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Changes in Fishing Practice, Fleet Capacity and Ownership of Harvesting Rights in the Rock Lobster Fishery of Western Australia, G. Morgan

106 Barton Tce. West, North Adelaide, SA 5006, Australia
<garymorg@ozemail.com.au>

1. INTRODUCTION

Western Australia has for the past 40 years managed many of its fisheries through a system of limited-entry, with the first of these fisheries (the western rock lobster fishery for Panulirus cygnus) being made a limited-entry fishery in 1963. This fishery, and the way in which the initial allocation of the quota was managed, has been described by Morgan (2001a).

The Western Rock Lobster Fishery began in the early 1900s supplying a small local market. However, it was not until the 1940s, when an export market developed to supply first of all the armed forces and later the American market, that catches and fishing capacity began to increase rapidly (Sheard 1962).

With increasing prices being paid for rock lobster tails, the fishery rapidly expanded until by the late 1950s, it supported over 1000 fishermen who took approximately 8600t of rock lobsters from coastal areas as well as the Abrolhos Islands. As the number of boats and fishermen continued to increase and the fleet became more efficient, it became apparent that restrictions would have to be placed on the unbridled expansion of the industry if the stocks of rock lobsters were to be managed for long term sustainability.

On 1 March 1963, the first restrictions were put into place in the Western Australian rock lobster fishery with the number of rock lobster vessels in the industry being limited to those already engaged in the industry and, to the present time, no new additional licences have been issued.

Western Australia lobster boat at idling speed

The management system, which has evolved over the years within the context of a limited entry philosophy, has essentially stabilized catches and fishing-capacity. However, because the fishery remains an input-controlled fishery, the problem of containing fishing-capacity in the face of technological change remains an issue that needs continual management attention. The fishery today is a vigorous, wealthy and stable fishery with the catch in 1999/2000, which is taken by 594 licence-holders, being approximately 14 450t valued at some $A380 million. The fishery is, therefore, the largest single rock lobster fishery in the world, accounting for approximately 24% of global production.

The history of the allocation of access-rights in the western rock lobster has previously been documented as part of this case study series (Morgan 2001a). This paper examines the changes that have taken place in fishing practices, fleet capacity and ownership of harvesting-rights subsequent to the introduction of transferable access-rights in this fishery.

The data for this examination relies on occasional economic performance reports of the fishery. No social impact data have been collected on these effects and hence comments on social impacts are based on ad hoc observations. Provision of catch and fishing-effort data is a mandatory reporting requirement in all Western Australian fisheries and have been collected as part of the monitoring programme for the western rock lobster fishery since the earliest days of the fishery.

2. THE NATURE OF THE HARVESTING RIGHT

Access to the fishery was restricted in 1963 to those licence-holders who were part of the fishery on 1 March of that year. The access-right entitles the holder to operate a fixed number of pots (i.e. a retrievable fish-trap), with that number being restricted by the length of the vessel from which they are fished. Additional pots may be purchased (or, as is common practice, leased) but the number that can be operated is still restricted by the length of the vessel. Although restrictions on vessel replacement have been part of the fishery since 1965, these have recently been abolished so that there are currently no impediments to the building of larger vessels, thereby enabling a larger pot-entitlement. However, because the number of pots permitted in the fishery is fixed at 69 288, additional pots to operate from a larger vessel must be acquired in the open market from other licence-holders.

Both the access-right to the fishery (formalized by a commercial fishing licence) and the pot-entitlement are freely tradable and, because of the highly profitable nature of the fishery, these currently command significant prices on the open market. Pots (i.e. the right to operate a single pot) currently change hands for approximately $A27 000. Therefore, the free market price for an access-right with the average pot-holding of 116 pots would be approximately $A3.13 million. This does not include the cost of the vessel and other equipment.

