International arrangements and agreements

Robin Mahon

Existence of special arrangements for trade in pelagic fishery products

Only a few of the countries trade regionally or internationally in pelagics. None of the countries reported special trade arrangements, but prerequisite factors were identified, such as standards for gaining access to the EU market and the swordfish certificate of eligibility for the US market (Table 71). Countries did not report that the public or private sectors received special assistance from sources in the importing countries to ensure that trade was facilitated in the face of increasingly strict international standards. Thus it appears that the onus is entirely on CARICOM countries to ensure the feasibility of trade arrangements for large pelagic species.

In terms of especially negative arrangements, contracting parties may threaten to or actually impose trade sanctions for contravention of ICCAT management measures. This aspect, not mentioned by respondents, also needs to be considered.

Status of fish stocks agreement

Countries were aware of the Fish Stocks Agreement and recognized it as key to the management of large pelagic fish in this region and elsewhere (Table 72). At the time of inquiry four countries had signed the agreement, the most recent being Barbados. Several others were considering signing, and almost all seemed aware that its entry into force in the near future was likely.

Because of this, the obligations of the agreement were being examined closely. At least one country was concerned about the cost of meeting these obligations. Although not addressed in the questionnaire, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines noted the constraint in the Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) Protocol on harvesting marine mammals.

TABLE 71

Existence of special arrangements for trade in pelagic fishery products

Country		Special arrangements
ANT		No
BAR		No, but swordfish certificate of eligibility issued
BHA		No
BZE		No
DMI		No
GRN		Grenada is on EU List II - countries that can export to EU until Dec. 2003
GUY		No
JAM		No
STK
	SK	None, no trade
	NE	None, no trade
STL		No
STV		No. Restricted now from exporting seafood to EU
SUR		No, however trading according to international rules
TRI		No, but exporters required to identify species by scientific name for improved monitoring. Export database maintained. Swordfish certificate of eligibility issued, except for foreign flagged vessels

TABLE 72

Status of Fish Stocks Agreement

Country		Fish Stocks Agreement
ANT		Not certain
BAR		Party from September 2000
BHA		Signed
BZE		Considering
DMI		Not considered until now
GRN		Fisheries Division recommended signature. Now with External Affairs and will go next to Cabinet
GUY		Not actively being considered, but is reflected in action and new legislation
JAM		Signed but not ratified
STK
	SK	Unsure
	NE	Unsure
STL		Signed but not ratified
STV		Reviewing. Concerned with cost of meeting obligations. Noted problem with SPAW prohibition on harvesting marine mammals
SUR		Being considered; presently with Foreign Affairs. Operating according to its specifications
TRI		Not signed

Since conducting this investigation, the Fish Stocks Agreement came into force on 11 December 2001.

Status of compliance agreement

The Compliance Agreement builds upon the legal framework established by the LOSC. At the time of writing, 22 states had accepted the agreement, leaving three more acceptances required for it to enter into force.

Respondents were far less familiar with the Compliance Agreement than with the LOSC - and with its status with respect to their countries (Table 73). Only Jamaica and Barbados reported having signed it. Fewer countries were considering the Compliance Agreement than the Fish Stocks Agreement, but some were seeking to incorporate its provisions into legislation as a means of preparation. On the basis of a regional technical workshop, FAO had assisted OECS countries and Barbados by drafting a high-seas fishing bill, mentioned previously, for harmonized ratification of this agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement.There was little follow-up by countries on the FAO draft bill.

