DISCUSSION PAPER 8
DO SECURE ACCESS RIGHTS AND CO-MANAGEMENT GUARANTEE SUSTAINABILITY?
A CASE STUDY OF AUSTRALIA'S NORTHERN FISHERIES

by

Trysh Stone⁷⁴

Summary

Australia's Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF) is often cited as a model of the co-management approach to fisheries. It is characterised by long term access rights guaranteed by law, a comprehensive data program, extensive stock assessments, well informed and extensive stakeholder engagement in all facets of management and a structure that removes politicians from direct decision making.

Adjacent to the Northern Prawn Fishery is the Torres Strait Prawn Fishery (TSPF). It catches the same species and many of the northern prawn fishers also have access to this fishery. Unlike the Northern Prawn, the Torres Strait Prawn Fishery does not have secure access rights, or an effective consultative process. Limited resources have been devoted to research and the limited compliance assets available have been diverted to deal with illegal fishing for other species. All decisions are made by a group of three politicians; one from the federal “conservative” government, one from the State “labour” government and one from the regional indigenous authority.

When comparing the two management environments you would think that the Northern Prawn is likely to produce a superior fisheries management result. Yet until 2004 tiger prawns in the northern prawn fishery were overfished and the stocks in the Torres Strait Prawn Fishery were above target levels.

This paper presents a case study of the arrangements in place in the two fisheries and their effects on the sustainability of the stocks. In particular the paper will look at the effectiveness of participation of stakeholders in the management process, the use of the process to delay decisions and responses when a problem is identified.

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 The Australian fisheries context

Australia is a federation of six sovereign states and two territories. As such Australia has a tiered system of fisheries jurisdiction. Fisheries from three nautical miles from the coastline out to 200 nautical miles are managed by the Australian federal government. Those within the three nautical mile limit are generally managed by the State government.

In cases where it would make sense for a single stock, area or fishing method to be controlled by one agency the Australian government and the States have generally been able to reach an agreement to pass jurisdiction to one party through an Offshore Constitutional Settlement. Such is the case with the Northern Prawn fishery which is managed in whole by the Australian government.

At the federal level there are two different legislative regimes in place for fisheries. Most fisheries are managed under the provisions of the Fisheries Management Act 1991. Fisheries under this Act are managed by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) an independent statutory body on behalf of the government.

The other regime in place is the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984. This Act applies only to the water of the Torres Strait. Fisheries in the Torres Strait are part of a Treaty agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea. On the Australian side these fisheries are managed by the Torres Strait Protected Zone Joint Authority (PZJA) which is a Board made up of the Australian Minister for Fisheries, the Queensland Minister for Fisheries and the Chairperson of the Torres Strait Regional Authority⁷⁵ (TSRA). Instead of establishing a separate organisation the PZJA contracts AFMA and the Queensland Fisheries Service to provide fisheries management delivery on its behalf.

1.2 The AFMA model

In 1989 the Australian government released a new policy for fisheries management -New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries. This policy statement incorporated several new changes to fisheries, in particular:

-   incorporating ESD and economic efficiency as prime objectives for fisheries management;

-   the establishment of property rights in the fisheries;

-   making output controls the preferred method of management;

-   requiring a partnership approach to management; and

-   removing direct decision making powers from politicians and placing them with an expert Statutory Authority.

As part of this fisheries reform the Australian Fisheries Management Authority was created in 1992 operating at arms length from the Minister with decisions being made by an expertise based Board of Directors.

The AFMA model is based on a partnership approach to management in which a wide range of stakeholders are directly engaged in developing and implementing all aspects of fisheries management.

A key feature of this partnership approach is the system of Management Advisory Committees (MACs) who provide management advice and Fisheries Assessment Groups (FAGs) who provide scientific and economic advice. These groups are made up of fishers, managers, scientists, economists, environmental representations and representatives of other key stakeholder groups (e.g. recreational fishers).

To ensure the integrity of the scientific advice presented, FAGs and MACs provide their advice to the Board separately. This helps ensure that scientific advice is not “filtered” through the management process.

