Comparaison entre les modes de faire-valoir coutumiers et les systèmes de fermage: agriculture et développement en Zambie
Le système foncier en Zambie reste toujours dominé par une classification héritée de l'époque coloniale: le domaine national, les réserves, et le fidéicommis. A la suite de nombreux abus, le gouvernement a introduit, en 1975, une réforme foncière radicale qui élimine la propriété privée, ferme les agences immobilières, et met toutes les terres sous le contrôle du Président. Cette réforme était populaire à l'époque, mais le gouvernement considère maintenant un autre type de réforme fondé sur la propriété privée. La tenure coutumière continue de dominer l'accès aux réserves et aux domaines sous fidéicommis. Tandis que les réformes pour favoriser la propriété privée sur les réserves et les terres sous fidéicommis sont débattues, il faut veiller à empêcher les abus commis par des spéculateurs urbains, mieux éduqués et disposant de meilleures relations, au détriment de la population paysanne.
Comparación de la tenencia consuetudinaria y de arrendamiento: agricultura y desarrollo en Zambia
El sistema de tenencia en Zambia sigue estando caracterizado por una clasificación heredada de la época colonial: propiedad pública, reservas y fideicomiso. Como consecuencia de diversos abusos, el Gobierno introdujo en 1975 una reforma radical de la tenencia, por la que se eliminó la propiedad privada, se cerraron las agencias inmobiliarias y todas las tierras se pusieron bajo el control del Presidente. Esta reforma fue popular en su momento, pero el Gobierno está estudiando ahora otro tipo de reforma, basada en la propiedad privada. La tenencia consuetudinaria sigue predominando sobre las reservas y los terrenos en fideicomiso. Mientras se debaten las reformas para favorecer la propiedad privada sobre las reservas y los terrenos en fideicomiso, hay que vigilar para impedir los abusos de los especuladores urbanos, más instruidos y que disponen de mejores relaciones, en detrimento de los campesinos.
Vernon R.N. Chinene, Fabian Maimbo, Diana J. Banda
University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia
Ministry of Lands, Ndola, Zambia
Land tenure in Zambia continues to be classified as in colonial times, with three categories: State land, reserves and trust land. Because of the high level of abuse, the government introduced radical land reform in 1975, eliminating private property, closing down the estate agents and placing all land under the control of the President. This reform was well received at the time, but the government is now considering a different type of reform based on private ownership. Customary tenure continues to govern access to reserves and trust land. While the debate on reform to facilitate the private ownership of reserves and trust land continues, care needs to be taken to prevent better-educated and better-connected urban speculators from abusing the situation at the expense of the rural population.
Zambia has complex land tenure systems characterized by three categories of land: State land (formerly Crown land during the colonial era), reserves (formerly "native reserves") and trust land (formerly "native trust land"). The land tenure system in State land is based on the principles of English land law, whereas in the reserves and trust land, customary land tenure applies. In 29 years of independence, the land tenure system on State land has undergone reforms, but it still retains the basic characteristics of English land law. The two land tenure systems obtaining in Zambia today are different both in principle and in practice.
The administration of land issues is critical in determining the pace of advancement towards Zambia's long-term goal, which is to make agriculture the mainstay of the national economy. There is general agreement that the present land tenure rules are not providing the necessary enabling environment for agricultural development, particularly in rural areas. There is also great concern about conservation and environmental issues.
Following the change of government and the liberalization of economic policy in 1991, land policy has come under review, and major land reforms are being advocated for several reasons. First, land rights in reserves and trust land are not registered and are therefore not sufficiently secure for long-term investment. Second, preconditions are imposed before provision of leasehold tenure in reserves and trust land, titling procedures are cumbersome and surveying services are limited. Third, the State imposes compulsory conditions on land transactions and retains the right to repossess land. Fourth, the current system discriminates against women. Finally, amounts of unused land are increasing because of land degradation and abuse of land resources.
This article reviews the evolution of the land tenure systems in Zambia and presents a conceptual and empirical comparison of customary and leasehold tenure, with a view towards addressing land policy and institutional constraints to agricultural development.
In the period before colonialism, land was governed by customary law - a host of tribal laws existing in different tribal customs. Land was the most treasured possession for it was the basis of life itself. The amount of land under cultivation was small. Land was never viewed as a saleable commodity. Although landownership was communal, systems of regulation of communal rights existed. The general character of customary tenure was maintained during colonialism but evolved under the influence of population pressure, intensification and commercialization of agriculture, improvement of farming methods and sensitivity of the authorities to land degradation.
From the outset, colonialists and their institutions took the view that customary law was an inferior and undeveloped legal system. Custom was recognized as law only when it was found not to conflict with written law.