Approach to interaction with ICCAT

ICCAT is a dominant force in any consideration of the management of large pelagic fish in the region and elsewhere. Two countries (BAR, TRI) are members (contracting parties) of ICCAT, although Barbados has yet to pay fees or name its commission and scientific representatives. Belize is planning to become a member. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Lucia are considering membership, especially the former because of interaction with ICCAT over STV-flagged vessels on the open ships registry that operate in regions beyond normal state control. Six states (ANT, DMI, GRN, GUY, JAM and STK) are planning to interact with ICCAT via a regional effort to be led by the CRFM (Table 74). CARICOM has been an observer at ICCAT through CFRAMP since 1990 and has taken part in numerous activities. Most recently, CARICOM coordinated the development of a common position regarding allocations criteria that was presented to ICCAT by Trinidad and Tobago.^[25] ^[26]

TABLE 73

Status of Compliance Agreement

Country	Compliance Agreement
ANT	Not certain
BAR	Accepted 26 October 2000, but no further action
BHA	No decision. Foreign Affairs has asked Fisheries Department to prepare cabinet paper.
BHA	No objections
BZE	Not considering yet
DMI	Not considered
GRN	Fisheries Division recommended signature. Now with External Affairs and will go next to Cabinet
GUY	Not actively being considered, but is reflected in action and new legislation
JAM	Signed, but not ratified
STK	Accepted in principle 24 June 1994. Unsure of further action
STL	Not signed
STV	Being considered after draft high-seas fishing bill
SUR	Being considered; presently with Foreign Affairs. Operating according to its specifications
TRI	Not signed

TABLE 74

Approach to interaction with ICCAT

Country		Plans to interact with ICCAT
ANT		Via regional effort led by CRFM
BAR		Member since December 2000, but no contribution paid. National representatives not yet decided. Supplies data. May attend meetings
BHA		No plans
BZE		Will apply for membership in 2002 and will attend this year as observer. Ignored ICCAT until sanctioned. No export to EU of agricultural produce. Wants to establish vessel monitoring system
DMI		Via regional effort led by CRFM
GRN		Via regional effort led by CRFM
GUY		Via regional effort led by CRFM
JAM		Via regional effort led by CRFM. Membership has not been considered
STK
	SK	Supplies information only. Unsure of policy
	NE	Via regional effort led by CRFM
STL		May join ICCAT. Probably not able to take part at national level but via regional effort led by CRFM
STV		STV will be observer at ICCAT and is considering membership. Will try to monitor and control flagged vessels. Attended working groups on monitoring measures and allocation criteria
SUR		No plans as yet
TRI		TRI is member of ICCAT and plans to participate in its activities Transshipment facility raises issues of compliance with ICCAT data requirements for port states. Separate monitoring and compliance unit being set up to deal with these matters

Conclusions

The need for attention to the management of shared marine resources in the wider Caribbean region is well documented. From the early 1980s it has been a main subject for discussion by WECAFC, for example the Expert Consultation on Shared Fishery Resources of the Lesser Antilles (Mahon, 1987), and was stressed at the commission meeting in 1999 (FAO, 1999). Management of shared stocks has been discussed at other fora and agreement reached on the need for a coordinated regional effort. Examples of these fora include: the IOCARIBE^[27]Workshop on Fisheries Oceanography of Highly Migratory and Straddling Species of the Intra-Americas Seas in 1995; the Africa/ Caribbean/Pacific-European Union Fisheries Research Initiative, Third Regional Dialogue Meeting for the Caribbean and Pacific ACP countries in 1996 (ACP-EU, 1997); and the CARICOM Symposium on the Sustainable Utilization of Fisheries and Other Ocean Resources in 1999. At the latter, ministers endorsed recommendations that included developing an information base for shared living marine resources.

The signing or ratification of the various instruments as indicated in Table 75 is an indication of good intentions to take part in international management as specified by the Law of the Sea and related instruments - chiefly the LOSC, Fish Stocks Agreement, Compliance Agreement and Code of Conduct. Of these, only the first two are in force and binding for the states that are parties to the agreements. Both are relatively new, with major implications for countries engaging in fisheries for shared stocks. Thus it was to be expected that, before signing, there would be a period of assessing the implications and determining how they would be addressed. Nonetheless, relatively few CARICOM countries have signed these two agreements.

