D.K. CROWTHER (Assistant Director General, Administration and Finance Department) : The documents relating to this Item are C 83/LIM/13, C 83/LIM/13-Sup.l, C 83/LIM/22. The Basic Texts of the Organization sets out the financial obligations of all Member Nations and are formally accepted by each Member Nation at the time it joins the Organization.
Article XVIII-2 of the Constitution establishes that each Member Nation undertakes to contribute annually to the Organization its share of the budget as apportioned by the Conference. The scale of contributions for the 1984-85 biennium has already been reviewed by this Commission and is being forwarded to Plenary for formal adoption.
With regard to the required timing of payment of contributions, Financial Regulations 5.5 establishes that they shall be due and payable in full within 30 days of the receipt of the communication of the Director General informing Member Nations of the amounts of their financial obligations or as of the first day of the calendar year to which they related, whichever is the later.
Documents C 83/LIM/13 and C 83/LIM/13-Sup. 1 set out the status of contributions at 2 November 1983 when the Council reviewed the matter. Subsequent to that date, approximately five million three hundred thousand dollars have been received from some 15 Member Nations, of which just over five million dollars was received from the United States . The amounts of these contributions received will be reflected in the Appendix to the Conference Report on this Item. You will note from the two documents that notwithstanding the required timing of the payment of contributions in accordance with the Financial Regulations, only 82 Member Nations had paid their 1983 assessment in full while a balance of 70 Member Nations had not met their obligations. In fact, approximately $34 million of contributions ware outstanding at 2 November 1983.
I would also call your attention to paragraph 90 of the document which sets out the cumulative percentage of current year's assessments received during each month of 1983. In accordance with the Financial Regulations, all current assessments should have been received by the end of February. Only 18.81 percent had been received at 28 February 1983. The Report of the Council at paragraph 93 draws attention to another unsatisfactory aspect arising from delayed payment by Member Nations relating to miscellaneous income.
Member Nations which delayed payment of their contributions indirectly reduced the total amount of miscellaneous income which could be earned from the interest on investments. At the same time, however, these Member Nations would enjoy an unearned share of miscellaneous income which was, in fact, produced only from the contributions of the Member Nations which paid promptly.
The Conference may wish to endorse the appeal of the Council to all Member Nations to meet their financial undertakings in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Organization, both to prevent cash flow problems for the Organization, and to avoid inequitable treatment to the disadvantage of those Member Nations which paid on time.
I would also mention that the number of Member Nations with arrears, currently 38, is twice the number which had arrears on the same date in 1981, the previous Conference year.
While many are known to be suffering severe financial difficulties, the Conference may also wish to appeal to them to make every effort to pay their arrears at the earliest possible moment.
With regard to the nine Member Nations in danger at 2 November 1983 of losing their right to vote at this session of the Conference, from the reports of the General Committee you will have noted that five Member :Nation's votes have been restored, two Member Nations have no representation at
the Conference, and the remaining two Governments have not taken action on which the General Committee could recommend restoration of their votes.
At this time, I should like specifically to call attention to the matters included in document C 83/LIM/22, and specifically make reference to the shortfalls that have been projected for next biennium.
In an attempt to determine what the likely financial position will be of the Organization and the ability of the Organization to meet the full Programme of Work and Budget for the next biennium, we have foreseen that estimated contributions outstanding at the end of this year, and therefore the end of this biennium, could be as much as twenty-two million dollars. During calendar year 1984, there is a foreseeable shortfall of approximately two and a half million dollars. This would increase our outstanding amount to as much as twenty-four and a half million dollars at the end of 1984.
During 1985, we would expect about the same amount of increased shortfalls will occur in contributions, and that is another two and a half million dollars, which would bring the total normal shortfalls that are foreseeable to approximately twenty-seven million dollars at the end of the biennium.
In an attempt to look carefully at what the financial picture will be at the end of the biennium, we have looked at all possible further developments and find that our largest contributor and our third largest contributor could have special problems from either legislation, financial or other problems, and we have a large number of other contributors who could also have very critical problems leading to a possible shortfall in contributions.
Now recognizing that this is the worst possible case, and also recognizing that these major contributors have always paid their contributions within the year that they have been due, nonetheless looking at the contingencies and legislation that exists today, there is a possibility that the largest contributor could have a shortfall in its contributions to the Organization during 1984-85 biennium of as much as $7.8 million. The third largest could possibly have as much as a full $40 million shortfall. Other large contributors could have critical problems amounting to as much as $7 million. Again this worst case, if it were to occur, would amount to a total of an additional $54.8 million in shortfall which, added to the $27 million projected, could possibly have an outstanding contribution at the end of 1984-85 biennium of as much as $81.8 million.
The Organization has been provided with selected funds in order to make up shortfalls. These funds, at the beginning of 1984-85 biennium, will have in the working capital fund $12.9 million and in the special reserve account $21 million, total $33.9 million. We can foresee the normal shortfalls in receipt of contributions that I mentioned in both 1984 and 1985 amounting to a total of $5 million, which would be charged against the working capital fund and reduce the $12.9 million beginning balance down to $7.9 million. Similarly we can see probable unbudgeted staff costs that result from increased spending contributions, health insurance contributions and general service summary increases that have not been included in the budget. These could amount to as much as $7 million. These unbudgeted staff costs would be charged against the special reserve account.
In addition we see the possibility of post adjustment reductions that could amount to as much as $1.3 million. This amount would also be charged against the special reserve account. Taking those amounts from the beginning balance of $21 million in the special reserve account, the balance at the end of the biennium then could be $15.3 million, together with a projected balance in the working capital fund of about $7.9 million at that stage. We would have a total of $23.2 million to guard against other unforeseen circumstances.
Now taking into account the worst possible case of as much as $54.8 million in shortfalls from both contributors who have the possibility of other problems, we then would have an added shortfall that would totally take away the balance in the special reserve account in the working capital fund account.
At that point we would end up with a deficit of over $31 million. The special reserve account was originally set up for a number of purposes, including to guard against lire rate fluctuation and inflation. If we consider the possibility of lire rate fluctuation and inflation of an average of 1,465 lire per dollar, that could show us a shortfall during the biennium of as much as an additional $10 million. If that were charged against a special reserve account which, by this time, is way below zero, our total deficit then could be as much as $41.6 million.
It is for these reasons that we have included the LIM document, and at this time I would like to ask the Deputy Director-General, Mr West, to go further into some of the reasons for proposing the LIM document.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL: You have heard a lot of figures and at first sight they are complicated but, in fact, the situation is basically a simple one. We have so-called "normal" shortfalls in contributions. We have growing difficulties among some Member Nations, many small ones, but also some who contribute fairly large amounts. We have also the possibility that in addition we shall be faced with difficulties, however unwelcome to themselves, by some of the largest contributors in making available their contributions. So we have an enormous amount hypothetically not available during this biennium. To offest that we have certain instruments, the special reserve account, the working capital fund and also the authority to borrow. The working capital fund is small. A certain part of it is earmarked for meeting emergencies, such as foot-and-mouth disease, outbreaks of other pests, etc. So we cannot use the whole of that anyway, simply in order to offset contributions. But even after putting that aside, we are still faced with the fact that we shall begin the biennium with the working capital fund already eroded by a fairly large amount, leaving little more than half the scheduled figures, because of existing shortfalls in contributions
So the extent to which one could rely on the Working Capital Fund to meet all or even some of these possible shortfalls in contributions during the course of 1984-85 is very limited indeed.
Then we have the Special Reserve Account, whose primary purpose is to guard against unbudgeted inflation occurring during 1984-85, and possible adverse currency developments. It is only as a subsidiary use that it can be used, if not required for other purposes, to offset shortfalls in contributions. We are foreseeing that, there is already a considerable charge on the Special Reserve Account that is likely to happen on account of changes in health insurance contributions, pension contributions and salaries for general services, and we have deducted in our calculations a possible reduction in professional post adjustments - we have not forgotten to do that. But it seems probable that the total amount of the Special Reserve Account could be available.
Then we have to take account of the possibility, which.is foreseen by practically every commentator one reads at international financial gatherings or in the international financial monetary Press, that the present rate of the dollar cannot be sustained and is bound to come down some time - but nobody knows when, whether it is going to be next month or next year, but some time they feel there will be a big drop. It so happens that it is still rising, which means that the fall, if it comes and when it comes, is likely to be rather severe in its effects.
In this connection I would mention that the Italian lira, with which we deal to a large extent in this connection, may be weak against the dollar, but it is not out of line with the weakness of other currencies against the dollar. This is partly because of its position in the European monetary system, so it cannot be assumed that the dollar will remain stronger against the lira comparatively than it is against other currencies. Thus, if the fall comes it will affect us also. It would therefore be extremely imprudent to foresee running down the totality of the Special Reserve Account, because one might need quite a large part of it, or all of it, during the course of the biennium.
That would still leave the authority to borrow. When this was granted by the last Conference there was quite a lot of opposition to granting it. The Conference decided to grant it; the Director-General himself gave the guarantee that we would not use it unless we had to, and that he would report to the Conference if we had to use it. Well, owing to - I might claim, good management - we have not had to use it. It therefore continues unused, and this is available for dealing with problems in the next biennium. But the same reasons which led us not to want to use it during this biennium will lead us even more not to want to use it in the next biennium in the circumstances which we are discussing because, unlike other possible solutions, it carries additional penalties. We would not only be borrowing, mainly against unpaid contributions, which means that we have to pay it back, and this does mean eventually additional assessments on all Member Nations, some of which might also not be paid. But secondly, it would mean interest payments which would be another additional burden which otherwise would not pertain if other solutions could be adopted. So, we continue to feel that the use of the authority to borrow should really be the last desperate resource.
Why therefore have we come with this document? Because - to sum up the situation - there won't be much available in the Working Capital Fund; it would be folly to run down the Special Reserve Account in its totality; and we want to avoid authority to borrow in order not to create additional burdens for Member States. Hence the idea put forward in document C 83/LIM/22.
Why did we come with this during the Conference? Why was it a surprise to some delegations? We did take the matter to the Finance Committee in September when it appeared that the legislation of one country would be even worse in its effects than now appears might be the case, and a reference appeared in the report of the Finance Committee. This was discussed in Council and was brought up to date during the Council and Council included a reference in its Report. So the Conference had reason to know from the beginning that this was going to be a problem. We waited until the last moment in order to avoid confusing the Conference with what is obviously a complex and difficult problem to resolve. However, the best efforts of the largest contributor have proved unavailing (unless they are able to tell today that Congress has not adopted this provision), and we heard the other day from another major contributor of their problems concerning their contributions.
I want to emphasize very strongly that we are not pointing the finger at any particular delegation or delegations. There are many delegations which are not paying their contributions on time, and in the case of the largest contributor it has been evident from the beginning that they have done their utmost to avoid the situation with which they may be confronted through no fault of their own and through no fault of their colleagues in the capitals - we are all convinced that they have been doing their utmost to avoid the situation. As regards the other major contributor, the situation, I may say, remains somewhat obscure. We appreciated very much their attitude on the Programme of Work and Budget, but I think many of us were startled by the explanation of vote which followed; and, if I recall correctly, one delegation asked what its meaning was, and the explanation was somewhat delphic.
Let me say frankly that neither of those two major delegations - and I am only mentioning them because of the size of the contribution, not because of their good will or anything else, it is the sheer size of their contributions which makes it necessary to single them out - if either of them could give a guarantee today that these things positively would not happen, then I would tear up this document in front of you and leave the room. But no one can give such guarantees, particularly for 1984-85 - this is not only the 1984 situation,but the 1985 situation as well - and I am sure they will do their utmost to prevent this situation happening. However, none of us can be sure that it won't happen. Therefore the Director-General has concluded that it is his inescapable duty to come to you with proposals which, while not involving an immediate decision nor an irrevocable action, would provide the possibility of dealing with the situation in one year's time, or even in 1 1/2 years' time, if by then it would seem that something has to be done. If by then it would seem that nothing need be done, or that we could manage with the instruments we have at hand, we would not propose anything else. We would manage -- and I emphasize again that hitherto we have always managed very well: we have never come to you with a deficit situation. I think that the only time in FAO's history that there was a deficit was in 1952 or 1953, something like that, before any of us were involved in the affairs of the Organization. But in the last few years there has been a surplus and this time there is an unusually large surplus.
Why does the surplus arise? Because of good management with investments, good management with income from such things as the travel agents, and good management as regards the programme so as to avoid over-spending when we were unsure of contributions and wanted to avoid having to use the authority to borrow. We got the authority to borrow at the last Conference. We could have spent like mad up to the hilt on the programme and then said "Gentlemen, we have to borrow because we have implemented the programme in full and we still don't have enough money and therefore we are going to use the authority to borrow." But we didn't - we started out by saving as much money as possible so as to avoid placing that burden on Member Nations. So it is by good management that we have this sum of money available.
Returning to one of my points: it is an unfortunate situation for everybody but particularly for those Member Nations who help us avoid this situation of having to borrow by paying their contributions on time. It is at them that we should be pointing the finger as a good example to all the rest who cannot manage the same. So it is those who pay who are unfortunately involved with those among you who cannot pay that creates a problem. This is the problem: it is not between you and the Director-General, it is between yourselves that this situation arises, and the Director-General is only coming forward with the proposal which unfortunately will seem harsh or unfair to those who do pay on time, but nevertheless is,in his view, possibly necessary to meet a rather unusual situation.
I don't want to take too long so I will not go into too much detail; but I must make a few more remarks.
He could in certain circumstances have come to the Conference and proposed straight away that the Conference give him this authority - but he has not done so, because he is the first to inform you that the situation is still hypothetical. He has therefore proposed something which is a minimum action, which is simply to enable the Council to take action, if necessary, - no more, and if it is not necessary, no action will be taken.
There are many precedents for the Conference giving the Council enabling powers in financial matters. Furthermore, on his behalf, I want to assure you all - because you are all involved - that he will come first to the Finance Committee and then to the Council with full information on the situation regarding contributions at that time, the arrears, the late payments, the intentions of member governments as communicated to us. He will inform the Finance Committee and the Council of the existing commitments, if any, on the Working Capital Fund and on the Special Reserve Fund, of his assessment of the possible developments during 1985, as well as 1984, and he will undertake to use whatever is available on the basis of the assessment from the Working Fund and the Special Reserve Account to meet the station before suggesting anything about cash surplus.
In this connection the resolution says "as the first source of funds...". I think this is misleading because it was meant first before authority to borrow and not first before the Working Capital Fund and the Special Reserve Account. We will certainly use them to the extent considered feasible and desirable before any move is made to use the cash surplus, and that is a categorical assurance; and, if necessary, we can propose a change to the wording of the resolution to make that absolutely clear. It is in the verbatim and it can also be put in the report.
To sum up, we regret very much to have to come to you with this item. We are not pointing the finger at anybody. It is they who have informed us of their problems, not we who have initiated this. It may not be as bad as we think. But we have to be prepared. However, the way we are asking to be prepared is simply to give the Council - not us - the opportunity to decide on behalf of the Conference what to do. What has to be done cannot be foreseen. It may be that nothing has to be done. Maybe nothing special has to be done. We are not in any way pre-judging what will be proposed, what will be decided. So I think despite the concern which this seems to occasion - for some reason financial proposals seem to occasion more concern than any other proposals - despite this, I think it is at heart a simple proposition which no one need be afraid of. It should concern everybody but no one should be afraid of it.
So I hope that the debate will reveal that the Conference can support the simple proposal to empower the Council to take whatever decision seems appropriate at the time. And one more point on that: if it feels unable to take the decision at the end of November 1984, it is also possible for it to take a further decision in June 1985, or again in November 1985. There is no final date up to the end of the biennium by which a fatal step is taken which is irreparable.
W.A.F. GRABISCH (Germany, Federal Republic of) (original language German): This paper, C 83/LIM/22, which was submitted to us here unexpectedly, was carefully examined by us and we are still dealing with it. We have also listened attentively to the two introductions by the Secretariat.
Now, Mr Chairman, permit me to speak on item 21.3 of our agenda and to state the following at this point. Firstly, I think it is necessary to do away with what was obviously a misunderstanding in connexion with our brief statement after having voted in favour of the Programme of Work and Budget for 1984-85 on the 16th November in the Plenary here. A number of delegates who spoke to us subsequently, obviously - due to a difficulty of translation, understood something different from what we said. Therefore, let me say this for clarification. The Budget Committee of our Parliament did not at all decide to freeze our contribution, but to provisionally block in the sense of to withold our contribution for 1984, and, I stress for 1984 only. This to clarify the situation. This procedure was also applied in 1982 and 1983 in our country. In the last analysis it has not prevented the Federal Republic of Germany from paying its contribution in the year due.
May I add the following. The Federal Republic of Germany, in the 33 years of its membership of FAO, has always fulfilled its financial obligations in the respective budget year. On the other hand, if we look at document C 83/LIM/13, there are 68 countries that are in arrears with their contributions. That was point one
Now point two. After the initial examination of document 83/LIM/22, we have come to the conclusion that the measures proposed are not necessary. We think it is highly improbable that the Organization would arrive at such a difficult financial situation in which the implementation of the Programme of Work would be seriously jeopardized. It is our opinion that the instruments available, i.e. the Working Capital Fund, the Special Reserve Account and the Authority to Borrow, are sufficient to cope with the emergency situation as assumed here. Therefore the proposal contained in this document is one which we cannot endorse.
J.L. ZAPATA (Venezuela): Señor Presidente, a la Delegación de Venezuela también sorprendió mucho la lectura del documento C 83/LIM/22 en el cual, se narra una serie de circunstancias relativas al principal contribuyente de FAO, que nos llevan a gran preocupación.
Las palabras del representante de Alemania Federal nos tranquilizan en relación con la posición de ese país, que parecía diversa a la luz de la traducción que se hizo ayer de sus palabras. Sin embargo, nosotros consideramos que el problema, a la luz de estos documentos sigue siendo verdaderamente preocupante para el futuro de esta Organización.
El hecho mismo de que el Director General haya presentado esta solicitud, aun cuando se presente con esta forma y dando la posibilidad de que sea el Consejo quien decida en la oportunidad en que fuere necesario, pensamos en que el hecho mismo de presentarla es una demostración clara de que esa hipótesis está planteada. Y, ¿cuál es esa hipótesis? Muy simplemente, que estamos en presencia de la posibilidad de que la FAO no tenga los fondos suficientes y necesarios para hacer frente a nuestras obligaciones presupuestarias. No sé si nuestra delegación ha entendido mal, pero pienso que este es el significado de estos documentos.
Habría muchas preguntas que hacerse. Yo, al final de mi intervención, que espero sea breve, voy a leer algunas de las interrogantes que a nosotros se nos ocurren, para que el representante del Director General, aquí presente, nos las responda, si es posible.
Pero, desde luego, sí hay una interrogante fundamental y previa y es que, si no hay una voluntad política para seguir contribuyendo al mantenimiento de FAO, evidentemente estamos asistiendo al preámbulo de lo que pudiera ser la liquidación, si no total, sí parcial de esta institución. Enton-ces habría que hacerse una pregunta: si esta hipótesis está planteada, (por qué razón aprobamos ayer o anteayer el presupuesto de la institución, con unos datos que no contábamos con relación a esa hipótesis. Todo presupuesto debe contar con los fondos necesarios para hacer frente a las obligaciones que se contraen. Aprobamos entonces un presupuesto sobre base falsa. No contamos con la seguridad o la posibilidad más o menos cierta de tener los fondos necesarios para hacer frente a ese presupuesto. Entonces tendríamos que pensar en la posibilidad de discutir otro presupuesto más sincero, que cuente con una realidad distinta, pues los fondos que vamos a tomar de estos recursos que tiene FAO, evidentemente, como se ha demostrado y como se ha dicho ya, se van a agotar. Si los principales contribuyentes o todos no cumplimos con nuestras obligaciones oportunamente, nos veremos abocados a una crisis de financiación de nuestro presupuesto.
En consecuencia, yo creo que se impone una sinceración de esta situación y una sinceración de presupuesto. Si no hay los fondos suficientes y necesarios para hacerle frente en el presupuesto de FAO, tenemos que encarar esta situación con toda sinceridad y con todo realismo. Lo otro sería engañarse; porque, ¿qué institución financiera va a prestar fondos a una organización cuyos aportantes, cuyos miembros contribuyentes no están dispuestos a pagar esos créditos?
Entonces yo, como dije al principio, voy a concluir estas reflexiones haciendo unas preguntas, que serán las siguientes:
En primer lugar, si hay antecedentes según los cuales se haya autorizado en algunas ocasiones al Director General que tome dinero del fondo general, cuando el Reglamento Financiero en su Artículo 6.1(b) establece que: "todo superávit en efectivo que quede en el Fondo General al cerrarse un ejercicio económico se repartirá entre los Estados Miembros de conformidad con la escala de cuotas correspondientes al mismo ejercicio económico y, el primero de enero siguiente al año en que se terminó la comprobación definitiva de las cuentas del ejercicio económico..."
Segunda pregunta: ¿es justo castigar a los países solventes y premiar a los países insolventes?
Tercera pregunta: si se aprueba, de ser posible reglamentariamente, la proposición en marcha, esto supone que, una vez que los países deudores paguen sus deudas al Fondo General, éste será repartido entre los Estados Miembros, como lo determina el Artículo 6.1(b) del Reglamento Financiero ya citado?
Cuarta pregunta: Si algunos países que son los mayores contribuyentes no pagan o disminuyen sustán-cialmente sus aportes, como parece desprenderse del documento C 83/LIM/22, y declaraciones expresas que se hicieron en esta Conferencia, aun cuando ahora se ha aclarado que no es exactamente lo que se dijo,¿de dónde se van a sacar los fondos para hacer frente a las obligaciones presupuestarias?
Quinta pregunta: Si no hay dinero suficiente aportado por los Estados Miembros, tendrá la FAO que tratar con organismos financieros públicos o privados para llevar adelante su programa del próximo bienio?
Sexta pregunta: Habrá instituciones financieras que estén dispuestas a dar un crédito a la Organización sabiendo que hay Estados, que hay países que no pueden y otros que no están dispuestos a cancelar sus cuotas correspondientes?
Por último, séptima pregunta, quisiéramos saber, qué sucederá con un presupuesto aprobado sin tener la garantía de que se va a poder ejecutar?
Estas son todas las preguntas.
C. Di MOTTOLA BALLESTRA (Costa Rica): Quiero ante todo, señor Presidente, agradecer a la Secretaría y especialmente al Director General Adjunto, por la forma clara con que nos ha expuesto una situación compleja y extremadamente preocupante. Según entiendo hay tres motivos de preocupación: las cuotas atrasadas que ya tienen cierta consistencia y que, posiblemente por falta de voluntad de los países, por causas imprevisibles, pero que pueden existir, pueden aumentar; el atraso del año en curso y, el otro motivo, podría ser la reducción que unos grandes países pueden aportar en sus cuotas.
Estoy completamente de acuerdo con el Director General Adjunto en que los dos medios constitucionales que tenemos para hacer frente a esta situación, o sea, el Fondo de Operaciones y la Cuenta Especial de Reserva, no son suficientes. Y no son suficientes especialmente en este momento. El Fondo Especial de Operaciones sirve para hacer frente a atrasos durante el año o enfermedades que se produzcan localmente en un país, cosa que en este momento no hay, pero que puede pasar de un momento a otro. No se puede disponer de este Fondo para otros fines.
La Cuenta Especial de Reserva puede servir en caso de grandes fluctuaciones monetarias, y éste es un momento de grandes fluctuaciones monetarias. Es necesario recurrir a otros medios
Estoy completamente de acuerdo en que se tienen que prever los casos; que todos los motivos de preocupación se averigüen al mismo tiempo y no que se averigüe uno. Tal vez en el documento que se nos presenta, el texto de resolución es una precaución, porque no es ninguna decisión, sino simplemente delegar al Consejo ciertas facultades. Estoy de acuerdo con la totalidad de la resolución, solo con una pequeña variación, que en la parte operacional se debería invertir el numero 1 con el 3; o sea, se debería autorizar al Director General a recurrir antes al superávit de tesorería y, en un segundo momento, a préstamos. En este período en el cual los préstamos cuestan caros, no veo por qué se tiene que recurrir a ellos mientras exista superávit de tesorería.
Por tanto, hago esta sugerencia de que en el texto de resolución que se nos presenta se consiga la posibilidad de invertir el párrafo operacional 3 por el párrafo 1; que se ponga alguna frase para especificar que el recurso de superávit de tesorería sea antes que el recurso a los préstamos.
Tesema NEGASH ( Ethiopia): First of all, I appreciate the representation by the Assistant Director-General of Administration and Finance Department and the explanations given by Mr West. Inasmuch as the Deputy Director-General, Mr West, regrets the necessity to bring this matter before us, we regret the situation that has led to the presentation of the paper and the draft resolution. Regrettable as it is, we strongly feel that it is incumbent upon this Conference to indicate possible solutions for the problems facing this Organization so that it can effectively meet its responsibilities.
Based upon the paper before us and the assurances just given by Mr West, we understand that the Director-General is not asking for the use of this fund to fill the shortfall, but rather authority for the Council at its forthcoming meeting to take appropriate action vis-à-vis the Special Reserve Fund in order to take account of the serious problems facing the Organization.
My delegation has no problem with accepting and endorsing the draft resolution. In fact, we hereby declare our agreement. But this is not the end of the road. Such a shortfall could reoccur and, as pointed out by the Assistant Director-General, this will almost definitely happen again. What is the end of the road? Where are the permanent solutions? Can this Organization continuously live with such reoccurring problems?
We believe that this Commission should address itself to the long-term resolution of the problem rather than limiting itself only to the current one. It is our earnest hope that this Conference will appeal to our major donors and all others who have failed to meet their commitments, to do co timely so that the Organization can meet the obligations entrusted to it by the world community.
O. BILBEISI (Jordan) (original language Arabic): Before discussing the document submitted to this Commission, please permit me to read out paragraph 4 of the first part of the report of Commission II, document C 83/II/REP/1 which reads as follows: "The Conference emphasized that the current world economic situation made it necessary now more than ever not to relax the momentum of international effort and commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate malnutrition and poverty. It agreed that FAO had to remain at the forefront of efforts towards this objective" which was universally shared.
Mr Chairman, I cited this quotation to prove the leading role played by the FAO in the eradication of poverty and malnutrition through the full implementation of the Programme of Work and Budget for the biennium 1984-1985. Following the adoption of Programme of Work and Budget for the biennium 1984-1985, we expect that the FAO Director-General will take the necessary measures to implement fully the Programme of Work and Budget. But this will not be possible unless we provide the Organization with all the necessary funds in accordance with the Budget approved by the Conference. We would like to emphasize the necessity for all Member States to pay their contributions on time and as soon as possible. We have great concern over the news we have heard recently about the possibility of reducing largely the contribution paid by one of the major contributors to the Organization budget. Yet we do hope that this major country will not resort to such a measure. Besides, the non-payment by the major contributors of their contributions, whether intentional or unintentional, is another source of grave concern. That is why we appeal to the representatives of those contributors to convey this message to their governments. We are thus not only expressing
the viewpoint of our country but we believe that the majority of the FAO Member States share with us this concern. The justifications of delays in the payment of contributions by the above mentioned countries or by any other country are unacceptable and illogical. Moreover, many of the Member States among which unfortunately there are some developing countries have not paid their contributions partially or completely for one reason or another. That is why we seize this opportunity to appeal to all Member States to pay their contributions in full and on time.
All these factors will lead to a shortfall in the liquidity of the Organization. Hence the FAO Director-General will find himself unable to implement the Programme of Work and Budget. We cannot blame the Director-General then, because he will not be responsible for such a situation; the responsibility will fall squarely on the Member States.
In order to avoid such possibilities, and in order to avoid the risk of having a shortfall in the funds available for the Organization, it is incumbent upon the Conference to adopt the necessary decisions that would secure sufficient monetary liquidity that will enable the Organization to implement its activities and programmes that will be approved by this session of the Conference. The document prepared by the Organization on this question has made it clear that the use of the working Capital Fund or the Special Reserve Account will not remedy in full this situation, because the expected shortfalls in contributions according to the FAO assessments, are larger than the capacity of these two sources.
The FAO Council has given the Director-General the authority to borrow subject to certain conditions, in order to meet such a situation, but the Director-General has not used that authority during the biennium 1982-1983. This should not mean that such an authority given by the Council has ceased. We support giving the Director-General the authority to borrow during the biennium 1984-1985 subject to the same conditions. It might be even more appropriate to maintain this authority to borrow for the Director-General after the coming biennium and subject to the conditions which the Council may deem suitable. But I would like to add that in this regard to borrow from banks is a very serious thing taking into account the high rate of interest and the high commission of loans given by these banks. That is why this form of borrowing would be used as a last resort to secure the financial resources for the Organization, Therefore, this proposal presented by the FAO Secretariat seems to be acceptable under such circumstances, namely the use of cash surplus that will be available at the end of the biennium 1982-1983 to cover the shortfall in contributions due to delay in payment or non-payment partially or in full as I mentioned before.
Therefore, we support the adoption of a decision by this Conference mandating the Council to review this decision as mentioned in the document under consideration.
Mr Chairman, in conclusion, since I am taking the floor for the first time, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of this Committee. I should also like to extend my congratulations to the two Vice-Chairmen. I would also like to thank the Head of the Finance Department and the Deputy Director-General for their explanations of the financial situation of the FAO.
J. TCHICAYA (Congo): La delegation de mon pays a étudie avec le plus grand soin le document C 83/LIM/22 actuellement soumis à notre examen et tient à exprimer sa vive préoccupation de voir la conférence être obligée de recourir à des artifices pour permettre la réalisation du programme de travail et budget que nous avons librement et unanimement approuvé.
Nous avons écouté avec beaucoup d'attention les explications que M. West a bien voulu nous donner. Cependant, la situation étant ce qu'elle est, et compte tenu de ces explications, c'est-à-dire que nous nous trouvons dans une période d'incertitudes et où les impondérables semblent prendre le dessus, ma délégation voudrait donc apporter son soutien à la résolution qui confirme les disposi-; tions de la résolution 2/80 du Conseil autorisant le Directeur général a emprunter, résolution qui par ailleurs avait déjà reçu le soutien de ma délégation.
De même que nous pensons qu'il est nécessaire effectivement de déléguer au Conseil le pouvoir d'autoriser, en cas de besoin, le Directeur général à ne pas répartir l'excédent de trésorerie par lequel pourrait se solder l'exercice 82-83, et à le mettre de côté comme première source de financement à utiliser en cas de besoin pour couvrir les dépenses budgétaires que nous venons d'approuver. Nous faisons ainsi confiance au Conseil, organe dont le sérieux est incontesté. De plus, nous sommes sensibles au fait que le Directeur général, grâce à une gestion rigoureuse, n'a pas été amené à se servir de l'autorisation qui lui avait été précédemment donnée par le Conseil.
Mais vous me permettrez de profiter de l'examen de ce point de l'ordre du jour pour m'inquiéter une nouvelle fois de cette situation qui de toute évidence pénalise les gouvernements respectueux de leurs engagements, et favorise grandement les pays retardataires. C'est pourquoi la conférence devrait se pencher sérieusement sur cette question en prévoyant si besoin des pénalités de retard de paiements, et non se contenter d'expédients invitant les gouvernements à régler leurs contributions le plus rapidement possible.
Nous pensons qu'une telle mesure serait plus juste vis-à-vis des pays bons payeurs et les encouragerait à persévérer dans cette attitude, en même temps qu'elle inciterait les pays retardataires à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour accélérer les paiements de leurs contributions.
En effet, on peut même s'étonner que des Etats sérieusement éprouvés, dont les difficultés économiques sont connues de nous tous, perdent leur droit de vote en raison des arriérés qu'ils ont accumulés et qui, tout compte fait, restent minimes par rapport aux sommes perdues par l'Organisation en raison des paiements tardifs de certains pays gros contributeurs.
Enfin, la délégation de mon pays voudrait proposer, à la lumière de la présente situation et des arguments que je viens de développer, de faire une recommandation invitant le Conseil, par l'entremise du Comité financier, à étudier des mesures mieux adaptées à la situation et qui ne lèsent pas les pays qui payent leurs contributions dans les délais impartis car ils ne pourront indéfiniment permettre qu'on puise .sur les excédents de trésorerie destinés à réduire leurs contributions futures, réduction qui paradoxalement s'applique indistinctement aux bons et aux mauvais payeurs.
Nous pensons qu'aucun prétexte ne peut, à nos yeux, justifier ces retards de paiement de contributions, lorsqu'on connaît les colossales sommes d'argent souvent employées à des actions qui parfois ne sont pas conformes à la morale internationale. Nous espérons sincèrement que ces pays sauront se ressaisir pour permettre à l'Organisation d'assurer correctement ses missions.
R.B. RYANGA ( Kenya): I approach document C 83/LIM/22 with some frustration, because I feel that we should not be discussing such an issue here. However, the accumulated arrears are now reaching epidemic proportions. It was four million dollars four years ago, fifteen million dollars two years ago, and who knows about the future? It is certainly twenty million dollars at least at the beginning of the next biennium.
Even more serious are the unilateral delays in payment, not those by small countries who might be expected to have severe foreign exchange problems and other fiscal difficulties - we understand this - but those by large countries which delay payment on principle, either as a declared policy -we have had such declarations here - or, even more dangerously, as unannounced administrative practices.
We also face the possibility of a unilateral reduction in contribution in spite of the fact that the FAO budgets, including the current one, are agreed generally. I cannot plumb the depths of the minds of those who decide to take such action. I can only imagine that such actions are taken to demonstrate displeasure at the way that business is done in this house, or perhaps to harass the Organization into inactivity and perhaps eventual collapse. This is really the saddest part of the whole story, because the programmes which comprise the business of this Organization are fully debated here and agreed, and it is not necessary that absolutely everybody must agree with absolutely everything. That is what democracy is all about, and I should not be the one to talk about this. It is becoming quite clear that the full implications of democracy are acceptable to some people when and only when, they themselves agree with specific decisions regardless of the weight of public opinion.
I have now been reduced to the position where I have come to the unhappy conclusion that in spite of all the rhetoric here - and there is plenty of that, if I may say so - "democracy" is still just a beautiful word which we sometimes use to flatter ourselves.
The Director-General has to run this Organization. That is his job. He must be able to do so in spite of problems such as those outlined in this document. His proposals are sound. They are the proposals of a prudent executive who is securing the success of his programmes. They should therefore be supported, and we do support them now.
It is tempting to say "Let us wait and see what happens". It is tempting to argue, as it has been argued, that in the event there might be no need to activate these proposals, although I am not sure of the basis for such optimism. It may even be argued that we can always use the Working Capital Fund or the Special Reserve Account, and these things have been said already here. Of course we could do all those things, and the Director-General must surely have considered that possibility, but he must have come to the same conclusions as we did ourselves. Those funds do have their specified purposes and are therefore not totally available, and it would be self-defeating to divert them somewhere else only to be caught later, for example, with a locust or rinderpest outbreak without funds at hand.
Who knows what the dollar will be tomorrow? We do not. The questions raised by Venezuela and also by Ethiopia are relevant and need to be discussed. But at this time we support the resolution at pages 2 and 3 in its entirety.
L. ARIZA HIDALGO (Cuba): Pretendíamos hacer una intervención breve analizando los asuntos relacionados con la situación financiera de la Organización y los pagos de las cuotas asignadas para el bienio 1984/85, pero vemos que se han complicado las cosas, que una propuesta que a nuestro juicio tiene la intención de salvaguardar un poco el futuro incierto se está manipulando; no entendemos.
Hay delegaciones que han planteado algunas cuestiones de fondo; de fondo diríamos nosotros, porque si no hay otro motivo que el que se ha expuesto, no creemos que la situación es para dramatizar. Los miembros de la FAO saben el valor que tiene la FAO, y que esto es así por los muchos años de apoyo y ejercicio directo a la alimentación y a la agricultura; y si en los últimos años la causa fundamental de la crisis mundial financiera, como ha señalado claramente el Sr. West, alimentaria fundamentalmente en el Tercer Mundo, ha obligado a que la FAO se convierta realmente en un paladín del Tercer Mundo para paliar estas situaciones que, por lo general, quienes las pagan son los países pobres; situaciones de las cuales los países pobres no son responsables, porque todos sabemos que los países pobres no son responsables de la situación del dólar, ni son responsables de la situación alimentaria, ni son responsables de la situación financiera, nosotros, en términos generales, vemos que hay un problema de fondo y éste es un problema de fondo que si ya se quiere hablar del fondo, aunque estamos de acuerdo con las delegaciones que han planteado esto, debe analizarse y posible- mente preparémonos nosotros para analizarlo con más tranquilidad y con más fuerza en el futuro; futuro que parece se va a presentar rápido, pero creo que de pasada debemos decir que el ataque sistemático a las organizaciones multilaterales no es una casualidad; hay excepciones, y no nos explicamos por qué a un organismo se le facilitan los fondos periódicamente y a otros no; es el caso de la FAO, es el mismo caso del PNUD al cual se le han reducido los fondos; es el mismo caso del FIDA al cual se le han reducido los fondos.
¿Objetivo? Habría que analizarlo posteriormente; pero mientras llega este momento prácticamente creemos que debemos caminar con los dos pies, y es lo que ha propuesto la dirección de esta Organización; ha propuesto, ante una situación inusitada, porque hace solamente dos días, sí señor, hace dos días, la Plenaria de esta Conferencia aprobó el Programa de Labores y Presupuesto para el bienio 1984/85; lo aprobó unánimemente porque los miembros de la FAO necesitan de la FAO y necesitan, simplemente, este presupuesto; ya lo ha dicho el Sr. Crowther magistralmente: el artículo 18.2 de la Constitución de nuestra Organización dice: "los Estados Miembros se comprometen a pagar por entero las cuotas correspondientes de conformidad con la escala adoptada." Sin embargo, estamos en presencia de unas situaciones reales, situaciones que creo que la forma en que se trata de resolverlas es la mejor.
Hay algunos países cuyas legislaciones han expresado que contribuirán al Presupuesto de la Organización, "si no se efectúa en el plazo establecido o se suspenda provisionalmente", como se dice, esta provisionalidad o suspensión tmbién es bastante indefinida; situación que realmente se conoce y se mantendrá para el bienio. Esto, a nuestro juicio, es lo que hace que la dirección de la Organización presente el documento C 83/LIM/22.
Tenemos otra preocupación: precisamente los dos países que están planteando la situación de dificultades de pago son los dos grandes países y son, por sus porcentajes, los que obtendrían mayor parte en el superávit; esto es interesante.
Señor Presidente, este Presupuesto aprobado por la Conferencia para el bienio 1984/85 nosotros consideramos, como ha dicho la distinguida delegación del Congo que no debemos ser castigados los que pagan y que debe ser decidido plenamente por el Director General y, por consiguiente, corresponde a esta Conferencia misma proporcionar las facilidades resolutivas para cumplimentar ese importante mandato, porque ese es un mandato que ya esta Conferencia dio.
Para asegurar este futuro próximo el párrafo 8 del documento C 83/LIM/22 nos recuerda el mandato que fue dado al Director General referente a que en caso de necesidad tomara dinero en préstamo para financiar la ejecución del Programa de Labores y Presupuesto que se apruebe, en espera de que se reciban las cuotas atrasadas. Este recurso en su momento no pareció apropiado y aunque debería ser utilizado en última instancia, y por consiguiente tratando de encontrar fórmulas más prácticas como realizó la FAO, porque realmente el Director General logró no utilizarlo, no emplear este mandato, nos parece oportuno en este momento que esta Comisión dé su aprobación para que el superávit de tesorería que por diversos conceptos probablemente producirá el bienio 1982/83 sea utilizado como primera fuente de financiación del déficit de ingresos que por concepto de cuotas ha de producirse hasta que los ingresos fuesen suficientes para cubrir las consignaciones presupuestarias dentro del nivel del presupuesto aprobado. Esto es lo que yo llamo caminar con dos pies. Vamos a solucionar esta situación inmediata que se presentó de improviso y el futuro ya lo discutiremos, porque habrá que discutirlo. La FAO permanecerá y tendrá que seguir discutiendo muchos futuros; no creemos que la FAO vaya a desaparecer, no creemos que las fuerzas que quieren eliminar a la Comunidad Internacional de las Naciones Unidas van a hacerla desaparecer; las Naciones Unidas seguirán siendo Naciones Unidas y la FAO seguirá siendo el organismo especializado de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura.
Para concluir, mi delegación apoya la Resolución presentada por el Director General en el documento C 83/LIM/22 sobre la financiación de las consignaciones presupuestarias para el bienio 1984/85.
Podríamos estar en condiciones de analizar la proposición específica que hizo el representante de Costa Rica sobre un reordenamiento interno dentro de la Resolución; sin embargo en este momento no podría dar mi total aprobación hasta no analizar la situación.
ZHONG SHUKONG ( China): The Chinese delegation has listened carefully to the proposal made just now by the Director-General and the Secretariat concerning inter alia the use of the cash surplus if and when genuinely necessary and of the related matters. This delegation views the proposal as being a rational one.
In this connection my delegation wishes at this moment to state the following: firstly, as recognized by the speeches at the Plenary by over 130 leaders of delegations in the last ten days or so, FAO has done a lot of work conducive to the interest of mankind. Therefore, such work of FAO deserves support from us all in words and in deeds.
Secondly, the proceedings of our Conference over the last ten days or so indicate that there exists the question of arrears due to special reasons, and there also exists the question of decision yet to be made on the exact aggregate amount of membership contribution on the part of a major contributor country, etc.
On the other hand, without the necessary financial resources, FAO cannot carry out its work. It is against this background that the Director-General and the Secretariat have put forward the proposal now under deliberation. Evidently this is a kind of safeguard or precautionary measure compelled by circumstances. As such, it is a matter of necessity.
Thirdly, the use of the cash surplus is undoubtedly a major question which should be decided through democratic procedures by the delegations of member nations of FAO. Happily the approach to this question as approached by the Director-General and the Secretariat is in keeping with the democratic principle: for the Secretariat has first of all requested us, Commission III, to consider this matter which, along with the draft resolution, will be submitted finally to the Plenary, that is the highest organ of FAO, for consideration and adoption.
Moreover, whether or not the surplus will be used is a question which will be subject to the consideration and decision of next year's Council meeting to be duly authorized by our Conference. All this is in line with the democratic principle and is feasible.
In view of the above, the Chinese delegation supports the content of the relevant draft resolution as put forward just now and as contained in document C 83/LIM/22.
M. TRKULJA ( Yugoslavia): Firstly, let me explain our own position. I am satisfied to say that I received today a cable from Belgrade making sure that our contribution will be paid in a matter of days; even more so that we have taken steps so as to escape a similar situation in years to come. We appeared in the list of those who had substantial arrears, not necessarily because of economic difficulties, but because of very inflexible financial procedure of the Federal Government. I have received news from Belgrade that the procedure has been amended thus allowing us to pay in time.
Coming now to document C 83/LIM/22, I want to express our gratitude to Mr West and Mr Crowther who introduced the resolution at certain length. I feel even that it took them too much time to present a fairly simple case which perhaps unnecessarily produces an image of defence. We consider the resolution as a contingency scheme which will be put in pactice only if the worst sequence of events occurredo Such as painted so ably by Mr Crowthero Furthermore, what is in fact contained in the resolution is a provision for Council to review the authority to borrow which it has already granted to the Director-Generalo We are a little concerned, in the light of what Mr West said, that the emphasis is only of the next session of the Council in 1984; it might perhaps be necessary to insert two sessions of the Council to include 1985 as well. Again, it requests the Director-General to keep the Finance Committee abreast with the financial situation of the Organization -- something that has been traditional in the house.
Finally, it is an alternative for the Council to provide necessary safeguards for the implementation of the Programme of Work and Budget which was so unanimously approved yesterday. We are not willing to be involved in guesswork as to whether a sequence of events is probable or not. We have heard some delegations saying that it is highly improbable that such a sequence could occur. We hope very much that it will not happen but in case it does happen, this is a small contingency scheme which would then be put into effect.
I will not dwell on the sound management of the house and the Director-General I do not think it is necessary.
Let me touch on only one issue, the last one: that it might perhaps be proper for us to consider the possibility of taking into account the timeliness of contributions as a factor in accounting the reimbursement amounts. I think I have full moral rights, as my Government is also in arrears, to propose that a simple formula could perhaps be very easily found to take account of this very simple fact.
I.P. ALVARENGA (El Salvador): Ante todo, quisiéramos con la más absoluta sinceridad, agradecer la exposición hecha por la Secretaría, particularmente por el Sr. West, cuya acostumbrada y lúcida inteligencia nos ha permitido resumir un problema complejo en pocas palabras y con absoluta claridad.
Es probable que, debido al momento en el cual nos toca intervenir tengamos que repetir algunas exposiciones ya formuladas, pero creemos que el punto que estamos discutiendo así lo precisa.
Nuestra delegación, señor. Presidente, con base en el uso de ese derecho, realmente exaltante para nuestra Organización, que permite a un país, a cualquier país, hablar con el mismo derecho que le corresponda a cualquier otro país, hemos hecho, cada vez que ha sido posible y necesario, un llamado a todos los miembros de la Organización a que cumplamos con los deberes que el hecho de pertenecer a la misma nos impone.
En el caso presente sinceramente no creemos que exista mala voluntad. Sabemos que hay dudas expresadas o tácitas por parte de algunos sectores, de algunos países, o de algunos países en conjunto, sobre la validez de la ayuda multilateral. No se nos oculta que existen síntomas alarmantes en contra de ese tipo de ayuda que nosotros siempre hemos defendido. Sin embargo, no pensamos que en este caso nos hallemos ante una situación de ese tipo. Creo que es necesario tratar de comprender las dificultades que todos los países tienen, las cuales con sinceridad han sido expuestas acá y que debemos confiar en que esos países superarán dichas dificultades y cumplirán con los compromisos que han adquirido.
La situación finaciera, tal como nos la plantea el documento que tenemos ante nosotros, es ciertamente preocupante; pero debemos recordar que no es la primera, ni será la última sin duda de ese tipo que vive nuestra Organización. Todos nosotros, o algunos, recordarán cuando se presentó la primera crisis del PNUD. Parecía que la FAO iba a cerrar sus puertas, y no las cerró y de eso hace ya casi diez años. Cuando la posibilidad de obtener préstamos, para hacer frente a los compromisos de la Organización, en virtud de la falta de pagos, también se hizo motivo de alarma; pero esas dificultades igualmente fueron superadas. Estamos seguros de que también de este paso actual vamos a salir adelante, sobre todo gracias a la acertada gestión de quienes dirigen esta Organización.
Sobre el tema en concreto, parece entenderse que, por una parte se recurre en todo caso al fondo del superávit, cuando bien sabemos que pudiera ser que esa medida sea innecesaria. Si los fondos comprometidos para la Organización llegan de una u otra manera a tiempo, esa medida no tendrá aplicación. Pareciera entenderse que si se recurre al fondo del superávit, eso no será devuelto nunca a los países. Entendemos que no es así y nos satisface saber que una persona tan competente como es el representante de Yugoslavia nos haya hablado de una solución al respecto.
Si existe la duda de que esto también depende del arbitrio, ya se ha aclarado en el sentido de que estará sujeto al control del Comité de Finanzas, del Consejo y por supuesto al control que todos los países tenemos sobre esta Organización.
Finalmente, pareciera pensarse en que habría un daño, si esa medida se aplica. Si hubiese un daño, sería temporal, y aunque sólo fuese temporal, debemos tener consciencia de que en más de alguna oportunidad tendremos que sufrir las consecuencias, pero estaríamos dispuestos a aceptar ese daño, si existiera. De lo que sí estamos seguros es de que se trata de una medida transitoria y que después los fondos serán oportunamente restituidos.
En cuanto al fondo del problema, es decir, al punto de las cuotas, es satisfactorio saber que la resolución propuesta en los párrafos 2 y 4 hace alusión específica a la necesidad de establecer un sistema para que esta situación no se presente en el futuro, o para que se resuelva en una forma satisfactoria.
No está de más señalar algo que ya se ha mencionado y es que recurrir al fondo del superávit es una medida más sana que recurrir a préstamos. Si la Organización tuviese que adquirir préstamos, ahí tendríamos una carga mayor para todos los países, porque tendríamos que pechar con los intereses.
De modo que la solución propuesta nos parece la mejor y en consecuencia damos nuestro apoyo a la resolución planteada, tal como se encuentra propuesta por la Secretaría.
J. HEIDSMA ( Netherlands): I should like to limit myself to document C 83/LIM/22, and the draft resolution contained therein: in particular paragraph 3 of that resolution.
We agree with the Secretariat that there is a theoretical possibility that the Organization might run into cash troubles during the next biennium. However, we believe that this possibility is very limited indeed. Member Nations are obliged to pay their contributions, and there is no sufficient reason yet to believe that they will not do so -- at least, not to such an extent that cash problems will occur.
The resolution before us is of an enabling character and as such, does not necessarily lead to any concrete action. This is true: nevertheless, the resolution provides for a significant change in a long-and well-established principle which exists throughout the United Nations system. We do not think that it would be a responsible act to dispose of this principle, and certainly not within the very short time we have had available to study all these details and broader consequences.
There is another angle to this issue, to which my country attaches great importance. The resolution can in fact be considered to be a penalty for those countries which have paid in full and on time. My country happens to be one of those countries. We do not accept the idea that because Member States do not pay their obligatory contributions, the Netherlands would not receive its share of the cash surplus. This is a matter of fairness and of principle -- indeed, it is impossible for my country to compromise.
Finally, I would like to recall that if all existing safety nets appear to be insufficient -- and I repeat it is extremely unlikely -- there is still the possibility for the Director-General to call an Extraordinary session of the Conference to cope with it.
We realize, of course, that this would involve additional costs. As the possibility of this being necessary is very remote, however, we believe that it is worthwhile to take a chance instead of deciding now, on the spur of the moment, so to speak, on a principle of such a controversial nature.
H.M. CARANDANG ( Philippines): As indicated earlier by the Deputy Director-General, what we have before us is a contingency scheme. What is being requested is to allow the Council to give authority to the Director-General to use certain monies if need be. Therefore the members of the Council will again have the occasion to make a decision at that stage whether or not it is appropriate, indeed, that the Director-General should use such monies as proposed. In principle, therefore, I would have no very strong objections to this. Nevertheless, I have some misgivings and, like the delegate of Venezuela , I would like to ask a few questions.
It is, indeed, very important that FAO should implement its budget - the budget that has been voted upon, which has been approved, which is according to the priorities, and which has been debated almost ad infinitum from the sub-committees up to the Council, up to the Conference. Nevertheless, there are certain legal implications and some precedents which the practice would create if ever put into effect.
First of all, in the case that the cash surplus was used to cover up the shortfall, what it would amount to is that the cash surplus which should have been returned to individual countries would be used to cover up because somebody has not paid. In effect, it is somebody paying for somebody else's contributions. I do not know whether this is really what it means, but if I look at the Basic Texts, in the Financial Regulations, when there is a cash surplus the cash surplus shall be allocated among Member Nations in accordance with the scale of contributions. And so, in other words, it is money belonging to one being used to f ill up the gap which is not paid by another.
Suppose the Philippines, for example, was unable to pay its contribution in 1984 and 1985, could such a cash surplus be used to pay the deficiency of the Philippines ? This is a question which has already been asked previously, although in different words, by other countries and I am just wondering whether if that were to happen it would be a just thing?
Second, I would like to ask whether the Bill pending before the Congress of one particular country, which is indicated in paragraph 3 of document C 83/LIM/22, refers to the calendar year 1984 or 1983. I understand, however, that the appropriations bills are made for one year and, if so, it could refer to either 1983 or 1984.
Now if the foreseen cash surplus is supposed to be $30 million, just in case it may materialise, now taking into account the provisions of Financial Regulation 6.1(b), it is said that if there is any cash surplus it should be allocated among Member Nations in accordance with the scale of contributions and shall be released and applied to liquidate, in whole or in part, first, any advance due to the Working Capital Fund; secondly, any arrears of contributions. In other words, if 25 percent of that should be given back to the country which has not paid for that particular year, 25 percent of 30 would be more or less something like the amount cited in paragraph 4(i). Of course, I am just speculating with figures. I am playing with figures. Anyway, all the figures are speculative. I am just wondering whether that provision which is now written in the text would not suffice to meet that possible shortfall indicated in paragraph 4(ii).
Up to now this Organization has had arrears by member countries. Up to now this Organization has been able to face such arrears in contributions in one way or another. I hope this will not happen now because of the contingency which is indicated in document C 83/LIM/22. I hope I shall receive some clarification of the doubts that have arisen after reading this document closely and hearing other delegations.
H. ZANNETIS ( Cyprus): When we unanimously approved on Wednesday in Plenary the Programme of Work and Budget of the Organization for the biennium 1984-85, we were actually doing three things. Firstly, confirming our confidence in our Organization and its Director-General who tabled the said Programme of Work and Budget; secondly, giving a kind of mandate to the Director-General of the Organization to proceed with the implementation of the Programme of Work; and, thirdly, committing ourselves in accordance with Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the Organization to provide the required and unanimously approved budget resources for the implementation of the said budget.
However, it appears from certain information contained in document C 83/LIM/22, and from the explanations on this document provided by the Deputy Director-General this afternoon, that the situation may arise in the future whereby the Organization might face the risk of not having adequate cash resources to implement the Programme of Work which, I repeat, we have approved unanimously.
This possibility gives rise to concern and creates a peculiar situation in which the Organization might find itself unable to implement in full its Programme of Work. This is, indeed, a very unfortunate eventuality.
It is noted that the Working Capital Fund, in addition to the Special Reserve Account, might not be able to handle the situation because of the potential magnitude of possible shortfalls in receipts and, as the Director-General has said before, a proportion of these funds, especially the Working Capital Fund, is already earmarked to handle emergencies. In the light of the above, and in order to prepare for the worst, we agree that the provisions of Council Resolution 2/83, giving the Director-General authority to borrow, be confirmed by the Conference, leaving it to the Council to decide on the future of the authority, as necessary, if appropriate, at its session in November 1984.
In addition to the above, we fully agree that the Conference delegates authority to the Council to authorise, if necessary, the Director-General - notwithstanding the provisions of Financial Regulation 6.1 - to withhold any cash surpluses which may arise from the 1982-83 biennium and to set such surpluses aside as the first source of funds to be available, as required, to finance approved expenditure under approved budgetary appropriations.
Although we are not at all happy with this eventuality, we prefer to make use of the cash surplus, if necessary, rather than resort to borrowing as a first step. We therefore support the draft resolution. Of course the only way that it could be avoided is for Member States to take the necessary action to provide their contributions in full and in time in order to enable the Organization to function smoothly and evenly.
Youssef HAMDI ( Egypt) (original language Arabic): We would like to thank Mr Crowther for his introduction on this subject and also Mr-West for the clarification he made with regard to document C 83/LIM/22.
First of all, we would like to re-affirm the confidence of my country's delegation placed in the wise administration of the activities of this Organization by the Director-General. We believe we are not the only delegation to do so. There are many other delegates who have already expressed this feeling in the past few days by unanimously approving the Programme of Work and Budget.
The Director-General, who is the guardian of the funds of this Organization, is administering the financial affairs of the Organization and he anticipates the difficulties that could take place and which might affect the Programme of Work and Budget and the good conduct of its activities. If we try to summarize such difficulties, that would lead to such a situation, we could say that they could be confined to the accumulated arrears in contributions resulting from the economic difficulties faced by some member countries. In addition, there are some intentional or unintentional delays by some member countries with regard to the payment of their contributions.
We share the view of the Director-General and his concern with regard to the possibility of having a shortfall in the funds available to the Organization; and he has previously taken some precautions that would help him to meet any deficit in resources and we supported him in doing so. Among such precautions is the authority to borrow and to raise the reserve from 2.5 percent to 5 percent. Here I would like to mention that despite all these measures which have not been used by the Director-General, as a matter fo fact, this was due to the fact that he was very keen not to use the funds of the Organization in loans of high interest or to touch upon the Special Reserve Account which has specific purposes.
The Director-General is asking us to build another defensive line in order to meet some probabilities with serious consequences; in other words, the Conference should give a mandate to the Council to give the Director-General, if necessary, the authority to hold or to use the cash surplus for the biennium 1982-83. We find that this surplus is but more evidence of the wise and efficient use that the Organization has made of its resources. My delegation approves this request and supports the idea of giving such authority as proposed in this draft resolution.
J. SAULT ( Australia): We would like to thank Mr West for his explanation of the reasons that the proposal in document C 83/LIM/22 has been brought before us and Mr Crowther for his projections of the future financial position of the Organization.
As the document on this matter, that is C 83/LIM/22, has become available only recently, it is under consideration in Australia not only in regard to its implications for FAO but also as regards the possible implications that it might have throughout the UN system. However, I would like to make a few broad observations.
At the outset we are strongly of the view that since the Conference has unanimously endorsed the Programme of Work and Budget, all members should meet their obligations by paying their contributions so that the programme which they have endorsed can be implemented.
We also recognise that the Director-General should bring to the attention of the membership any difficulties he might foresee regarding contributions and suggest measures to alleviate any difficulties that might arise. Indeed, he has the responsibility to do that. However, we do have very real difficulties of principle with the proposal to give the Council authority to withhold the cash surplus. Moreover, we are far from convinced that the Organization needs any additional safeguards over and above those it already has in order to meet any shortfall which might arise regarding contributions.
Mr West has stressed that the resolution in document C 83/LIM/22 is simply an enabling measure. The matter would be considered by the Finance Committee and the Council and the cash surplus would be used only as a last resort. However, the proposal does represent a very significant step down a road that causes us significant difficulties in principle. May I refer to a couple of these difficulties.
In the first place, the proposal does nothing to encourage members to meet their obligations to pay their contributions as soon as possible. Quite the reverse, it gives a signal to members who are in arrears - let us be quite frank, there are a very large number of such members - that the Organization can carry on with its programme even if their contributions continue to be in arrears.
We also have difficulties in proposing yet another device to safeguard the Organization against developments which our own national administrations, to one degree or another, have to cope with. May I refer to a number of safeguard measures that have been implemented or expanded in recent years.
Firstly, the Special Reserve Account. This was established in 1977; it was replenished in 1979, and doubled to 5 percent in 1981. It was also extended to cover unbudgeted extra costs in 1981. Also, we had the introduction of the authority to borrow in 1981. We now have another proposal, which is that the estimated US$ 30 million cash surplus be withheld, a cash surplus which under the existing rules would otherwise revert to members on 1 January 1985.
Is there a necessity for the proposal? The Organization already has a number of devices to safeguard itself against a shortfall in contributions: the Working Capital Fund, the Special Reserve Account, and the authority to borrow. The latter was, of course, approved by the Council after very considerable debate only a couple of years ago. These measures have proved more than sufficient during the last biennium. Indeed, the Organization is currently in a very healthy financial position which has resulted in the cash surplus of US$ 30 million. The only really new development has been the possible amendment to the US State Department authorization bill which is pending before Congress. Of course, we do not know whether the amendment will be passed by Congress, and even if it is, the State Department has discretion in its application. In this respect, the United States has only very recently voted in favour of the FAO Programme of Work and Budget.
Mr Crowther has given us some very interesting projections of other shortfalls that might arise in contributions, and we are very grateful for these. We note that some US$ 40 million of the projected shortfall is attributed to the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, as the representative of that country has explained, the Federal Republic of Germany has always paid its contributions in full before the end of the calendar year.
Similarly, other very pessimistic projections are made about contributions by other members. The Secretariat has also referred to possible unfavourable movements in the lira/dollar exchange rate. Exchange movements are, of course, unpredictable, but we do note that the Secretariat is assuming a
very significant appreciation of the lira against the dollar; thus, the very worse scenario, as I think it was termed, of a deficit at the end of the biennium of US$ 41.6 million. We just cannot see that some US$ 47.8 million of that sum will arise, and we think that a further several million dollars is highly doubtful.
Thus, while appreciating that there are always uncertainties, I cannot see that additional safeguards over and above those that the Organization already has are required. Those already seem adequate even if the authority to borrow is not used.
In summary, may I repeat that Australia believes that all members should meet their obligations in contributions to the budget which they have approved so that the programme they have endorsed can be implemented. We do not think that this proposal encourages members to meet their contributions. We have other difficulties in principle and we are by no means convinced that the Organization does not already have sufficient safeguards to meet any foreseeable shortfall in contributions.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL: I assure you that I am not going to enter into any discussion on the arguments used so far. I want to clarify questions asked principally by the Representative from the Philippines . He referred to Regulation 6.1 (b), but only to the first part. He did not refer to the second part, which says that before the cash surplus is distributed any arrears of contribution shall be set off against it. That refers to the previous year. In other words, in this case before there is a cash surplus of US$ 30 million, or whatever it is going to be, any shortfall in any contributions for 1983 will be set off against that cash surplus before it would be distributed. It so happens that the country to which he referred does still owe us US$ 6.8 million for 1983. We have not taken account of that in the figures that we have given you because we are hoping that it is going to be paid before the end of the year; it may not be, nobody knows. Therefore, even the figures we gave you are optimistic to the extent of another US$ 6.8 million for 1983, not US$ 7.8 million. That is another figure for next year.
In that connection I should point out that in this particular case the repayment of that cash surplus could not be offset against the legislation because the legislation would limit the contributions to the Organization in dollar terms and not in terms of the regulations on what was contribution and what was arrears and what was cash surplus. It would be a dollar level, so it would not help there.
Furthermore, in this connection I want to mention another technical point which has come up. There is no issue of principle involved because Regulation 6.1 (b) already refers to using the cash surplus to offset arrears. The only change here is timing. The Regulation already foresees that shortfalls in contributions have to be set off against cash surplus before it is distributed. We are discussing only a question of timing. However, if the Special Reserve Account and the Working Capital Fund are drawn on, they have to be replenished in another biennium, which means additional assessment on Member Nations. Therefore, somebody is going to lose money, however unjustly. It is a question only of when they lose the money, next year, the year after or the year after that.
P. OLMOS MORALES ( Uruguay): Por ser esta nuestra primera intervención en esta Comisión permítanme expresar nuestras felicitaciones al Presidente y a los Vicepresidentes. Asimismo, expresar nuestro reconocimiento al señor Director General Adjunto por las explicaciones introductorias del tema que en este momento nos ocupa.
Mi delegación ha analizado detalladamente el documento C 83/LIM/22 y el proyecto de Resolución adjunto que se presenta a estudio de esta Comisión.
En ese. aspecto interesa reseñar las situaciones planteadas en cuanto a la situación financiera de nuestra Organización. Evidentemente, hay algunos aspectos que plantean un futuro incierto al cual, efectivamente, los distintos mecanismos vigentes, sea el Fondo de Operaciones, sea la Cuenta Especial de Reservas o la aplicación de la Resolución 2/80 del Consejo por la cual se autorizó al Director General a tomar dinero a préstamo, no nos plantea la seguridad de que efectivamente la situación planteada pueda ser subsanada por estos mecanismos. Por lo tanto, consideramos que los lineamientos planteados en la Resolución a estudio nos brindan una medida de emergencia más frente a la situación que afronta nuestra Organización por la situación de los distintos adeudos de cuotas de 1983, y aun de cuotas de ejercicios anteriores.
En ese sentido nuestra delegación, compartiendo lo expresado por algunos otros colegas que nos precedieron en el uso de la palabra, brinda su apoyo a la Resolución propuesta y destaca que el mecanismo de emergencia que pueda utilizarse permiten flexibilizar las medidas para afrontar la situación presente, o que pueda presentarse en el proximo bienio, de una manera que efectivamente pueda subsanar las condiciones de incertidumbre sobre el futuro del ejercicio 1984/85. Por ese motivo, y compartiendo lo expresado por otras delegaciones, nuestra delegación apoya la Resolución presentada por el Director General.
M. FENWICK ( United States of America): This delegation, too, for the first time speaks in Commission III and I could wish that it were on a happier occasion. In the three days which membership is given to study and deliberate the proposal before us, my Government has reached certain conclusions which I should like to share with you. They are conclusions which, frankly, are not favourable to the proposal before us.
Before explaining the nature of our conclusions and the reason behind them, I wish to make two points clear. We fully recognize the prerogative of the FAO Secretariat to make contingency plans for the future. Prudence and duty and a sense of responsibility require no less. On the other hand, the United States Government, which has been singled out in document C 83/LIM/22 before us, has never been in arrears, and in fact has a record of strong and consistent financial support for this Organization.
The United States Government owes nothing to FAO for any year previous to 1983. For the present year we have already paid over $ 38 million of the $ 45 million payment which FAO assigned to us. Payment of the balance due, $ 6.8 million, will be made in the very near future upon completion of certain formalities, and I am distressed to hear any questioning of this, because we have made it perfectly clear that there is absolutely no chance of the $ 6.8 million not being paid. It only depends on certain formalities. It has nothing to do with the Lugar amendment which is referred to later. This I take very hardly. The FAO will have its $ 45 million, and more, before the end of the year.
It has been the policy of our United States Administration to ask Congress for the funds to meet our assessed commitments, and the Administration has opposed any such legislation.
A small point, but it does make a difference perhaps: in the very preamble of C 83/LIM/22 it speaks of the Department of State Authorization Bill. This is a Congress Bill for an appropriation for the Department of State. It is not a Department of State Bill. That is a very big difference in a democratic society.
I should like to point out - I am afraid I am not going to be very brief - that in 1983 the approximate sum for the whole FAO, this arrangement of it, was $ 180 million. Outstanding there are some $ 34 million for 1983, for arrears of this year and past years. Forty countries have not paid; 74 countries are in arrears, and ours is the only country which has been singled out. It is not the largest part of the $ 34 million which is outstanding, it is $ 6.8 million, and assurance has been given that that will be paid for 1983.
With this record in mind, we must take exception to the blame and the onus that has been placed on the United States Government and on Congress in the proposal and the explanatory memorandum placed before the Conference. As I have said, the United States Government alone is singled out for mention, despite a steady and consistent financial support for this Organization, and despite the fact that potentially - I stress the word "potentially" - we are only a small part of the potential problem. Indeed, we are smaller than indicated in the Secretariat's explanatory memorandum, for the Lugar amendment, if enacted, would apply only to 1984 - not 1983, not 1985, as the paper somewhat seems to suggest.
Let me turn to the reasons for the unfavourable reaction to this proposal. First, my Government - I stress "my Government" - has seriously questioned the need for the proposed enabling resolution for a future need, actual or potential, to authorize the Director-General to have access to the cash surplus from the current biennium.
Despite the information which the Secretariat has placed in our hands - information which I believe its authors would agree is in the "worst possible case" category - we are simply not persuaded that the possibilities of this Organization facing a serious financial problem in the coming biennium are sufficiently great to warrant what can only be described as a major change with complex and far-reaching implications in the financial management of this Organization. It has simply not been demonstrated that there is a realistic likelihood in the next biennium of a shortfall in income which will or is likely to exceed the capacity of the safety nets already in place in the form of the Working Capital Fund and the Special Reserve Account to meet such contingencies.
Secondly, if the worst case contingencies portrayed in the material prepared by the Secretariat and all the interesting economic prophecies that we have heard here this afternoon should materialize and prove too heavy for the mechanisms and safety nets already in place - should these hypotheses become a reality, this Organization is not powerless to respond. There are provisions for action of the Council or a special Conference to allow the Director-General to borrow. The financial management of this Organization is of great importance to all of us, to the Director-General, to the Secretariat, to each and every member. I would not hesitate to describe it as of fundamental importance, and because this is so my Government feels there must be careful deliberation and thought before a major change is made in that management - a change which would seem to rest on a principle my Government cannot accept - that a cash surplus is an asset which an international organization is able to draw on or withhold at its own discretion.
The opportunity for careful and deliberate thought on such a major change which could affect not only FAO but, by extension, every other United Nations Agency is not with us in the time constraints we all face at this Conference.
I do hope that the Conference will decide that there is no reason to bring this matter and decide upon it at this Conference now. If my remarks have been too heated, I apologise, but I do feel we have heard of justice here, we have heard of fairness, and those words are important and compelling. I do not think that this is just.
M. YUSOF bin AHMAD ( Malaysia): In lending its support to the resolution, my delegation would like to echo what other delegations have said on the reason why it is necessary for this resolution to be accepted and approved. Many speakers have emphasized the possible financial problems that may arise as a result of the delay in the submission of contributions due either to genuine inability of the countries, or due to declared policy or practice of some member countries. Many members have also discussed possible measures that might be available in order to meet these possible problems.
As we know, the Director-General can resort to the Working Capital Fund and the Special Reserve Account, but these funds have very distinct uses and may not be able to cover the gap that may be created. To overcome that, the last Conference agreed to delegate the authority of the Council to enable the Director-General to borrow. As we know, the Director-General has never used these measures because he considered this to be a last resort.
Whether or not this need will arise during this biennium depends on how member countries will respond to the call for payment and submission. We do not know what is coming and therefore how to accomodate possible gaos, and to be far-sighted the resolution simply asks the Conference to give authority to the Council to review the situation and to allow the Director-General to borrow if need be.
The resolution does not ask for any action now. Since the next Conference will take place only two years from now, many things could happen which may require the Director-General to take action to ensure that the Programme of Work will not be jeopardized. We are not pre-judging the situation.
Based on the considerations above, my delegation once again reiterates its support for the resolution, and we hope it will get the understanding and the approval of all of us.
J. GLISTRUP (Denmark): We have listened very carefully to the introduction and the deliberations on this Agenda item, and I have the pleasure to speak on behalf of the Nordic Governments: Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark .
The document before us on the financial position of the Organization and payment of assessed contributions for the next biennium touches upon a problem which, regrettably, is of growing importance for the international organizations of the United Nations system.
The Nordic Governments have always emphasized the timely payment of contributions to the FAO and to other United Nations Organizations. Against that background there is reason for concern that an increasing number of Member States find it difficult to meet their obligations on time.
Besides the more general delays in the payment of contributions, document C 83/LIM/22 describes the possibility for decreases in the payment of Member States's assessed contributions. Like other delegations, we would have preferred this issue to have been brought up earlier in the Conference, perhaps parallel with the deliberations on the Programme of Work and Budet for 1984-85. There is not much time left for consideration of the issue, where matters of principle are involved. The outcome of these deliberations will also have an important bearing for other organizations of the United Nations family.
Furthermore, the Director-General is seeking the delegation of authority from the Conference to the Council. At this stage we will only voice our preliminary comments. Therefore, we reserve the right to intervene on this complex subject at a later stage.
We understand that the Secretariat expects that should this hypothetical problem materialize, it will only be a one-time phenomenom. The Nordic countries think the problem is so hypothetical that it does not call for a decision at this stage along the lines which the Director-General is seeking. We have noted that the Member States, for whom non-payment of assessed contributions could occur, have voted in favour of the Programme of Work and Budget for 1984-85. In our opinion, the problems connected with non-payment of contributions and arrears within the coming biennium can, therefore, be solved with the existing mechanisms for which the Director-General already has authority.
With respect to the options proposed by the Director-General in the draft resolution, we would like to say that the authority of the Director-General to borrow is one of the measures which was approved to enable the Organization to cope with such situations should they arise.
With regard to the application of the cash surplus, we think that this proposal in its present formulation might encourage further delay to payments of assessed contributions. This could not be the idea behind the proposal.
As far as the members who have paid their contributions on time are concerned, it is our opinion that a cash surplus, as stated in the Financial Regulations 6.1.b, should be reallocated to these Member States.
A.S. OULD MOLOUD (Mauritanie): Je vous remercie Monsieur le Président. Ce que j'avais à dire a été dit par mes collègues les délégués du Congo et de Cuba . Néanmoins, j'ajouterai tout simplement l'appui de ma délégation en faveur de la résolution qui nous est soumise.
M.B. SY (Sénégal): Puisque notre délégation intervient pour la première fois au sein de votre Commission, je voudrais vous présenter toutes mes félicitations pour votre élection ainsi qu'aux membres du Bureau de la Commission.
A la lecture de la résolution qui nous est soumise j 'étais persuadé qu'aucune discussion n'aurait été suscitée tellement, apparemment, le problème paraissait simple. A la lumière des débats, on se rend compte que les diplomates ont ceci de particulier, ils arrivent à donner au problème le plus clair une dimension nouvelle et fort intéressante .
En tout cas, le Sénégal est tout à fait d'accord pour supporter sans réserve cette résolution parce qu'il est fidèle au principe selon lequel un bon gestionnaire est celui qui prévoit les situations les plus difficiles et je crois qu'il n'est pas nécessaire ici d'insister sur les qualités de gestionnaire du Directeur général de la FAO puisque s'il n'avait pas réalisé les économies dont le sort est aujourd'hui discuté aucun reproche ne lui aurait été fait.
Cela dit, j'ai tout de même quelques observations sur les deux premiers paragraphes de la résolution. Je pense que pour la délégation sénégalaise les arriérés signalés d'un certain nombre d'Etats membres devraient être en tout cas atténués pour que cela n'apparaisse pas comme étant un paradoxe parce que ce qui se passe, c'est que l'on aura constaté que des Etats ne payent pas d'une part, et que d'autre part, l'on demande des sacrifices de bons payeurs. Mais puisque les arriérés,en fait, pour la plupart des Etats, dépendent de situations économiques particulièrement difficiles résultant d'une situation dont la détérioration est liée à divers facteurs que je me réserverai d'analyser ici, je voudrais seulement proposer que l'on ajoute à ce premier paragraphe le fait que la plupart de ces Etats membres sont confrontés avec de sérieuses difficultés économiques et financières.
En ce qui concerne le deuxième paragraphe, au nom du principe selon lequel le Sénégal se refuse à s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures des Etats (et surtout lorsque l'on ne va pas jusqu'au bout du raisonnement) nous souhaiterions quand même une modification au deuxième paragraphe. Il est fait mention d'une manière singulière d'un Etat et malheureusement l'erreur a été relevée et c'est le point favorable: il ne s'agit pas d'un gouvernement d'un pays mais d'un organe législatif.
Ensuite, il y a une seconde préoccupation qui a été soulignée et répétée: un autre pays dont l'organe législatif envisage une mesure qui peut avoir les mêmes répercussions, or cela ne ressort pas de la même résolution. Pour cette raison, le Sénégal pense que l'on aurait pu dire tout autant que certains organes législatifs de certains pays bailleurs de fonds ont pris des initiatives tendant soit à réduire leur contribution, soit à retarder le versement de celle-ci. Nous pensons que ces deux idées fortes pourraient quand même éviter la singularisation d'un pays bien déterminé et permettre de reconnaître l'injustice de la situation que nous craignons.
D'autre part, il est assez étonnant de dire que si le Directeur général rencontre des difficultés, il peut emprunter. Très simplement, en tant que profane, je m'étonne que l'on ait de l'argent bloqué quelque part et que l'on aille emprunter à des taux d'intérêt exorbitants.
En second lieu, on dit: "si la situation se produit, on peut convoquer une session extraordinaire de la Conférence". A partir dece moment, ne peut-on pas se demander à quoi servent les organes de la Conférence que l'on a créés et que tous les Etats ont élus; je veux parler du Conseil et de l'organe pratique de celui-ci, c'est-à-dire le Comité financier. Dès lors qu'un Etat ne peut plus faire confiance à un organe, que tout au moins des Etats ne peuvent plus faire confiance à des organes qu'ils ont créés, je me demande vraiment à quel jeu nous sommes en train de nous livrer.
Je pense qu'à part ces quelques observations que nous avons formulées pour rendre le texte, à notre avis, beaucoup plus juste par rapport aux discussions et aux débats qui se rapportent à ces deux questions, nous approuvons encore une fois, de toutes nos forces, cette résolution qui n'est qu'une garantie comme celle que l'on avait donnée au Directeur de contracter des prêts et qu'il n'a jamais utilisée. Donc il faut seulement souhaiter qu'il ne l'utilise pas mais il faut tout de même prévoir des situations difficiles.
G.E. GONZALEZ (Argentina): Mi Delegación ha escuchado con suma atención la clara y sincera exposición que nos hiciera la Secretaría General y muy particularmente el Sr. West, así como las valiosas intervenciones de las delegaciones, dando argumentos de peso, tanto a favor como en contra, de la conveniencia de aprobar la resolución presentada.
Estimamos que algunas de las dudas planteadas son válidas, y quizá me refiero aquí a lo que dijo la distinguida y muy respetada embajadora de los Estados Unidos. Existe quizá una explicación racional para el por qué se ha mencionado a su país en uno de los documentos que tenemos a nuestro estudio. Pienso - y no estamos tratando de justificar a nadie - que es que el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos era el único para el cual se preparaban estos documentos, porque había anunciado la posibilidad de hacer un recorte en el presupuesto de sus contribuciones a los organismos internacionales.
Pero, señor Presidente, a pesar de la validez de muchas de esas dudas planteadas, la delegación argentina ha llegado a la conclusión de que es justo dar nuestro respaldo al proyecto de resolución que tenemos frente a nosotros por las siguientes razones:
En primer lugar, porque no estamos asumiendo ningún compromiso específico.Tan sólo estamos autorizando al Consejo de la Organización, llegado el caso, a analizar la necesidad y conveniencia de retener una parte o todo el superávit de Tesorería; pero los Estados Miembros de esta Organización continuamos reteniendo el poder y la autoridad política de la decisión.
En segundo lugar, porque creemos que no podemos correr el riesgo de que la Organización deba suspender o cortar el Programa de Labores; aunque confiamos en que no tendremos que llegar a una situación tan extrema o dramática.
Tercero. - porque nos sentimos alentados a que el Consejo no tendrá que enfrentarse a este problema, que no será necesario activar esta resolución, conociendo el espíritu, autoridad y racionalidad administrativa que anima a las autoridades de la Organización. El hecho de que estemos precisamente discutiendo que hacer con un superávit de treinta millones de dólares, creo que es muestra cabal de esta actitud.
Cuarto.- porque confiamos también en que, tanto los grandes como los más pequeños contribuyentes de esta Organización, realizaríamos los esfuerzos necesarios para cumplir con los compromisos que formal y libremente hemos asumido.
Sin embargo, señor Presidente, debo dejar constancia de que apoyamos la resolución, aunque sin ningún entusiasmo. Argentina ha sido siempre reacia a tener que caer en este tipo de disposiciones. Enten-demos que lo justo sería liberar a la Secretaría de este tipo de problemas, pagando todos nuestras cuotas a tiempo y sin tener que crear este tipo de problemas, que pone en peligro, o al menos limita, las actividades de una organización como la FAO; organización que consideramos un instrumento fundamental para el desarrollo de muchos de nuestros países.
Señor Presidente, nosotros no tenemos dudas acerca de la justificación de la existencia de la FAO y continuaremos prestando toda nuestra cooperación hasta el máximo de nuestras posibilidades. Sin embargo, el hecho concreto es que nos podemos ver enfrentados a un problema financiero serio y comprendemos que a la Secretaría no lo queda otro remedio que traerlo a esta Conferencia.
Por ello - y lo repito - daremos nuestro respaldo a la resolución.
M. BENNIS (Maroc): Le document C 83/LIM/22 que nous examinons et qui traite du paiement des contributions ordinaires de l'exercice 1984/85 semble soulever, à notre sens, deux questions de nature différente ou du moins deux questions qui nécessitent des solutions différentes.
En effet, le premier point évoque le risque de voir certains pays réduire leur contribution.
Le deuxième point pose quant à lui le problème des retards dans le versement des contributions par un certain nombre de pays.
En ce qui concerne la réduction de la contribution, déjà au niveau du Conseil, lors de sa dernière session où cette question a été soulevée, ma délégation a lancé un appel auquel se sont d'ailleurs jointes d'autres délégations pour exhorter l'ensemble des Etats Membres à éviter de mettre en difficulté l'avenir de l'action de la FAO, cette Organisation qui a encore beaucoup à faire.
La réduction des contributions pose un problème différent de celui des modalités de leur versement et nécessite en conséquence des solutions différentes.
Pour ce qui est du retard du règlement des contributions qui, en fait, est à l'origine de la résolution qui nous est proposée, nous estimons que la proposition du Directeur général tendant à différer la répartition des excédents de trésorerie et à les utiliser pour couvrir le retard de quelques contributions, nous estimons que cette formule constitue effectivement une solution de circonstance. Or, comme nous l'a expliqué M. West tout à l'heure dans son introduction, chaque fonds et chaque compte ont leur destination spécifique. Il en est ainsi du Fonds de roulement comme du Fonds de réserve spécial. Il devra en être de même des excédents de trésorerie.
La solution proposée, bien qu'elle pénalise ceux qui font l'effort de remplir leurs engagements de contribution dans les délais impartis, mérite cependant d'être appuyée dans la mesure où elle représente un palliatif provisoire au problème. Mais cette mesure ne doit pas, en fin de compte, encourager les retardataires dans leur comportement, bien que pour beaucoup de pays, le retard soit dû essentiellement aux difficultés économiques auxquelles ils se heurtent. Il s'agit donc pour ceux-là presque d'un cas de force majeure qui doit susciter la compréhension.
C'est pourquoi, Monsieur le Président, la mesure qui nous est proposée semble convenable puisqu'elle devra assurer un simple relais provisoire destiné à soulager temporairement les pays en difficulté sur le plan économique, mais elle ne devra pas servir, pensons-nous, à couvrir les réductions de contribution décidées pour toute autre considération.
Elle ne devra pas non plus servir à faire face aux paiements délibérément en retard pratiqués par certains contribuants importants.
On peut d'ailleurs, pour ces cas déplorables, rechercher d'autres solutions, mais de toute manière, nous estimons que 1 utilisation des excédents de trésorerie est de nature à permettre de réaliser, avec le moins de difficultés possible, la mise en oeuvre du Programme de travail et budget que nous avons retenu à l'unanimité.
Cette mesure mérite donc notre soutien, d'autant plus qu'il s'agit en fait de confier au Conseil le soin de permettre d'y avoir recours en cas de besoin seulement et après un nouvel examen de la situation. Il s'agit donc d'une mesure conservatoire qui reçoit tout notre appui.
LE PRESIDENT: Nous sommes ainsi arrivés à la fin de la séance d'aujourd'hui et je vous souhaite un bon week-end.
The meeting rose at 17.55 hours
La séance est levée à 17 h 55
Se levanta la sesión a las 17.55 horas
