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2.1 Background

The international instruments relating to fisheries provide a framework both for the evolving role of RFMOs and for the development of measures that can be taken in relation to IUU fishing activities.

Just over half of the regional fishery bodies currently in existence were established prior to the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("the 1982 UN Convention"). The earlier bodies tended to have advisory mandates only, and served primarily as fora for international cooperation and vehicles for research, analysis, and data repository and exchange.

The 1982 UN Convention, which has 143 Parties as at August 2003, including nineteen GFCM member countries[2], broadened the role of regional fishery bodies, based on a suite of activities including:

In addition to these activities, the 1982 UN Convention encourages states to cooperate through or to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations for specified purposes. These include taking measures for the conservation of fisheries resources in the high seas, and in respect of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.

Basic principles that would form the basis of later elaboration of IUU fishing were also included in the 1982 UN Convention, including flag State responsibility and the duty of non-nationals to comply with coastal State measures and laws.

However, although many of these provisions would assist RFMOs in addressing IUU fishing, an impediment to exercising the new mandates in the most effective manner has been attributed to the fact that the UN Convention does not confer management authority on regional fishery bodies.

In the years to come, the absence of broad international agreement on the management authority of RFMOs received increasing attention, fueled by a growing awareness of the scarcity of fishery resources. It was acknowledged that to be effective, RFMOs would need a clear mandate to manage the fishery resources in full respect of international law.

Adoption of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement ("UN Fish Stocks Agreement")[3] brought the role of RFMOs into sharper focus and is enhanced by other international fisheries instruments agreed in the years following the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), especially the:

The Code of Conduct and the IPOAs are voluntary. The 1982 UN Convention, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement are binding on parties that have ratified or adhered to the instrument, but are also being implemented by many states that have not yet formally deposited their instruments of ratification.

GFCM Members that have signed, ratified or adhered to these instruments are shown in Appendix 1. Nearly all have ratified the 1982 UN Convention, six have adhered to the Compliance Agreement and seven have signed the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, including the European Community with four members having ratified it.

Many RFMOs are actively encouraging their members to ratify or adhere to the international instruments. However, the pace is slow. While most RFMOs are investigating and reviewing, through appropriately constituted working groups how best to address the relevant issues, few RFMOs have actually taken concrete steps towards implementing the desired regime. The issues are complex, and the RFMOs are the only realistic option for the conservation and management of shared stocks. To this end, RFMOs could adopt, and encourage members and non-members to adopt, provisional measures to implement applicable international instruments, as formal solutions are being developed.

2.2 The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement

The UN Fish Stocks Agreement entered into force on 11 December 2001, and is the most comprehensive of the binding international instruments in defining the role of RFMOs and elaborating measures that could be taken in relation to IUU fishing activities. It was signed by 59 states and entities, including eleven GFCM members, and by August 2003, 36 ratifications had been deposited.[5] There have been successive General Assembly Resolutions calling for the implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.[6] The vital role of RFMOs in implementing the UN Fish Stocks Agreement was recognized by all States Parties at the 2002 Informal Meeting of the States Parties.[7]

However, a May, 2003 report on the status and implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, prepared in response to a request by the General Assembly[8], provides an overview of the main trends in implementation and identifies one constraint as the fact that no RFMO was composed exclusively of Parties to the Agreement at the time of writing.[9] It was therefore not possible to say that any RFMO is bound by the Agreement. In addition, several important fishing states are not parties.

The report, which features findings from a survey of states and other stakeholders, also states that "Notwithstanding the constraints, practice since the adoption of the Agreement demonstrates that even before entry into force, provisions of the Agreement have been widely used as a benchmark for State practice." Positive trends identified in the report are the wide application of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, even by non-parties, and a high priority given to almost all of the general principles for conservation and management in Article 5.

Although the UN Fish Stocks Agreement applies primarily to the highly migratory and straddling fish stocks on the high seas,[10] its broad acceptance and application is evidenced by the reinforcement of other international instruments, implementation at the regional level, and to some extent by State practice within areas of national jurisdiction.

The UN Fish Stocks Agreement complements and strengthens a number of provisions of the 1982 UN Convention. The former seeks to ensure a harmonious development of coherent conservation and management measures for exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the high seas, and thereby alleviate some of the existing tensions and conflicts. It is recognized that the effective implementation of this instrument depends on political will and a high degree of cooperation between coastal states and high seas fishing nations and fishing entities on a range of technical issues. Part III, relating to mechanisms for international cooperation, sets out the central role of appropriate RFMOs as a mechanism through which States Party to the Agreement should act to meet their obligations and exercise their rights under the Agreement.