1.3 AFMA's legislative objectives

AFMA legislation requires that it pursues five key objectives in its management of Australia's fisheries resources:

1. implementing efficient and cost effective fisheries management;
2. ensuring the exploitation of fisheries resources and the carrying on of any related activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the principles of ESD and the exercise of the precautionary principle, in particular the need to have regard for the impact of fishing on non-target species and the marine environment;
3. maximising economic efficiency in the exploitation of fisheries resources;
4. ensuring accountability to the fishing industry and the Australian community; and
5. achieving government targets in relation to the recovery of costs.

The objectives are not in any priority order and each one must be balanced in achieving outcomes.

Figure 1. Map of the Northern Prawn and Torres Strait Prawn Fisheries

2. THE NORTHERN PRAWN FISHERY

2.1 Overview

With an average annual value of about US$70 million, the Northern Prawn Fishery is one of Australia's most valuable fisheries and the most valuable managed by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). The average annual catch is about 8 000 tonnes taken by 96 otter trawlers. Over 90 percent of the product from the fishery is exported.

Geographically the fishery is very large. It extends from the low water mark to the edge of the Australian Fishing Zone along approximately 6 000 km of coast line between Cape York in the east to Cape Londonderry in the west. It occupies approximately 771 000 square km of waters in some of the remotest areas of Australia (Figure 1). There is little infrastructure and few roads. Besides Darwin there are only two towns of any significant size in the area of the fishery. These are Karumba and Weipa which both have a population of less than 2 500 people. Much of the coast line of the fishery is Aboriginal land and contains Sacred Sites thus landings are restricted.

To allow boats to stay on the fishing grounds for the whole fishing season they are supported by a system of independent carrier boats or “motherships”. The motherships transport the catch to port and reprovision the boats.

While up to nine species of prawns are taken commercially, fishing focuses on four species: white banana (Penaeus merguiensis), Indian banana (Penaeus indicus), brown tiger (Penaeus esculentus), and grooved tiger (Penaeus semisulcatus). Other species taken include giant tiger (Penaeus monodon), blue endeavour (Metapenaeus endeavour), red endeavour (Metapenaeus ensis), western king (Penaeus latisulcatus) and red spot king (Penaeus longistylus).

Banana prawns have a very high natural variability and hence catches fluctuate dramatically (from 2 000 to 12 000 tonnes). They are targeted for a short period of time in April and into May. They form dense aggregations known as “boils” because of the way that they disturb the mud and discolour the water. Fishermen use spotter planes to locate boils and guide the boats. Shot time is about 15 minutes.

Conversely, tiger prawn fishing relies on using a small “try” net to identify concentrations of prawns and then pattern trawling with shot times of about three-four hours.

While banana prawns make up most of the catch, tiger prawns are really the focus of the fishery. Not only is most of the fishing year spent targeting tiger prawns but they are the more valuable on Asian markets because their superior size and tiger like stripes make them pleasing to the eye. The fishery for tiger prawns is the focus of this paper.

2.2 Management arrangements

A Statutory Management Plan is in place for the NPF which spells out both the fishery objectives and the management “tool box”⁷⁶. Objectives in the plan are very broad and have been operationalised through preparing a five year strategic plan for the fishery.

Under the Management Plan fishers have been granted Statutory Fishing Rights which are secure long term access rights which have been recognised as a form of property. All Statutory Fishing Rights in the fishery are fully transferable and may be bought, sold or leased.

The principal control on effort is through limits on fishing gear, with each Statutory Fishing Right representing one share of the total allowable gear pool. In addition fishing time is limited to less than 5 months and a series of large area closures are in place which protect particularly sensitive areas such as seagrass beds and juvenile habitats covering about 8 percent of the total area of the fishery (Anon 2003).

To protect by-catch species and important charismatic mega-fauna the use of turtle excluder devices and by-catch reduction devices are mandatory throughout the fishery. A series of by-catch limits apply on a number of important species.

2.3 Consultation mechanisms

AFMA's management philosophy of a partnership approach means that cooperation with relevant stakeholders, such as the fishing industry, government agencies, the environmental community and others with an interest in the resource, is a vital part of management.

