121. The present evaluation is the first in-depth review of FAO activities contributing to a particular Strategic Objective since the Strategic Framework for FAO 2000-2015 became operational. While FAO has been involved in addressing the needs related to food and agricultural emergencies since the early 1970s, Strategic Objective A3 (Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies) has its origins in the dramatic increase in recent years of natural disasters and civil conflicts that have impaired or threatened food security for millions of people.
122. The evaluation, covering the period between 1996 and 2001 and conducted by the FAO Evaluation Service (PBEE) with consultants’ inputs, included an examination of FAO’s normative work under the Regular Programme (RP) related to this Strategic Objective; an opinion survey of member countries and external partners and donors; an evaluation of country needs and the performance of field activities in 15 countries,19 covering all types of disasters; and a review of coordination mechanisms, both within FAO and with partners.
123. Strategic Objective A3 covers FAO activities in four main components: disaster preparedness and early warning; agricultural relief; transition from relief to rehabilitation and development; and strengthening of resilience. Thus, the Objective represents a crosscutting theme, with many of the Organization’s activities contributing to it. FAO’s RP work has been most strongly directed towards early warning.
124. The focus has been on the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS); plant pests and animal diseases – particularly in the context of the Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases (EMPRES); support to national and regional early warning systems; and the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS). A number of other activities under technical activities contain emergency-related components, including programme entities on National Seed Production and Security, Nutrition and Household Food Security in Emergencies, and Advice and Capacity Building in Agricultural Policies. During the period 1996-2001, biennial RP allocations under the main RP activities ranged from US$18 million to US$19 million, accounting for some 3 percent of the biennial RP budget.
125. Extrabudgetary resources in support of emergency activities increased sharply in recent biennia, from US$31.5 million in 1996-97 to US$103.8 million (expenditure basis) in 2001. In addition, the Oil-for-Food Programme for northern Iraq expanded to US$687 million (cumulative allocation in 2001). Most of these resources were for agricultural relief and early rehabilitation operated by the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE). During the same period some US$10 million was approved for the development of early warning systems in Africa.
126. The implementation of FAO activities for the Strategic Objective is coordinated by two in-house mechanisms. The Emergency Coordination Group (ECG), established in 1996, has the task of ensuring that FAO responds to specific country emergency situations in a coordinated manner. Under the chair of the ADG of the Technical Cooperation Department (TC), its membership covers all the main technical and operational units involved. The ECG has fostered in-house debate on FAO’s role in emergencies and has been playing a key role in preparing an interdivisional programme in the context of the MTP. The second mechanism comprises the Priority Areas for Interdisciplinary Action on Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness and Post-Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (PAIA-REHAB) in direct support of Strategic Objective A3. While PAIA-REHAB is still in the formative stage, it reports to the ADG/TC and is evolving into a planning and programming tool for ECG.
127. FAO cooperates closely with several organizations – particularly with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – in responding to emergencies, mainly through the Inter-agency Standing Committee and its Working Group (IASC-WG), in OCHA-led missions and Inter-agency Consolidated Appeals. FAO has overall responsibility for the crop, livestock and other food security components and, together with the World Food Programme (WFP), for emergency food aid needs assessment. The Organization has actively contributed to discussions on the role of the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (UNCAP) as a strategic planning and programming tool and has been a member of the United Nations Inter-agency Task Force for Disaster Reduction (IATF) since the formal launch of the Inter-agency Task Force on the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) in early 2001. Collaboration is maintained with WFP in many emergency-related activities, notably crop and food supply assessments, gathering of information on vulnerability, and some aspects of agricultural relief. Other important FAO partners in emergencies include the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the International Red Cross. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also key partners in the field, especially for the implementation of agricultural relief projects in countries where local government structures are weak. FAO has moreover been an active member of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).
128. The evaluation confirms the continuing overall relevance and importance of Strategic Objective A3 as an organizational priority for FAO. Natural and human-induced disasters contribute increasingly to global food insecurity and poverty, especially in rural areas. Thus, it is entirely appropriate that increasing resilience and the capacity to cope with natural disasters should be an important focus of FAO’s work.
129. The components addressed in the Strategic Objective are appropriate in that they respond to all aspects of an emergency situation from preparedness, through early warning and needs assessment, provision of relief, and planning for the transition, to rehabilitation and development, so that people’s resilience in the face of future disasters is strengthened. This holistic approach also draws on FAO’s unique comparative advantage (both demonstrated and potential) in having capacity in all these components and makes it possible for the Organization to assist more easily those member countries in need.
130. The questionnaire submitted to member countries and partners confirmed the useful role of FAO in dealing with emergencies and its assistance was generally viewed as positive. While the relatively small number of replies (from 41 countries and ten international partners) limits the degree to which detailed inferences can be made, countries rated FAO assistance as “satisfactory” or “excellent” in all five areas of emergency work (preparedness, early warning, needs assessment, agricultural relief and rehabilitation/recovery planning). Compared with other donors, a majority of countries found FAO to be best, or about equal to others, in needs assessment and relief operations, while other donors were found better by a majority of respondents in preparedness, early warning and rehabilitation/recovery planning.
131. The relative attention that FAO gives to each of the strategic components has varied considerably, and the Organization’s stated comparative advantage (i.e. a broad range of technical expertise and breadth of field experience) is not well reflected in the implementation record. Early warning is an area in which FAO has long been active and in which its work is well appreciated by member countries and the international community, as also confirmed by the questionnaire. However, sharp increases in the number of emergency situations in recent years, combined with – at best – static funding, has meant that resources for this work are stretched thin, making it difficult to maintain the same high degree of quality.
132. In line with its expanding role in agricultural relief operations, donor trust in FAO’s ability in this area has generally increased, leading to the establishment of a new division (TCE) with responsibility to implement agricultural relief operations. On the whole, agricultural relief projects have performed satisfactorily, as indicated in the assessments of 70 operations by review missions. FAO generally provides a technically appropriate solution to a given problem; Emergency Coordinators and technical assistance in particular, often provided through TCP projects, have proved to be effective and are much appreciated by other partners, raising FAO’s profile in major emergency situations. However, FAO’s ability to exploit its comparative advantage is constrained by its weakness in making speedy delivery of agricultural inputs. This weakness is a result of several factors, including internal administrative and financial procedures, which FAO itself can improve.
133. Other strategy components have received far less attention in FAO’s work. Activities aimed at disaster preparedness (with the exception of support to early warning) have been somewhat few and scattered; this fact has been recognized and improvements are being pursued through the PAIA-REHAB mechanism. Activities aimed at promoting the effective transition from relief to rehabilitation and development have also been few. As of yet, there are no examples in which FAO has played a decisive role in such a transition, and there are important institutional questions that need to be resolved.
134. In conclusion, Strategic Objective A3 is relevant and appropriate, providing a broad guide in terms of priority areas for FAO action. Clearly, its effective implementation requires development over time – through the MTP process – of more operational planning and programming for a set of priority results to be achieved. The need for this development is also indicated by the unevenness with which the four component areas have been addressed so far, showing considerable scope for better exploitation of the Organization’s technical expertise and capacity in support of the Strategic Objective. The following recommendations reflect these considerations.
135. The evaluation points to the need for greater mainstreaming of emergency-related work, especially in the work of technical divisions. Although a good start has been made through the ECG and PAIA-REHAB, efforts need to be further reinforced.
136. FAO should help to integrate a systematic approach in countries that are especially prone to natural disasters to ensure that disaster management forms a key consideration in their agricultural development activities. In particular, the FAO Country Offices, as well as the regional Policy Assistance Branches, should be strengthened – through sensitization and training – in their capacity for incorporating this aspect into the programmes and projects that are under their control.
137. While FAO has been active in early warning through GIEWS and support to national and regional information systems, only a few activities have been carried out for other components of preparedness. In terms of supporting the preparation of comprehensive preparedness plans at the regional and national levels, FAO has a mixed record from the field experiences reviewed. Clearly, TCP is not a suitable source for this kind of support, which requires strong institution-building components that are not amenable to TCP’s budgetary and time constraints.
138. FAO does have comparative advantages in key domains related to preparedness, particularly in food and agriculture information for preparedness. However, it is important to focus on priority areas and articulate them within the MTP context.
139. FAO should pursue and strengthen its work on information for early warning, impact assessment, needs assessment and the design of appropriate responses in the following areas:
140. The evaluation found that, while some interventions were implemented on time, in many cases inputs were not made available in time for the intended cropping season. Sometimes delays were beyond the control of FAO (e.g. late requests for assistance, late responses from donors). However, lengthy procedures in FAO were also a contributing factor. This was a common criticism, confirmed by the questionnaire sent to the member countries and partners surveyed during the evaluation. The FAO rule that limits procurement by FAO Representatives (FAORs) to US$25 000 means that most agricultural relief procurement must be done from headquarters. Assuming FAORs have sufficient capacity, in principle, agricultural relief procurement should be carried out by them.
141. FAO Emergency Coordinators performed extremely well and provided good follow-up to all aspects of agricultural relief supply activities. While Coordinators cannot be appointed for every emergency situation, especially if the FAO activity is of limited nature, they could help overcome delays experienced in some agricultural relief interventions because of inadequate follow-up and lack of assignment for performing specific tasks.
142. This has been generally weak. Target beneficiaries were described in general terms and, in practice, beneficiary selection was usually left to local discretion. While recognizing that beneficiary identification takes time, enough cases of dubious input distribution were seen to warrant greater attention to this aspect in future activities.
143. The process of beneficiary identification and targeting should be an integral part of project design and work planning, especially for interventions over several production seasons. Beneficiary identification is best done when criteria for selection have been established and explained to stakeholders; the selection process has been decentralized to the lowest level; and various institutions/stakeholders are involved, including the beneficiaries themselves.
144. Most projects took a standard approach to agricultural input distribution. There is a need to experiment more with other approaches that may be more successful, particularly for seed distribution, for which the use of locally known varieties has many important advantages.
145. Where practical, other approaches to seed distribution, such as seed fairs or seed vouchers, should be used in agricultural relief projects. Assistance in the design of such projects should be sought from the technical division (the Seed and Plant Genetic Resources Service [AGPS]).
146. The quality of FAO’s agricultural relief interventions was enhanced when underpinned by technical assistance components, one of FAO’s comparative advantages. This can be achieved most cost effectively through existing FAO technical cooperation activities already present in the country. In all cases, the inputs distributed should be appropriate to the intended target beneficiaries.
147. The supply of agricultural relief inputs to needy farmers is inherently different from rehabilitation or development activities, which tend to be more complex. While these two elements have been handled successfully under programme-type interventions with sufficient time for synchronizing them, attempts to do so within a single project were unsuccessful because the relatively short implementation time frame of a single project was not conducive to the planning and implementation of both components in an adequate manner.
148. Relatively small, relief-oriented projects should not be designed or implemented so as to pursue both relief and rehabilitation objectives at the same time.
149. Monitoring and evaluation are essential for the systematic assessment of intervention results. However, they have rarely been included in agricultural relief projects, although this situation has improved recently. Some evaluations undertaken by national consultants or NGOs have made useful findings and recommendations, but it is not always clear that this information has been used for future programming.
150. In general, more use should be made of evaluation to identify successful intervention approaches and from which to draw lessons. An appropriate, simple format for evaluation reports should be established by TCE, with assistance from PBEE, and all such evaluation reports should be commented upon by TCE and by concerned technical divisions. Lessons learned from evaluations should be shared among all relevant FAO units and partners, and be used to identify “best practices” to guide future operations. For more independent evaluations, annual evaluation plans for emergency activities should be agreed between TCE and PBEE.
151. The Oil-for-Food Programme in northern Iraq was not specifically reviewed for this evaluation. However, given its size and importance, and the fact that it is now moving into a rehabilitation phase, the FAO-implemented component should be evaluated at some point. The Evaluation Unit, already established within the local FAO management structure, should contribute to this effort.
152. The FAO component of the Oil-for-Food Programme in northern Iraq should be subject to an in-depth evaluation during 2003-2004, focusing on the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation throughout its entire duration.
153. Looking at the “disaster cycle”, FAO has been effective in linking early warning activities to agricultural relief, since there are clear institutional homes for these. In post-natural disaster situations, FAO has generally been effective because of its experience in development work and the normal government structures are in place and functioning. Much more problematic has been the organization of assistance in the transition period following complex (conflict-related) emergencies. While some activities have taken place in such situations, these have tended to be individual projects and not part of an overall programme. Thus far, FAO has not been successful in having rehabilitation activities included in UNCAP. This is partly because of the phasing out of donor funding when an emergency situation abates, but also because of the fact that FAO has not evolved an effective approach and has done relatively little to advocate the importance of transitional assistance, leaving the field more to other actors, particularly the International Food Information Service for Disaster Reduction (IFIs).
154. The responsibility for planning transitional assistance strategy has recently been assigned to the Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit (TCER). However, this unit does not have sufficient staff to deal with all the countries in the transitional stage and, since this is a new arrangement, it is not clear in practice how effective it will be. Nor is it clear what the best permanent institutional arrangement should be for programme/project development once the strategy has been developed. As an alternative, the Regional Policy Assistance Branches could play a role in developing rehabilitation programmes. However, they generally lack experience in emergency- and transition-related assistance as well as in access to emergency funds.
155. While FAO Country Offices present a third possibility for action in this field, they currently lack capacity and already have overstretched responsibilities. They are thus not a viable choice for leading this activity.
156. Given the evolving institutional situation, it would be prudent to remain flexible in evolving a satisfactory modality for this process. Since the ADG/TC has oversight of the main units (including the Investment Centre Division [TCI]) that may be involved in transition programming, it would be appropriate for him to designate overall responsibility, depending on the circumstances in the particular countries involved and the relative capacities of the organizational units.
157. The ADG/TC should designate responsibilities for programming transition activities once the transition strategy has been prepared under TCER. This may involve Regional and Subregional Offices, TCI, the Policy Assistance Division (TCA) and FAORs, as appropriate to particular country circumstances. TCE’s involvement should end at this point. However, in the longer term, more permanent appropriate institutional arrangements need to be decided.
158. Regardless of which unit leads the process, an effective FAO presence in the field will be a key precondition for the Organization to play a primary role in the transition period. This has proved an important factor in major emergency operations and it should be the same for transition situations. However, the type of expertise required will be different.
159. In countries where FAO will provide post-emergency transition policy and programming assistance, a full-time programme manager should be appointed, preferably soon after the emergency operation starts. This individual should be able to act in an advisory capacity to the government on post-emergency issues, assist in the development of an agricultural development strategy and design a role for FAO in the implementation of that strategy.
160. The evaluation noted that collaboration with other partners, both within the UN and with the NGO community, could be enhanced. For example, FAO should work on disaster preparedness country strategies with UNDP, which has overall responsibility within the UN system for strengthening national capacities related to disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness. Work could be carried out with WFP on emergency logistics, and with international NGOs on suitable cooperation in the provision of agricultural relief.
161. FAO should review its emergency-related activities with a view to developing joint programmes at the field level with other UN agencies and NGOs. In this respect, the negotiations started with several partners on formal Memoranda of Understanding should be brought to a successful conclusion.
162. Some of the recommendations imply increased funding for emergency work. In the prevailing situation of zero-budget growth in the RP, the evaluation cannot recommend increased RP allocations. However, the following funding mechanisms could be considered, as appropriate. All involve approaches to donors.
163. TCE has proposed the creation of a Rapid Response Fund to finance the early phases of a relief operation before donor funds become available. The Rapid Response Fund would be replenished by donor contributions for the emergency in question. Thus, as long as there are donors for an emergency, which is highly likely, the fund would remain at the same level, or even increase over time. The creation of the fund would help to remove one of the obstacles to timely availability of emergency agricultural relief inputs, i.e. slow donor response. It has been proposed that the initial target for the fund would be US$1.5 million.
164. The Rapid Response Fund should be created with financing from the accumulated balance on the Direct Operating Cost account for TCE projects or (with donor consent) from unspent project funds.
165. Similar to the Rapid Response Fund, a fund could be created for establishing rehabilitation advisers during the post-conflict transition phase and financing the programming of transition activities. In theory, the Transition Fund could also be replenished from donor contributions, but these may be less forthcoming than for agricultural relief activities, unless and until advocacy activities are successful. Because various units may undertake transition and rehabilitation activities, control over the funds should be exercised by the ADG/TC. As the Transition Fund has a more limited scope than the Rapid Response Fund, its level would be considerably lower, in the range of US$500 000.
166. The Transition Fund should be established under the authority of the ADG/TC, and financed in the same way as the Rapid Response Fund.
167. FAO has been extremely successful in attracting funding for agricultural relief activities undertaken by TCE but far less successful in fundraising for other types of emergency-related activities. The Organization is following a trend, since donors appear to be far more ready to provide funding for emergency operations than for development. However, donor decisions concerning funding are increasingly delegated to the field, while responsibility for fundraising within FAO remains centralized.
168. FAO should engage donors in an attempt to raise additional funds for non-relief emergency-related activities, emphasizing its areas of comparative advantage and the benefits of mitigating disasters.
169. The external Peer Review Panel met from 19 to 21 June 2002 in Rome when consultations were conducted with PBEE staff, the ADG/TC and FAO staff from various departments. The Panel considered the draft Evaluation Report in the context of the current Strategic Framework for FAO 2000-2015, Strategic Objective A3, and in the light of the priorities outlined by senior managers responsible for the FAO activities concerned.
170. The Panel recognizes the increasing demands on FAO’s services in relation to disasters and considers the evaluation of Strategic Objective A3 as extremely timely and useful in defining the institutional adjustments needed to meet the challenges of upscaling activities and services in this field.
171. The evaluation process adopted by FAO is regarded as exemplary by the Panel as it is participatory, transparent and involves further review of the findings by an independent expert group.
172. The Panel recognizes that the evaluation had to be undertaken in a limited time over a large geographic area which required the review of a large number of very diverse projects. The generalized conclusions were, therefore, reviewed against this background.
173. The Panel, in general, endorses the findings of the evaluation and its recommendations as useful and practical for the Organization, particularly those that focus on FAO’s comparative advantages, ranging from forecasting and early warning information to the technical design of emergency inputs.
174. The following points are put forward by the Panel in a positive spirit, since the tenor of the Evaluation Report, and especially its generally practical orientation, has been much appreciated.
175. The evaluation rightly looks for FAO's comparative advantages, but the recommendations should push more strongly for the Organization to focus on what it does well, which obviously cannot be everything.
176. Since the recommendations are fairly numerous, it would be helpful if an order of priority in terms of importance and/or timing were to be attached to them.
177. Senior Management commends PBEE on preparing a succinct and constructive review of Strategic Objective A3. The report addresses the key issues of FAO’s role and approach to emergency from preparedness to rehabilitation and highlights those comparative advantages on which the Organization should build the upscaling of its emergency activities, emphasizing interactions between normative and operational activities. Senior Management welcomes this report as an important contribution to the ongoing development of interdisciplinarity and expansion of partnerships in the implementation of Strategic Objective A3.
178. Recommendations made will enable the Programme Committee to conduct a well-informed debate on the preliminary achievements of the Strategic Objective and suggested areas for improvement. As already mentioned to the external Peer Review Panel, Senior Management agrees in principle with the recommendations formulated and is committed to ensuring that appropriate actions be taken for their implementation. Following are some of the actions already undertaken.
179. In addition, and based on the report’s recommendation, Management would like to share views with the Programme Committee on the following three specific items.
180. Senior Management agrees with the findings contained in the Evaluation Report, that the Organization should further develop its comparative advantages in key aspects related to preparedness. As reflected in the report, two mechanisms have already been created for achieving institutional coordination.
181. During the last decade, work on agricultural relief has been by far the fastest growing area of FAO’s activities in the field. This is partly because of an increase in the number of emergencies as well as the shift, by funding sources, towards the financing of emergency rather than development-oriented projects. However, this growth is mainly a result of FAO’s enhanced credibility in responding to emergencies. FAO has proved that it has not only delivered inputs to farmers but was also able to provide them with key technical assistance to restart production. This role has been formally and practically acknowledged by traditional and non-traditional FAO donors.
182. As underlined by the report of the external Peer Review Panel, appropriate measures are required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of this growing emergency programme. Further to the upscaling of the former Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR) into a division (TCE) and the reinforcement of the management of the Oil-for-Food Programme, two issues will need to be addressed.
183. While FAO has the comparative advantage to implement the transition phase in countries affected by disasters, Senior Management recognizes that, to date, the Organization has not been able to achieve much in terms of results in that area. However, by adopting a pragmatic approach, as was the case for Kosovo and Afghanistan, FAO has recently started to improve its capacity to address the management of transition phases. The process has been pushed forward with the establishment within TCE of a new unit responsible for rehabilitation and humanitarian policies (TCER). This unit has to stimulate the rapid launching of rehabilitation programmes and plans based on FAO’s relief response in the country. In close collaboration with the technical divisions concerned, it should initiate the rehabilitation phase, which requires strong and diversified technical expertise and capacity. The unit will facilitate formulation of policies and investment framework aimed at linking relief to reconstruction and development. It plays a catalytic role in enhancing support to FAO from other important stakeholder/partners in the transition process. TCER does not, however, have operational responsibility for rehabilitation, which will be ensured by the other responsible units/divisions.
184. This new mode of operation needs to be tested and it is proposed that it be reviewed in two years’ time. Based on lessons learned, Senior Management will be in a position to propose a final structure aiming at ensuring FAO’s role in rehabilitation.
185. The Committee noted that this thematic evaluation represented the first of its kind and was aimed at assessing the Organization’s programmes in the framework of its strategic objectives. The Committee welcomed the evaluation’s comprehensive approach to the strategy through a systematic review of normative activities and an assessment of a balanced sample of relief and rehabilitation operations in the field. It also appreciated the survey of the views of members and main international partners concerned. It considered the evaluation a positive initiation of strategy-oriented evaluation.
186. The Committee found the evaluation an informative and useful assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of FAO’s activities. It also appreciated the candid and critical examination of issues in the evaluation as well as the comments of the external Peer Review Panel.
187. The Committee endorsed the recommendations in general, although many members felt that given their large number, a clear indication of relative priority between them would have been useful, as suggested by the external Peer Review Panel. The Committee highlighted the importance of recommendations concerning:
188. The Committee welcomed Management’s response indicating that actions were being taken by the Secretariat on several of the recommendations.
189. The Committee underlined the relevance and usefulness of Strategic Objective A3. It highlighted the importance of developing a multidisciplinary approach to exploit FAO’s comparative strengths particularly for preparedness activities and especially in disaster-prone countries. It also emphasized technical and policy-oriented advice in the difficult transition phase.
190. The Committee stressed the importance of strengthening partnerships with other agencies, donors and NGOs as well as participation of national authorities and local communities in this endeavour, including assistance in strengthening their capacity for preparedness and prevention.
191. While recognizing some weaknesses in FAO relief operations and transition assistance, the Committee appreciated the difficulties in achieving effective and sustainable results and noted that similar problems were also experienced by other agencies and donors. It thus urged the Secretariat to follow up the evaluation recommendations effectively and requested a progress report, in one year’s time, on the status of actions taken for their implementation. Finally, noting the lack of opportunity for an intergovernmental discussion on this important topic, it recommended that the Secretariat prepare a concise paper covering main issues and lessons on its emergency and rehabilitation activities as a basis for such a discussion next year.
18 PC 88/5 (a).
19 Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, Viet Nam, Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.
20 The members of this independent panel were: Antonio Arenas (El Salvador), Director of the National System for Territorial Studies; Yasemin Aysan (Turkey), Acting Chief, UNDP/Disaster Reduction and Recovery Programme, Geneva; Francois Grunewald (France), Director of the French NGO Urgence-réhabilitation-développement; Julius Holt (UK), Founder-partner of the Food Economy Group Consultant SCF-UK; Robin Jackson (USA), Policy Adviser, WFP, Rome; and Mahboub Maalim (Kenya), Coordinator of the Kenya Drought Emergency Response, Office of the President, Nairobi.
21 PC/88/REP, paras. 51-57.