Several other countries have initiated implementation of the Code of Conduct by preparing implementation plans, e.g. NMFS (1997).

Evidence of actual participation in collaborative management of shared fish stocks is generally low. Most collaborative activity is in the area of stock assessment. For large pelagics, CFRAMP has carried out a project to collect data and assess the major species in CARICOM countries (CFRAMP, 2001a). This was mainly a scientific exercise, but did provide management recommendations for three species of regional importance. There was a similar exercise for reef fish. Most countries are actively involved in collaboration on assessment for lobster and conch. The countries involved collaborate through the WECAFC Ad Hoc Working Group for the Guianas-Brazil Region and more recently in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Flyingfish, again focusing primarily on stock assessment.

WECAFC itself is another general forum for collaboration in which CARICOM countries have taken part. All but two wider-Caribbean countries are members; most participate at one time or another. WECAFC’s mandate is only to review and exchange information. The topic of large pelagics has not been discussed at WECAFC often.

There has been much less emphasis on the broader assessment of fisheries from the point of view of providing management advice to the countries. The harmonization of legislation by the OECS in the 1980s was followed by various initiatives towards the establishment of a common fisheries zone or zones and efforts at joint surveillance. Otherwise, there has been little activity regarding cooperation in management at the regional level, either within CARICOM or among the countries of the wider Caribbean. This is not surprising given the lack of a competent organization for management of shared stocks (Murray, 2000).

Most CARICOM countries participate indirectly through CFRAMP in international-level management of large pelagics as carried out by ICCAT. But this is only in observer status. Two CARICOM countries are members, two more indicate their intention of joining. Other Caribbean member countries are: France and the United Kingdom via the European Union, the United States and Venezuela. Recently, CARICOM countries provided collaborative, electronic input to the ICCAT Ad Hoc Working Group on Allocation Criteria (Singh-Renton, Mahon and McConney, 2003). This exercise and the differences between the agreed CARICOM position and those of many of the major fishing countries provide a good indication of the importance of participation in ICCAT, or any other organization that deals with shared stocks of interest to CARICOM.

Many of the criteria for allocations were derived directly from the rights and responsibilities of coastal states as defined in the Fish Stocks Agreement. Others were conventional criteria used in allocation negotiations in other organizations that manage shared stocks. Closer examination of the criteria and their interpretation provides an indication of how the readiness of and need for CARICOM states to participate may be judged in the international arena. Demonstration of both need and readiness are important considerations that require well-documented information on the nature of the fisheries and on the systems that are in place for participation in management.

TABLE 75

Membership of countries and states of the wider Caribbean in organizations relevant to large pelagic fisheries management and development, and their status as regards relevant regional and international agreements

Country/State	Organizational membership					Binding fisheries agreements			Code of Conduct
Country/State	CARICOM	OECS	WECAFC	GEF^a eligible	IOCARIBE member	LOSC	Fish Stocks Agreement	Compliance Agreement	Code of Conduct
Antigua and Barbuda	x	x	x	x		2/2/89
Bahamas	x		x	x	x	29/7/83	16/1/97		x
Barbados	x		x	x	x	12/10/93	22/9/01	26/10/00	x
Belize	x		x	x	x	13/8/83			x
Brazil			x	x	x	22/12/88	8/9/01		x
Colombia			x	x	x				x
Costa Rica				x	x	21/9/92	18/6/01		x
Cuba			x	x	x	15/8/84			x
Dominica	x	x	x	x		24/10/91			x
Dominican Republic				x	x				x
France (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint-Barthelemy, Saint Martin)			x		x	11/4/96			x
Grenada	x	x	x	x		25/4/91			x
Guatemala			x	x	x	11/2/97			x
Guyana	x		x	x	x	16/11/93			x
Haiti			x	x	x	31/7/96			x
Honduras			x	x		5/11/93			x
Jamaica	x		x	x	x	21/3/83			x
Mexico			x	x	x	18/3/83		11/3/99	x
Nicaragua			x	x	x	3/5/00
Panama			x	x	x	1/7/96			x
Saint Kitts and Nevis	x	x	x	x		7/1/93		24/6/94	x
Saint Lucia	x	x	x	x	x	27/3/85	9/8/96		x
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	x	x	x	x		1/10/93			x
Suriname	x		x	x	x	9/7/98
The Netherlands (Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, Saint Eustatius, Saint Maarten)			x		x	28/6/96			x
Trinidad and Tobago	x		x	x	x	25/4/86			x
UK – Anguilla		x	x		x	25/7/97			x
UK – Bermuda			x
UK – British Virgin Islands		x	x
UK – Cayman Islands			x
UK – Montserrat	x	x	x
UK – Turks and Caicos Islands			x
USA (Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands)			x		x		21/8/96	19/12/95	x
Venezuela			x	x					x

^aGlobal Environment Facility.

Singh-Renton, Mahon and McConney (2003) includes an overview of the CARICOM position in relation to the key criteria (Box 2). Indications from negotiations suggest that CARICOM countries will have difficulty in getting their interpretation of the terms of the Fish Stocks Agreement accepted in ICCAT. Thus the pursuit of increased shares in the allocations, upon which to base expansion of fisheries for large pelagics, is likely to require a substantial and persistent presence in the negotiation process, as well as supporting analyses and arguments.

It is evident that in the past 10-15 years there has been an increased level of activity in collaborative work on stock assessment, but much less towards actual joint management. This emphasis on assessment has been driven by the technical staff of national and regional institutions. However, attention to stock assessment has not often translated into actual collaboration in establishing cooperative management regimes or into implemented measures. This is possibly because fisheries have a relatively low priority at national levels and because collaboration in management of shared resources requires the commitment of resources for personnel, training and travel, as well as for the operation of the organization.

BOX 2

Allocation criteria considered by the ICCAT working group and their relation to the CARICOM position (after Singh-Renton, Mahon and McConney, 2003)

Allocating Shared Resources

Allocation of shared resources among users has been an issue for many decades. Even before the LOSC, international commissions such as the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, later the North Atlantic Fishery Organization (NAFO), grappled with this problem. In the light of the LOSC, Gulland (1980) and Caddy (1982) outlined the process of negotiating allocations of fishery resources, including the variety of criteria that could be applied.

ICCAT practice has been to allocate the total allowable catch in quotas based solely on historical catches. Certain ICCAT member countries have sought to review the catch allocation criteria in order to recognize the needs of developing fisheries, developing states and the sovereign rights of coastal states. In 1998, ICCAT established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Allocation Criteria to analyse and recommend revised criteria. During 1999, three ICCAT members - Brazil, the European Union and the United States - proposed sets of criteria, with other countries subsequently contributing additions and modifications. Together, CARICOM countries reviewed the catch allocation criteria proposed by the three ICCAT members and developed a position paper that was submitted by Trinidad and Tobago to the ICCAT working group in May 2001 (ICCAT, 2001a). The group concluded its discussions during a fourth meeting held in November 2001.

The identification of the parties eligible to participate in catch allocation negotiations should rely on simple qualifying criteria that take access rights into account. For any particular sea area, therefore, coastal states rights should naturally be given at least equal status to those of high-seas distant water fleets, as prescribed by international agreements (United Nations, 1983).

In its recently completed review of qualifying criteria (ICCAT, 2001a), ICCAT has agreed to include cooperating non-member countries in addition to ICCAT member countries as qualifying participants in its catch allocation negotiations. ICCAT has also included another qualifying criterion - the ability to conduct responsible fishing and scientific research.

Catch Allocation Criteria

Gulland (1980) and Caddy (1982) presented criteria that could be used in quota allocations of shared resources, e.g. historical catches, occurrence of spawning and nursery areas, occurrence of migration routes that may make certain areas more suitable for fishing, and socio-economic criteria such as investment in the fishery and impact on employment. These and other more recent criteria can be broadly grouped as biological and conservation criteria and socio-economic criteria. With increased awareness of the impact of fishing on fishery resources and the development of international agreements for conservation and management, a third category, responsibility criteria, has emerged.

ICCAT’s recent review of catch allocation criteria (ICCAT, 2001c) has grouped these into the following categories: (i) status of the stocks and the fisheries concerned; (ii) past/ present fishing activity of qualifying participants; (iii) status of the qualifying participants; and (iv) contribution to compliance, data submission and scientific research. Category (i) includes the biological and conservation criteria, categories (ii) and (iii) address social and economic concerns, and category (iv) covers responsibility criteria. We review these criteria below, together with their implications for CARICOM states.

Biological and conservation criteria

Several criteria can be considered in this category, including the status of the stock concerned, occurrence of critical habitats such as spawning and nursery areas, the distribution of stock biomass in a country’s EEZ (Caddy, 1982, 1987) and availability of suitable fishing areas. ICCAT intends to address biological and conservation issues using the following two criteria:

Status of the stock and the existing level of fishing effort

This criterion is taken from the Fish Stocks Agreement and addresses access to the fishery by new participants. The agreement also provides for cooperation with developing states to facilitate their access to and participation in high seas fisheries. Certain nations argue that additional access to the fishery cannot be allowed when stocks are overexploited or are being rebuilt, which would exclude CARICOM states from developing their large pelagic fisheries. Alternatively, accommodation of new entrants, particularly those of developing states, would require redistribution of existing total allowable catch.

Distribution and biological characteristics of the stock, including its occurrence in areas under national jurisdiction and on the high seas

This criterion should include the consideration of critical habitats, as well as the availability of suitable fishing areas. Coastal and island states should be able to exercise their right to exploit resources sustainably within their claimed EEZs. The proportion of the biomass of a stock that occurs in the EEZ of a country can be the basis of a claim for an allocation. This can be a complex issue if migratory routes and time spent in an EEZ during migration are taken into consideration. Caddy (1982, 1987) has developed models for various types of sharing based on migration. A quantitative index that incorporates the size of the EEZ and the average known catch rate within it could support CARICOM states’ needs for additional shares of the resource.

Socio-economic criteria (relating to past/present fishing activity and the status of qualifying participants)

These criteria attempt to reflect the value a country places on the resource (Gulland, 1980). Interestingly, the recent review by ICCAT splits socio-economic criteria into two categories: criteria relating to past/present fishing activity and criteria relating to the status of qualifying participants. These socio-economic criteria can help or hinder the interests of developing CARICOM large pelagic fisheries.

Historical catches and historical use of the resource

This criterion has featured prominently in negotiations for allocations in several fora, notably NAFO and ICCAT. It has no rational basis (Gulland, 1980) and is severely disadvantageous to CARICOM states. There is no reason why any country should accept an inequitable distribution of the benefits of a resource purely because it has been so in the past. Moreover, this criterion is clearly linked to other, more pragmatic criteria such as “existing level of fishing effort” and “economic and/or social importance of the fishery to habitual participants”.

Nevertheless, the larger, developed ICCAT nations are insistent on this criterion and have placed it in a separate category to retain the emphasis on past fishing activities. The other criterion, in the same category with historical catches, deals with present fishing activity in a weak, qualitative manner by referring to a country’s fishing interests, patterns and practices.

Interests of artisanal, subsistence and small-scale coastal fisheries

The Fish Stocks Agreement and the Code of Conduct both recognize the need to avoid adverse impact on and ensure access to fisheries by persons involved in artisanal, subsistence and small-scale fishing. In developing states such as those in CARICOM, these fisheries usually involve significant portions of the population and promote food security and food quality.