The tradable entity is therefore the pot and transfers occur freely in an open market. The market, however, is restricted to those who have a rock lobster licence to fish in this limited-entry fishery and hence it is not possible for persons external to the fishery to operate pots although it is possible for non-licence-holders to own pots. There is a minimum pot-holding of 63 pots and a maximum of 150. The current average pot-holding, for all areas combined, is 116 pots per vessel. Once the minimum pot-holding is reached, there are no further restrictions on the issuing of a boat licence so that these pots can be operated. Owners of pots who do not have the minimum holding of 63 commonly lease their pots to operators in the fishery. These operators must, of course, comply with the minimum and maximum pot-holding requirements, restrictions on the number of pots per foot of boat length, the current temporary 18% reduction in pots able to be used, and other management measures.

At current pot prices of approximately $27 000, the annual return for leased pots is approximately 8-9% although lease prices are sometimes influenced by other considerations, such as ensuring through-put for processing factories. The fishery is also subject to a number of input-controls, which have been detailed in an earlier contribution to these case studies. These include measures such as minimum and maximum size limits, closed seasons etc.

3. MEASUREMENT OF FLEET CAPACITY

3.1 Characterising fleet capacity

In all limited entry fisheries in Western Australia, the primary measure of fleet capacity has been the number of vessels licensed to fish in the fishery. In the western rock lobster fishery, the number of vessels has slowly decreased as amalgamation of pot-holdings has taken place. Changes in the number of vessels operating in the rock lobster fishery are shown in Figure 1 from the introduction of transferable property-rights in 1963 to 1999/2000, together with changes in the number of pot-lifts over the same period. The current (1999/2000) number of vessels in the fishery is 594, compared with 689 in 1990/91 and 836 in 1964. Apart from the primary measure of number of vessels, a number of other important measures of fleet capacity are also used in this fishery.

An important measure of fleet capacity in the rock lobster fishery has been the pot or trap. Various restrictions have been in place over the history of the fishery to limit vessel-numbers and pots per vessel, etc., but the primary aim of these measures was to limit the total number of pots in the fishery. In 1965, the number of pots in the fishery was capped at 76 623 by a series of input-controls that restricted the number of vessels, the number of pots per unit length of the fishing vessel, and the size of vessels. These measures have largely remained in place although there has been some attrition of pots due to forfeiture, etc., so that in 1999/2000 the total number of pots in the fishery was 69 288. Again, details of changes in the total number of pots in the fishery has been included in Morgan (2001a).

As vessel (license) numbers have declined in the fishery (see Figure 1) and the number of pots have declined at a much lesser rate, both the average size of vessels, and the average number of pots operated per vessel have increased. Table 1 shows these date from 1990/91 to the present with a comparison with 1962/63 and 1973/74. Earlier data on average vessel size is not available.

The frequency with which pots are utilized during the open season has been documented since the introduction of the limited-entry management-regime in 1963 through compulsory monthly fishing returns (which also record catches and areas fished) and a voluntary system of fishermen’s log books. The log books are completed by approximately 30% of the fleet and provide daily information on catches and fishing activities in much greater detail than the compulsory monthly returns.

Figure 1. Changes in number of licenses and number of pot lifts in the western rock lobster fishery, 1964/65-1999/00

Table 1. Average length of vessels and average number of pots used per vessel in the western rock lobster fishery, 1990/91-1999/00 with a comparison with 1962/63 and 1973/74.

Data for 1962/63 and 1973/74 from Morgan (1977).

Year

Average length of vessel (m)

Average pots/vessel*

1962/63

8.71

90.7

1973/74

9.16

88.7

1990/91

10.93

102.7

1991/92

11.44

102.5

1992/93

11.59

104.2

1993/94

12.02

108.5

1994/95

12.34

111.6

1995/96

12.45

112.7

1996/97

12.52

113.4

1997/98

12.67

114.9

1998/99

12.82

116.3

1999/00

13.05

116.6

* Under temporary management arrangements introduced in 1993/94, only 82% of these pots can be utilized at any one time.
The pot-lift has therefore been the primary measure of fishing-capacity in the western rock lobster fishery since it incorporates both the number of pots being used and the frequency with which they are being used. This information is available daily on a spatial basis of an approximate 10x10 nautical mile grid that covers the entire fishing area.

The increased efficiency of pots in the fishery, brought about by technological advances in pot, vessel and equipment design, has been measured (Brown, Caputi and Barker 1993) as has the seasonal vulnerability to capture of rock lobsters (Morgan 1974). However, these chnages in efficiency and vulnerability are not incorporated into the measure of fleet capacity as a matter of course, but are used in specific studies.

3.2 Changes in fleet capacity arising from the introduction of transferable property-rights

Since the number of pots in the western rock lobster fishery was effectively capped in 1965 through a series of input-controls, there has been no increase in the number of pots being used in the fishery since that time. In fact, through a process of slow attrition, the number of pots has declined from 76 623 in 1965, to 69 288 in 1999/2000.

However, the frequency with which these pots are used has increased dramatically, despite a six-week reduction in the length of the fishing season since 1978. As a result, the primary measure of fishing-capacity, the pot-lift, has changed since 1963, and is currently 56% higher than it was when tradable access-rights were introduced in 1963 (see Figure 1). Initially, the number of pot-lifts increased steadily as a result of more frequent usage of pots. In the late 1980s, there was a recognition that this increased fishing-capacity was having an adverse impact on the abundance of the stock, particularly the spawning stock. As a result, additional input-controls, detailed in Morgan (2001a), and including an 18% ‘temporary’ pot-reduction, were introduced which succeeded in stabilizing fishing-capacity. These measures, together with changes in size limits and additional direct protection for the spawning-stock have rebuilt the spawning-stock levels significantly. Table 2 presents data on changes in fishing-capacity (number of pot-lifts) since the introduction of tradable access-rights in 1963.

As a result of changes in fishing capacity, outlined in Table 2, catch rates have also varied since tradable access rights were introduced in 1963. Figure 2 shows these changes.

Table 2. Catches (t) and Fishing-Capacity (millions of pot-lifts) in the western rock lobster fishery of Western Australia, for the fishing seasons 1964/65 - 1999/2000. Seasons begin on 15 November each year and ended on 15 August the following year up to 1977/78, and 30 June the following year for 1978/79 onwards.

Year

Catch (t)

Pot-lifts (m)

Year

Catch (t)

Pot-lifts (m)

1964/65

7882

6.812

1982/83

12884

11.625

1965/66

8550

7.301

1983/84

11349

11.214

1966/67

9089

7.480

1984/85

9682

11.601

1967/68

10375

7.898

1985/86

8166

10.822

1968/69

8506

8.861

1986/87

8529

11.343

1969/70

7285

8.408

1987/88

12066

12.883

1970/71

8437

9.589

1988/89

12312

12.306

1971/72

8625

9.956

1989/90

10298

12.080

1972/73

7263

9.091

1990/91

9220

12.032

1973/74

7234

9.864

1991/92

12164

12.773

1974/75

8877

10.255

1992/93

12303

11.733

1975/76

9110

10.202

1993/94

11040

10.374

1976/77

9286

10.861

1994/95

10802

10.373

1977/78

10549

10.594

1995/96

9800

10.462

1978/79

12105

10.842

1996/97

9902

10.621

1979/80

11024

10.724

1997/98

10463

10.734

1980/81

10328

10.890

1998/99

13009

10.750

1981/82

11050

11.255

1999/2000

14437

10.635



Figure 2. Catch Rates in the western Rock Lobster Fishery, 1964/65-1999/00

Of particular note is the decline in catch-rate through to about 1974/75. This was a time of increasing fishing-capacity as prices for rock lobsters increased. In recent years (1991/92 onwards), fishing-capacity has been reduced through a series of measures, including an 18% ‘temporary’ pot-reduction and this, combined with other measures designed to protect the breeding stock, has resulted in a trend of increasing catch-rates.

3.3 Consequences of changes in fleet capacity

The consequences of the changes in fleet capacity have been evident on a number of fronts. From a stock-abundance point of view, it was apparent as early as the mid-1970s that fishing-capacity was continuing to increase despite the range of input restrictions that were in place (Morgan 1979, 1980a, 1980b). This resulted in further restrictions, the most notable of which was the additional six-week closed-season, introduced in 1978.

More recently, concerns over the decline of the breeding-stock resulted in a range of measures, introduced in 1993/94, to increase its abundance. These measures included an 18% ‘temporary’ reduction in the number of pots allowed to be used as well as measures designed to provide direct protection to the breeding stock. The 18% pot-reduction had the effect of reducing the number of pot-lifts by 11.6% between 1992/93 and 1993/94 (Table 2), although the reduction in fishing-capacity between 1992/93 and 1999/00 has been a more modest 9.4%.

Clearly, compensatory mechanisms are operating so as to result in continuing upward pressure on fishing-capacity, despite the ‘temporary’ pot-reduction with approximately half of the potential benefits of an 18% pot-reduction being eroded over a seven year period. The additional measures that were put in place in 1993/94 to directly protect the breeding-stock (such as a maximum size for females that may be landed, adjustment to the minimum size permitted, and extending protection to those females which are mature rather than just carrying eggs) have obviously been highly successful. Breeding-stock abundance has increased by a factor of about three since 1992/93 (Anon. 1999) and has now returned to levels not seen since the late 1970s. This appears to be having a positive effect on subsequent recruitment to the fishery, as measured by the abundance of settling puerulus larvae.

However, continuing upward pressure on fishing-capacity may erode those increases in abundance in future years, although the potential for increased capacity (in terms of latent capacity available) is significantly less than it was in the early days of the fishery.

From an economic point of view, the most significant change in the fishery has been the rapid appreciation in the value of the access-right. This appreciation in asset-value seems to have been a direct result of the limited-entry nature of the fishery, aided in large part by the increase in prices received for the product in export markets.

Table 3 shows the approximate free-market transfer-value of pots since 1990/91 and demonstrates the rapid and consistent escalation of prices. The Table is separated into prices received for pots in Zones A and B combined (i.e. the northern part of the fishery) and Zone C (the southern part). This is a result of consistently higher prices being paid for Zone A and B licences because of generally higher catch-rates and the better ability, because of weather conditions, to work later into the season in northern areas.

Table 3. Approximate range of prices ($A) paid per pot on transfer for northern (Zones A and B) and southern (Zone C) areas of the Western Rock Lobster Fishery, 1990/91-1999/2000

Season

Price - Zones A and B

Price - Zone C

1990/91

$7000-$8500

$6200-$7000

1991/92

$9500-$12000

$8000-$9500

1992/93

$12000-$13000

$10000-$11500

1993/94

$20000-$25000

$13000-$20000

1994/95

$22000-$25000

$18000-$20000

1995/96

$30000

$21000-$23500

1996/97

$25000

$18000-$21500

1997/98

$29250-$30000

$21500-$25000

1998/99

$18000

$18000-$19000

1999/00

$24000-$25000

$22500-$28500


Using the data from Table 3, the total asset value of the access-rights to the western rock fishery can be calculated, and these are presented in Table 4. Average pot-values (for all zones) have been calculated as the means of the median pot-price shown in Table 3. These have then been multiplied by the number of pots in the fishery each season to arrive at a total asset-value of the access rights. Table 4 also presents data on the revenues generated each year (based on average prices and catches) and compares these revenues with the annual asset-value as a measure of earnings/asset-value. This latter measure should approximate earnings/capital employed since the value of equipment (boats, gear, etc.) is only a small, and relatively constant, proportion of total capital with the largest proportion being the asset-value of the access-right.

The total value of the access-rights to the western rock lobster fishery (i.e. excluding vessels, fishing gear, etc.) in 1999/2000 is therefore around $A1.42 billion. This value has been created since the initial allocation of access-rights in 1963.

Table 4. Total asset-value of access-rights to the western rock lobster fishery, together with earnings/asset-value for the years 1990/91-1999/00.

Season

Average pot price ($A)

Total asset value of access rights ($A millions)

Revenue (i.e. earnings) $A millions

Earnings/ asset value (%)

1990/91

7275

514.78

189.98

36.9

1991/92

9750

675.58

249.36

36.9

1992/93

11625

805.53

223.55

27.8

1993/94*

19500

1108.61

280.75

25.3

1994/95*

21250

1207.61

297.07

24.6

1995/96*

26125

1484.81

232.27

15.6

1996/97*

22375

1271.25

241.33

19.0

1997/98*

26440

1502.15

211.87

14.1

1998/99*

18250

1037.30

263.43

25.4

1999/00*

25000

1419.84

389.80

27.5

*18% temporary pot reduction in effect which reduced available pots to 82% of licensed pots. This has been taken into account in establishing total asset values.
Two things are worth noting about the transfer prices presented in Tables 3 and 4. First, the largest increase in pot-prices occurred in 1993/94 when the 18% reduction in pot-usage was introduced. It appears that increased confidence about the long-term management arrangements for the fishery contributed significantly to this increase in price, despite the loss of the use of 18% of fishing-capacity.

Second, the large drop in prices in 1998/99 was a result of a high catch (see Table 2) reducing market prices. This can be seen from Table 3 where, despite the high catch in 1998/99, total revenues only increased a small amount because of the reduced prices.

It is interesting to note the general trend of a decline in earnings/asset-value, although the last two years have seen an increase. The increase in 1999/00 was due to a large increase in earnings. This, in turn, was a result of the unusual co-incidence of a record catch of 14 437t and high prices paid to fishermen of around $A27/kg. In the longer term investors and operators in the fishery are apparently willing to accept a lower (although still substantial) return on their assets employed, and this may partly be attributed to the stable management environment of the fishery.

The high returns available in the fishery (see Table 4) have apparently resulted in a trend towards an increasing number of pots being owned by non-operators in the fishery, although precise data on this aspect is not readily available. A consensus of industry and Government opinion, however, indicates that, currently, 20-40% of all licensed pots are owned by non-operators with these pots being leased to fishermen. The non-operators include investors as well as entities such as processing companies which have taken a strategic stake in pot-ownership to ensure supply of product to their factories.

Costs of management of the fisheries have also been documented in recent years. Morgan (1997) showed that compliance costs had increased significantly in the fishery, apparently in response to the more complex management environment. In 1998/99, costs of management of the fishery totaled $A6.016 million with a breakdown of those costs being given in Table 5.

Table 5. Costs of management of the western rock lobster fishery for 1998/99

Component

Cost ($A)

Compliance and surveillance

2140000

Research

1072000

Policy and programme management

314000

Corporate support (overheads)

700000

Levy for fisheries development fund

1790000

Total

6016000

Cost per licensed pot

87

Source: Anon. 1998.
The total cost of management therefore represents approximately 2.3% of the gross earnings from the fishery or $A462 per tonne. This compares with a management cost for South Australian rock lobster fisheries of $A784 - 1137 per tonne (see Morgan 2001b). Since 1999/00, the total cost of management is now collected from pot-holders as a licence fee and is administered by the Government of Western Australia in order to carry out the various management functions outlined above. This recovery of costs from pot licence-holders was phased in, beginning 1995/96 when 85% of attributable costs were recovered.

4. CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP

4.1 Status prior to programme

When access-rights were restricted in 1963, there were 845 vessels operating in the fishery. The number of pots licensed to operate in the fishery was capped at that time at 76 623 through a series of measures which have been outlined in Morgan (2001a). This resulted in an average number of pots per vessel of 90.7 immediately prior to the restriction of access-rights. The fishery was, up to that time, an open access fishery with no restrictions on access-rights.

By 1974, the number of vessels had been reduced to 798, operating a total of 72 367 pots, an average pot holding of 88.7. Since that time, concentration of pot-holdings onto fewer, larger vessels has continued. There are currently 594 licence-holders in all zones of the rock lobster fishery with the numbers of licences having declined slowly over recent years as amalgamation of pot entitlements and structural adjustment of the industry has taken place. This aspect is further discussed below. Table 6 shows the number of licensees and the average number of pots per licence-holder for the period 1990/91-1999/00.

Table 6. Licence numbers and average pot-holdings in the WA rock lobster fishery

Year

Abrolhos Islands
Zone A

North Coastal
Zone B

South Coastal
Zone C

Total

Licences

Pots/ licence*

Licences

Pots/ licence*

Licences

Pots/ licence*

Licences

Pots/ licence*

1990/91

180

100.4

166

96.8

343

106.7

689

102.7

1991/92

175

99.1

166

97.2

335

107.0

676

102.5

1992/93

168

100.4

7

99.4

330

108.6

665

104.2

1993/94

153

106.2

164

105.0

322

111.3

639

108.5

1994/95

149

108.8

158

109.7

314

113.9

621

111.6

1995/96

149

110.6

155

110.1

311

114.9

615

112.7

1996/97

149

111.4

154

110.1

308

116.1

611

113.4

1997/98

149

113.3

151

110.4

303

118.0

603

114.9

1998/99

148

114.3

150

110.8

298

119.9

596

116.3

1999/00

148

113.5

150

111.7

296

120.7

594

116.6

* Under temporary management arrangements introduced in 1993/94, only 82% of these pots can be utilized at any one time.
There is less information on the extent of concentration of the beneficial ownership of pots and how this has changed since 1963. When access-rights were first restricted in 1963, all pots were owned and operated by the fishermen. However, as indicated above, the high returns available in the fishery (see Table 4) has apparently resulted in a trend towards an increasing number of pots being owned by non-operators in the fishery. A consensus of industry and Government opinion, indicates that currently 20-40% of all licensed pots are owned by non-operators, with these pots being leased to fishermen.

In summary, since 1963, there appears to have been a significant concentration of ownership of pots and also a concentration of pots being operated from a diminishing number of larger vessels.

4.2 Restrictions on transfer of ownership

There are currently no restrictions on the ownership or the transfer of pots. However, there are a number of restrictions on the operation of these pots, including minimum and maximum pot-entitlements. These have been described above.

4.3 Prices received

Data have been collected on prices received for rock lobsters for a number of years and are shown in Table 7.

The price differentials between the northern zones (Zones A and B) and the southern zone (Zone C) are usually related to the average size of rock lobsters caught, with the generally more desirable smaller lobster being more common in northern areas.

Table 7. Prices received by operators in the western rock lobster fishery, 1990/91-1999/00. The data has been separated into those zones (Zone A and B) in the northern part of the fishery and those in the southern part (Zone C)

Season

Price Zones A & B ($A/kg)

Price Zone C ($A/kg)

1990/91

20.65

20.65

1991/92

21.00

20.00

1992/93

18.50

17.75

1993/94

28.00

26.50

1994/95

29.00

26.00

1995/96

25.50

22.00

1996/97

27.50

26.00

1997/98

20.50

20.00

1998/99

20.25

20.25

1999/00

27.00

27.00


4.4 Effectiveness of regulations governing ownership of rights

The effectiveness of regulations governing ownership of rights has been high from a compliance point of view, and this is reflected in the high cost of compliance activities (see Table 5). In addition, the high monetary value of the access-right (see Table 4) itself results in a high profile of the industry and the early detection and reporting of illegal activities.

5. DISCUSSION

5.1 Reduction in fleet capacity

Since a reduction in fleet capacity was not originally a policy objective for the introduction of tradable access-rights, fleet capacity has not been reduced. Rather, the policy objective was to stabilize fleet capacity and, using the measures of fleet capacity available, this has been achieved (see Tables 2 and 3). However, because of the input-managed nature of the fishery there is constant pressure for fishing-capacity to increase. As a result, an increasing array of restrictions has needed to be applied in order to stabilize fishing-capacity. This has included a recent ‘temporary’ 18% reduction in allowable pots in the industry.

A major concern is that the measures of fleet capacity being used do not explicitly take into account efficiency increases brought about by technological innovation, and unfortunately no data-collection programmes are in place to collect such information on a regular basis. However, specific studies (e.g. Brown et al. 1993) suggest that this may become an important issue.

5.2 Concentration of ownership

The limited-entry nature of the fishery has not prevented a concentration of both ownership of pots and the utilization of those pots. This has been discussed above in Section 4.1 and data presented in Table 6 demonstrating the concentration of pot usage to a fewer number of larger vessels.

One of the most important issues surrounding the concentration of ownership has been the large profits which have been derived from the fishery. The value of the access-right to the fishery, together with earnings from the fishery, has continued to increase dramatically in recent years (see Tables 3 and 4). This follows a trend established when the fishery was made a limited-entry fishery in 1963.

Despite this increase in value of the access-right, Table 4 shows that consistently high returns on investment of over 25% per annum have been achieved in the fishery, with individual vessel earnings in 1999/00 averaging over $A650 000. Earnings-growth in the fishery has averaged some 18% per annum in recent years compared with Western Australian average earnings-growth of 1.6% per annum.

Rent generated from the fishery is therefore substantial and, using the total value of the access-rights and a discount rate of 3%, was approximately $A43 million in 1999/2000. Of this, only some $A6 million is collected as license - or access-fees.

The ‘surplus’ rent generated, of approximately $A37 million per annum, has been invested in ever more lavish vessels and equipment, and also in a range of other non-fisheries investments. The marginal returns on recent investment in vessels and equipment has reputedly been low or negative and such ‘capital stuffing’ has become a significant management and social issue.

The importance of social issues whereby the attitudes in the small coastal community can influence individual decisions to concentrate ownership has not been well recognized or studied in southern areas of Western Australian fisheries. Although these issues have emerged as major drivers of the effects of ITQ-management in South Australia, they are likely to be of lesser importance in Western Australian fisheries.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks are due to Chris Chubb, Eric Barker and staff of the Western Australia Fisheries Department, for making data available for the analyses presented in this paper.

7. LITERATURE CITED

Anon. 1998. The western rock lobster fishery - cost recovery and managed fishery fees. Information Paper, Fisheries WA; 6pp.

Anon. 1999. The effects of five years (1993/94-1997/98) of stable management in the western rock lobster fishery. Comm. Fish. Res. Bull. Fisheries WA; 8pp.

Brown, R.S., N. Caputi and E. Barker 1993. A preliminary assessment of increases in fishing power on stock assessment and fishing effort expended in the western rock lobster fishery. Proc. 4th Int. Workshop on lobster Biology and Management, Japan, 1993.

Morgan, G.R. 1974. Aspects of the population dynamics of the western rock lobster (Panulirus cygnus) II. Seasonal changes in the catchability coefficient. Aust. J. Mar. Freshw. Res., 25:249-259.

Morgan, G.R. 1977. Aspects of the population dynamics of the western rock lobster and their role in management. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Western Australia.

Morgan, G.R. 1979. Assessment of the stocks of the western rock lobster, Panulirus cygnus, using surplus yield models. Aust. J. Mar. Freshw. Res. 30:355-363.

Morgan, G.R. 1980a. Increase in fishing effort in a limited entry fishery - the western rock lobster fishery 1963-1976. J. Cons. Int. Explor. Mer 39(1):86-91.

Morgan, G.R. 1980b. Population dynamics and management of the western rock lobster fishery. Marine Policy 4(1):52-60.

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Sheard, K. 1962. The Western Australian Crayfishery, 1944-1961. Paterson Brockensha, Perth, 145pp.


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