In particular, Article 8 of Part III is pivotal, and relates to cooperation for conservation and management. It provides, inter alia, that where a competent RFMO exists, states should either become members, or they should agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by such organizations. This complements other Articles, including those providing the following:

Many of these Articles provide the impetus for specific measures relating to IUU fishing taken by RFMOs, including information and data requirements, establishment of registers, requirements for high seas fishing, landings, port inspection and transshipment, inspection and enforcement and cooperation with non-members.

An important deterrent against IUU fishing in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement relates to non-members of RFMOs. If they do not agree to apply the conservation and management measures, they are not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in the conservation of the relevant fish stocks. If they do not cooperate, members are to take measures to deter activities of vessels which undermine the effectiveness of the RFMO’s conservation and management measures.[17] This has taken the form in some RFMOs of trade information/catch documentation schemes, trade sanctions and measures inter alia prohibiting transshipment and landings of fish caught from IUU activities, and seeking to discourage investment in such activities. Some RFMOs have established subsidiary bodies such as compliance committees to develop procedures to collect information on IUU fishing and recommend deterrent measures.

2.3 The FAO Compliance Agreement

The FAO Compliance Agreement entered into force in April, 2003, and as at August 2003 had been accepted by 27 states, including six GFCM members.[18] It concerns high seas fishing, and seeks to encourage countries to take effective action, consistent with international law, and to deter the reflagging of vessels by their nationals as a means of avoiding compliance with applicable conservation and management rules for fishing activities on the high seas.

The Compliance Agreement assigns the primary role of international coordination to FAO rather than RFMOs, but does assign some roles to the latter. The preamble calls upon states which do not participate in global, regional or subregional fishery organizations or arrangements to do so, with a view to achieving compliance with international conservation and management measures. Some articles relating to RFMOs provide:

The failure to exercise flag State responsibility is a major cause of IUU fishing, and the Compliance Agreement has extensive provisions relating to this, similar to those in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Among other things, it requires authorizations for fishing on the high seas. In that context, a State must be satisfied that it can effectively exercise its responsibilities before it authorizes its flag vessels to fish on the high seas, and authorizations are not to be granted to vessels that have undermined conservation and management measures.[22]

The Compliance Agreement also requires Parties to keep a record of fishing vessels authorized for fishing on the high seas,[23] international cooperation including port State investigation[24] and has extensive requirements on the exchange of information and obligations of FAO in this regard.[25] Non-parties are addressed by requiring Parties to encourage them to accept the Agreement and adopt appropriate laws, and to cooperate to the end that non-parties’ vessels do not undermine the conservation and management measures.

2.4 The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

The development of the Code of Conduct occurred over the same general time period as that of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and closely tracks the latter’s provisions. The Code extends to all fisheries and to fisheries-related matters beyond those covered by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. RFMOs are among the agencies tasked to implement the Code.[26]

The Code of Conduct is a voluntary, broad and comprehensive instrument that sets out principles and standards for the conservation and management of all fisheries and aquaculture including processing and trade in fish and fishery products, research, and the integration of fisheries and aquaculture into coastal area management. The Code makes numerous references to the role of RFMOs in establishing a responsible international fisheries regime. Some relevant provisions are:

The Code also provides a foundation for action on IUU fishing in particular through Article 8, Fishing Operations. That Article contains paragraphs relating to the duties of all states, flag States and port states, and the conduct of fishing activities. These provisions enhance those of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement.

2.5 International Plans of Action: Capacity and IUU Fishing

All IPOAs elaborated within the framework of the Code of Conduct refer to the role of RFMOs in respect of the relevant activity: in particular, the IPOA - Capacity and the IPOA - IUU contain a number of provisions to this effect. Both IPOAs are relevant for IUU fishing, and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development identified actions that are required at all levels to achieve sustainable fisheries including to:

urgently develop and implement national, and, where appropriate, regional plans of action, to put into effect the international plans of action of the FAO, in particular the IPOA - Capacity by 2005 and the IPOA - IUU by 2004.[31]

At the twenty-fifth session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in 2003, the Committee agreed that there is a linkage between fleet overcapacity and IUU fishing.[32] Some members also stated that this relationship was exacerbated by the payment of government subsidies to industry. The Committee endorsed the convening of a Technical Consultation in 2004 to review progress and promote the full implementation of the IPOA - IUU and the IPOA - Capacity.