In 1928, two categories of land were created: Crown land and native reserves. Crown land consisted of land reserved for European settlements and mining. In these areas, freehold tenure was applied as prescribed in English law. The reserves were vested in the Secretary of State for Colonies for the sole and exclusive occupation by the natives in perpetuity. The concept of reserves was subsequently found unsuitable for both the Africans and the Europeans, but for different reasons. The Africans resisted the concept because the reserves were overcrowded and impoverished. The Europeans wanted access to larger areas of land, which resulted in resentment of colonial rule by the Africans.
The colonial administration responded to the demands of the European settlers by introducing the concept of native trust land. Under this arrangement, all unalienated land (i.e. land not categorized as either Crown land or native reserve) that was suitable for non-native settlement or that contained mineral deposits was brought into the category of Crown land; the remainder was categorized as native trust land. On both native reserves and trust land, land administration was governed by customary law. The difference was that on trust land, the Secretary of State for Colonies could grant rights of occupancy to non-natives, whereas reserve land was for the exclusive settlement of native Africans. The reservation of the good fertile land for the exclusive settlement of whites provided the impetus for the independence struggle, especially in predominantly agricultural areas such as Southern Province.
At independence in 1964, Crown land was renamed State land and the reserves and trust land were retained. All land in Zambia (except the Barotse reserve) was vested in the President for and on behalf of the people of Zambia. English law continued to apply to State land while customary law continued to apply to reserves and trust land. The policy of land reservation through the concept of native reserves and trust land did not apply in Barotseland. The Barotseland Agreement of 1964 recognized and guaranteed the powers of the Litunga, the traditional Barotse leader, over land in Barotseland as governed by customary law of the Lozi people. This arrangement prevailed until 1970 when the special status of the Barotse reserve was withdrawn.
In 1975, President Kaunda announced far-reaching changes in landownership and land tenure in Zambia. These changes were largely brought about against a background of land speculation and manipulation of property rights. All freehold titles to land were abolished and existing interests were abridged to statutory leaseholds of 100 years' duration, unutilized tracts of farm land were taken over by the State, Presidential consent was subsequently required for dealing in land, and real estate agencies were ordered to close down.
The President's pronouncements were welcomed by the people of Zambia by virtue of their appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the time. However, the land reforms brought about unforeseen constraints: significant restriction of the public's access to land and property resulted in an artificial land shortage; the introduction of the requirement for State consent brought complications in the procedures of land acquisition, causing administrative delays; and less land was brought to productive use as those who have no capacity to develop it are legally inhibited from selling off undeveloped land.
The cornerstone of customary tenure is the principle of usufruct, under which anyone can have access to and use a piece of land but cannot claim any form of ownership of it. This principle became the basis of land policy for reserve and trust land after independence. When the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy government came into power in 1991 it noted that the land policies inherited from the previous government were a result of an unsatisfactory colonial heritage but that previous reforms had not improved the situation. The new government pledged a different package of reforms based on private property rights. The government embraces the notion of statutory leasehold tenure on State land, but for an automatically renewable period of 99 years, if the lessee is not in breach of any conditions and caveats contained in the lease agreement.
Despite the vesting of all land in Zambia in the President, land administration on reserves and trust land is by customary law. However, the President retains the right to make land dispositions in these areas. Individuals wanting to convert their customary land into leaseholds are given 14-year leases. Where survey requirements have been wholly fulfilled, the State grants 99-year leases to Zambians on reserve land.
The government intends to introduce a uniform system of interests in land tenure on State land, reserves and trust land, but the 99-year lease will be maintained. However, the reforms must ensure a way of recognizing indigenous peoples' rights in already settled areas currently designated as customary land. That is, in the granting of an individual title deed, no forced resettlement or removal of people on that land should be permissible. After legislation making State grants of land uniform has been introduced, the government intends to take measures to make land transactions in reserves and trust land easier than they are now. This will initially require an educational and research campaign all over the country.
Most Zambians conduct their activities in accordance with and subject to customary law (Hansungule and Mwansa, 1993), but the term is used to cover a host of tribal laws existing in different ethnic groups. Since the colonial era, customary law has been recognized only after it has been found not to conflict with written law. Two contending views are held on customary land tenure in customary law. One view suggests that land and land rights are not individual but commonly shared. The other, increasingly held view recognizes individualism in land relations and tenure (Mvunga, 1977). Both views are valid because they arise from the dynamism of customary tenure, which has evolved from commonly shared land rights to individualization of croplands with continued commonly shared rights to grazing land, forests and fisheries. Individualization of croplands is a result of agricultural intensification, increase in population pressure and commercialization of agriculture. At present, cultivation rights of individual families are recognized on land where other families are excluded, but communal use rights may also be recognized (Hansungule and Mwansa, 1993).
