of the owner of the industrial vessel.

5.1.4 The specific case on surveillance at sea in Fass Boye

The Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité in Fass Boye, Senegal, is probably the most interesting of the case studies on surveillance at sea. It appears to be the only surveillance system that effectively deterred industrial vessels from intruding into “their” (artisanal) fishing zone - at least at first. The committee used methods that come down to hijacking of industrial vessels and extortion to achieve this “effectiveness”, so it is not an example for others to follow. However, on an analytical level, it does serve to study strengths and constraints.

The Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité in Fass Boye had certain strengths over the other cases studies on surveillance at sea. First of all, the committee was created on the basis of the community’s economic and social interest, so they had full back up and support from the community. Secondly, it had low running costs: mainly canoes and fuel for the patrols. The community carried this cost, which weighed up to the benefit of keeping industrial vessels out of the “artisanal fishing zone”. Thirdly, a large number of persons were involved in surveillance, all of them fishers themselves. They therefore had an interest in applying the rules and seeing results by keeping industrial vessels from overfishing their zone. As such, there was little scope for corrupting the controllers (fishers) carrying out the surveillance. Fourthly, the committee used social as well as financial sanctions and even violence to intimidate intruders. According to the case study, the controlling fishers hijacked industrial vessels that intruded into the “artisanal fishing zone”, ensured the payment of “taxes” and “damages” from the owners for the release of the vessels, and ridiculed the captain of the vessel in the community. The combination of these sanctions was a real threat to both captains and owners of industrial vessels, and they started to avoid the Fass Boye area. This, of course, is exactly what the committee aimed to achieve. The fifth strength of this committee was that the whole process of surveillance, from initiation through execution to enforcement of sanctions, was in the hands of one entity: the fishers’ committee. That made the procedures quick (although not particularly impartial) and the artisanal fishers had direct positive effects from their actions.

The main constraint of the Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité in Fass Boye lay in the fact that local rules were not backed up by formal rules at national level. The methods used by the committee were simply illegal. The industrial captains and owners used the national law system to have the Fass Boye committee prohibited.

5.1.5 Comparing surveillance at sea and controls at landing sites

It would seem that the cases of controls at landing sites work better than the cases of surveillance at sea. However, it should be kept in mind that surveillance at sea is an activity that has constraints that controls at landing sites cases do not have. The table below gives a summary of why this is so:

Comparing elements of controls at landing sites and surveillance at sea

Thus, in general, fisheries management rules or mechanisms are easier to implement when the rules or mechanisms apply:

• to a restricted group of people,

• in a restricted geographical area,

• at a defined moment in time,

• with limited opportunities for bribing or cheating.

Low levels of (or simple) equipment and low implementation costs and high and timely benefits increase the likelihood of effectiveness further.

5.1.6 Lessons learned from the case studies

Summarising, the case studies show a number of underlying issues that affect the effectiveness of a fishery management mechanism:

• Three elements act as a deterrent to potential transgressors:

  - high enough sanction on breaking the rules,

  - high enough probability of being caught, and

  - high enough chance of the sanction being applied.

• The enforcers need to have a vested interest in up holding the fisheries management measures, otherwise bribery and corruption will undermine the measure.

• Homogenous, easily distinctive and small groups of fishers tend to be more effective in applying local rules and regulations to themselves than general rules covering a variety of fisher groups, applied by non-fishers.

Additional lessons can be learned from the case studies about compliance and effectiveness of fisheries management measures. First there is the aspect of cause and effect. Only when stakeholders feel that they are (partly) responsible for fisheries management problems and feel they have influence on it, will they be inclined to initiate or conform to fisheries management mechanisms. The clearer the underlying reasons and direct positive effects of fisheries management mechanisms, the likelier that fishers will accept them and abide by them.

The second lesson is about the process used in fisheries management. The case studies underlined the fact that fisher leaders and representatives who take part in discussions and decisions with respect to fisheries management mechanisms need to be seen as legitimate. They must be taken seriously by those they represent as well as by government administrators. The process of discussion and decision making over fisheries management needs to be transparent, otherwise fishers will find reasons not to comply with the mechanisms.

