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FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME |
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A FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission visited Timor-Leste from 17 March to 8 April 2007 to review and analyze the food supply and demand situation in the context of the country’s macro-economic situation, and to forecast import requirements in the light of potential food needs in marketing year 2007/08 (April/March), with particular attention to the needs of the most vulnerable groups. The team also carried out general analysis regarding food security policy in the country, as a rice crisis had just erupted; this provided lessons on what not to do in similar future circumstances. Emphasis was placed on the appropriate institutional set-up needed to achieve consistency in food security, as well as sustainable development over the longer term, especially through a rehabilitation of the agriculture sector.
The mission carried out a field survey in several districts (Manatuto, Lautem, Baucau, Oecussi, Bobonaro and Ermera), with WFP visiting the districts of Viqueque, Liquiça, and Manufahi. The situation in the other districts was assessed through interviews with agents of the Ministries, traders, and other sources. A specific survey was made to assess the extent of the locust outbreak in the districts of Bobonaro and Ermera and the risk of its subsequent propagation to other districts as migratory swarms already had started to form. An evaluation of the impact of the infestation on crops, especially maize and rice, in these two districts – among the few that can be labelled as surplus districts –, was carried out, and an emergency action plan was prepared to halt the propagation of the locusts. Damage to crops is currently estimated at 500 tonnes of rice and 4 000 tonnes of maize.
The timing of the mission was scheduled for a normal harvest time starting in March and peaking in April. Due to a delay in the onset of rains, and drought during the flowering stage, the mission observed reduced crops, and a reduced planted acreage of rice.
The majority of rural households are subsistence farmers who practice inter-cropping of maize and cassava and other tubers or legumes, often in scattered locations. Hence, the transition to a market-based agricultural system is likely to prove difficult in the coming years, with such difficulty further compounded by the isolation of remote areas, very poor extension services offered to producers, and limited access to private sector services. There is also very scant investment in up-and crops. Assistance to the rehabilitation of irrigation systems currently lacks planning, a weakness that is exemplified by the low provision for maintenance usually reported. Rehabilitation is also insufficiently based on community participation, a fact that may strengthen, or at least leave unchanged, an attitude of passivity inherited from the colonial and Indonesian eras. Poor post-harvest practices, particularly in rice, are a major constraint to raising the competitiveness of domestic agricultural production. This limits local procurement of food aid and the constitution of food reserves from domestic supply, which is currently minimal. In rice, poor drying contributes a high proportion of broken grains during milling, a defect of domestic rice often reported by consumers and traders. This is partly due to lack of labour and adequate threshing and drying facilities. Another major weakness of post harvest activities is the lack of adequate storage equipments and know-how, and the resulting high loss rate for grains. Effective policy measures are needed to promote the development of domestic agriculture to draw closer to self-sufficiency in staples and other food products and hence, improved food security.
Rice growers often are more specialized in this crop, which may weaken their food security to the extent that they cannot resort to other crops as a coping mechanism in case of rice shortfall. Rainfall and its distribution over time is a major limiting factor to yields and output. Generally speaking, this small country is very fragmented in terms of terrain and rainfall conditions, with sometimes an abundant crop in one location and a drastic shortfall in production only a short distance away. This complicates the assessment of overall production, also in view of unreliable data on agricultural production. In the Southern part of the country, a second crop of rice and maize can be grown, whereas in the Northern part, this is not possible, excepted on irrigated areas.
Overall agricultural performance in 2007 was poor. Total production of maize, rice and cassava (in cereal equivalent) is forecast at 123 469 tonnes, a decline of 25-30 percent compared to the average over the last few years, due to late onset of rains, lack of maize seeds and other inputs and generally unfavourable, erratic, rainfall. Assistance in providing seeds, particularly for maize, is therefore urgently needed. The drought occurred at the beginning of the season, adversely affecting maize. Farmers delayed rice planting until adequate water became available, but also reduced planted acreage.
Cassava production in 2007 is projected to decline slightly compared to the average level, causing a rise in the price of this tuber, as effective demand switched from expensive rice to tubers.
As a result of the lower overall production, cereal import requirements for the marketing year 2007/08 are estimated at 86 364 tonnes. Projected needs for food aid by WFP in rice total some 15 000 tonnes, government imports for the constitution of strategic reserves and for subsidized sales is expected at 16 000 tonnes which will be brought through private traders or government-to-government agreements. The rest of the rice import requirement of some 49 000 tonnes is expected to be met by private commercial importers. Due to methodological difficulties, the contribution beans, bananas and other products is not taken into account in the calculation of the country’s overall food balance. These products often play an important part in nutrition both quantitatively – in terms of calorie intake – and qualitatively – due to the important nutrients that they bring to the diet. This, however, should not substantially change the stark picture of food security in the country in the coming year.
Food security in Timor-Leste is a key component of national security at large since only 36 percent of households are considered food secure, and global chronic malnutrition affects 47 percent of the population countrywide. Household food security is highly heterogeneous across districts, despite the fact that food insecurity is generally more pronounced in rural upland areas, where subsistence farmers are not able to engage in other activities. Food insecurity is positively correlated with the lean season, since the depletion of the vulnerable households' stocks is then particularly rapid. It is worth noting that this depletion of stocks added to the contraction of output is occurring after two years of reduced crops. Together with flaws in food security policy, these factors can help explain why stocks were very scarce at the beginning of the recent rice crisis, and why the disruptions thus caused were so deep.
Food security also continues to be hampered by (1) limited market access, with villages being on average 20 miles away from the nearest market, (2) lack of effective demand by subsistence farmers in rural areas and impoverished city dwellers, Dili in particular, (3) very high post-harvest losses, (4) shortages of secure on-farm storage capacity, as well as (5) absence of policies to promote domestic production in the face of strong international competition, especially for rice.
Vulnerability analysis indicates that the total number of persons in prioritized districts in need of food assistance is 210 000-220 000 countrywide. It is worth noting that while most IDPs receive food aid, only a small proportion of subsistence farmers benefit from it. In addition to this, households up-country often accommodate IDPs from the cities, mainly Dili, a situation which further strains their already stressed resources. A better targeting of the needy and commensurate allocation of food aid may help in addressing the tensions created by what is often perceived as an unfair treatment by some population groups.
School-feeding (now called Food for Education) is an efficient tool to build up food security as it combines many advantages: (1) child under- and malnutrition problems are directly addressed, with all subsequent benefits when they grow, (2) it is an incentive to attend school, hence is conducive to sustainable development and (3) takes off a burden from their parents’ shoulders both in terms of time to prepare food and, obviously helps provide sufficient food for the children. Mother and Child Health programmes (MCH) are also needed to safeguard pregnant women and children from deterioration of nutrition situation.
Timor-Leste is a small mountainous country occupying the eastern half of an island (plus the enclave of Oecussi in the western half, which is Indonesian territory). Its insularity contributes heavily to the economic problems faced by the youngest nation in the world, whose independence took place in 1999 under dramatic conditions.
In 1999, after Timorese electors overwhelmingly voted in favour of independence, violence erupted throughout the country, causing the displacement of more than the three quarters of the population and destruction and damage of about 70 percent of the physical infrastructure. The war, as well as political and social unrest in 2006 and in February-March 2007, has taken a heavy toll on the country, which is currently the poorest in South-East Asia.
According to the EIU country report released in January of this year, real non-oil growth has been negative in 2002 (-6.7 percent) and 2003 (-6.7 percent) but became slightly positive in 2004 and 2005 (respectively 0.4 percent and 2.3 percent). This modest growth is, however, lower than that of the population, around 3 percent per year. The establishment of UNMIT to help restore stability and support the electoral process is likely to have supported economic activity, but recent events (social turmoil and the consequences of the drought) have had the reverse effect, probably leading to a contraction in 2006 and in the first quarter of 2007. The modest non-oil GDP at current prices of US$350 million for a population nearing one million, illustrates the population's difficult living conditions.
Government expenditure currently remains a major component of the limited effective demand, despite the limited budgetary resources. In 2005, a Petroleum Fund was created to manage the country’s oil and gas revenues in a sustainable development perspective, to prepare for the time when, eventually, oil and gas reserves will run out. These revenues are expected to increase manifold as tapping of the reserves enters in its full phase. According to the EIU, the Fund’s closing balance stood at US$847.1 million at the end of September 2006. However, State expenditure expansion through use of effectively available funds, of all origins, is hindered by its limited capacity to formulate and implement development projects and to meet stringent financial procedures avoiding graft.
Inflation is picking up as consumer prices rose sharply, by 6.9 percent, in the second quarter of 2006, though it fell slightly to year-to-year rate of 6.3 percent in the third quarter of that same year. A matter of concern is that the price index is pushed by a steep rise in local fuel prices: local transportation, both for its cost and its availability, indeed is a major problem for food distribution inside the country, hence is also a major issue for food security policy.