Stakeholders are involved in all aspects of management, science, compliance and planning through a series of committees. All aspects of management are first discussed with the Northern Prawn Management Advisory Committee (NORMAC) and its sub-committees before it is passed to the Board for decision. Figure 2 shows the structure of the consultative mechanisms. Industry is in the majority on each committee other than the Northern Prawn Fishery Assessment Group (NPFAG).

As part of the extension program for the fishery there is an annual briefing session for vessel skippers (who are generally not the owners of the Statutory Fishing Rights). Recently training course for members of the crew have been implemented to provide them with a broad understanding of why different rules are in place in the fishery (with the aim of improving compliance) and to try to improve environmental practises (e.g. training in handling sea snakes). This program has proved a success with over 50 percent attendance.

The use of sub-committees in the process not only allows detailed consideration of issues but as the membership is drawn from outside the NORMAC and NPFAG; it allows a broader participation in the process.

There is also a broader process of consultation. Periodically NORMAC holds a well attended industry workshop. The workshop format includes a number of presentations by scientists, managers and fishers and then discussion both in small groups in open plenary. The workshops have covered a wide range of areas usually on a topical issue. Workshop topics have included stock assessment concepts including the opportunity to “play” with simulation models and fish behaviour and by-catch reduction.

It is also worth mentioning that industry take an active role in the science on the fishery. This not only includes participation in determining research priorities and participating in the stock assessment but also in funding and carrying out research. Of particular note is a program of crew based observation. About 15 percent of the vessels in the fishery have volunteered⁷⁷ and been trained to collect detailed biological information each day and collect samples. Many will believe that industry collection of this type of data is open to manipulation, but previous programs in the fishery have shown that this data is just as reliable as that collected by scientists placed on board commercial boats (Robins 2002).

An assessment of how the fishery rates against the “paths to solutions” identified at the Mauritius meeting is included in Appendix 1.

Figure 2. The Consultation model for the Northern Prawn Fishery

2.4 Why did stocks become over-exploited?

The reason that the tiger prawn stocks in the northern prawn fishery became severely overfished is simple; while the message was clear that effort needed to reduce, it took six years to make decisions and put in place measures to achieve a reduction. To appreciate how this occurred some history is needed.

The NPF has had a long history of considerable scientific investment (at least on an Australian scale). During the 1980's there were problems with both biological and economic overfishing. These were addressed principally by a series of “buybacks” aimed at removing fishers out of the fishery using both government and industry funds. These buybacks were largely unsuccessful (Meany, 1993) and resulted in a compulsory acquisition of 30.76 percent of the units of capacity attached to each licence in early 1993. A full account of this period and the industry and government responses to the scientific advice can be found in Dichmont (in press).

There were two major outcomes of this compulsory surrender that it is useful for readers to understand. The first is that both industry and managers agreed that the management system had to be changed (an explanation can be found at Appendix 2). Consequently in 1993 NORMAC and AFMA embarked on a process of consultation about a new management system. This process of consultation dominated management discussions until the current “gear unit” system was eventually put in place, in July 2000.

The second is that the acquisition resulted in a 25 percent decrease in the number of boats in the fishery. With the consequent reduction in effort both the managers and industry believed that the fishery had turned the corner and an air of optimism prevailed. This resulted in the removal of a number of other restrictions on fishing effort which were considered an impediment to economic efficiency and no long necessary to contain effort.

The optimism was short lived. Late in 1993 CSIRO started to express some “concerns” about the expected recovery of tiger prawn stocks and about the high rate of fishing power increase in the fishery (CSIRO, 1993). These concerns were repeated at the NORMAC meetings in 1995 and 1996 (Anon, 1995 and 1996). With most attention focused on discussions about a new system of management for the fishery, a “wait and see” attitude prevailed.

By November 1996 there was general agreement in the industry and unanimous agreement at NORMAC that the system of management should change to a system based on tradable gear units. However at the beginning of 1997 things started to change.

Firstly tiger prawn stocks were officially declared “over-fished”. Also at that time discussion on gear based management turned from the concept to the specifics. Once discussion of how the transition from one system to another would be handled, and most importantly the formulae for allocation, any consensus quickly vanished. Each operator started to calculate what they would be likely to receive as an allocation under the scenario proposed. Those who considered that they would be disadvantaged in the subsequent allocation began to vehemently oppose the change.

