The case of SPFS-promoted local multiplication of certified maize and bean seeds illustrates the logic behind this cautious attitude. It also helps to identify the advantages and disadvantages of adopting project promoted on-farm income generation activities more as a form of "low-profile" diversification than as an opportunity to engage in fully-fledged market-oriented farming.
Seed multiplication was introduced in Jocotán in 2001 (in combination with other land husbandry and crop management good practices, including agro-forestry, water harvesting and irrigation, organic fertilization, and soil moisture management), at the beginning of SPFS operations in the area. The aim was to enhance food security in the drought-affected areas by giving local farmers access to high yield and drought-resistant varieties of maize and beans. The plan was to train the owners of irrigated plots in the multiplication of certified variety seeds to be sold at a low (and subsidized) price to neighbors. To this end, after some initial testing, an agreement was made with the Guatemalan Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology (Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnología Agropecuaria, ICTA), for supplying participant farmers with new performing varieties (ICTA B7 maize and ICTA ligero bean) and training them in seed multiplication.
In 2002, the project took-off with hundreds of farmers supplied with the locally reproduced seeds and an estimated increase of maize and bean yields among improved-seed adopters of 30-40%. This stimulated local demand for the new seeds. Individual farmers and groups, retail sellers and institutions approached SPFS to get these ICTA B7 and ICTA Ligero seeds which performed as well as the most expensive brand hybrids, but can be purchased at half price and used for two or three generations[19]. To meet this demand, seed producers joined in a pre-cooperative association (ASEJO, Asociación de Semilleristas de Jocotán) and, with the support of SPFS, intensified dry-season seed production in their irrigated land plots. This proved very effective. According to SPFS sources[20], by the end of 2003, the 30 trained seed producers from Jocotán had made a total of 27 tons of maize and bean seeds available to institutions and private purchasers, which benefited 4,000 campesino families. Profit for producers was estimated by the same source as 100%.
SPFS decided, at the beginning of 2004, to completely hand over the business to ASEJO. Technical assistance and subsidies to seed producers were replaced by the transfer to the association of start-up capital which should allow the purchase of a new stock of first generation ICTA seeds and other inputs. In order to maintain this start-up capital, ASEJO members agreed that seeds and inputs should be borrowed from the Association and paid at harvest time. SPFS also supported the initial steps made by ASEJO for getting the legal status of a farmer cooperative association (ECA, Empresa Campesina Asociativa).
In January 2004, the SPFS ended its assistance to ASEJO, actually handing over the reigns to the Association. However, this left ASEJO dealing with a range of activities in which its members had little or no capacity. These included the management, supervision and marketing of products, as well as monitoring and evaluation and record keeping. In general, the Association lacked key technical and organizational skills for maintaining the successes of the previous year.
ASEJO activities for 2004, and their outcomes, are poorly documented. In interviews, Association members and the SPFS extension staff reported a major loss in maize seed yield caused by the low germination rate of new seeds provided by ICTA[21], and additional losses in bean seeds harvest due to pests and frost.
According to the (very informal) registry kept by the ASEJO president, about 7 metric tons of ICTA B7 maize seeds were sold by May 2004 (beginning of the sowing season), mostly to FAO and other institutions. This figure represents half of ASEJO’s maize seed sales for the same period in 2003. Although there is no documented evidence available, a similar trend was reported for bean seeds.
According to ASEJO members, poor yield, missed gains and in some cases major losses are the root causes of another shock that affected the Association in 2004, the high credit delinquency. This failure to repay was largely the result of disillusionment with the failed germination of the seeds. As this issue was seen as being very sensitive, it was not possible to collect relevant figures from ASEJO registries. However, it was reported that half of the members refused to pay for the spoiled ICTA maize seeds and left the Association. Following the defections, and in order to limit the Association’s 2004 losses and to try to make-up the losses in 2005, the remaining members agreed to sell their yield to the Association at a price significantly lower than that charged by ASEJO to its "institutional" clients[22]. However, not all the interviewed ASEJO members were comfortable with this decision. The new price made the commercialization of the whole seed stock through ASEJO seem less attractive. Many producers sold a significant share of their seeds within the community or entered into in-kind arrangements with their extended families.
As 2004 was a critical year for seed producers, one would expect that the farmers who continued in ASEJO would feel frustrated and discouraged. This was not the case, however, as active members complained of the losses and missed earnings, but did not regard them as a major economic shock. They remained interested in seed multiplication and reasonably confident about the chances of recovering their losses in 2005. In order to fully understand this attitude, it is necessary to examine the role that seed multiplication actually plays in the livelihoods of the ASEJO members.
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[18] Information in this
section was collected through in-depth interviews with project staff and
participants, and a review of relevant written sources. [19] It must be stressed that, unlike improved hybrid seeds available on the market, ICTA seeds belong to genotype varieties that maintain phenotype properties for 3-4 generations. [20] PESA- Guatemala (2004c) "Semilla mejorada para la producción de granos básicos. Producción de semilla de calidad para mejorar la situación alimentaria en el Municipio de Jocotán". [21] Apparently this problem is rather common in artisan seed multiplication. The poor germination rate of certified seeds delivered by national agronomic institutes has been reported to the author by Ian Cherrett (FAO-RLAC) for Honduras and by Gouantoueu Guei (FAO-AGPS) for several African sites. [22] In 2003 ASEJO bought from producers, maize and bean seeds at 270 and 420 Quetzales (per American quintal). These were sold at 300 and 450 Quetzales, respectively, with a profit of 30 Quetzales per quintal (which was meant to cover transaction costs). Following the decision mentioned in the text, purchase prices paid in 2004 were 200 Quetzales/quintal for maize and 300 Quetzales/quintal for bean. Resale prices were kept the same as in 2003. Thus, ASEJOs profit per quintal went up in 2004 to 100 Quetzales for maize and 150 Quetzales for bean. It must be noticed that the 2004 ASEJO purchasing price is the same that producers offer in the aldea (where, however, they do not have to charge for transport, seed treatment and packaging costs). |
