4. THE CASE STUDIES ON ARTISANAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

4.1 Introduction to the case studies

4.1.1 Main points in this section

• Fisher communities vary greatly in livelihood possibilities and constraints, as presented by the availability of infrastructure, accessibility, primary economic activity, population structure and so on.

• The case studies on artisanal fisheries management mechanisms concentrate on two types of activities: control at landing sites and surveillance at sea.

4.1.2 The communities and the case studies per community

From the country reports on fisher participation on MCS in Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea, ten case studies were taken for analysis in the present study. The case studies on artisanal fisheries management took place in eight communities. The communities, per country are:

THE EIGHT CASE STUDY COMMUNITIES, PER COUNTRY

The number of case studies per community varies. There is one for the PNBA in Mauritania, one for the two communities in Guinea, one case each in three communities in Ghana, and five case studies in the two Senegalese communities. To clarify the situation, the table below shows an overview of the case studies in the respective communities.

THE CASE STUDIES PER COMMUNITY

On the following pages, maps illustrate roughly where the communities are located. In a text-box next to the maps, some livelihood characteristics of each community are described, and the name of the case that goes with each community is given.

(The source of the maps is the following web-site:

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/Map_collection.html.)

INDICATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE CASE STUDY AREA IN MAURITANIA

INDICATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS IN SENEGAL

INDICATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS IN GUINEA

INDICATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS IN GHANA

4.1.3 Division of case studies into two groups for analysis

For the sake of analysis, the case studies were divided into two main groups, according to whether the fisheries management activity was carried out at sea and aimed at protecting intrusion of foreign vessels in an area, or at the landing site to control fish landings:

1. Surveillance at sea: concern patrol activities at sea to ensure that certain vessels do not enter into a particular zone.

2. Control at landing sites: these cover a range of activities, such as the amount of fish that can be caught and the type of gear that can be used, but the control activity all take place at the beach, port or landing site.

The table below shows into which group each of the case studies falls.

GROUPING THE CASE STUDIES INTO “SURVEILLANCE AT SEA” AND “CONTROLS AT LANDING SITES”

4.1.4 Implications for livelihoods-centred fisheries management

Although this section simply introduces the case studies, the description above does underline that artisanal fisheries take place in communities and contexts that vary enormously in terms of livelihoods, the assets available, the fisheries, the livelihood strategies etc. It reinforces the point that fisheries management needs to be adapted to the context and flexible. This is not just in order to be adapted to the livelihoods, but also for the purely practical reason that the context creates possibilities and constraints on how participation, implementation, MCS and enforcement of fisheries management are able to take place. The challenge is therefore to create a basic management framework that sets the general objectives of fisheries management, while leaving room for local adaptation. Creating such a framework is most likely done through trail and error and learning from experiences elsewhere. Countries could identify experts that could help with this process.

4.2 Description of the case studies

4.2.1 Main points in this section

• Controls at landing sites tend to be at the initiative of artisanal fisher committees whereas surveillance at sea is mostly initiated by government.

• Differences between community and government mechanisms concern mostly their scale and equipment used.

• Controls at landing sites by fisher groups are more effective than surveillance at sea by either government or fisher groups.

• A satisfactory level of effectiveness is more important than 100% effectiveness.

4.2.2 Origin and objectives of the controls at landing sites

Four of the case studies concern controls at landing sites, all of them by fisher committees. They are almost entirely initiated and executed by fishers. The committees have agreed upon rules for:

• restricting the number of fishing trips (Commission des sennes tournantes, Kayar),

• the amount of fish landed on certain days (Comité de Pêche, Kayar) or

• the inspection of mesh sizes of nets and checks on other informal regulations (Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders, Mumford; Community Fisheries Management Committee, Egyan).

The origins and objectives of the case studies on controls at landing sites vary.

In Senegal, both of the case studies on controls at landing sites - the Commission des sennes tournantes and the Comité de Pêche - were situated in Kayar (see map for a reminder). The Commission des sennes tournantes was put in place by fishers in the early 1990’s to improve the price purse seine fishers were getting for small pelagics. Also in Kayar, the Comité de Pêche, created in 1994, has the aim of regulating the offer of demersal species destined for export to get a better price. It concerns handline fishers. Both have objectives of improved marketing.

In Ghana, the cases on control at landing sites consist of the Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders in Mumford and the Community fisheries management committee in Egyan (see map for a reminder of their location). In contrast to the situation in Kayar, Senegal, the Ghanaian cases on controls at landing sites were initially set up to regulate social issues, such as conflict management. Gear control activities for protection of fish resources were later added to the initial objective.

The new objective of the committees in Mumford and Egyan originated at the end of the 1990’s under influence of the Sub-sector Capacity Building Project which introduced community-based fisheries management committees in Ghana (see also Section 3.2.3). Since then, in Mumford, the nets and documents of local fishers and seasonal migrant are inspected on fishing with nets of small mesh sizes and landing of juvenile fish. In Egyan this regulation is combined with an area near the shore, restricted to fishing for elderly fishermen so that they can ensure a minimum level of income.