This group, composed of smaller SFR holders, also disputed the stock assessment, they disputed that fishing power was increasing and believed that changes in the CPUE were largely attributable to either environmental factors, predation or the fleet had been reduced to too small a size to effectively work all of the prawn grounds (Cartwright, 2003). It is also likely that this group of operators believed that reductions for stock purposes on top of the reduction in the transition to the new management system would be difficult for them to adjust to. Unlike the fleet based operators their choices for adjustment were limited to buy/lease more SFRs or leave the fishery. This marked the beginning of a lengthy process of obfuscation and delay.

In 1998 NPFAG advised that an immediate 35 percent reduction in effort on tiger prawns was required. In response a three week closure, which was estimated to reduce fishing effort by 15 percent was implemented. Major effort reductions continued to be put off until the “holy grail” of gear based management was implemented.

The advice of the Fishery Assessment Group continued to become stronger and more urgent, particularly in light of continuing fishing power increases. As the advice became stronger so did the criticism of the stock assessment by members of industry. At each turn objections were raised and further research was sought. The key developments in the stock status and management responses are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1. Key developments in the northern prawn fishery

Source: Anon 1994 –2001; NPFAG 1996; NPFAG 1999; NPFAG 2001; NPFAG2004; Taylor undated; Taylor 1997; Taylor 1999.

2.5 Where did management fail?

It wasn't as if AFMA didn't try many ways to seek a resolution to the issues. There were endless meetings and workshops (more than 20), over a dozen consultation papers and other opportunities for seeking public views, letters from the Minister and the Chair of the Board urging NORMAC for unanimous recommendations and even the employment of a professional mediator to assist industry in coming to a united view.

While the lack of agreement continued, most decisions could be avoided and those that were reached were to be implemented at some time in the future despite the continued advice from NPFAG that “significant and urgent efforts” were needed to rebuild stocks. Eventually in 1999 the Board decided that there was no possible solution other than to proceed with the introduction of gear based management without the support of some sectors of industry. The introduction of the new system included an estimated 15 percent decrease in the amount of net used in the fishery, which could be expected to give about a four percent decrease in effort (Venables, 2003).

At this point in time NPFAG still considered the stocks to be over exploited. Table 2 shows the amount of each stock compared to targets and NPFAG's suggested reduction.

Table 2. Status of each tiger prawn stock at the end of 1999

Source: (NPFAG, 2000)

Why did the management authority allow this lengthy period of inaction? The legislative mandate of AFMA requires it to “ensure that the exploitation of fisheries resources…is consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development and the exercise of the precautionary principle…”. However it allowed one of its most valuable fisheries to be become, and continue to be, over-fished on its watch.

In looking at the causes it is important to understand that managers were strongly committed to bringing the new gear based management into being, a process which had started in 1993. A goal that always seemed around the corner. The industry members who supported the stock assessment advice also strongly supported gear based management, those that believed the assessment flawed vehemently opposed the new system of management. This set up a situation where the introduction of a new system of management and the action that needed to be taken to reduce fishing effort became inextricably linked, one could not be progressed without the other.

One of the major motivations behind considering new management arrangements was the “blunt nature” of the system in place at the time and its inflexible nature when adjustment was needed. There were concerns both within industry and within AFMA of how well such reductions could be implemented under the inflexible management system that was in place at the time. With the introduction of gear based management seeming only to be a short time away (little did they suspect it would take another 3 years to implement) a delay in action to address tiger prawn status seemed a fair compromise for progressing gear based management.

In addition to the controversy the fact that management objectives for the fishery were vague did not assist in the discussions. The lack of a definitive trigger point, decision rules and specific performance targets provided another area for endless discussion.

However, most importantly was the lack of will on the part of the agency to make a decision without unanimous NORMAC support. While AFMA's legislation requires it to ensure accountability to the fishing industry and the community for its management decisions it does not require it to only act with the complete consensus of industry.

The reason for the lack of will to act may possibly be understood by looking at why the agency was created. AFMA was set up in 1992 in response to industry criticisms about fisheries management. Industry distrusted assessments and lack of involvement in the process of fishery management and the previous agency (the Australian Fisheries Service) was seen to be unable to resolve user group conflicts (McColl, 1996). A key tenet of the new organisation was a “partnership approach” centred around the use of MAC's and FAG's both with substantial industry membership to provide advice to an expertise based Board who were ultimately vested with the decision making powers. The organisation was heavily invested in making the MAC system work and every opportunity to achieve a consensus view from the MAC was pursued. This allowed those who disagreed to use their position in the MAC to delay or soften management action.

Add to this heavy political lobbying on this issue by both sectors of industry (something which was a rarity in the federal fishery management sphere at the time) and the agency was put in a difficult situation. A decision either way would result in heavy criticism and the partnership approach may be seen to be failing in just the situation it was set up to avoid.

2.6 How were decisions eventually reached?

In 2002 one of the largest ever reductions of real effort in Australian fisheries was negotiated through a unanimous agreement of NORMAC in a single meeting. The reduction, which achieved a 40 percent reduction in effort on brown tiger prawns and a 25 percent reduction in effort on grooved tiger prawns was the result of three changes.

1. Gear based management was in place. This broke the nexus between the issues allowing effort reduction to be considered only on the basis of biological need rather than as a part of a new system of management. It also meant that industry had more flexibility to adapt to the new system of management which removed some of the trepidation.

2. A meaningful recovery target for the fishery had been agreed. This removed the debate about the quantum of reduction needed.

3. There was the political will to make a decision.

This new political will was evidenced to fishers in two ways. Firstly, there was a new Minister responsible for fisheries, the Hon. Wilson “Iron Bar ” Tuckey. He called the industry and their political representatives together and told them that he supported the science and wanted a decision made on reduction of effort in the fishery. He told them that he would brook no political interference in the matter (he wasn't called Iron Bar for nothing) effectively cutting off the opportunity for political lobbying.

The second was that the new Chair of the AFMA Board attended the NORMAC meeting and told them that if it could not come up with a recommendation to reduce effort in the fishery that the Board would make its own decisions. Industry was in no doubt that this solution would be more draconian than anything they could come up with themselves.

Add to this an independent review of the assessment which removed all opportunity to criticise the assessment. After a three-day meeting, a unanimous agreement was put forward to implement a 25 percent reduction in the value of gear units in the fishery and reduce the fishing season by 13 percent.

This reduction, combined with a few years of higher than average recruitment has resulted in both species of tiger prawn being rebuilt and no longer being classed as overfished (NPFAG, 2004).

3. THE STORY REPEATS ITSELF

Unfortunately, delays in taking necessary management action in the NPF are not an isolated experience. Similar stories can be told about a number of other fisheries managed by AFMA where stakeholders have used their role in the management partnership to delay or moderate actions that are needed.

Lack et al (2003) have documented the decline of the Australian Orange Roughy Fishery. Despite warnings from 1994 that there was a potential problem, the TAC for the fishery was not reduced until 2000, and then only at a rate of 10 percent annually. Subsequently the TAC has been reduced by 50 percent. Lack et al attribute this lack of action, in part, to the inclusive approach to management which provided the fishing industry with the opportunity to defer or soften management decisions.

A similar story can also be told for the Southern Shark Fishery. Concerns were expressed about severe over-fishing of school shark from 1991. This was initially met with a one-third reduction in net allowances. This was insufficient to address the situation and Shark FAG continued to advise that the current level of effort was continuing to deplete stocks which were estimated to be between 15–25 percent of virgin levels. Industry opposed the stock assessment at every turn and further work and an independent review was commissioned. Despite largely accepting the stock assessment and a rebuilding target for the fishery at the end of 1996 there was a protracted debate about how the necessary reductions should be achieved. Each option proposed was opposed by industry. Again the process dragged on attempting to find compromise until 2000, when the Board decided in the face of industry opposition to implement quotas to the Southern Shark Fishery and substantially reduce school shark TACs (Sachse 2003). However the latest advice (BRS 2003) is that at the current level of TAC the stock cannot be rebuilt by the target date of 2011.

In the East Coast Tuna fishery the debate over the management plan for the fishery has raged since 1992. While some progress has been made on individual issues (such as seabird protection measures) industry has strongly opposed every management measure that is likely to cap effort. The draft Plan of Management is currently has under-going an unprecedented third public consultation process. It is unlikely that the Plan of Management could be implemented before 2006.

Table 3 provides a short summation of the domestically managed fisheries, which have been classed as overfished by the Bureau of Rural Science, when advice was first given that there were stock issues and when effective reductions were put in place. The Bass Strait Scallop fishery and the Eastern Gemfish fisheries have not been included. These species have been over-exploited since the 1980's and are therefore not relevant to the issues at hand.

Table 3. Overfished species, management advice and action dates

Sources: Lack 2003, BRS 1994, BRS 1998, BRS 1999, BRS 2000, BRS 2001, BRS 2003, Sachse 2004

4. TORRES STRAIT PRAWN FISHERY

4.1 Overview of the Torres Strait Prawn Fishery

With an average annual value of about US$19 million the Torres Strait Prawn Fishery is much smaller than its valuable neighbour. The fishery produces an average annual catch of 1 700 tonnes taken with 76 otter trawlers. However few vessels fish exclusively in the Torres Strait and 17 of the boats also fish in the NPF (Anon 2004).

The fishery is restricted to a relatively small area of the TSPZ (approximately 8 000 square km or 20 percent of the area of the TSPZ). These fishing grounds are bounded to the west by the Warrior Reef complex, the east by the reefs surrounding Darnley Island, the north by the border of the TSPZ and the south by the border of the ‘outside but near’area. The main fishing ground is to the east of the Warrior Reef complex with a focus around Yorke Islands (figure 3).

Figure 3. Location of the TSPF and trawl closure areas

To allow boats to stay on the fishing grounds for the whole fishing season they are supported by a system of independent carrier boats or “motherships”. The motherships transport the catch to port and reprovision the boats.

The majority of the catch is made up of brown tiger and blue endeavour prawn prawns. Because of the absence of major river systems banana prawns are not found in the Torres Strait.

4.2 The Torres Strait and the Treaty with Papua New Guineas (PNG)

Torres Strait Islanders are a unique group of indigenous people within Australia. They are island people with a strong cultural connection to the sea and a dependence on it for their survival. Much of their custom and tradition have survived European settlement (HRSCATSIA, 1997).

The northern islands of the Torres Strait are within five kilometres of the PNG mainland and there has always been interaction between the people of the Torres Strait and those of PNG.

In 1985 Australia and PNG ratified the Torres Strait Treaty. While the Treaty establishes the international border and the sharing of fisheries resources between PNG and Australia its principal purpose is to “…acknowledge and protect the traditional way of life and livelihood of the traditional inhabitants including their traditional fishing…”. The Treaty and the Torres Strait fisheries act provide stronger acknowledgment of traditional fishing rights that have currently been granted to other indigenous people in Australia.

To give effect to the provisions of the Treaty three prawn fishing licence shave been set aside of Islanders. However, because of economic and social⁷⁸ issues the licences have never been activated.

In the 1990's an important part of Australian history was initiated in the Torres Strait by Eddie Mabo. Mabo successfully challenged the principal of Terra Nullius that had existed, and established traditional ownership and indigenous land rights. There is currently a claim for large areas of the sea in the Torres Strait before the courts.

The Treaty also provides for each party to access the other waters. Under the Treaty each party is entitled to 25 percent⁷⁹ of the allowable catch in the other's side of the Protected Zone. To give effect to this provision there is a bilateral agreement which allows seven PNG vessels access to Australian waters for prawn fishing. There has a small amount of fishing on these licences.

4.3 Management Arrangements

There is no statutory management plan in place for this fishery. The fishery is managed through a series of notices and conditions placed on annual licences. Licences and their conditions are granted at the discretion of the PZJA. They can be revoked or varied at any time.

The main management tool is a form of individual transferable effort units. Each fishing operator is allocated a number of days of fishing time on their licence. The days are tradable but there are restrictions and forfeiture provisions. These provisions have seen very limited adjustment in the fishery.

In addition, fishing gear is limited with a maximum headline length applying to nets and a series of large area closures in place, which protect particularly sensitive areas such as seagrass beds and juvenile habitats.

To protect by-catch species and important charismatic mega-fauna the use of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) and By-catch Reduction Devices (BRDs) are mandatory throughout the fishery. A series of by-catch limits also apply on a number of important species.

4.4 Consultation mechanisms

The consultative structure in place for the fishery has provided an opportunity for a range of stakeholders, in particular the fishing industry, to provide input to the PZJA decision making process. In 2002 the PZJA established a new consultative structure of advisory bodies which allows for greater participation from Islander representatives at all levels of the consultative process. Islander representatives, together with industry and government representatives, now actively participate in the development of management arrangements (Figure 4).

The Prawn Working Group (PWG) provides much the same role as a MAC in the AFMA consultative structure the key difference being that there are no environmental members on the committee. Also the absence of a suite of sub-committee to deal with specific issues limits detail consideration of these issues and limits discussion to the membership of the PWG.

There is only a single Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) for all of the twelve Torres Strait Fisheries. Industry and Islander membership is restricted to two and three representatives respectively. This means that the group is not able to deal in detail with issues affecting the prawn fishery or to provide stakeholders with the same opportunity for input into the assessments. To try to resolve this gap some open stock assessment meetings have been held, but without a core group of people and the ability to undertake inter-sessional dialogue the process has not been as successful as a formal Fisheries Assessment Group (FAG) could be.

Figure 4. The consultative structure for Torres Strait Prawn

Advice from the PWG was passed through the TSFMAC where a wider group have an opportunity to review advice TSFMAC makes recommendations to the PZJA. Until 2002 PZJA meetings were closed and only Ministers and officials attended meetings. Meetings are now public meetings and a wide range of industry and islanders attend and take the opportunity of providing their views directly to the members of the PZJA.

4.5 Why has the TS prawn fishery survived?

There are three factors which has kept effort in check in the fishery:

1. the failure of PNG and TSI to take up their entitlements;

2. the economic considerations: catch rates drop off severely towards the end of the season and all boats have access to other fisheries; and

3. the number of boats was cut back early before they started fishing there.

For the early part of the fishery the first two of these factors, together with a closure of the important nursery grounds, were enough to sustain the fishery. However, in the late 1980's the scene for prawn fishing in Australia was changing.

In the early 1980's Australia had decided to support its ailing ship building businesses by providing a ship building bounty. For each boat built in Australia over 23 metres the Federal government met 25 percent of all the costs of construction. Combined with other tax advantages it became an attractive proposition for NPF operators to build a new boat rather than spend money maintaining and upgrading older vessels. However, these older boats were then sold off or redeployed into other fisheries, in particular the Queensland East Coast fishery, which was an open access fishery at that time. This fishery clearly could not withstand the increased fishing effort. Several boats also entered the Torres Strait fishery.

In December 1985 entry was limited in the Queensland fishery and a program was set up to reduce the number of boats. This was achieved by encouraging operators to amalgamate multiple smaller boat licences into a single licence for a larger vessel. This program was very successful and resulted in a dramatic decrease in the number of licences and vessels (Glaister, 1993). However, once again a number of serviceable small trawlers were becoming available and were looking for new fishing opportunities.

At the same time the NPF embarked on the first of its buyback schemes. This scheme was aimed at removing boats from the fishery to decrease fishing pressure on stocks and increase returns to those who remained in the fishery. Again this resulted in a number of serviceable boats who had been paid handsomely by the government to exit one fishery to seek other fisheries for their boats.

The easiest target was the adjacent Torres Prawn Fishery. While the entry to the fishery had been limited early in 1985 the criteria for access was so broad that 500 boats had licences and a further 500 more remained eligible to obtain a licence (Anon, 1987). However, only 130 of these boats had ever fished in the fishery.

At that time the fishery was considered to be fully exploited and increases in effort where not acceptable either biologically or economically. Seeing the potential for large increases in effort to occur quickly the Ministers acted decisively. Without any consultation they implemented new eligibility criteria designed to reduce the number of boats to those who had actively fished and were economically dependent on the fishery.

Clearly, a consultation process which would have involved those with a deliberate interest in holding the door open for themselves to gain access to the fishery would have taken time, enough time in fact to allow new entrants to the fishery. While the ability to impose retrospective access rules applies so does a system of appeal on the grounds of individual circumstances. At that time review bodies were generous in their treatment of those who had joined fisheries late.

Since the 1990's a more inclusive and consultative approach to management has been adopted in the Torres Strait. This has resulted in some of the same difficulties that have been experienced in other fisheries.

In 2002 a new stock assessment was developed for the brown tiger prawn stocks in the TSPF. The assessment advised that the level of effort was too high and unless it was reduced the brown tiger prawn stock would become over-exploited. This advice was opposed by industry. As a compromise position managers agreed to commission an independent review of the science by a person agreeable to both sides. The process to agree on a person to undertake the review took more than six months.

During this period PNG and Torres Strait Islanders signalled that they intended to take up their access to the fishery in the near future adding further momentum to the need to reduce the effort in the non-islander commercial sector.

The review was completed in October 2003. It indicated that the conclusions of the assessment were sound but some suggestions were made for improvement (Die, 2003). A majority of these improvements have now been completed and the advice is largely unchanged: a reduction in effort is needed to ensure that the fishery does not become overfished (Turnball, 2004).

PWG have met to consider the issue three times and no compromise agreement has been able to be reached. The PZJA had proposed a system of progressive reductions in the fishery over a period of 4 years and had intended to make a decision on effort levels in the fishery at a meeting in January 2004 but a series of elections prevented the meetings from going ahead.

Industry has been lobbying federal politicians seeking a government funded buyback scheme to at least in part meet the needed reductions. Industry have put forward the view that the entitlements of Islanders and PNG have never properly been allocated and therefore, the government should purchase existing licences to cover the activities of these groups.

There is a divergence of views as to the nature of the access rights in the fishery. Industry believes that they are secure and can not be altered or varied without due compensation. However, legal advice is that the annual licences are granted at the pleasure of the PZJA and they have the power to revoke, alter or refuse to renew licences and without any need for compensation (Menham, 2002).

Federal government agencies are currently investigating a scheme to remove Islander and PNG entitlements in return for some compensation. This would require a renegotiation of the Treaty between Australia and PNG. Until the investigations have been completed the government has decided that no further action should be taken to reduce effort by non-indigenous commercial fishers in the TSPF. It is therefore unlikely any reductions in effort will be made in the fishery until 2006. Current advice is that the fishery will be classed as over-fished in 2005 (O'Neill 2004).

5. CONCLUSION

The northern prawn fishery has long been held up as a paragon of a well managed fishery and in many ways it is. However, getting all the best practice processes in place does not guarantee good fisheries management results. Likewise a sustainably managed fishery does not indicate that the decision making framework is right. There could be as much good luck as good management.

The essential element of any management framework is the will and courage to make decisions when advice is provided, even in the face of considerable opposition.

Of course the involvement of stakeholders in fisheries management process is important and acts to ensure that in most cases rational, practical outcomes are achieved but it does not come without its costs and risks. The process is open to being used to reduce impacts on industry or delay decisions. This is particularly so when the decisions being taken involve, the allocation of access rights or a reduction of access.

Co-management systems can work, and work well, but it is important that the system is set up correctly. The co-management body must be given clear objectives, boundaries and performance indicators and trusted to act responsibly within those. It must also be in no doubt that if it fails to act within these guidelines that the responsible agency will act swiftly.

APPENDIX 1

Comparison of the fisheries against the “paths to solution” from the Mauritius meeting

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⁷⁴ The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author Trysh Stone, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Canberra, Australia, [email protected].

⁷⁵ An indigenous regional representative body.

⁷⁶ Plan outlines what measures can be taken and provides the scope for AFMA to make “Directions” and “Determinations” which set the actual quantum (e.g. season dates) in a timely manner. The plan includes mechanisms to ensure that AFMA undertakes consultation before deciding on changes and provides sufficient notice of changes.

⁷⁷ There is no payment to those involved in the program but the annual training and briefing course is held somewhere “attractive” as a reward.

⁷⁸ There have been difficulties in islanders reaching agreement on how these licences should be allocated amongst themselves.

⁷⁹ There are some small areas where the provision is for 50/50 sharing.

⁸⁰ House of Representative Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs