3. SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES: PAST EXPERIENCE AND FUTURE SOLUTIONS

Dr R. Mahon and D. Wilson

SUMMARY

Small-scale management regimes are nearly as unique as small-scale fisheries, although certainly some general lessons about their design can be garnered. In order to describe the development and current condition of small-scale management regimes we chose to begin with descriptions of the small-scale management regimes in place in three geographic locations, the Bay of Fundy, the inland fisheries of Zambia, and the member countries of the Caribbean Community Secretariat (CARICOM). These descriptions begin by outlining the existing fisheries management agencies in each of the cases, and then management measures, stakeholder participation, conflict resolution, resource allocation, monitoring issues are all addressed. The case studies give details about these three unique situations that are then used as examples in the broader discussion that follows.

Drawing on these examples and others, the report addresses several important topics about the design of small-scale fisheries management regimes in general. These include: i) building effective fisheries co-management institutions; ii) ecosystem management; iii) problems associated with small stocks; iv) low perceived value of small-scale fisheries; v) inappropriately structured, planned and operated fisheries departments for small-scale fisheries.

Issue 1: Building effective fisheries co-management institutions

Considerable recent research has focussed on what does and does not contribute to strong co-management institutions. The first lesson, perhaps, is that co-management must involve real cooperation. Where co-management is simply a recruiting tool for inexpensive labour to help the government to enforce its fisheries regulations it is unlikely to succeed. Even if the co-management institutions are maintained, they will not make the contribution to effective management that truly collaborative approaches can make. The second lesson is that co-management institutions that are based on the democratic representation of the fishers have more depth and staying power than those that are not.

The problem that governments face when they seek to manage small-scale fisheries is accountability. How can the government know and influence the kinds of decisions and behaviours that are going on at the local level so that they can insure that they reflect the government’s priorities, e.g., the sustainable and equitable use of a large-scale resource. Fishing communities, meanwhile, want to access the governments’ higher-scale reach and resources. Two reasons why communities want to involve the government in local fisheries management are common. The first is simply a desire for the money and other resources that co-management programmes frequently make available. In such cases, the community will remain motivated to participate in co-management so long as the money is flowing. The second reason is that the community is facing a conflict situation and wants the government to help them deal with it. Effective co-management will come about when the government can use its authority to contain and channel fisheries conflicts in creative ways. The benefits of co-management are best achieved when the state is willing to surrender real decision-making power, including the legitimacy that only the government can bestow to democratic local institutions, even while holding them accountable for their responses to the needs of the broader society. Such accountability itself can, in fact, increase the effectiveness of co-management institutions when it takes the form of ongoing, outside participation in goal clarification and the evaluation of achievements.

Issue 2: Ecosystem management

Ecosystem management has emerged in several forms in discussions of fisheries management. Approaching fisheries management from an ecosystem perspective is biologically attractive because of its recognition of the reality that fishing is related to a far broader set of problems than simply the impact of harvesting on populations. It is also enormously challenging. Most scientific approaches to ecosystem management, however, use multi-species models that essentially treat ecosystem management as single species management. This leads to overwhelming measurement and analysis problems. From a social perspective, ecosystem management would also result in an exponential increase in the number of groups that would have a stake in any given decision. In fact, the complexity that the management of the marine ecosystem would entail would likely overwhelm any current management institution. The bottom line from these scientific, social and bureaucratic considerations is that ecosystems are not a unit of management that is congruent with democratic, science-driven management as it is carried out on large scales through government bureaucracies. What cannot be done on large scales, however, may be feasible on small scales. Ecosystem management requires the processing of too much biological and social information for which large bureaucracies to handle are required. The ability of institutions on smaller scales to make use of more and more nuanced information suggests that small-scale fisheries are where experiments with real ecosystem management need to begin.

Issue 3: High Diversity of small stocks of low total individual value that does not justify a full conventional stock assessment, target setting and enforcement programme

Although small-scale fisheries are often treated as a discrete category, there in a fact a continuum of fishery types from very small subsistence to enormous industrial types. There may be some value in developing ideas relating to this continuum further as a basis for considering problems of small-scale fisheries. For example, are the types of problems often flagged as relating to small-scale fisheries due to the scale of the fishery, the size/value of the fish stock being exploited or the type of management regime that is often found in situations where small-scale fisheries are prevalent? Taking the above three dimensions may provide a useful framework for considering small-scale fisheries issues. Issues relating to these dimensions and their implications for management are discussed. Inventory of the relative distribution of stocks in this framework would provide the context for a research programme on small-scale fisheries that focusses on the relevant characteristics. For small size/value stocks there is the need to develop approaches that are indicator-based rather than conventional stock assessment, use reference directions rather than targets, and emphasize consensual processes.

Issue 4: Low perceived importance of fisheries in general and small-scale fisheries in particular

In CARICOM countries, with the exception of shrimp fisheries in Guyana and Suriname, and the lobster and conch fisheries in Belize, fisheries are generally perceived to be of low importance relative to other productive sectors. One reason suggested is that Fisheries Divisions are usually situated in ministries that are primarily concerned with agriculture. The backgrounds of the Chief Technical Officer, Permanent Secretary and Minister are usually agriculture related. Furthermore, because fisheries are mainly small-scale and often rural, fishers are usually from the lowest economic strata and have little voice, except when there are crises. By and large, small-scale fishing is perceived by planners and decision-makers as a subsector that takes care of itself. Proper economic evaluation of the value of small-scale fisheries in national economies would go some way towards redressing this situation. In countries with tourism, this must include the value-added by providing inputs to tourism. Often these are counted under tourism earnings. However, knowing the value although necessary, this is not sufficient. There is the need to communicate this to decision-makers and the public at large.

Issue 5: Small poorly managed, unplanned fisheries departments that do not have the range of expertise needed to conduct conventional top down management using assessment-based targets

Problems relating to the actual organization and operation of fisheries departments in countries where small-scale fisheries are predominant may be one of the major reasons for the poor management of these fisheries. In summary, the structure and function of developing country fishery departments, based on levels of financial support that are appropriate to the value of resources to be managed, have not been systematically addressed. Similarly, although the need for improved planning and review processes is frequently identified, there is little to guide managers in these areas. Consequently, systematic action to address these issues has been minimal. This is an area within which there is great potential for input from the field of organizational change management and public administration. In addition to exploring the most appropriate model for fisheries departments of various sizes and with a mandate for various levels of resource value, there is the need to consider the relative capacity that should be established in national and regional institutions. The matter of how fisheries departments are run and of accountability bears further exploration. When there is no plan that sets priorities for a period and is reviewed on a regular basis, there is scope for a great deal of ad hoc activity on the part of fisheries department staff. In summary, the structure and function of developing country fishery departments based on levels of financial support that are appropriate to the value of resources to be managed have not been systematically addressed. Similarly, although the need for improved planning and review processes is frequently identified, there is little to guide managers in these areas. Consequently, systematic action to address these issues has been minimal.

1. INTRODUCTION

Small-scale management regimes are nearly as unique as small-scale fisheries, although certainly some general lessons about their design can be garnered. In order to describe the development and current condition of small-scale management regimes we chose to begin with descriptions of the small-scale management regimes in place in three geographic locations, the Bay of Fundy, the inland fisheries of Zambia, and the member countries of CARICOM. These descriptions address the specific descriptive elements called for in the Terms of Reference (ToR). Then, drawing on these examples and others, we address several important topics about the design of small-scale fisheries management regimes in general. These include: i) building effective fisheries co-management institutions; ii) ecosystem management; iii) problems associated with small stocks; iv) low perceived value of small-scale fisheries; v) inappropriately structured, planned and operated fisheries departments for small-scale fisheries.

2. SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT REGIMES IN THREE AREAS

2.1 Small-scale fisheries in the Canadian maritimes: the case of the Bay of Fundy groundfish

2.1.1 Agencies and local institutions

The Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has overall responsibility for the system and directly manages an ITQ system for the larger-scale (65 m+) mobile gear fishery. Harvest decisions are made by the Fish Resource Advisory Council (FRAC) while the DFO Science Branch provides analyses of stock status. The small-scale fishery, which consists of < 65 m fixed gear is managed by community management boards that are assigned quotas. The mobile gear boats, all of which are otter trawls, target cod, haddock, pollock and flounder. The fixed gear fleet consists of handline vessels, longline vessels and gill-net vessels, with some vessels fishing different gears at different times. The handlines and longlines target cod and haddock, and the gill-nets target cod and pollock.

2.1.2 Management measures

Beyond setting the quotas, DFO management also issues species-based licenses. A series of technical measures attach to each license. They have also designated marine protected areas, although not in the Bay of Fundy.

The Canadian fisheries management system is a classic, single stock, output control supported by technical measures system. There is no official management unit one could think of as an “ecosystem”. However, a number of habitat and bycatch controls, including protections for marine mammals, are in place so that the environmental impacts of fishing activities are considered. The community quotas have also given rise to some local groups that start from the ecosystem level in considering policies and actions. On the Nova Scotia side especially, management institutions are rapidly developing toward an ecosystem perspective because the local management boards are bringing small-scale fishers and environmental activists into contact around concrete programmatic issues.

2.1.3 Stakeholder participation in planning and co-management

The management boards are made up of fishers’ groups that represent informally both geographical sub-regions and types of gear. On the New Brunswick side, the community management board is made up of three fishers’ groups, one each for two islands and one for the mainland. These geographical divisions correspond strongly, but not absolutely, with the three types of gear. This management board divides their quota among the different gear types and each sub-group is responsible for managing one gear type. However, all three gear-type harvesting plans have to be agreed to by all three fishers’ groups. On the Nova Scotia, side the board consists of two fishers’ groups, one of which loosely represents the hand-line fishers. The board has three members from each of these groups and is experimenting with having three other members representing community non-fishing interests for some issues. This board also operates by consensus.

Other stakeholder groups consist of fish dealers and some environmental conservation groups. These groups include an environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) in Halifax and another at St. Francis Xavier University. These two groups address marine resource issues in the larger Maritimes region. Several environmental groups operate at the level of the whole Bay of Fundy and of sections and offshoots of the bay. On the Nova Scotia side, several of these groups are already cooperating closely with the community management board and this trend is growing. The community management board is, in fact, operating as a growing nexus of marine-related environmental action focussed at the ecosystem level.

2.1.4 Conflict resolution

The current Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ)-based management system was set up by a “participatory” system in which DFO selected participants to represent the industry. There is still a great deal of resentment among the “losers” in the process, the major issue being the selection of a particular three-year baseline line to establish individual histories.

The management system is made more inclusive than the Canadian norm through the use of the management boards. This has evolved in two very different directions in the two boards. On the Nova Scotia side the community management led directly to the creation of the Marine Resource Centre, through which they are playing an expanding role in community life and including a steadily broader number of stakeholders with a self-consciously “ecosystem” approach. This has led to the inclusion of non-fishers on the Fundy Fixed Gear Council.

On the New Brunswick side there is a good deal of conflict between the three fishers’ groups that make up the board and this has led to a number of ongoing problems. While these problems have not resulted in failure, they have kept the New Brunswick side from developing the broader kinds of institutions and institutional links found on the Nova Scotia side. There are a number of explanations for this, running from the personalities of the people involved to strong differences of interest across gear type, geographical location, especially island v. mainland, and the organizational interest of the three fishers’ groups.

2.1.5 Allocation and Management

DFO sets a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for many important species, including groundfish, area and distributes the bulk of the quota through an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system, some of the quota to the community management boards, with a small remainder of the quota being allocated to “Group X” or open access.

Quotas based on DFO’s TAC are the central management measure. The community management boards are mainly concerned with how their aggregate quotas are caught. They rely mainly on trip or weekly landing limits. These measures are made by the management boards themselves.

In the two management boards relevant to the Bay of Fundy all decisions are made by consensus. An interesting development on the Atlantic side, across the Nova Scotia peninsula from the Bay of Fundy, is that the community management boards have evolved an informal ITQ system of their own as a way to manage their aggregate quotas. On the Bay of Fundy side the fishers’ groups have resisted attempts to move in this direction.

2.1.6 Monitoring of management performance

Stock assessments for cod, haddock and pollock are performed through formal Virtual Population Analysis (VPAs) with precautionary reference points. The DFO management system is currently examining the option of assessing the Gulf of Maine (which includes the Bay) and the Scotian Shelf stocks separately. The stocks have known biological differences such as growth rate. Sanctions for breaking the fisheries management regulations promulgated by the government are backed up by the full force of law. Community management regulations, on the other hand, are enforced more indirectly. The community management was set up, from a technical, legal viewpoint, as an “option” rather than a requirement for the small-scale boats. These boats can opt to fish for ‘Group X’ open access quota. But this quota is quickly exhausted, mainly by larger boats operating on the Scotian Shelf. The basic source of enforcement power that the community boards have is that they can refuse to allow a fisher to fish for community quota, effectively forcing this fisher into “Group X”. The community management boards have created a set of management measures rooted in this ability to exclude those who do not respect their regulatory structure. These are effort controls aimed at spreading the community quota out over the year to avoid a race for fish. These measures are enforced mainly by fines which are imposed by an anonymous, rotating board that makes decisions about sanctions without knowing the identity of the fisher being sanctioned. This system is reported to work fairly well.