In discussion, many members pointed out that IUU fishing, often by displaced vessels,[33] undermined efforts to sustainably manage fisheries at both national and regional levels. There was agreement that measures of positive listing for fishing vessels should be adopted by regional fishery bodies, and the Committee reaffirmed the need for the global implementation of measures against IUU fishing. The Committee considered a range of initiatives to more effectively address IUU fishing, and those relating to capacity included decommissioning and scrapping vessels rather than deregistering them, and tightening fishing vessel registration procedures, including the deregistration of vessels that have engaged in IUU fishing.

2.5.1 IPOA - Capacity

The UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution in 2003 that encouraged states, through RFMOs as appropriate, to implement the IPOAs, on sharks, seabirds and capacity since, according to the IPOA timetables, progress on implementation should be either completed or at an advanced stage.[34]

In its introduction, the IPOA - Capacity states that excessive fishing capacity is a problem that, among others, contributes substantially to overfishing, the degradation of marine fisheries resources, the decline of food production potential and significant economic waste. The objective is for states and regional fisheries organizations to achieve an equitable and transparent management of fishing capacity not later than 2005, through implementation of the IPOA.

Urgent actions needed to implement the Plan are specified, and include assessment and monitoring of fishing capacity, preparation and implementation of national plans and taking international considerations including through regional fisheries organizations. The IPOA - Capacity incorporates many actions similar to those in the IPOA - IUU and is based on the international fisheries instruments. The common actions include:

Appropriate capacity reduction and subsequent management of capacity is central to the successful implementation of the IPOA. Poor implementation in terms of temporary reductions in fleet capacity and the displacement of capacity to other fisheries may actually aggravate the overcapacity problem and contribute to IUU fishing. In addressing the management of fisheries and fishing capacity, some regions such as Southeast Asia are pursuing a rights-based approach, while others, such as the multispecies, multifleet fisheries of the Adriatic Sea, are pursuing an effort-constraining approach[35]. FAO database and recent COFI consideration of capacity

In addition to its emphasis on the management of capacity, the IPOA - Capacity emphasizes the importance of reliable fishery fleet statistics. FAO collects global data on fishery fleets through a biennial questionnaire for its report to COFI on the implementation of the Code of Conduct. In view of previous difficulties encountered in collecting such data, FAO has revised and simplified the fishery fleet questionnaire, which has resulted in a better rate of returns from countries.

FAO has also established a data base, the High Seas Vessels Authorization Record (HSVAR), which is included in the Fisheries Global Information System (FIGIS). The HSVAR implements requirements in the Compliance Agreement for flag States to report the vessels they have authorized for high seas fishing. At present, Canada, the USA, Japan, Norway and the European Union have provided vessel authorization data to HSVAR. There were 5506 vessel records on the database in September 2003. The user may query the database for a particular vessel by radio call sign, flag State, vessel name, port or registration number, and may request details of all queries made in the past seven days. Information categories include agreements, exemptions and recent additions.

The twenty-fifth session of COFI was informed of members’ actions to address fleet capacity-related problems where they already exist. These included implementing awareness campaigns among fishers to highlight the damaging effects of overfishing, introducing limited entry schemes and ITQs, instituting controls on fishing efforts (by way of vessel licensing schemes), prohibiting the exploitation of species that are particularly threatened, intensifying the use of MCS/VMS, undertaking a review of fishing licences and in some cases a reduced number of licences issued, introducing zone and time restrictions, promoting work on the selectivity of fishing gear, introducing size limits, establishing processing quotas, initiating and strengthening publicly-funded vessel buyback and early retirement schemes, encouraging fishers to move to other fisheries and occupations outside the fishery sector and discouraging credit for inshore fishing.

To prevent excess fishing capacity from developing, some Members have elaborated plans and national policies, established vessel registers and sought to strengthen databases. Other measures to prevent excess capacity have included banning the issuance of new fishing licences, introducing seasonal and area closures, withdrawal of licences and imposing maximum capacity restrictions on gear.

In the biennial report to COFI on implementation of the Code of Conduct, FAO advised the twenty-fifth session, based on information received from Members,[36] that a few Members have indicated that they have developed their NPOAs - Capacity while other Members[37] have partially done so. Some Members reported that they have not proceeded to develop a NPA - Capacity. A few other Members[38] indicated that they would not have their NPOAs - Capacity in place by the 2005 deadline. Key GFCM actions in relation to capacity

Adoption of measures designed to reduce and control the fishing effort is one of the basic tools for the management of Mediterranean fisheries; management by total allowable catch and quota management systems is thought to be less appropriate for the region’s multispecies, multi-gear fisheries. On an ongoing basis, the GFCM’s task to implement fishing effort control involves the following:

In an early initiative, the GFCM adopted, at its twenty-first session, Resolution 95/4 which called upon members to prepare a list of fishing boats operating from ports in the Mediterranean and requested the Secretariat to establish a common data base on existing fleets of fishing vessels operating outside national jurisdiction.

To implement the Resolution, CopeMed[39] collaborated in 1997 and 1998 in gathering data on vessels over 15 m fishing in the Western Mediterranean, in accordance with the Compliance Agreement, the Code of Conduct and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. In 2000, information submitted by relevant member countries[40] showed vessel attributes[41] and types of boat/gear. However, activity by CopeMed has since ceased.

At the twenty-fourth session of GFCM, Resolution 95/4 was recognized to be still valid, but not fully complied with. It was recognized that progress in implementation needs to be monitored. It was further noted that the implementation of this unfulfilled Resolution was essential for the work of the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) and that the list of vessels should include artisanal vessels operating from each port in each sub-area. The work of SAC involves a number of activities that are closely related to assessing fishing capacity, commissioned by GFCM since the twenty-third session.[42]

These include:

In 2002, the SAC Sub-Committee on Economic and Social Sciences emphasized the need to further specify the characteristics of operational units, in particular through defining its spatial dimension in relation to the concept of Local Operational Units (LOUs).[43] The Sub-Committee identified 13 fleet segments mainly based on métiers and vessel length. It noted that the combination of LOUs and the vessel segmentation would constitute the basis for analysis aimed at monitoring fleet capacity. SAC recommended to GFCM that it adopt for the Mediterranean the fleet segmentation being identified, and requested the Sub-Committee to undertake pilot studies to further define the concept of LOUs.

GFCM in turn requested SAC to monitor and fine tune, as necessary, fleet segmentation to support an update (at subregional level and by geographical areas) of the inventory of operational units generating catches of shared stocks.[44] GFCM also adopted Recommendation GFCM/2002/1 that encouraged Members in relevant geographical sub-areas (management units) to adopt measures aimed at adjusting the fishing effort for selected demersal species and small pelagics, and to rationalize their exploitation on the basis of advice from the SAC.

2.5.2 IPOA - IUU

The IPOA - IUU is prominently visible and the subject of ongoing high-level attention. Two supportive General Assembly Resolutions were adopted in 2003: one urged states to take all necessary steps to implement the IPOA - IUU, including through relevant RFMOs,[45] and another urged states to develop and implement national and, where appropriate regional plans of action, to put the IPOA - IUU into effect by 2004.[46] The latter also urged states to coordinate their activities and cooperate as appropriate through RFMOs, in implementing the IPOA, to promote information-sharing, to encourage the full participation of all stakeholders, and to coordinate all the work of the FAO with other international organizations. It also affirmed the need to strengthen, where necessary, the international legal framework for intergovernmental cooperation in the management of fish stocks and in combating IUU fishing.

The IPOA - IUU’s scope is broad and addresses IUU fishing in a holistic manner. During the negotiation process it was recognized that a range of measures were necessary to deal effectively with IUU fishing, and that the IPOA - Capacity would reinforce its objectives through reducing fleet capacity, lowering fishing pressure on fish stocks and reducing incentives for fishers to engage in irresponsible activities.

The objective of the IPOA - IUU is to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing by providing all states with a "toolbox" of comprehensive, transparent and effective measures by which to act, including through RFMOs. The IPOA defines principles and strategies, and a number of key terms as they are used in the text, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The full definitions are in Appendix 2, and the common thread is that IUU fishing may be said to occur in violation of - or at least with disregard for - applicable fisheries rules, whether adopted at the national, regional or international level.

The IPOA - IUU sets out clearly the responsibilities of all states and of flag States. It describes measures to be taken by coastal states and port states, and elaborates internationally agreed market related measures. It refers also to responsibilities and measures of states acting through RFMOs, and of states that are not members of RFMOs. The measures are integrated, and should be applied in accordance with international and other applicable law. The IPOA - IUU identifies these responsibilities and measures under the following headings:

A summary description of the paragraphs in the IPOA - IUU under the above headings is elaborated in Appendix 3. The IPOA - IUU calls for national plans of action (NPOAs) to be implemented by 2004, including action to implement initiatives adopted by relevant RFMOs. Similar to other instruments, particularly the Code of Conduct, implementation is carried out by governments and interested stakeholders, including industry, fishing communities and non-government organizations (NGOs).

The FAO Fisheries Department has prepared and published Technical Guidelines to support implementation of the IPOA - IUU.[47] The Guidelines provide advice as to how the measures in the IPOA - IUU can be put into effect, and on the possible organization and content of national plans of action for implementation of the IPOA - IUU. The Guidelines also encourage RFMOs to find ways to integrate measures to control IUU fishing with their other basic missions, including, for example, conservation of resources, control of catches and effort, management of fishing capacity, by-catch reduction, scientific research, and general data collection and dissemination.[48]

Some issues in the IPOA - IUU are linked to capacity, especially those relating to economic support[49] and measures relating to fishing vessel registration.[50] The latter reiterates requirements for the grant of a flag to a fishing vessel, and for authorizations to fish including conditions on information and reporting. Regarding economic support, the two IPOAs provide as follows:

While the implementation will require considerable work at the international and national levels, some of which is already under way[51], the IPOA - IUU Technical Guidelines urge states to move immediately to end all forms of government economic support for IUU fishing. FAO: Recent COFI consideration of the IPOA - IUU

In the biennial report to COFI on implementation of the Code of Conduct, FAO advised the twenty-fifth session, based on information received from Members, that some Members[52] indicated that they would take steps in the near future to finalize their national plans of action to implement the IPOA - IUU (NPOAs - IUU) while other Members[53] indicated that the plan would be completed before the 2004 deadline in the IPOA - IUU. There are no members of GFCM among those indicating the NPOAs would be completed, but the NPOA - IUU of Spain, dated November 2002, is discussed under section 3.2, below.

Members reported that measures taken to deter IUU fishing include the ratification of international agreements, strengthened policy and legislation to conform with the IPOA - IUU including tougher licensing/management arrangements and improved mechanisms to address flag State and port State responsibilities, control over nationals working on vessels, measures to address "flag of convenience vessels", higher penalties and imprisonment terms for fishers engaged in IUU fishing, increased MCS and the mandatory implementation of VMS, the seizure and destruction of catches resulting from IUU fishing, seizure and destruction of fishing gear, tightened catch reporting, enhanced observers’ programme, strengthened regional cooperation through RFBs, the introduction of certification to trace the origin of fish and prohibition of certain landings, catches of vessels from third Party countries, the promotion of fishers’ associations, and awareness building among stakeholders about the effects of IUU fishing.

COFI expressed concern at its session in 2003 about the continuing high and growing incidence of IUU fishing and the lack of effective implementation of the IPOA - IUU. References to the IPOA - IUU in the report of that session[54] include the following, indicating activity at both national and regional levels.

To address the request for technical assistance, FAO is planning a series of regional workshops with the objective of developing national capacity so that countries will be better placed to elaborate their NPOAs and, as a result, meet the requirements of the IPOA - IUU. One workshop, to be announced, is planned for the FAO Near East Members in 2005.