Coffee accounts for nearly all of the country’s non-oil exports, at a very low level of US$1.4 million in January-February 2006. Despite this level, coffee is the main source of cash income for a sizeable proportion of the rural poor, so that any drop in coffee price or output would deeply affect their livelihood; many of the concerned farmers concentrating on coffee production to the detriment of food crops.
Exports (all commodities) cover only a very small fraction of imports, as these stood at 30.1m in January-February and April-May 2006, of which 2m were cereals (as commercial imports). In 2005, cereals imports reached US$5.8 million, while imports of petroleum products added up to US$35.1 million.
The rate of unemployment is very high, posing a very serious challenge for the future given limited development opportunities. It also constitutes a cause of social unrest, especially in cities. Unemployment is a main reason of limited effective demand, along with the predominance of subsistence farming. The situation decisively worsened after independence, as many jobs in the Indonesian public sector disappeared.
The country’s dependence on cereal imports rose from 20 percent in 1990 to approximately 40 percent at present as mentioned in the WFP document released in April 2006 and entitled “Timor-Leste: Market Profile for Emergency Food Assessments”. Annual rice imports of 35 000-40 000 tonnes increased to 55 831 tonnes in 2004. Free trade and free market policies adopted in the wake of independence (a 5 percent import duty on all goods, a 5 percent income tax and a 5 percent sales tax) totally reversed the situation that existed during Indonesian domination. In the course of this 24 years period, stringent quantitative restrictions on imports were supplemented by a centralized scheme for the collection and distribution of basic staples, which was regulated by the national logistics system BULOG, with, at the provincial level, the provincial Depot Logistik (DOLOG). Indonesian restrictive import policies drew exclusively on quantitative restrictions, plus BULOG’s monopoly on imports of rice, sugar, wheat, maize and soybeans. This scheme, though it favoured very hierarchical relations in the farming sector and discouraged an innovative spirit, sought to keep domestic prices at targeted levels, in application of the policies chosen.
Currently, local producers, who are mostly subsistence growers, find themselves exposed directly to international competition while no longer benefiting from subsidized fertilizers and other inputs, or from guaranteed Government purchase prices.
As a radical change from Indonesian times, private traders now dominate commercial imports, but have functioned in an environment of high uncertainty due to market interventions that were not well prepared and predictable, and social unrest. There is a clear need for coordination between all parties contributing to national food security, with the objective of making sure that all stakeholders, including traders, know their respective roles, opportunities and constraints.
The consequence of this combination of low productivity of farming and open barriers is stated as follows in the above-mentioned WFP study (p.12): “Although free trade is good for the urban poor, food security for subsistence farmers – more that 90 percent of the rural population – has been negatively affected by imported cheap rice. As consumers, the benefits of cheap rice for these households are very limited owing to their limited purchasing power. As subsistence producers with limited alternative income sources, they have to sell portions of their crops for cash requirements. Monthly data show that the rice import pattern has not followed monthly rice imports requirements or production-hunger seasons, implying that farmers’ food deficit during the lean season has not been met by imported rice.”
This means that the separation between imports and domestic production does not only lie in the fact that subsistence farmers cannot, in practice, access commercially imported rice (and, in addition, receive scarce humanitarian rice), due to their very limited income. It also relates to price formation: since the domestic market has been integrated into the world market as of 2003, the domestic price of rice is no longer affected by domestic supply shocks. Shortages of supplies during the lean season do not affect wholesale and retail prices, so food aid accurately targeted to the rural poor during the lean season, or after crop failures, would thus make a valuable and much-needed contribution to food security while not causing market disruption.
As shown in Table 1 below, population is steadily increasing, at an annual rate of around 3 percent. To be noted is the specific situation of Dili, which registers a substantial loss due to the high number of IDPs leaving it, while Baucau is on the contrary receiving a very substantial influx of IDPs, hence a sharp rise of 35 percent of its population.
| District | Census 2004 |
Mid Year 2007 without IDPs |
IDPs flux in 2006 |
Mid Year 2007 with IDPs |
| Aileu | 37 967 | 41 081 | 5 816 | 46 897 |
| Ainaro | 52 480 | 56 784 | 3 572 | 60 356 |
| Baucau | 100 748 | 109 010 | 25 776 | 134 786 |
| Bobonaro | 83 579 | 90 433 | 3 340 | 93 773 |
| Covalima | 53 063 | 57 415 | 2 602 | 60 017 |
| Dili | 175 730 | 190 141 | -74 180 | 115 961 |
| Ermera | 103 322 | 111 795 | 4 380 | 116 175 |
| Lautem | 56 293 | 60 909 | 5 841 | 66 750 |
| Liquiçá | 54 973 | 59 481 | 7 942 | 67 423 |
| Manatuto | 36 897 | 39 923 | 2 516 | 42 439 |
| Manufahi | 45 081 | 48 778 | 1 795 | 50 573 |
| Oecusse | 57 616 | 62 341 | 2 395 | 64 736 |
| Viqueque | 65 449 | 70 816 | 8 205 | 79 021 |
| Total | 923 198 | 998 907 | 0 | 998 907 |
Table 2 below shows the food balance district per district, using available data. However, it must be stressed that the relevance of such an exercise is very limited due to the marked unreliability of production data. While due caution is needed in using this table, it provides some indications on the surplus and the deficit districts, with the latter by far outnumbering the former. Determining accurately the variations of the food balance district-wise would require a marked improvement in data collection and processing by the Ministry of Agriculture, with substantial assistance by donors.
| Maize | Rice |
Cassava & Other Root Crops1/ |
Total | Maize | Rice |
Cassava & Other Root Crops1/ |
Total | |
| AILEU | LAUTEM | |||||||
| Total Availability | 2 448 | 419 | 1 085 | 3 952 | 14 491 | 2 598 | 4 883 | 21 973 |
| Production | 2 448 | 419 | 1 085 | 3 952 | 14 491 | 2 598 | 4 883 | 21 973 |
| Total Utilization | 4 898 | 3 555 | 736 | 9 189 | 9 903 | 5 241 | 1 148 | 16 291 |
| Food Use | 4 221 | 3 517 | 703 | 8 441 | 6 008 | 5 006 | 1 001 | 12 015 |
| Seed feed and losses | 677 | 38 | 33 | 747 | 3 895 | 234 | 146 | 4 276 |
| Deficit/Surplus | 2 450 | 3 136 | -349 | 5 237 | -4 588 | 2 643 | -3 735 | -5 681 |
| AINARO | LIQUICA | |||||||
| Total Availability | 4 001 | 743 | 1 750 | 6 495 | 1 400 | 236 | 445 | 2 081 |
| Production | 4 001 | 743 | 1 750 | 6 495 | 1 400 | 236 | 445 | 2 081 |
| Total Utilization | 6 545 | 4 594 | 958 | 12 096 | 6 454 | 5 078 | 1 025 | 12 557 |
| Food Use | 5 432 | 4 527 | 905 | 10 864 | 6 068 | 5 057 | 1 011 | 12 136 |
| Seed feed and losses | 1 113 | 67 | 53 | 1 232 | 386 | 21 | 13 | 421 |
| Deficit/Surplus | 2 543 | 3 850 | -793 | 5 601 | 5 054 | 4 842 | 580 | 10 476 |
| BAUCAU | MANATUTO | |||||||
| Total Availability | 6 616 | 3 018 | 2 042 | 11 676 | 3 508 | 3 027 | 1 914 | 8 448 |
| Production | 6 616 | 3 018 | 2 042 | 11 676 | 3 508 | 3 027 | 1 914 | 8 448 |
| Total Utilization | 13 910 | 10 388 | 2 083 | 26 380 | 4 771 | 3 457 | 694 | 8 923 |
| Food Use | 12 131 | 10 109 | 2 022 | 24 262 | 3 819 | 3 183 | 637 | 7 639 |
| Seed feed and losses | 1 779 | 279 | 61 | 2 119 | 952 | 274 | 57 | 1 284 |
| Deficit/Surplus | 7 294 | 7 370 | 41 | 14 705 | 1 263 | 431 | -1 220 | 474 |
| BOBONARO | MANUFAHI | |||||||
| Total Availability | 3 718 | 4 074 | 2 512 | 10 304 | 6 612 | 2 519 | 1 411 | 10 542 |
| Production | 3 718 | 4 074 | 2 512 | 10 304 | 6 612 | 2 519 | 1 411 | 10 542 |
| Total Utilization | 9 431 | 7 343 | 1 482 | 18 256 | 6 337 | 3 992 | 801 | 11 130 |
| Food Use | 8 440 | 7 033 | 1 407 | 16 879 | 4 552 | 3 793 | 759 | 9 103 |
| Seed feed and losses | 991 | 310 | 75 | 1 377 | 1 785 | 199 | 42 | 2 027 |
| Deficit/Surplus | 5 712 | 3 269 | -1 030 | 7 951 | -275 | 1 473 | -610 | 588 |
| COVALIMA | OECUSSE | |||||||
| Total Availability | 8 436 | 4 407 | 2 854 | 15 698 | 2 976 | 1 440 | 2 621 | 7 037 |
| Production | 8 436 | 4 407 | 2 854 | 15 698 | 2 976 | 1 440 | 2 621 | 7 037 |
| Total Utilization | 7 641 | 4 843 | 986 | 13 469 | 6 749 | 4 985 | 1 050 | 12 783 |
| Food Use | 5 401 | 4 501 | 900 | 10 803 | 5 826 | 4 855 | 971 | 11 652 |
| Seed feed and losses | 2 239 | 341 | 86 | 2 666 | 923 | 130 | 79 | 1 131 |
| Deficit/Surplus | -795 | 435 | -1 869 | -2 229 | 3 773 | 3 545 | -1 571 | 5 746 |
| DILI | VIQUEQUE | |||||||
| Total Availability | 778 | 40 | 563 | 1 381 | 12 376 | 3 600 | 3 437 | 19 413 |
| Production | 778 | 40 | 563 | 1 381 | 12 376 | 3 600 | 3 437 | 19 413 |
| Total Utilization | 10 657 | 8 701 | 1 756 | 21 114 | 10 445 | 6 222 | 1 288 | 17 956 |
| Food Use | 10 437 | 8 697 | 1 739 | 20 873 | 7 112 | 5 927 | 1 185 | 14 224 |
| Seed feed and losses | 220 | 3 | 17 | 241 | 3 334 | 295 | 103 | 3 732 |
| Deficit/Surplus | 9 879 | 8 661 | 1 193 | 19 733 | -1 931 | 2 622 | -2 148 | -1 457 |
| ERMERA | ||||||||
| Total Availability | 2 460 | 618 | 1 392 | 4 469 | ||||
| Production | 2 460 | 618 | 1 392 | 4 469 | ||||
| Total Utilization | 11 136 | 8 769 | 1 784 | 21 689 | ||||
| Food Use | 10 456 | 8 713 | 1 743 | 20 912 | ||||
| Seed feed and losses | 680 | 56 | 42 | 777 | ||||
| Deficit/Surplus | 8 676 | 8 151 | 392 | 17 219 | ||||
General
Timor-Leste has a total land area of approximately 14 500 sq. km, of which 600 000 hectares are suitable for crop and livestock production. Approximately 174 000 hectares are arable with an additional 124 000 hectares that can be used as bushed gardens. Untapped land however abounds in some parts of the country. This gives some leeway for mechanization and the possible development of large-scale agriculture. However, the vast majority of farmers grow for their own subsistence and a large proportion of them practice inter-cropping, especially with maize as the main crop. Despite some apparent increase in agricultural production during recent years, the sector suffers from lack of investments that could provide a more business-friendly environment. This particularly concerns market infrastructure and public services like extension and agricultural statistics.
Rainfall and its distribution closely determine the outcome of agriculture production, as irrigation accounts for a minor share of the total and is used almost exclusively for rice. With rains becoming increasingly erratic over the years, variation in output tends to grow larger, putting food security at risk. Agricultural activities start with the onset of the main northeast monsoon rainy season. Soils are generally poor and the terrain is often steep to very steep in upland areas. Farmers have adapted to these conditions and selected crop varieties best suited for inter-cropping under prevailing conditions over centuries. Crop varieties have been selected more for coping with post-harvest losses than for increasing yields. Full heed must be taken of this long-acquired experience when trying to modernize agricultural production.
Climatic conditions
Two climatic zones correspond to the northern and the southern part of the country, and they are divided by mountains and a central plateau:
The northern part has one rainfall peak within the wet season lasting between four to six months. The coastal areas receive on average from 500 to 1 500 mm of rainfalls yearly, while above 500 m rainfalls vary between 1 500 to 3 000 mm.
The southern part has two rainfall peaks during the wet season which lasts between seven and nine months. The first peak is situated in December and February and the second peak manifests itself in May and June. Coastal areas get an average annual rainfall from 1 500 to 2 000 mm, while the areas above 500 m receive more abundant rainfall from 1 700 to 3 500 mm.
Starting with the onset of the main, northeast-monsoon, and rainy season, the agricultural cycle in Timor-Leste normally begins in November with land preparation and planting of maize in upland, followed by nursery preparation and transplanting of rice in lowland, in December/January in the northern part, and a month or two later in the south coast. Harvesting of maize begins from February and completes in April, while harvesting of wet season rice is around June/July in the north and August/September in the south. In the south where there is a second rainy season (maize and rice) in areas with some supplementary irrigation. The relative importance of the second crop is however small, approximately 10 percent of the total production areas. Planting is around 90–110 days prior to the harvesting of maize and rice while generally cassava is planted in December inter-cropped with maize”.
Farming systems
Low input/output subsistence farming forms the bulk of Timorese agriculture. Shifting cultivation, often based on slash and burns is widely practiced. Soils are shallow in a large proportion. Inter-cropping of maize and cassava is usual on steep slopes situated in the northern area of the country but also in the more fertile terrain found in the southern part of the country. Cowpeas and sweet potatoes are also cultivated at the onset of rains in November. While cereals and cassava are grown in most parts of the country, other crops like sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, beans and bananas constitute a significant portion of the diet of subsistence farmers and bring useful nutrients, two characteristics which explain their important role as coping mechanism in difficult periods, hence their important contribution to overall food security. The main lowland rice is generally irrigated but also to a smaller extent is grown as rainfed, while upland rice is in most cases rainfed. Irrigated areas are often poorly maintained and managed and some networks need urgent, large scale, repair. Other crops include yam, soybean, taro (swamp and upland), squash, pumpkin, cabbage, onion, peanuts, sago, coconuts, fruits, coffee, and tobacco. The availability of the produce varies rather widely according to the location, season and tradition in line with the fact that the country is very heterogeneous despite its small size.
As a consequence of the El Niño effects on global weather conditions, the main rainy season in Timor-Leste started only in December 2006, with a delay of more than one month compared to normal conditions. In addition, rainfall pattern remained erratic and dry spells have been reported until late February 2007. The late onset of the rainy season and erratic rainfall pattern is having a serious negative impact on agricultural production in Timor-Leste for 2007.
Consequently, land preparation and planting of inter-cropped maize, cassava and other root crops and pulses have themselves been delayed for more than one month. The total area planted is reduced due to shortages of planting material experienced by farmers who had to sow maize twice or even several times. In addition, dry spells during the flowering period have further reduced the expected yields. Maize harvest has also been delayed and was just starting at the time of the mission field visits in late March 2007. An extremely high spatial variability of production has been observed, with some fields showing crops in reasonably good status while fields just a few kilometres away registered severe damages or complete crop failure.
Delayed onset of rains also postponed the planting of rice. Sowing in nurseries started in February and transplanting to paddy fields was ongoing during the mission’s visits. In some areas, direct broadcast sowing in paddy fields was preferred in order to accelerate planting operations. As a consequence of the late sowing/transplanting, there is an increased risk of damages to rice crops caused by possible dry spells during April and May. Rainfall pattern between April and June will be critical for rice production in 2007. This higher risk of crop failure induced some farmers to cultivate a reduced area in order to save part of their paddy rice stocks.
The erratic rainfall pattern has also created favourable conditions for various crop pests. A major locust outbreak is currently causing severe damage to both maize and rice fields in Bobonaro and Ermera districts with potential risk of spreading of swarms to Covalima district. More than 4 000 ha have been severely damaged to date and the infested area is expanding. FAO is currently supporting the government in facing the locust outbreak and control operations will soon start in the affected areas. Despite this, the impact of the locust outbreak on the overall 2007 maize and rice production is likely to be relevant considering that Bobonaro is probably the most productive districts of Timor-Leste. In addition to the locust, rodent infestations have been observed in various districts and severe damages on maize production have been reported for the central and southern sub-districts of Manatuto.
High post-harvest losses on stored grains due to the lack of proper storage facilities at the household level also affect food production. These losses, mainly caused by insects and rodents, are estimated at approximately 20-30 percent for maize and 5 percent for paddy rice.
All available data on cultivated areas, yields and total production present a significant degree of uncertainty. In the case of maize and other crops under shifting cultivation systems, the area planted varies every year. Agriculture Officers at the District level are responsible for data collection and transmission to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). However, they lack adequate capacity in terms of training, technical equipment and funds to carry out an accurate job.
MAFF provided the mission with the available data on agriculture production (area planted, yields and total production for the main crops) for the past years. The mission analyzed the data on area planted together with MAFF staff and elaborated the final estimates used in this report.
The total area of harvested maize crop in the 2005-2006 agricultural season was of approximately 71 000 ha. Due to the delay and erratic nature of the 2006-2007 main rainy season, the area of maize being harvested this year is expected to be about 10 percent lower than last year, reaching a total of over 63 000 ha.
Rice production in irrigated and rainfed areas has also been affected by the late onset of rains, with a reduction of approximately 5 percent in the area planted. However, the area which will produce a satisfactory harvest will depend much on the rainfall pattern during the period from April to June. A decrease has been observed in areas under up-land rice cultivation.
Worldwide, production of maize is greater than that of rice, even though maize is grown on a smaller area than rice. This pattern is reversed in Timor-Leste, in large part due to the mountainous relief. According to the “Suku Survey”1, approximately 81 percent of, Timor-Leste farmers grow some maize. Maize is the most important staple crop in the country, but its yields are extremely low, compared to that of the other countries in the region. Hence, there is potential for increasing yields, in particular through an improvement of farm productivity on relatively favourable lands.
Cassava is the third most important food crop in Timor-Leste, after maize and rice. It is mostly planted in backyards or in small plots near the house. Plants are pulled up when needed and the peeled roots are eaten after boiling. Most local varieties have good eating quality but low yields and starch contents. The average cassava yield in the country is reported as 4 t/ha, one of the lowest in Asia.
Groundnuts are grown widely in small plots, but it is not a major crop in Timor-Leste. Low yield varieties are grown and the produce is used for direct consumption.
There is good potential to increase the cultivation of groundnut in the country. Moreover, introducing legumes in cropping systems will help stabilise the productivity of cereal-based cropping systems. ICRISAT, under an ACIAR-funded and coordinated project, ‘Seeds of life – East Timor’, introduced into East Timor 15 advanced varieties in the 2000–2001 season. These varieties outperformed the local varieties in all locations. According to a study conducted in 20022 , increased groundnut production would not only stimulate the local food and oil processing industry but would also provide an opportunity to export to neighbouring countries which are currently net importers of this commodity. However, premium quality groundnut can hardly be grown by subsistence producers, hence expansion of production is highly dependent on high-input farming, but all the related services, such as effective extension, are currently lacking.
General comments
Many factors limit agricultural productivity, including:
Low quality varieties: seed stocks have been severely affected by the current crisis, not only quantitatively since growers and their families eat them in last resort, when no other food is left, but also qualitatively. This year in particular, as the season started late, a large proportion of seeds did not germinate. Seeds are essential in improving crop productivity. In Timor-Leste, where there is no seed industry, public support is needed to build up a viable system of seed production and distribution. FAO and NGOs distribute maize seeds, such as the Arjuna and Kalinga varieties, as well as rice seeds, which can yield much more than most local varieties. However, these varieties remain little used in Timor-Leste.
Lack of mechanization: farming is overwhelmingly hand-powered, a characteristic which is, however, useful for intercropping. Animal traction is not widespread, with the exception of buffaloes for puddling. Family is by far the dominant labour source.
Inputs use is very low: fertilizers and seeds are expensive or unavailable; this, combined with the fact that farmgate prices are generally low, makes intensification impossible for most farmers.
Credit institutions are non-existent, with some exceptions concerning micro-credit provided through some local NGOs and small credit unions.
Some farmers organize themselves in farmers’ groups, but this only facilitates their access to inputs and marketing channels in a limited number of cases. Moreover, the many low skilled farmers cannot benefit from extension services as these obviously need to be up-graded.
Lack of markets: marketing channels in rural areas are very inefficient, and many cities (including Dili) do not have a food market with suitable equipment such as storage facilities, weighing machines, packing and grading facilities, etc. This induces high transaction costs and remains a bottleneck to a sound marketing of domestic production.
The negative impact of this bottleneck is obvious in the case of maize, scarcely traded in the country since only a limited number of growers have marketable surpluses. Scarce market access (road network in very bad condition and logically high transport costs, often rudimentary, marketing channels) may explain frequent inability or unwillingness to invest in inputs that would increase production. Another reason (as well as a consequence) for this, is migration from rural areas to the cities, and the resulting reduction in labour force available for farming3.
Lack of irrigation and appropriate water management; there is no ad hoc institution designing and implementing a water management policy. While maintenance of irrigation schemes is in some cases effectively carried out, virtually no instruments are in place to monitor performances, utilization of equipments, to study new opportunities and evaluate costs. In addition, farmers are very seldom organized in water user organizations.
One important consequence of these constraints is an underutilization of the agricultural sector, with a reduction of the planted area observed in all the districts, combined with scarce use of the technologies apt at tapping the important potential of the country.