CARICOM fisheries are predominantly artisanal, small scale and coastal. Owing to their complex, diverse nature, adequate statistical coverage is often not possible. Thus total allowable catch levels should be set to accommodate possible underreporting of catches by these fisheries. Moreover, given their coastal nature, much of the catch may be young fish. Thus the harvest of young fish by large-scale fisheries should be limited insofar as possible in order to accommodate the special needs of artisanal, subsistence and small-scale coastal fisheries.

Needs of coastal fishing communities

Coastal communities may be defined as local communities, in coastal areas, that have traditional or cultural practices that make them highly dependent on fishing and fish resources. As indicated above, artisanal and small-scale coastal community fisheries are usually limited in their capacity and options for change. The Code of Conduct and the Fish Stocks Agreement make clear provisions for the needs of these communities.

Needs and sovereign rights of coastal states

The LOSC clearly recognizes the sovereign rights of coastal states for the purpose of exploring and exploiting all the natural resources found in their EEZs, and also notes that the right to fish on the high seas is subject, inter alia, to the rights, duties and interests of coastal states. The Fish Stocks Agreement also addresses the rights and needs of coastal states, particularly the issues of cooperation and shared access.

Needs of developing states

Access to fish resources can contribute significantly to poverty alleviation and basic food security - and thus to social and economic stability. In the case of small-island and coastal developing states, access to fish resources is a natural and essential part of their culture and development. The Fish Stocks Agreement makes specific provisions for addressing the special needs of developing states, including the need to accommodate socioeconomic expansion and economic diversification and thus ensure comparable initial development opportunities.

Economic and/or social importance of the fishery to habitual participants. Impact on the current fishing industry

Like the historical catches criterion, this criterion supports historical fisheries to the disadvantage of CARICOM states. It is therefore simply a rephrasing of that criterion. Despite this, certain ICCAT nations have argued strongly for its retention in this second format. Since many stocks are already overfished, a criterion that seeks to protect excessive capacity and overcapitalization would appear invalid. In view of this, its reiteration in the form of a second criterion is clearly illogical.

Contribution of the fishery to national food-security needs, consumption, export revenue and employment

This criterion, although accepted by ICCAT, appears to have elements already addressed by other criteria such as “economic and/or social importance of the fishery”, “historical catches” and “needs of developing states”, including food security. Depending on the nature of the fishery, the same catch may be taken with different levels of employment. Arguments that favour the distribution of social benefits among a larger number of persons, particularly in countries with low per capita income, would be a component of the special needs of developing countries.

Responsibility criteria

These criteria, addressing adherence to conservation measures and participation in the management process, provide direct benefit to countries that fish responsibly. ICCAT intends to apply three responsibility criteria: (i) contribution to conservation and management, accurate statistics and research; (ii) exercise of responsibilities concerning vessels; and (iii) record of compliance.

Criterion (i) appropriately rewards countries that comply with agreed conservation and management measures and that contribute accurate statistics and research. However, in measuring the respective contribution and cooperation of states, differences in available management resources between developed and developing states must be taken into account. Furthermore, it is well accepted that enforcement of regulations is virtually impossible for widely dispersed, small-scale fisheries that sell much of their catch locally (Berkes et al., 2001). Applying this criterion to states that have predominantly small-scale fisheries would place them at an immediate disadvantage that would be virtually unaddressable. It would favour large-scale commercial fisheries, when it is well accepted that small-scale fisheries are more efficient and result in greater social distribution of the benefits derived from the resource (Berkes et al., 2001).

Criterion (ii) is clear in its reference to flag-state responsibilities prescribed by international agreements.

Criterion (iii) appears to capture the same ideas as criteria (i) and (ii), except that it is specific in addressing compliance with ICCAT conservation and management measures. Depending on its interpretation and application, however, this criterion may extend the emphasis in favour of historical fisheries, leaving new entrants comparatively empty-handed.

^[25] Mahon and Singh-Renton (1999).
^[26] Singh-Renton, Mahon and McConney (2003).
^[27] IOCARIBE is the Sub-Commission for the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC).