|
|
126. The evaluation confirms the continuing overall relevance and importance of Strategic Objective A3 as an organizational priority for FAO. Natural and human-induced disasters contribute increasingly to global food insecurity and poverty, especially in rural areas. Thus, it is entirely appropriate that increasing resilience and the capacity to cope with natural disasters should be an important focus of FAO’s work.
127. The components addressed in the Strategic Objective are appropriate in that they respond to all aspects of an emergency situation, from preparedness, through early warning and needs assessment, provision of relief, and planning for the transition to rehabilitation and development, so that people’s resilience in the face of future disasters is strengthened. This holistic approach also plays to FAO’s unique comparative advantage (both demonstrated and potential) in having capacity in all these components and makes it possible for FAO to exploit such advantages to the assistance of those Member Nations that require it.
128. The questionnaire submitted to member countries and partners confirmed the useful role of FAO in dealing with emergencies and its assistance was generally viewed as positive (see Annex 1). While the relatively small number of replies limits the degree to which detailed inferences can be made, countries rated FAO assistance as “satisfactory” or “excellent” in all five areas of emergency work (preparedness, early warning, needs assessment, agricultural relief, and rehabilitation/recovery planning). Compared with other donors, a majority of countries found FAO to be best, or about equal to others, in needs assessment and relief operations, while other donors were found better by a majority of respondents in preparedness, early warning and rehabilitation/recovery planning.
129. In the abstract, all the strategy components are important. However, the relative attention that FAO gives to each of the components has varied considerably, and the Organization’s stated comparative advantage (i.e. a broad range of technical expertise and breadth of field experience) is not well reflected in the real-world situation. Early warning is an area in which FAO has long been active and in which its work is well appreciated by member countries and the international community, as also confirmed by the questionnaire. However, sharp increases in the number of emergency situations in recent years, combined with – at best – static funding, has meant that resources for this work are stretched thin, making it difficult to maintain the same high degree of quality.
130. Funding for agricultural relief operations has increased tremendously in recent years, as the number of emergency situations has gone up and donor trust in FAO’s ability in this area has increased. Within FAO, a new Division (TCE) has been set up with responsibility to implement agricultural relief operations in response to the demands for this type of assistance. On the whole, agricultural relief projects have performed satisfactorily, as indicated in the assessments of 70 operations by review missions and also as reflected in the questionnaire survey of member countries and FAO partners. FAO generally provides a more technically appropriate solution to a given problem (through Emergency Coordinators and technical assistance, particularly in TCP). FAO’s provision of Emergency Coordinators is unique. These have proved to be effective and are much appreciated by other partners, raising FAO’s profile in major emergency situations.
131. However, FAO’s ability to exploit its comparative advantage is constrained by its weakness in making speedy delivery of agricultural inputs. This weakness is due to several factors noted in the report, including internal administrative and financial procedures that FAO itself can improve.
132. Other strategy components have received far less attention in FAO’s work. Activities aimed at disaster preparedness (with the exception of support to early warning) have been rather few and scattered. However, this has been recognized and FAO is seeking ways to improve the situation, particularly through the PAIA-REHAB mechanism. Activities aimed at promoting the effective transition from relief to rehabilitation and development have also been rather few. As of yet, there are no examples in which FAO has played a decisive role in such a transition, and there are important institutional questions that should be resolved.
133. In conclusion, Strategic Objective A3 is relevant and appropriate, providing a broad guide in terms of priority areas for FAO action. Clearly, its effective implementation requires development over time – through the MTP process – of more operational planning and programming for a set of priority results to be achieved. The need for such a development is also indicated by the unevenness with which the four component areas have been addressed so far, showing a considerable scope for better exploitation of the Organization’s technical expertise and capacity in support of the Strategic Objective. The following recommendations reflect these considerations.
134. The evaluation points to the need for greater mainstreaming of emergency-related work, especially in the work of technical divisions. In the context of the MTP, PAIA-REHAB represents the logical mechanism for a greater mainstreaming and integration of emergency-related work by key technical units and, while a good start has been made, this effort needs to be reinforced further.
135. Recommendation 1: (a) Specific emergency-related outputs should be programmed and budgeted by the concerned technical divisions, starting from the next Programme of Work and Budget (2004-2005), particularly in areas related to Strategic Objective A3 that have received insufficient attention so far (e.g. preparedness). (b) Functional statements of those units participating in ECG and PAIA-REHAB should be reviewed to ensure that their role in emergencies is clearly stated. In key technical divisions for emergency work, a focal point with appropriate terms of reference should be designated to deal specifically with emergency-related matters.
136. Recommendation 2: FAO should help integrate a systematic approach to deal with countries that are especially prone to natural disasters, and thus it should ensure that disaster management is a key consideration within all agricultural development activities in such countries. In particular, the FAO country office, as well as the regional Policy Assistance Branches, should be strengthened – through sensitization and training – in their capacity for incorporating this aspect into the programmes and projects that are in their control.
137. While FAO traditionally has been, and continues to be, active in early warning through GIEWS and support to national and regional systems, only a few activities have been carried out for other components of preparedness. In terms of supporting the preparation of comprehensive preparedness plans at the regional and national levels, FAO has a mixed record from the field experiences reviewed. Clearly, TCP is not a suitable source for this kind of support, which requires strong institution-building components that are not amenable to the budgetary and time constraints of TCP.
138. FAO does have comparative advantages in key domains related to preparedness. In particular, it has strong comparative advantages in food and agriculture information for preparedness. However, it is important to focus on priority areas and to articulate them within the MTP context.
139. Recommendation 3: (a) Building on FAO’s specific strengths, priority actions for the future should be reviewed and stated in an FAO Strategy and Priority Actions for Preparedness. This work could well be carried out under the aegis of ECG and the members of PAIA-REHAB, once the latter have agreed on a work plan and further refined priority actions for FAO, particularly in the field of information. Such a document would help to clarify FAO’s role vis-à-vis other organizations in this domain, facilitate needed advocacy vis-à-vis donors and FAO Member Nations in general, and enhance coordinated resource allocations among FAO units. (b) Clear responsibility should be given to a lead unit for each output that is defined for activities in the MTP.
140. Recommendation 4: FAO should pursue and strengthen its work on information for early warning, impact assessment, needs assessment and the design of appropriate responses in the following areas:
Ø On the basis of the existing guidelines, develop a practical and useful manual for field staff and consultants conducting CFSAMs.
Ø In post-conflict situations and/or in situations where government institutions have collapsed, provide training on the regular collection and analysis of information, at a very early stage, to the officials responsible for emergency activities in the field (i.e. the ECU, FAO representation).
Ø In disaster-prone countries, strengthen the development of early warning systems by integrating the household food security dimension and vulnerability analysis. In this regard, the work carried out by FAO under FIVIMS should provide relevant inputs. The objective should be to develop local food security monitoring systems with low-cost approaches and methodologies, using existing structures to the extent possible. To do this, FAO will have to integrate the disaster dimension into its work under FIVIMS.
Ø FAO should consolidate the rich existing information into a database that would facilitate the assessment of impact and needs in future disasters. Such a consolidated database would include information on logistics, population distribution, food security, natural resources, disaster history and impact, etc. It should also take into account existing relevant initiatives, such as the FAO GeoNetwork (hazard-related agricultural environmental data), aimed at improving access to information. PAIA-REHAB should advise on the items for inclusion in the database; some additional information may have to be collected (e.g. national seed sector profiles, including the varieties actually grown by farmers). In its development, priority should be given to the most disaster-prone countries and regions.
Ø FAO’s work for impact and needs assessment could be further improved by: i) disseminating, through training and in-country testing, the RADAR guidelines produced by SDRN; and ii) preparing guidelines for conducting rapid assessment in the field in countries where satellite imagery and GIS techniques are not readily available. These guidelines would be geared to practitioners (FAO staff in the field, national consultants), and training for staff and consultants could be carried out at regional and subregional offices.
Ø Under the FIVIMS programme, greater attention should be given to the disaster and crises dimension of food insecurity and vulnerability. In this respect, the interesting experience of FSAU in Somalia should be clearly monitored in order to draw key lessons for similar situations. Furthermore, more synergies have to be built between the work currently carried out under the EC-funded project on EWFIS in complex emergencies and FIVIMS.
141. The evaluation found that, while some interventions were implemented on time, in many cases inputs were not made available in time for the intended cropping season. Sometimes delays were beyond the control of FAO (e.g. late request for assistance, late response from donors). However, lengthy procedures in FAO were also a contributing factor. This was a common criticism, confirmed by the questionnaire sent to the member countries and partners surveyed during the evaluation. The FAO rule that limits procurement by FAORs to US$25 000 means that most agricultural relief procurement must be done from headquarters. Assuming FAO representations have sufficient capacity, in principle, agricultural relief procurement should be carried out by them.
142. Recommendation 5: (a) FAO should implement a training programme for the representation staff who would be carrying out local procurement. First priority should be given to those countries where there is, or is likely to be, a higher volume of agricultural relief assistance. For major operations, a pool of experienced administrative/procurement officers (including, especially, retirees under the Partnership Programme) should be established, to be mobilized rapidly to carry out procurement activities in the affected country. (b) On a case-by-case basis, procurement limits on FAORs for agricultural relief inputs should be raised.
143. FAO Emergency Coordinators performed very well and provided good follow-up to all aspects of agricultural relief supply activities. Emergency Coordinators cannot be appointed for every emergency situation in which FAO may intervene, especially if the FAO activity is a single project or two projects over a short duration. On the other hand, some agricultural relief interventions were delayed because of inadequate follow-up and lack of assignment for performing specific tasks.
144. Recommendation 6: (a) FAO should appoint an Emergency Coordinator whenever the volume and duration of the emergency operation warrants. A pool of qualified candidates to serve in this capacity should be developed. (b) Project documents for emergency interventions should include a work plan tied to the cropping calendar, with designation of responsibilities for implementing specific actions and deadlines for doing so. The job descriptions of NPDs, in particular, should be included in project documents.
145. This has been generally weak. Target beneficiaries were described in general terms and, in practice, beneficiary selection was usually left to local discretion. While recognizing that beneficiary identification takes time, enough cases of dubious input distribution were seen to warrant greater attention to this aspect in future activities.
146. Recommendation 7: The process of beneficiary identification and targeting should be an integral part of project design and work planning, especially for interventions over several production seasons. Beneficiary identification is best done when criteria for selection have been established and explained to stakeholders; the selection process has been decentralized to the lowest level; and various institutions/stakeholders are involved, including the beneficiaries themselves.
147. Most projects took a standard approach to agricultural input distribution. There is a need to experiment more with other approaches that may be more successful, particularly for seed distribution, for which the use of locally known varieties has many important advantages.
148. Recommendation 8: Where practical, other approaches to seed distribution, such as seed fairs or seed vouchers, should be used in agricultural relief projects. Assistance in the design of such projects should be sought from the technical division (the Seed and Plant Genetic Resources Service [AGPS]).
149. The quality of FAO’s agricultural relief interventions was enhanced by the inclusion of technical assistance components, thereby playing to one of FAO’s comparative advantages. Technical assistance can be most cost-effective when it is given through existing FAO technical cooperation activities already present in the country. In all cases, however, the inputs distributed should be appropriate to the intended target beneficiaries.
150. Recommendation 9: (a) Technical support for all FAO agricultural relief interventions should be assured, either within the project itself or from other available sources, such as ongoing FAO projects in the same country. (b) In designing projects, care should be taken to ensure that management requirements for the inputs distributed are not beyond what the recipient farmers can provide. This will particularly be the case for novel inputs.
151. The supply of agricultural relief inputs to needy farmers is inherently different from rehabilitation or development activities, which tend to be more complex. While these two elements have been handled successfully under programme-type interventions with sufficient time for synchronizing them, attempts to do so within a single project were unsuccessful because the relatively short implementation time frame of a single project was not conducive to the planning and implementation of both components in an adequate manner.
152. Recommendation 10: Relatively small, relief-oriented projects should not be designed or implemented so as to pursue both relief and rehabilitation objectives at the same time.
153. Evaluation and monitoring are essential for the systematic assessment of intervention results. However, they have rarely been included in agricultural relief projects, although this situation has improved recently. Some evaluations undertaken by national consultants or NGOs have made useful findings and recommendations, but it is not always clear that information has been used for future programming.
154. Recommendation 11: In general, more use should be made of evaluation to identify successful intervention approaches and from which to draw lessons. An appropriate, simple format for evaluation reports should be established by TCE, with assistance from PBEE. All evaluation reports for agricultural relief projects should be commented on by TCE and any technical division that may also be concerned. Comments should cover the adequacy of the report, recommend actions to be taken and summarize lessons learned for future application. Lessons learned from evaluations should be shared among all relevant FAO units and partners, be made widely available and be used to identify “best practices” to guide future operations. For more independent evaluations, annual evaluation plans for emergency activities should be agreed between TCE and PBEE.
155. Because it is so different from any other FAO emergency operation, the Oil-for-Food Programme in Northern Iraq was not specifically reviewed for this evaluation. However, its size and importance, and the fact that it is now moving into a rehabilitation phase, would indicate that, at some point, the FAO-implemented component should be evaluated, at least for the sake of accountability. An Evaluation Unit has been established within the local management structure of the FAO component of this programme, and it should contribute to this effort.
156. Recommendation 12: The FAO component of the Oil-for-Food Programme in Northern Iraq should be subject to an in-depth evaluation during 2003-2004, focusing on the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation throughout its entire duration.
157. Looking at the “disaster cycle”, FAO has been effective in linking early warning activities to agricultural relief as there are clear institutional homes for these. In post-natural disaster situations, where FAO has had a strong presence it has generally been effective because the normal government structures are in place and functioning. Much more problematic has been the organization of assistance in the transition period following complex (conflict-related) emergencies. While some activities have taken place in such situations, these have tended to be individual projects, not part of an overall programme. Thus far, FAO has not been successful in getting rehabilitation activities included in UNCAP. Partly this is owing to the phasing out of donor funding when an emergency situation abates. Partly it is because FAO has not evolved an effective approach and has done relatively little to advocate the importance of transitional assistance, leaving the field more to other actors, particularly IFIs.
158. In FAO, as in most organizations, one unit takes primary responsibility for a task and controls the funds for carrying out that task. Responsibility for planning transitional assistance strategy has recently been assigned to TCER. However, that unit does not have sufficient staff to deal with all the countries in the transitional stage and, being a new arrangement, it is not clear in practice how effective this will be. Nor is it clear what the best permanent institutional arrangement should be for programme/project development after the strategy is developed. The apparent alternatives in this regard are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4 : Project development options – the pros and cons
Lead unit |
Pros |
Cons |
TCER |
Mandated for developing transition strategy when TCE was established; ready access to emergency funds that could be used for transition programming. |
Lack of staff for performing or backstopping the work; located at headquarters; TCE considered isolated from rest of FAO. |
Regional Policy Assistance Branches |
General responsibility for programme development; presence and numbers of staff in all regions means quick mobilization possible; already linked to TC. |
Limited experience in dealing with emergencies; not all staff are qualified to deal with transition issues; lack of access to emergency funds. |
FAO Representations |
Local presence and familiarity with conditions. |
No capacity for performing or backstopping work. |
159. At present, because of the lack of capacity and their already overstretched responsibilities, the FAO Representations are not a viable choice for leading this work. The constraints to both the other alternatives are such that neither is optimal at present.
160. Given the evolving institutional situation, it would be prudent to remain flexible in evolving a satisfactory modality for this process. Since the Assistant Director-General (ADG) of TC has oversight of all the units (including TCI) that may be involved in transition programming, it would be appropriate for him to designate overall responsibility, depending on the circumstances in the particular countries involved and the relative capacities of the organizational units.
161. Recommendation 13: The ADG/TC should designate responsibilities for programming transition activities after the transition strategy has been prepared under TCER. This may involve Regional and Subregional Offices, TCI, TCA and FAORs, as appropriate to particular country circumstances. TCE’s involvement should end at this point. However, for the longer term, more permanent appropriate institutional arrangements need to be decided.
162. Regardless of which unit leads the process, an effective FAO presence in the field will be a key precondition for the Organization to play a primary role in the transition period. This has proved an important factor in major emergency operations and it should be the same for transition situations. However, the type of expertise required will be different.
163. Recommendation 14: In countries where FAO will provide post-emergency transition policy and programming assistance, a full-time programme manager should be appointed, preferably soon after the emergency operation starts. This individual should be able to act in an advisory capacity to the government on post-emergency issues, assist in the development of an agricultural development strategy and design a role for FAO in the implementation of that strategy.
164. The evaluation noted that collaboration with other partners, both within UN and with the NGO community, could be enhanced. For example, FAO should work on disaster preparedness country strategies with UNDP, which has overall responsibility within the UN system for strengthening national capacities related to disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness. Work could be done with WFP on emergency logistics, and with international NGOs on suitable cooperation in the provision of agricultural relief.
165. Recommendation 15: FAO should review its emergency-related activities with a view to developing joint programmes at the field level with other UN agencies and NGOs. In this respect, the negotiations started with several partners on formal Memoranda of Understanding should be brought to a successful conclusion.
166. Some of the recommendations imply increased funding for emergency work. In the prevailing situation of zero-budget growth in the RP, the evaluation cannot recommend increased RP allocations. However, the following funding mechanisms could be considered, as appropriate. All involve approaches to donors.
167. TCE has proposed the creation of a Rapid Response Fund to finance the early phases of a relief operation, before donor funds become available. The Rapid Response Fund would be replenished by donor contributions for the emergency in question. Thus, as long as there are donors for an emergency, which is highly likely, the fund would remain at the same level, or even increase over time. The creation of the fund would help to remove one of the obstacles to timely availability of emergency agricultural relief inputs, i.e. slow donor response. It has been proposed that the initial target for the fund would be US$1.5 million.
168. Recommendation 16: The Rapid Response Fund should be created with financing from the accumulated balance on the Direct Operating Cost account for TCE projects or (with donor consent) from unspent project funds.
169. Similar to the Rapid Response Fund, a fund could be created for establishing rehabilitation advisers during the post-conflict transition phase and financing the programming of transition activities. In theory, the Transition Fund could also be replenished from donor contributions, but these may be less forthcoming than for agricultural relief activities, unless and until advocacy activities (mentioned in paragraph 171) are successful. Because various units may undertake transition and rehabilitation activities, control over the funds should be exercised by the ADG/TC. As the Transition Fund has a more limited scope than the Rapid Response Fund, its level would be considerably lower, in the range of US$500 000.
170. Recommendation 17: The Transition Fund should be established under the authority of the ADG/TC, and financed in the same way as the Rapid Response Fund is.
171. FAO has been extremely successful in attracting funding for agricultural relief activities undertaken by TCE. It has been far less successful in fundraising for other types of emergency-related activities. FAO is following a trend as donors appear to be far more ready to provide funding for emergency operations than for development. However, donor decisions concerning funding are increasingly delegated to the field, while responsibility for fundraising within FAO remains centralized.
172. Recommendation 18: FAO should engage donors in an attempt to raise additional funds for non-relief emergency-related activities, emphasizing its areas of comparative advantage and the benefits of mitigating disasters.
Two questionnaires were prepared for the evaluation – one to most of the developing member countries of FAO; the other to UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs cooperating with FAO on emergencies.
The first questionnaire was sent to 113 developing country Member Nations, to determine which were the major emergency threats, whether or not contingency and response plans existed for each threat, whether the country had received emergency-related assistance from FAO in the period 1996-2001 and a quality comparison of FAO’s assistance with that of other donors.
By region, the response rate to the questionnaire was:
| Region | Responses received | % | Total # of questionnaires sent | % returned |
Africa |
14 |
34.1 |
47 |
29.8 |
Asia/Pacific |
6 |
14.6 |
26 |
23.1 |
Latin America/Caribbean |
11 |
26.8 |
27 |
40.7 |
Near East, North Africa, Europe |
10 |
24.4 |
13 |
76.9 |
Total |
41 |
100.0 |
113 |
36.3 |
Member Nations were asked to classify the main types of emergency threats faced. The most important ones were droughts, floods and pests and diseases. Countries were also asked whether there were contingency or response plans for each type of emergency. Countries reported in surprisingly high numbers that such plans existed. However, no qualitative questions were asked about the plans. The experience of the field evaluation missions tends to support the notion that many plans may be fragmentary or would be difficult to implement.
| Number of responses | ||||||||
Degree of threat |
Flood |
Droughts |
Civil conflicts |
Fires |
Storms |
Pests/ |
Industrial accidents |
Earthquakes and volcanoes |
Minor |
5 |
3 |
14 |
9 |
17 |
5 |
21 |
13 |
Occasional |
15 |
15 |
6 |
19 |
11 |
18 |
7 |
8 |
Major |
14 |
15 |
6 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
1 |
5 |
Total |
34 |
33 |
26 |
32 |
33 |
34 |
29 |
26 |
Contingency/response plans |
||||||||
No |
5 |
8 |
9 |
8 |
12 |
7 |
12 |
12 |
Yes |
22 |
20 |
10 |
17 |
11 |
22 |
8 |
7 |
Total |
27 |
28 |
19 |
25 |
23 |
29 |
20 |
19 |
Countries were asked to assess the quality of FAO assistance in five emergency-related areas (preparedness, early warning, needs assessment, relief, and rehabilitation and recovery planning). Although relatively few of the countries that replied had received assistance in early warning, this was scored the highest in terms of quality. Relief assistance was the only area in which there were more “unsatisfactory” than “excellent” replies. The main criticisms of the relief assistance were the small amount of assistance provided (covering only a small proportion of needs), the length of approval procedures and slow delivery of inputs. The country visits by the evaluation team confirmed that approval procedures and delivery times were often long. With regard to the level of assistance, it could be that some countries do not understand that assistance from FAO’s own resources, through TCP, is limited to a maximum of US$400 000.
| Assessment of assistance received from FAO | Preparedness | Early warning | Needs assessment | Relief | Rehabilitation and recovery planning |
Excellent |
2 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
Satisfactory |
6 |
1 |
9 |
5 |
11 |
Not Satisfactory |
1 |
4 |
8 |
2 | |
Total |
8 |
6 |
19 |
19 |
19 |
Member Nations were also asked to compare FAO’s assistance in each emergency-related area with the assistance of other donors, in terms of both quality and quantity. With the exception of needs assessments and relief, countries received more assistance from other donors than from FAO. What was more disturbing was that FAO’s assistance was found to be inferior to that of other donors in all areas except needs assessment. Those countries that commented on the reasons for their assessment cited the same factors as in the assessment of FAO’s assistance overall – FAO was more bureaucratic and slow than other donors and the amount of assistance was low.
Comparison of FAO and other donors |
Preparedness |
Early warning |
Needs assessment |
Relief |
Rehabilitation and recovery Planning |
Volume of other donors’ assistance compared with FAO’s |
|||||
- More from FAO |
1 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
4 |
- More from other donors |
4 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
7 |
Total |
5 |
6 |
10 |
17 |
11 |
Quality assessment of FAO assistance compared with other donors’ |
|||||
-FAO assistance: best |
1 |
4 |
3 |
3 | |
-FAO and other donor(s): about equal |
3 |
3 |
7 |
6 |
2 |
-FAO assistance: inferior |
5 |
5 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
Total |
8 |
9 |
12 |
16 |
13 |
Questionnaires (and follow-up reminders) were sent to 34 of FAO’s international partner agencies in emergencies. The response rate, as shown below, was poorer for the partner agencies than for developing member countries, and poorest of all for UN agencies and bilateral donors. Because of the small number of replies received, no meaningful analysis could be done to differentiate the replies by type of agency.
| Type of agency | Responses received |
% | Total # of questionnaires sent |
% returned |
UN |
2 |
20 |
10 |
20.0 |
Bilateral donors |
3 |
30 |
11 |
27.3 |
NGOs |
5 |
50 |
13 |
38.5 |
Total |
10 |
100 |
34 |
29.4 |
Respondents were asked in which areas they knew FAO’s work well and how they had worked with FAO over the past six years. The predominant area was agricultural relief, which is not surprising as this is the main activity of FAO in emergencies, particularly at the field level.
Type of activity |
Know FAO’s work well (# responses) |
Worked with FAO (# responses) |
Preparedness |
2 |
0 |
Early warning |
5 |
1 |
Impact and immediate needs assessment |
5 |
1 |
Agricultural relief |
7 |
8 |
Rehabilitation, reconstruction and sustainable recovery |
5 |
5 |
Partners were asked if they were satisfied with their partnership with FAO. Nine of the ten respondents said “yes”; there was one that did not answer. To obtain more detailed information, respondents were asked to rate FAO’s performance and usefulness to the partner in the various types of emergency-related activities. The partners’ assessment confirmed that of the member countries, that early warning received the highest ratings. However, in contrast to the assessment by countries, agricultural relief also scored high.
Score |
Preparedness Perf. Use. |
Early warning Perf. Use. |
Impact and needs assessment |
Agricultural relief Perf. Use. |
Rehabilitation, | |||||
1=very good |
- |
- |
1 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
2 |
1 |
- |
2 |
1 |
2 |
- |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
- |
- |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
- |
- |
1 |
5=poor |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
1 |
- |
1 |
Total |
5 |
3 |
7 |
7 |
7 |
5 |
8 |
7 |
8 |
6 |
Partners were also asked to comment on FAO’s strengths and weaknesses as a partner. The comments were largely reflected in the items scored: FAO was cited positively as an “honest broker” and good coordinator of assistance. However, FAO’s limited financing capacity and need to rely on donors was mentioned several times, as were its bureaucratic procedures and consequent slow delivery. Interestingly, however, one NGO stated that FAO, although bureaucratic, was less so than other UN agencies.
The results of the questionnaires to member countries and partner agencies supported the findings of the field missions: there were no major differences in the strengths and weaknesses identified, or in the areas of comparative advantage for FAO.
Thematic Evaluation on Strategic Objective A3
“Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable
response to, food and agricultural emergencies”
(i) Background
FAO’s evaluation programme is increasingly framed in the context of the Strategic Framework 2000-2015 and the Medium-Term Plan, as requested by the Governing Bodies. Such evaluations are intended to be formative, examining whether FAO’s response to strategic objectives is adequate to achieve the desired results and making recommendations intended to improve the design, implementation, results and follow-up of related activities. These evaluations cover both Regular and Field Programme activities. The evaluations are intended to examine questions from the point of view of member countries. Some evaluation studies, such as this one, include a component of review of TCP activities, since TCP represents a significant part of the Regular Programme of FAO and the Governing Bodies have expressed continuing interest in evaluation of the effective use of TCP.
At its September 2001 session, the Programme Committee selected Strategic Objective A3 as a topic for in-depth evaluation. The goal of this Strategic Objective is “to increase the resilience and capacity of countries and their populations to cope with the impacts of disasters that affect national and household food security and, when disasters do occur, to contribute to emergency operations that foster the transition from relief to recovery of the food and agricultural sectors”.
The components of the strategy include:
For the purpose of this study, food and agricultural emergencies are defined as the result of events related to floods; droughts; civil conflict; fires; storms; pests and diseases; industrial accidents; and earthquakes and volcanoes.
The evaluation is intended to be formative, drawing on past experiences in order to assess the validity and adequacy of the activities under the strategy, as well as the strategy itself, to the needs of member countries, and suggest changes in programme orientation if warranted.
(ii) Scope of the study
FAO has defined the emergency sequence as falling into six distinct phases.24 These are:
For the purposes of this evaluation, the study will examine FAO’s role in all the steps of the sequence except prevention, although the role and impact of work on prevention will be considered with respect to other phases of the emergency sequence. Prevention is generally excluded in order to give a clear focus to the evaluation, in that a great many FAO activities could conceivably be included under “emergency prevention” but also are directed at other purposes as well.
The evaluation will cover FAO’s emergency-related work over the last three biennia, i.e. 1996 to 2001.
(iii) Methodology and outputs
The evaluation has already begun with an information-gathering exercise involving technical divisions, to determine the scope of work being carried out under Strategic Objective A3.
The evaluation will include four main steps:
1. Evaluation of FAO’s normative work in relation to Strategic Objective A3
This part consists in collecting and reviewing guidelines, manuals and methodological materials aiming at developing norms, standards and best practices and providing support to field assistance activities in the fields of preparedness, early warning, needs assessment and conducting relief/rehabilitation activities. This will involve a review of materials produced by FAO and others, including an examination of relevant literature on the subject. The review of written materials will be complemented by interviews with technical officers of key lead units.
2. Survey of Member Nations, implementing partners and donors
A questionnaire will be submitted to Member Nations, implementing partners and donors for emergency activities, to assess developing countries’ needs and the quality of FAO’s response from the various points of view.
3. Evaluation of country needs and performance of field assistance
The main work of the evaluation will be field visits to 15 countries, for an in-depth assessment, including review of individual interventions, most of which will be TCP projects. Specific field activities to be reviewed are at the end of this Annex. Regional coverage will be:
In addition, the evaluation will include a study of transitional assistance in the post-relief period by FAO in Kosovo, where there was a large programme of emergency assistance.
Besides review of written material, evaluation missions (consisting of an external consultant and a PBEE officer) will conduct interviews with key informants in each country concerned with disaster preparation and response, with a view to obtaining information on country needs and capacity. Missions will also interview persons involved with the design, implementation and follow-up of project interventions in the selected countries, including intended beneficiaries on a sample basis. Missions will also meet with implementing partners to obtain their assessment of country needs and work carried out in the country. Each mission will prepare a regional report, including separate reports on each country and project intervention reviewed.
Besides the projects listed at the end of this Annex, missions will assess all relevant emergency-related activities in the selected countries, including assessment missions and use made of normative outputs.
4. Evaluation of coordination of and linkages between activities under Strategic Objective A3
This part will examine how an emergency is recognized and processed within FAO as well as coordination mechanisms to determine the extent to which synergies are reinforced between activities conducted along the emergency sequence, including the transition between emergency, rehabilitation and further development. In particular, this part will assess the effectiveness of existing institutional mechanisms for coordination (such as ECG) as well as strategic and technical mechanisms (such as PAIA). This will be conducted through interviews with key units contributing to these mechanisms as well as through the review of selected cases where coordination was deemed to be effective.
(iv) Final output
At the end of these four steps, an overall evaluation report will be prepared and vetted by an independent external peer review panel. The report, along with the comments of the review panel and a management response, will be presented to the Programme Committee at its September 2002 session. It will also comprise a chapter in the Programme Evaluation Report, to be submitted to the FAO Conference in 2003.
A separate report will be prepared on technical and operational issues arising out of the TCP projects.
(v) Issues to be covered
Within the established evaluation criteria accepted by the Programme Committee and Council (PC 82/4), the evaluation will in particular assess, at the country level and/or the global level, as appropriate:
1) Extent to which emergency-related work of the Organization has corresponded with the thrusts of Strategic Objective A3.
2) Relevance of emergency-related work, including the:
3) The responsiveness and efficiency of FAO’s institutional capacity for provision of emergency assistance, including the:
4) The quality of emergency-related work, including the:
5) Effectiveness and impact, including the:
6) Identification of strengths and weaknesses in FAO’s emergency-related work.
(vi) Timetable
1. Preparation of terms of reference for evaluation, using information from the in-house survey – November 2001.
2. Selection of countries for field visits and external consultants, including for peer review panel – November 2001.
3. Dispatch of questionnaire to countries, implementing partners and donors, on requirements and performance of projects – sent out by 10 December 2001.
4. Make arrangements for field visits of missions – November 2001-January 2002.
5. Follow-up meetings with divisions on resource use, further information on activities identified – December 2001-February 2002.
6. Carry out field visits, preparation of country and regional reports and individual TCP evaluation reports – January-April 2002.
7. Analysis of country, partner, donor questionnaires (consultant) – February-March 2002.
8. Preparation of overall evaluation report for peer review panel – May 2002.
9. Hold peer review panel, prepared management response to panel report and submit all to ODG – end June 2002.
10. Preparation of report on TCP projects – July 2002.
Asia (16)
OSRO/CMB/002/SWI – “Emergency Supply of Rice Seeds to Flood-Affected Households in Cambodia”
TCP/CMB/0167 – “Emergency Supply of Rice Seeds to Flood-Affected Households”
OSRO/VIE/002/NOR – “Emergency Supply of Agricultural Inputs to Flood-Affected Farmers in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam
OSRO/VIE/102/NOR – “Emergency Assistance to Poor and Vulnerable Fish Farmers in the Flood-Affected Province of Dong Thap”
OSRO/VIE/101/SWI – “Emergency Assistance to Poor and Vulnerable Fish Farmers in the Flood-Affected Province of Can Tho”
TCP/VIE/8925 – “Emergency Supply of Agricultural Inputs to the Flood-Affected Districts of Quang Tri Province”
TCP/VIE/8926 - “Emergency Supply of Agricultural Inputs to the Flood-Affected Districts of Binh Thuan Province”
TCP/VIE/0067 – “Emergency Supply of Rice Seeds to Flood-Affected Farm Households in Dong Thap Province”
TCP/VIE/0168 – “Emergency Assistance to Rehabilitate the Aquaculture Sector in the Flood-Affected Province of An Giang”
OSRO/VIE/001/DHA – “Emergency Supply of Rice Seeds to Flood-Affected Households in An Giang Province”
UTF/BGD/029/BGD – “Crop Yield Forecasting and Agrometeorology”
TCP/BGD/6611 – “Emergency Assistance to Tornado-Affected Families”
TCP/BGD/7825 – “Emergency Supply of Vegetable Seeds to Flood-Affected Farmers”
TCP/BGD/7827 – “Assessment of Flood Damages in Fisheries and Livestock Sectors”
TCP/BGD/0066 – “Emergency Supply of Agricultural Inputs to Flood-Affected Farmers In Bangladesh”
TCP/THA/0166 – “Emergency Supply of Agricultural Inputs to Flood-Affected Farmers in Southern Thailand”
Africa (25)
TCP/BDI/0065 – “Evaluation des Récoltes et des Besoins Alimentaires”
TCP/BDI/5612 – “Fourniture d’Urgence de Semences aux Réfugiés de Retour et aux Populations Vulnérables”
TCP/BDI/6611 - Assistance Technique aux Programmes Humanitaires pour la Réhabilitation du Secteur Agricole”
TCP/BDI/6713 – “Evaluation des Récoltes et des Approvisionnements Alimentaires (Phase II RAF/6715)”
TCP/BDI/6714 – “Fourniture d’Urgence d’Outillages Agricoles aux Réfugiés de Retour et aux Populations Vulnérables”
TCP/BDI/8927 – “Fourniture Urgente d’Intrants pour la Relance de la Production Agricole”
TCP/BDI/9067 – “Fourniture d’Intrants Agricoles aux Populations Affectées par la Sécheresse”
OSRO/BDI/904/NET – “Emergency Integrated nutrition- agriculture intervention in western Burundi”.
TCP/ERI/4557 – “Emergency Assistance to Desert Locust Control”
TCP/ERI/8924 – “Urgent Provision of Cereal Seeds to Drought-Affected Farmers in the Lowlands, North-East Red Sea Region”
OSRO/ERI/003/SWE, OSRO/ERI/001/USA – “Emergency Distribution of Vegetable Seeds and Farming Hand Tools to Assist Internally Displaced Families”
TCP/RWA/6616 – “Assistance d’Urgence pour la Fourniture d’Intrants Agricoles aux Réfugiés de Retour”
TCP/RWA/6617 – “Appui Technique d’Urgence pour la Campagne 1997-B”
TCP/RWA/6618 – “Appui à la Relance et à la Réhabilitation des Productions Agricoles”
TCP/RWA/6719 – “Evaluation et Suivi des Récoltes et des Besoins Alimentaires”
TCP/RWA/8922 – “Assistance d’Urgence pour la Lutte contre les Chenilles Légionnaires et Mise en Place d’un Système d’Alerte Rapide”
TCP/RWA/8926 – “Assistance d’Urgence pour la Relance des Activités Agricoles dans la Préfecture de Gisenyi”
TCP/RWA/9066 – “Assistance d’Urgence pour la Mise en Culture de Zones de Marais”
TCP/SIL/0065 – “Emergency Assistance to Artisanal Fisheries”
TCP/SIL/0166 – “Emergency Agricultural Rehabilitation Assistance to ex-Combattants and Host Communities”
TCP/SIL/6713 – “Emergency Assistance to Artisanal Fisheries”
TCP/SIL/8821 – “Emergency Supply of Agricultural Inputs to Severely War Affected Farm Families”
TCP/SIL8923 – “Emergency Rehabilitation of Agricultural Food Production”
TCP/SIL/8924 – “Urgent Provision of Seeds and Strengthening the Coordination of Agricultural Relief and Rehabilitation Programmes”
Near East and Europe (15)
TCP/MAU/6612 - ‘Appui à la lutte terrestre et aérienne contre le criquet pèlerin’
TCP/MAU/7821 - “Fourniture d'urgence d'intrants agricoles aux populations autochtones de Bassiknou”
TCP/MAU/8924 – “Assistance d’Urgence aux Agriculteurs Victimes des Inondations”
TCP/MAU/8925 – “Assistance d’Urgence à la Lutte contre le Criquet Pèlerin”
OSRO/MAU/701/FRA – “Appui a la Lutte contre le Criquet Pèlerin”
TCP/KAZ/0065 – “Emergency Programme for the Control of Locust Outbreak”
TCP/KAZ/6711 – “Emergency Assistance to Locust Control”
TCP/KAZ/8921 – “Medium to Long-Term Assistance to Locust Outbreak Identification Mission”
TCP/GEO/9066 – “Assessment of Drought Impact and Emergency Supply of Wheat Seeds to Drought-Affected Farmers”
OSRO/GEO/001/SWI, OSRO/GEO/002/USA, OSRO/GEO/004/NET – “Emergency Supply of Wheat Seeds to Drought-Affected Farmers”
OSRO/GEO/003/UK – “Emergency Supply of Seed Potatoes, Maize and Sunflower to Drought-Affected Farmers”
OSRO/GEO/005/GRE – “Emergency Supply of Seed Potatoes to Drought-Affected Farmers in the Tsalka Region”
OSRO/GEO/101/BEL – “Emergency Supply of Fertilizer to Farmers in Drought-Affected Areas of Georgia”
Latin America and Caribbean (14)
TCP/COS/0065 – “Rehabilitacion de los Sistemas de Produccion Afectados por el Huracan”
TCP/COS/6714 – “Rehabilitacion de las Areas de Produccion de Pequenos y Medianos Productores en la Region Brunca”
TCP/COS/5611 – “Rehabilitacion Agropecuaria de la Region Huetar Atlantica Costa Rica”
TCP/ELS/0165 – “Assistencia de Emergencia para Pequenos Agricultores Afectados por el Terremoto”
TCP/ELS/0166 – “Assistencia de Emergencia para Pequenos Agricultores Afectados por la Sequia”
TCP/NIC/0167 – “Assistencia de Emergenza a Pequenos Productores Afectados por la Sequia en los Departamentos de Leon y Chinandega”
TCP/NIC/7821 – “Apoyo a la Rehabilitacion de las Actividades Productivas Agropecuaria en las Zonas Afectadas por el Huracan Mitch”
TCP/NIC/8822 – “Asistencia al Gobierno de Nicaragua para la Coordinacion de las Actividaded de Emergencia del Huracan Mitch”
TCP/NIC/6611 – “Apoyo a la Rehabilitacion de las Actividades del Sector Agropecuario en las Zonas Afectadas por El Huracan Cesar”
TCP/NIC/6713 – “Apoyo a la Rehabilitacion de las Actividades Productivas del Agropecuario en las Zonas Afectadas por el "Nino"
OSRO, Addendum to GCP/HON/018/NET “Emergency Assistance for victims of Hurricane Mitch in the area of influence of project number GCP/ HON/018/NET”
OSRO, Addendum to GCP/HON/019/NET “Emergency Assistance for victims of Hurricane Mitch in the area of influence of project number GCP/ HON/019/NET”
OSRO/HON/901/NOR - “Urgent rehabilitation of agricultural production systems”
TCP/HON/8822 – “Assistance to the Government of Honduras in the coordination of emergency activities resulting from Hurricane Mitch”
1. The Panel met in Rome during 19-21 June 2002, during which consultations were conducted with the evaluation staff, the Assistant Director-General of the Technical Cooperation Department and the FAO staff from various departments.
2. The Panel considered the draft Evaluation Report in the context of the current Strategic Framework 2000-2015 for FAO, the Strategic Objective A3, and in the light of the priorities outlined by senior managers responsible for the FAO activities concerned.
3. The Panel recognises the increasing demands on the FAO’s services in relation to disasters and considers the evaluation of Strategic Objective A3 as very timely and useful in defining the necessary institutional adjustments to meet the challenges of up-scaling its activities and services in this field of work.
4. The evaluation process adopted by FAO is regarded as exemplary by the Panel as it is participatory, transparent and involves further review of the findings by an independent, expert group.
5. The Panel recognises that the evaluation had to be undertaken in a limited time over a large geographical area which required the review of a large number of very diverse projects. The generalised conclusions were, therefore, reviewed against this background.
6. The Panel, in general, endorses the findings of the evaluation and its recommendations as useful and practical for the Organization, particularly those that focus on FAO’s comparative advantages, ranging from forecasting and early warning information to technical design of emergency inputs:
1. It is evident that FAO’s long standing experience in the field of information and early warning is well appreciated by the international community, hence the Panel endorses the recommendations regarding the strengthening of FAO capacities in this sector.
2. The intention for FAO to develop its capacity as an information source by creating, where it does not exist, and consolidating existing country-based information in a global database, is timely and strongly supported by the Panel as a useful tool for disaster assessment and programme design.
3. Increased involvement of FAO in emergencies requires better tools and systems in place. The Panel endorses the recommendations regarding the preparation of guidelines for conducting rapid assessment, programme design and the strengthening of FIVIMs.
4. The Panel noted the importance FAO places on relief and rehabilitation and endorses the recommendations aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of these operations, such as those related to improvement of procurement procedures and funding procedures.
5. The current structure of FAO needs to accommodate the strategic direction as implied by A3. The Panel acknowledges the importance placed on the necessary institutional changes recommended by the Evaluation Report and the commitment of management to bring about the changes in this direction.
7. The following points are offered by the Panel in a positive spirit, since the overall tenor of the Evaluation Report, and especially its generally practical orientation, is much appreciated by the Panel.
Making Strategy A3 operational
Comments on Recommendations
8. The Evaluation rightly looks for FAO's comparative advantage, but the recommendations should push more strongly for the Organization to focus on what it does well - which cannot be everything.
9. The recommendations are quite numerous, and it would be helpful if an order of priority were attached to them - in terms of importance and/or timing.
Issues concerning field operations
Internal management
FAO's relationship with the wider humanitarian community
“Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies”
1. Senior Management commends the FAO Evaluation Service on preparing a succinct and constructive review of the Strategic Objective A3. It addresses the key issues of FAO’s role and approach to emergency from preparedness to rehabilitation. It highlights those comparative advantages on which the Organization should build the up-scaling of its emergency activities, emphasizing interactions between normative and operational activities. Senior Management welcomes this report as an important contribution to the ongoing development of interdisciplinarity and expansion of partnerships in the implementation of Strategic Objective A3.
2. Recommendations made will enable the Programme Committee to conduct a well-informed debate on the preliminary achievements of the Strategic Objective and suggested areas for improvement. As already mentioned to the External Peer Review Panel, Senior Management agrees in principle with the recommendations formulated and is committed to ensuring that appropriate actions are taken for their implementation. The following are some of the actions already undertaken:
3. In addition, and based on the report’s recommendation, we would like to share views with the Programme Committee on the following three specific items.
A. Preparedness
4. Senior Management agrees with the findings contained in the evaluation report, that the Organization should further develop its comparative advantages in key aspects related to preparedness. As reflected in the report, two mechanisms have already been created for achieving institutional coordination:
B. Agricultural relief and rehabilitation
5. During the last decade, work on agricultural relief has been by far the fastest-growing area of FAO’s activities in the field. This is partly due to an increase in the number of emergencies as well as the shift, by funding sources, towards the financing of emergency rather than development-oriented projects. However, this growth is mainly due to FAO’s enhanced credibility in responding to emergencies. FAO has proved that it not only delivered inputs to farmers but was also able to provide them with key technical assistance to restart production. This role has been formally and practically acknowledged by traditional and non-traditional FAO donors.
6. As underlined by the report of the External Peer Review Panel, appropriate measures are required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of this growing emergency programme. Further to the up-scaling of TCOR into a division (TCE) and the reinforcement of the management of the “Oil-for-Food” Programme, two issues will now be addressed:
C. Management of the transition phase
7. While FAO has the comparative advantage to implement the transition phase in countries affected by disasters, Senior Management recognizes that, to date, the Organization has not been able to achieve much in terms of results in that area. However, by adopting a pragmatic approach, as was the case for Kosovo and Afghanistan, FAO has recently started to improve its capacity to address the management of transition phases. The process has been pushed forward with the establishment within TCE of a new unit responsible for rehabilitation and humanitarian policies (TCER). This unit has to stimulate the rapid launching of rehabilitation programmes and plans based on FAO’s relief response in the country. In close collaboration with the technical divisions concerned, it should initiate the rehabilitation phase, which requires strong and diversified technical expertise and capacity. The unit will facilitate formulation of policies and investment framework aimed at linking relief to reconstruction and development. It plays a catalytic role in enhancing support to FAO from other important stakeholder/partners in the transition process. TCER does not have operational responsibility for the rehabilitation, which will be ensured by the other responsible units/divisions.
8. This new mode of operation needs to be tested and it is proposed that it be reviewed in two years time. Based on the lessons learnt, Senior Management will be in a position to propose a final structure aiming at ensuring FAO’s role in rehabilitation.
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24 FAO Emergency Activities: Technical Handbook Series (leaflet).
25 Expert Panel’s Members are: Arenas, Antonio (El Salvador), Director of National System for Territorial Studies; Aysan, Yasemin (Turkey), Acting Chief UNDP/Disaster Reduction and Recovery Programme, Geneva; Grunewald, François (France), Director of the French NGO “Urgence Réhabilitation Développement”; Holt, Julius (UK), Founder-partner of the Food Economy Group Consultant SCF-UK; Jackson, Robin (USA), Policy Adviser, WFP, Rome; and Maalim, Mahboub (Kenya), Coordinator of the Kenya Drought Emergency Response, Office of the President, Nairobi.
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