Yields of individual products
Productivity of maize under shifting cultivation and/or intercropping systems commonly found in Timor-Leste is lower than the one cultivated under high-input, intensive agriculture. However, other techniques - such as mulching, the use of animal manure and/or compost and the intercropping or rotation with nitrogen fixing legumes - are available to enhance productivity of traditional systems. These are not widely adopted in Timor-Leste. Therefore, yields generally remain very low, ranging from 0.9 to 2.2 t/ha in normal years. As a consequence of the drought observed this year, and the resulting water stress plus the effect of pests (locusts, rodents), maize yields in 2007 are expected to range between 0.3 and 1.3 t/ha depending on the local conditions of each district and sub-district. The national average yield is estimated at 1.1 t/ha (Table 3). Due to the pivotal importance of maize as staple food in Timor-Leste, increasing such very low yields is a priority.
Productivity of rice differs depending on production techniques. In Timor-Leste, yields are generally low, varying from 1.2 to 1.5 t/ha with peaks of around 1.8 t/ha in areas where water is available throughout the cropping season. The average yield in 2007 is estimated at 1.4 tonnes of paddy per hectare.
Cassava, Sweet Potato, Taro and various other local root crops (kontan, wild yams, etc.) provide a constant and relevant contribution to the diet of the rural population, but their importance for food security is also related with their role as alternative staple crops in adverse years of low cereal production. Yields in Timor-Leste vary according to the species and farming practices, ranging from 1.1 t/ha for local tubers to 4.4 t/ha for Cassava.
Table 3 shows estimated crop production in 2007. Total production of maize, rice, cassava and other root crops in 2007, in cereal equivalent, is estimated at 123 469 tonnes. Maize production is estimated at 69 820 tonnes, approximately 30 percent less than previous years, average production ranging around 100 000 tonnes/year. Rice production is estimated at 44 566 tonnes of paddy – some 20 percent lower than previous years average estimates and 30 percent lower than in 2003. Production of cassava and other root crops is estimated to decrease slightly.
| District | Maize |
Prod. Second Crop (t) |
Total Prod. 2007 (t) |
Paddy |
Prod. Second Crop (t) |
Total Prod.1/ 2007 (t) |
Cassava
Prod. (t) |
Other Root Crops Prod. (t) |
Total output in Cereal Equiv. 1/ 2/ (t) |
||||
| Main Cropping Season | Main Cropping Season | ||||||||||||
|
Area (ha) |
Yield (t/ha) |
Prod. (t) |
Area (ha) |
Yield (t/ha) |
Prod. (t) |
||||||||
| Aileu | 2 720 | 0.9 | 2 448 | - | 2 448 | 580 | 1.2 | 698 | - | 698 | 1 890 | 1 500 | 3 952 |
| Ainaro | 4 680 | 0.9 | 4 001 | - | 4 001 | 1 040 | 1.2 | 1 239 | - | 1 239 | 2 770 | 2 700 | 6 495 |
| Baucau | 5 200 | 1.1 | 5 616 | 1 000 | 6 616 | 4 440 | 1.0 | 4 530 | 500 | 5 030 | 4 880 | 1 500 | 11 676 |
| Bobonaro | 2 560 | 1.1 | 2 918 | 800 | 3 718 | 3 700 | 1.6 | 5 950 | 840 | 6 790 | 5 150 | 2 700 | 10 304 |
| Covalima | 5 540 | 1.3 | 7 046 | 1 390 | 8 436 | 4 200 | 1.5 | 6 305 | 1 040 | 7 345 | 6 290 | 2 630 | 15 698 |
| Dili | 1 080 | 0.7 | 778 | - | 778 | 50 | 1.3 | 67 | - | 67 | 1 010 | 750 | 1 381 |
| Ermera | 2 710 | 0.8 | 2 060 | 400 | 2 460 | 860 | 1.2 | 1 030 | - | 1 030 | 2 770 | 1 580 | 4 469 |
| Lautem | 11 360 | 1.2 | 13 291 | 1 200 | 14 491 | 3 630 | 1.2 | 4 330 | - | 4 330 | 8 230 | 7 030 | 21 973 |
| Liquiçá | 1 500 | 0.6 | 900 | 500 | 1 400 | 330 | 1.2 | 393 | - | 393 | 1 010 | 380 | 2 081 |
| Manatuto | 3 120 | 0.9 | 2 808 | 700 | 3 508 | 4 270 | 1.1 | 4 644 | 400 | 5 044 | 2 380 | 3 600 | 8 448 |
| Manufahi | 5 510 | 1.2 | |||||||||||