Following more than a decade of seemingly inexorable increases in the number of undernourished people, estimates for 2010 presented in this edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World show a slight glimmer of hope, with the first fall since 1995. But that still leaves nearly a billion people going hungry, and it is too early to know if this is the beginning of a downward trend or merely a momentary dip in the number of undernourished.

This year, The State of Food Insecurity in the World focuses on a particular group of countries, those with protracted crises, where levels of undernourishment are estimated to be at about 30 percent. Even during the difficult period in Iraq to turn around the situation in such countries, not least the difficulty of moving beyond the mindset of humanitarian intervention towards a broader-based development agenda.

The report highlights actions that can be taken to rationalize the way protracted crises are handled. These include more holistic assessments of the crisis itself, including a deeper understanding of the factors that lead to undernourishment; building on local community responses and institutions; introducing or supporting social protection mechanisms such as food-based safety nets; and moving from food aid to a broader-based food assistance approach.

The final section of the report provides recommendations on ways to improve engagement with countries in protracted crises. These focus on improving the analysis and understanding of protracted crises, supporting the protection, promotion and rebuilding of livelihoods and the institutions that support and enable livelihoods; and changing the architecture of external intervention in protracted crises to match the reality on the ground.

As this edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World shows, there are many challenges, but there is also much that can be done to address the root causes of protracted crises. Lessons from the experience of many countries show that with careful attention to livelihoods, strengthening longer-term resilience and investments in social protection mechanisms, the prospects for addressing the root causes of protracted crises are promising.
Key messages

1. Countries in protracted crisis require special attention. Whether human-induced or the result of repeated natural disasters, local institutions have failed, and these have the potential to contain and recover from crises. Supporting institutions is key to addressing protracted crises and laying the foundation for food security in the longer term.

2. Food assistance helps build the basis for long-term food security and is procured (including local purchase), helps to ensure that humanitarian food assistance will serve as a strong basis for food security in the longer term.

3. Humanitarian assistance to support short-term efforts to better address both immediate needs and the structural causes of undernutrition.

4. Of 192 countries, 55 have declared themselves as food insecure, but only 23 have had their official food insecurity reduced to acceptable levels.

5. Undernutrition: FAO estimates for Table - 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Undernourishment 2004-06</th>
<th>Undernourishment 2005-07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Least
undernourished | 5-9%                     | < 5%                     |
| Undernourished | 5-9%                     | < 5%                     |
| Moderately
undernourished | 5-9%                     | < 5%                     |
| Severe
undernourished | 5-9%                     | < 5%                     |

6. The current aid architecture needs to be modified to focus on food insecurity, and development assistance to be oriented towards building stability, where it is required, rather than a more formalized approach that focuses on structural adjustments.

7. Undernourishment is procured (including local purchase), helps to ensure that humanitarian food assistance will serve as a strong basis for food security in the longer term.

8. After increasing from 2006 to 2009 due to high food prices, the proportion of people suffering from hunger declined in 2010 as food prices fell. However, the global increase in hunger in 2010 was due to a combination of high food prices and the impact of protracted crises and ongoing conflict in some countries.

9. In 2010, the proportion of people suffering from hunger declined in 2010 as food prices fell. However, the global increase in hunger in 2010 was due to a combination of high food prices and the impact of protracted crises and ongoing conflict in some countries.

10. The current aid architecture needs to be modified to focus on food insecurity, and development assistance to be oriented towards building stability, where it is required, rather than a more formalized approach that focuses on structural adjustments.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1. Support the prevention, promotion and rehabilitation of protracted crisis settings, and in particular, protracted food insecurity in particular, in countries at risk of protracted crises.

Recommendation 2. Recall the action-oriented, evidence-based, human rights-based, and participatory approach to protracted crisis settings, and in particular, protracted food insecurity in particular, in countries at risk of protracted crises.

Recommendation 3. Recall the action-oriented, evidence-based, human rights-based, and participatory approach to protracted crisis settings, and in particular, protracted food insecurity in particular, in countries at risk of protracted crises.
The State of
Food Insecurity in the World

Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Rome, 2010
4 Foreword

8 Undernourishment around the world in 2010
8 The number of undernourished people has declined but remains unacceptably high
10 Undernourishment by region

12 Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?
12 Common features of countries in protracted crisis
18 How livelihoods adapt in protracted crises
21 Gender issues in protracted crises
24 Learning from, and building on, community responses

27 National and international responses to protracted crises
27 Analysis of aid flows to countries in protracted crisis
32 Humanitarian food assistance in protracted crises
36 Towards social protection in protracted crises
40 Using short-term responses to support longer-term recovery in agriculture and food security
43 Success stories: the example of Mozambique

45 Towards ensuring food security in protracted crises: recommended actions

50 Technical annexes
50 Table 1
Prevalence of undernourishment and progress towards the World Food Summit (WFS) and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets in developing countries
53 Table 2
Selected development and food security indicators for countries in protracted crisis

54 Notes
The number of undernourished people in the world remains unacceptably high at near the one billion mark despite an expected decline in 2010 for the first time since 1995. This decline is largely attributable to increased economic growth foreseen in 2010 – particularly in developing countries – and the fall in international food prices since 2008. The recent increase in food prices, if it persists, will create additional obstacles in the fight to further reduce hunger.

However, a total of 925 million people are still estimated to be undernourished in 2010, representing almost 16 percent of the population of developing countries. The fact that nearly a billion people remain hungry even after the recent food and financial crises have largely passed indicates a deeper structural problem that gravely threatens the ability to achieve internationally agreed goals on hunger reduction: the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) and the 1996 World Food Summit goal. It is also evident that economic growth, while essential, will not be sufficient in itself to eliminate hunger within an acceptable period of time.

This edition of *The State of Food Insecurity in the World* focuses on people living in a group of countries in which the incidence of hunger is particularly high and persistent, and which face particular challenges in meeting the MDG targets – namely countries in protracted crisis. These countries are characterized by long-lasting or recurring crises, both natural and human-induced, and limited capacity to respond. In the 22 countries identified by this report as being in protracted crisis (or containing areas in protracted crisis), the most recent data show that more than 166 million people are undernourished, representing nearly 40 percent of the population of these countries and nearly 20 percent of all undernourished people in the world.

This unacceptably high degree of hunger results from many factors, including armed conflict and natural disasters, often in combination with weak governance or public administration, scarce resources, unsustainable livelihoods systems and breakdown of local institutions. Faced with so many obstacles, it is little wonder that protracted crises can become a self-perpetuating vicious cycle.

Protracted crises are not a series of one-off, short-lived phenomena, and they are not temporary interruptions from which countries easily return to a path towards longer-term development. Rather, they represent ongoing and fundamental threats to both lives and livelihoods, from which recovery may become progressively more difficult over time.

Protracted crises call for specially designed and targeted assistance. Assistance focused on the immediate need to save lives is critical in protracted crises – as it is in shorter-duration emergencies – but in protracted crises it is also essential to direct assistance towards underlying drivers and longer-term impacts. These may include conflict, disintegration of institutions, depletion of resources, loss of livelihoods and displacement of populations. There is thus an urgent need for assistance in protracted crises to protect livelihoods as well as lives, because this will help put the country on a constructive path to recovery.

Despite these additional needs, trends in development assistance give cause for concern: nearly two-thirds of countries in protracted crisis receive less development assistance per person than the average for least-developed countries. More importantly, agriculture receives only 3 to 4 percent of development and humanitarian assistance funds in countries in protracted crisis, despite accounting for 32 percent of their gross domestic product and supporting the livelihoods of 62 percent of their populations.

There are a number of things that we can do to improve the way we handle protracted crises, and provide more effective and lasting help for people living in these situations. Lessons from the experience of many countries show that building longer-term assistance activities on the framework of existing or revitalized local institutions offers the best hope of long-term sustainability and real improvement of food security. Social protection mechanisms, such as school meals, cash and food-for-work activities and vouchers, can make a vital difference in the long term. Food assistance contributes to building these social protection mechanisms – providing food as part of safety net programmes, stimulating markets through purchase of food aid supplies on local markets or through cash-based schemes – and helps to bridge the gap between traditional humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance. Efforts should also aim at achieving sustained, long-term improvements in the productive capacity of vulnerable countries and at the same time strengthening their resilience to shocks. Underlying all of these improved responses, a proper understanding of the nature of protracted crises themselves constitutes an essential step towards addressing their specific problems. These messages are developed further in the report, and provide the basis for specific
recommendations to support improved understanding and, most importantly, stronger and more effective response to help people in protracted crisis situations break the downward cycle.

The 2010 edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World is again the product of close collaboration between our two organizations and other partners. Drawing on the expertise and knowledge of staff from both organizations has brought a fresh perspective to the issues of food insecurity in countries in protracted crisis and has provided a platform for a new vision on combining the strengths of humanitarian assistance with longer-term development assistance. We hope that this report will shape the response by decision-makers at local, national, regional and international levels to improve food security in protracted crises, and ultimately, to save lives, strengthen communities and help build a more hopeful, prosperous and self-sufficient future.

Jacques Diouf
FAO Director-General

Josette Sheeran
WFP Executive Director
The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010 was prepared under the overall leadership of Hafez Ghanem, Assistant Director-General, and the guidance of the management team of the Economic and Social Development Department. The technical coordination of the publication was carried out by Kostas Stamoulis and Keith Wiebe of the Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA) while the technical editors were Luca Alinovi and Luca Russo of ESA and Dan Maxwell of the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. The staff of the Statistics Division (ESS) generated the underlying data on undernourishment.

This is the second year that SOFI has been jointly prepared by FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP). Nicholas Crawford and Sarah Laughton of the Policy, Planning and Strategy Division of WFP acted as technical coordinators for all contributions from WFP and provided valuable insights and advice as drafts were reviewed.

The chapter “Undernourishment around the world in 2010” was prepared by the Economic and Social Development Department with key technical contributions from Luca Alinovi and Erdgin Mane (ESA).

In the chapter “Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention”, the section “Common features of countries in protracted crisis” was prepared by Dan Maxwell with contributions from Luca Alinovi and Luca Russo. The Global Information and Early Warning Systems (GIEWS) data considered in this chapter for the selection of countries in protracted crisis were provided by Kisan Gunjal of the Trade and Markets Division (EST). The section “How livelihoods adapt in protracted crises” was provided by Margie Buchanan-Smith, Susan Jaspars and Sara Pantuliano of Overseas Development Institute (ODI). The section “Gender issues in protracted crises” was contributed by Gabriel Rugalema and Libor Stloukal with the support of Carina Hirsch and Joseph Sentongo of the Gender, Equity and Rural Employment Division (ESW). The section “Learning from and building on community responses” was written by Karel Callens of the Policy and Programme Development Support Division (TCS), with contributions from Kevin Gallagher (FAO Sierra Leone), Luca Russo (ESA), Rene Salazar (SEARICE Sierra Leone) and Oriane Turot (ESA).

In the chapter “National and International responses to protracted crises” the section “Analysis of aid flows to countries in protracted crisis” was written by Luca Russo and Winnie Bell (ESA) with statistics, analysis and support provided by Daniel Coppard and Asma Zubairi of Development Initiatives. The section “Humanitarian food assistance in protracted crises” was provided by Nicholas Crawford and Sarah Laughton, both of WFP, with an additional contribution (Box 6) by Saskia de Pee, Martin W. Bloem and Tina van den Briel on behalf of WFP. The section “Towards social protection in protracted crises” was written by Ugo Gentiliini of the Policy, Planning and Strategy Division of WFP. The section “Using short-term responses to support longer-term recovery in agriculture and food security” was prepared by Jennifer Nyberg, Neil Marsland, Lucia Palombi and Dick Trenchard of the Emergencies Operations and Rehabilitation Divisions (TCE). The final section, “Success stories: the example of Mozambique”, was provided by Karel Callens (TCS), in collaboration with Margaret David e Silva and Christopher Tanner (FAO Mozambique).

The final chapter “Towards ensuring food security in protracted crises: recommended actions” was prepared by Luca Alinovi and Dan Maxwell with contributions from Luca Russo. Contributions to Box 12 were provided by Nick Haan and Zoë Druilhe (ESA).

Ricardo Sibrian produced Table 1 of the Technical annex with support from Cinzia Cerri, Seevalingum Ramasawmy (ESS) and Erdgin Mane (ESA). Initial projections were contributed by Rafik Mahjoubi and Panagiotis Karfakis (ESA). The editorial process benefitted through invaluable comments, suggestions and inputs from Jean Baille (ESA), Boubaker BenBelhassen (ODG), André Croppenstedt (ESA), David Dawe (ESA), Bénédicte de la Brière (ESA), Xiaoning Gong (ESS), David Hallam (EST), Arif Husain (WFP), Henri Josserand (EST), David Marshall (ESS), Steven Were Omamo (WFP), Terri Raney (ESA), Alexander Sarris (EST), Shahla Shapouri of the Economic and Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Dick Trenchard (TCE), Jeff Tschirley (TCE) and Marcela Villarreal (ESW). The readability of the report was greatly enhanced by Paul Neate, who provided English editorial support. Daniela Farinelli provided excellent administrative support throughout the process. Helpful research and support was provided throughout the writing process by Lavinia Antonaci, Winnie Bell, Marco D’Errico, Erdgin Mane and Denise Melvin.

The language editing, graphic and layout services were provided by Visiontime. Translations and printing services were provided by the Meeting Programming and Documentation Service of the FAO Corporate Services, Human Resources and Finance Department.
Undernourishment around the world in 2010

The number of undernourished people has declined but remains unacceptably high

Key message

The number and proportion of hungry people in the world are declining as the global economy recovers and food prices remain below their peak levels, but hunger remains higher than before the food price and economic crises, making it more difficult to meet the internationally agreed hunger-reduction targets.

After increasing sharply from 2006 to 2009, owing to high food prices and the global economic crisis, the number of undernourished people in the world is estimated to have declined in 2010 as the global economy recovers (Figure 1). But the number of undernourished people remains unacceptably high – higher than it was before the recent crises, higher than it was 40 years ago, and higher than the level that existed when the hunger-reduction target was agreed at the World Food Summit in 1996 (see Box 1).

Based on the latest available data, the total number of undernourished people in the world is estimated to have reached 1,023 million in 2009 and is expected to decline by 9.6 percent to 925 million in 2010. Developing countries account for 98 percent of the world’s undernourished people and have a prevalence of undernourishment of 16 percent (Figure 2) – down from 18 percent in 2009 but still well above the target set by the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1.

Global cereal harvests have been strong for the past several years – even as the number of undernourished people was rising – but the overall improvement in food security in 2010 reflects improved access to food through the expected resumption of economic growth, particularly in developing countries, combined with food prices that remain below the peaks of 2008. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that world economic output will increase by 4.2 percent in 2010, faster than previously expected, following a contraction of 0.6 percent in 2009. In general, gross domestic product (GDP) is growing faster in emerging economies and developing

**What is food security and what are the hunger reduction targets?**

- **Food security** exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individuals within households as the focus of concern.

- **Food insecurity** exists when people do not have adequate physical, social or economic access to food as defined above.

- **Undernourishment** exists when caloric intake is below the minimum dietary energy requirement (MDER).

The MDER is the amount of energy needed for light activity and to maintain a minimum acceptable weight for attained height. It varies by country and from year to year depending on the gender and age structure of the population. Throughout this report, the words “hunger” and “undernourishment” are used interchangeably.

- The **World Food Summit goal** is to reduce, between 1990–92 and 2015, the number of undernourished people by half. **Millennium Development Goal 1**, target 1C, is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
Undernourishment around the world in 2010

**FIGURE 1**
Number of undernourished people in the world, 1969–71 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969–71</td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–81</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–92</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–97</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–02</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–07</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2**
Proportion of undernourished people in developing countries, 1969–71 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969–71</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–81</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–92</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–97</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–02</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 3**
Economic growth is projected to resume in 2010, particularly in developing countries

**Annual percentage change in GDP at constant prices**

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database, April 2010.
countries than it is in developed countries (Figure 3). The World Bank estimates that private capital inflows to developing countries are also increasing faster than originally expected. In parallel, international cereal prices have declined in recent months and are below their recent peaks, reflecting ample global cereal supplies in 2009/10 and prospects for large crops in 2010 (Figure 4), but food prices in most low-income food-deficit countries remain above the pre-crisis level of early 2008, negatively affecting access to food by vulnerable populations.

The analysis of hunger during crisis and recovery brings to the fore the vulnerability to economic shocks of many poor countries. Lack of appropriate mechanisms to deal with the shocks or to protect the most vulnerable populations from their effects result in large swings in hunger following crises. Moreover, it should not be assumed that all the effects of crises on hunger disappear when the crisis is over. Vulnerable households deal with shocks by selling assets, which are very difficult to rebuild, by reducing food consumption in terms of quantity and variety and by cutting down on health and education expenditures – coping mechanisms that all have long-term negative effects on quality of life and livelihoods.

Undernourishment by region

The majority of the world’s undernourished people live in developing countries. Two-thirds live in just seven countries (Bangladesh, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia and Pakistan) and over 40 percent live in China and India alone.

Projections for 2010 indicate that the number of undernourished people will decline in all developing regions, although with a different pace. The region with most undernourished people continues to be Asia and the Pacific (Figure 5), but with a 12 percent decline from 658 million in 2009 to 578 million, this region also accounts for most of the global improvement expected in 2010 (Figure 6).

While the World Food Summit goal is to reduce by half the number of people who are undernourished, MDG 1 seeks to reduce by half the proportion of these people. Because the world’s population is still increasing (albeit more slowly than in recent decades), a given number of hungry people represents a declining proportion of people who are hungry. In fact, developing countries as a group have seen an overall setback in terms of the World Food Summit goal (from 827 million in 1990–92 to 906 million in 2010), while some progress has been made towards MDG 1 (with the prevalence of hunger declining from 20 percent undernourished in 1990–92 to 16 percent in 2010).
The proportion of undernourished people remains highest in sub-Saharan Africa, at 30 percent in 2010 (Figure 7), but progress varies widely at the country level. As of 2005–07 (the most recent period for which complete data are available), the Congo, Ghana, Mali and Nigeria had already achieved MDG 1 and Ethiopia and others were close to achieving it; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, the proportion of undernourishment had risen to 69 percent (from 26 percent in 1990–92). In Asia, Armenia, Myanmar and Viet Nam had achieved MDG 1 and China and others were close to doing so, while in Latin America and the Caribbean, Guyana, Jamaica and Nicaragua had achieved MDG 1 and Brazil and others were approaching the target reduction. (Table 1 in the Technical annex provides more details on country-level statistics.)
Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?

Common features of countries in protracted crisis

**Key message**
Twenty-two countries are currently considered to be in protracted crisis. Protracted crisis situations are characterized by recurrent natural disasters and/or conflict, longevity of food crises, breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to the crises. Countries in protracted crisis thus need to be considered as a special category with special requirements in terms of interventions by the development community.

There is no simple definition of a country in protracted crisis. Protracted crises have been defined as “those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection.” Food insecurity is the most common manifestation of protracted crises.

Protracted crisis situations are not all alike, but they may share some (not necessarily all) of the following characteristics:

- **Duration or longevity.** Afghanistan, Somalia and the Sudan, for example, have all been in one sort of crisis or another since the 1980s – nearly three decades.
- **Conflict.** Conflict is a common characteristic, but conflict alone does not make for a protracted crisis, and there are some countries in protracted crisis where overt, militarized conflict is not a significant factor or is a factor in only part of the country (e.g., Ethiopia or Uganda).
- **Weak governance or public administration.** This may simply be a lack of capacity in the face of overwhelming constraints, but may also reflect lack of political will to accord rights to all citizens.
- **Unsustainable livelihood systems and poor food-security outcomes.** These contribute to malnutrition and increased mortality rates. Both transitory and chronic food insecurity tend to increase in protracted crisis situations. However, unsustainable livelihood systems are not just a symptom of protracted crises; deterioration in the sustainability of livelihood systems can be a contributing factor to conflict, which may in turn trigger a protracted crisis.
- **Breakdown of local institutions.** This is often exacerbated by state fragility. Relatively sustainable customary institutional systems often break down under conditions of protracted crisis, but state-managed alternatives are rarely available to fill the gap.

**Defining countries in protracted crisis**
It is obvious from the above that the definition of a protracted crisis is somewhat fluid: no single characteristic identifies a protracted crisis and the absence of one or more of the characteristics outlined does not necessarily mean that a country or region is not in a protracted crisis. This report uses three measurable criteria to determine whether or not a country is in a protracted crisis: the longevity of the crisis, the composition of external aid flows, and the inclusion of the country on FAO’s list of low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs).

- **Longevity of crisis.** The criterion for longevity of the crisis is based on the number of years a country has reported a crisis (whether a natural disaster, a human-induced crisis or disaster, or a combination of the two) that required external assistance. This information is collated annually for all UN member states by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS). A country is considered to be in a protracted crisis if it appears on the GIEWS list for eight years or more between 2001 and 2010 (to capture more recent crises) or 12 years or more between 1996 and 2010.
- **Aid flows.** The second defining criterion is the proportion of humanitarian assistance received by the country as a share of total assistance. Countries are defined as being in
Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?

Protracted crisis if they have received 10 percent or more of their official development assistance (ODA) as humanitarian aid since 2000.8

- Economic and food security status. The final defining criterion is that countries in protracted crisis appear on the list of LIFDCs.

A total of 22 countries currently meet all three of these criteria (Table 1).

All the countries in Table 1 have suffered some kind of human-induced emergency – a conflict or political crisis of some kind. Sixteen of them have also experienced some kind of natural disaster at some point – either as a stand-alone crisis or combined with a human-induced emergency, while 15 have experienced at least one occurrence of combined natural and human-induced emergency.

Some protracted crisis situations are limited to a particular geographic area of a country and may not affect the entire population. For example, Uganda appears on the protracted crisis list, but the protracted crisis in Uganda is limited to the northern and northeastern parts of the country. A territory, such as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, could also be considered as being in protracted crisis and is among the case studies presented in this report.

There are other cases of countries that appear to have been in protracted crisis but are not included in this list. Sri Lanka, for example, is just emerging from a long civil conflict that devastated much of the northern part of the island and displaced a large proportion of the population. However, it appears on the GIEWS list of countries in crisis for only seven of the past ten years, thus narrowly missing the inclusion criterion.

There is thus a considerable degree of heterogeneity among countries in protracted crisis, including the capacity to handle crises, with some countries having a functioning government and others being currently considered as fragile or failed states.9

In terms of aid flows, countries in protracted crisis are characterized by a relatively high share of total aid received in the form of humanitarian assistance rather than development assistance. Globally, about 10 percent of total ODA is in the form of humanitarian assistance, but in countries in protracted crisis the share is generally much higher – as high as two-thirds in countries such as Somalia.

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: FAO GIEWS and Development Initiatives.
Some countries have experienced protracted crisis for many years, often due to conflict and political instability. This has led to high levels of food insecurity and a reliance on humanitarian assistance. The amount of humanitarian assistance received per capita is also higher in all 22 countries in protracted crisis than the average for developing countries. Levels and allocation of aid flows will be discussed in greater detail later in the report (see pages 27–31).

**Protracted crisis: the case of Somalia**

Somalia has been without a central government since 1991, and was in a state of civil war for several years prior to that. Since 2004, a Transitional Federal Government has attempted to exercise some authority but has been unable to extend its control over much of the country. Quasi-independent regional governments have exercised some autonomy and administration in Somaliland and Puntland in the north. In recent years, the conflict has taken on elements of regional rivalry.

The conflict led to a major famine in south–central Somalia in 1992–93. Since 2000, there have been localized food-security crises in various parts of the country. Fierce fighting in Mogadishu in 2006 led some half a million residents of the city to flee to the relative safety of the Afgooye corridor, to the northwest of the city.

In 2009, some 3.2 million people in Somalia required immediate food assistance. Over half of these were internally displaced people; the remainder were affected either by the conflict, by drought and an underlying livelihoods crisis, or both. As of early 2010 and despite a good harvest in 2009, the food security situation for much of the population of south–central and central Somalia appeared increasingly worrying, while the security situation has forced almost all international agencies to withdraw from these areas.

**Protracted crisis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip**

Since the onset of the Israeli occupation in 1967, the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been largely dependent on the provision of labour to Israel and other countries. This has made the territory extremely vulnerable to changes in the Israeli labour and goods markets. Economic conditions have deteriorated since late September 2000. High population growth rates have outpaced GDP growth, leading to a steady decline in per capita GDP. The overall deterioration of the economy has worsened since the beginning of 2006. The impact on the socio-economic situation is particularly acute in the Gaza Strip.

The movement of goods and people into and out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been severely restricted, and this has negatively impacted the lives of the Palestinian population. Unemployment reached 31 percent in mid-2002. It has since declined, but remains above 24 percent. The loss of jobs, earnings, assets and incomes has sharply reduced economic access to food, as real per capita income has halved since 1999. In mid-2006, six out of ten people had incomes below the US$2.10 per day poverty line, while 34 percent of all people living in the territory were considered to be food-insecure with a further 12 percent considered to be particularly vulnerable to becoming food-insecure. In the Gaza Strip, four out of every five families had to reduce expenditures, including on food.

**Food insecurity: are countries in protracted crisis a different case?**

Countries in protracted crisis show generally high levels of food insecurity (Table 2). In 2005–07 the proportion of undernourished people in countries in protracted crisis ranged from a low of 14 percent in Côte d’Ivoire to a high of 69 percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Global Hunger Index, made up of a composite of undernourishment data, the prevalence of underweight and the under-five mortality rate, varied from a low of 14.5 (“serious hunger problem”) in Côte d’Ivoire to a high of 39.1 (“extremely alarming hunger problem”) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?

Table 2 shows that, on average, the proportion of people who are undernourished is almost three times as high in countries in protracted crisis as in other developing countries (if countries in protracted crisis and China and India are excluded) (Figure 8). Nonetheless, not all countries in protracted crisis present very high levels of undernourishment as in some of these countries crises are localized to certain areas or regions. There are approximately 166 million undernourished people in countries in protracted crisis – roughly 20 percent of the world’s undernourished people, or more than a third of the global total if China and India are excluded from the calculation.

Food security is significantly worse in the group of countries in protracted crisis than in the rest of developing countries in four out the of six key food security indicators: proportion undernourished (FAO); proportion stunted; mortality rate of children under five years old; and the Global Hunger Index (International Food Policy Research Institute [IFPRI]) (Table 3).
A deeper analysis of the relationship between protracted crisis and food security outcomes shows that changes in income, government effectiveness, control of corruption and the number of years in crisis are significantly related to the proportion of the population who are undernourished (Table 4). These factors, plus education, are also all significantly related to a country’s Global Hunger Index. More importantly, it is not just the presence or absence of protracted crisis that is significant – the number of years a country has been in crisis also makes a difference. An increase in the number of years a country has been in crisis significantly increases the prevalence of undernourishment.

## Engagement in protracted crises: constraints and opportunities

The characteristics of countries in protracted crisis make them some of the most difficult contexts for the international community to engage with. These difficulties are linked to two key issues: (a) the way in which the development community perceives protracted crises and its relationship to the development process and (b) the way in which aid is used to respond to protracted crises (aid architecture).

With regard to the first issue, “development” is sometimes viewed as a gradual improvement in quality of life. Disasters or acute emergencies (briefly) interrupt this trend, but the expectation is that a situation will return to the “normal” upward trend once the crisis is over (Figure 9) – hence the terminology of “disaster,” “recovery” and “sustainable development” and the principles and interventions associated with each. However, in protracted crises the trend line is likely to be unpredictable for an extended period, not necessarily sharply downwards as in an acute emergency but not upwards either – at least not for a long time.

The second issue, closely related to the first, is that the architecture of intervention in a protracted crisis is

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>No protracted crisis</th>
<th>Protracted crisis</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>T-test</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage undernourished</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>−12.6 **</td>
<td>1.0 – 69.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage underweight</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>−2.0</td>
<td>1.6 – 44.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage stunted</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>−5.1</td>
<td>3.7 – 63.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage wasted</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>−1.1</td>
<td>1.0 – 22.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five mortality rate (%)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>−4.1 **</td>
<td>0.7 – 26.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Hunger Index</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>−5.8 **</td>
<td>5.2 – 39.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data are for 2005-07. Estimates differ from those in Figure 8 because they are not weighted by population. * Significant difference between countries in protracted crisis and those not in protracted crisis, P <0.05 (95%). ** Significant difference between countries in protracted crisis and those not in protracted crisis, P <0.01 (99%). Sources: FAO, IFPRI and WHO.

### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Elasticity</th>
<th>Z (sig)</th>
<th>T-test</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Elasticity</th>
<th>Z (sig)</th>
<th>T-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income1</td>
<td>−0.76</td>
<td>−2.85 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>−0.72</td>
<td>−4.58 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education2</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−0.36</td>
<td>−2.36 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness3</td>
<td>−1.45</td>
<td>−3.63 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>−0.65</td>
<td>−2.84 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption4</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>2.79 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2.14 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in crisis5</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>4.29 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>Years in crisis</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>3.14 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R² (OLS)6</td>
<td>0.52 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusted R² (OLS)</td>
<td>0.72 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
1 Human Development Index (UNDP).
2 Human Development Index (UNDP).
3 Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank Institute).
4 Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank Institute).
5 Number of years a country appeared on the FAO GIEWS list requiring external humanitarian assistance.
6 Ordinary least squares.

Sources: FAO, IFPRI and WHO.
Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?

Protracted crises are fundamentally different from the model of acute disasters.

Humanitarian principles have long been well articulated, though increasingly difficult to adhere to in protracted crisis situations. The principles underlying development efforts have never been as explicitly articulated, but are broadly as outlined in the second column of the table below. While both sets of principles may be applicable in protracted crises, there is little clarity about what principles apply when. To address this lack of clarity, the OECD issued a set of principles for “engagement in fragile states” – not precisely the same as countries in protracted crisis, but typically similar to that designed for short crises followed by a return to some degree of long-term improvement. Yet this clearly does not fit the characteristics of most protracted crisis situations. Even some of the recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles for working in fragile state contexts do not seem appropriate for engaging in protracted crises (see Box 4). As a result, engagement, especially international engagement, in protracted crises is not well matched to the problems encountered, and the approach used is not sufficiently flexible to adjust to changing realities. In many cases, the state apparatus of the affected country is undermined by a protracted crisis, leaving both an institutional vacuum and a lingering question about the priorities for engagement: is the priority to strengthen or, in some cases, rebuild state institutions, or to strengthen or rebuild livelihoods and the local institutions that support livelihoods?

**BOX 4**

**Principles for engagement in protracted crises?**

Humanitarian principles have long been well articulated, though increasingly difficult to adhere to in protracted crisis situations. The principles underlying development efforts have never been as explicitly articulated, but are broadly as outlined in the second column of the table below. While both sets of principles may be applicable in protracted crises, there is little clarity about what principles apply when. To address this lack of clarity, the OECD issued a set of principles for “engagement in fragile states” – not precisely the same as countries in protracted crisis, but similar in many ways. These appear in the third column of the table. However, some of these principles would clearly clash in situations with ongoing conflict – particularly internal conflict or counter-insurgency where the state is one party to the conflict. With many of the same donors and the same external agencies involved in both humanitarian response and development programmes in protracted crises (or in fragile states or both), there remains a lack of clarity about what operating principles govern what kind of interventions, and when and where.

**Principles for protracted crises?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian principles</th>
<th>Developmental principles</th>
<th>OECD principles for “engagement in fragile states”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanity</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Context-specificity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Do no harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>State building as central objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>Self-reliance</td>
<td>Prioritize prevention/ risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Recognize political, security and development links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Promote non-discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency/accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?

How livelihoods adapt in protracted crises

Key message

Improving food security in protracted crises requires going beyond short-term responses and protecting and promoting people’s livelihoods. People living in protracted crises are often forced to make radical adjustments to their livelihoods, including relocation from rural areas for the relative safety of population centres. This can disrupt traditional livelihoods and coping mechanisms, either temporarily or permanently, but can also present new livelihood opportunities if properly supported.

Humanitarian assistance programmes have aimed at protecting livelihoods since the mid-1980s, when it was realized that early efforts to do so would be more effective than those delayed until people were destitute or at risk of dying. In reality, however, humanitarian aid has predominantly focused on saving lives; it has not always been designed to support longer-term livelihood-protection goals and food security. Until recently, interventions other than food aid have been limited to activities such as adding the distribution of seeds and tools to regular food aid distributions. Programmes have been more likely to introduce interventions to support livelihoods as a crisis persists.

But protecting and promoting livelihoods requires a more holistic approach that addresses the causes of vulnerability to food insecurity as well as the consequences. In doing so, it needs to pay attention to what people are doing for themselves and to how their efforts can best be supported.

This section explores what happens to rural livelihoods in protracted crises, what this means for how livelihoods can be supported and what is needed to strengthen livelihoods programming in order to improve food security. It draws heavily on experience from the Sudan, where many parts of the country have suffered for decades from frequent periods of acute food insecurity as well as chronic food insecurity, caused by factors ranging from conflict(s) to socio-economic marginalization, environmental degradation and natural disasters. It also draws on case studies from other countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, where the longevity of the crises experienced has had similar impacts on rural livelihoods.

What happens to livelihoods during protracted crises?

Livelihoods are often severely disrupted in protracted crises. The impact of the Darfur crisis in the Sudan – now in its eighth year – is a concrete demonstration of that.

In Darfur, the first couple of years of the conflict were marked by the rapid devastation of livelihoods. Millions of people became displaced. Many lost everything – livestock, agricultural tools, access to land, their homes and even relatives. Those who remained in their area of origin also suffered heavy losses. Pastoralists in North Darfur lost over half of their livestock in the first three years of the conflict – around a quarter of their herd was looted while an even larger proportion died because poor security limited their access to feed and water supplies.

As the crisis became protracted, assets continued to be lost through a gradual process of attrition. As the economy shrank and freedom of movement declined, livelihood options inevitably became fewer. Many people became dependent on marginal subsistence activities. Rural people could not migrate for work or send remittances home, which had a serious impact on their livelihoods in the initial stages of the conflict.

The conflict in the Nuba Mountains, in central Sudan, which started in 1985 and escalated in the 1990s, also led to widespread destruction of traditional sources of livelihoods and large-scale internal displacement, with few Nuba retaining access to their traditional farmland. This was a key factor in triggering recurrent food insecurity. Insecurity on the plains drove many Nuba to flee to the rocky hilltops, abandoning the productive clay soils found in the plains. Harvest yields dropped to approximately one-tenth of previous levels in several areas. Livestock productivity also fell significantly because of lack of access to pasture and water points on the plains. Many cattle were lost in the areas most affected by conflict, and lack of access to veterinary drugs in areas where fighting was most intense caused further declines in livestock holdings.

Similarly, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, agriculture-based livelihoods were yet another victim of the war. As a result of insecurity and the repeated displacement of households, local productivity fell to minimal levels (in North Kivu during the peak of the war, bean productivity fell 72 percent, that of manioc by 53 percent and bananas by 45 percent). In Kismayo district
Livelihood systems adapt over time in a variety of ways when crises are prolonged.

On the positive side, there are remarkable examples of human resilience and flexibility. Livestock traders in Darfur, for example, altered their trade routes to avoid areas of insecurity, in one case resorting to air-freighting sheep from the far west of Darfur to Khartoum. The way in which remittances are sent has also changed, often creatively so, to avoid obstacles associated with the conflict (see Box 5 on page 20). Similarly, in the Juba region in Somalia, pastoralists partially moved to agriculture to cope with increased crop prices as a result of the conflict. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lake Edward was once the fishing reserve of the entire province of North Kivu, but its fish output declined significantly, from over 11,000 tonnes per year in 1954 to 3,000 tonnes in 1989. The reasons for this decline include the institutional disintegration surrounding the exploitation of local resources related to the progressive breakdown of formal government institutions aggravated by the conflict(s). Confronted with this decline in local production, the population (mainly fisherfolk) began cultivating rice, maize, soya, bananas and manioc in the northern part of Virunga National Park. The favourable location of the park offered an attractive alternative for the production of subsistence and commercial crops. Paradoxically, the absence of formal institutions and regulatory functions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo favoured the movement of people from Lake Edward to the Virunga National Park. This offered fisherfolk who had become food-insecure because of the depletion of fisheries resources the opportunity to create an agriculture-based livelihood for themselves.

On the negative side, many adaptations are harmful or unsustainable. For example, in Darfur, as the economy contracted and large numbers of people moved from rural areas to urban areas, increasing competition for work in a saturated labour market forced more and more people to become dependent on the collection and sale of natural resources, especially firewood, and on brick-making. This led to devastating environmental degradation in ever-widening rings around Darfur’s main towns. Out of desperation, poor households (especially internally displaced people [IDPs]) have been engaging in high-risk livelihood strategies such as the collection of firewood from insecure areas. Pastoral populations have also increasingly turned to collecting firewood as a source of income, and this has fuelled the conflict as they compete with farmers and displaced people for this resource. In many cases it would be more appropriate to call such strategies “maladaptation”.

### Longer-term and permanent adaptations

As initial short-term responses to crises become longer-term adaptations, protracted crises can prompt or accelerate longer-term and permanent transitions.

The most common transition is the accelerated process of rural–urban migration that accompanies many protracted crises. This occurred throughout most of the Sudan. Khartoum grew rapidly as more than 4 million people were displaced during two decades of civil war in the south of the country. Around half of the displaced people have remained in urban areas, especially Khartoum, even after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in early 2005. The town of Nyala, the commercial centre of Darfur, has grown to approximately three times the size it was when the conflict began, and is now home to well over a million people. Similar trends have been recorded elsewhere: it is estimated, for instance, that the urban population grew by a factor of eight in Luanda in Angola, five in Kabul in Afghanistan and seven in Juba in southern Sudan. These phenomena are largely attributed to the conflicts and post-conflict–related dynamics. Such changes in settlement patterns bring with them a significant change in livelihoods, with an increase in the number of people dependent on the urban labour market. As noted above, this may exceed the capacity of urban labour markets to support the influx, and may adversely affect the surrounding environment. Such migration may also jeopardize migrants’ rights to the land they have left behind in rural areas.

Another common feature of protracted crises is increasing competition among different livelihood groups that may have coexisted peacefully before the crisis. As the economy contracts (and freedom of movement may also contract during a conflict), livelihoods have come under increasing pressure. There is strong evidence of this in Darfur, where competition between pastoralists and farmers over the natural resource base has intensified as both groups have become increasingly dependent on strategies such as grass and firewood collection to replace pre-conflict livelihood strategies that are no longer possible. In Jubba Region in Somalia, increased competition over irrigated land, resulting from the conflict, led to a further marginalization of the Bantu groups whose livelihoods depend on agriculture. Similarly, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, farmers moved from central Lubero to the forests of west Lubero to regain access to the land lost because of the conflict and institutional breakdown. Tensions with local communities and customary landlords led to marginalization of newcomers.

---

*Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?*
Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?

Remittances in protracted crises

Populations who suffer in situations of protracted crises are often dependent on remittances from family members and relatives elsewhere. The significance of remittances is often underestimated, and yet they represent a livelihood strategy that could be supported, building on local people's own creativity in maintaining remittance flows.

In Darfur, prior to the current conflict, remittances comprised an important component of people's livelihoods, particularly in drought-prone areas.1 In Somalia and Sri Lanka, also, remittances have been essential to livelihoods for decades.

The impact and importance of remittances vary over time. At the start of a conflict, remittances are frequently disrupted by border closures, restrictions on movement and remittance senders returning home. In Darfur, new ways to transfer money were found, taking advantage of increased mobile network coverage and the possibility of using mobile phones for money transfers.2 The importance of remittances increased during conflicts in Sri Lanka and Somalia.3 With a million Somalis now living abroad, remittances have become a substantial source of external revenue – estimated at between US$700 million and US$1 billion in 2004.4 In Sri Lanka, remittances may also have had a wider impact on the war economy given that the receipt of remittances for many Tamil populations was largely controlled and sustained by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).5

Efforts to facilitate remittance flows could thus make a significant difference to people's livelihoods in crisis-affected areas, yet they are rarely a component of humanitarian response. Improved communication systems, open borders and protection for remittance senders and receivers have been recommended as ways of facilitating remittances.6

What can be done to support livelihoods and food security in protracted crises?

So what can be done to support livelihoods and food security? There are three broad types of intervention: livelihood provisioning, livelihood protection and livelihood promotion.26

Livelihood provisioning – the most common type of intervention – aims to meet immediate basic needs and protect people's lives. Free food distribution is often carried out for livelihood provisioning, as well as meeting immediate food needs directly if frequently serves also as a form of income support. This income support function was the explicit intention of WFP when it increased food rations in Darfur in 2005–06, allowing beneficiaries to sell more and also helping to stabilize grain prices. Other examples of livelihood provisioning include interventions such as voucher systems, which people can use to buy essential goods and services. In Darfur, fuel-efficient stoves have been widely distributed, with the objective of reducing expenditure on firewood and protecting the environment, and vouchers for grain milling have been introduced. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the non-governmental organization (NGO) German Agro Action provided cash-for-work to people working on a road rehabilitation programme in order to help them to buy food and essential basic assets, while at the same time revitalizing markets and trade.

Livelihood protection interventions aim to protect and support people's assets and to prevent negative outcomes, such as divesting productive assets. Most examples of this in Darfur relate to projects with IDPs or assistance to rural populations aimed at discouraging migration to towns. In the IDP camps, livelihood programming commonly aimed to boost the incomes of IDPs so that they did not have to take high personal risks by venturing into insecure areas, for example to collect firewood. A number of NGOs provided life-saving support to donkeys early in the conflict – donkeys were often the only form of livestock owned by the IDPs and were essential for fetching water and firewood and as a means of transport. Fodder and veterinary care were provided and space to keep the animals was organized in the camps.

Livelihood promotion aims to improve livelihood strategies and assets, and to support key policies and institutions that can boost livelihoods. Projects that provide vocational training to IDPs, for example, can enhance their skill levels and thus their employability once the crisis is over. This has been done for IDPs from the north–south civil war in the Sudan, and more recently for displaced people currently living in camps in Darfur. In the

References

4. Savage and Harvey (2007), see note 3.
6. Young et al. (2005), see note 1; Young, Jacobsen and Osman (2009), see note 2; and Savage and Harvey (2007), see note 3.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the NGO Action contre la Faim provided agricultural services such as seed multiplication and crop protection as well as agricultural extension to improve farming practices. Generally, however, humanitarian agencies do not frequently engage with institutions and policies that could boost livelihoods during the crisis, such as helping to negotiate access to markets or engaging with issues over land rights and land “occupation”. These are seen as “long-term” issues, whereas short-term planning and funding drive much humanitarian work. But there is growing demand for agencies to engage with some of these contentious issues when the crisis becomes protracted and a number of positive examples can be drawn upon. On the other hand, local institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) seem to be more flexible in dealing with land-related issues. For instance in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the chambres de paix (local peace councils – see page 25) were the only informal community organization that played a role in local land disputes (see pages 24–26), while in Mozambique (see pages 43–44) customary authorities were one of the pillars of the land reform process.

What needs to be done to ensure more effective livelihood interventions?

The capability of the international humanitarian aid community to launch life-saving interventions has improved substantially in the last decade, but the capability for all types of livelihood programming has not kept pace. Of particular concern is the time it takes for livelihood programming to start when crises become protracted, and a number of positive examples can be drawn upon. On the other hand, local institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) seem to be more flexible in dealing with land-related issues. For instance in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the chambres de paix (local peace councils – see page 25) were the only informal community organization that played a role in local land disputes (see pages 24–26), while in Mozambique (see pages 43–44) customary authorities were one of the pillars of the land reform process.

1. Livelihood assessments should be undertaken early in all crises (not just protracted crises), incorporating not only an assessment of basic life-saving needs but also an assessment of the causes of longer-term vulnerability to food insecurity for all groups. This should inform strategies to protect and promote livelihoods that should be implemented as soon as the emergency has been contained. This kind of programming should be seen as part of the first phase of response and should not be delayed.
2. The analysis that precedes livelihoods programming must pay attention to conflict and power dynamics, in particular the interactions among different livelihood groups. This is true not only for protracted crises caused by conflict but also for natural disasters. In both, there is a high probability that inequalities and exploitation by the powerful will intensify in the chaos and weakened governance that often prevails.
3. Humanitarian agencies must become aware of, and be prepared to engage with, the longer-term transitions that begin or are accelerated during prolonged crises, the most common of which is urbanization. This requirement challenges the short-term planning horizons that characterize humanitarian programming, yet will ensure more appropriate interventions that prepare for the post-crisis era.

Gender issues in protracted crises

Protracted crises affect men and women differently. Differences in gender roles and disparities in the way men and women are treated play a major role in how protracted crises emerge and are experienced. Better understanding of these differences can improve responses to protracted crises by the societies affected as well as by providers of humanitarian assistance and the international community as a whole.

Differences in gender roles and impacts result in part from unequal access by men and women to assets, economic opportunities, services, crisis aid and decision-making. For example, in many societies women tend to be less educated, less involved in the formal economy, less experienced in dealing with authorities, endowed with fewer and poorer-quality productive resources, and faced with more restrictions on their mobility than men. Men and women are often affected very differently in crisis situations. In armed conflicts, for example, men may be drafted by force into military groups or killed, while women are at high risk of sexual
Men and women are affected differently by protracted crises

Protracted crises affect men and women differently in three key areas: sexual exploitation and gender-based violence, access to social services such as health care and education, and stress on livelihood strategies and survival or coping mechanisms.

Sexual exploitation and gender-based violence

Vulnerable people trying to survive protracted crises are at heightened risk of being forced into exploitative sexual relationships. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable, but young males may also be victims. The fear of sexual exploitation may also force vulnerable women to form alliances with soldiers and other men in power as a safety measure. This frequently causes other problems, such as more abuse and eventual abandonment, as well as potential expulsion of affected women from their home communities. Evidence from disparate countries such as Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone and Uganda shows that displaced children are frequently targets of abduction and recruitment by armed combatants. Boys are typically recruited for combat and other military activities. While girls may also fight on the front lines, they are more likely to be recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. In many cases, physical injury carries additional emotional, psychological, economic and social disadvantages.

Violence against women and girls represents one of the most tragic gender-specific results of the collapse of institutions that characterizes protracted crises. Gender-based violence not only violates human rights, but also negatively affects human capital in terms of people’s productive and reproductive abilities, access to health, nutrition, education and other productive resources, and ultimately undermines opportunities for economic growth. Rape and domestic violence cause more death and disability among girls and women aged 16–44 years than do cancer, motor vehicle accidents, war and malaria combined.

Access to social services such as health care and education

Poor governance and lack of resources and capacities affect both the provision of public services and households’ abilities to invest in education and health care. This has negative implications for both mothers and children, most notably in the form of high levels of maternal mortality.

Maternal mortality is high in countries that have been, or still are, in protracted crisis and at the same time are faced with chronic food insecurity (Figure 10). The average maternal mortality ratio (number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in a given year) in the 22 countries in protracted crisis is almost four times as high as the global average, and the rate increases significantly with the duration of the crisis.

Gender-based disparities are also evident in access to education. In countries in protracted crisis, girls tend to have much less access to education than boys do, particularly at the secondary level.

Several factors contribute to these disparities. For instance, when household resources are scarce, boys often get first priority for schooling. Protracted crises can lead to higher drop-out rates for girls as they are forced to assume greater roles within their households. If schools close and children have to travel further to get to school, parents might opt against exposing their daughters to dangers inherent in travel, such as sexual violence.

Low levels of school attainment by girls are associated with higher levels of malnutrition. For instance, the odds of having a stunted child decrease by about 4 to 5 percent for every additional year of formal education achieved by mothers. Reduced livelihood opportunities can also increase the vulnerability of girls and women over the longer term. Yet public investment in the education sector in countries in protracted crises is generally low, as is investment from aid (see pages 27–31).

Stress on livelihood strategies and survival or coping mechanisms

Protracted crises reduce household livelihood security, most importantly by restricting access to economic opportunities, reducing investment choices and reducing or destroying household assets. Women are often over-represented in crisis zones because men are more likely to migrate in search of work elsewhere or to become fighters in military operations. The outcome is often a heavily altered demographic structure in the crisis-affected areas, with high proportions of female-headed households. Such households are particularly vulnerable because they commonly have a higher share of old people and children, fewer assets and less access to resources. Liberia provides a telling example. In 2005, 14 years after the armed conflict began, over half of Liberian families were headed by a single parent, most of whom were women. In addition, there were many single mothers with children born outside of marriage, often the result of rape. Such women are extremely vulnerable to social isolation and discrimination.
Countries in protracted crisis: what are they and why do they deserve special attention?

Relations among household members and gender roles are also affected, but the extent to which crisis and conflict change gender roles (and for how long) remains the subject of debate. Crisis and conflict cause the breakdown of many traditional roles and barriers, and may open new space for women in terms of livelihoods, economic roles, and community leadership. Women may take a more active role in economic affairs and begin performing work that is confined to men in “normal” times. For example, during the civil war in Sri Lanka rural women took a larger role in marketing activities because men were more liable to be detained at army checkpoints or by the rebels.38

Yet in most cases gender roles may be modified only temporarily, returning to pre-crisis patterns when the crisis is over. For instance, urban insecurity in Zimbabwe in 2006 drove many men to return to their rural homes, resulting in a sharp decline in household earnings. As a consequence, the gender difference in incomes temporarily declined. However, economic improvements in 2007 provided fewer opportunities for women than for men, largely because rigid social norms have stereotyped them as household caretakers.39 Thus, sharp gender disparities have re-emerged in rural Zimbabwe because of limited recognition and value given to women’s domestic work, combined with severe constraints on women’s mobility to participate in non-domestic economic opportunities.

Similarly, the demographic impact of the Liberian crisis undoubtedly contributed to the prominent role that women now play in the production of food crops and in the processing of agricultural produce. However, women’s participation in cash crop production and other more lucrative agricultural activities continues to be constrained by an inflexible gender division of labour, reducing their households’ food security as well as reducing the productivity of the agriculture sector in general.40

■ Incorporating a gender perspective into responses to protracted crises

By definition, humanitarian and early recovery responses to protracted crises are carried out in difficult situations. It is therefore understandable that they often focus on the “big picture”: saving lives, delivering essential supplies, protecting basic human rights and trying to build the social and economic foundations for long-term recovery. In the midst of these urgent challenges, gender issues may seem irrelevant or of little importance.

Yet, in most cases, a gender perspective in humanitarian assistance can help address these more visible challenges. As noted in a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) report, “a gender perspective can assist in the profiling and understanding of vulnerabilities and capacities, assist humanitarian agencies channel resources to those most in need, and also assist in the mobilization of a significant proportion of the population whose capacities are often underestimated”.41

The first step to incorporating gender into humanitarian crisis policies and programmes is a sound analysis of differential vulnerabilities and impact generated by the crises as well as differential strengths and capabilities. This would allow planners to target those who face particularly adverse conditions or at least to ensure that their needs are not neglected. Evidence shows that when gender analysis is neglected, humanitarian programmes may cause more harm than good.42

Second, it is important to ensure that actual programmes on the ground are gender-sensitive. Such programmes

---

**FIGURE 10**

Maternal mortality is generally high in countries in protracted crises, and increases with the duration of the crisis.

Maternal mortality rate

Source: UNICEF.

Maternal mortality is generally high in countries in protracted crises, and increases with the duration of the crisis.
should seek to redress not only existing inequalities but to secure and build assets in ways that empower victims of crises (e.g., through safe and secure access to land, cash and other productive resources for women and the youth). Evidence indicates that relief programmes that adopt a gender perspective can avert widespread malnutrition and lead to quick and more widespread recovery in food production and other aspects of livelihoods.43

Third, humanitarian response must deliberately ensure that institutions embrace a gender perspective in which the needs and rights of both women and men are recognized and addressed. As such, community groups and professional networks (including women’s organizations), civil society and other organizations must participate in dialogue to reconstruct the lives and livelihoods of the victims of protracted crises.

The fourth aspect in which gender issues could be integrated into response to protracted crises is in the provision of social services, including but not limited to health and education. The foregoing analysis has shown how the impact of protracted crises on health and education is higher on women than men. Improving access to health and education particularly for women would have a long-term positive effect on social and economic development in communities affected by protracted crises.

Learning from, and building on, community responses

Key message

Local socio-economic and institutional arrangements that existed prior to a protracted crisis – or were developed in response to it – can provide a sustainable basis for addressing drivers of the crisis and for rebuilding livelihoods after the crisis is over.

The role of local organizations and institutions in protracted crisis and post-crisis recovery situations is often ignored by humanitarian aid and development organizations. This section draws on case-study evidence from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sudan to demonstrate how informal socio-economic and institutional arrangements can provide a sustainable basis for addressing drivers of the crisis, rebuilding livelihoods and improving food security. The case studies support the notion that situation assessments should go beyond the identification of immediate humanitarian needs and include an analysis of the local socio-economic and institutional context and the roles to be played by local people’s organizations and institutions.

All four countries reviewed in this section have been affected by prolonged internal and external conflicts; of these, two remain, at least in some areas, in a “no peace, no war” situation. The drivers of the conflicts and of the overall institutional breakdown that have characterized these countries (or parts of these countries) are different but with a number of common elements, such as competition over access to land, conflicts over areas rich in natural resources, social exclusion mechanisms, and overall poor governance.

A major impact of these crises has been a dramatic increase in the level of food insecurity in the countries or regions affected. In Sierra Leone, for instance, two and a half million people (46 percent of the population) were undernourished in 2004–06, 600,000 more than when the war started, while in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the prevalence of undernourishment rose from 26 percent in the period 1990–92 to the current level of around 70 percent. In the Sudan, while national trends indicate progress in the reduction of the level of undernourishment, food insecurity worsened specifically in the regions affected by conflicts such as southern Sudan.44 Furthermore, crises commonly lead to the displacement of large numbers of people and the disruption of the livelihood systems that formerly supported them.45 These consequences, in turn, lead to a vicious cycle of political instability, breakdown of public services and conflict among sections of the population as they compete for access and control over the remaining resources and services.

With the weakening or breakdown of public services, people turn to local initiatives, often based on traditional institutions, for the provision of basic services. These institutions often prove effective and resilient in otherwise chaotic situations.
Local institutions and post-conflict recovery

Numerous studies on countries in protracted crisis have identified local socio-economic and institutional changes that have helped in addressing some of the structural drivers of crises and that could provide a sustainable basis for post-conflict recovery.

For example, in Sierra Leone, many communities developed strong informal networks and local institutions, partly as a reaction to the breakdown of national structures. One study found that, three years after the end of the civil war, measures of local community mobilization and collective action – including the number of community meetings and voter registration – were higher in areas that had experienced more war-related violence against civilians than in areas that had experienced less violence.

A 2009 World Bank report on youth employment in Sierra Leone noted an upsurge in self-organized social activism among young people after the war, including the establishment of business cooperatives, groups aiming at the development of a chiefdom and section or district and occupational groups, such as bike-riders and tape-sellers associations. In the Kono District alone, one NGO study counted 141 groups with membership of more than 17,000 young people.

Fieldwork carried out in Sierra Leone in 2004 and 2008 in Kayima, a village situated in Sandor Chiefdom that had traditionally served as a pool of unskilled mining labour, found that tensions between chiefs and youth over land rights and mining revenues had decreased over the study period as “wartime displacement had fostered a new sense of self-reliance among people of all ages”. Youth also showed a renewed interest in farming and family-oriented life in the village as they turned away from poorly paid diamond mining. Sixty-eight percent of interviewees in Kayima had joined labour cooperatives or social clubs, and credited these organizations with facilitating their successful return to farming. With the return of former miners and others displaced by the conflict, the pool of family labour had grown and local residents could now cultivate larger farms.

Similarly, in eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, local people relied on their own institutions to deal with issues related to access to land that were fueling the conflict. They established so-called chambres de paix or “peace councils”, composed of elders and tasked with investigating land disputes and reaching a compromise solution among the concerned farmers. Some local associations also played a role beyond conflict resolution, introducing collective fields, establishing microcredit systems, informing farmers about their property rights, providing information on the legal framework regulating access to land and advocating at the national level for a modification of the existing land laws. Despite their dynamism and development potential, particularly in addressing the key drivers of food insecurity, these local associations and the chambres de paix lacked technical and financial capabilities and their potential role as building blocks for addressing some of the underlying drivers of food insecurity and conflict was seldom recognized and integrated into the action plans of intervening agencies.

In Liberia, informal institutions played a critical role in the survival and food security of local people during the civil war from the late 1980s to 2003, and indigenous “development associations” were central to the reconstitution of post-conflict governance arrangements, the provision of social protection, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and promotion of food and livelihood security. For example, clan-based networks and membership organizations or “development associations”, such as the Dugbe River Union in Sinoe County and the Seletorwaa development association in Yarwim-Mehnsonnok District, emerged to cope with the drivers of the conflict and its impact on livelihoods. These organizations created safety nets for the vulnerable and food-insecure, resolved conflicts and developed social and physical infrastructure such as clinics, roads, market sheds and community halls.

These observations demonstrate first and foremost the remarkable resilience of local people in the face of conflict. They also illustrate that crises not only lead to devastation: they can also result in important positive institutional and social changes, including increased political awareness and an upsurge in self-organized collective action. Provided they are identified and well-managed, such changes can become powerful drivers for sustainable post-conflict recovery and entry points for more imaginative and empowering support by agencies beyond aid distribution. However, there are risks that local elites can exploit such developments for their own self-interest and that indiscriminate funding of these activities by development agencies can create aid dependency among emerging local organizations. Engaging with such mechanisms thus will require careful situation analysis and monitoring to ensure that efforts to improve the well-being of the broad population are not misdirected.

Building and rebuilding local institutions

Experiences from several countries demonstrate how investments by government, civil society and development agencies can build on and amplify local social and institutional changes.

The farmer field school initiative in Sierra Leone is a good example of how such investments are helping to address some of the food-security-related structural drivers and impacts of the conflict. The Government and its development partners launched the initiative immediately after the end of the war in 2002. The core objectives of the programme were to rebuild trust among members of rural communities ravaged by the civil war and to train farmers, many of whom were young and inexperienced, in basic practices related to agricultural production, processing and marketing. Part of the rationale was also to increase the
accountability of service providers, whether in government or CSOs, to the farming community. This was seen as a way to strengthen and decentralize government institutions that, already weak before the war, had been further debilitated during the war.52

Farmer field schools also provided a unique opportunity to help young people who had never received any formal training during the war years to become viable farmers. Since the inception of the initiative approximately 75 000 farmers, from about 3 000 rural groups, have graduated from such field schools run under either Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS) or NGO extension programmes. Youths accounted for 60 percent of participants in field schools carried out by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-funded programmes between 2004 and 2007. Most graduates either returned to work for existing organizations or went on to establish new farmer-based organizations in their communities. In Sierra Leone, independent impact assessments have shown that they have increased the long-term sustainability of community-led initiatives and helped to rebuild self-sustaining farmer-based organizations.

There has been a similar experience in southern Sudan, where an innovative livestock health programme was able to build on the capabilities of local organizations and institutions to develop community-based services that helped to control livestock rinderpest.53

Initial efforts by Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in 1989–92 to control rinderpest in the area were “top down”, bringing in formally trained animal health workers and establishing a cold-chain to deliver vaccines. No local institutions were involved because OLS wanted to be seen to be independent of parties to the civil war. But this lack of local buy-in proved to be the downfall of the initial effort.

In 1993, the OLS programme changed its strategy towards the use of community-based approaches that built on local institutions, such as informal pastoralist associations. Traditional institutions, such as elders’ groups and other kinship-based associations, were involved in the planning process and herders were trained as vaccinators and supplied with heat-stable rinderpest vaccine. These new approaches quickly achieved positive results. The OLS programme vaccinated over 1 million cattle in 1995, compared with only 140 000 in 1993. Outbreaks of rinderpest decreased from 11 in 1993 to only 1 in 1997. There have been no confirmed outbreaks of rinderpest in southern Sudan since 1998.

The experiences from both Sierra Leone and southern Sudan indicate that livelihoods-based food-security programming is possible in protracted crises. It requires commitment to livelihoods approaches, a strong but flexible coordination effort with control over resources, and support for systematic assessment of the impact of interventions on livelihoods. The involvement of local institutions and an engagement with parties in conflict are fundamental to the success of such programmes.

The Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan case studies indicate that informal socio-economic and institutional arrangements that existed prior to a protracted crisis or developed in response to it can provide a sustainable basis for addressing the drivers of the crisis and rebuilding livelihoods after the crisis is over. In contrast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo case study illustrates how assessments carried out by aid and development agencies are often narrowly focused on identifying immediate needs, while the capabilities and potential roles of local organizations in programme planning and implementation are frequently ignored.

Experiences from Liberia and Sierra Leone also illustrate the importance of addressing the social and economic exclusion of youth. Although this issue is often ignored, it is a major driver of conflict and needs to be addressed if post-conflict recovery is to be sustainable and effective.

The lesson that can be learned from this is that humanitarian and development agencies should base their actions during and after a conflict on an assessment that goes beyond immediate humanitarian needs and includes an analysis of the evolving local socio-economic and institutional contexts.
National and international responses to protracted crises

Analysis of aid flows to countries in protracted crisis

**Key message**

Official development assistance (ODA) contributes to a large share of public expenditure in most countries in protracted crisis. Yet the level of ODA to these countries remains low and unevenly distributed, with key sectors such as agriculture seriously underfunded, and is not adequately linked to development objectives.

Aid to countries in protracted crisis is a major tool used in mitigating the effects of food insecurity and in addressing the structural issues that cause it. As noted earlier (see page 13), countries in protracted crisis are characterized by a relatively high dependence on humanitarian assistance. In most countries in protracted crisis, a large part of the investment in the country’s capital – such as schools, roads, railways, hospitals and land improvements – is also financed by aid. For the 18 countries in protracted crisis for which data were available, external funds accounted for about 80 percent of gross capital formation in 2007, indicating significant dependence on external aid. This section examines trends and volumes of aid flows that went to countries in protracted crisis between 2000 and 2008 and related policy implications. Overall trends are contrasted with data from other least-developed countries (LDCs). Afghanistan and Iraq are excluded because the dramatic increase of development assistance to these two countries risked distorting the overall analysis of aid flows to countries in protracted crisis. Development ODA to Iraq, for example, increased over 120-fold between 2000 and 2008, from US$23 million in 2000 to US$2.8 billion in 2008; while in Afghanistan, development ODA increased more than fifty-fold, from US$63 million in 2000 to US$3.5 billion in 2008. These increases are associated with the conflicts and related security and anti-terrorism concerns that have affected these two countries and, to some degree, a number of other countries in protracted crisis.

Recent trends have seen increased allocation and targeting of development and humanitarian assistance according to security criteria – a phenomenon often labelled the “securitization of aid”. This trend is based on the argument that security is a precondition for emergence from crisis situations. However, some observers are concerned that targeting assistance by security criteria – rather than by poverty or humanitarian criteria – allocates a disproportionate share of resources to the most conflict-affected countries or areas at the expense of other places with equally pressing needs and potentially higher probability of developmental or humanitarian impact from assistance.

**Development aid and humanitarian aid are increasing but better balance is needed**

Globally, both development ODA (excluding debt relief) and humanitarian ODA grew by roughly 60 percent between 2000 and 2008 (Figure 11). Development aid rose from US$59.2 billion in 2000 to US$95.2 billion in 2008, while humanitarian aid increased from US$6.7 billion in 2000 to US$10.7 billion in 2008 (2007 constant prices).

Development aid Development aid to countries in protracted crisis (excluding Afghanistan and Iraq) grew slightly faster than the global average over the period, rising from US$5.5 billion to US$11.0 billion, representing a 100 percent increase between 2000 and 2008. However, it started from very low levels in 2000 (US$5.5 billion), representing 9 percent of all development assistance, while by 2008, it accounted for only 12 percent of all development assistance. Considering the average over the years 2000–02 the per capita rate was equivalent to US$17.87, below the LDC average of US$28.69. Accordingly, 14 of the countries in protracted crisis still received less development aid per capita than the LDC average in the most recent period analysed (2006–08; Figure 12).
Humanitarian assistance to countries in protracted crisis (excluding Afghanistan and Iraq) has risen steadily, resulting in a five-fold increase between 2000 and 2008, from US$978 million to US$4.8 billion. Humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq, overall, has also climbed significantly. In the case of Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance increased from US$155 million in 2000 to US$802 million in 2008. Iraq, in 2000, was receiving US$141 million in humanitarian assistance. By 2008, this had more than doubled to US$359 million, with a peak of US$1.2 billion in 2003. Over the same period, humanitarian assistance has become increasingly concentrated among countries in protracted crisis; the proportion of total global humanitarian assistance going to countries in protracted crisis tripled over the period, increasing from 15 percent to 45 percent (56 percent if Afghanistan and Iraq are included). The amount of humanitarian assistance per capita varied widely among countries in protracted crisis and across years, as would be expected given the nature of the response to emergencies (Figure 13). However, unlike development assistance, all countries in protracted crisis received more humanitarian aid per capita than the LDC average.

**Sectoral analysis of aid flows shows that key sectors for food security are underfunded**

This analysis of aid flows to different sectors focuses on agriculture and education – two sectors that are particularly crucial for food security. Regrettably, the way ODA data are organized preclude a more detailed analysis of the kinds of programming that appear to be most relevant to protracted crises, such as assistance to livelihood promotion or social protection.

Based on 2005–2008 ODA commitments, only 3.1 percent of development ODA received by countries in protracted crisis is dedicated to agriculture (Figure 14), compared with an average of 5.8 percent for LDCs. Yet the agriculture sector accounts for an average of 32 percent of protracted crisis countries’ GDP and employs an average of 62 percent of their populations (see Annex table 2), proportions similar to those of the group of LDCs. The case studies presented in this report (see, in particular, pages 18–21) illustrate the importance of agricultural and rural-based livelihoods to the groups most affected by protracted crises.

Similarly, the percentage of development ODA allocated to education is very low in countries in protracted crisis (3.8 percent, compared with an average of 9.6 percent for LDCs), while basic (i.e. primary) education receives just 1.6 percent, compared with an average of 3.5 percent for LDCs.

All but three (Angola, Eritrea and Guinea) of the 22 countries in protracted crisis receive a lower percentage of development ODA targeted to basic education than the average for LDCs (Figure 15). However, given the low level of per capita ODA that these three countries receive, aid flows to basic education remain very low even here.

Yet education is vital to achieving food security in the long-run. There is ample evidence that investing in education, particularly basic education, contributes to reducing hunger and undernourishment by increasing the productivity of smallholders and subsistence farmers. Low levels of school attainment are associated with high levels of undernourishment. A survey conducted for the World Bank found that a farmer with four years of primary education is, on average, almost 9 percent more productive than a farmer with no education.

**Food aid remains the best-supported humanitarian response, especially in countries in protracted crisis**

As with development ODA, agriculture received a small proportion of total humanitarian assistance (3 percent of total commitments globally in 2009, and 4 percent in protracted crisis countries). Education received a mere 2 percent of humanitarian ODA.

The allocation of humanitarian assistance through the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) illustrates the current priority given to food aid over other forms of assistance – globally and in countries in protracted crisis.

Food aid is the best-funded sector of humanitarian aid, receiving on average 96 percent of funding requested globally through the CAP between 2000 and 2008. Countries in protracted crisis fared slightly less well, receiving 84 percent of funding requested for food aid over
National and international responses to protracted crises

**FIGURE 12**

Patterns of development ODA per capita vary widely among countries in protracted crisis

Per capita development ODA (US$)

![Graph showing patterns of development ODA per capita for various countries in protracted crisis](image)

- **Note:** PC = countries in protracted crisis; LDC = least-developed countries (excluding countries in protracted crisis).
- **Sources:** OECD-DAC online database; World Bank World Development Indicators website.

**FIGURE 13**

Humanitarian ODA fluctuates widely from year to year, but countries in protracted crisis receive more than the average for least-developed countries

Per capita humanitarian ODA (US$)

![Graph showing humanitarian ODA for various countries](image)

- **Note:** PC = countries in protracted crisis; LDC = least-developed countries (excluding countries in protracted crisis).
- **Sources:** OECD-DAC online database; World Bank World Development Indicators website.
National and international responses to protracted crises

**FIGURE 14**

Agriculture is vital to the economies of countries in protracted crisis, yet receives a small fraction of development ODA

Development ODA to agriculture as a percentage of total ODA, 2005–08

![Graph showing Development ODA to agriculture as a percentage of total ODA, 2005–08 for various countries.](image)

*Note:* PC = countries in protracted crisis; LDC = least-developed countries (excluding countries in protracted crisis).

Source: OECD-CRS database.

**FIGURE 15**

Only a small percentage of development ODA is dedicated to supporting basic education in countries in protracted crisis, less even than the average for LDCs in most cases

Development ODA to basic education as a percentage of total ODA, 2005–08

![Graph showing Development ODA to basic education as a percentage of total ODA, 2005–08 for various countries.](image)

*Note:* PC = countries in protracted crisis; LDC = least-developed countries (excluding countries in protracted crisis).

Source: OECD-CRS database.
the same period (Figure 16). On average, the agriculture sector fares less well than the food aid sector, receiving on average just 44 percent of funds requested globally and 45 percent in countries in protracted crisis between 2000 and 2008. Education and other key sectors such as water and sanitation also received less than 50 percent of assessed needs.

- **Aid flows: what does this mean for food security in countries in protracted crisis?**

The current low level of ODA to countries in protracted crisis should be reconsidered given that most of them still depend on external aid for a large part of their pro-poor public investments. At the same time, humanitarian assistance – which has increased rapidly and has been a major source of aid over prolonged periods of time – should be integrated with development assistance within a long-term policy and planning framework. This will require significant rethinking of the ways assistance is delivered to these countries.

Regarding food security, it is difficult to track investments aimed at reducing food insecurity using existing data sets, and almost impossible to identify key initiatives such as livelihoods promotion and protection and social protection. This limits the ability to formulate policy decisions that would contribute to reducing food insecurity.

Despite these limitations, a sectoral analysis of aid flows provides a number of indications. Both development and humanitarian assistance to agriculture in countries in protracted crisis are below the LDC average, despite the fact that such investments are crucial for rebuilding and promoting livelihoods. Basic education is also underfunded relative to the key role it has in promoting long-term food security. Long-term gains in food security are therefore compromised. At the same time, food aid receives support close to actual needs. Food aid is vital for preserving lives and protecting livelihoods in countries in crisis, and must continue to receive support from donors, but action is needed to raise awareness of the shortfalls in funding for other areas that can help these countries build the foundations of long-term food security.

**FIGURE 16**

Most sectors received less than half of the funds they requested through the Consolidated Appeal Process between 2000 and 2008

Percentage of requested funding received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Countries in protracted crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection/ Human Rights/ Rule of Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Financial Tracking System (FTS) database.
Humanitarian food assistance in protracted crises

**Key message**

Humanitarian food assistance not only saves lives in protracted crises, but is also an investment in long-term food security and future development.

Humanitarian food assistance is a significant feature of protracted crisis environments. It saves lives and helps address the scarcity or deprivation that underlies many protracted crises. Humanitarian food assistance is also an investment in a country’s future. Emergency food support that safeguards nutrition and livelihoods and supports education provides a strong basis for food security in the longer term and represents a potentially crucial investment in future development. The many operational and political challenges of working in protracted crises, however, should not be underestimated.

**From food aid to food assistance: a strategic shift**

Year after year, the largest share of the commitments made in response to UN appeals for emergencies worldwide goes to food assistance, which includes in-kind food aid, cash contributions for the local and regional purchase of food, food vouchers and cash provided directly to the beneficiaries.63 Forty-four percent of the original 2009 Humanitarian Appeal, for instance, was for food and food-assisted programmes (US$3.1 billion of US$7 billion sought).

Observers have long feared that humanitarian aid – particularly prolonged food aid – can undermine local economies and damage local agricultural production. Recent years have seen a notable shift away from food aid imports to more sustainable and developmental procurement practices. Food assistance in crisis situations no longer means just food aid; new tools are available to WFP and other agencies working in protracted crisis environments. In countries or areas where markets are functioning poorly, food assistance might mean the provision of food directly to families, as the most basic form of safety net. Where markets are in place and distribution infrastructure exists, it can mean the provision of cash or vouchers, which enable recipients to purchase food items directly at selected shops. The possibility of tailoring interventions to specific contexts has made it possible to provide more nuanced and context-specific interventions and helped alleviate concerns about the possible disincentive effects of prolonged assistance.

The largest food assistance agency, WFP, now buys more food for distribution than it receives in kind. In 2009, 80 percent of WFP’s purchases were made in developing countries, including in 12 of the 22 countries in protracted crisis considered in this report. WFP has also realigned the way it buys food to address more effectively the root causes of hunger: “Purchase for Progress”, begun in 2008, is designed to enhance smallholders’ and low-income farmers’ access to markets where they can sell their produce at competitive prices. In Liberia, for instance, the initiative involves 5 600 farmers and is expected to improve their linkages to markets and build national capacity in production, processing and marketing of agricultural produce. Eight countries in protracted crisis are among the initiative’s pilot countries, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and the Sudan.

**Humanitarian food assistance as an investment in a country’s future**

During the acute phase of a crisis, food-assistance safety nets – including blanket and targeted food or cash transfers, mother and child nutrition and school meal programmes – are life-saving interventions and are often funded from specifically humanitarian resource pools. Yet these activities also help to preserve the human assets that are a necessary foundation for a country’s future stability, food security and growth.

Food assistance given to safeguard mothers’ and young children’s nutrition, for example, is a powerful basis for longer-term development – even a few months of inadequate nutrition in young children can have irreversible, life-long negative effects on health, education and productivity (see Box 6). Estimates of GDP lost to malnutrition range from 2–3 percent in many countries to 11 percent in some Central American countries.65

School meals have proved effective in protecting vulnerable people while providing nutrition, education and gender-equity benefits, along with a wide range of socio-economic gains.66 In an emergency or protracted crisis context, school feeding encourages children to enter and remain in school by providing food to the household on condition that children attend class. In a post-crisis or transition context, school-feeding programmes can restore the educational system and encourage the return of IDPs and
Refugees by signalling that basic services are operating and it is thus safe to return home. Food-assistance safety nets also include productive activities such as food- or cash-for-work to rehabilitate community assets, preserve livelihoods and increase households’ resilience. In Haiti, food- and cash-for-work are used to meet the immediate needs of food-insecure populations while supporting the rebuilding of vital economic and social community assets that will increase households’ resilience to disasters (see Box 7).

Humanitarian activities in the “gap” between relief and development

The role of agencies providing humanitarian food assistance is significant: crisis-affected populations need the basic services and livelihood opportunities that they provide. And the capacity – or, in some cases, willingness – of states to meet these needs is often lacking.

Development initiatives for poverty reduction and employment investments are often non-existent during protracted crises, too slowly introduced or insufficiently targeted to the poorest and the hungry. Humanitarian food assistance can begin to facilitate a movement towards development, helping to reduce underlying risk factors, build resilience and provide a basis for eventual national social protection. However, it is not a substitute for other forms of effective international engagement in crises, including the provision of alternatives to humanitarian assistance.

Moreover, no international engagement is a substitute for effective and accountable national government and social protection systems.

The fact that humanitarian food assistance can be a basis for development does not mean that it alone should be held accountable to development objectives and principles. Acting according to humanitarian principles, which stress independence and neutrality in order to meet...
The acute needs of individuals in a timely and impartial manner, is not always compatible with working through and building the capacity of state or local institutions. Because states in a protracted crisis usually have insufficient capacity to meet people’s needs, and may even be perpetrating the crisis that causes them, state structures cannot be counted on to facilitate or channel life-saving assistance and to reach people in need impartially. Humanitarian investments may in some cases support state institutions but may also not be optimal for longer-term capacity-building. This is not necessarily counterproductive for the state; on the contrary, maintaining all parties’ perception of humanitarian agencies’ neutrality is essential if agencies are also to be able to work with states and affected communities in the post-crisis phase as a credible and trusted development interlocutor. Humanitarian food assistance can also help to lay a foundation for food security and future development by improving disaster preparedness and risk reduction, as well as by safeguarding nutrition, education and livelihoods. Where a protracted crisis results from, or is compounded by, recurrent natural disasters, humanitarian food assistance represents an opportunity to begin such measures. The development of Ethiopia’s well-known Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) – which reaches about 7.3 million rural dwellers with transfers of food or cash to help bridge food-deficit periods while generating community assets – was based in part on decades of experience in responding to individual disasters and famines through humanitarian food assistance. The PSNP marries the humanitarian food agencies’ understanding of vulnerability with, among other components, the lessons learned from successful community-based asset development schemes such as MERET – a WFP-supported government programme supporting sustainable land and water management and increased productivity in food-insecure communities. The PSNP is also an example of how countries emerging from protracted crises can build long-term assistance programmes for vulnerable groups on the basis of experience with humanitarian food-assistance safety nets. In contexts where state capacity is especially weak or where violence and rights violations are perpetuating the crisis, the possibility of handover to a responsible and responsive state is more distant, but the assistance itself still serves to protect human and community assets from further harm and loss. This was for years the case in southern Sudan, where conflict and associated human rights abuses caused famines in which many civilians perished. The limits of what humanitarian food assistance could achieve were clear as long as the underlying causes of hunger (e.g. the conflict and rights abuses that provoked the 1988 famine in which 250,000 died) were not stopped. 67 The 2005 Consolidated Peace Agreement represented the beginning of a period in which it was possible to envisage a transition to humanitarian food assistance that more meaningfully supported recovery. At that stage, food distributions helped to meet immediate basic needs while also contributing to building communities’ confidence in the peace process. Returnees, in particular, were targeted with food assistance to help tide them over during the months until they could resettle and harvest from their own farms. A recent study in the Sudan concluded that returnees had the greatest food assistance needs upon arrival, and that the provision of this assistance had one of the most significant positive impacts on reintegration and recovery for this group. 68

**Challenges and risks for food assistance in protracted crises**

Protracted crises pose many challenges and risks that agencies must manage effectively if humanitarian food assistance is both to meet its life-saving objective and to provide a strong basis for food security in the longer term.
Maintaining humanitarian space

Humanitarian actors in many of today’s protracted crisis contexts confront tension between serving the humanitarian imperative – meeting people’s immediate need for food – and adhering to core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Agencies may make compromises on principle in order to gain and maintain access to vulnerable populations. For example, WFP coordinated its operations in northern Sri Lanka in 2006–09 with the Sri Lankan military, which was essential to facilitate important food deliveries to the north of the country. This may also, however, have compromised perceptions of WFP’s humanitarian effort as fully neutral or independent, a situation that may complicate future relations with communities in the Tamil north.

The need to balance conflicting priorities in order to establish and maintain “humanitarian space” is a constant characteristic of food assistance operations in many of today’s protracted crises. The stakes are high; as explained above, maintaining perceptions of humanitarian agencies’ neutrality is essential for the agencies’ ability, during and following a crisis, to work effectively in areas affected by conflict. The perception that humanitarians’ neutrality and independence from political agendas is compromised can be dangerous or deadly for humanitarians and the populations they are trying to assist. In Afghanistan, aid agency staff members have been attacked by armed insurgent groups because of their actual or perceived association with the government or coalition forces. This has had a negative impact not only on the safety of staff, but also on their ability to reach people in need. With the increased targeting of aid workers by insurgents, some organizations have completely halted their assistance in parts of Afghanistan. Arguably, in an increasing number of today’s protracted crises, humanitarians must think beyond their need to be perceived as neutral, independent and impartial in a given country, to how they are associated with global political actors, trends and events, and the likely repercussions of those linkages on future operations.

Doing no harm

Humanitarian food assistance is sometimes the most valuable resource in underserviced, remote and often insecure protracted crisis environments. The way it is targeted and delivered can affect local social and economic relationships. In southern Sudan in the 1990s, Nuer people from Ayod were recruited into militias to raid Dinka areas in part because of a perceived neglect in relief operations in Nuer areas. In Somalia, the targeting of a community and not its neighbour, particularly when the status of both seem the same to the excluded village, can lead to conflict and raiding.

Agencies work to limit unintended negative consequences of their aid on the safety and security of recipients. For example, given the history of violence in Haiti, and Port-au-Prince in particular, the prevention of violence during food distributions after the January 2010 earthquake was a key concern for WFP. Protection measures were immediately integrated into WFP’s food assistance activities, including clear messaging on targeting and entitlements to prevent misunderstandings and conflict; the provision of safe spaces and extra support for pregnant women and elderly and disabled people at food distribution sites; and dissemination of WFP’s zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

What does this mean for food assistance in protracted crises?

Innovative and principled approaches are required to address the challenges of working in protracted crisis environments. Work by humanitarian food-assistance organizations in recent years to integrate a “protection lens” into their assistance activities is promising in this regard. Building on the work of Oxfam and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and working with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Protection Cluster, WFP over the past few years has introduced research and training intended to improve the analysis of beneficiary protection needs in complex environments, advocate more effectively for humanitarian access, manage perceptions of the agency’s neutrality and impartiality and programme food assistance to “do no harm”.

Humanitarian food assistance not only saves lives, but is also an investment in the future. The shift from standard food aid to a varied set of food assistance tools, complemented by innovations in how food is procured, helps to ensure that appropriate assistance is provided and to maximize the chance that humanitarian food assistance will serve as a strong basis for food security in the longer term.

First and foremost, humanitarian food assistance is about meeting acute individual needs. It is not a substitute for other forms of effective international engagement with crises or for required national structural or societal changes and good governance. While food assistance in protracted crises can be developmental in many respects, it should not be oversold and expected to be accountable to development objectives and principles; rather, it should be seen as part of a package of essential interventions in protracted crisis situations. Ultimate accountability for humanitarian action is to individuals in need.
National and international responses to protracted crises

Key message

Social protection systems lay an essential foundation on which to rebuild societies in protracted crisis. However, in contexts where financial, institutional and implementation capacities are limited, social protection programmes are generally short-term, relief-oriented or externally funded.

Beyond improvements in humanitarian food assistance, interest in wider social protection measures in the development sector is growing dramatically. Social protection comprises safety nets, insurance and various sectoral interventions for health, education, nutrition and agriculture. New initiatives are emerging both at the global level, such as the United Nations’ Social Protection Floor Initiative, and at the regional level, such as the Inter-American Social Protection Network. At the country level, a host of experiences is blossoming, including, for example, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and the Hunger Safety Net Programme in Kenya. Sometimes, those components are enshrined in legislation governing specific domains, such as minimum wages in labour markets, and thus set the stage for the so-called “transformative” and rights-based engagement approaches to social protection.

Social protection can be provided formally and informally. The latter includes support and sharing practices within and between communities, while the former concerns arrangements provided publicly (by the state) or privately (through contractual agreements). Public measures can be funded domestically or externally (by donors), while private mechanisms mostly include market-based insurance products.

One of the most challenging debates revolves around social protection in protracted crises. In those contexts, humanitarian and development issues overlap to a large extent, and as a result debates on social protection involve a complex blend of both sets of issues. While there is renewed attention to the need to combine those domains, progress in conceiving social protection systems in protracted crises remains tenuous.

Social protection in protracted crises

In broad terms, social protection can be looked at from a variety of perspectives, including the composition (e.g. mix of safety nets and insurance), form (formal and informal), source of funding (domestic or aid-supported) and level of implementation capacities in the system. Based on those general criteria, countries in protracted crisis show a number of intertwined characteristics.

Overall, there is a paucity of national policy frameworks that provide the foundations for social protection. Elements of social protection are often diffused and not adequately reflected in food security, poverty reduction or development strategies.

The combined effects of high poverty rates, binding budgetary constraints and limited tax revenues stifle countries’ redistribution capacity. As already noted, countries in protracted crisis generally rely heavily on external funding for key social and economic services and investments. This reliance poses serious questions about the domestic affordability and sustainability of social protection in resource-constrained countries.

With this magnitude of external investment, decisions relating to social protection clearly intersect with the aid effectiveness agenda. As stated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “… our actions [in social protection] must be aligned with national policy, in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action”. Therefore, the large shares of external investment in these countries may raise concerns over national ownership of social protection agendas.

Institutional capacities to provide oversight and guidance are often weak. Social protection functions are generally spread across various line ministries, authorities and actors; institutions that share responsibility for social protection may not be among the most influential, compared with, for example, finance ministries. Technical, administrative and...
Trade-offs and innovations

In general, social protection is an integral part of three key debates unfolding in contexts of protracted crises.

The first involves changing from annual relief to multiannual developmental approaches. New initiatives are being explored to transform humanitarian assistance for chronic needs into predictable, longer-term development approaches (see Box 8).

In Ethiopia, for example, the adoption of an entitlement-based approach such as that adopted by the PSNP followed various institutional evolutions. The PSNP draws on lessons learned about enhancing the predictability of the previous Employment Guarantee Scheme, a relief-oriented public works programme (until 2002) and various lessons learned in the first year of implementation (2005).

Second, it is essential to review the effectiveness and efficiency of available programmes. This includes the strategic and operational review of targeting, coverage and performance of various social protection instruments. For example, the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs is in the process of producing a National Social Protection Sector Strategy. This is one of the first efforts to appraise social protection programmes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to unify them under a coherent strategic framework.

Third, innovation is taking place in terms of fostering empowerment and rights-based agendas. A number of initiatives are emerging to enhance social inclusion of marginalized populations and advocate for basic social-protection commitments. For example, in 2006, several African countries signed the “Livingstone Call for Action”, which advocated for greater collaboration and commitments on social protection. These materialized in a new set of consultations led by the African Union in 2008, including recommendations to “establish specific budget lines for social protection that should not be less than 2 percent of GDP”.

These examples show that a number of issues combine in social protection – debates invariably include the identification of an optimal mix of humanitarian and development interventions that could support the transition out of crisis. Although domestic funding of social protection presents daunting challenges, at least in the short term, there

---

**Predictable support for predictable needs: the Hunger Safety Net Programme in Kenya**

The Hunger Safety Net Programme is a programme under the Ministry of Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands. It targets the four largest and poorest districts in arid northern Kenya and uses cash transfers as a means of meeting the consumption needs of food-insecure households. The programme is supported through a UKaid grant from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID). Phase I of the programme will target 60,000 households by the end of 2010. Phase II will scale up to target approximately 300,000 households. The programme is highly innovative, testing approaches such as registration of households using biometrics, real-time data capture and an effective rural-outreach payment system using biometric identification, point-of-sale devices and mobile phone technology. This is a frontier of banking and other financial services in the poorest areas of Kenya.

is new momentum for increasing the importance of social protection on the political agenda (e.g. see Box 8), including forging innovative alliances and sharing an array of successful implementation practices. Future applied-research initiatives should build upon the growing interest and demand for social protection, while informing decision-making processes with credible and context-specific evidence.

From another perspective, these considerations clearly demonstrate the interrelated nature of social protection and growth-oriented interventions: without growth, there is little prospect of financing social protection through domestic resources, but without social protection, future growth patterns may be less inclusive and pro-poor than they might have been. This dilemma involves a number of choices around how interventions are implemented and their possible sequencing (reducing inequality versus promoting growth).

### Sequencing of interventions for food security

Social protection is chiefly about public measures, which raises the issue of defining the scope and size of public assistance for food security. Historically, formal social protection measures in advanced economies were introduced following sustained economic development, and this has led to a lively discussion in developing countries on the appropriateness and viability of a different sequence – namely, about whether sweeping social protection measures could be introduced before solid economic performance. How should limited public budgets be allocated among competing priorities? Should countries invest in enhancing agricultural productivity or expand safety nets for the elderly? Clearly, these issues are further magnified in contexts of protracted crises.

A number of considerations may help inform some of these choices. In situations of post-conflict countries, for example, it is argued that social protection may reduce the likelihood of future conflicts and hence should be enacted before sectoral and macro policies. Moreover, new evidence suggests that trade-offs between efficiency and equity may be less pronounced than is often perceived. In particular, social protection may promote growth in three ways, rather than necessarily retard or jeopardize it.

The first way concerns investments in human capital. For example, improving child nutrition can enhance cognitive development, school attainments and future labour productivity, and thereby enhance earning potentials (see Box 9).

A second stream of growth effects revolves around the adoption of higher-risk but higher-income livelihood options. This is an area where a number of linkages could be established between the social protection and food security agendas. Indeed, farmers may sometimes underperform because of overly conservative practices. Social protection could play an important role by guaranteeing a floor over which more risky but rewarding strategies could be pursued.

A third channel centres on alleviating some market failures (see Box 10).

Taken together, these considerations have helped change the perception of social protection from a mere cost to an investment. However, there are also important limitations and policy implications should be drawn cautiously. For instance, realizing the sustainable growth effects of social protection is likely to take a long time, even up to a generation (e.g. education outcomes). This may clash against shorter-term priorities that vulnerable households and countries often face.

### BOX 9

**Food-for-education in protracted crises: experimental evidence from IDP camps**

Food-for-education (FFE) programmes include two modalities: on-site school feeding and take-home rations. Recent research investigated the impacts of FFE in 31 IDP camps in northern Uganda. Based on a sample survey of about 1,000 households conducted in 2005 and 2007, the evaluation found that on-site school feeding and take-home rations reduced anaemia prevalence by 19.2 percent and 17.2 percent, respectively, among children aged 10–13 years. Moreover, stunting of preschool-age children declined significantly in households with children receiving on-site feeding, possibly as a result of redistribution of food within the household. This gain was primarily concentrated among the younger preschoolers, aged 6–35 months, whose height is most responsive to changes in nutrition. Thus, even in protracted crises it is often possible to lay the foundations for long-term development.

National and international responses to protracted crises

In 2009, WFP and partners implemented a number of cash-based programmes that provided quality food assistance while stimulating local business and the farming sector. Two voucher programmes in protracted crises are highlighted here.

In Afghanistan, WFP implemented a six-month voucher pilot for 10,000 disabled, female-headed and large vulnerable households as well as IDPs in a district of Kabul. Each month, the beneficiaries received a coupon worth US$30 that could be exchanged for food commodities in selected shops. The voucher programme is expected to be scaled up to other urban areas of Afghanistan.

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, WFP launched an urban voucher project targeting nearly 7,800 food-insecure households. In collaboration with NGOs, each month WFP distributed vouchers worth US$56. Vouchers increased beneficiaries’ access to protein-rich food.


- What does this mean for improving social protection in protracted crises?

Social protection programmes in protracted crises are generally relief-oriented, externally funded and of limited scale. They resemble initiatives present in other contexts but without the same level of domestic financial and institutional commitments and capacities to make them a national system. Progress in social protection in protracted crises could potentially help bridge the divide between humanitarian and developmental initiatives. A range of promising policy and programming innovations has emerged that deserves further attention and application.

It has been shown that some considerations are specific to social protection, such as what transfers to use or what targeting methods to employ, while others, such as the role of aid in sustaining social protection systems, raise issues of broader relevance. Indeed, in order to start building national social-protection systems a number of key choices need to be fully recognized and tackled. These include choices between short- and longer-run interventions, domestic and external support, public measures and private incentives, productivity and equity, supply and demand of services, pursuing agendas and promoting ownership. Some of these may be relatively simple choices, while others may involve significant trade-offs and be more difficult to reconcile.

While external support may help unbundle some trade-offs in the short-to-medium term, there is a growing recognition that the current aid system needs to be improved, including fresh thinking on ways to enhance accountability and feedback mechanisms from both aid suppliers and recipients. Social protection platforms must not be developed in isolation, as they tend to be in countries in protracted crisis, but should be part of a broader process to inform decision-making on investment priorities alongside other social and economic sectors.
Using short-term responses to support longer-term recovery in agriculture and food security

Key message

Most responses to protracted crises take place in a humanitarian context that often limits the ability to address the real drivers of the crisis in a more comprehensive way. However, experience in Afghanistan, Haiti, Tajikistan and the West Bank and Gaza Strip shows how linking short- and long-term responses in protracted crises, and undertaking or promoting responses that address the structural causes of crises, can support longer-term recovery in agricultural livelihoods and food security.

Events such as drought, floods, conflicts and other human-induced disasters have tended to be the focus of humanitarian food-security responses and the concepts and tools used in addressing humanitarian crises. However, given the characteristics that differentiate countries in protracted crisis from other food-insecure countries – the breakdown or absence of governance, the presence of conflict or complex crises, types of aid flow, longevity of crisis – greater attention is necessary to ensure the application of available tools, coordination and conceptual frameworks in more holistic and integrated ways that focus on understanding and supporting community resilience and creating more sustainable, diversified livelihoods.

Lessons learned in food and agriculture by FAO and partners in protracted crises

There are numerous examples of how FAO and its partners either have sought or continue to seek creative ways to address key challenges in the agriculture sector that may include but go beyond short-term emergency responses. These responses aim at building more sustainable and durable food production and access in volatile and uncertain environments. They range from seeking to increase food availability and restore local markets through urban gardening in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to encouraging improved natural resource and land management and increased availability of and access to food through conservation agriculture in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe and supplying agricultural inputs to strengthen private-sector seed production in Afghanistan. This section briefly reviews lessons learned by FAO and its partners from interventions linking short- and long-term responses in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A final example briefly reviews how lessons learned in hurricane preparedness were used to guide the development of a new type of project in Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake.

Afghanistan: promoting sustainable livelihoods, food security and nutrition

FAO’s work in Afghanistan provides important lessons in terms of addressing short- and long-term needs in a protracted crisis context. Decades of conflict, compounded by drought, have left Afghanistan with degraded infrastructure, high unemployment and widespread poverty. In 2005, 44 percent of Afghan households perceived themselves as food-insecure. Agriculture plays a prominent role in the Afghan economy, generating an estimated 36 percent of GDP, excluding poppy cultivation and other services related to agriculture, such as food processing.

Two specific examples demonstrate the way that livelihoods have been transformed or constraints addressed through a more integrated approach in Afghanistan. These interventions are supported by an active food-security cluster, jointly coordinated by FAO and WFP, as well as an Agricultural Task Force, supported by the members of the UN country team, that is focused on ways of responding in the immediate-, medium- and longer-term by addressing cross-cutting issues (including food security, agriculture, irrigation, social affairs and health).

First, FAO has implemented programmes in Afghanistan aimed at integrating emergency relief/recovery with nutrition, biodiversity preservation, food security and livelihoods objectives into relevant government policies and institutions, notably in agriculture, rural development, health and education. Strategies promoted to develop the agriculture sector and, in turn, the national economy, have been aimed at diversifying crop and animal production in ways that reach many segments of society. For example, FAO and the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock worked together to expand wheat seed production by supporting private seed enterprises with loans to produce certified and quality-declared seed for the 2008 and 2009 planting seasons. At the end of both seasons, 99 percent of the loans...
had been repaid, with interest, by the seed enterprises. The proceeds (approximately US$5 million) have been used to create a seed industry development fund, managed by the Afghanistan National Seed Association, that will help establish new private seed enterprises in other parts of the country with FAO technical support. The proceeds will be also be used to provide seasonal loans to seed enterprises as a means of supporting increased production of certified seed.97

Second, nutrition programmes were also used as culturally acceptable entry points to address gender issues in Afghanistan. Strategies have aimed at strengthening women’s technical skills by working in partnership with organizations that assist women to form self-help groups to access credit and markets and develop small, agriculture-based businesses.

Lessons learned: These interventions were implemented during a period marked by substantial changes in government structure. Such an evolving institutional context required flexibility that allowed for effective real-time adjustments without compromising longer-term goals, and interventions focused at local levels or other types of entry points – communities, households and small enterprise. Nutrition was a culturally acceptable entry point to address gender issues in Afghanistan, even when women remain excluded from public life. Assisting line ministries and local institutions in project planning and resource mobilization for food security interventions helped fill identified gaps and scale up successful interventions.

West Bank and Gaza Strip: improving understanding of food security for better programming.

WFP and FAO have worked closely with the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) to establish a socio-economic and food-security monitoring system (SEFSec) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 2008. At the time SEFSec was conceived, no territory-wide, household-level socio-economic survey or monitoring had been done for almost ten years and the PCBS had stopped monitoring the impact of border-crossing restrictions in 2002. The PCBS had tried to establish a more traditional food-security information system, but there was little uptake of the system; users found that it did not focus sufficiently on access to food, which is the most critical and relevant dimension of food insecurity in the context of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

SEFSec was established to provide accurate and up-to-date socio-economic and food-security information in order to be able to: track trends over time and inform decisions about programming and targeting assistance; provide disaggregated information at governorate level and by type of person (for example, refugee or non-refugee); make data more readily available and more frequently monitored; and develop the capacity of the PCBS to analyse food security. Recent SEFSec reports confirmed that food insecurity in both results from insufficient and unstable access to food but, more significantly, that access and market-based indicators need to be selected and systematically monitored over time. After a second year of joint surveying (2010), the PCBS will conduct the 2011 survey, with key indicators gathered twice per year or annually as part of the Bureau’s regular programme of work.

The SEFSec approach has helped design new forms of safety nets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. WFP and Oxfam launched an urban food assistance voucher programme for the Gaza Strip in late 2009 in response to high food prices identified by SEFSec. Thus, WFP was able to use short-term funding to identify needs requiring longer-term interventions related to monitoring and gathering information on food access. The longer-term impact of the programme is focused on strengthening urban livelihoods by supporting market development and identifying ways for small enterprises to remain viable when challenged with closure policy and income poverty. FAO’s work in the West Bank has a similar focus on supporting rural livelihoods, in that the aim is to protect access to land and help alleviate pressures on farmers to abandon their land. Moreover, SEFSec has enabled statistical profiling of food-insecure households (including size, age/gender composition, education, employment, dependency ratio), which has significantly improved humanitarian targeting; for example, FAO has enhanced the women and youth focus of its field programme.

Lessons learned: The strong shared history of collaboration between FAO and WFP has provided the foundation for a more unified approach to working with the PCBS on food security monitoring, and this collaboration has helped facilitate communication on food security among various departments and ministries within the Palestinian Authority. Capacity development in food security analysis and monitoring takes time, and in the case of the PCBS has been largely driven by strong collaboration between FAO and WFP over the past eight years. A more holistic approach to the analysis of food insecurity has helped illustrate its full extent in terms of income poverty, closure policy and the undermining, and in some cases destruction, of livelihoods. It has also provided the basis for greater advocacy and messaging related to food insecurity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Tajikistan: institutional and gender-sensitive land reform

Tajikistan remains one of the poorest countries among the former Soviet republics, with poverty concentrated in rural areas. Civil conflict from 1992 to 1997 resulted in a large number of IDPs, disabled people and widows. The collapse of state social safety nets exacerbated poverty, particularly for rural women. Women were, in many cases, the primary source of financial support for their families and households, and while 73 percent of all agricultural workers were women, only 2 percent of private farms were owned by women. There was a need for greater awareness of gender-related issues in agriculture, particularly in the context of the unfolding land reform process.
Between 2006 and 2008, FAO and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) implemented a project to improve land reform management and monitoring systems, with a special focus on promoting gender equality and consultative processes. One of the aims of the project was to support women in securing their land-use rights and livelihoods, and focused on campaigns to raise awareness of impending land reform for ten state farms. More than 60 seminars were conducted on the state farms, reaching 3,784 participants, 55 percent of whom were women. To enhance the gender responsiveness of key government institutions, a network of national gender specialists was formed in the Agency of Land Tenure, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Water Resources, Association of Dekhkan Farms, Agroinvestbank and the Agency for Statistics. Throughout this process, FAO and UNIFEM worked closely with the former State Land Committee (now renamed the Agency for Land Management, Geodesy and Cartography).

**Lessons learned:** Efforts at land reform were weakened by the lack of capacity to undertake sustainable actions aimed at achieving gender equality and a poor understanding of gender analysis and a gender mainstreaming approach. Interventions needed to be developed by specialists with a holistic perspective. Traditional technical experts may not necessarily adopt people-centred approaches in addressing technical problems. Adoption of consultative processes and participatory approaches helped reduce the disproportionate emphasis on external support in rural areas, and helped women secure their land-use rights and livelihoods.

**Haiti: strengthening climate resilience and reducing disaster risk in agriculture to improve food security post-earthquake**

The earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 left Port-au-Prince and surrounding villages in ruins, displaced an estimated two million people and injured or killed hundreds of thousands. The situation in rural areas was made all the more difficult given reports of as many as 600,000 people who had to move back to rural areas, compounded by the disruption of markets and livelihoods caused by the earthquake. The agriculture sector has become increasingly vulnerable over recent decades because of a combination of population pressure, environmental degradation, inefficient land-use systems, poverty, governance problems and high exposure to recurrent natural hazards such as hurricanes, drought, landslides, earthquakes and tidal waves.

FAO formulated a project, financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), World Bank, that for the first time under this funding window explicitly integrated emergency relief (agricultural inputs) with identified good practice in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. FAO had previously undertaken a regional project in the Caribbean that had identified good practice in adapting to climate change and identified and multiplied seed of high-quality, shorter-cycle crop varieties that were developed as part of hurricane preparedness for Haiti. Lessons learned from the previous work were used in planning the GEF-funded project interventions.

Interventions include promoting soil conservation and agroforestry practices that have proved effective in reducing risks associated with climate hazards; identifying, multiplying and distributing seed of short-cycle, drought- and flood-tolerant crops that had already been accepted by local farmers and adapted to changes in local climatic conditions; and promoting good agricultural practices that enhance risk reduction and risk management.

**Lessons learned:** Actively seeking ways to link short-term and long-term needs through one programming and funding window may provide a good opportunity to ensure that Haitians’ livelihoods are restored and transformed, and that results are sustainable. Accessing good practice and lessons learned from a wide variety of disciplines have provided ways forward in terms of integrating multiple programming entry points. One of the key challenges in integrating short- and long-term needs has been resolving the tensions between the more operational and relief-focused humanitarian actors and the more systematic and longer-term focus of development practitioners, particularly in terms of cost-benefits, coverage of beneficiaries and concepts related to sustainability.

### Ways forward

For all the examples above, activities were developed through a unified food-security strategy that integrated short- and longer-term dimensions. However, they are still far from a comprehensive approach for addressing short- and longer-term issues such as institutional weakness affecting livelihoods. Most responses to protracted crises take place in a humanitarian context that often limits the possibility of addressing the different drivers of the crisis in a more coordinated and holistic way. However, humanitarian food-security clusters in protracted crises can provide important platforms for strengthening linkages between immediate humanitarian responses and longer-term development assistance aimed at addressing underlying structural factors limiting livelihoods. At a more global level, a similar arrangement could further facilitate these efforts (see Box 11). Clusters can develop transition strategies to ensure a smooth handover to development structures and processes and bring together the main national and international partners active in the food security sector.

From a conceptual point of view, simultaneously addressing short- and longer-term food-security issues in protracted crisis situations is not a new idea. What has perhaps changed in recent years is the extent to which such thinking has been put into practice and, in a growing number of instances, mainstreamed. Major donors have highlighted the need to link humanitarian food assistance
National and international responses to protracted crises

**Box 11**

Global Food Security Cluster

The “cluster approach” is a key element of the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review, commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the subsequent Reform Initiative for improved efficiency, increased predictability and higher accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies. FAO and WFP have been fully engaged in the process since the onset; WFP as global lead of the logistics and emergency telecommunications clusters and as lead for food assistance at the country level, and FAO as global lead of the agriculture cluster.

Country-level clusters or coordination arrangements for food security have long existed between FAO and WFP — for example, in late 2009, FAO and WFP were already co-leading food security-related clusters in 11 countries and co-leading along with other partners in a further 5 countries. The Phase 1 cluster evaluation by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, completed in late 2007, proposed that WFP and FAO give consideration to the co-leadership of a global cluster on food security, together with other partners. The provisional report of the Phase 2 cluster evaluation recommends that this now be implemented.

Similarly, the 2008 conference on Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response (see Box 13 on page 48) encouraged FAO, WFP and key partners to move ahead in establishing such a global cluster. Since February 2010 WFP and FAO have embarked on a structured process to establish the Global Food Security Cluster before the end of the year.

Success stories: the example of Mozambique

**Key message**

Countries can move out of protracted crisis situations. This requires improved governance, understanding structural drivers of the crisis and addressing them with sound policy action. Involvement of local communities and enhanced donor coordination are also essential.

After its independence in 1975 Mozambique descended into three decades of armed conflict that left the country socially and economically devastated. One million people died and 5 million were internally displaced or made refugees in neighbouring countries. By the end of the conflict in 1992, 40 percent of first-level health posts and 60 percent of primary schools had been closed or destroyed and GDP was only half of what it could have been.94 Since the signing of the peace accords in 1992, Mozambique has enjoyed a period of remarkable stability and has become a success story in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. According to the World Bank,95 economic growth averaged 8 percent a year between 1996 and 2008. Since 1992, agricultural output has grown by 5.6 percent a year, mainly as a result of expansion of the area cultivated but also in part because of growth in the agricultural labour force and increases in productivity. The country also saw a 15 percent fall in poverty between 1997 and 2003. There has been a substantial increase in human development indicators such as education, child mortality and access to safe water, although the country still ranks
172nd out of the 182 countries in the Human Development Index. Finally, incidence of hunger in Mozambique is continuing to decline steadily (Figure 17), but the country has some way to go to achieve MDG 1.

The country’s successful post-conflict recovery has been attributed to a variety of macro-level factors, including macro-economic stability, policy reform, pro-poor government expenditures and the massive inflow of aid in support of economic and social development. In recent years, increased decentralization, strong donor coordination and harmonization in support of government-led programmes and private-sector investment have also played important roles. However, the foundation for post-conflict recovery was laid in the immediate aftermath of the conflict through the successful demobilization of fighters and resettlement of displaced people, without which economic and social development could not have taken hold. A governance structure that focused on disaster prevention and mitigation was also instrumental in this process.

■ Social engagement in dealing with key issues:

the example of land access

Another key to the post-conflict recovery was the effort made to deal with land access issues. Conflict over access to land, a key driver of the civil war, re-emerged in the immediate aftermath of the war as a potentially explosive source of tension. When the millions of displaced people and former fighters returned to the land they had abandoned, they often found their land had been occupied by others. Private investors were also rushing to the rural areas to bring apparently “free” land into production. As a result, occupants, returnees and private investors often clashed over who had the right to use the land. Such disputes were often aggravated by a dysfunctional state administration weakened by years of war. The situation was also not helped by the 1979 land legislation that was still in place. This land law was based on the post-independence socialist agrarian model and did not reflect customary land-tenure systems, which were still alive and respected despite the long conflict and official policy changes.

A key instrument in the process adopted for dealing with the land issue was the creation of an Interministerial Land Commission, with FAO support, which provided an open and democratic forum for developing a new land policy. Great efforts were made to involve many groups, including civil society, peasant organizations, the nascent private sector, national academics and all those public sectors with some stake in how land and other resources are accessed and used. The policy review process began with an extensive and inclusive consultation process that was started in the immediate aftermath of the war and was informed by a thorough analysis of the social and economic realities of land tenure in Mozambique.

What was most evident was the continuing legitimacy and role of customary authorities in the aftermath of the war, and how they were effectively managing the vast majority of land access and conflict issues in this critical period. This experience led to the recognition of the usefulness of these customary systems and the rights people had acquired through them, and informed the integration of aspects of customary and formal law into the development of the new land legislation. This key policy move successfully dealt with a range of emerging tensions and provided the bedrock for a new land law, enacted in 1997, that also provided secure tenure for new private investors, seen by the Government as a key element for post-war recovery in a decapitalized and still poor country. This was done by making “community consultations” a mandatory part of the investment process, promoting a negotiated and consensus-building approach to the complex issue of giving land to new investors.

The result has been a policy and law with great social legitimacy and a strong sense of national ownership, both critical ingredients in any post-conflict settlement. The legislation was designed to serve simultaneously the social and economic needs and rights of local communities and broader national economic development objectives, both of which are essential for the consolidation of the post-conflict recovery process.

Today, over ten years later, the Land Policy is still in place and the 1997 law has achieved its basic goal of maintaining order and food security while also promoting new investment. This policy and legal framework has done much to promote a more equitable and sustainable path towards economic growth and social development in a country with a still predominantly rural population.

The way in which the land challenge was met in the mid-1990s has created a strong awareness in the wider society of the value of a negotiated and participatory approach to complex policy questions and has led to the expectation that the Government will continue to build on past experience and address the land issue—and indeed other pressing social and economic issues—through a similar process of broadly-based social and political engagement.
Towards ensuring food security in protracted crises: recommended actions

Countries in protracted crisis are characterized by long-lasting or recurring crises and conflict, extensive breakdown of livelihoods and very little institutional capacity to respond. As a result, the proportion of undernourished people in countries in protracted crisis (excluding China and India) is three times as high as it is in other developing countries. About one-fifth of the world’s estimated 925 million undernourished people live in the 22 countries currently considered to be in protracted crisis. Because of the distinctive features of protracted crises, appropriate responses differ from those required in short-term crises or in non-crisis development contexts. Countries in protracted crisis thus need to be considered as a special category with special requirements in terms of interventions by the development community.

The findings presented in The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010 lead to three main sets of recommendations for addressing food insecurity in protracted crises:

- improving analysis and understanding;
- improving support for livelihoods and food security; and
- reforming the “architecture” of assistance.

Improving analysis and understanding

While protracted crises have some general characteristics in common, the case studies considered in this report make it clear that each crisis has its own context-specific characteristics. Each case is different and responses – whether internal or external – must be tailored to the specifics of each case. Identification of appropriate responses is often hobbled by poor or non-existent data. With the exception of a few high-profile crises, data are often lacking or of poor quality, making it difficult to understand the dynamics of protracted crises.

Current understanding of protracted crises remains superficial and narrow. While humanitarian emergencies clearly require rapid assessments of needs, protracted crises require analysis that is both broader and deeper. An in-depth understanding of livelihoods, gender dynamics, the social context and local and national institutions is required not only to address the critical constraints to livelihoods at the household level but also to understand the underlying causes of the crisis. And better analysis is needed to understand the nuances of livelihood adaptations in protracted crises, some of which can be built upon by external actors (e.g. remittances and changes in local institutions governing property rights in land and natural resources), and some of which should be mitigated (e.g. over-exploitation of natural resources).

The ability to compare the severity of crisis across different contexts is important to reduce the risks of uneven aid allocation and the related “forgotten-crisis” syndrome. This is an area in which good progress has been made, but this progress needs to be expanded – particularly in countries in protracted crises. An emerging approach to this is the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) (see Box 12). One distinguishing feature of the IPC is that its development is the result of collaboration between several agencies that does not replace existing analytical tools or other food security analysis efforts but complements them through a transparent and partnership-based approach.

Progress has also been made in improving the match between assessed needs, analysis of underlying causes and proposed assistance, but much of this effort is still in the pilot stage and too often responses still jump straight to implementing “tried and true” interventions in a protracted crisis. But these are often the wrong form of assistance and have little impact.

Similarly, assessment of the impact of both external interventions and local responses to protracted crises has improved, but many donors and agencies are still reluctant to invest in impact assessment, as well as in response analysis, to the required extent. Impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation systems and learning and accountability mechanisms all need to be strengthened if we are to improve the way in which we respond to food security in protracted crises.
Towards ensuring food security in protracted crises: recommended actions

■ Improving support to livelihoods for food security

Responses that save lives are indispensable, but in countries in protracted crisis there is a need to move towards improving support for livelihoods, social protection and risk reduction while retaining the capacity and flexibility of responding to acute crises.

Livelihoods assessments must take into account key dynamics of local institutions (including power and conflict dynamics) in order to better understand the drivers of crisis and identify adequate forms of assistance as well as trustworthy and sustainable partners to address long-term needs. The examples drawn from Sierra Leone and the Sudan demonstrate that external assistance can either be helpful or harmful – depending on how livelihoods dynamics are understood and must recognize and support livelihood innovations on the ground while deterring maladaptive practices relied on by populations under extreme duress.

■ Reforming the “architecture” of assistance

The experiences described in the preceding chapters of this report show that there is a gap between the reality on the ground in protracted crises and the architecture of international assistance in place to address protracted crises. Recognition of this gap is not new; indeed, a global forum of
Towards ensuring food security in protracted crises: recommended actions

**RECOMMENDATION 1**

**Support further analysis and deeper understanding of people’s livelihoods and coping mechanisms in protracted crises in order to strengthen their resilience and enhance the effectiveness of assistance programmes**

- Donors and agencies must invest more in analysis, impact assessment and lessons learning in protracted crisis situations. This includes both financial and human resources.
- Information systems should be strengthened and expanded. Assessment of humanitarian needs is critical, but analysis must also be broadened to include livelihoods and local and national institutions, which can support livelihoods, but may also be at the heart of the causes of protracted crises.
- Response analysis must be improved, building capacities in both production and use of better-informed analysis of options for assistance.
- The ability to compare needs across different and varied contexts must continue to improve in order to enhance aid allocation and prevent the “forgotten crisis” syndrome.
- The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) should regularly monitor and discuss the overall situation in countries in protracted crisis.

**RECOMMENDATION 2**

**Support the protection, promotion and rebuilding of livelihoods, and the institutions that support and enable livelihoods, in countries in protracted crisis**

- Governments, donors and agencies should better link responses that address both short- and longer-term needs through improved food assistance, social protection and investments in agriculture as well as non-agricultural livelihoods.
- Provisioning, protection and longer-term promotion of livelihoods should be stepped up using a variety of instruments that support people’s resilience and address vulnerability (e.g. safety nets, nutritional support, and developing people’s capacity to produce and acquire food). Gender differences should be duly recognized.
- Support for livelihoods must build on existing capacity and should strengthen positive livelihood adaptations in specific contexts while preventing and/or mitigating maladaptive strategies.
- Efforts should focus on helping to rebuild and/or promote local institutions that support livelihoods.

UN organizations, NGOs and the Red Cross movement addressed many of these issues in 2008 (see Box 13).

The findings of the 2008 conference are even more urgent today – particularly in protracted crises. Part of the need to improve aid architecture is to better bridge the gap between classic approaches to “relief” (or humanitarian response) and “development”. The ways donors currently classify humanitarian and development activities do not match – or account for – the diversity of interventions being undertaken or the array of local responses to protracted crises. External forms of assistance are inadequately described by either these labels or the time-frames presumed to correspond to them. Donors should allocate – and account for – funding according to assessed need and programming opportunities, with the requisite resources for responding to conditions in protracted crises.

Progress has been made in some of these areas. WFP and FAO are leading the process to establish a Global Food Security Cluster to ensure a more coherent, predictable and comprehensive response to food insecurity within a humanitarian context (see pages 40–43). The cluster would provide a forum at the international level to inform and support the elaboration of emergency strategies and implementation plans at the country level that integrate urgent measures to address food availability, food production, food access and food utilization concerns. It would also provide a crucial improvement in the coherence in the overall approach and in integrating saving lives and protecting livelihoods in the humanitarian context. However, the role of the Global Food Security Cluster in protracted crises is yet to be defined.

Incremental improvements have been made in strengthening evaluation and learning mechanisms and analytical approaches, such as the IPC. But many of these recommendations have yet to be fully implemented. A major challenge relates to leading and coordinating interventions in the absence of a capable and willing national government. Part of an integrated approach to reducing food insecurity has to be to support the development of governmental capacity in technical...
Towards ensuring food security in protracted crises: recommended actions

The Forum recommended that these two key areas of action be supported by fundamental changes in the architecture of international assistance in food security. The changes needed include:

- Strengthening monitoring and evaluation, learning and accountability mechanisms
- Improving capacity for analysis to inform policy, programmes and responses
- Ensuring that aid agencies are fit for purpose by reviewing their programme portfolios, funding mechanisms, staffing and structure and making needed changes according to identified gaps and in line with the roles defined in the common framework
- Establishing food security coordination mechanisms to bring together aid agencies across relief, transition and development, and those that are involved in the different elements of food and nutrition security.

ministries to lead and coordinate efforts, but this will be difficult in civil conflict situations.

Responses in the same context by the same agencies are now often simultaneously intended to address humanitarian needs, livelihood protection and promotion, institution-building and, in some cases, security objectives. As a result, principles governing activities in the field are increasingly unclear. Humanitarian agencies decry the undermining of humanitarian principles, and the undermining of these principles has led to increased difficulty in access to populations in need in some crises as well as contributing to declining security of aid workers (see pages 32–35). The objectives of external assistance in protracted crises, and the principles governing the allocation, distribution and impact assessment of such assistance must be clarified if food insecurity specifically, and humanitarian and development objectives more generally, are to be successfully addressed.
### TABLE 1
Prevalence of undernourishment and progress towards the World Food Summit (WFS)\(^1\) and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)\(^2\) targets in developing countries\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORLD</td>
<td>6 559.3</td>
<td>843.4</td>
<td>787.5</td>
<td>833.0</td>
<td>847.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>1 275.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>5 283.7</td>
<td>826.6</td>
<td>768.1</td>
<td>816.0</td>
<td>835.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA AND THE PACIFIC***</td>
<td>3 558.7</td>
<td>587.9</td>
<td>498.1</td>
<td>531.8</td>
<td>554.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>1 402.1</td>
<td>215.6</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>142.2</td>
<td>139.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China [3]</td>
<td>1 328.1</td>
<td>210.1</td>
<td>141.8</td>
<td>133.1</td>
<td>130.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia [4]</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea [1]</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>555.5</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia [4]</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia [3]</td>
<td>221.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao People's Dem. Rep. [4]</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia [1]</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar [3]</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines [3]</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand [3]</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam [3]</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>1 520.1</td>
<td>255.4</td>
<td>252.8</td>
<td>287.5</td>
<td>331.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh [4]</td>
<td>155.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India [4]</td>
<td>1 147.7</td>
<td>172.4</td>
<td>162.7</td>
<td>200.6</td>
<td>237.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal [3]</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan [4]</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka [3]</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan [1]</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan [3]</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan [4]</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan [2]</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan [3]</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia [4]</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan [1]</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia [1]</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>556.1</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and Central America</td>
<td>145.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica [1]</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador [2]</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala [4]</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras [3]</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico [1]</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua [3]</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>▼</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1
Prevalence of undernourishment and progress towards the World Food Summit (WFS)\(^1\) and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)\(^2\) targets in developing countries\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORLD</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>Progress</strong></td>
<td><strong>Proportion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Progress</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Panama [3]</em></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Caribbean</strong></td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cuba [1]</em></td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dominican Republic [4]</em></td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Haiti [5]</em></td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jamaica [2]</em></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad and Tobago [3]</strong></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
<td>375.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Argentina [1]</em></td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bolivia (Plurinational State of) [4]</em></td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Brazil [2]</em></td>
<td>188.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chile [1]</em></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Colombia [3]</em></td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ecuador [3]</em></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guyana [3]</em></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Paraguay [3]</em></td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Peru [3]</em></td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Suriname [3]</em></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Uruguay [1]</em></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) [2]</em></td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Near East</strong></td>
<td>439.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1]</em></td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jordan [1]</em></td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kuwait [2]</em></td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lebanon [1]</em></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Saudi Arabia [1]</em></td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Syrian Arab Republic [1]</em></td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Turkey [1]</em></td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>United Arab Emirates [1]</em></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*<em>Yemen [4]</em></td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Africa</strong></td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Algeria [1]</em></td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Egypt [1]</em></td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [1]</em></td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Morocco [1]</em></td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tunisia [1]</em></td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Saharan Africa</strong>*</td>
<td>729.6</td>
<td>164.9</td>
<td>187.2</td>
<td>201.7</td>
<td>201.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Africa</strong></td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cameroon [4]</em></td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Central African Rep. [5]</em></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010*
### TABLE 1
Prevalence of undernourishment and progress towards the World Food Summit (WFS) and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets in developing countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/subregion/ country [undernourishment category]</th>
<th>Total population 2005–07 (millions)</th>
<th>Number of people undernourished 2005–07</th>
<th>Progress in number towards WFS target = 0.5*</th>
<th>Proportion of undernourished in total population 2005–07 (%)</th>
<th>Progress in prevalence towards MDG target = 0.5**</th>
<th>MDG trend 1990–92 to 2005–07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad [5]</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>▲↑ 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo [3]</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>▼ 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Rep. of the Congo [5]</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>▲ 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon [1]</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>252.8</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>▲ 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi [5]</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>▲ 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea**** [5]</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>▲ 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia**** [5]</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>▼ 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya [4]</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>▼ 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda [4]</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>▲ 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan [4]</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>▼ 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda [4]</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>▲ 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania [4]</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>▲ 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>▲ 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola [5]</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>▼ 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana [4]</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>▲ 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho [3]</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>▲ 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar [4]</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>▲ 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi [4]</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>▲ 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius [2]</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>▲ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique [5]</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>▲ 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia [3]</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>▲ 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland [3]</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>▲ 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia [5]</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>▲ 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe [4]</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>▲ 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>275.0</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>▼ 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin [3]</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>▲ 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso [2]</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>▲ 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire [3]</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>▲ 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia [3]</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>▲ 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana [2]</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>▲ 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea [3]</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>▲ 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia [4]</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>▲ 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali [3]</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>▼ 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania [2]</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>▲ 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger [4]</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>▼ 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria [2]</td>
<td>144.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>▼ 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal [3]</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>▲ 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone [5]</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>▲ 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo [4]</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>▲ 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa*****</td>
<td>888.4</td>
<td>169.8</td>
<td>192.6</td>
<td>207.3</td>
<td>207.2</td>
<td>▲ 28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Please see inside back flap.
### TABLE 2

Selected development and food security indicators for countries in protracted crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Humanitarian ODA in total ODA&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Average humanitarian ODA&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Average development ODA&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Average humanitarian ODA per capita&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Average development ODA per capita&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Development ODA to agriculture in total ODA&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Contribution of agriculture to GDP&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Population living in rural areas&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Aid as % of gross capital formation&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>DES per capita&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>1 905</td>
<td>19.01</td>
<td>78.27</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>75.96</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1 950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>17.47</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>43.30</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1 950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>15.22</td>
<td>31.84</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>34.8&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>89.60</td>
<td>272.60&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1 680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>25.93</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>61.42</td>
<td>116.10</td>
<td>1 960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>25.55</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>73.32</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>2 040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>0.601</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>13.31</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>38.66</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>2 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>51.22</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>2 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. People's Rep. of Korea</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>37.32</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>66.04</td>
<td>67.30</td>
<td>1 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>19.34</td>
<td>44.74</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>24.3&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>79.28</td>
<td>106.70</td>
<td>1 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>1 554</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>21.31</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>83.00</td>
<td>50.10</td>
<td>1 950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>22.36</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>65.56</td>
<td>39.00</td>
<td>2 530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>42.08</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>28.0&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>53.16</td>
<td>40.60</td>
<td>1 850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>2 786</td>
<td>16.98</td>
<td>101.76</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>8.6&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>33.40</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>20.96</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>78.40</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>2 060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>27.09</td>
<td>55.75</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>39.86</td>
<td>473.60</td>
<td>2 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>14.88</td>
<td>64.77</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>62.24</td>
<td>239.50</td>
<td>2 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>25.41</td>
<td>14.34</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>65.0&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>63.48</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>20.10</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>56.56</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>2 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>30.69</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>73.54</td>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>2 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1 225</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>43.93</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>87.02</td>
<td>65.70</td>
<td>2 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>19.1&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>62.66</td>
<td>64.89&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2 210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Please see inside back flap.


4 Of all the regions, Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced the smallest decline of just 1.1 percent. The fact that there has only been a slight decrease in the number of undernourished people can be attributed to the region’s slower growth during the period 2008–10; its vulnerability, as a net exporter of food, to the decline in food commodity prices following the global food crisis and the slow recovery of reduced remittance flows to the region as a result of the United States recession.


8 The 10 percent threshold represents the global average proportion (1995–2008) of ODA (excluding debt relief) in the form of humanitarian assistance.

9 The Crisis States Research Centre defines a “failed state” as a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders (http://www.crisisstates.com).

10 The factors analysed include those that make up measures of poverty found in the Human Development Index (HDI) and of governance found in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (compiled by the World Bank Institute).

11 Chambers and Conway (1991) provided the following definition of livelihoods that has been adopted by this report: “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks.” See R. Chambers and R. Conway. 1991. Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century. IDS Discussion Paper 296. Brighton, UK. Institute of Development Studies.


17 M. Buchanan-Smith, and A.A. Fadul. 2008. Adaptation and devastation: the impact of the conflict on trade and markets in Darfur, Medford, USA, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

18 Little (2008), see note 16.

19 Raeymaekers (2008), see note 15.


22 As termed by Young et al. (2009), see note 21.


24 Little (2008), see note 16.

25 Raeymaekers (2008), see note 15.


27 See, for example, Pantuliano (2009), see note 23.


37 Tefft (2005), see note 30.


40 Tefft (2005), see note 30.


45 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2009, Global links, Table 6.15 – Aid dependency, pp. 376–379. Washington, DC.


47 Peeters et al. (2009), see note 46.


53 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2009, Global links, Table 6.15 – Aid dependency, pp. 376–379. Washington, DC.

54 The statistical analysis for this chapter was prepared for FAO by Development Initiatives International and is based on the data sets from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) and on the Financial Tracking System (FTS) managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The rationale for using two different data sets is that while OECD-DAC statistics are based on clear and consolidated procedures they are limited to OECD countries and offer only a limited disaggregation of humanitarian assistance. FTS data sets are still under consolidation but are more comprehensive and offer a more detailed analysis of sector allocation of humanitarian assistance.

55 Least-developed countries (LDCs) are those countries that, according to the United Nations, exhibit the lowest indicators of socio-economic development, with the lowest Human Development Index ratings of all countries in the world. The current list of LDCs includes 49 countries: 33 in Africa, 15 in Asia and the Pacific and one in Latin America.

56 This includes all aid disbursements (not including humanitarian assistance and debt relief).


59 This section is based on data from the Financial Tracking System (FTS) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is based on current prices and is based on commitments. See note 55 for an explanation of the difference between FTS and OECD-DAC data.

60 The CAP is an advocacy and planning tool for humanitarian financing, in which projects managed by the United Nations, NGOs and other stakeholders come together to approach the donor community funding international development activities on a yearly basis. As of 2006, the CAP is divided into “clusters” representing the various groups of implementing agencies in humanitarian aid. Humanitarian principles drive the formulation of the CAP: the humanitarian need on the ground is assessed by the stakeholders, to ensure that appeals’ funding requests are grounded in solid evidence.

61 This estimate includes carry-over funds, i.e. contributions made at the end of the year in which they are registered but that are actually for the requirements for the following year. This may distort the estimates. WFP estimates that the actual level of funding of food aid is 82 percent and not 96 percent as estimated by FTS.

62 The European Union’s recent definition of food assistance also includes the transfer or provision of relevant services, inputs, skills and knowledge.


71 FAO and WFP (2009), see note 45. See also M. Grosh, C. del Ninno, E. Tesluc and A. Ouerghi. 2008. For protection and promotion: the design and implementation of effective safety nets. Washington, DC, USA, World Bank.


79 For example, as part of the IDA eligibility process, the World Bank measures social protection as the simple average of values (ranging from 1 to 6) assigned to five sub-indicators covering labour markets, pensions, safety nets and social funds. Scores for those domains are based on questionnaires compiled by World Bank offices in client countries. Such composite index informs the calculation of the broader IDA Resource Allocation Index, which, in addition to social protection, is the result of the average rating of another 15 social and economic dimensions (World Bank, 2009, see note 54). For quantitative assessments of social protection coverage and incidence see, for example, the ADePT toolkit (www.worldbank.org/adept).

80 See WFP’s Food Aid Information System, Quantity Reporting (available at http://www.wfp.org/fais/quantity-reporting).


83 A related debate revolves around “entitlement-based” versus “incentive-oriented” approaches. These are often lumped together as “developmental” initiatives (essentially because of the predictability and longer-term vision), while they may entail different outcomes and costs, see U. Gentilini. 2009. Social protection in the “real” world: issues, models and challenges. Development Policy Review, 27(2): 147–166.


86 In terms of lesson sharing and capacity building, see, for example, the UNDP-supported Africa–Brazil Cooperation Programme on Social Protection (http://www.ipc-undp.org/ipc/africa-brazil.jsp).


The “cluster approach” has been a key element of humanitarian responses and coordination since 2005. Clusters exist at the global level and the country level, with WFP serving as a lead for the food clusters and FAO for the agriculture clusters. At the moment FAO and WFP are considering establishing a global level food security cluster. A global food security cluster (food security clusters already exist in some countries) would bring under the same framework short term and immediate needs concerns that are typical of the food cluster(s) with longer term consideration that characterize the agriculture cluster(s).

The High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis, chaired by the UN Secretary-General, and the Government of Afghanistan, supported the establishment of the Agriculture Task Force, supported by UN agencies (FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNAMA) and the World Bank.

USAID and DFID provided almost US$6 million to support this activity.


**Key messages**

- **Recommendation 1.** Support the prevention, promotion and rehabilitation of livelihoods, and ensure that recovery is in fact the means to long-term security, in countries in protracted crisis.

- **Recommendation 2.** Address the fragility or failure of livelihoods, and the institutions that underpin them, at the start of a crisis, before they become “locked in.”

- **Recommendation 3.** Revisit the current distribution of humanitarian aid and support, and ensure that aid is sufficient and properly targeted to meet the needs, and to maintain dignity and self-reliance, of people in protracted crisis.

**NOTES**

1. World Food Summit and Plan of Action, Rome, 1996: 375–76. (For references, see Footnote 3.)


3. Estimated increase in undernourishment for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

4. Percent of population undernourished in 2005–07:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Proportion of Population Undernourished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>&lt; 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>≥ 35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. FAO, State of Food Insecurity in the World 2008, p. 3.

6. Data comes from the OECD-DAC online database for the humanitarian ODA (2000–08) by average population for the period.

7. Figures are based on all humanitarian ODA disbursements (actual amounts spent, as opposed to amount committed). Source: OECD-DAC database.

8. The Human Development Index (HDI) generated by UNDP is a summary measure of achievements in three basic areas of human development: health, knowledge, and a standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP US$). Each component is calculated as the average of several indicators, weighted appropriately. Source: OECD-DAC database.
The State of Food Insecurity in the World

Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises

Following more than a decade of seemingly inexorable increases in the number of undernourished people, estimates for 2010 presented in this edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World show a slight glimmer of hope, with the first fall in the number of undernourished people in a decade. It is not yet clear if this is the beginning of a downturn trend or merely a temporary dip in the number of undernourished.

This year, The State of Food Insecurity in the World focuses on a particular group of countries, countries in protracted crises, where levels of undernourishment are estimated to be at or above 30 percent. It examines the difficulties faced in trying to turn around the situation in such countries, not least the difficulty of moving beyond the mindset of humanitarian intervention towards a broader-based development agenda.

The report highlights actions that can be taken to handle situations of protracted crises and how to do this in a way that is sustainable. These include more holistic approaches to the risk itself, including a deeper understanding of the drivers of risk; building a more community-responsive and enabling environment; supporting social protection mechanisms such as food-based safety nets; and moving from food aid to a broader-based food assistance approach.

The final section of the report provides recommendations on how to improve engagement with countries in protracted crises. These focus on improving the analysis and understanding of protracted crises, supporting the protection, promotion and restoration of local livelihoods and institutions, building early warning and planning, and changing the architecture of external intervention in protracted crises to match the reality on the ground.

As this edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World shows, there are many challenges, but the outlook is not entirely bleak. There are several positive signs, including improved understanding of the nature of protracted crisis, greater recognition of the importance of social protection; more effective coordination of humanitarian and development efforts; and a growing recognition of the need for a more integrated approach to addressing the root causes of protracted crises. This report also highlights that there are many positive experiences to learn from, from which to better address the complexity and diversity of issues, including that of extremely high undernourishment in countries in protracted crises.
The State of Food Insecurity in the World

Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises

Following more than a decade of seemingly inexorable increases in the number of undernourished people, estimates for 2010 presented in this edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World show a slight glimmer of hope, with the first fall in the number of undernourished in more than a decade. This may be the beginning of a downward trend or merely a momentary dip in the number of undernourished.

This year, The State of Food Insecurity in the World focuses on a particular group of countries, those in protracted crises, where levels of undernourishment are estimated to be at almost 30 percent. It examines the difficulties faced in trying to turn around the situation in such countries, not least the difficulty of moving beyond the mindset of humanitarian intervention towards a broader-based development agenda.

The report highlights actions that can be taken to combat the high levels of undernourishment that are characteristic of protracted crises. These include more holistic assessment of the crisis itself, including a deeper understanding of the drivers of crises; building on local community responses and institutions; introducing or supporting social protection mechanisms such as food-based safety nets; and moving from food aid to a broader-based food assistance approach.

The final section of the report provides recommendations on ways to improve engagement with countries in protracted crises. These focus on improving the analysis and understanding of protracted crises, supporting the protection, promotion and rebuilding of livelihoods and the institutions that support and enable livelihoods; and changing the architecture of external intervention in protracted crises to match the reality on the ground.

As this edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World shows, there are many challenges facing countries in protracted crises, but they are not insurmountable. There is hope. Through improved understanding of the nature of protracted crises, the ability to respond more effectively improves. Lessons from the experience of many countries show that, with careful attention to livelihoods, strengthening longer-term resilience to reducing food insecurity, investing in social protection mechanisms, and promoting food-based safety nets for addressing the root causes of protracted crises, this report suggests that there are many positive experiences. It remains to be seen through which to better address the multiplicity of causes, including that of extremely high undernourishment, in countries in protracted crises.