The Economic Valuation of AnGR:
Importance, Application and Practice^[7]

Adam G. Drucker
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI),
PO Box 5689, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Abstract

The importance of AnGR valuation and its policy applications: Economics is about choice and the efficient allocation of scarce resources that have alternative uses. Rationally speaking, choices should be made in such a way as to maximize the "utility" or "welfare" obtained. The large amount of AnGR at risk, together with the limited financial resources available for conservation, mean that there is a need to decide which breeds should be conserved and how this should be done. Economic valuation can play an important role in ensuring an appropriate focus for conservation efforts. Specifically, establishing economic values for animal genetic resources can contribute to policy and management decisions because they can be used to: i) guide resource allocation between biodiversity conservation and other socially valuable endeavours, and between various types of genetic resource conservation, research and development; and ii) assist in the design of economic incentives and institutional arrangements for farmers/genetic resource managers and breeders. Identifying the value of AnGR can thus be used to support, inter alia: i) resource conservationists and government planners who need to identify such values in order to justify budgets; ii) farmers’ rights supporters who want measures of the value in order to calculate compensation to farmers in developing countries; and iii) the Convention on Biodiversity’s (CBD’s) call for "the fair and equitable distribution of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources" (Article 1).

Understanding the economics of AnGR erosion: Biodiversity and genetic resources conservation generate economic values, which are not captured in the marketplace. A public good incentive problem clearly exists since AnGR conservation is a non-excludable, non-rival good (i.e. benefiting from the conservation/use of AnGR does not preclude others benefiting from it and it is impossible, or excessively costly, to operate any exclusion mechanism). Not only is benefit estimation difficult but also the benefits are "embedded" in the phenotype, which is itself a manifestation of some of these resources. All these properties obscure the relationship between these resources and the benefits they generate, such that genetic resources are unlikely to have an exchange value that reflects their economic scarcity. The result of this "failure" to fully capture the broader total economic values (which include direct and indirect use values, as well as non-use values) of AnGR conservation/sustainable use in the marketplace is a distortion where the incentives are against genetic resources conservation/sustainable use and in favour of the economic activities that erode such resources. Such outcomes are, from an economic viewpoint, associated with market intervention and/or global appropriation failures.

Valuing AnGR in practice: A number of methodological difficulties that have arisen in valuing plant genetic resources (PGR) are also likely to affect AnGR. However, in addition to confronting similar challenges, there are several differentiating characteristics between AnGR and PGR that may have an influence on valuation. Animal resources are more mobile and have a comparatively high cost per unit. Fecundity is low and "seed" needs to be deeply frozen to survive. In addition, many animal diseases spread rapidly and impact seriously both within and across animal species, including Homo sapiens. These substantial differences convey policy, legal and technical uniqueness that must be addressed to achieve effective management of AnGR. They also have implications for valuation. A range of valuation methodologies exist and these can be broadly categorized into three groups on the basis of the practical purpose for which they may be conducted. These are: i) determining the appropriateness of AnGR conservation programme costs (i.e. consider environmental values); ii) determining the actual economic importance of breeds at risk (i.e. consider breed values); and/or iii) be used in priority setting in AnGR breeding programmes (i.e. consider trait values). The results of field-testing a selection of these methodologies and a discussion regarding their relevance to community-based management are considered in this paper.

Conceptual economic background to AnGR valuation

The large amount of AnGR at risk in African countries, combined with the limited financial resources available for conservation and sustainable development of animal genetic resources, indicate that there is a need to decide which breeds should be conserved and how this should be done. Economics can therefore play a key role in orienting such decisions as economics is about choice and the efficient allocation of scarce resources that have alternative uses. Rationally speaking, choices should be made in such a way as to maximize the "utility" (also referred to as "welfare" or "satisfaction") obtained.

