The authors are with the Overseas Development Group, School of
Development Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK. Fax: +44 1603
505262;
e-mail: [email protected]
This research was funded by the Department for International Development of the United
Kingdom. However, the Department for International Development can accept no
responsibility for any information provided or views expressed.
Le pr�sent document a pour objectif de stimuler le d�bat et de
clarifier les questions li�es � la participation des communaut�s � la lutte contre la
mouche ts�-ts� en utilisant des pi�ges et des cibles. Un cadre est fourni afin de
faciliter la planification du programme. En int�grant diff�rents niveaux et types de
participation et un certain nombre d'�ventuels partenaires, le cadre apporte une s�rie
d'options � prendre en compte. Le d�fi que doivent relever les planificateurs est de
faire co�ncider l'objectif g�n�ral, �radication ou suppression, avec les aspects
techniques de la lutte et les param�tres sociaux, institutionnels et �conomiques, afin
de mettre au point un programme durable.
Les incidences que les politiques d'�radication ou de suppression peuvent avoir sur la
composition des partenariats font l'objet d'un examen. Un certain nombre de variables
incluant les objectifs g�n�raux, les priorit�s de d�veloppement, la densit� et la
r�partition des populations humaines et animales, la capacit� organisationnelle des
communaut�s et la taille propos�e de la zone de contr�le seront d�terminantes pour les
gouvernements, les organisations non gouvernementales et les individus lorsqu'il s'agira
de d�cider de lancer un programme de lutte contre la mouche ts�-ts� - ou d'y
participer. Sur la base d'�tudes de cas, le pr�sent document conclut que l'engagement
envers la participation communautaire a �t� bien faible. Toutefois, il est �vident que
la participation communautaire ne constitue pas une strat�gie d'ensemble appropri�e en
mati�re de lutte contre la mouche ts�-ts� m�me si elle peut �tre r�alisable dans
certains contextes. Une strat�gie plus durable consisterait vraisemblablement � faire
intervenir des partenariats des diff�rentes parties prenantes. Une vision claire de la
mani�re dont ces partenariats peuvent fonctionner et des avantages attendus tels que
per�us par chacun des partenaires est n�cessaire.
El presente art�culo tiene por objeto aclarar los problemas en relaci�n con la participaci�n comunitaria en la lucha contra la mosca ts� ts� utilizando trampas y blancos. Se proporciona un marco para facilitar la planificaci�n de los programas. Mediante la incorporaci�n de diversos niveles y tipos de participaci�n y una serie de posibles socios, el marco permite plantear diversas opciones. El problema para los planificadores est� en hacer coincidir el objetivo de la pol�tica general, erradicaci�n o supresi�n, con los aspectos t�cnicos de la lucha y los par�metros sociales, institucionales y econ�micos, para llegar a un programa sostenible. Se examinan las repercusiones de las pol�ticas alternativas de erradicaci�n y supresi�n de la mosca ts� ts� para la formaci�n de asociaciones. Hay una serie de variables, entre ellas los objetivos de las pol�ticas generales, las prioridades de desarrollo, la densidad de distribuci�n de la poblaci�n humana y pecuaria, la capacidad de organizaci�n de las comunidades y el tama�o propuesto de la zona de lucha, que determinan las decisiones en cuanto al comienzo de una lucha contra la mosca ts� ts� de car�cter comunitario o la participaci�n en ella de los gobiernos, las organizaciones no gubernamentales, las comunidades y los particulares. Tomando como base estudios monogr�ficos, en el art�culo se llega a la conclusi�n de que el compromiso en relaci�n con la participaci�n comunitaria ha sido escaso. No obstante, es evidente que dicha participaci�n no es una estrategia global apropiada para la lucha contra la mosca ts� ts�.
The objective of this paper is to stimulate debate on the factors that determine when, where and how it might be appropriate to involve communities in tsetse control operations. Its purpose is not, therefore, to advocate community participation in all situations but rather to provide a framework to facilitate decision-making.
In recent years the participation of local communities in tsetse control
has been widely promoted and is even a prerequisite for funding by many donors. This
emphasis on community management of tsetse control reflects policy changes in other areas
of natural resource management where communal resources are involved. However, in the case
of tsetse control, little attention has been paid to the context within which community
participation is expected to operate and to the appropriateness of participation as a
strategy in different contexts. The discussion has focused on technical issues, and not
only have community aspects been overlooked but the role and capacity of other partners
which are necessarily involved in any control exercise have also been ignored and/or taken
for granted.
This article explores these issues in cases where traps and targets are the principal
technologies being proposed for tsetse control. Although some other technologies have also
been implemented with a degree of community participation, the specific properties of
traps and targets and their use raise a number of unique issues, such as the necessity for
a coordinated group effort, since individual action has been ineffective. The article
therefore pays particular attention to how programmes have approached this problem,
although much of the discussion will be equally applicable to other situations where
community involvement is under consideration. It begins with a brief overview of
programmes with an element of community participation, followed by a discussion of
variables to be considered in determining appropriate strategies and developing action
plans based on task sharing by the various partners involved. It concludes by highlighting
major concerns and suggests how the planning process might move forward.
The discussion is based on documentation from the FAO Regional Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis
Control Programme (RTTCP) and individual tsetse control pro-grammes in sub-Saharan Africa
in addition to the authors' own ongoing comparative study in Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. Information on projects visited during the course of this study is provided in
Table 1.
1a
Characteristics of projects studied
Caract�ristiques des projets �tudi�s
Caracter�sticas de los proyectos estudiados
Project |
Kalobolelwa, Western Province Zambia, 1992-1994 |
Zambezi Islands, Western Province, Zambia 1990-1997 |
Msanzar, Eastern Province, Zambia 1995 onwards |
Lambwe Valley, Kenya 1992 onwards |
Busia, Kenya 1992-1996 |
Institutions: Implementor (I) and Funder (F) |
I: LDP and DVTCS F: Netherlands Govt. |
I: LDP and DVTCS F: Netherlands Govt. |
I: ASVEZA-East and DVTCS F: RTTCP, ASVEZA |
I: ICIPE F: ODA (1992-96) |
I: KETRI F: WHO |
Project area/previous control |
Discrete area 50 km from barrier maintained by contractors |
3 islands in Zambezi River adjacent to existing barrier |
Previous trial in adjacent area (Mvuvye), with maintenance by employed staff |
Technology tested in area from 1990 |
Previous control by govt., covering 6 villages. Current stage covers 2 villages |
Tsetse |
G. morsitans centralis |
G. morsitans centralis |
G. morsitans morsitans |
G. pallidipes |
G. fuscipes fuscipes |
Technology |
656 targets - 10/km2 grazing areas, 4/km2 other areas |
122, 60 and 20 targets on 3 islands, respectively |
c. 3 625 targets at an average density of 4/km2 |
64 NGU traps in thicket, 40 along park edge, 524 planned |
40 pyramidal traps near each village in previous stage 60 near the two villages in current stage |
Control area |
140 km2 (7 x 20 km) |
3 islands |
930 km2 |
100 km2 |
2 villages - 10 and 15 km2 |
Partner contributions |
Cash from cattle owners Free community labour for deployment and maintenance |
Free materials from project Free community labour for deployment and maintenance |
Free materials and facilitators from project Free community labour for deployment and maintenance |
Cash from community Free community labour for construction, deployment and maintenance |
Cash from community Free community labour for construction, deployment and maintenance |
Local organization involved |
Existing crushpen associations |
Liaison with village head |
Committees set up to mobilize community |
Committee created to coordinate activities |
Committee created to coordinate activities |
Incentives for local participation |
Free Berenil for positive cases |
Mobile health clinic and cheap drugs |
|||
Population, households, villages |
Villages: 20 |
Total population: 1 365 Villages: 1, 2 and 7 (on 3 separate islands) |
Total population: 63 141 Households: 14 093 Villages: 269 |
Total population: 12 000 Homesteads: 1 212 |
Households: 464 and 442 |
Cattle ownership and numbers |
Cattle owners: 41 Cattle: 300 |
Cattle owners: 58 Cattle: 1 022 |
Cattle owners: 844 Cattle 4 257 (5.4% of households) |
Cattle: 22 600 (78.8% of households) |
Cattle owners: 52% of households |
1b
Characteristics of projects studied
Caract�ristiques des projets �tudi�s
Caracter�sticas de los proyectos estudiados
Project |
Southeastern Uganda 1987 onwards |
Bukooli County, Uganda 1993 onwards |
Zimbabwe 1994 onwards |
Okavango Delta, Botswana 1995 onwards |
Institutions: Implementor (I) and Funder (F) |
I: Ugandan Govt. depts (COCTU) F: EU, Ugandan Govt. |
I: LIRI (UTRO) |
I: Zimbabwe Govt. |
I: Botswana Govt. |
Project area/previous control |
Much previous control in area |
Pilot project in 2 subcounties, 1988-1992. Now covers whole county |
Much previous control, including aerial spraying |
Previous control includes aerial spraying |
Tsetse |
G. fuscipes fuscipes |
G. fuscipes fuscipes |
G. pallidipes and G. morsitans morsitans |
G. morsitans centralis |
Technology |
6 000 pyramidal traps in Oct. 1996; 16 000 in 1993 |
c. 100 monoscreen traps plus 100 tree targets in October 1996 |
c. 70 000 swinger targets at average density of 4/km2 |
17 000 targets in grid pattern, around or along centre of islands |
Control area |
8-4/km2 Parts of 6 districts |
375 km2 |
Along northern borders |
Delta area |
Partner contributions |
Paid labour for construction and maintenance of traps |
Individuals and groups encouraged to buy materials, make and deploy own traps |
Some community sensitization to reduce theft/vandalism |
No community involvement |
Local organization involved |
Committees to monitor trap maintenance |
No organization Individual activities |
No organization |
No organization |
Incentives for local participation |
Community workers paid for construction and maintenance |
|||
Population, households, villages |
Average population density: 100/km2 |
Total population: 239 000 |
Small population to service tourism |
|
Cattle ownership and numbers |
No cattle in Delta |
Numerous programmes can be or are listed as community tsetse control programmes with the earliest beginning in the mid 1980s, for example in Bouenza region, the Congo (Gouteux et al, 1989), and new programmes are about to be initiated through the European Union-funded East Africa regional programme. As national governments in Africa continue to face financial crises which limit both staffing and recurrent funding, the call for community-driven programmes is likely to continue.
Tsetse control programmes using traps and targets which have been
initiated to date have involved local populations in various ways. These include the
creation of local awareness about the problems of tsetse and trypanosomiasis and the
function of the technology in order to reduce theft and vandalism (Ghibe Valley,
Ethiopia); the provision of traps and targets or component materials by governments or
other agencies, with local communities undertaking partial or total responsibility for
trap and target construction, deployment and maintenance (Msanzara, Zambia and Vavoua,
C�te d'Ivoire); the employment of local people to deploy or maintain the technology
(southeastern Uganda); the hiring of private contractors to maintain target barriers
(Senanga West, Zambia); the provision of technical assistance following local requests,
with community responsibility for financing control measures and undertaking all
de-ployment and maintenance activities with minimal out-side facilitation and support
(Lambwe Valley, Kenya). Although all these types of participation have been used, the most
common scenario entails local provision of labour for trap and target maintenance.
Table 2 presents the range of contributions from local populations and links community
participation levels with the type of external assistance necessary. In large part, the
contributions expected from communities have been minimal and this is acknowledged by
communities themselves. In interviews few complained of onerous duties, even though
individuals are rarely paid for contributing labour. The most common community-level tasks
have been to organize meetings to mobilize villagers to participate in maintenance
sessions or to appoint individuals who would contribute labour for maintenance either with
or without assistance from technical support staff.
2
Level and type of participation by communities and partners
Niveau et type de participation des communaut�s et des partenaires
Nivel y tipo de participaci�n de las comunidades y los socios
Level of external involvement and organization required |
Type of external support |
Type of community participation/contributions |
Level of community participation and organization required |
Mininum |
Training and information |
Make decisions on control methods, implement and coordinate all activities |
Maximum |
Inputs provided free |
Financial contribution towards traps/targets or components |
||
Inputs supplied with costs wholly or partially recuperated |
Provide free labour |
||
Local people hired |
Provide paid labour |
||
Maximum |
All inputs supplied and work undertaken by government staff |
Tolerate technology in local area |
Minimum |
Note: The type of organization required for providing each of the inputs from both external institutions (government or other) and communities will vary.
Several programmes have required communities to make financial
contributions to cover, either wholly or partially, the cost of the traps and targets in
addition to placing and maintaining traps in the field - Lambwe Valley, Kenya (Ssennyonga,
1994); Busia, Kenya (Echessah et al., 1997); Kalobolelwa, Zambia (Dietvorst, 1995)
and Bukooli County, Uganda (Okoth, personal communication). Materials are then made
available for purchase by the technical agency involved, the only exception being the
project in Bukooli County, Uganda, where the traps are manufactured from locally available
materials. Furthermore, it is rare for community members to have any significant input
into decision-making about where traps and targets should be placed. In the Lambwe Valley
the initial trap placement strategy was designed by researchers and, following community
training, trap deployment decisions were made by the community. And in Bukooli County,
Uganda, although advice is offered by technical staff, location decisions are made at an
individual rather than at a community level.
In general, the experience has been one of partnerships between public agencies and
communities, with a considerable financial and technical burden continuing to be met by
government, frequently with donor funds (Table 1). Thus, government personnel (livestock
extension staff and veterinarians) provide training and technical information and, in most
programmes, they also frequently provide materials for the traps and targets, while in
others they also maintain them.
Alternative partners have rarely been considered and indeed are not discussed. The case of
Zambia (initially in Western Province but now also in other areas) is unique in the extent
to which it is involving the private sector in target maintenance (Thakersi, 1996). Here,
barrier maintenance has been contracted out by the government. Elsewhere there are plans
or discussions to broaden participation and include other partners, such as tour companies
(in Zimbabwe and Botswana). If it is reasonable to expect participation from others
benefiting from enhanced resource access and use, the potential would also seem to exist
for including second-tier beneficiaries such as crop and livestock merchants and
associations. Such possibilities have yet to be seriously explored in any location.
Nevertheless, most of the discussion and debate is about community involvement and the
ability of local populations to organize themselves and to make a long-term commitment to
control operations. There are few instances where communities have organized themselves
for this particular activity.
The Lambwe Valley Project, supported by the International Centre of Insect Physiology and
Ecology (ICIPE), has paid most attention to community organization and this was
necessitated by the fact that community members were expected to pay for and implement a
tsetse control programme (Omolo et al., 1995) and there has been a clear commitment
to sustainability beyond the project life. Other organizational forms used for tsetse
control are detailed in Table 1. The most usual practice has been either to make use of
existing community or village committees or to create dedicated "tsetse"
committees which then appoint individuals to participate in maintenance sessions or are
responsible for mobilizing as many villagers as possible to join in with these sessions.
The responsibilities of such committees rarely extend to decision-making on other aspects
of the control pro-grammes. As indicated in Table 2, only minimal levels of local and
government organization are likely to be re-quired where their respective contributions
are minimal.
In spite of the apparent growing interest in community participation and the number of projects that have already been implemented, it is difficult to learn from the experience, much of which has been gained within a project context with uncertain and even only short-term funding. The area and number of communities involved have been comparatively small (given the tsetse-infested area as a whole), and the level of community involvement has been minimal (Table 2). Nevertheless, the main questions raised in the literature relate to the ability of local populations to sustain their interest over time and the willingness of members to make financial and other contributions in a situation where freeriders can benefit (Swallow and Woudyalew, 1994).
There are certainly instances where after a period traps and targets have not been maintained, including at Nguruman (one of the most well-known experiences) and in Bouenza region, the Congo. While the specific problems associated with each of these apparent failures will not be discussed in this article, they raise questions about factors likely to sustain community-level participation. Planners need to consider the various factors that should guide decision-making about types and levels of participation by different partners. Here we look at three levels - community, individual and district/national (Table 3), although there are others that should also be considered. Although some variables are relevant at more than one level, we suggest that only one variable, human health, is likely to be relevant at all three levels.
3
Significant variables determining decisions to initiate or participate in community-based
tsetse control programmes
Principales variables d�terminant les d�cisions de lancer ou de participer � des
programmes communautaires de lutte contre la mouche ts�-ts�
Variables significativas determinantes de decisiones de iniciar programas de lucha contra
la mosca ts� ts� de car�cter comunitario o de participar en ellos
Variables |
Levels of decision-making |
||
District/national |
Community |
Individual |
|
Overall policy objectives |
X |
||
Previous experience of external assistance |
X |
X |
|
Links with outside agencies |
X |
||
Population density/distribution/movement |
X |
||
Alternative disease management strategies |
X |
||
Costs: |
|||
- Technical advice |
X |
||
- Cash |
X |
||
- Labour |
X |
||
- An organization |
X |
||
Perceived immediate and future benefits: |
|||
- Human health |
X |
X |
X |
- More land |
X |
||
- More livestock |
X |
||
- More productive livestock |
X |
||
- Status/power |
X |
||
- Fly-free environment |
X |
||
Public pressure |
X |
||
Development priorities |
X |
X |
Note: A cross indicates a strong association; the individual and community levels may coincide, for example in the case of a "livestock-owning village".
We have suggested a number of variables determining decision-making at different levels regarding community participation in tsetse control programmes (Table 3). Only the most significant ones are discussed here although it is difficult to discuss variables as though they are independent of one another.
A significant variable used to justify programmes in western Kenya and
southeastern Uganda is the incidence of sleeping sickness and, in locations where serious
outbreaks of this disease have occurred within living memory, this would logically provide
a major incentive for community action. Outside these locations, it is not easy to
identify similar incentives which might mobilize the whole population. At the level of
whole communities, we have suggested that a desire for continued outside linkages is an
important incentive, although development priorities and existing commitments to these are
likely to determine the types and levels of participation.
In all the study areas, cattle ownership (but also in some instances the ownership of
other livestock) was indicated as a significant variable determining individual
willingness to contribute but it is not clear what level of ownership might be linked with
specific contributions. For example, in the Msanzara trial in Zambia, even though only 5.4
percent of households own cattle, expected community contributions were met. However, only
a minimal level of contribution (free labour) is required and participation is still not
widespread throughout the community. In general, however, it might be expected
that the larger the proportion of livestock owners within a community the greater the
community incentive to contribute - and this is supported by the findings reported
in Swallow and Woudyalew (1994). However, what we might refer to as "livestock
communities" living in tsetse-infested areas - where the majority of households
either own or are largely dependent on cattle for their livelihood security - will already
have a means of addressing the problem, and the costs and benefits of these alternative
strategies will obviously influence their decisions to participate.
In our framework, we have suggested that contributions may reflect a more general
expectation of future benefits - more livestock and more draught power, meat and milk. It
may also reflect satisfaction with a fly-free environment (a conclusion from our own work
and also that of others) but also, perhaps even more simply, a reflection of the impact of
community pressure.
Nevertheless, all our research also suggests that previous experience of externally
initiated development action is an important variable which determines willingness to
contribute, and Swallow and Woudyalew (1994) attribute at least some of their positive
response to the interest of local people in being more involved in the activities of the
research institute (the International Livestock Centre for Africa).
As already noted, the broader discussion in the literature on community participation has
revolved around the willingness of individual community members to make financial
contributions towards an activity which has a large public good element. Unfortunately,
examples where substantial contributions have been made are few largely because in most
instances it is argued by the project organizers themselves that local populations are not
in a position to contribute. Hence, communities are often given incentives to participate
- such as free cattle treatment or payment for labour - and the contributions sought are
minimal (Table 1). However, the sustainability of this approach is dependent on the
ongoing provision of materials and other inputs by governments and donors. Survey data
from the Ghibe Valley in Ethiopia demonstrated a large expressed willingness to contribute
- only 3 percent of the sample volunteered neither money nor labour (Swallow and
Woudyalew, 1994). A study carried out in Busia, Kenya, arrived at a similar percentage - 4
(Echessah et al., 1997). However, it is noteworthy that in Busia, actual
contributions were lower than those pledged (Mwangi, 1996).
Much of the evidence to support or refute arguments about financial and other
contributions is based on premises about individual motivation and choice and the
extent to which individual "self interest can undermine the effectiveness of
voluntary organizations or community natural resource management" (Uphoff, 1996, p.
328). Using the work of others and the experience from Gal Oya in Sri Lanka, Uphoff argues
for an alternative scenario to one which predicts "tragic outcomes" following
from individuals deriving benefits at the expense of others (i.e. freeriding). These
alternative outcomes are based on the assumptions that individuals are motivated by
cooperation and generosity rather than by individualism and self-interest, and that
individual choice is determined partly by the situation in which decisions are being
taken: whether there is communication and anticipation of future communication between the
actors, including "some capacity to promise, threaten, cajole or retaliate"
(Ostrom, 1986 in Uphoff, 1996, p. 355). He agrees with the conclusions of others that
"if an activity produces benefits greater than the cost of the individual's
contribution, a rational chooser gains more by proceeding on the assumption that others -
at least most or a sufficient number of others - will similarly recognize the advantage of
the first alternative and accordingly participate in collective action" (p. 353). Our
own surveys in general support these alternative arguments, which predict freeriding but
not to the exclusion of voluntary collective action for improving people's well-being.
The question of the overall objective of tsetse control - eradication or suppression - has significant implications for issues of participation and this objective is usually incorporated into a national tsetse control strategy. Although it appears to be widely appreciated that the eradication of the tsetse fly is both technically difficult in large areas of the tsetse belt and financially out of the reach of most countries affected by human and animal trypanosomiasis, eradication continues to be the implicit objective of many programmes (Barrett, 1997). Given this objective, a number of considerations automatically follow.
First, all the available evidence (Barrett, 1994) suggests that the
financial cost is likely to be far greater than the economic benefits to the communities
located in close proximity to the area where "a holding operation" is likely to
be initiated, while the area threatened is likely to be much wider than that covered by
the immediate location of the barrier and/or control operations. This would appear to
exclude any plan to seek financial contributions from local populations without also
considering measures for taxing communities at risk but located further from the area of
greatest challenge.
Second, the length of the barrier through often uninhabited areas rules out communal
labour contributions although local people might be hired for pay. In the case of Western
Province, Zambia, for example, the barrier consists of approximately 6 000 targets
covering a length of 200 km, much of it through very sparsely populated areas. In Zimbabwe
many of the targets are located in uninhabited areas.
Third, it is unrealistic to expect communities to take responsibility for a function that
meets the needs of a national strategy but is not necessarily in line with their own
objectives. An eradication policy may satisfy national or regional livestock and
agricultural objectives but is likely to exceed by far the expectations and needs of local
communities.
The range of options for community participation widens once the objective shifts from
eradication to suppression. The greater the contributions expected from communities, the
more they should be able to determine the desired level of suppression, which will be a
function of the resources - labour, time and money - they are able and wish to invest as
well as of their satisfaction with the level of fly and trypanosomiasis reduction.
Beyond these issues of policy, we can hypothesize about the other most important
variables which are likely to - or should - influence national or district decisions to
involve communities directly in a tsetse control programme (Table 3). As indicated above,
population density, distribution and movement are important if communities are expected to
provide labour to maintain traps or targets over a wide geographical area. In areas with
very low population densities and/or widely distributed inhabitants, participation in trap
or target maintenance will be more difficult: travel time is increased and control over
theft and vandalism is almost impossible to maintain. However, the layout and density of
traps and targets compared with population distribution and the extent to which the
location is on a major route for others will be the important considerations.
Making land available for livestock has certainly directed thinking around past programmes
but cannot logically involve populations which are not already there but may move in once
tsetse challenge has been reduced. The risk of human sleeping sickness is another factor
which will significantly influence national level considerations regarding tsetse control.
Such disease prevention efforts will undoubtedly require the coordination of a number of
government agencies, as happens in Uganda under the auspices of the Coordinating Office
for Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU).
Despite the new philosophy of local participation in tsetse control, this review has demonstrated an apparent lack of serious commitment to the possible gains from community participation. Since most tsetse control projects were designed by veterinarians and/or entomologists with little, if any, input from social scientists or trained extension staff, certainly few technical staff are convinced that control by local populations using traps and targets can be achieved and sustained as well as it can by other partners. Some reluctance stems from the understanding by technical staff of what is referred to in development studies as "local agency" (Long and Long, 1992) which leads to local populations changing the implementation of the technology in line with local objectives and understandings. Further hesitation by technical staff possibly arises out of an appreciation on their part of the gaps in knowledge relating to the impact of this technology on trypanosomiasis in varying situations but also of the complexity of implementing an apparently simple tool such as traps and targets.
One of the outcomes of this lack of commitment is the continued absence
of input from individuals with community organization skills and there appears to be
little intention of addressing this shortfall (e.g. the new RTTCP-sponsored M.Sc. course
in Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Control will barely cover this topic). The Bukooli County
programme in Uganda appears to be unique in this respect. This Livestock Health Research
Institute (previously UTRO) project uses existing community workers alongside the
technical staff to ensure that social issues are incorporated into control efforts from
the outset. Associated with this gap is the lack of emphasis on local organizational
capacity, which is critical to the continuation of activities beyond the lifetime of
projects (Mitti, Drinkwater and Kalonge, 1997) but is also essential for providing
incentives and guarantees that all or a sufficient number of people will contribute
towards the creation of a public good (Uphoff, 1996).
We would suggest that another outcome is the refusal to address the need to institute
self-financing programmes from the outset even in situations where it is known that
livestock keepers are already self-financing trypanocidal drugs, which is the case in most
countries.
Nevertheless, we have argued in this article that it is not realistic to adopt an overall
strategy of community participation. As a planning process, a decision has first to be
taken about the objective of the control strategy: eradication or suppression. Although
there is verbal agreement in most countries that suppression is now the only realistic
option, we have suggested that there continues to be confusion over required or possible
suppression levels and that this has implications for community involvement. It would seem
to be essential to accept that this will be determined by communities themselves if they
have any considerable input into and control over the operation. The next decision,
possibly to be taken at a different level, relates to technical options for different
types of locations - and the associated tasks, needs and requirements with, possibly,
different levels of suppression. With these in mind, the full range of possible partners
and stakeholders can be defined and an analysis of likely incentives required for reaching
different levels of involvement by these different stakeholders. Using this approach,
planners might arrive at a whole series of partnerships - some possibly even excluding
community participation - and a whole range of sites where control programmes can be
initiated.
Although traps and targets are now in use in a variety of locations, they are not
constructed or deployed in the same way in each situation, so maintenance requirements
differ. Research continues to be carried out on all these variables and there would still
seem to be considerable room for manoeuvre. These technical considerations must be part of
any understanding about the participation of local populations in tsetse control, since
the level of responsibility for implementation by local communities and/or others is
likely to determine the extent to which the technology will be implemented as a whole
package and what changes, if any, are likely to be made.
The design and implementation of a tsetse control strategy also requires consideration of
a whole range of other factors, including land use planning. Although such issues are
beyond the remit of this paper, it is worth noting that where land use plans have been
drawn up in order to maximize the benefits of tsetse control while minimizing potentially
damaging environmental consequences, plans have largely been made without any serious
consideration being given to local knowledge and experience. In general, therefore, local
communities in these locations are required to manage the resources within a framework of
controls and restrictions reflecting the needs and interests of other groups. A number of
the points raised in this paper, therefore, about the role of different stakeholders in
tsetse control generally are also applicable to the issue of land use planning.
Following this planning scenario, a national priority-setting exercise for tsetse control
is one that takes into account the fact that different decisions will be taken at
different levels. Once suppression is the policy and different stakeholders are involved,
there is no single set of objectives and no necessity for a single ranking of sites where
tsetse control will be carried out. Indeed, the priority would seem to be to prepare and
disseminate information, including clear guidelines for decision-making at different
levels. In an era of decentralization, the desired and possible level of suppression would
obviously also vary depending on local development priorities and a successful
community-based tsetse control programme might be indicated by its eventual incorporation
into the local development plan.
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