Pierre TerverPierre Terver, a forester by profession, spent 20 years in the field of agricultural development. At the time of his retirement from FAO he was Assistant Director-General in charge of the Development Department.
The great drought which has prevailed in the Sahel since 1972 has led the international community to give emergency aid on a massive scale. It has also shown the need for a reappraisal of the problems of the Sahel. It has become clear that the inquiry should be set in a wider context, going beyond mere considerations of protection. In particular, it must take into account the necessity for ensuring the economic and social development of the countries in question, based on well-planned and well-organized government and external assistance activities. At a meeting of the FAO Forestry Commission for Africa held in Nairobi in February 1972, the Upper Volta, Mali and Senegal delegations asked FAO to held them, by means of surveys and projects, to solve the serious problems of the advance of the desert and soil erosion in the Sahelian zone. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) immediately expressed its willingness to take part in such activities, under the aegis of FAO, and to pay for a first FAO-SIDA Mission to inquire into these problems on the spot. An international committee was set up to combat the Sahelian drought - Comité permanent inter-états de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS) - and one of its first moves was to find out from the governments of the countries concerned how they expected surveys and projects to be carried out. At a meeting at heads-of-state level in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, a cooperative organizational structure for the work was arrived at for the Sahel as a whole. The Mission was also expanded to cover Mauritania, Niger and Chad, in addition to Upper Volta, Mali and Senegal. The importance of the FAO-SIDA Mission to the Sahel lies in its multidisciplinary approach to land protection combined with the agricultural development of an extensive, fragile, complex combination of ecosystems spanning a vast desert and semidesert area. It is this which the author, who headed the Mission, describes.
It has long seemed to me that research aimed purely at environment protection was open to question as a development goal. But in the Sahel the necessity of protecting the environment and safeguarding the ecology is clearly a factor upon which development depends. Despite the uncertain agricultural productive potential of the Sahel it must provide a livelihood for not only the present population but for future generations as well. The need to increase agricultural development, the need to protect the environment at the same time, and the short-term and long-term approaches which can sometimes be at odds with each other, are all parts of the Sahelian problem.
Both FAO and SIDA listened sympathetically when I discussed these problems, and consequently the original terms of reference of the Mission to the Sahel were revised, making it more interdisciplinary and permitting study of the overall ecology, forestry and land protection aspects with a reason ably long-term development outlook.
This having been done, the Mission went to the field. There our broad, long-term approach was sorely tested, first of all by the directors of national forest services. Their initial reaction was one of frustration and I, originally a forester by profession, could only sympathize with them. The international camaraderie of foresters is not an empty expression; it does make it possible for foresters to exchange ideas with great frankness and understanding. The difficulties faced by forest service directors in the Sahel are real. Nonetheless, they recognized the soundness of our arguments and they understood the need for an integrated approach. For all of us it was a matter of making the kind of synthesis that would facilitate the solution of complex problems. In broad outline, this is what we agreed upon.
None of the factors which influence the problems in the Sahel - and no development project in this part of Africa - can be studied or dealt with in isolation. All are components of a single, large complex. The end purpose of our efforts should be neither ecological equilibrium nor technical-economic development, but rather the saving of human lives and the assurance of the future survival of the peoples of the Sahel.
The major characteristic of the Sahel - a very low and extremely precarious potential for agricultural production - led us to consider the area not simply as a marginal zone but rather as the "back country" for more affluent and often ecologically complementary areas. For this reason we saw the need to replace the idea of a strategy for the Sahel alone with one of overall land development and soil management going beyond the Sahel. This, we felt, would afford the opportunity to undertake a whole series of projects aimed at economic integration of the dry Sahel with ecosystems within it having a high productivity potential - the Senegal and Niger river valleys and the Chad basin, on the one hand, and the Sahel and complementary adjacent zones (the Sudan-Sahel and the wet tropics) on the other.
Our point of view was also formed in the light of certain errors in land management which had been made in the past. They were understandable mistakes because they had been made under the pressure of crisis and emergency. Nonetheless, they led us to condemn all local or sectoral action programmes or projects not conceived as part of a combined environmental protection and development plan, or which could not be fitted into such a coordinated approach.
The kind of errors of the past which we hoped to see avoided in the future involved uncoordinated, haphazard drilling of wells, piecemeal measures in the raising of livestock, a food production policy aimed at self-sufficiency, and similar mistaken actions which resulted in vegetation cover and land being increasingly degraded even to the point of localized desertification. Conceived as short-term benefits for specific sectors, such moves proved in the long run to be failures. Consequently, it was now appreciated that the Sahel needed coordinated management policies for grasslands and livestock raising, agriculture, forestry and pisciculture, and that such policies had to be formulated and carried out while not neglecting the needs of the people and the realities of heavy population pressure on the land in certain areas.
The vastness of the Sahel and the rapid and progressive degradation of the land, combined with economic and technical difficulties and the uncertainty of the long-term impact of projects, led us to seek an approach which would balance costly environment protection projects with measures aimed at agricultural production.
As regards environment protection work, therefore, there was no question that action was required throughout the area, on a very large scale and all at once. In order to do this and at the same time keep within the realm of the possible and the practical, an overall plan had to be laid out, then broken down into its component parts and finally phased over a period of time. Priority action projects were selected in the light of the acuteness of the land degradation, as well as on the basis of their relationship to overall development.
The Sahel covers six politically independent countries - Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger and Chad - which, although linked together through the CILSS pacts do not individually possess the kind of resources required to effectively implement a single, integrated, interdisciplinary protection - cum production plan. It was essential that each of these countries frame its own national forestry policy and plans which should follow guidelines on which they all agreed.
Within the framework of such a policy to cover all the Sahel, the Ouagadougou Conference had agreed upon "Operation Green Front." This aimed at the modification of the macroclimate and the setting up of barriers in the path of the north-south advance of the Sahara desert. Man-made tree plantations and reforestation projects were to be undertaken. But the Mission also felt that it was necessary to confirm some long-standing observations concerning the advance of the desert. There appears to be no proof to support the theory of a frontal advance of the Sahara resulting from climatic factors, while it is certain that desertification attributable to man's influence and impact on the land is increasing in specific places within the Sahel as well as at great distances from the fringe of the Sahara.
The Mission agreed that it should advise CILSS and the governments of the Sahel countries to plan land development in such a way as to replace zonal protection projects with a series of local efforts. Such a mosaic pattern of action projects should not be confined to man-made plantations alone, but should be diversified to include the setting aside of reserves for protection purposes, the fixation of continental sand dunes and afforestation under special management - for example, combined forestry-pastoral projects, the growing of dum palms (Hyphaene thebaica), Borassus palms (Borassus aethiopum) and rubber tree plantations. Above all, the planting of trees on croplands and around pasture lands should be encouraged in order to create improved conditions for both crop and livestock production.
This brings us to the concept of rural land development and the coordination of sectoral policies, keeping in mind the need for combining protection and production.
Foresters know from long experience that forest which is intended for timber production is easier to safeguard from the damaging influences of man and his livestock than forest intended for protection purposes. The so-called "green polygon of the Niger," discovered by the Skylab satellite, is an illustration of the kind of protection which can be obtained, however, when there are vested economic interests involved. Nevertheless, in rural land development projects, such as those under consideration here, man-made stands created for environmental protection are often the only solution, in spite of their high cost and the technical difficulties involved in establishing them.
From the technical standpoint, tremendous strides have already been made thanks to forestry research. But such research needs to be pursued. Accordingly, the role of an "Institute for the Sahel" was discussed.
Many difficulties in the field still need to be solved. The choice of project sites will certainly depend on technical necessities, as will also the satisfaction of the requirements of human beings and the quality of their lives. Should it be possible to integrate a forest stand, even one primarily established for industrial purposes, into an overall plan for suburban land development with recreational facilities, its cost would be more readily justified. In the Sahel such combinations are possible. For instance, near villages, and especially near large cities, there is great need for firewood, and the possibilities for combining woodlots and protective stands are obvious. In all this work, whether it is a question of plant nurseries or actual tree plantations, one of the main factors for achieving success, not only from the technical but also from the financial standpoint, will be the availability of skilled manpower. Having tree nurseries which produce sufficient numbers of seedlings for planting by specific deadlines would avoid heavy losses due to failure of plants to take hold and would eliminate costly watering.
Usually, of course, the forest services require assistance. But it is best if outside assistance, adapted to the actual circumstances, is provided for training purposes during the project execution stage in the field.
A MAN-MADE DESERT WINDBREAK another kind of forestry
The Mission could not be expected to make revolutionary technical discoveries in the field of forestry in the space of a few months. What it could be expected to do was to compile, collate and insert into the picture of what was possible and feasible innumerable bits of knowledge and pieces of information collected over several decades of experience. What appeared to us most important, and what we stated and forcefully repeated, was that in the Sahel nothing can be done separately, in isolation, by itself, and that no one can work alone whether in forestry or in other disciplines. Are we suggesting that forest services, their forestry officers and technicians disappear, and be replaced by multidisciplinary services and agents? Most categorically, no! The competence, technical knowledge and experience of these forest services and their staffs are absolutely indispensable for the survival of the Sahel. But what is equally essential is that these services and their officers should learn to think and to work in close cooperation with their colleagues in animal husbandry and agriculture, as well as with ecologists, economists and sociologists who should act as permanent advisers and consultants. Furthermore, this must be done at all levels, out in the field, among the higher echelon staffs of the various technical services and among the top-ranking planners and managers of national and regional soil management and land development work. In addition, it is essential that there be foresters among the higher echelon staff participating directly in final decision-making. Foresters are among those best acquainted with the Sahel, its peoples, and their capabilities and aspirations, and who best understand the recent disaster in human as well as in technical terms.
It is not easy to define the Sahelian zone of West Africa. Sahel is an Arab word meaning coast, or by extension an edge or border. It is used to designate the belt of land which borders the southern part of the Sahara desert, from Mauritania to Chad.
The FAO-SIDA Mission ¹ to the Sahelian zone (October 1973-January 1974) defined the area as being characterized by summer rainfall, a long dry season of eight to nine months, and with the general appearance of steppe land with trees or shrubs. In addition, it is a zone in which the main occupation is pastoral. Its agriculture is principally devoted to cereal crops. Both these forms of production are particularly subject to climatic hazards.
¹ The Sahelian characteristics given here may be found in Chapter I of Report on She Sahelian Zone, a survey of the problem of the Sahelian zone made with a view to drawing up a long-term strategy and a programme for protection, restoration and development, FAO-SIDA Mission FAO, Rome, 1974.
The following are some of the basic characteristics of the Sahelian zone as summarized from the report of the FAO-SIDA Mission.
Climatic parameters are among the criteria which are employed to delimit the ecological zones of the Sahel and adjacent areas. Use is made in particular of mean annual rainfall figures. The Sahelian zone proper is often divided into two parts, one with a mean annual rainfall of 200 to 350-400 mm, the other with a mean annual rainfall of 350-400 mm to 600 mm. A rainfall of 350-400 mm sets the limit, more or less, for dry farming.
The general appearance, agriculture and mean annual rainfall of the Sahelian and adjacent zones of the whole area are as follows:
Saharan-Sahelian zone (100-200 mm): Very sparse shrubby vegetation. No cultivation.Sahelian zone (200-600 mm): Predominantly pastoral zone, but with important cereal crops, principally millet (between 300 and 600 mm) with some sorghum; groundnuts present but production unreliable.
Sudano-Sahelian zone (600-800 mm): Cereal crops predominant; more sorghum than millet; groundnuts widely cultivated; cotton present, but production unreliable; livestock still numerous. In both the Sahelian and the Sudano-Sahelian zones varieties of sorghum and millet with short growing periods are predominant.
Sudanese zone (800-1200 mm): Many and varied agricultural activities; cash crops compete with maize and with varieties of sorghum and millet with long growing periods.
Guinean zone (over 1200 mm): Represents only a small part of the Sahelian zone countries studied by the Mission: Senegal, Mali and Upper Volta. Because of the two-peak rainfall distribution two cultivation seasons and a greater variety of crops are possible.
Other limits have been proposed, especially for the Sahelian zone, which has sometimes been put between 100 and 500 mm isohyets, and sometimes between 100 and 600, 100 and 400, etc.
The lower limit for the Sahelian zone could in fact have been put at 100 mm without this making any difference to the Mission's observations.
Rainfall represents only one aspect of the climate. Other factors such as continentality also play a part and may modify the local characteristics of zones which have the same rainfall. Bearing these reservations in mind, the Mission found that the limits of the zones as given above were satisfactory. They are sufficiently broad, and in addition they agree with the ideas of the local technical experts.
The opinion has sometimes been put forward that the Sahelian zone could be defined by the presence of pastoral tribes. Although these people are there in large numbers, we may also in fact note the presence of predominantly agricultural villages such as those of the Soninke, Bambara, Sonhrai, etc., right up to the minimal limits of the zone, while some pastoral tribes, such as the Fulani, are found at the present time in places well outside the zone, in Dahomey, Cameroon and Ivory Coast. The Mission has, however, noted the interest which all the tribes take in their livestock.
Some writers have noted certain plant species as being characteristic of the Sahelian or Saharan zones. The Mission, however, has not accepted that it is possible to identify each zone by a single characteristic species, given the diversity of the plant cover and the existence of special edaphic environments - for example dunes or temporarily flooded areas - which may take plant species far from their normal distributional range. Nevertheless, each of the ecological zones noted above has its list of preferred species.