Economic theory has shown that functioning markets can be a powerful ally in the efficient allocation of resources by reflecting the relative scarcity of a given resource through the price mechanism, thus providing the correct incentives for its use/conservation. However, Pearce and Moran (1994, p. xi) argue that the activity of biodiversity (and genetic resources) conservation generates economic values, which may well not be captured in the marketplace. The result of this "failure" is a distortion, a tilted playing field with the odds stacked against genetic resources conservation and in favour of the economic activities that erode such resources. The discipline of economics regards this erosion largely within the following framework:

Economic forces drive much of the extinction of the world’s biological resources and biological diversity; yet biodiversity (including AnGR) has economic value. If the world's economies are rationally organized, this suggests that biodiversity must have less economic value than the economic activities giving rise to its loss; yet we know that many biological resources do have significant economic value. We also know that many of the erosive/destructive activities themselves have very low economic value; therefore something is wrong with the way the actual economic decisions are made - for some reason they fail to "capture" the economic values that can be identified; these "economic failures" lie at the heart of any explanation for the loss of biological diversity. If we can address them, there is a chance of reducing biodiversity loss.

From the framework above, it appears that the value of biodiversity and its capture play a key role in explaining biodiversity loss. It therefore becomes critical for us to consider the issues of:

identifying the types of values attributable to biodiversity;

quantifying these values (i.e. valuation); and

implementing mechanisms and policies that permit the "capture" of these values.

Notice how the above framework begins with considering that economic forces drive much of the extinction of the world's biodiversity. Economic rationality suggests that the decision to, say, replace a native breed of cattle with an imported high yielding modern breed will be determined by the relative profitability or rates of return of the two options.

Yet if biodiversity has economic value (as discussed below) and many of the erosive or destructive activities themselves have low economic value, why does biodiversity loss take place?

Note that the relevant rates of return are those that accrue to the farmer rather than to society or the world as a whole. This loss thus appears to be economically rational because returns from erosive/destructive alternatives may simply be higher than that from activities compatible with genetic resources conservation because the latter may consist of non-market benefits that accrue to people other than the farmer.

The main economic reason for the erosion of biodiversity is, therefore, that there is an underlying disparity between the private (financial) and social (economic) costs and benefits of biodiversity use and conservation. This leads to the existence of "externalities" and is why the framework talks about a failure to "capture" the economic values that can be identified.

Why do private and social interests diverge? The main factors involve three types of failure, as can be seen in Figure 1:

market failure: distortions caused by the "missing markets" in the external benefits generated by biodiversity conservation. Freely functioning markets are based on narrow self-interest. Individuals thus have no incentive to account for the external costs their actions impose on the rest of society. This failure arises from the uncontrolled functioning of the marketplace.

intervention failure: distortions caused by government actions intervening in the way the marketplace works. Governments may even do so in order to remove the main elements of an externality. However, a great many interventions, even where they appear to serve some social purpose, are contrary to the interests of biodiversity/AnGR conservation. Financial incentives for deforestation and many national livestock-breeding programmes are an example. With regard to the latter, such programmes are increasingly promoting the universal use of a few "improved" breeds. But such programmes have important implications for genetic resource conservation and food security, as they result in a dramatic reduction in population numbers for many indigenous breeds and, in addition, these very few "improved" genetic lines are unlikely to achieve high levels of production, productivity and sustainability given the broad range of production environments and farmer needs.

global appropriation failure: many biodiversity conservation activities yield global benefits (e.g. planetary life-support functions or existence values - see below). For example, the loss of tropical forest cover and biodiversity, which affects global climate (e g. through the release of carbon dioxide and the greenhouse effect) is an example of a global externality. However, if a country receives no financial incentive to pay for the costs of maintaining these global external benefits, it will have no incentive to preserve such resources. Global appropriation failure thus arises from the absence of markets/mechanisms to capture these values.

Note that global missing markets can coexist with local market failure and intervention failure. The loss of biodiversity and animal genetic resources is a case in point.

As Wells (1992) notes, in many countries conservation is characterized by a spatial mismatch between costs and benefits. Economic benefits from conserved areas tend to be limited to a local scale, increase somewhat on a national scale and, as is slowly becoming clear, can be substantial on a global scale. On the other hand, costs, in terms of foregone development opportunities, tend to be locally significant and nationally and globally moderate.

According to Swanson (1997), this spatial mismatch is exaggerated further by the fact that biodiversity is not equally distributed among nation states, suggesting that global external values are likely to be significant. In addition, much of the global biodiversity resides in precisely those states that have the least capacity to support it. For example, 70 percent of the approximately 4 000 remaining breeds of livestock are found in developing countries (FAO, 1999, p. 28).

AnGR erosion can thus be seen in terms of the replacement (not only by substitution but also through cross-breeding and the elimination of livestock resulting from changes in the production system) of the existing variety of breeds of domestic animals with a selection from a small range of specialized "improved" breeds. This bias towards investment in such specialized breeds results in underinvestment in a more diverse set of breeds in a world where human investments are necessary for the survival of the latter (Brown et al., 1993). At the same time, this replacement process has traditionally been regulated on a globally decentralized basis. Historically, each state or individual has been able to make replacement decisions without regard to the consequences for others. This creates an important regulatory problem because the cost (in terms of the value of lost services) of each successive replacement is not the same. As native animal breeds become increasingly threatened, the cost of each successive replacement (in terms of lost diverse resource services lost to all societies on Earth) escalates rapidly. The absence of a mechanism that brings these costs into the decision-making framework of the converting state or individual is a large part of the biodiversity problem (Swanson, 1997).

We will consider policy issues in more detail below. Before we do so, however, it is worth asking how we know that such failures are important. They might, after all, be trivial compared with the urgent need to introduce modern breeds for the benefit of economic development. The issue of AnGR resource valuation is therefore a key issue in such investment decisions.

Values attributable to biodiversity and genetic resources

In the previous section we discussed how the relative distribution of the costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation play a key role in the process of genetic resources erosion. But what are the values that should be taken into account in determining the relative economic costs and benefits of genetic resources conservation?

Pearce and Moran (1994) argue that the recognition of the broader total economic value of natural assets can be instrumental for altering decisions about their use, particularly in investment decisions that present a clear choice between erosion/destruction or conservation.

Total economic value (TEV) can be expressed as follows:

TEV = DUV + IUV + OV + BV + XV

Use values are the values arising from the actual use of a given breed and can be divided into direct use values (DUV), indirect use values (IUV) and option values (OV). Non-use values can be divided into bequest values (BV) and existence values (XV).

Direct use values (DUV) refer to the benefits resulting from actual uses, such as for food, fertilizer and hides, and rituals.

Indirect use values (IUV) are the benefits deriving from ecosystem functions, such as the maintenance of genetic stock and other important interactions between these breeds and the ecosystem. For example, some animals play a key role in the dispersion of certain plant species.

Option values (OV) are derived from the value given to safeguarding an asset for the option of using it in future times. It is a kind of insurance value against the occurrence of, for example, a new animal disease or drought/climate change.

Similarly, non-use values can be divided into:

Bequest values (BV), which measure the benefit accruing to any individual from the knowledge that others might benefit from a resource in the future; and

Existence values (XV), which are simply derived from the satisfaction of knowing that a particular asset exists (e.g. blue whales, capybaras or N´Dama cattle).

Note that some asset values may overlap between these categories and double counting must be avoided, e.g. direct use of hides and indirect maintenance of genetic stock may be mutually exclusive. In addition, attempts to isolate option, bequest and existence values can be problematic. Underlying principles and procedures for such valuation are still debated. But if the objective is to demonstrate economic value, then this is not an insurmountable problem.

Furthermore, it is important to note that current economic decisions are largely based on only the first category - direct use values - although the other categories may be of equal or greater importance and in the context of genetic resources are indeed likely to be positive. By focusing exclusively on direct use values, biodiversity and genetic resources conservation are likely to be consistently undervalued, thus resulting in a bias towards overexploitation through activities that are incompatible with conservation.

The importance of establishing economic values for AnGR

As we saw above, factors such as the existence of externalities, the divergence between private and social costs, and the focus only on direct use values contribute to the fact that animal genetic resources are unlikely to have an exchange value that reflects their economic scarcity.

Having identified the reason why private and social values diverge, and the nature of those values (i.e. use and non-use values), it is important to ask how establishing economic values for AnGR can contribute to policy and management decisions. Artuso (1996) notes that establishing such values is important because they can:

guide resource allocation between biodiversity conservation and other socially valuable endeavours;

guide resource allocation between various types of genetic resource conservation, research and development; and

assist in the design of economic incentives and institutional arrangements.

When considering how valuation can guide resource allocation, one notices that it will allow society to allocate its scarce economic resources efficiently among competing sectors (including that of biodiversity conservation), in a way that overall social welfare is maximized. The benefits of genetic resources conservation and utilization are currently undervalued, but if the "true" value were taken into account when making investment decisions, this would lead to a relative shift in the allocation of resources towards genetic diversity conservation. The reason is that the marginal benefits to investment in this sector would then be more attractive. Given that this relative shift would take place at the expense of sectors and activities that tend to erode AnGR, a shift in the economy towards a sustainable development path could be said to have taken place.

Valuation would also allow resources to be allocated efficiently within the field of genetic resource conservation. It is worth noting how the reasons given for valuation appeal to different sets of stakeholders.

Brush and Meng (1996) note that the need for being more specific about the value of genetic resources is recognized by different groups:

resource conservationists and government planners, who need to identify such values in order to justify budgets for biodiversity conservation in general, and allocate funds between different types of genetic resources conservation; and

farmers’ rights activists, who want measures of the value in order to calculate compensation for farmers in less developed countries.

A further source of pressure for establishing such values, and which gives legitimacy to much of the above, is the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), signed in 1992, which stresses the importance of "the fair and equitable distribution of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources" (Article 1).

Figure 1. Schematic summary of factors affecting global agrobiodiversity loss. TEV = total economic value. Source: Adapted from Brown et al. (1993)

Animal genetic resources valuation

Having established the theoretical arguments in favour of AnGR valuation and the policy issues that we aim to resolve through such valuation, we now turn to the practical difficulties involved.

Animal genetic diversity in general, and valuation in particular, have not received the attention that plant/crop genetic resources (PGR) have. As a result, the development of methodologies for AnGR must draw heavily on the literature on PGR valuation. Given that the underlying principles of genetics and gene action are similar for plants and animals, it is worth asking what can be learned from PGR valuation methodologies that would be beneficial to AnGR valuation.

A number of methodological difficulties that have arisen from valuing PGR are also likely to affect AnGR. For example, Evenson (1991) has shown that it is extremely difficult to measure the benefits of germplasm diversity to crop development. The genetic resources are rarely traded in markets and are often the product of generations of informal innovations. Thus, identifying the contribution of a particular local breed to the success of an improved breed is complicated. In addition, the base materials used for breeding are the result of a production function and identifying the returns to respective factors (e.g. labour, on-farm technology, intellectual inputs) is likely to be possible only in the most general terms (Evenson, 1991; Pearce and Moran, 1994).

However, while AnGR and PGR confront similar challenges, they differ in several ways that may have an influence on valuation. According to Hammond (1996), of the FAO Animal Genetics Resources Group, animal resources tend to:

be more mobile;

be comparatively expensive with regard to cost per unit;

have very low fecundity, with "seed" needing to be deeply frozen; and

spread animal diseases rapidly, with a serious impact both within and across animal species, including Homo sapiens.

These primary differences lead to a number of related considerations, which will impact on valuation methodologies (as we shall see below) and resource management strategies. The following facts point to important differences:

the relatively small quantity of animal genetic resources and extremely small amount of these that have been exposed to modern development technology;

the high impact of certain biotechnologies on the "disperse" ability of animal resources;

the small number of wild relatives of domestic animal species that remain;

the low level of knowledge of animal biology compared with the wide range of environments that sustainable production is being sought for;

the high impact of animal disease protocols on international transport and access; and

the low quantity of genes of animal resources at risk that are kept in gene banks.

These substantial differences convey the policy, legal and technical uniqueness that must be addressed to achieve effective management of animal genetic resources. They are also likely to have implications for valuation.

Valuation methodologies

How can we measure these values and which valuation methodologies are the most appropriate? A range of potential valuation methodologies exists. These are presented in Table 1 and can be broadly categorized into three groups on the basis of the practical purpose for which they may be conducted (Drucker, Gomez and Anderson, 2001). Following the identification of a given breed that is at risk, these methodologies can be applied in order to justify conservation costs by:

determining the appropriateness of AnGR conservation programme costs (i.e. environmental values);

determining the actual economic importance of the breed at risk (i.e. breed values); and/or

priority setting in AnGR breeding programmes (i.e. trait values).

For a detailed description of these methodologies see Drucker, Gomez and Anderson, 2001. Note, however, the relevance of the different valuation techniques for different groups of stakeholders (e.g. policy-makers, breeders, farmers, farmers’ groups). While all three valuation categories have relevance to the community-based management of AnGR, it is clear that, once an appropriate incentive framework has been established, the valuation techniques of interest will be those that are most useful to farmers and breeders.

Overview of AnGR valuation methodologies and knowledge gaps

Despite the fact that some models have been developed for assessing the value of crop genetic resources and that it may be possible to adapt some of these to AnGR, the field of economic valuation of AnGR requires substantial development. As a result, many of our questions cannot be answered in quantitative terms, nor can specific techniques be recommended. Rather, a broad array of these tools needs to be determined, so that those that are best or most suitable for different circumstances can be employed (ILRI, 1999).

The valuation techniques considered above have been shown to have strengths and weaknesses. The decision as to which technique to use in a particular case requires experience and judgement on the part of the analyst. Data availability and/or the potential for acquiring relevant data will clearly be an important determinant, especially with respect to the problems of missing markets and market imperfections commonly encountered in developing countries. Where such missing markets/imperfections are significant, the resulting impact of any violations of the underlying assumptions of the potential valuation methodologies must be carefully considered and appropriate measures taken (if application is still a possibility). As indicated in Table 1, such violations will frequently require the collection of much of the required data through specially designed surveys^[8] and adequate shadow pricing of relevant inputs/outputs, used where market prices do not exist or are distorted.^[9] In choosing between methodologies, the analyst will also have to be aware that different methodologies will be of interest to different groups of actors, which include farmers, breeders and policy-makers in charge of conservation (see Table 1).

Given the state of AnGR valuation, ILRI is currently in the process of implementing a strategic framework for international research in AnGR valuation (ILRI, 1999; ILRI, 2000), which includes the field-testing of potential valuation methodologies. A subsequent evaluation of the more promising methodologies will then be carried out and a set of guidelines for preferred methods elaborated. Case studies are currently being conducted at several locations in Africa and Latin America.

Preliminary case study results aimed at assessing the performance of some of the non-market and market valuation tools described in Table 1 suggest that such valuation techniques can indeed provide plausible estimates of the value that producers and traders place on breed attributes. The application of contingent valuation methods for cattle attributes, for example, has permitted the estimation of the value of traits that could plausibly be obtained through breeding programmes, compared with transaction data that can only reveal the value of existing breed traits. This has obvious applications for orienting the goals of community-based management. The results of such surveys will also be used as an input for the design of cost-effective in situ participatory conservation programmes and commercialization strategies (the latter given the identification of consumer willingness to pay for indigenous breed products).

Table 1. AnGR valuation methodology evaluation

Policy implications and the design of incentives and institutional arrangements

Despite the importance of the economic valuation of AnGR, it is not an end in itself. Even where it is possible to identify the total economic value of AnGR, mechanisms to capture those benefits are necessary (Artuso, 1996). The current divergence of private and social costs implies that the relative costs and benefits of AnGR conservation tend to accrue unevenly at local, national and international levels (Wells, 1992; Swanson, 1997). A range of potential mechanisms/incentive measures (such as genetic call options,^[10] licensing agreements, prospecting/royalty rights, farmers’ rights, the removal of adverse subsidies, environmental funds and public financing, benefit-sharing, and market creation and commercialization) exists for translating these social values into efficient incentives for farmers/genetic resource managers and breeders (Artuso, 1996; Thies, 2000). Where ex situ conservation is to take place, the focus shifts to motivating efficient collection, storage, maintenance and evaluation of genetic resources. These mechanisms may even help to accelerate the development of improved valuation models.

The particular nature of the erosion of AnGR diversity allows us to identify some areas for further research, and will also orient valuation activities. There should be a focus on the development/adaptation of valuation methodologies that are appropriate for in situ conservation and can be implemented in situations where secondary data availability is limited, which is often the case in developing countries.

Three primary strategies are therefore envisioned (Brush and Meng, 1996, p. 28):

Research on AnGR, ecology and social science. This will determine the number and distribution of farms needed to maintain animal evolutionary systems in specific locations.

Community development activities related to increasing the value of local breeds. Although increasing such values can play an important role in promoting in situ use and conservation, Franks (1999) warns that conservation goals are unlikely to be met by depending on revenues earned from marketing commercially valuable traits of rare breeds. Biotechnology may create/discover substitutes for the traits of rare breeds. This, together with the fact that there are livestock subsidies for commercial herds, means that higher importance may have to be given to non-market-based payments. In this context economists have an important role to play in terms of: i) estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for the conservation of AnGR; ii) estimating the commercial value of genetic traits once they have been incorporated into commercial herds; and iii) assisting with the design of payment mechanisms that ensure a fair distribution of any subsidy payments.

Decentralized or participatory breeding to increase the use of local AnGR in breeding programmes. The ITDG (1996) agrees with FAO regarding the importance of in situ conservation of indigenous breeds, because this has proved more successful in sustaining and enhancing the gene pool than ex situ methods. However, it notes that such an approach should be combined with the issue of "genetic impact statements". Many native breeds have the potential for increased production. This potential needs to be fully evaluated before the occurrence of breed substitution. Properly planned in situ conservation could also serve as a model for sustainable livestock development with a minimum of external inputs. It is therefore proposed that, like the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of development projects, a "genetic impact statement" that calculates the effects on the number of animals of local breeds in the project's vicinity accompany the approval of any livestock programme. Valuation should play a role in the assessment of the economic significance of this genetic impact. In situ conservation programmes should also pay increased attention to gender issues, as women often play a key role in farm animal management and in increasing the "visibility" of local breeds by ensuring that the important ones in backyard and other non-commercial production systems appear in national statistics.

Conclusions

The seriousness of AnGR diversity erosion represents a major threat to agrobiodiversity, agricultural sustainability and the livelihoods of many farming families that possess few resources. AnGR have economic values (use and non-use values), which are not captured in the marketplace. The resulting disparity between the private and social costs tends to favour activities that promote the erosion of such resources. Economic valuation of AnGR thus is important from a policy perspective because it can play a key role in translating such social values into efficient incentives and institutional arrangements for farmers/genetic resource managers and breeders.

References

Anderson, S., Drucker, A. & Guendel, S. 1999. Conservation of animal genetic resources. External Programme, Wye College, Univ. of London.

Artuso, A. 1996. Creating linkages between valuation, conservation and sustainable development of genetic resources. Paper prepared for the Symposium on the Economics of Valuation and Conservation of Genetic Resources for Agriculture, Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth, Tor Vergata University, Rome, 13-15 May.

Brown, G. & Goldstein, J. 1984. A model for valuing endangered species. J. Environ. Econ. and Management, 11: 303-309.

Brown, K., Pearce, D., Perrings, C. & Swanson, T. 1993. Economics and the conservation of global diversity. Working Paper No. 2. Washington, DC, Global Environmental Facility.

Brush, S. & Meng, E. 1996. Farmers´ valuation and conservation of crop genetic resources. Paper prepared for the Symposium on the Economics of Valuation and Conservation of Genetic Resources for Agriculture, Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth, Tor Vergata University, Rome, 13-15 May.

Brush, S., Taylor, J. & Bellon, M. 1992. Technology adoption and biological diversity in Andean potato agriculture. J. Development Economics, 39: 365-387.

Cervigni, R. 1993. Estimating the benefits for plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. CSERGE, UCL and Univ. of East Anglia.

Drucker, A., Gomez, V. & Anderson, S. 2001. The economic valuation of farm animal genetic resources: a survey of available methods. Ecological Economics, 36: 1-18 (also available at www.elsevier.nl/cas/tree/store/ecolec/sub/2001/36/1/1163.pdf).

Evenson, R. 1991. Genetic resources: assessing economic value. In J. Vincent, E. Crawford & J. Hoehn, eds. Valuing environmental benefits in developing economies. Proc. seminar series, February-May 1990. Special Report No. 29. Michigan State University.

Evenson, R. 1996. Valuing genetic resources for plant breeding: hedonic trait value, and breeding function methods. Paper prepared for the Symposium on the Economics of Valuation and Conservation of Genetic Resources for Agriculture, Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth, Tor Vergata University, Rome, 13-15 May.

Evenson, R., Gollin, D. & Santaniello, V., eds. 1998. Agricultural values of plant genetic resources. Wallingford, UK, CABI.

FAO. 1997. Nations discuss utilization and conservation of genetic resources. In FAO global programme for management of farm animal genetic resources (available at www.fao.org/dad-is/library/programm/index.html).

FAO. 1999. The global strategy for the management of farm animal genetic resources. Rome.

Franks, J. 1999. The conservation of domestic animal genetic resources. Ecological Econ. Bull., 4(1): 16-19.

Gollin, D. & Evenson, R.E. 1994. The economic impact of the International Rice Germplasm Center (IRGC) and the International Network for the Genetic Evaluation of Rice (INGER). International Rice Research Institute.

Hall, S.J.G. & Ruane, J. 1993. Livestock breeds and their conservation - global review. Conservation Biology, 7(4): 815-825.

Hammond, K. 1996. The status of global farm animal genetic resources. Paper presented at the Symposium on the Economics of Valuation and Conservation of Genetic Resources for Agriculture, Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth, Tor Vergata University, Rome, 13-15 May.

Hazel, L. 1943. Genetic basis for selection indexes. Genetics, 28: 476-490.

Heisey, P., Smale, M., Byerlee, D. & Souza, E. 1997. Wheat rusts and the costs of genetic diversity in the Punjab of Pakistan. American J. Agricultural Economics, 79: 726-737.

ILRI. 1999. Economic valuation of animal genetic resources. Proc. FAO/ILRI Workshop, Rome, 15-17 March 1999. Nairobi. 80 pp.

ILRI. 2000. Report of the research-planning workshop on economic valuation of animal genetic resources. 2-4 February. Nairobi.

ITDG. 1996. Livestock keepers safeguarding domestic animal diversity through their animal husbandry. Dynamic Diversity Series, ed. P. Mulvaney. Rugby, England, Intermediate Technology Development Group.

Jabbar, M., Swallow, B., d’Iteran, G. & Busari, A. 1998. Farmer preferences and market values of cattle breeds of west and central Africa. J. Sustainable Agriculture, 12: 21-47.

Ladd, G. & Gibson, C. 1978. Microeconomics of technical change: what’s a better animal worth? American J. Agricultural Economics, 60: 236-240.

Laird, S. 1993. Contracts for biodiversity prospecting. In W. Reid et al., eds. Biodiversity prospecting: using genetic resources for sustainable development. Washington, DC, World Resources Institute.

Mitchell, G., Smith, C., Makower, M. & Bird, P. 1982. An economic appraisal of pig improvement in Great Britain. Animal Production, 35: 215-224.

Oldfield, M. 1989. The value of conserving genetic resources. Sunderland, Massachusetts, Sinauer Associates.

Pearce, D. & Moran, D. 1994. The economic value of biodiversity. London, Earthscan.

Richards, T. & Jeffrey, S. 1995. Hedonic pricing of dairy bulls - an alternative index of genetic merit. Department of Rural Economy. Project Report 95-04. Faculty of Agriculture, Forestry and Home Economics. University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.

Scarpa, R. 1999. Revealed preference valuation methods for farm animal genetic material: principles, strengths and weaknesses. Paper presented at: Economic Valuation of Animal Genetic Resources - An ILRI-FAO Planning Workshop, 15-17 March, Rome.

Simpson, R.D. & Sedjo, R.A. 1996. The value of genetic resources for use in agricultural improvement. Paper prepared for the Symposium on the Economics of Valuation and Conservation of Genetic Resources for Agriculture, Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth, Tor Vergata University, Rome, 13-15 May.

Smith, C. 1984a. Estimated costs of genetic conservation of farm animals. In Animal genetic resources conservation and management, data banks and training, pp. 21-30. FAO Animal Production and Health Paper No. 44/1. Rome.

Smith, C. 1984b. Genetic aspects of conservation in farm livestock. Livestock Production Science, 11: 37-48.

Smith, C. 1985. Scope for selecting many breeding stocks of possible economic value in the future. Animal Production, 41: 403-412.

Swanson, T. 1997. Global action for biodiversity. London, Earthscan.

Thies, E. 2000. Incentive measures appropriate to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of agrobiodiversity. GTZ.

Wells, M. 1992. Fiduciary funds to preserve biodiversity: Green funds. Ecologia, (February).