Finally, any type of conflict in a community will undermine a fisheries management exercise. This is because there is not enough mutual trust between parties to come to an agreement or to trust each other with enforcement.

5.1.7 Implications for livelihoods-centred fisheries management

This section illustrates why it is important to distinguish different groups of fishers, as was discussed in Section 2.2. Fisheries management mechanisms which are adapted to specific groups or fishers, their fishing strategies and livelihoods, have a greater chance of being effective than those that are not. Government fisheries agencies can work with fishers on specifying the groups, the geographical areas and the fisheries management mechanisms that would be most appropriate for each.

This section also reinforces the point that when fishers can see the direct benefit for themselves of a fisheries management mechanism, they are more likely to abide by it (see also Sections 3.3 and 5). Fisheries management for the sake of fisheries management is not likely to interest fishers and they are less likely to participate in it to make it effective; fisheries management that will improve their livelihoods will. This is an argument in favour of participatory and livelihoods-centred fisheries management and a reason why fisheries agencies should adopt it. It supports the assumption of this study that responsible fisheries management actively involves artisanal fishers (see Section 1.1.4).

Another point that this section underlines is the need for rules and regulations at local level and at national level that strengthen each other, rather than contradicting each other. This is one of the underlying problems of enforcement. Another is that also mentioned in Section 3.1.3 of the variety of enforcing organizations. Apart from finding ways of increasing collaboration between these agencies, it would be in line with the decentralization process for countries to find ways of enforcing official rules at local levels, rather than at national levels. This will reduce the problem of distance and costs involved in trails and enforcement of sanctions, and more direct contacts between the parties involved in the resolution would probably put more pressure on them to comply with agreements made. FAO and other agencies could support countries in identifying how such “decentralization of enforcement” could be implemented.

5.2 The respective roles of artisanal fishers and government

5.2.1 Main points in this section

• Government and fishers tend to have separate fisheries management measures and enforcement systems, but they do influence each other.

• Local fisheries management committees’ measures are most effective when backed by official laws.

• Commitment by both government and the community is essential for a management measure to be effective.

• Specifying the artisanal fisher group and government institutes involved in the different phases of fisheries management is useful to ensure meaningful participation of all relevant fisher groups and reducing the constraints of fisheries management.

5.2.2 Phases of the fisheries management process

This Section addresses the different roles of government and fishers in the fisheries management mechanisms of the case studies. To facilitate analysis, several phases were distinguished in the fisheries management of the cases studied. The phases are:

• Initiative: who had the idea and took the effort of starting the fisheries management mechanism?

• Creation: who takes part in deciding on objectives, rules and functioning of the fisheries management mechanism?

• Implementation: who takes part in carrying out the fisheries management mechanism?

• Sanctions: who “judges” wrongdoers and determines what sanctions are applicable?

• Enforcement: who ensures that these sanctions are actually carried out?

• Appeal: who can those sanctioned turn to for reconsideration of their case when they feel they have been unjustly treated?

Although the case studies did not always go into detail about the different phases, it was possible to make the tables below, which give a rough indication of whether fishers -F- or government -G- had a leading role at each phase. There is a separate table for the case studies on controls at landing sites and the case studies on surveillance at sea. Where possible, the order of the case studies in the table goes from high involvement of fishers (at the top of the table) to low involvement of fishers (at the bottom of the table).

The role of fishers and government in different stages of “controls at landing sites”

It is clear from the above that artisanal fishers tend to be involved in fisheries mechanisms that concern control at the landing site. The government’s role is, according to the information available from the case studies, limited to the “Appeal” phase of the fisheries management process.

The table below shows that government is more represented in surveillance activities, but that there is a greater variety between the cases in the roles that government and fishers play.

The role of fishers and government in different stages of “surveillance at sea”

* The letters in brackets indicate a restricted role of that party in that particular stage.

From this table and earlier descriptions, a number of conclusions can be drawn about the case studies. One is that surveillance at sea is almost always initiated and executed by government. The case study of Fass Boye (Senegal) is the exception. In two of the six cases, fishers have a role in almost all the phases of the fisheries management process. In those where the role of government dominates, artisanal fishers’ role is limited to:

• informal consultation on fishing and where to patrol (such as with the Surveillance Project at Bonfi and Koukoudé in Guinea); and

• joining in patrols as guides or participants (such as Kayar, the PSPS at Fass Boye, PNBA).

The case studies show that an important role for fishers is, as such, no guarantee for increased effectiveness of fisheries management mechanisms. The cases on surveillance at Fass Boye in Senegal (Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité) and Tema in Ghana (Sub-Committee for Surveillance) are evidence of this.

An important role for fishers only leads to increased effectiveness of fisheries management mechanisms if:

• the fishers feel a commitment towards the activity, and

• government actively supports and backs the local activities (i.e. is also makes a commitment).

This is an important addition to the assumption of this study that states that active involvement of artisanal fishers in fisheries management will improve the effectiveness of management measures (see Section 1.1.4).

Whether in local/informal or in national/formal fisheries management measures, the government has a very important role in dispute settlement and enforcement in the last instance. It can therefore reinforce or undermine what initiatives taking place at local level and ensuring that justice is done.

5.2.3 Identification of the specific groups involved

The above analysis gave an idea of whether fishers or government had a role in a certain phase of fisheries management^[37]. But which artisanal fishers and which types of government organizations are they? As far as the case studies give information on the issue, the artisanal fishers in the fisheries management committees are mostly influential older men in the fishing community. They are owners of canoes and gear, fishing chiefs, representatives of different clans in a community^[38], councils of elders, often representatives of their communities to the outside world. Also, it would appear that resident fishermen would tend to be represented in the committees, rather than migrants. Although some of these committees, notably in Ghana, try to include other interest groups, others have very exclusive membership. The members of the Ghanaian committees rotate, for example but in Kayar, membership of the Commission des sennes tournantes and the Comité de Pêche is fixed.

When carried out by fishers, the initiative, creation, enforcement, application of sanctions, and appeal are generally carried out by the influential older men. Younger members of the group often carry out the implementation, or persons who have been specifically designated or are paid to do so.

On the side of the government, implementation of surveillance activities mainly involve several of the following agencies: the Navy, the Airforce, the MCS Unit of the Directorate of Fisheries, Maritime Navigation authorities, and, in the case of the PNBA in Mauritania, national park authorities.

The enforcement, application of sanctions, and appeal generally involve national level government institutes. They could consist of any number of the ones just mentioned under the implementation of surveillance, the police, the courts, or special Fisheries Commissions, Arbitration Committees, etc. As was mentioned in Section 3.1, the lack of transparency as to which organization is responsible for which phase of fisheries management causes constraints in the enforcement of fisheries management mechanism.

In the case studies of the Commission de Surveillance in Kayar, Senegal and with Community Management Committee in Egyan, Ghana, local government authorities -such as prefects and district directors- become involved in fisheries management. Here they serve as initiators of fisheries management mechanisms, or as arbitrators. However, they are not generally involved in implementation and enforcement. This level of government is only involved in these aspects insofar as they pass information about intrusions on to national level organizations.

5.2.4 Implications for livelihoods-centred fisheries management

It is clear from the analysis above that commitment by both government and fishers is essential for a management mechanism to be effective. Government and fishers’ roles are most effective when they complement each other. If one of the roles is weak (such as commitment of fishers for surveillance in Tema, Ghana, or enforcement of regulations by government in Egyan, Ghana), the entire management mechanism fails. The fisheries councils mentioned under Section 3.2 could be used as a means for establishing more coherence between the government and fishers’ roles and between local and national fisheries regulations. This would reduce the vulnerability of fishers to the sometimes arbitrary application of monitoring, control and enforcement.

Specifying the artisanal fisher group involved in the different phases of fisheries management is useful. As mentioned in other sections, it can identify which groups are represented in and which have to be included more actively. It also permits management mechanisms to be better directed at the included groups, their interests and livelihoods.

The identification of which government agencies are involved in each phase of fisheries management and what their role is, is essential in reducing the constraints of fisheries management as identified in this study. Only if it is clear who is responsible for what and only if there is co-ordination between government agencies will it become easier and more relevant for fishers to collaborate with government. The recommendations that are mentioned under Section 3 are relevant here.

In summary, both government and fishers need to be committed to identifying problems and finding solutions for fisheries management problems together. Clearly defining the role, responsibility and authority of each party, as well as communication and co-ordination processes to be followed, is an essential part of this process. The FAO and other agencies for international co-operation could assist the countries it works with by providing support to this process by identifying or training persons capable of facilitating or leading it. The limitations of such an approach are that it requires a lot of time and effort from the participants, and a positive outcome is not guaranteed. On the other hand, not going through a collaborative effort may lead to failures, as illustrated by the case studies.

5.3 Interaction between fisheries management and fisheries livelihoods

5.3.1 Main points in this section

• Unintended side effects of fisheries management measures prevail over intended benefits.

• Ineffective enforcement of formal and informal procedures for settling conflicts between artisanal and industrial fisheries tends to favour the latter.

• Fisheries management measures impact differently on different social groups.

• Existing and changing livelihood strategies affect the outcome of fisheries management measures.

5.3.2 Beneficiaries and benefits of the cases on controls at landing sites

As stated in the “Introduction”, in SLA terms, the objective of fisheries management is to improve fisheries’ livelihoods through reduced vulnerability of fishers to reductions in fish resources, conflicts over those resources, the loss of rights to exploit the resources, and so on. Management should protect fisheries’ livelihoods in the long run through the sustainable exploitation of the fish stock. One of the underlying assumptions of this study is that responsible fisheries management will improve artisanal fisheries’ livelihoods, if fishers are actively involved in responsible fisheries management.

To evaluate the beneficiaries and benefits, it is necessary to know who the intended beneficiaries were, and what the intended benefits consisted of. This Section takes into account the extent to which fishers were actually involved in the fisheries management, as well as strengths and constraints described in previous Sections.

The intended beneficiaries of the controls at landing sites and the surveillance at sea were different in each case study. For the controls at landing sites in Ghana the intended beneficiaries were the artisanal fishers and the community of the villages of Mumford and Egyan. The intended beneficiaries of the controls at landing sites in Senegal (Kayar) were a group of owners of canoes with hand lines and with purse seines respectively. This is represented in the table below:

Intended beneficiaries of the cases on controls at landing sites

The general benefits of each of the case studies were improved livelihoods, but each mechanism attempted to achieve this in a different manner. The intended benefits of the committees concerned with controls at landing sites consisted of:

• increasing price for fish landed through restricting the number of fishing trips (for the case studies in Kayar);

• regulation of social issues and protection of fish resources through the inspection of mesh sizes of nets and checks on other informal regulations (for the case studies in Mumford and Egyan).

The previous Sections show that controls at landing sites were carried out almost entirely by fishers. These cases were also relatively effective in achieving their aims. The Commission des sennes tournantes and the Comité de Pêche in Kayar (Senegal) partly succeeded in directly improving the incomes of the persons who are members of the committee by increasing the price for the fish they landed. The case studies also mention unexpected positive side-effects for committee members: the Commission des sennes tournantes’ reduction in fishing trips has led to the purse seines lasting longer, so saving the net-owners money.

For some committees of the cases on controls at landing sites in Ghana, the organizational capacity and influence of the committee and its members has increased. An example is the case study on the Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders in Mumford (Ghana). However, the even if these committees partially achieved their aims, the intended benefits for artisanal fishers of both this committee and the Community fisheries management committee in Egyan (Ghana) do not appear to have been achieved.

In a more general way, vulnerability factors such as reductions in conflicts over fish resources do not appear to have been reduced for the intended beneficiaries. For example, Egyan (Ghana) is still vulnerable to conflicts with migrant fishers who use nets with very small mesh sizes in their waters. The overall effect of the case committees’ activities on the fish stock is unknown.

The communities as a whole do tend to derive some positive social and economic effects from the committees’ non-fisheries activities. Examples are cleaner beaches and increased school attendance. Mumford (Ghana) has even received public recognition for these efforts by winning a prize for the cleanliness of its beach. Apart from these activities, fisher groups often use part of the income from its activities for community development ends.

5.3.3 Beneficiaries and benefits of the cases on surveillance at sea

For surveillance of the “artisanal fishing zone” the intended beneficiaries were generally the artisanal fishers in the surveillance area. For surveillance by the Commission de Surveillance in Kayar (Senegal) the intended beneficiaries were the resident line fishers and migrant gill net fishers. The Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité in Fass Boye in Senegal was aimed to protect the interests of artisanal fishers from that community. The intended in the PNBA in Mauritania is less clearly defined: as the area is a park, it aims to protect fish stock and other natural assets for the country’s population, future generations, tourists, and perhaps only in a later instance for the population living in the area. The intended beneficiaries of the surveillance activities are shown in the following table:

Intended beneficiaries of the cases on surveillance at sea

The specific intended benefits of the cases on surveillance at sea were:

• exclusive access to certain fishing grounds for the intended beneficiaries (in all cases except the PNBA in Mauritania),

• reduction of conflicts (in Kayar),

• protection of fish stocks from overfishing (in all cases).

The case studies on surveillance at sea were not very effective in achieving their aims. It is not surprising, then, that the intended benefits of the surveillance were not achieved. A possible exception is the PNBA in Mauritania, but there is not enough information in the case studies to be sure. The Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité in Fass Boye, Senegal was achieving the benefit of having exclusive access to certain fishing grounds for a while, but only until the committee was abolished.

The second benefit of reducing conflicts was not achieved either. At the time that the case study was written up, artisanal fishers in Fass Boye (Senegal) were still vulnerable to conflicts with intruding vessels. The conflict between resident (handline fishers) and migrant (gill net fishers) in Kayar, Senegal, is just as intense, if not more intense, than it was before the installation of the Commission de Surveillance.

Just as with the case studies on controls at landing sites, the overall effect of the committees and surveillance posts on the fish stock is unknown.

5.3.4 Fisheries management as a means to ensuring sustainable livelihoods

The above analysis shows that fisheries management is not necessarily a means to ensuring sustainable livelihoods for fishers. Although this is partly due to the constraints of the existing systems, some constraints are likely to remain and should be taken into account.

Probably the most important point to notice with respect to the case studies on fisheries management is that fisheries management cannot be a means to ensuring sustainable livelihoods for all fishers. Each of the cases studied has been designed to benefit one particular group of fishers often as opposed to another. For example, catch limitation lead to higher prices of fish for the fishermen but may reduce profits for fish processors and traders. Keeping trawlers out of the “artisanal fishing zone” to protect artisanal fishers and fish stocks may mean a reduction in income for industrial vessel owners, captain and crew. In other words, protecting one fisher groups’ livelihood may adversely affect another group and this is inherent to fisheries management. Effective fisheries management mechanisms are therefore likely to increase tensions between social groups, because the mechanisms exclude access to resources for particular groups (such as industrial fishers in the “artisanal fishing zone”). This, too, should be taken into account when planning for fisheries management from a livelihoods perspective.

Taking this issue one step further, the case studies show that fisheries management measures do not necessarily favour the poorest or most vulnerable social groups. In the example of Ghana where small mesh sizes are prohibited in to protect juvenile fish, one of the groups affected by this measure would be beach seining groups. However, there are indications that this may be one of the poorer groups of artisanal fishers. Fishers’ committees tend to be run by elder, relatively well off men, generally owner of boats and gear. Depending on the objectives of the committee, poorer, minority or non-represented groups’ interests may or may not be taken into account.

The fact that the fisheries management mechanisms studied were mostly not very effective has led to an increase in the problems the mechanisms were trying to solve (incursions, accidents, conflicts, etc.). Consequently, already existing tensions between different groups (migrants and residents, industrial and artisanal fishers, fishers and fisheries administrations) have remained or increased. It also means that there are non-intended beneficiaries such as: the patrol officers of the surveillance system in Guinea who profit from the incentives received; migrants in Egyan (Ghana) who profit from catching fish in a prohibited zone; industrial owners and captains which can continue to fish in the “artisanal fishing zone”, and; generally those whose illegal activities were supposed to be stopped. All this can lead to tensions between social groups.

Fisheries management can contribute to or undermine sustainable livelihoods, depending on its objectives. For example, the conservation objectives in the Parc National du Banc d’Arguin in Mauritania create constraints to fisheries developments such as the use of outboard engines, which in turn may limit income earning possibilities for fisher communities. As was mentioned in Section 3.3, according to fisheries regulations in Ghana, small mesh sizes nets are prohibited so as to protect juvenile stock. However, the widespread use of such nets makes confiscating “illegal” nets not only an enormous task, but also a socially unacceptable one. The fact that fisheries management does not necessarily improve fisher communities’ livelihoods is an important conclusion to reach, as it questions the first of the assumptions of this study (see “Introduction”).

On the one hand, protecting the long-term sustainability of stocks is in fishers’ interests, as it ensures their livelihoods. On the other, stock protection need not be a priority for fishers. People are known to change livelihood strategies according to the opportunities and constraints available. A reduction in one stock may cause fishers to start learning to catch other species, to migrate, or to develop other economic activities, as they have done in the past.

5.3.5 The Influence of livelihoods on fisheries management

Various aspects of the livelihoods of artisanal fishers and fisher communities can impact on fisheries management. Many of them were mentioned in other Sections of this report, but here is a short summary:

• Livelihood assets such as existing networks and organizations amongst fishers can interactive positively with fisheries management by forming a basis for fisheries mechanisms at the local level.

• Fisher groups with different attitudes to access to resources and social structure will perceive the same fisheries management mechanism in a different way and develop different livelihood strategies in reaction to it.

• Emigration, immigration and seasonal migration strategies can complicate participation of directly interested parties in the different phases of the fisheries management process.

• Fishers often also have other sources of livelihoods than fishing or other priorities than fisheries management mechanisms (e.g. health problems, access to inputs, winning a conflict, fluctuations in the economy) and therefore not wish to invest time in fisheries management.

In terms of laws and regulations, fisheries management does not just impact on fishers’ livelihoods. The laws and regulations are one of the means to achieve or confirm access over livelihood resources. They therefore are actively used and constructed by different groups. This can be part of the groups’ livelihood strategies. Different fisher groups will have access to different systems of laws and regulations - formal and informal, local and national - to do so (see Section 3.3). This is illustrated by the examples of the Community fisheries management committee at Egyan (Ghana) and the Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité Fass Boye (Senegal). In both of these cases, local fisher committees apply local rules on fisheries to defend their interests and keep non-compliant “other fishers” out of their fishing area. These “other fishers’ - migrants and industrial fishers - then turn to formal criminal law to defend their interests, claiming that the local rules applied to them were unjust or illegal.

Artisanal fishers and the fisheries administration also influence one another. In Ghana, the existing community management committee in Mumford served as a “model” for the national programme on community-based fisheries management. The Mumford committee in turn profited from training and support from this government programme and broadened its activities. In Senegal, government economic policy caused a drop in fish prices. This led to the creation of the Commission des sennes tournantes and the Comité de Pêche by fishers in Kayar. Another example is the Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité (Fass Boye, Senegal). Its activities were of the reasons that Fass Boye was one of the first communities in Senegal in which a decentralized government surveillance posts was created.

5.3.6 Implications for livelihoods-centred fisheries management

The relationship between fisheries management and sustainable livelihoods for fishers is thus far more complex and dynamic than stated in the assumptions of this study. This requires fisheries management to be flexible and to adapt to changes. The implications of all the above for livelihoods-centred fisheries management have been mentioned in the other Sections, and include: identification of different fisher groups, participation of those groups in fisheries management processes, clarification and balancing of fisheries management objectives, clarification of the roles of different government organizations and fisher groups, and improvement of enforcement.