2.1.7 Roles and responsibilities

Decision-making procedures in Canadian fisheries were extensively changed in the early 90s as a response to the groundfish collapse. Before the collapse, fisheries science and management was carried out by a body which had responsibility for the Atlantic zone from Labrador down to the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank. The new system separated the science advice (DFO) from the harvesting advice (FRAC). FRAC has biologists on staff and consists of representatives from industry and academia. At the community level decisions management boards make decisions about the allocation of quota and seek to ensure that the catch is spread through the year using such measures as days-at-sea.

2.2 Southern African Inland Fisheries - the Case of Zambia

2.2.1 Agencies and local institutions

The Zambia Department of Fisheries (DoF) is charged with the management of Zambia’s extensive fresh water fisheries. Since the late 1980s one of their central strategies has been a form of “co-management” in which village and multi-village level committees are formed and given the responsibility to enforce the government’s fisheries regulations. These kinds of co-management programmes have been established in three main areas. In Lake Mweru-Luapula River system 78 Village Management Committees (VMCs) were formed with 13 zonal management committees at chiefdom or sub-chiefdom level between 1997-1999. In the Bwangweulu system, which consists of Lake Bwangweulu and the surrounding swamps, there are 39 village management committees organized into six zones each with a zonal committee. On Lake Kariba 40 village communities are organized into four zones.

2.2.2 Management measures

The most important fisheries management measure is a nation-wide closed season from December through February. This time was chosen because there are many fish that spawn during this time and because it is a time of high demand for agricultural labour.

There are also a number of technical measures in the various fisheries such as controls on mesh sizes and bans on specific fishing practices. Most of these banned practices are various forms of “active” fishing, such as seining or driving fish into nets.

2.2.3 Stakeholder participation in planning and co-management

Zambia is in the process of putting together enabling legislation for fisheries co-management, a process which began with proposals from the DoF in 1994. The delay is not due to the co-management provisions but to other aspects of the legislation which involve a major reorganization of the DoF. Currently the DoF operates as a small section within the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries and does not enjoy strong access at the Ministerial level (Malasha 2002).

While this legislation is pending, the VMCs remain essentially an education and surveillance extension of the DoF, and sometimes the local Traditional Authority (TA) i.e. a king, chief or sub-chief. The VMCs are not empowered to create fisheries management measures. Currently, the DoF and the TAs are the only legal and effective authorities that can make and enforce fisheries regulations. The VMC’s main function is to go on patrols and find fishers that are breaking the fishing rules. When such violations are aggravated or repeated they may fine the violators or confiscate the fishers gear, but these punishments must later be confirmed by the DoF or a TA. Village committees are quite aware of the pending fisheries legislation and its implications, but their most articulated desire for increased powers is for more formal powers of arrest rather than the ability to create fisheries rules.

The degree to which the lower-level DoF officers in the villages actually work with the VMCs is variable. In some places the relationship is not at all cooperative. This is a violation of DoF policy and reflects the attitudes of individual officers.

In all three areas the co-management projects are supposed to be funded through the collection of taxes on behalf of local authorities called District Councils. The district council is entitled to 100 kwatcha for each kg of fish caught. At the present time only 10-15 percent of this revenue is ever collected. The intent is that the co-management program can facilitate the collection of these funds in return for operating funds for themselves and small-scale development programmes in the village. This cooperation with the District Councils has not yet emerged; in Lake Kariba at least this was due to the inability to agree on how the funds would be shared.

2.2.4 Conflict resolution

There is a substantial migration of fishers into the fisheries and between one fishery and another. This raises considerable tension which often takes the form of accusing the migrants of introducing damaging fishing gear. The question of how to deal with the immigrants, and what kinds of authority the committees have to deal with the immigrants, comes up often at VMC meetings. Research has suggested that these co-management committees are more effective and self-motivated institutions in areas where there are conflicts with in-migrants.

The most extreme example of such conflict took place on Lake Kariba. Lake Kariba is an artificial lake and its creation simultaneously reduced the amount of land available to the local Tonga people and attracted fishers from the rest of Zambia. Strong tensions arose both over fishing and access to land. In 1994 a donor funded fisheries co-management programme was launched through a planning workshop which was made up almost entirely of various kinds of government officials and Tonga TAs. The 2000 fishers in the fishery were represented by seven of the 56 participants (Malasha 2002). The workshop agreed that all fishers should be moved to designated fishing villages. This idea was strongly supported, and its implementation funded, by semi-industrial pelagic fishing concerns that had been losing large amounts of their catch through crew members selling fish to other fishers in fish camps, especially on islands in the lake. The implementation of this concentration affected almost entirely the immigrant fishers because fishers who also had farms, i.e. the Tonga, were allowed to keep fishing from the farms. A great many fishers resisted the exercise and chose to leave the fishery. The number of fishers fell from 2 283 in 1993 to 1 355 in 1995 (Malasha 2002). Because of their concentration in the villages, however, the immigrant fishers began to dominate elected posts in the VMCs. Tonga fishers in the villages were marginalized and the immigrants increased their control over access to both fish resources and general assistance from NGOs (Malasha 2002).

2.2.5 Allocation and management

Allocation and management is a primary issue in these fisheries. Recent combined biological and social research (Jul-Larsen et al. 2002) suggests that the pulsating water volumes that characterize most of Africa’s inland fisheries, including those discussed here, create patterns of fish reproduction, growth and mortality such that overfishing from increases in numbers of fishermen has little effect. They do not extend this argument to increased fishing pressure resulting from increased capital investment and technological change, rather it is restricted to simple changes in the numbers of fishers. They further argue that African inland fisheries represent a critically important cushion against hunger within a highly variable agricultural system. They conclude from this that restrictions on access to fisheries do little to improve fisheries production while cutting off an important option for both rural households and urban consumers.

2.2.6 Monitoring of management performance

Zambian fisheries management is based on relatively little current biological information. The actual effectiveness of the implemented management measures is unknown and is being called into question (Jul-Larsen et al. 2002). The measures themselves are more effectively enforced than is often the case in Africa. The single nation-wide closed season allows the DoF, and other government agencies such as the police, to monitor the movement of fish on the highways. This makes it difficult for fish traders to take the fish to the cities and is quite effective in reducing the demand for fish in the fishing areas during the closed season. Fishing for subsistence and some trading still goes on, but fishing activities are noticeably reduced during this period.

The DoF carries out patrols to enforce both the closed season and the technical measures, but this is not an extensive effort due to both limited resources and the co-management strategy. The VMCs also carry out enforcement patrols; it is their primary role.

2.2.7 Roles and responsibilities

Co-management programmes have evolved in Zambia in various ways because of the different inceptions, particularly the different NGOs and donors involved. The Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) was a driving force on Lake Kariba as was the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SNV) on Bwangweulu and in the Mweru-Luampula system. SNV volunteers have played a very central role in the co-management efforts until the late 1990s, since then SNV has pulled back and encouraged DoF to take a greater lead. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) was involved in the initial stages in co-management in the Bwangweulu system but pulled back after some disagreements with the DoF. The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) launched a small co-management effort in the Upper Zambezi that collapsed when the donor funding was withdrawn.

In the Mweru-Luampula system and on Lake Kariba the traditional leaders are heavily involved in the co-management. In the Bwangweulu system their relationship to the co-management efforts is more ambiguous. Here both the DoF and SNV have concluded that there is too much dependence on the chiefs in the other programmes, particularly on Lake Kariba and have adopted a policy of trying to limit TA involvement in the programme.

2.3 The Wider Caribbean with emphasis on CARICOM countries

The Wider Caribbean Region^[12] extends from the mouth of the Amazon River on the north coast of Brazil through the Caribbean Sea, including all coastal countries, to the east coast of Florida, USA and the Bahamas. There are 28 countries represented in the Wider Caribbean. Throughout the region, the majority of the population inhabits the coastal zone, and there is a very high dependence on marine resources for livelihoods from fishing and tourism, particularly among the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), of which there are 16 independent states, while all 14 of the dependent territories are SIDS.

The countries of the region range from among the largest (e.g. Brazil, USA) to among the smallest (e.g. Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis) in the world, and from the most developed to the least developed. The World Bank classifies Aruba, Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, USA and the US Virgin Islands as developed (high income). All other countries are developing, with most being upper or lower middle income, and two being low income. The countries of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)^[13] form a political entity comprising mainly ex-British colonies, recently Suriname and Haiti have joined.

The fisheries of the Wider Caribbean Region are based upon a diverse array of resources (FAO 1993, Mahon 2002). Those of greatest importance are for offshore pelagics, reef fishes, lobster, conch, shrimps, continental shelf demersal fishes, deep slope and bank fishes and coastal pelagics. There is a variety of less important fisheries, such as marine mammals, sea turtles, sea urchins, and seaweeds.

The fisheries of the developing countries of the Caribbean use a wide variety of gear, and are primarily artisanal^[14], or small-scale, using open, outboard powered vessels 5-12 m in length. The most notable exception are the shrimp and demersal finfish fisheries of the Brazil-Guianas shelf, where trawlers are in the 20-30 m size range, and the tuna fishery of Venezuela which uses large (>20 m) longliners and purse seiners. In many countries there has been a recent trend towards more modern mid-size vessels in the 12-15 m range, particularly for large pelagics, deep-slope fishes and lobster and conch on offshore banks (FAO 2002). Given the seasonal nature of large pelagic fish availability, vessels are often multipurpose and switch between these fisheries sequentially throughout the year.

2.3.1 Agencies and institutions

Central agencies

The region is characterized by a diversity of national and regional governance and institution arrangements, stemming primarily from the governance structures established by the countries that colonized the region. Owing to this and to the diversity in size and state of development of Caribbean countries, there is an extremely wide range in their capacities for fishery management.

In Caribbean countries the management of capture fisheries is the mandate of the government Fisheries Department. These vary widely in staffing and in the level of training of their staff. At the top end of the range are the USA and Mexico with substantial federal and state fisheries agencies. At the low end are countries such as St. Kitts and Nevis and dependencies such as the British Virgin Islands and Montserrat with Fisheries Departments comprising only a few persons. There has not been any systematic comparative review of the structure and function of Caribbean Fisheries Departments, but a baseline review of 12 CARICOM countries recognized a wide range of capability even within these countries, which are all at the lower end of the capacity scale (Mahon and Boyce 1992).

Whereas one ministry has primary responsibility for fisheries, several others usually have an important role to play in fisheries development and management: ministries of foreign affairs are key players in any approach to management that involves international relations, which given the proximity of states in the Caribbean often involves small-scale fisheries; trade ministries are key to fisheries that export, e.g. conch and lobster; certification and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) management are often under the control of health ministries; enforcement is usually a matter for the Coast Guard. However, cross-sectoral coordination and cooperation is a weak area for many Caribbean countries.

In addressing the management regime for small-scale fisheries in Caribbean countries, it is necessary to consider the possible role of other institutions with expertise in marine resource management and maritime affairs as sources of technical input, when fisheries departments are weak. Many larger countries in the Wider Caribbean have universities and institutes that can provide expertise, or be encouraged to develop programmes that support fisheries management, e.g. USA, Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia. There are few such institutions in the small, less-developed countries. In CARICOM countries, there are the University of the West Indies, the University of Guyana and the University of Suriname. These have very limited capacity in the area of fisheries and oceanography.

National agencies must be considered in the context of the several regional initiatives aimed at enhancing capacity for management of small-scale fisheries through coordination, sharing of information and pooling of resources. Some examples are: the Western Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission (WECAFC) of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) which has been a primary forum for fisheries personnel to exchange technical information; Latin American Organization for Fishery Development (OLDEPESCA) which is the successor to the SELA Action Committee on Seafood and Freshwater Products; The CARICOM Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM), a permanent regional fisheries mechanism which was recently established (March 2003) to provide support to its member countries; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Oceanographic Commission, Sub-Commission for the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions (IOCARIBE), Colombia. The influence of these has been mainly at the technical level. A few other regional organizations have a mandate to facilitate regional-level management of fishery resources, to promote interchange of information and to build marine science capacity but are little involved in direct management.

The need for regional cooperation in fisheries management as a means of enhancing capacity of small fisheries departments is well appreciated, but there is a large number of agencies in the mix. These often compete for the attention of the relatively small number of staff in fisheries departments and may at times even duplicate efforts.

The role of international agencies e.g. The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) must be borne in mind as many Caribbean small-scale fisheries exploit tuna resources and must be managed with reference to ICCAT.

2.3.2 Management measures

Traditional management measures have not been reported to occur in many places in the Caribbean. It has been argued that most Caribbean peoples are not indigenous and thus being relative newcomers to the area there may not have been sufficient time for traditional management to develop as it has elsewhere, for example in Oceania. There are some examples of traditional measures, e.g. rules to reduce conflict in Grenada seine fisheries and promote conservation in Barbados sea urchin fisheries. Perhaps other examples exist, but not much effort has gone into finding them in the Caribbean.

The main means of regulating small-scale fisheries has been area and seasonal closures, gear regulations, chiefly mesh size of traps and nets, but also banning of scuba, and banning of destructive fishing practices such as blast fishing and trammel nets. In cases of extreme depletion, such as is often the case for easily exploited inshore resources like conch and sea urchins, there have been complete closures for extended periods.

Limited access is almost unheard of in small-scale fisheries in the Caribbean, except in Cuba and US territories. Such fisheries are often perceived as a last-resort means of making a living for the poorest persons. Thus preventing them from fishing is seen as taking away any chance of making a living and is politically unacceptable.

2.3.3 Stakeholder participation in planning and co-management

Stakeholder involvement in planning and/or the management process is a very new concept in the Caribbean. Fisheries Advisory Committees (FACs) are about as far as it goes in most countries, and FACs are seldom very active or influential. Exceptions exist, such as in the case of the Belize Fisheries Advisory Board, which plays a strong role.

Consciousness regarding the need to involve stakeholders in planning and management is growing in the region. There are several recent projects aimed at studying and enhancing co-management. Much of the effort aimed at involving stakeholders relates to the management of marine protected areas and is conservation rather that fishery oriented, although fisheries objectives are often cited with the hope of engaging fishers.

At this time, consultation is the main mode of involving stakeholders in fishery management. There are few reported examples of fishery comanagement in the Caribbean involving the delegation of management authority to stakeholders. The Portland Bight and Negril Management Areas in Jamaica are notable examples in which authority for management of the fisheries in a designated area has been delegated to an NGO. Both cases are relatively new and it is too early to determine if they are sustainable.

2.3.4 Fishery organizations

Attempts at establishing fisheries cooperatives have a long history throughout the Caribbean. However, there are few examples of cooperatives that have become strong and sustainable. The cooperatives in Belize are the best known examples. They are based primarily on the valuable conch and lobster fisheries there, and have played a central role in processing and exporting. Similarly in Guyana, the Georgetown Cooperative has been strong and active in managing the fisheries complex there. Recent initiatives have been more oriented towards promoting fisherfolk organizations, as interest groups, rather than cooperatives as economic entities. The stated purpose of these initiatives has been to give fisherfolk a collective voice in management. This has been recognized as being particularly needed in countries where there is a strong tourism sector, which tends to compete with fisheries for marine and coastal space. In many countries small-scale fisheries have been marginalized by tourism. At the same time, the tourism sector complains about lack of availability of fishery products. There is the need for such organizations to demonstrate successes in order to convince the wider fisherfolk community that they are worth supporting. At present they tend to be supportive only in times of crisis. To achieve the successes needed to gain credibility, considerable strengthening through capacity-building and ongoing support in planning and implementing activities will be required (McConney et al. 1998).

2.3.5 Conflict resolution

Conflict management among stakeholders through negotiation and mediation is a not the cultural norm in most CARICOM countries. Mediation is only recently being seen as a useful complement to the judiciary system in most Caribbean countries. These types of skills are rarely present in government fisheries divisions, given the primarily biological background of staff in most cases, and even more rare in fisherfolk organizations. Berkes et al (2001) point out that the role of the fisheries officer is changing, particularly with regard to small-scale fisheries, where management may be more people-based than science-based, towards one where mediation, facilitation and organizational skills will be most important. There is the need to ensure that managers have these skills.

2.3.6 Allocation and management

Attempts to allocate resources to different user groups are primarily through zoning, involving Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in particular. In the case of MPAs, fishers are prevented from fishing, or restricted in how they may fish, usually in favour of tourism but also for conservation purposes. However, most MPAs in the Caribbean are “paper parks” with little enforcement of restrictions.

Given the lack of limited entry or controls on total allowable catch in most Caribbean countries there are few reported examples of resource allocation among users within fisheries. Conch in Jamaica is a notable example where spatial and allowable catch limitation were placed on the large commercial vessels in favour of small-scale fishers on Pedro Bank (Aiken et al. 1999). Zoning is also used to separate activities of small-scale and large-scale commercial fishing in shrimp fisheries in Trinidad.

2.3.7 Monitoring of management performance

Few countries have fishery management plans that require systematic review of management performance. Thus there is little information upon which to base comments. Monitoring the status of fisheries is one key means of determining if management is working. Time series of landings and catch per unit effort are basic data for such monitoring. Establishing catch and effort monitoring systems in Caribbean countries has been a major thrust of the CARICOM Fisheries Programme over the past 12 years. However, in most countries it is usual to find data being collected according to a routine with little analysis beyond the simple statistical output of reporting annual production figures for national and international organizations (FAO 2002).

2.3.8 Roles and responsibilities

Management in Caribbean countries remains essentially top-down, with consultation. Consequently, given the difficulties involved in dealing with widely dispersed, mainly rural small-scale fisheries, little management actually takes place. Closed seasons for species that are primarily exported are most strictly observed, because they can be controlled through export permits, although in some places over the side sales to vessels from neighbouring countries with different closure periods is problematic. In the eastern Caribbean, harmonization of regulations among countries helps to address this problem. There is widespread recognition that comanagement is desirable, but neither government nor stakeholder organizations are equipped to move rapidly in that direction.

Conservation NGOs are having an increasing influence on small-scale fisheries in the Caribbean, primarily through the promotion of MPAs as a management tool. Regional and national NGOs also promote protected areas, but are much less strong less well funded than their international counterparts. The situation with fisherfolk NGOs has been described above. In the Portland Bight area mentioned above, the use by the managing NGO of local rangers for enforcement is reported as working well.

3. ISSUES FOR MANAGEMENT REGIMES

The following five issues were identified as key for consideration in developing a research programme for small-scale fisheries:

1. Lessons from fisheries co-management.

2. Small-scale fisheries management and ecosystem management.

3. High diversity of small stocks of low total individual value that does not justify a full conventional stock assessment, target setting and enforcement programme.

4. Low perceived importance of fisheries in general and small-scale fisheries, in particular.

5. Small poorly managed, unplanned fisheries departments that do not have the range of expertise needed to conduct conventional top-down management using assessment-based targets.

Issue 1: Lessons from fisheries co-management^[15]

Co-management is a rapidly expanding model for fisheries management that has enjoyed wide support by both donor agencies and NGOs. Sen and Nielsen (1996) define co-management as: “an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the government and user groups” (406). McCay and Jentoft (1996) are more specific when they describe co-management as cooperative fisheries management where “the basic principle is self-governance, but within a legal framework established by government, and power is shared between user groups and the government” (239). Co-management mobilizes several assets to aid effective management. One is facilitated access to information (Pinkerton 1989). Others are increased legitimacy through increased transparency in decision-making (Jentoft 1989), greater accountability for officials (Magrath 1989), and increased respect for indigenous perspectives (Pomeroy and Carlos 1997). Co-management has a mixed record of success (Wilson, Nielsen and Degnbold 2003) but the most effective small-scale fisheries management institutions are, to a growing degree, co-management institutions (Raakjaer-Nielsen et al. 2002).

Considerable recent research has focussed on what does and does not contribute to strong co-management institutions (Raakjaer-Nielsen et al. 2002, Wilson Nielsen and Degnbold 2003). The first lesson, perhaps, is that co-management must involve real cooperation. Where co-management is simply a recruiting tool for inexpensive labour to help the government to enforce its fisheries regulations it is unlikely to succeed. Even if the co-management institutions are maintained, they will not make the contribution to effective management that truly collaborative approaches can make (Raakjaer-Nielsen et al. 2002).

The second lesson is that co-management institutions that are based on the democratic representation of the fishers have more depth and staying power than those that are not. Hara et al. (2002) in their comparative case studies of co-management in Malawi found that close involvement by non-democratic traditional authorities (TA) had a negative influence on the effectiveness of the management regimes. Similar lessons are emerging from community-based natural resource management approaches to many resources throughout the world (Ribot 2002).

Effective environmental management is management that can process and respond well to biological and social information, i.e., management that is adaptive whether it uses that term or not. One way to think about the contribution that co-management can make to fisheries management, and the motivations behind participation in such programmes, is to look at the problem in terms of information processing across scales. The smaller the scale an institution is operating on the better able it is to understand and respond to rich, nuanced information. When seeking to manage large-scale problems, governments rely on bureaucratic authority, and sometimes market-based mechanisms, because these approaches create cooperation through simple decisions in response to strong, clear incentives that operate predicably across large scales. Markets and bureaucracies, however, are poor at processing and responding to complex information, such as scientific data about rapidly changing fisheries (Wilson 2003).

The problem that governments face when they seek to manage small-scale fisheries is accountability. How can the government know and influence the kinds of decisions and behaviours that are going on at the local level so that they can ensure that they reflect the government’s priorities for, e.g., the sustainable and equitable use of a large-scale resource? In creating co-management institutions, the government desires to make use of the richer information processing mechanisms embedded in local cultures to facilitate this accountability. The government’s motivation for participating in co-management begins with its need for the communities’ help in dealing with aspects of management that require richer, more sensitive and subtle tools than bureaucratic authority provides.

Fishing communities, meanwhile, want to access the government’s higher-scale reach and resources. Two reasons why communities want to involve the government in local fisheries management are common. The first is simply a desire for the money and other resources that co-management programmes frequently make available. In such cases, the community will remain motivated to participate in co-management so long as the money is flowing. The second reason is that the community is facing a conflict situation and wants the government to help them deal with it. For these communities, government involvement holds two attractions: giving legitimacy to particular objectives and local groups, and managing the broader conflicts.

Stakeholder conflicts in fisheries are situations of both problem and possibility. It is communities that need government help in resolving conflicts that are the most ripe for the creation of effective, self motivated, co-management institutions. Such institutions can be of great use, in turn, to a government trying to hold a local community accountable to a larger scale need. Situations where co-management has the greatest possibility for success will often be situations of conflict.

Of course, conflicts also undermine management efforts. In the Canadian case described above the community management boards were invested with government legitimacy to resolve the conflicts that emerged in the sharing of a decreasing groundfish quota. The ongoing need to deal with these conflicts has meant that both of the boards have continued to function, but one board has proved a stronger institution because of a larger capacity for conflict resolution.

Effective co-management will come about when the government can use its authority to contain and channel fisheries conflicts in creative ways. This means using its rule-making authority to make it possible for more open and culturally embedded communications to play an effective role in conflict resolution and other local decision-making processes. Other examples beyond the Canadian case exist (Wilson Nielsen and Degnbold 2003). The creative channelling of conflict does require, however, that the state use its authority for this purpose rather than attempting to micro-manage the fishery. The benefits of co-management are best achieved when the state is willing to surrender real decision-making power, including the legitimacy that only the government can bestow, to democratic local institutions, even while holding them accountable for their responses to the needs of the broader society.

Such accountability itself can, in fact, increase the effectiveness of co-management institutions when it takes the form of ongoing, outside participation in goal clarification and the evaluation of achievements. This is true both of co-management programmes involving the state and emerging possibilities of ecolabelling in small-scale fisheries management in which certification programmes use the high scale power of the market, rather than of the state, to achieve a similar purpose. There are a great many problems involved in certification of small-scale fisheries, but this approach does hold real potential if it is conceived as a mechanism of ongoing accountability to locally created and globally ratified management goals that strikes the right balance between firm accountability to goals and transparency about ways to achieve those goals.

Issue 2: Small-scale fisheries management and ecosystem management

Making use of the richer information that smaller scale institutions are able to work with is the key to understanding the ecosystem management problem. Ecosystem management has emerged in several forms in discussions of fisheries management (McCay and Wilson 1997). Approaching fisheries management from an ecosystem perspective is biologically attractive because of its recognition of the reality that fishing is related to a far broader set of problems than simply the impact of harvesting on populations. It is also enormously challenging. In a number of contexts it has been defined as “multispecies management” wherein a management is designed around several interacting species. Ecosystem management has also been promoted by those seeking fundamental reforms in the way we defined fisheries management, on such example being the “parametric management” approach of Wilson and Dickie (1995). Most scientific approaches to ecosystem management, however, use multi-species models that essentially treat ecosystem management as single species management. This leads to overwhelming measurement and analysis problems (Degnbol 2003). From a social perspective, ecosystem management would also result in an exponential increase in the number of groups that would have a stake in any given decision. In fact, the complexity that the management of the marine ecosystem would entail would likely overwhelm any current management institution. Nor do ecosystem approaches reflect the realities of managing behaviour through bureaucratic authority. Bureaucracies depend on calculable rules to trigger responses (Porter 1995), while ecosystem approaches present complex interactions of parameters that are difficult to quantify and impossible to interpret in real, decision-making time. More fundamental, the concepts needed to make ecosystem management work do not translate into firm, legal definitions, even ones as simple as boundaries (Haueber 1996). Ecosystem approaches depend on the flexibility to make changes in response to shifting system parameters.

The bottom line from these scientific, social and bureaucratic considerations is that ecosystems are not a unit of management that is congruent with democratic, science-driven management as it is carried out on large scales through government bureaucracies. Studies of the application of the ecosystem concept in environmental management in practice have demonstrated this empirically (Yaffee 1996). What cannot be done on large scales, however, may be feasible on small scales. Ecosystem management requires the processing of too much biological and social information for large bureaucracies to handle. The ability of institutions on smaller scales to make use of more and more nuanced information suggests that small-scale fisheries are where experiments with real ecosystem management need to begin.

The Canadian experience described above is one instructive case. The community management boards emerged to deal with conflicts created by the allocation of an aggregate quota. In the one case where they were successful in dealing with these conflicts the local institution, rather than simply carrying on with that task, began to be involved in a wider and wider set of problems related to the management of the Bay of Fundy. They are now centrally involved in a network of local groups focussed on management issues around the Gulf of Maine. Nor is this the only case; the increasing involvement of the Sea Fisheries Committees that handle small-scale fisheries management in the UK, with the management of EU Special Conservation Areas, are another example. Co-management systems that incorporate the principles outlined in Issue 1 may be one key to making the kinds of changes in human management institutions that will make ecosystem management a feasible alternative.

Issue 3: High diversity of small stocks of low total individual value that does not justify a full conventional stock assessment, target setting and enforcement programme

Although, for discussion purposes, small-scale fisheries are often treated as a discrete category, they are in fact a continuum of fishery types from very small, subsistence to enormous, industrial. There may be some value in developing ideas relating to this continuum further as a basis for considering problems of small-scale fisheries. For example, are the types of problems often flagged as relating to small-scale fisheries due to the scale of the fishery, the size/value of the fish stock being exploited or the type of management regime that is often found in situations where small-scale fisheries are prevalent? Unravelling this is clearly beyond the scope of this brief report, but it may be possible to raise some points that can be considered in further discussions.

Taking the above three dimensions may provide a useful framework for considering small-scale fisheries issues. It encompasses all fisheries.

Dimension 1 is the scale of the fishery, ranging from subsistence through artisanal, small-scale commercial to large-scale commercial or industrial.

Dimension 2 is the size/value of the stock fished, which may range from a few tonnes to over a million tonnes.

Dimension 3 is the management organizational context, ranging from a very small fisheries management organization with low capacity and low related support to a large, fully developed management system with science, administrative, enforcement and judiciary support.

These dimensions are not unrelated and have other correlates such as temperate-tropical axes and developed-developing country axes, that make it difficult to frame the problems seen in small-scale fisheries as purely due to the scale of the fishery. Ideally, to explore this approach, one would look at the distribution, relative frequency of occurrence, and total value (dollar, employment, food security) of global fisheries in this three-dimensional space. Then the issues relating to management for the different parts off the space could be considered, with reference to possible solutions and the appropriate investment of research and management effort according to value. That would be a substantial research effort in itself, largely because the data on stock size/value is scarce. Much fishery data is reported in aggregate form, certainly at the national level, without regard to stock unit size. Some observations on the characteristics of fisheries that occur in different parts of the three-dimensional space are provided in Table 1. These illustrate possible different needs for small-scale fisheries in different situations. This table is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather to illustrate an approach to expanding upon the usual small-scale/large-scale continuum and to emphasize that many apparent problems of small-scale fisheries may not be due only to the scale of the fishery.

Table 1. Characteristics and issues for management of small-scale fisheries in various parts of a management regime framework based on three dimensions: Management organization and capacity; stock size; and fishery scale

Inventory of the relative distribution of stocks in this framework (or some variation) would provide the context for a research programme on small-scale fisheries that focussed on the relevant characteristics (Mahon 1997). For small size/value stocks there is the need to develop approaches that are indicator-based rather than conventional stock assessment, use reference directions rather than targets and emphasize consensual processes (Berkes et al. 2001).

Issue 4: Low perceived importance of fisheries in general and small-scale fisheries in particular

In CARICOM countries, with the exception of shrimp fisheries in Guyana and Suriname, and lobster and conch fisheries in Belize, fisheries are generally perceived to be of low importance relative to other productive sectors. One reason suggested is that Fisheries Divisions are usually situated in ministries that are primarily concerned with agriculture. The backgrounds of the Chief Technical Officer, Permanent Secretary and Minister are usually agriculture related. Furthermore, because fisheries are mainly small-scale and often rural, fishers are usually from the lowest economic strata and have little voice, except when there are crises. By and large, small-scale fishing is perceived by planners and decision-makers as a subsector that takes care of itself. Despite clear evidence of overexploitation of most coastal resources, there is reluctance on the part of decision-makers to actively manage these resources. Left alone, the small-scale fishers go about their business quietly, but with low returns from depleted resources. Attempts to impose management regulations on them often leads to unfavourable political exposure due to the perception that the livelihoods of the poor fisher is being threatened.

Where tourism is an important sector, small-scale fisheries are often marginalized by demands for coastal space, particularly in SIDS where space is limited. There is little in the way of integration of fisheries with tourism. Important linkages wherein fisheries provide inputs to the tourism restaurant sector and thus considerable value added when the product is served as a meal, rather than exported, are often overlooked.

The above situation has been exacerbated by the lack of good information on the value of fisheries, and/or the potential benefits from fisheries management. As a consequence, fisheries management controls are minimally developed and seldom enforced in CARICOM countries. The situation appears to be similar in other developing countries of the Wider Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba, where there is evidence that management control has brought benefits in several fisheries (Claro et al. 2001).

Little emphasis has been placed on quantifying and promoting the importance of small-scale fisheries in CARICOM. It may be thought that when there are good functioning data systems for monitoring fisheries performance these will provide the necessary information. After 12 years of work on data systems by the CARICOM Fisheries Programme, there has been little output oriented towards documenting the value of small-scale fisheries.

Proper economic valuation of the value of small-scale fisheries in national economies would go some way towards redressing this situation. In countries with tourism, this must include the value added by providing inputs to tourism. Often these are counted under tourism earnings. However, knowing the value although necessary is not sufficient. There is the need to communicate this to decision-makers and the public at large. The collective voice that fisher associations should give fishers could make a substantive contribution to raising the profile of small-scale fisheries and an appreciation of their value.

Programmes to quantify the occurrence, and value of small-scale fisheries would help to redress this problem. Often, when one refers to valuation of small-scale fisheries, the response from national agencies is that it would require major social and economic surveys, the cost of which could not be justified. Berkes et al. (2001) suggest that the information could be acquired at the level of accuracy needed to persuade the public and decision-makers through much simpler surveys than are often proposed. Development, documentation and sharing of simple reasonable methods for arriving at estimates of small-scale fisheries value and value added would assist in addressing this need. These methods could focus of the use of single/one-off studies at intervals (e.g. 5-10 years), rather than on setting up ongoing systems for monitoring economic performance. The latter although possibly necessary for monitoring fisheries performance for management do not seem to capture small-scale fisheries information in a form needed to document and promote their value.

Issue 5: Small poorly-managed, unplanned fisheries departments that do not have the range of expertise needed to conduct conventional top-down management using assessment-based targets

Problems relating to the actual organization and operation of fisheries departments in countries where small-scale fisheries are predominant may be one of the major reasons for the poor management of these fisheries. This is particularly so when conventional management approaches are percieved as being the desired, if not the only, approach to managing these stocks. This has been considered to some extent under Issue 3 above, but bears further examination. For a start, there is the need to consider the extent to which small-scale fisheries require a completely different structure and staffing of fisheries departments compared to that of large-scale conventional fisheries management. As previously described in this paper, most fisheries departments have a bias towards biological expertise with limited skills in facilitation, mediation and conflict resolution. Furthermore, even the dominating biological expertise is not the most appropriate biological expertise for dealing with the complexity of small-scale fisheries.

The lack of guidelines for appropriate expenditure on management for a given resource value (if it were known) is a root cause of the evident lack of planning in CARICOM countries for human resource development for fisheries departments that includes clearly stated structures and targets. This has contributed greatly to the instability in fisheries departments. Because there are no guidelines, fisheries department size and structure has generally been an ad hoc decision based on the decision-makers perception of the value of fisheries, and the persuasive power and/or position of favour, of the department chief. This issue is closely linked to the one above regarding low perceived value of small-scale fishery resources, particularly when the whole fishery sector is a suite of small-scale fisheries on small/low individual value stocks (regardless to the overall value of the sector).

It appears obvious that the level of investment in management should generally be related to the value of the resource (that may include non-fishery worth such as for biodiversity, culture, religion or ecosystem integrity). However, there is a lack of analyses that lead to easily applicable formal or informal rules to guide the manager in determining an appropriate level of investment. Indeed there are few studies that even quantify existing levels of investment (Arnason, Hannesson and Schrank 2000). For large-scale fisheries in developed countries, the costs of management may be substantial and variable, ranging from 3 percent of the value of the fishery in Iceland through 10 percent in Norway to 15-25 percent in Newfoundland, Canada (Arnason, Hannesson and Schrank 2000). This is an area in which there is the need for further analysis by fisheries economists with the aim of providing managers with at least some rules-of-thumb regarding appropriate levels of investment.

The approach of quantifying the costs of not managing in order to determine an appropriate level of expenditure on management should be explored. There can be many social and economic impacts of not managing a fishery (Berkes et al. 2001). Incentives for investment in management may be higher where the fishery has additional value to the country, such as providing foreign exchange, or where the fishery products are culturally important. In the latter case, the value placed on a fishery may be much higher than its measured economic value.

Serious attention to the economic value of fisheries and guidelines for the appropriate levels of national budget for management could provide a basis for more planned and structured departments.

Even if there were a clear view of the appropriate amount of public investment in fishery management and development, there is little to guide the manager as to the appropriate organizational arrangements for a developing country fisheries department. Attention to guidelines for fisheries department structure and function could make a substantial contribution to the effectiveness of developing country fisheries departments. There is a large sample of developing country fisheries departments from which to learn what has worked, what has not, and why. An international study of existing arrangements in the context of various organizational models is called for.

Many developing country department chiefs appear to take the view that in order to manage fisheries effectively they need the full range of skills and positions that are commonly found in a large-country department such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the USA. Their training and their post-training exposure, frequently lead them to conclude that management cannot be successfully carried out without such levels of input.

In addition to exploring the most appropriate model for fisheries departments of various sizes and with a mandate for various levels of resource value, there is the need to consider the relative capacity that should be established in national and regional institutions. Models of national/regional arrangements that take advantage of limited resources are only now beginning to emerge (Sydnes 2001). This further complicates the matter of national investment in management, because regional institutions must be supported from national funds, usually at the expense of the national institutions. Thus it can be expected that, in addition to collaboration between the two levels, there will be tensions.

The matter of how fisheries departments are run and of accountability bears further exploration. When there is no plan that sets priorities for a period and is reviewed on a regular basis, there is scope for a great deal of ad hoc activity on the part of fisheries department staff. This activity may be opportunity-driven by offers of travel to workshops and training. Travel with associated per diems may increase annual salaries of fisheries officers substantially. Consequently, in the absence of transparent planning, activities that include well-paid travel may get priority.

In small fisheries departments that do not operate according to clear plans that are developed with stakeholders and reviewed regularly, individual agendas may exert a strong influence over the department’s priorities. For example, a fisheries officer with strong inclinations to reef conservation may shift the departmental focus in this direction while providing limited attention to offshore fisheries. Formal planning can provide balance and prioritization that can help to overcome these effects.

At the national level, the mechanism for fisheries management planning and decision-making is critical for successful management. The lack of political will to regulate users is a common cause of failure in fisheries management. Fishers inevitably suffer genuine short-term hardship due to regulations, and the political directorate will often favour their short-term needs over the long-term sustainability of the resource. One way to mitigate this may be to formalize the advisory and decision-making process so that fishers inputs are incorporated, long-term versus short-term benefits are documented, and it thus becomes more difficult for the political directorate to ignore the advice.

In summary, the structure and function of developing country fishery departments based on levels of financial support that are appropriate to the value of resources to be managed have not been systematically addressed. Similarly, although the need for improved planning and review processes is frequently identified, there is little to guide managers in these areas. Consequently, systematic action to address these issues has been minimal.

This is an area within which there is great potential for input from the field of organizational change management and public administration, perhaps even considering the applicability of some of the recent thinking on complex adaptive systems and organizational change (Olson and Eoyang 2001). A research programme could be developed to address the areas identified above.

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