[2] See Appendix 1: two additional Members have signed but not yet ratified the 1982 UN Convention.
[3] The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
[4] Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High seas. Part of the Code of Conduct, the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement entered into force on 24 April 2003.
[5] See Appendix 1. Of the eleven GFCM members that signed the Fish Stocks Agreement, four have ratified and the EU ratification is expected before the end of 2003.
[6] Most recently General Assembly Resolution 57/143. See also the 2002 Report of the Informal Consultative Process, paragraph 41, document 57/80.
[8] See General Report of the Secretary General, distribution 30 May 2003, advance, unedited text. The status and implementation of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks Agreement) and its impact on related or proposed instruments throughout the UN system, with special reference to implementation of Part VII of the Fish Stocks Agreement, dealing with the requirements of developing States.
[9] At the time of writing this document, the EC is expected to ratify the Fish Stocks Agreement. When this happens, and with current membership, the South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO) will become the first RFMO in which all members are parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement.
[10] Provisions on the precautionary approach and compatibility of conservation and management measures may apply within areas of national jurisdiction: Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 3. Also note the Convention of one RFMO implements the Fish Stocks Agreement for all stocks on the high seas, and is not limited to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
[11] Article 8(4).
[12] Articles 9 and 10.
[13] Article 11.
[14] Article 12.
[15] Article 13.
[16] Articles 18-23.
[17] Article 17.
[18] See Appendix 1.
[19] Article V(3).
[20] Article VI, (4), (6) and (11).
[21] Article VII.
[22] Article III.
[23] Article IV.
[24] Article V.
[25] Article VI.
[26] Articles 1.2 and 4.1, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Also see Appendix 1.
[27] Article 1.2.
[28] Article 4.1.
[29] Article 6.5.
[30] Article 7.
[31] Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 26 Aug.-Sept. 2002, A/CONF.199/20.
[32] Report of the twenty-fifth session of the Committee on fisheries, Rome, 24-28 Feb. 2003. CL124/7.
[33] Ibid. The reference in the Report is to vessels displaced from fisheries trying to address the issue of over-capacity.
[34] General Assembly Resolution A/Res/57/142, 2003: "Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing, unauthorized fishing in zones of national jurisdiction and on the high seas/illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, fisheries by-catch and discards, and other developments."
[35] Greboval, D. "The Management of Fishing Capacity: General Overview and Preliminary Considerations in Reference to the Case of the Adriatic Sea", prepared for the AdriaMed Seminar on Fishing Capacity, Fano, Italy, 24-25 October 2002. The Report of the fourth session of the SAC, 2001, FAO Fisheries Report No. 653, refers to work being done to polish the definition of Operational Units, and the fact that many countries had yet to submit Operational Units Data. The issue of Management Units was addressed, and the collection of data with reference to a statistical geographic pattern. The twenty-sixth session of the GFCM agreed on a temporary delimitation of the Management Units that were re-named "Geographical Sub-Areas". See also "Regional Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries in Southeast Asia", Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, ISBN: 974-537-297-8, April 2003.
[36] Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia; Nepal; Spain; Argentina and Venezuela; New Zealand.
[37] Burundi, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Morocco, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda; India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand; Cyprus, European Community, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden; Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Peru; Egypt and Oman; Canada and the United States of America; Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall Islands and Samoa.
[38] Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria; Lithuania and Turkey; Honduras, Nicaragua and St Lucia; Jordan and Sudan; Nauru and Tonga.
[39] CopeMed, an FAO-executed regional project in support of GFCM, stands for "Advice, Technical Support and Establishment of Cooperation Networks to Facilitate Coordination to Support Fisheries Management in the Western and Central Mediterranean". The project was initiated in 1996.
[40] Spain, Morocco, France, Malta, Tunisia, Libya.
[41] Including type of vessel, gear, GRT, previous name, flag of the vessel, name and address of the owner and operator.
[42] The Report of the fourth session of the SAC, 2001, FAO Fisheries Report No. 653, refers to work being done to polish the definition of Operational Units, and the fact that many countries had yet to submit Operational Units Data. The issue of Management Units was addressed, and the collection of data with reference to a statistical geographic pattern. The twenty-sixth session of the GFCM agreed on a temporary delimitation of the Management Units that were re-named "Geographical Sub-Areas".
[43] At the fifth session of the SAC, 2002, FAO Fisheries Report No.684.
[44] At the twenty-seventh session in 2002.
[45] A/Res/57/141, 2003. Oceans and Law of the Sea.
[46] A/Res/57/142, 2003. Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing, unauthorized fishing in zones of national jurisdiction and on the high seas/illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, fisheries by-catch and discards, and other developments.
[47] FAO Fisheries Department. Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries. No. 9. Rome, FAO. 2002. 122p.
[48] For extensive discussion on actions taken by RFMOs to address IUU fishing and related matters, see Swan, J., "The Role of National Fisheries Administrations and Regional Fishery Bodies in Adopting and Implementing Measures to Combat IUU Fishing", prepared for the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing organized by the Government of Australia in Cooperation with FAO, Sydney, Australia, 15-19 May 2000.
[49] Paragraph 23.
[50] Paragraphs 34-41.
[51] Paragraph 28 of WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted in Doha, 14 November 2001, agreed to negotiations to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies. Paragraph 32 of that Declaration also encouraged the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment to give particular attention in its future work to those situations (including situations involving subsidies to the fisheries sector) in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, the environment and development. Recent decisions of other international organizations, including FAO and OECD, to continue to work on the issue of fisheries subsidies will buttress these efforts within the WTO.
[52] Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Seychelles; Pakistan and Sri Lanka; Estonia and Finland; Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago; Islamic Republic of Iran; Australia, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, New Zealand and Samoa.
[53] Benin, Comoros, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa; Pakistan; Estonia; Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic and Haiti; Islamic Republic of Iran; Australia, Cook Islands, Nauru and Papua New Guinea.
[54] Report of the twenty-fifth session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 24-28 February 2003. CL124/7.
[55] Paragraph 18.
[56] Paragraph 22.

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