SWIOP/WP/48 - The Future of the Schooner Fishery - Problems of Financial Viability and Recruitment of Fishermen













Table of Contents


RAF/87/008/WP/48/E

August 1989

by D. Parker
(FAO Project TCP/SEY/6752(I)
and UNDP Project SEY/86/005)

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed are those of the authors.

SWIOP
DOCUMENT
OISO

RAF/79/065

REGIONAL PROJECT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT & MANAGEMENT
OF FISHERIES IN THE SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN

PROJET REGIONAL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET L'AMENAGEMENT
DES PECHES DANS L'OCEAN INDIEN SUD-OCCIDENTAL

c/o UNITY HOUSE P.O. BOX 487, VICTORIA, MAHE SEYCHELLES

TELEPHONE: 23773

TELEX: 2254 SWIOP SZ

This electronic document has been scanned using optical character recognition (OCR) software and careful manual recorrection. Even if the quality of digitalisation is high, the FAO declines all responsibility for any discrepancies that may exist between the present document and its original printed version.


Table of Contents


1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and Scope
1.2 Problems Identified in the NDP
1.3 Progress Achieved
1.4 Continuing Shortage of Premium Fish
1.5 Continuing Shortage of Recruits
1.6 Lack of Financial Incentives

2. THE SCHOONER FISHERY

3. COMMERCIAL HISTORY OF THE SCHOONER FISHERY

4. ECONOMICS OF SCHOONER OPERATION

4.1 Revenues

4.1.1 Catch Rates
4.1.2 Catch Value and Revenues

4.2 Trip Costs

4.2.1 Fuel Costs and Lube Oil
4.2.2 Ice
4.2.3 Provisions
4.2.4 Miscellaneous: Gear, bait, etc.

4.3 The Share System
4.4 Boat Owner's Costs

4.4.1 Depreciation
4.4.2 Maintenance
4.4.3 Insurance

4.5 Loan and Hire Purchase Installments

5. VESSEL VIABILITY AND OWNERS RETURN

5.1 Traditional Vessel
5.2 Chantal
5.3 New La Digue Design (11.6 metres)
5.4 Sensitivity to Changes

6. CONCLUSIONS

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX 1 - SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS - YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 2 - FIDECO BOAT VALUATION AND SALE PRICE

APPENDIX 3 - ARREARS ON SCHOONER LOANS (DECEMBER 1987)


1. INTRODUCTION


1.1 Purpose and Scope
1.2 Problems Identified in the NDP
1.3 Progress Achieved
1.4 Continuing Shortage of Premium Fish
1.5 Continuing Shortage of Recruits
1.6 Lack of Financial Incentives


1.1 Purpose and Scope

The Seychelles schooner fishery is characterized at the present time by poor earnings, run-down vessels and chronic defaults in repayment of development loans by boat owners.

This paper examines the difficulties of the schooner fishery, identifying the principle problems and suggesting action which could be taken to deal with them. However, because the resolution of these difficulties will involve SMB Fish Division in a fundamental way, the recommendations contained in this paper cannot be acted upon without further exploration of their implications for SMB and Government. It is to be hoped, nevertheless that this paper will enable an in depth review of domestic fish export policy.

This is essentially an economic evaluation and is based on an examination of catch and cost data for 1987. Information has been obtained from SFA's statistical records of schooner catches, from SMB and from the Development Bank of Seychelles.

The difficulties discussed also apply more generally in the artisanal fishing industry but they are at their most acute in the schooner sector, because of the greater capital investment involved in each fishing unit. This paper is, therefore, mainly confined to the specific problems of the schooners which fish the more remote parts of the Mahé and Amirante plateaux.

1.2 Problems Identified in the NDP

The 1985 - 1989 National Development Plan (Chapter 14 Section I) states:

The demersal varieties most enjoyed by Seychellois are generally those that have formed the basis or the growth of exports. This suggests a conflict between meeting the demands of the local market on the one hand and the growth of exports on the other. This potential is thrown into sharper relief by the decline in fish landings,

Section II goes on to outline constraints on fish production, including:

* An ageing manpower base.

* Difficult working conditions: poor accommodation: poor safety at sea; rudimentary fishing gear.

* Seasonal fluctuations and regional deficiencies.

* Lack of shore and port infrastructure.

The NDP explains how action by Government intends to remedy the difficulties. The main thrust of the development programme concentrates on:

1) A maritime training programme at the Polytechnic.

2) A replacement programme for the fishing fleet so as to introduce more comfortable, safer and more efficient vessels.

3) Re-organization of marketing and distribution channels.

4) The provision of fishing port infrastructure within the framework of the East Coast Project.

1.3 Progress Achieved

Since the Plan was prepared, very substantial progress has been made in respect of the construction of new port facilities and infrastructures, and modern fish handling facilities. Storage and processing facilities have been set up by SMB Fish Division. In contrast, little progress has been made in the area of fish production and recruitment of young people into the industry.

1.4 Continuing Shortage of Premium Fish

In view of changes in statistical methods and changes in the Government bodies responsible for collecting fisheries statistics, it is difficult to know precisely what the fluctuations in fish landings have been over the past few years. A report by a group of Seychelles biologists [Lablache et - al. 1987] shows schooner landings declining from a high of 1,173 tonnes in 1982 when 40 schooners were active to a low of 383 tonnes in 1985, the year after the winding up of FIDECO (see Section 3 below). Since then landings have improved slightly reaching 514 tonnes in 1986 and 553 tonnes in 1987.

Residents in Seychelles complain about the shortage of high valued species such as Bourgeois, Job and Vieille (see Table 1 for Latin names). These are the same species which form the bulk of the export trade and which are provided mainly by the schooner fishery. SMB Fish Division could always sell more of these higher valued species if it could obtain them. (The shortage is not, of course merely a problem of catching more fish, rather it is a complex issue involving the whole supply chain and is influenced by seasonality, SMB's storage capacity and overall efficiency.)

1.5 Continuing Shortage of Recruits

Of the 58 graduates from the School of Maritime Studies at Seychelles Polytechnic during the last three years not one has entered the domestic schooner fishing industry. Some have gone into more lucrative or more glamorous occupations in seafaring with the Navy, or on the French or Spanish purse seiners, but most appear to have found work ashore. One or two have acquired their own smaller Lekonomi type GRP boats.

There are very few fishermen under thirty years old in Seychelles and it is clear that fishing is not now perceived as an attractive occupation by young people. This is perhaps not surprising in relation to the alternative employment prospects in the hotel and tourist industry and in office work. However, decisions about careers, though influenced by social and psychological factors (status, glamour, occupational dress, place of work, etc), usually depend primarily on the relationship between effort and reward.

The slow progress of the fleet rehabilitation programme is at least partly due to related causes, in this case to the very great difficulties that have been experienced by SFA in finding suitable skippers, in particular for the new generation of schooners being constructed at La Digue urgently needed to replace the present moribund fleet.

Those coming forward and expressing interest in participating in hire-purchase HP schemes for the new boats are either experienced skippers with no funds of their own and little business experience, or else persons with minimal fishing experience. Moreover, none of the current skippers on the 25 or so active schooners is accumulating sufficient cash reserves or savings to be a prospective new boat buyer on commercial terms. Hence the lack of clients, even though the La Digue boats are being offered at very substantial discounts on cost. It is true that technical problems have also arisen, but the lack of owner/skippers who could both operate the boats and who also have the ability to repay the hire purchase installments remains a persistent difficulty.

1.6 Lack of Financial Incentives

It will be the argument of this paper that at present the material inducements to taking up a career in fishing are not sufficient, and that it is poor financial reward in the artisanal fishery which is primarily responsible for the lack of recruits.

This paper examines the economics of the schooner fishery from the viewpoint of the operation of individual vessels. By examining all the key parameters and variables affecting the operation of a typical schooner, it illustrates the underlying problems.

Before the economic analysis, the following sections describe the nature of the schooner fishery, its grounds, its biological basis and its modus operandi.

2. THE SCHOONER FISHERY

In 1987 the schooner fishery landed 553 tonnes of fish with a landed value at Victoria of about SR 4.4 million. About 180 fishermen are employed in the fishery on a regular basis, some 18 per cent of the total number of full time fishermen.

Perhaps three quarters of the schooner fish is exported through SMB Fish Division. It is difficult to trace exported fish to individual types of vessel, but in very approximate terms the schooner fish probably accounts for an export value (fob) of about SR 6 million or about one million US dollars. The remainder of the export fish comes from the whalers and inshore vessels. Chief destinations are Reunion, France and UK with small quantities also going to Australia, other European countries and North America.

The schooner fishery is based on the outer areas of the Mahé and Amirante banks which typically require voyages of from 50 to 175 miles from the Mahé group where the schooners are based (see map). These fishing grounds are too far away to be exploited by the smaller FRP boats (Lekonomi and Mini Mahé types) and the open "whalers" (typically 5 to 8 metres) which normally range up to 25 nautical miles from Mahé, although in fair weather other boats do go much further and occasionally exploit some of the same grounds as the schooners. Fishing trips normally last from 6 to 10 days, shorter when fishing is easier and longer during the South East monsoon. (Essentially what happens is that when catch rates are higher the boat fills up more quickly and they come home sooner, although it is not clear whether they always come back with a maximum load.)

The schooners are typically 8 to 13 metres long with a crew of about 6 (including the skipper), though some schooners carry up to 8 men. The vessels are decked and powered in most cases by Yanmar inboard engines of 27 Hp or 37 Hp, depending on the size of the vessel. There are exceptions: one vessel has a 56 Hp engine and another, which has been fishing mainly for crabs, has a 120 Hp Volvo engine. The navigation equipment on board the schooners is usually limited to a compass. Each schooner is fitted with an ice box of 2 to 3 tonnes capacity.

Joel Nageon [1986] in "The Present Status and future Prospects of Fisheries in Seychelles" describes the fishing methods as follows:

The sole fishing method practised by the schooners is handlining. The fishing gear consists of a cotton main line and a monofilament leader with several branch lines with 2/0 to 4/0 size barbed hooks. The main line is weighted at the bottom with about 700 gm of iron. The number of hooks varies according to the target species: for larger species, such as snappers and big groupers, 4 to 8 hooks are used.

More recently, some vessels (such as Chantal), have started to use electric reels which, in combination with echo-sounders, are believed to increase the catch rates by at least 50% and perhaps by as much as 100%., de San (personnel communication).

Species composition studies done on the schooner fishery in 1987 show the preponderance of higher valued demersal species such as snappers and groupers which are suited for export. Table - 1 shows the species composition, the prices paid by SMB Fish Division and the weighted average value of the fish using the SMB prices (October 1987 prices). The value calculation will be discussed later in connection with the economic analysis and actual revenues of the schooners.

Table 1: Species Composition and Catch Value (SMB Victoria) 1987

Local Name (Species or family)

Weight

Price (SR)

Component

Bourgeois (Lutjanus sebae)

.293

10.50 (11.25-7.75)

3.08

Bordemar (Lutjanus sanguineus)

.029

8.25

.24

Vara Vara (Lutjanus bohar)

.063

4.25

.27

Job gris (Aprion virescens)

.072

5.50

.40

Job jaune (Pristopomoides spp.)

.098

9.00 (10.50-7.50)

.88

Maconde (Epinephelus clorostigma)

.086

10.00 (11:00-9.00)

.86

Vielle Platte (E. Leprosus)

.076

7.75

.59

Vielle (Epinephelus spp.)

.036

10.50 (13.00-7.75)

.38

Lascar (Lethrinus spp.)

.084

4.50

.38

Capitaine (Lethrinus nebulosus)

.051

5.50

.28

Carangue (Caranx spp.)

.030

2.00

.06

Minor species

.082

5.50

.45


1.000

Average Value/Kg = R7.87

Source: SFA statistics and SMB price information.

Note:

Figures in brackets show a price range when it is applicable. A typical price has been used for the calculation. The weights correspond to % proportion of catch if multiplied by 100.

Data collected in 1987 by SFA (see Appendix 1) on the schooner fleet provides some interesting figures on the performance of the vessels.

The average crew size was 5.77. A total of 538 fishing trips were undertaken. The average number of trips per boat was 16.8 but excluding the vessels which were relatively inactive, the 24 or so "active" vessels (more than 10 trips per year) averaged 21 trips. The highest number of trips per vessel was 35 by Soumarin I (a very small boat). The best performing full sized vessel was Chantal which completed 30.

The average trip length was 6.7 days and an average catch of 1,028 kg per trip was achieved in 1987. The vessel with the highest average catch per trip was Chantal with 1,927 kg and 12 vessels caught more than the average catch per trip and 19 caught less. Some of the latter category were not active participants in the fishery.

Data on revenue in Appendix 1 needs to be treated with caution because it only includes revenue from catches sold to SMB and in times of short supply the schooners do sometimes sell on the local market. Thus revenue is understated and the imputed price (average value column) and the value/man/day column tend to be understated also.

The data on catches, crew and trip duration are, however, believed to be quite accurate. The average catch rate for the whole fleet in 1987 was 39 kg/man/day fished, but this does include some vessels which cannot be described as serious participants in the fishery. Chantal achieved 49 kg/man/day with electric reels (with a larger than average crew).

It is important to note that there is no evidence of declining catch rates. A study by Joel Nageon [1982] of the FIDECO fleet during its first year of operation in 1982 revealed a catch rate of 43.3 kg/man/day. He pointed out that this was very close to the performance of 10 commercial schooners surveyed in 1978-79 which recorded 44.8 kg/man/day [FDL 1979]. A later study of the FIDECO fleet in 1982-83 by Lablache and Carrara [1984] revealed a figure of 43.41 kg/man/day. (There are, of course, marked seasonal variations, with Lablache and Carrara reporting a high of 59.09 kg/man/day in March to a low of 24.01 kg/man/day in June.)

It is clear that, despite the upheavals in the fishery connected with changes of ownership, the basic catch rates at sea have not changed significantly and there is no evidence of excessive pressure on the fish stock in the grounds fished by the schooners.

3. COMMERCIAL HISTORY OF THE SCHOONER FISHERY

The exportation of fish from Seychelles was previously handicapped by the great distance from markets. A sporadic trade in salted fish was conducted for many years but it was not until the opening of the international airport in the mid 1970's that exportation of fresh fish by air to Reunion and Europe became possible. Three commercial companies participated in this trade: Trade Winds Fisheries, Larue Fishing Company and Bon Poisson Fisheries. They all apparently traded profitably.

The records of the former Fisheries Department show that these companies, in addition to running their own vessels, bought premium fish from fishermen at prices as high as R16/kg for croissant. However, at that time the rupee value of sales in Reunion was more favorable.

In 1981 the Government decided to bring the schooner fishery into state ownership, but this was not put into effect until 1982 with the setting up of FIDECO (Fisheries Development Company). Twenty boats were acquired from the three companies, although only fifteen were ultimately put into service. A few boats operated by small owner/operators were not taken into state ownership.

FIDECO was not successful, although debate continues as to the reasons, with state ownership and poor quality of crews and vessels variously cited.

According to the Lloyds surveyor [pers comm], on acquisition by the Government, the condition of some of the boats was poor but they were generally serviceable.

Others, notably Chantal, Sea Gleaner and Altair were in good condition. Shortly after nationalization, all the boats were re-engined with Yanmar engines.

When SFA replaced FIDECO at the end of 1985 it was decided to sell the boats to the skippers. This amounted to a policy of privatization, but the Government was concerned to keep the fishery in the hands of the fishermen and to prevent "big business" from taking over, and hence a reversion to the status quo ante nationalization.

According to a confidential report to SFA by the Lloyds surveyor:

"..the condition of all the boats had deteriorated to a point where the value of the vessels was very low. Various overhauls were carried out before each vessel was sold."

The boats were repaired and transferred to their skippers at half the estimated value once repaired! Appendix 2 shows the summary of valuations placed on the FIDECO schooners at the time of transfer and the actual transfer price. It can be seen that the vessels were transferred at extremely preferential prices.

However, the Lloyds Surveyor also reports that since the selling off of the boats the condition of almost all of them has deteriorated and consequently that most will require replacement in the very near future, if a fleet is to be maintained. It should also be borne in mind that the age of the hulls of most of these boats is now quite advanced and that adequate maintenance is particularly important.

The final evidence concerning the parlous financial state of the schooner fishery is the failure of the boat owners to repay their loans. Appendix 3 schedules the extent of arrears which has accumulated over the past few years. Only one of the ex-FIDECO schooner loans is up-to-date and this is for the smallest of the FIDECO boats which was transferred for a mere R17,000, (approximately the price of a new GRP Mini Mahé). Two of the schooners which were not part of the FIDECO fleet are also in arrears with loans. Out of 22 vessels which may be considered as pure fishing schooners (excluding part cargo vessels such as Clarte, and Scorpio, which is operated by the Navy) 12 have defaulted on loans or HP agreements. DBS reports that no current loan to schooners (except for Sousmarin) is up-to-date.

4. ECONOMICS OF SCHOONER OPERATION


4.1 Revenues
4.2 Trip Costs
4.3 The Share System
4.4 Boat Owner's Costs
4.5 Loan and Hire Purchase Installments


This section will examine the achievable financial performance of typical schooners. In the absence of a comprehensive survey of actual costs incurred, reconstructions of operations in 1987 have been made.

Using a microcomputer spreadsheet, simulations have been made using many varied assumptions. However, for the purposes of this paper, three basic cases have been examined. These reconstruct the actual or expected performance of the three vessels concerned:

a) The typical or average schooner, using data for all the schooners obtained during 1987.

b) The most "successful" schooner in terms of catch, Chantal, which is considered by SFA to have one of the abler skippers and which has been utilizing an echo-sounder and electric reels.

c) The new La Digue 11.6 metre boat, assumed to be fitted with similar fishing gear to Chantal.

The simulations illustrated in tables 4, 5 and 6 have been constructed to match as closely as possible actual performance in 1987 as evidenced by activity levels, catches and costs. Table 6 deals with proposals for the La Digue boats in their current form. Hire purchase installments are therefore actual and do not necessarily reflect the purchase costs of the vessels on commercial terms.

4.1 Revenues


4.1.1 Catch Rates
4.1.2 Catch Value and Revenues


Revenues for the schooners can be computed with reasonable confidence on a per trip basis because good data exists on the achieved historical performance of the schooners.

4.1.1 Catch Rates

The actual revenue on an individual trip may be considered as being a function of prices, catch rates achieved by the gear employed, species composition and the duration of the trip. The traditional hand lines are believed to be capable of yielding 50 to 60 kg/day. However, the historical analyses of catches has generally been done on a catch/man/day basis which is not quite the same thing, time being shared by the crew between minding the line and cleaning and gutting and the various other tasks of the crew. Most ordinary boats operate about four handlines and a catch/man/day of, say, 44 kg/man/day thus translates into 55 kg/line/day. This then is the average performance of a typical schooner and has been used in the simulation. It produces a catch per trip figure for a typical four line boat marginally above but very similar to the average achieved by the schooners in 1987.

Electric reels used in combination with echo sounders are achieving substantially better results. Four electric reels on Chantal seem to be yielding about 100 kg/reel/day. A study being undertaken by SWIOP is still in progress on this aspect. However, the figure of 100 kg/reel/day does fit with the achieved average catch per trip of Chantal and the average duration of Chantal's fishing time per trip of about 5 days (similar to that of the average vessel).

In the simulations, therefore, two key assumptions for the base cases are 100/kg/reel/day in the case of Chantal and the new La Digue boats and 55 kg/line/day in the case of the typical schooner. Assumptions on fishing days per trip and days at sea are based broadly on 1987 averages. (For some reason, Chantal seems to have spent rather more time than the average vessel in going to and coming from the fishing grounds, possibly because she has been in the habit of travelling to more remote grounds.)

The size of the crew does not greatly influence revenue as the catches depend primarily on the gears used, which are assumed to be properly manned. Crew size marginally affects costs in the form of provisions and, of course, reduces the average share per man, but it does not greatly affect total returns to the boat owner, provided all tasks (including cleaning and gutting) are efficiently organized, because his share as owner is independent of the size of the crew.

4.1.2 Catch Value and Revenues

The values of the catches are all calculated using the weighted average price/kg as calculated in Table 1. This figure has been cross-checked with and is broadly corroborated by the records of sales in 1987 to SMB for individual trips (in those cases where all sales are known to have been made to SMB), though there are fluctuations from trip to trip as a result of varying catch composition.

Thus in the case of the typical schooner at current prices the expected revenue per trip is R8,657 and in the case of the La Digue boats and Chantal R15,750. Proportional increases in catch rate or prices would, of course, be matched by equal increases in revenue. Revenue per trip could also be enhanced by more fishing days per trip (subject to limitations of vessel hold capacity).

The major variable in relation to overall revenue is the number of trips a vessel can manage in a given time period. In relation to maintenance costs and loan repayments, the more intensively the vessel can be used the more likely it is to be viable. However, failure to maintain the vessel adequately will reduce the cash flow; a lower cash flow will reduce the availability of funds for maintenance and a vicious circle will assert itself.

4.2 Trip Costs


4.2.1 Fuel Costs and Lube Oil
4.2.2 Ice
4.2.3 Provisions
4.2.4 Miscellaneous: Gear, bait, etc.


4.2.1 Fuel Costs and Lube Oil

The variable costs of each schooner trip are known with some precision. Fuel costs are a function of fuel price R4.19/litre (wholesale to fishermen), engine horse power and engine hours per trip. The simulations make assumptions about the power settings (in terms of percentage of horsepower used) when going to/from the fishing grounds and while fishing, and according to the respective number of hours spent fishing and in navigation. The assumptions about fuel consumption per horsepower are standard. (0.2 litres/Hp/hr).

Excluding Scorpio (which is not a typical schooner), actual average fuel consumption per trip in 1987 was 258 litres (vessels mainly of 27 and 37 Hp). The three simulations illustrated show consumption figures of 287 litres in the case of the typical vessel (37 Hp engine assumed), 542 litres in the case of Chantal (56 Hp) and 678 litres for the La Digue boats (70 Hp). Thus the method of computing consumption produces results consistent with actual fuel consumption in 1987. Lube oil is calculated as 4 per cent of fuel costs.

4.2.2 Ice

Ice costs are also known. The typical vessel purchases two tonnes of ice per trip, Chantal normally takes three tonnes. This ratio is believed to be adequate and normal practice for trips of about a week's duration.

4.2.3 Provisions

Provisions include food and tobacco for the crew and are calculated at the rate of R25/head/day.

4.2.4 Miscellaneous: Gear, bait, etc.

An allowance of R250 is made for miscellaneous items of gear such as lines and hooks. This is distinct from maintenance because it is a cost deducted from gross receipts (together with other variable costs) in order to calculate the shares of crew and owner. Bait is normally obtained free of charge but occasionally has to be purchased. An allowance of R100/trip is made for this.

4.3 The Share System

The normal share system works as follows. For each trip the direct costs (provisions, ice, fuel, bait and gear) are deducted from gross revenue, and the balance is distributed one third to the owner of the boat and two thirds to be divided equally among the crew (with the skipper/owner included as a crew member). Thus the skipper/owner benefits from two sources of income: his share as a crew member and any balance remaining from his share as boat owner, after paying for maintenance and repairs and after allowing for depreciation of the boat. He also should allow for repayment of loans or Hp instalments. This is where considerable difficulties arise.

4.4 Boat Owner's Costs


4.4.1 Depreciation
4.4.2 Maintenance
4.4.3 Insurance


The boat owner must allow for three main costs. These are:

1) Capital depreciation (to enable him to buy the next boat when the current one wears out).

2) Maintenance

3) Insurance (sharing the risk of accidents)

In most cases he also has to allow for repayments of:

4) Hire Purchase installments. These are not all true costs of operation (except for the finance cost element), since they are the payments the skipper/owner makes to acquire the vessels, but they are very real demands on his cash flow and can easily crowd out other demands on his cash, notably maintenance.

Because some of these costs, especially maintenance, costs do not arise automatically with every trip the boat makes, and because they can usually be deferred to some extent they present the greatest management challenge to the skipper/owner. It is essential that the skipper/owner accumulate cash reserves and have contingencies for dealing with unforeseen urgent requirements. Some of the skippers do not even have bank accounts.

The long term consequence of making no allowance for capital depreciation is that when the boat becomes too old the skipper/owner cannot replace it without a 100 % loan. More critically, the consequences of failing to maintain a boat accelerate physical deterioration and lead to non-serviceability and loss of income. This is all obvious. But it is clear that most of the current skipper/owners are unable or unwilling to maintain their vessels adequately. The next step in our analysis therefore is to quantify these costs to the boat owner.

4.4.1 Depreciation

Using standard estimates of vessel life as employed by Lloyds surveyors, a wooden boat should last for at least 15 years, depreciating to a residual 20 % of original value, indicating an annual depreciation charge of 5.33% during that time. Engines depreciate more rapidly. For vessels of the class and size of the schooners, the engine should be depreciated at 15% per year till written off, indicating a life expectancy of about 6 years. These figures are not precise but they are indicative of the sort of allowances a prudent owner should make for depreciation of his capital.

Table 2: Indicative Schedule for Depreciation of Capital


Typical Schooner

Chantal

La Digue Boat

Hull value new

150,000

325,000

300,000 (1)

Depreciation p.a. (5.33% of 80%)

8,000

17,333

16,000

Engine Value new

36,000

50,000

103,000

Depreciation p.a. (15%)

5,400

7,500

15,450

Total Depreciation p.a.

13,400

24,833

31,450

Monthly depreciation

1,177

2,069

2,621

Note:

(1) This figure is known to understate the actual construction cost but it is probably near to the replacement cost.

4.4.2 Maintenance

This is the most difficult item to analyse. There are no records of actual expenditure and, as has been discussed already, actual expenditure on maintenance would appear to be minimal and far below that needed to maintain vessel serviceability and ensure normal life expectancy for the vessels.

An added difficulty is that maintenance costs differ from country to country, depending on duties, distance from engine manufacturer, and labour costs. Care has to be taken therefore in applying crude rules of thumb derived from environments where cost structures are different.

Table 3: Estimated Maintenance Costs (based on Chantal)

Slipping every 6 months (R600 x 2 + slipway rental)

2,100

Anti-fouling compound

1,500

Paint for all exposed woodwork (10 litres)

2,150

Caulking repairs

450

Rigging repairs

2,000

Sail repairs and renewals

1,500

Engine top overhaul (annually)

4,500

Engine spare parts

859

Service of electrical and electronic equipment

112

Renewal of sacrificial anodes

200

Safety equipment (renewal every 3 years)

496

Total annual maintenance and service costs

15,867

Equivalent in monthly terms

1,322

Table 3 shows a calculation of annual maintenance costs in Seychelles prepared by the SFA surveyor for a boat like Chantal. The figure would be slightly higher for the La Digue boats (R 1,500) and slightly lower in the case of a typical 37 Hp schooner (R 1,050). The variation between the boats is not great; it costs much the same to overhaul any engine or boat in this size class.

4.4.3 Insurance

The cost of insuring fishing boats can be high and for many vessels in Seychelles is as high as 6 per cent of capital value per year. The most favourable terms available are currently 3.5 per cent, and this figure has been used in our simulations. Skipper/owners who are making use of DBS loans or HP terms (which applies to all of them at present) do also have to arrange life insurance for themselves to cover the amount of the HP agreement. This is not expensive and tends to be built into the repayment installments.

Insurance is a true cost because it reflects (if correctly assessed, the risk of total or partial loss of the vessel as a result of an accident. Indeed as insurance rarely repays the full loss and does not normally cover loss of earnings as a result of accidents, some risk is still born by the skipper/owner and a prudent owner would allow for this by ensuring adequate reserves of cash in addition to his annual insurance premiums. In addition, these vessels should all carry third party insurance. They operate in a port area also frequented by very expensive yachts. It is not clear how many of them do actually carry this insurance. An allowance of R250 has been included for this.

4.5 Loan and Hire Purchase Installments

It is a general policy of the Development Bank of Seychelles to encourage sound management and a realistic approach to the commercial operation of vessels, while at the same time not imposing unrealistically high repayment burdens. However, even allowing for the fact that the FIDECO vessels have in all cases been transferred to skipper/owners at substantially below their value, repayments have not been in accordance with the agreements, and defaults or requests for extensions have occurred in every case.

The extent of the problem may have been exacerbated by the way in which payments are collected and a degree of "money illusion" on the part of skipper/owners unfamiliar with management of a business and the need to provide for repayments, maintenance and depreciation. But the root cause is simply that the returns to the capital employed (that is the vessel owner's share qua owner) are not sufficient to enable the skipper/owner (or perhaps he would be more accurately described as the skipper/hirer/owner) to make the payments required for him to become the real owner within a reasonable period of time. This conclusion was also reached implicitly by Torbjorn Johnsen [1985] of FAO's South West Indian Ocean Project in some simulations of profit potentials for different boats. He analysed and projected cash flows and found that repayment periods of over 9 years and for some vessels 15 years would be required if there were to be any chance of skipper/owners meeting their commitments. There is some confusion between loan repayments and depreciation. True depreciation would be an allowance for the fact that the capital is being consumed during the period of the loan or HP agreement, rather than a sum available for repayment.

Given the length of the HP agreements required, in practice, by the time the HP period is concluded, the asset acquired would in many cases be completely worn out. In the absence of allowance for depreciation the HP agreement would have been to all intents and purposes a hire agreement and the whole process, involving purchase of a new boat with a new HP agreement would have to start again at the end, or shortly after the expiry, of the old agreement. This would not meet the Government's objective concerning ownership. Moreover, soft financing of a subsidized capital amount on 100% HP terms should certainly not be taken for granted for replacement of the engine and ultimately the boat itself.

In the present simulations, in arriving at the figure "net disposable income of the skipper", assumed to be a "prudent" skipper, both HP payments and depreciation have been deducted. Whereas this would be double counting in an IRR or ROI calculation, in terms of vessel management this is considered to be a prudent view to take on the part of the skipper in relation to his "take-home pay". For example in the case of the La Digue boat, immediately after finishing his HP payments he will have to replace his engine which will be at the end of its life. If he has not put money aside for this he may be in trouble since he cannot rely on 100% financing for this on such favourable terms as his original boat purchase. In the case of the other two simulations shown (tables 4 and 5), the repayments should certainly not be accepted in lieu of all depreciation as they reflect only half the value of the boats (and are incidentally interest free), due to the Government's subsidy. Hence the skipper's need to provide for replacement in addition to the installments when managing his cash.

In the simulations shown in this paper, the repayments are the actual installments which have applied in a representative case or, in the case of the La Digue boat, the proposed monthly installments.

5. VESSEL VIABILITY AND OWNERS RETURN


5.1 Traditional Vessel
5.2 Chantal
5.3 New La Digue Design (11.6 metres)
5.4 Sensitivity to Changes


Tables 4, 5 and 6 show simulations, respectively for (I) a typical schooner, (II) Chantal using electric reels and (III) one of the new 11.6 metre La Digue boats also using electric reels. The assumptions are in accordance with the foregoing discussion of actual costs.

Table 4: Schooner Simulation - Case I: Typical Schooner

Revenue

Costs/trip


Catch/line/day

55

Cost of ice/kg

0.26

Catch/reel/day

100

Cost of fuel/It

R4.19

No. of lines

4

Eng. hrs to/from

36

No. of reels

0

Eng. hrs/day/fishing

10

Catch/day

220

Total eng hours

86

Days fishing/trip

5

Engine % power nav

80%

Days to/from/trip

1.5

Engine % power fish

20%

Value catch/kg

R7.87

Engine Hp

37

Crew (inc skipper)

5

Fuel cons l/Hp/hr

0.2

Catch/trip (kg)

1,100

Fuel litres/trip

287

Revenue/trip

R8,657

Fuel cost/trip

R 1,203


Lube oil

R48


Ice cost/trip

R520


Bait

R100


Provisions/man/day

R25


Provision/trip

R813


Gear

R250


Costs/trip

R2,934



Total crew shares

R3,816



Average share/man

R763



Available to owner of boat/trip

R1,908



Owners share as crew member

R763



Gross cash flow Skipper/Owner/trip

R2,671



Trips/month

2



Gross cash flow/m

R5,342



Repayments

R1,056



Maintenance/month

R1,050



Annual insurance rate

3.5%



Insured value

R180,000



Insurance/m

R525



Third party insurance

R250



Depreciation

R1,117



Net monthly disposable income of owner/skipper

R1,344



Assumed Capital Employed:


R186,000



Return to Capital (PBIT) p.a.


R10,483



Return on Capital as %


5.64% p.a.

Table 5: Schooner Simulation Case II - Chantal

Revenue

Costs/trip


Catch/line/day

55

Cost of ice/kg

0.26

Catch/reel/day

100

Cost of fuel/It

R4.19

No. of lines

0



No. of reels

4

Eng hrs to/from

48

Catch/day

400

Eng hrs/day/fishing

10

Days fishing/trip

5

Total eng hours


Days to/from/trip

2

Engine % power nav

80%

Value catch/kg

R7.87

Engine % power fis

20%

Crew (inc skipper)

8

Engine Hp

56

Catch/trip (kg)

2,000

Fuel cons l/Hp/hr

0.2

Revenue/trip

R15,740

Fuel litres/trip

542


Fuel cost/trip

R2,271


Lube oil

R91


Ice cost/trip

R78


Bait

R100


Provisions/man/day

R25


Provisions/trip

R1,400


Gear

R250


Costs/trip

R4,892



Total crew shares

R7,232



Average share/man

R904



Available to owner of boat/trip

R3,616



Owners share as crew member

R904



Gross cash flow Skipper/owner/trip

R4,520



Trips/month

2.5



Gross cash flow/m

R11,300



Repayments

R2,806



Maintenance/month

R1,322



Annual interest rate

3.5%



Insured value

R325,000



Insurance/m

R948



Third party insurance

R2,069



Net monthly disposable income of owner/skipper

R3,905



Assumed Capital Employed


R375,000



Return to capital


R53.411



Return on capital as %


14.24%

Table 6: Schooner Simulation Case III: La Digue Boats

Revenue/trip

Costs/trip


Catch/line/day

55

Cost of ice/kg

0.26

Catch/reel/day

100

Cost of fuel/It

R4.19

No. of lines

0

Eng. hrs to/from

48

No. of reels

4

Total eng. hours

98

Eng. hrs/day/fishing

10

Engine % power nav

80%

Catch/day

400

Engine % power fishing

20%

Days fishing/trip

5

Engine Hp

70

Days to/from/trip

2

Fuel cons l/Hp/hr

0.2

Value catch/kg

R7.87

Fuel litres/trip

678

Crew (inc. skipper)

8

Fuel cost/trip

R2,839

Catch/trip (kg)

2,000

Lube oil

R114

Revenue/trip

R15,740

Ice cost/trip

R780


Bait

R100


Provisions/man/day

R25


Provisions/trip

R1,400


Gear

R250


Costs/trip

R5,483



Total crew shares

R6,838



Average share/man

R855



Available to owner of boat/trip

R3,419



Owners share as crew member

R855



Gross cash flow Skipper/owner/trip

R4,274



Trips/month

2.5



Gross cash flow/m

R10,685



Repayments

R6,000



Maintenance/month

R1,500



Annual ins rate

3.5%



Insured value

R360,000



Insurance/m

R1,050



Third party ins

R250



Depreciation

R2,621



Net monthly disposable




income of owner/skipper

(R736)



Assumed capital employed


R403,000



Return to capital (PBIT)


R37,521



Return on capital as %


9.31%

5.1 Traditional Vessel

It can be seen that in the case of the typical schooner the skipper/owner receives a gross return of R5,342 after deducting the crews shares and the direct costs of the trip. Out of this he is supposed to pay installments on his borrowings and of course his maintenance and insurance costs. He should also provide for depreciation and contingencies. If he does all these things he will be left with only R1,344 disposable income. This is plainly not enough, indeed it is less than the take home money of the ordinary fisherman who could probably net R1,526. Most probably what he does is to defer maintenance and make no allowance for depreciation at all.

5.2 Chantal

The position of the more sophisticated vessel with electric reels like Chantal, which is also the vessel with the best overall catch performance, is somewhat better. The residual "take-home" pay of the prudent skipper/owner would be R3,905. This would not be unreasonable for a secure office job in Seychelles, but is not commensurate with the dangers and hardships of a fisherman's life, coupled with the financial responsibilities and burden of management born by the skipper/owner. This is further evidenced by the fact that Chantal's skipper, like all the others, is in arrears with loan repayments.

5.3 New La Digue Design (11.6 metres)

The case of the La digue boat is similar to that of Chantal in terms of catching capacity and costs, with the exception of the fact that it has a larger and more expensive engine and the fact that the loan repayments proposed are R6,000 month. The most likely outcome therefore of the La Digue boat scenario is failure. The skipper/owner would actually have no money available to feed his children after paying his HP installments and maintaining his boat. This is very disturbing in the context of the proposed re-equipment of the fleet with boats of this order of cost. The results illustrate clearly why the schooner fishery is run down. There are two fundamental problems. First, the absolute returns to the owner of the boat are poor. Second the money flows initially into the owner's hands on sale of the fish, and, in the context of the poor returns, the temptation to regard it as "take home" pay is overwhelming. It is probable also that the skipper/owner does not fully appreciate his actual costs, in that he is probably unaware of how much he should be spending on maintenance and how much he should be putting by for contingencies and for depreciation.

The question of what is a reasonable return to the boat owner is debatable. The return on investment (ROI) figures shown in these tables may seem respectable for those who are used to looking at large capital schemes. They have to be seen, however, against the normal requirement for the prospective owner to borrow money at 10 per cent (more in some cases) in order to buy his way in under a hire purchase scheme. It is difficult to buy into an asset which is only producing, say 14 % when one has to borrow at 10 %. Moreover, the absolute size of the asset is not large, so the owner is not in any way comparable to a professional capitalist manipulating a large portfolio. Another factor which has to be remembered in the case of fishing boats is the risk, to life and limb as well as to the boat and its financial return.

There seems to be a widespread perception of the skipper/owners as irresponsible, lazy individuals prone to excessive drinking, and that it is these defects of character which account for the poor state of the fishery. Such value judgements have no place in an analysis of this kind though they could be considered (in less emotive terms) by a socio-economic study. From an economic point of view they do not represent a conflicting explanation of the situation. If indeed the industry lacks conscientious fishermen, then it is probably because the effort/reward relationship in the industry is insufficient to attract abler individuals, against a background of more attractive occupations. The evident lack of motivation among schooner fishermen is more likely to be a symptom of depression in the industry than it is to be the cause.

5.4 Sensitivity to Changes

The next step is to ask what magnitude of changes would need to be brought about to remedy the situation.

Table 7 illustrates the effects of some changes in the assumptions in terms of the expected take home money of the prudent skipper/owner who meets his HP repayment installments. It also shows return on investment (ROI). This figure is equivalent to the owner's net return less his share as a fisherman and plus his repayments, as a percentage of the value of the boat (as estimated in table 2). The figure should be viewed with some caution as the precise evaluation of the capital employed is difficult, bearing in mind the capital subsidies which have been given (see section 3 above). In our examples the denominator has been the same figure as used in the depreciation calculations.

Table 7: Expected net cash position of skipper/owner & ROI




Case I

Case II

Case III

Typical

Chantal

La Digue

(a) 2t/m

(b) 2.5t/m

 

 

(1) Present cost structure

Gross cash flow

5,342

6,666

11,300

10,685

Fisherman's pay

1,526

1,907

2,260

2,137

Net cash/month

1,344

2,679

3,905

(736)

ROI

5.64%

11.79%

14.24%

9.30%

(2) Duty Free Fuel

Net cash/month

1,979

3,474

5,244

937

ROI

8.56%

15.54%

17.76%

13.30%

(3) 10% price increase

Net cash/month

2,152

3,689

5,544

1,347

ROI

9.36%

16.44%

18.44%

14.27%

(4) Duty Free Fuel & 10% price increase

Net cash/month

2,787

4,484

6,833

3,021

ROI

12.29%

20.10%

21.87%

18.26%

Notes:

1) ROI = Return on Investment = net returns to the capital employed (the value of the boat).


2) The alternatives under Case I are for 2 trips per month and 2.5 trips per month on average.


3) Net cash/month = skipper/owners disposable income for his own purely domestic purposes after making prudent provisions for his boat.

First, for the sake of consistency, for the typical schooner it seems reasonable to suppose that it can achieve the intensity of operation achieved by Chantal, that is 30 trips a year or an average of 2.5 per month. This improves the performance somewhat. So two alternatives have been shown for Case I, and the second alternative (b) is calculated using the same trips per month (2.5) as for cases II and III.

It seems unlikely that more than 30 trips a year could be achieved consistently with the existing management regime. The only vessel which exceeded this figure in 1987 was the very small boat Soumarin.

The effects of two favourable changes to the economic environment in which these vessels have to operate have then been considered: an elimination of duty on fuel; and a 10 per cent increase in the prices paid for the catch. The effects of a combination of these two measures are also shown.

It can be seen (Table 7) that the fuel duty change is very helpful. More effective on the owner's position is a 10 per cent increase in the value of the catch. Only a combination of the two produces a set of circumstances in which an improvement in the fortunes of the industry could be expected with confidence, (although bigger price increase could be substituted for the waiving of fuel duty).

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 It is clear from the present run down state of the schooners and the defaults in payment of HP installments that the policy of transfer of ownership of ex-FIDECO schooners to skippers is failing.

6.2 The reason for this is that the returns to schooner fishing in general are insufficient to permit the skipper to retain a reasonable "take home" pay, maintain his boat, provide for depreciation and contingencies and at the same time find the funds necessary to buy his boat. This is notwithstanding the soft terms of the loan, coupled with (in the case of the FIDECO schooners) a heavily subsidized transfer price.

6.3 This situation has probably been exacerbated by managerial inexperience on the part of the skippers. They are not used to budgeting and receive the gross return in cash. This, however, is a secondary problem.

6.4 The difficulty of recruitment of suitable persons into the industry with ambitions of captaincy merely reflects the poor potential earnings. It is relevant to note that the schooner fishery competes with the cargo and passenger schooner industry in terms of attracting recruits with an interest in the sea and that industry is relatively lucrative. The difference between the physical condition and appearance of the fishing schooners and that of the cargo/passenger schooners bears witness to this.

6.5 There is no evidence that declining catch rates are in any way responsible for the problems: these have been stable since the fishery began in the mid 1970's. However, more intensive use of the schooners (more trips/year) would clearly help. Whether this is achievable to any degree in the context of the serviceability of the vessels, the current conditions of work and the effort/reward relationship is doubtful. The simulations show poor returns even using the utilization rates currently being achieved by the most active vessels.

6.6 The proposed HP repayment of R6,000 per month for the La Digue 11.6 metre fishing schooners is unrealistically high and will lead to early default.

6.7 The returns to primary fish production will have to be increased if the present ownership structure is to be maintained. It is most likely that a continuation of the present situation will lead to the early demise of the existing vessels and failure to maintain the new vessels in a satisfactory state. Moreover, the chronic problems of loan repayments will persist unless the earning capabilities of the schooners are enhanced by increased fish prices and/or decreased costs. It should be noted that the problem of loan defaults is widespread and extends to some private schooners which were not originally operated by FIDECO as well as to many whalers.

6.8 Given these problems in the primary function of fish production the outlook for the growth of exports of high valued fish remains poor, unless the financial environment in which the schooners have to operate improves.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

It will be apparent from the foregoing analysis that the management of individual fishing units is posing a serious problem for the schooner fishery, and that returns from "ownership" of the vessels (taken to include those vessels being acquired through a hire purchase arrangement) do not provide enough revenue for the skipper/owner to acquire his vessel and adequately maintain it, even under soft hire purchase arrangements and heavily subsidized capital costs. Indeed, even without the cash burden of vessel acquisition, the returns to vessel ownership are poor.

It is clear that the policy of subsidizing capital cost (as pursued so far) is insufficient, and to increase the capital subsidy to a level sufficient to enable operators to manage the vessels competently would be tantamount to giving the boats away.

In simple terms, there are two ways of boosting profitability: increasing the price of fish or reducing the costs. However, as we have seen, it probably requires action in both directions simultaneously to remedy the situation.

More generally, the question of the returns to fish capture in the fish export industry cannot be divorced from the industry as a whole, that is, capture, processing, storage and dispatch overseas. Seychelles Marketing Board Fish Division is the next link in the chain after fishing itself, and the only channel to export markets. Any review of pricing policy for the fishermen would obviously have to take into account the downstream effects on SMB. but it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the efficiency of SMB Fish Division, the basis on which prices to fishermen are fixed, or the nature and scale of SMB Fish Division's overheads.

A difficulty faced in the export of demersal fish in Seychelles and shared on the export of other traditional exports such as copra and cinnamon is the high valuation of the Seychelles rupee. This suits the tourist industry very well since tourist holidays are packages and an expensive Seychelles component of such a package is cushioned by the other components, notably the airfare. Thus the demand for Seychelles holidays is very inelastic with respect to Seychelles prices, and the Government very sensibly keeps the prices of local components as high as possible, chiefly through maintaining an expensive currency.

An unfortunate side effect of this is to make all Seychelles' visible exports expensive, including Seychelles' fish. In the face of these commercial pressures in export markets, as well as local pressures to employ more people on a full time basis (despite marked seasonal fluctuations in work load) in its processing operations, SMB Fish Division, therefore, tries to minimize costs, of which some fifty per cent is represented by the cost of fish purchased from fishermen. The slow asphyxia of the fish production activity, which is entirely independent of SMB, is the result.

These pressures on the demersal fish export industry in general, which are largely attributable to an exchange rate parameter created by the needs of the tourist industry, suggest that a close examination of the impact of Government taxes on the sector as a whole would be warranted.

Government revenues come mainly from tax on fuel in the form of duty of diesel fuel directly and, for SMB, in the form of the large tax element in electricity costs.

The fishermen also suffer through the trades tax on certain imported items of essential equipment, including, astonishingly, safety equipment. Consequently, given their shortage of cash, the fishermen often go to sea with inadequate safety equipment.

The duty on fuel consumed by the schooners is estimated to account for about R400,000 (138,000 litres @ R3 approx). This amounts to what is in effect a heavy tax on an export industry: the effects of removal of fuel duty on the profitability of individual schooner operation are illustrated in Table 7.

Thus one obvious way of alleviating the burden on the schooners is to remove duty. There are, however, practical difficulties associated with this, notably the risk of abuse of the privilege and leakages to other diesel users of duty free fuel. Probably the best way of obviating this is simply to charge full price at time of purchase and to offer the bona fide skippers a rebate at the end of every month on presentation of purchase vouchers and receipts for fish sales to SMB. The rebate could also be used to offset maintenance bills with SFA workshops and/or loan repayments.

The following initial recommendations are made:

In order to reduce costs on the fish export industry,

(1) Fuel duty should be rebated to skipper/owners who maintain regular landings of fish to SMB.

(2) All duty on safety equipment, engines and spare parts should be removed.

(3) There should be a review of SMB pricing policy to fishermen, with a view to increasing fish prices, taking into account overheads and commercial pressures on SMB in export markets. This should include a review of electricity charges to SMB which include a very large tax element.

As has already been explained some combination of these measures offers a way forward given the present policy concerning ownership for skipper/owners.

(4) On the question of improved management alone, an approach which merits close attention and which would leave the present ownership arrangements intact would be the introduction of some umbrella body for fleet management, possibly constituted as a co-operative and owned collectively by the skippers. The question of a service cooperative assisting the schooner fishery has already been suggested informally by Mr Ardill of SWIOP and it is recommended that the feasibility of this approach be looked into. Such a body could provide competent fleet management, record keeping and accounting services and could organize efficient crewing and maintenance scheduling.

Finally it must be stressed that the fundamental problem is an inadequate first hand fish price, which, if retained, will lead to the further deterioration of the schooner fishery and will continue to frustrate efforts to re-equip the fleet with efficient, safe and comfortable vessels.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cole, R. C., 1965. Commercial Fishing in Seychelles. Ministry of Overseas Development (London) Tropical Products Institute Report No R13.:82 p.

FDL (Fisheries Development Limited), 1978. Fisheries Development in Seychelles. Consultants Report. (2) p.27.

Johnsen, T., 1985. Simulations of the profit potential for different boat types introduced as a supplement to or replacement for the schooner fleet of Seychelles. SWIOP Doc. RAF/79/065/WP/25//85.:25 p.

Lablache, G., and G. Carrara, 1984. RAF/79/065/14/84.:45 p.

Lablache, G., Moussac, G., Jivan Shah, N., 1987. Summary of the artisanal fisheries of Seychelles. Mimeo. Seychelles Fishing Authority. Table 3.3.:12p.

Nageon de Lestang, J., 1982. FIDECO's first year (1982). Mimeo. Seychelles Fishing Authority report.:16 p.

Nageon de Lestang, J., 1986 a. The present status and future prospects of the fisheries of Seychelles. Mimeo. Seychelles Fishing Authority report.:15 p.

Nageon de Lestang, J., 1986 b. Working document on the present state of the fisheries loan scheme in Seychelles. Mimeo. Seychelles Fishing Authority.:16p.

Tarbit, J., 1980. Demersal trawling in Seychelles. Seychelles Dep. of Ag. and Land Use. Fisheries Bulletin No.4:84 p.

Tarbit, J., 1987. Demersal fisheries development in Seychelles and the evaluation of new fishing vessel designs and operating strategies. Mimeo. report to SFA.:33 p.

APPENDIX 1 - SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS - YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 - SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS - YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: JANUARY YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: FEBRUARY YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: MARCH YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: APRIL YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: MAY YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: JUNE YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: JULY YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: AUGUST YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: SEPTEMBER YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: OCTOBER YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: NOVEMBER YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 1 (Contd.) SCHOONER FISHERIES STATISTICS MONTH: DECEMBER YEAR: 1987

APPENDIX 2 - FIDECO BOAT VALUATION AND SALE PRICE

APPENDIX 2 - FIDECO BOAT VALUATION AND SALE PRICE

VESSEL NAME

ESTIMATED ORIGINAL BUILDING COST

ENGINE COST AT TIME OF RENEWAL

ACTUAL VALUE OF BOAT AND ENGINE

ESTIMATED REPAIRS

TOTAL VALUE

PROPOSED SALE PRICE

QUEEN

145,000

36,000

29,113

36,000

65,113

33,000

DICK

150,000

36,000

12,600

45,000

57,600

38,000

SERRE

150,000

36,000

18,550

57,500

76,050

38,000

TOUSSAINY

160,000

36,000

50,330

34,500

84,830

50,000

LANINA


36,000

12,000




MAMI

100,000

36,000

30,100

39,700

69,800

23,000

ALERT

120,000

36,000

11,300

53,500

64,800

35,000

VIGILANT

140,000

36,000

21,050

42,500

63,550

32,000

INNOCENT

120,000

36,000

35,800

29,000

64,800

33,000

CHANTAL

325,000

50,000

182,913

20,650

203,563

101,000

SOUSMARIN

50,000

28,000

23,150

11,000

34,150

17,000

APPENDIX 3 - ARREARS ON SCHOONER LOANS (DECEMBER 1987)

APPENDIX 3 - ARREARS ON SCHOONER LOANS (DECEMBER 1987)


YEAR

AMOUNT

REPAYMENTS

INTEREST %

AMOUNT

EQUIVALENT MONTHS

EX-FIDECO (HP)

CHANTAL

1985

101,000

36 X 2805.55

NIL

33,372.75

12

INNOCENT

1985

33,000

36 X 917.00

NIL

4,471.00

5

DICK

1986

38,000

36 X 1056.00

NIL

3,811.59

4

TOUSANIE

1985

50,000

36 X 1389.00

NIL

10,891.70

8

ALERT

1986

35,000

36 X 972.25

NIL

10,769.75

11

QUEEN

1985

33,000

36 X 917.00

NIL

4,470.63

5

VIGILANT

1986

32,000

36 X 888.90

NIL

4,952.00

6

SERRE

1986

38,000

36 X 1056.00

NIL

5,686.00

5

MAMI

1985

23,000

36 X 638.90

NIL

2,629.75

4

SOUSMARIN

1985

17,000

36 X 472.25

NIL



OTHERS (LOANS)

PAILLE EN QUEUE

1983

68,600

36 X 1490.00

8

25,008.00

17

VENUS

1985

114,000

36 X 3825.00

12

48,984.00

13


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