3. Role of Local Institutions in Managing Recent Disasters: An Assessment

3.1 Conceptual Framework

An assessment of local institutional responses to recent disasters was undertaken with reference to each major phase of the disaster management cycle. While detailed analysis is given in the succeeding paragraphs, the highlights of the assessment are shown in Figure 9. While local institutional response with regard to disaster preparedness is adequate to manage annual routine floods, these were inadequate in the event of severe floods like the November 1999 flood. Based on the experience of the 1999 flood, the local institutions could articulate the disaster prevention and mitigation strategies, which could reduce the impacts of floods. However, due to paucity of resources, the disaster mitigation and prevention measures are yet to be incorporated into development planning process at the local level.

This section is structured to provide the assessment of the performance and perceptions of local institutions in the context of the 1999 flood in respect of preparedness, response, recovery and development phases of the disaster management cycle.

3.2 Preparedness

Household preparations

Although people could observe that floods are becoming worse, they prepare at a level commensurate with the worst disaster they experienced, and not at a level that might exceed their experience. In the 1999 flood, people’s preparation for and local institution perception about the flood were all based on their past experience.

Some families do not begin to make any preparations until the floods are virtually upon them. Elderly, young couples with small children, and women-headed households in particular may not have enough labour to undertake thorough preparations.

Early warning

Vietnam has a good network of climatological observation stations as well as river level monitoring (Figure 10 and Table 8). The November 1999 flood was predicted 24 hours in advance, but there was no indication of the magnitude of the flood. On 20 October 1999, the region experienced heavy rains, and 10 days thereafter there was a serious weather disturbance indicating the potential possibilities of the heaviest flood during the first week of November. It would have been possible to give an indication of the magnitude of the flood based on climatological history and river behavior with reference to the 1953 and 1983 floods. As the magnitude of the flood was not predicted, people and local institutions prepared only for routine annual floods and not against the 1999 flood. Hence, most of the preparedness proved to be inadequate.

Source: HMS Vietnam

Table 8. Rivers for which floods are officially announced on the Voice of Vietnam and Vietnam Television by the General Department of Hydro-Meteorology

Source: HMS Vietnam

Another main shortcoming was with flood warning interpretation. Local people, with their own grassroots experience of disasters, do not always respond to warnings. Also, there is a lack of understanding by local institutions on the interpretation and communication of flood warnings to potential victims. There is a need to develop a community-based flood warning system with appropriate capacity building at the local community-based institutions, and provincial and national meteorological forecast information providers.

3.3 Response

There was quick and comprehensive action from the Government at all levels, as well as from local organizations, in response to the crisis. Immediate action was taken for rescue operations and food distribution by the local CFSC, mass organizations and the Red Cross. District leaders were in boats during the whole flood, organizing rescue operations and food distribution. As action was urgent, more power was delegated to the District People’s Committee (DPC) than normal. The DPC took the main initiative in organizing both the immediate emergency response and the longer-term efforts for recovery. The budget had to be thoroughly revised and the DPC was active in designing a strategy and in organizing resources for recovery.

At the commune level, the CFSC sub-committees involving the People’s Committee and mass organizations provided rescue, evacuation, relief, assessment of damage and rehabilitation measures. At all levels, sub-committees for the Management and Distribution of Support for Flood Relief were established, with representatives of key district sections and organizations. Sub-committees for Flood and Storm Protection were responsible for the planning and coordination of disaster mitigation efforts.

The role of the village leader is greater during crisis than under ‘normal’ conditions. The village leader has the overview of all the activities undertaken by the various organizations and support directed to the village. Community decision-making is strengthened regarding the distribution of support from outside. Village meetings were frequent in order to decide on the distribution of Red Cross housing support, who was in extra need of food support, and so on. The village-based cooperative organizations played an important role in increasing self-reliance of the village. They built the capacity for producing the seed that the village needed, organized the storage of emergency supplies, and organized credit funds.

The Fatherland Front, Farmers Association, Women’s Union, Youth Union, Veterans Association, Agriculture Cooperative, the Vietnam Red Cross, and the Buddhist community all took part in the organization of activities for repairing houses and infrastructure, cleaning up the environment, burying dead animals and replacing losses. People organized labour teams to help each other to recover the land. There were frequent village meetings on how to handle the crisis, and people in the village looked out for and supported each other.

Mass organizations, village and commune leaders spent a lot of time on social visits, supporting people, finding out about what damage people had suffered and how people were coping. It is socially very important that leaders of the village and commune organizations visit as many households as possible to see how they are, and show that they care. During the interviews, people would always specify which leaders of organizations had visited them to enquire about their situation. The cases where commune or village staff failed in these social commitments were seen as a serious problem, impacting on their credibility to continue in their positions. Table 9 shows how respondents assess the role of mass organizations after the November 1999 flood.

Table 9. Assessment of the role of commune and district organizations after the floods, Hong Ha Commune [1]

There is some diversity as to who took the lead on response among the mass organizations in different localities. In almost all cases, VNRC played a key role; in some cases the members of the Women's Union; and in other cases, the Farmers Association. In all cases, there was much collaboration between them and with others, including the Fatherland Front, Veterans Association, Youth Union, etc. These organisations divided responsibilities according to their mandates, and led on different aspects of response and recovery. For example, the VNRC led in many localities on safety, rescue and evacuation, and training and information dissemination in this regard; the Women’s Union on food preparation. The inter relationship of local institutions with macro level institutions are shown in the Figure 11.

Note: The size of the circles represents the relative importance of the organisation (to local disaster management). Overlap of circles indicates closeness in relationships.

Figure 11. Stakeholders in disaster management, according to officials and staff of mass organizations in Quang Tri Province

3.4 Recovery and Development

Land use

In the mountain areas, land management issues are seen at both the commune and district levels to be the key, both to the immediate capacity to recover from floods, and to long-term development.

Today, the management of the hill land is controlled by the Bo River Watershed Management Board, the Forest Station and the State Forest Enterprise. The Watershed Management Board designates which area to plant and with which species, without consulting either district or commune authorities. Households do not take initiatives to develop the sloping land for fear that it will be claimed for forest planting in mid-crop season.

The main provincial level strategy for improving access to land is through a resettlement programme to open up new areas for cultivation along the Bo River Valley. Thirty-five households have already moved there. The development strategy is mainly based on the cultivation of fruit trees and pepper. The new area is less at risk from flooding but the development strategy involves other risks especially initially, because of lack of experience, lack of market channels and market information, and insufficient development of input supply networks.

In the case of Hong Ha commune, there seems to be unused potential in the development of natural resources available. The management structures are not meant for the use and development of the hill land resources, they are meant for protection. Commune and district authorities are arguing for a revision of land use planning and land management with the following purpose:

• Make a detailed assessment of the protection needs in the watershed and assess what kind of ground cover is required, and in which areas. The existing plan is too general and defines practically the whole area as protected land.

• Analyze which land, presently defined as forest land, could be developed for agriculture or agro-forestry purposes.

• Increase district and commune capacity for the development of agro-forestry, which would fulfill the multiple purposes of environment protection, sources of income and sources of food.

• Include bamboo planting along the river as part of the tree planting program.

Institutionally, this would involve:

• Increased resources for the district and commune to conduct land use analysis and land use planning.

• Clarification of commune and household rights regarding the hill land close to the settlement area.

• Allocation of hill land to the commune and households for agro-forestry development.

• Redefinition of the mandate of the Province Watershed Management Board to involve the district and commune authorities in the planning and management process.

• The use of personnel resources of the Forest Inspection System to support the commune and households in forest development and management.

• State support for commune management of bamboo planting for reduced riverbank erosion and flooding.

Credit system

In the lowland and hill land areas of Hai Lang District, the main institutional issues regarding recovery concern credit and insurance systems. The credit requirements include:

• Community management of savings and credit funds which can partly replace the need to take out private loans to bridge seasonal gaps.

• Long-term credit for flood recovery, which is paid back in installments.

• Improved capacity for the cooperative management of input supply credit.

• Credit and insurance systems which enable people to take more risks in the process of developing new lines of income generation for diversification.

• Insurance policies protecting against harvest losses and damage to property.

• Special credit and extension support programmes to help poor households who are deeply in debt to gradually stabilize their economic situation.

• Health insurance policies.

In the communes studied, the credit for flood recovery has not been sufficient for recovery. The credit was largely used to replace lost resources, mainly rice, and did not contribute to the accumulation of new resources. It is therefore difficult for many people to repay. In order to be effective for recovery, the repayment term needs to be longer, with repayments made in installments relative to the harvest seasons.

The combination of old debts, which were difficult to pay back after the floods, and new debts, both formal and informal, put some households in a situation of negative debt spiral, which is difficult to get out of. These households would need special attention to help them out of their difficulties. The Government is generally reluctant to cancel debts despite of a ruling to cancel bank debts if the investment loss in the floods exceeded 80% of the loan value. The State has been more liberal in granting prolongation of a loan period, rather than cancelling debts.

Normally VBARD does not give new loans if the old loans are not yet repaid. The Bank also does not allow loans to be used to repay private debt. A special programme would thus be required for households caught in this debt spiral, with a combination of credit to service old debts and provide for income generation. They would need special extension support to make sure that the income generation efforts payoff. They would also need support with overall household economic planning over a long time period. This could possibly be a role for the mass organizations at commune level, with support from household economic expertise from the district planning section and finance section.

Much of the rice, which was lost in the floods was supposed to be used to pay back the input credit to the cooperative for the summer-autumn crop (1999). When the State credit for recovery of production arrived in March, it was in many cases used to pay back that previous debt to the cooperatives. The flood recovery credit was thus necessary for the whole input supply system to function. Without it people would not have been able to repay the debt to the cooperatives, and the cooperatives would have become bankrupt. Vice versa, without the cooperative input credit, the State credit would have come too late to be useful for the winter crop after the floods.

Allocation of the State credit in Hai Lang District was based on area of paddy production. This was mainly a practical decision, in order to be able to administer the quick distribution, and for the credit to reach a vast majority of the households. The credit was mainly used to secure inputs for rice production, but was also used for other production purposes. Those who lacked resources for recovery were groups such as fishermen, who don't have any paddy. Most of the hill land population have a little paddy land.

For the mountain commune, credit was restricted to recovery of losses sustained in fish raising, the main source of income generation that was affected by the floods. Very few households in Hong Ha commune had access to credit. The type of losses in the mountain areas (land fertility, cassava, banana) was not defined as economic resources (in the sense that they had not been bought nor were to be sold) and this influenced decisions on credit allocation, reportedly made as a result of province directives.

Private loans

Private loans are a common way for poor people to bridge the food gap during the months before the harvest of the winter-spring crop. These loans are paid back directly after harvest, and are normally not a big problem if they do not accumulate. The problem with private loans was decreasing before the 1999 flood because of increased availability of other sources of credit. After the floods, the situation became more difficult, as people have taken out more private loans than usual. Income during the years after the floods has been low and people have had difficulties repaying the loans.

The local money-lenders are often local traders or more well-off households in the community or neighbouring communes. There is a degree of social pressure on these households not to claim too high interest rates. But there is little open discussion about the problem at commune level. Households who take out loans do not normally talk about it. Loans from traders are more difficult to control, as they are outside community social pressure.

Resources for recovery

Apart from the food relief and production credit, the third large area of emergency support was the provision of subsidized seed. Local government and local organizations expended great efforts in purchasing seed, both for rehabilitation of normal production, and for planting emergency crops of vegetables and tubers.

In the mountain commune, people struggled hard to recover their land from sand and stone. Many people were digging full-time for two months. Their access to land is very limited and mainly restricted to the low-lying land close to the river. Much of the land was cultivated with sugarcane, which could not be sold, so a great deal of effort went into clearing that land for food crop production. Access to hill land for cultivation is limited either by rules protecting forestland or because the land is covered with imperata grass, which makes cultivation difficult. Resources for recovery are therefore scarce.

There were large sanitation problems after the floods, causing epidemics of animal husbandry diseases. Many people, who reinvested in pigs and poultry after the floods, were again faced with losses. There were however no human disease epidemics, due to massive disinfecting efforts with chlorine added to all drinking water.

The poor have experienced the greatest difficulties in recovering due to four main factors:

1) The poor have houses of poorer quality, which therefore sustained greater damage than the houses belonging to the better-off. The poor used more resources to repair and strengthen their houses in proportion to their total resources.

2) The poor had a higher degree of production failure in animal husbandry due to diseases caused by lower standards in sanitation and less production knowledge.

3) The poor have a less diversified household economy and are more dependent on paddy production (lowland) and cassava (mountain area).

4) The poor often have lower labour capacity and poorer health conditions. The recovery process is often very labour-demanding.

The households in Hong Ha commune are very articulate in their assessment of the work of the commune and district organizations, and they have clear demands and expectations of the services that these organizations should provide (Table 10).

Table 10. Perspectives on organizational relations for long-term development Hong Ha Commune [1]

CFSC focus on preparedness and mitigation

After the 1999 floods, the central provinces have put greater importance on preparedness and mitigation. In Thua Thien Hue, the following have been achieved after 1999:

• disaster preparedness was enhanced, with the identification of most vulnerable areas

• disaster management plan drawn down to district and commune levels

• rescue teams created at the commune level

In Quang Tri Province, the following projects have been prioritized by the provincial CFSC to mitigate and prepare for disasters:

Early warning:

• Additional observation stations to support forecasting activities

• Improvement of communication system from observation stations to the provincial HMS station

Preparedness:

• Preparation of inundation risk map

• Community-based disaster management training

• Setting up evacuation plans in vulnerable communes

• Infrastructure for evacuation

Mitigation

• Reforestation (currently has 36% forest cover). This will also help address the drought problem.

• Upgrading of the river dyke system

• Construction of an upstream reservoir for flood control during the rainy season, and for water storage during the dry season

Currently, the Ministry of Science and the Environment is implementing a demonstration project to shift the cropping calendar to adapt to floods, while the Ministry of Construction is pursuing the design of cyclone and flood resistant houses. Funding is, however, a constraint, as funds from the Central Government are not sufficient to support these prioritized projects.

In Gio Linh District, officials reported that the Central Government, as well as some NGOs, has provided assistance in upgrading infrastructure, such as elevating dwellings in communes prone to inundation and reinforcing houses in communes prone to cyclones. Projects, which they have prioritized for funding assistance from the Central Government and other organizations, for disaster mitigation and preparedness are:

• Local level training on agronomics

• Fishery extension center

• Potable water supply system

• Small-scale irrigation scheme for upland areas

• Riverbank works to prevent bank collapse

• Strengthening of evacuation sites

• Reforestation

In Hai Hoa, the CFSC has also identified priority projects to enhance its capacities for emergency response, as well as to mitigate and prepare for disasters. These are:

• Boats for search and rescue

• Construction of elevated latrines

• Post harvest facility to dry paddy

• Digging of canals necessary in the shift from winter-spring rice to fish and lotus

• Construction of dykes to protect the commune from flooding