4.2.3 Origin and objectives of surveillance at sea

There are six case studies for surveillance at sea.

Three of these case studies consist of fisher committees or sub-committees that carry out surveillance activities. The other three cases on surveillance at sea consist of decentralized government surveillance posts with respective staff.

Of the fisher committees and sub-committees, the Sub-Committee for Surveillance took place in Tema, Ghana.

The the Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité took place in Fass Boye and the Commission de Surveillance in Kayar, Senegal (also the site of case studies on controls at landing sites and the decentralized government surveillance posts).

Of these three surveillance committees, only the Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité in the community of Fass Boye, Senegal, was initiated by fishers. The other two, the Comission de Surveillance in Kayar (Senegal) and the Sub-Committee for Surveillance in Tema (Ghana) are executed by fishers but were initiated at the encouragement of the fisheries administration.

The other three cases on surveillance at sea consist of decentralized government surveillance posts with respective staff. These cases concern the Projet de Protection et Surveillance des Pêches au Sénégal (PSPS) in Fass Boye; the Système de Surveillance du PNBA, in the PNBA Park in Mauritania (see map left); and the Surveillance Project in the communities of Bonfi and Koukoudé in Guinea.

The objective of most of the case studies on surveillance is to ensure that no trawling takes place in the near-shore zone where this is prohibited, often translated as being an “artisanal fishing zone”. This zone varies per country, but is generally several miles out to sea from shore. It is based on regulations for stock protection (see also Section 3.3.3). As was mentioned before, artisanal fishing is concentrated in this area, and the surveillance activity is generally perceived to have as its objective to keep industrial vessels out of the “artisanal fishing zone”.

The Système de Surveillance du PNBA (Mauritania) differs slightly in objective from the other cases in that the underlying interest of keeping industrial vessels out of the park is the conservation of resources and the park itself. Within the park, there is a prohibition on the use of outboard engines and access to the park is limited to necessary travel and regulated tourist visits.

The objective in the case study called the Commission de Surveillance of Kayar (in Senegal) is also different from the other case studies. Its objective was to ensure that gill nets (used by migrants) were not used in a newly defined zone destined for line fishing (practised by Kayar fishers). These two zones were defined within the “artisanal fishing zone”.

The Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité (in Fass Boye, Senegal) and the Commission de Surveillance (in Kayar, Senegal) were initiated in the 1980’s. The other cases on surveillance date from the 1990’s.

4.2.4 Organization and functioning

For controls at landing sites, the fisheries management mechanism was aimed at different groups in the different case studies. In Kayar (Senegal), the rules for controls at landing sites of the Comité de Pêche and the Commission des sennes tournantes apply specifically to its own members, that is handliners and purse seiners respectively. In the two Ghanaian communities of Egyan and Mumford the rules set by the Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders (Mumford) and the Community fisheries management committee (Egyan) apply to all fishers active in those communities’ waters. Egyan has made its rules known to all other fishing communities and local authorities in the district, which agreed to comply with the rules when fishing at Egyan. In Mumford the rules are made clear to migrant fishers when they announce their arrival at the landing site to the Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders.

For the majority of the case on surveillance at sea, the rules on respecting the so-called “artisanal fishing zone” or the marine park (in the case of the PNBA in Mauritania) have been laid down by national government in legislation and apply especially to industrial vessels. Artisanal vessels are not restricted in where they fish. The sole exception to this is the Commission de Surveillance of Kayar (in Senegal), where the zones for gill nets (used by migrants) and the zone for line fishing (practised by Kayar fishers) were defined by local authorities and fisher leaders, in order to end a conflict between the two groups of fishers.

The cases show that control of compliance at the landing site is very simple and requires no specific equipment. Each committee generally has sub-group, which deal with this specific task. For example, at the landing site in Mumford (Ghana), so-called “security personnel” are hired by the Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders to ensure orderly conduct and compliance. This is done with money from fines and landing site “taxes” for the use of the landing site paid to the council. In addition, a general form of control is usually carried out by the community at large, by the simple fact that everyone is present on the beach when catches are landed and can see who does what. Sometimes geo-morphological aspects of a region facilitate the control, as in Kayar (Senegal). The area around that community does not permit the landing of canoes and unloading of fish, forcing all fishers to land their catch at Kayar where they can be seen and controlled.

(Sub-)committee members carry out sanctions against those who do not comply with the landing site rules. They consist, amongst other things, of fines, confiscation of landed juvenile fish, and in the case of continued disobedience, stopping canoes from going fishing, confiscation nets or prohibition to fish in that community’s area. But social sanctions are also important, such as acquiring a reputation as a rule-breaker or losing credibility as a community leader. The income from fines in the systems goes to finance the control persons, other committee activities, or community development initiatives.

Surveillance at sea requires more inputs than controls at landing sites. In the committees for surveillance, committee members make canoes and outboard engines available for patrols. The committees then carry out patrols on a regular basis and on the basis of specific information on intrusions. The information is reported to the committee, who often calls a meeting, hears the case and tries to settle it via payment of fines at the community level. The running costs of the committees often come from the money gathered from fines. An exception to this procedure is the Sub-Committee for Surveillance in Tema (Ghana), which reports intruding industrial vessels to the fisheries authorities. The MCS Unit of the Directorate of Fisheries should then take action.

The decentralized government surveillance posts have more and more sophisticated equipment than the committees: VHF portable radios, Geographical Positioning System (GPS), compasses, cameras, maritime maps, etc. Generally, they possess one or more small vessels with outboard engines. In the Guinean case (Surveillance Project, Bonfi and Koukoudé) and the PSPS (Fass Boye, Senegal) case, Navy vessels are used, while the Système de Surveillance du PNBA (PNBA, Mauritania) has a small plane at its disposal for surveillance. The posts schedule patrols, generally on a monthly basis. These are based on national surveillance plans, information about local fishing practices, and experience of where incursions are likely to take place. The plans are elaborated by staff of the surveillance post, often in collaboration with other relevant authorities, such as the Navy (who may send a security officer). Patrols also go out to follow-up on specific information from fishers, observers aboard industrial vessels, or radar. During patrols, more specific information or evidence is gathered, which may involve boarding and inspection of the industrial vessel. The information is either passed on to the relevant authorities verbally or in a written report for arrests, prosecution and fines. Each post also makes monthly reports. Financing comes from part of the fines and from government.

4.2.5 Results and effectiveness

What were the results of the cases studied? What is the actual state of the committees and to what extent have they reached their objectives? To start once more with the controls at the landing site, for these case studies the picture is relatively positive. The Commission des sennes tournantes (Kayar, Senegal) which aims to increase prices for small pelagics appears to be functioning quite well, although prices still vary somewhat. In the same community, the objectives of the Comité de Pêche (aim: to increase the price for exported demersals) are generally, but not always, reached. In Ghana, Mumford’s Chief Fisherman and the Council of Elders seems to be working rather well in preventing the use of undersized mesh nets in the community’s waters. However, a big problem exists in Egyan (also Ghana), where the Community Fisheries Management Committee cannot restrain migrant fishers from the community of Princetown further along the coast from fishing with undersized mesh nets in their area. There is an ongoing conflict over this issue, which outside mediation has not been able to resolve.

For the case studies on surveillance the results are much less positive. To start with the fisher committees doing surveillance, the Commission de Surveillance of Kayar (Senegal) has stopped surveillance activities due to lack of means while the problem remains: conflicts between migrants with gill nets and residents with hand lines continue. The case study at Tema, the Sub-Committee for Surveillance (in Ghana) was set up only three years ago, but already it has known decreasing attendance at its meetings. This began when relatives of sub-committee members were caught breaking the rules that the sub-committee is supposed to check on. Sub-committee members hesitate to apply the rules to their friends and relatives. The Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité of Fass Boye (Senegal) was initially effective in achieving its objective of keeping industrial vessels out of the “artisanal fishing zone”. However, the methods used were so radical that industrial vessel owners went to the formal courts to complain about the committee’s harassment. As a result, its activities were declared illegal and stopped by the government. The process did, however, lead to the installation of the decentralized PSPS post in Fass Boye in 1992.

The effectiveness of such government controlled surveillance activities has, according to the case studies, also been low. The PSPS decentralized surveillance post just mentioned in Fass Boye (Senegal) is no longer functional due to operational problems. Still faced with incursions by industrial vessels in the coastal zone, some fishers in Fass Boye would now like to bring the Comité de Vigilance et de Sécurité back to life. The Surveillance Project in Bonfi and Koukoudé (Guinea) was turned into a government programme after 1996. Although it is still in place, it is generally considered by both government officials and fishers to be ineffective. The most recent surveillance post implemented was the one in the PNBA in Mauritania (1998). It is not clear from the report whether it is successfully deterring vessels from entering the park or fishing illegally.

If effectiveness is taken to mean the extent to which the objectives were reached (keeping industrial vessels out of the coastal zone, fishing with certain gear only in a certain area, limited access to the park, etc.), none of the fisheries management measures of the case studies can be considered one hundred per cent effective. However, it would seem that three of the case studies on controls at landing sites are satisfactory enough to stay in place. In contrast, the group of case studies on surveillance at sea has so many problems that they do not appear to be satisfactory enough and surveillance issues continue to be an issue of heated debate in the communities concerned.

4.2.6 Implications for livelihoods-centred fisheries management

As with the last section, this section is mainly an introduction to the case studies. However, it does show that both fishers and government are actively involved in fisheries management. Most of the time, fishers are very motivated to apply fisheries management mechanisms that are likely to directly improve their livelihoods. Once again, by collaborating with fishers, governments could improve the implementation of their fisheries management mechanisms, and vice versa. Fisheries project and programmes could encourage this collaboration by organising exchange visits between fisher committees and between fishers and government officials in order to raise awareness about the possibilities.

The information from the case studies also shows, however, that some fisheries management mechanisms are more complicated to carry out than others. Surveillance is clearly much more difficult to carry out than controls at landing sites. Yet it is an essential part of fisheries management if the laws on different zones or protected areas are to be respected. The next Section analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the case studies on surveillance and on controls at landing sites.