Two points define the tenure of trees in customary law: the possibility of individual ownership is recognized, and trees can be owned separately from land. Trees, like land under customary tenure, are subject to group rights of the indigenous people. Generally, landowners have rights to the trees and crops they may grow on their land. Similarly, the owner of a fruit-tree can exclude third persons from its fruits. The owner can even put a value on the fruits and sell them. This idea is consistent with common law in which labour invested in growing trees entitles the labourer to possession of the trees and their fruits.
The cornerstones of the customary land tenure system are reflected in the modes of acquiring land: original acquisition, through clearing of virgin bush, outright grants or purchases of improvements on the land; derivative acquisition, particularly through marriage; or inheritance.
The Conversion of Titles Act of 1975 stresses two features: first, the distinction of improvements on the land versus the land itself; and second, the right of inheritance of land. The act does not distinguish trees from land, so trees are included in the concept of land. The introduction of a 100-year lease as the only form of ownership of State land marked the cornerstone of the reform process. Freeholds and other types of estates were abolished. The statute appropriated all economic value of land except for improvements.
An important impediment to rights in leaseholds is the restriction on tenants' dealings in their land: all dealings in land must follow Presidential consent. Another impediment is the requirement for planning permission before any development is attempted. The Town and Country Planning Act is the framework for the control and regulation of all development on statutory leaseholds. Finally, the rights and interests of the tenant in a statutory leasehold are subject to compulsory acquisition of land and other property whenever the President deems it in the interest of the people of Zambia.
Zambia has had the experience of both freehold and leasehold tenure. Supporters of leasehold tenure argue that it allows State intervention if the tenant fails to utilize the land or damages it by mismanagement. They find the unrestricted ownership of land offered by freehold tenure undesirable because it may also result in speculation, fragmentation, underutilization or damage to the land by irresponsible farming practices.
On the other hand, opponents of leasehold tenure argue that it does not convey absolute ownership which the occupier needs for assurance of the security of long-term investments. A leasehold is essentially a qualified right to occupy land for a fixed term which may or may not be renewed. The leaseholder is essentially a tenant of the State, to which rent is paid. The argument in support of freehold tenure is that it conveys absolute ownership to the occupier. The owner is free to develop the land as desired or to sell part or all of it at any time. No rent is payable. Ownership and security are virtually unrestricted. Occupants can invest without fear of dispossession. They can pass on the property to their designated heirs without any restriction.
Customary tenure has by and large been more successful than leasehold tenure in meeting the needs of the people. The administrative procedures are simple and easily implemented. Land issues are dealt with efficiently and decisively. The problem, however, is that the land rights are never registered, although their recognition is guaranteed. No attempt has been made to reform customary tenure. However, the obtainment of title deeds to customary land must be facilitated by a simplified government machinery for land delivery.
In contrast, four different government bodies administer State land or policies governing leasehold tenure. A major component of reform in the land law would be to reduce administrative overlap and simplify the registration procedures.
This section presents an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the land tenure systems with respect to a number of variables including employment creation, income generation, agricultural productivity, social justice, social cohesion and group solidarity, environmental considerations and general welfare. The evaluation is supported by a case study of 52 farmers in Mazabuka district carried out by the authors in 1993. Half of the farmers (26) were from communal areas and the other 26 were from a government settlement scheme on State land. Most of the farmers in the latter group came from communal areas where there was a land shortage. The settlement scheme started in 1975, but to date none of the 26 farmers interviewed have title deeds to their land.
During colonialism, reserves and trust land became the major source of labour for the industries on Crown land. The resulting exodus of young people left behind mainly old people, women and school-leavers. To ensure continued labour availability, the colonial administration did not develop any rural industries or capacity for entrepreneurship. These trends have continued in post-independence Zambia. Opportunities for wage employment continue to be limited on reserves and trust land because of small farm size, low capital investment, limited incentives, limited entrepreneurship, poor infrastructure and limited availability of services. However, customary tenure makes it possible for all rural people to have work - in the sense of labour - through access to land.
The scale of operation is limited on reserves and trust land. The farm sizes are related to the amount of family labour available and the availability of inputs. Semi-commercial farmers use hired labour on a casual basis to supplement the power of oxen for specific operations. Off-farm employment is very limited, and many factors hinder creation of wage employment outside the tenure system in rural areas. However, the availability of land is virtually guaranteed.
The history of employment creation on State land is different. During the colonial period, Crown land was apportioned for exclusive use of the white settlers. The farms established were large since the intention was commercial crop and animal production. The scale of operations was so large that employment opportunities for wage labour were created for the Africans.
After independence, settlers who chose to leave the country sold their farms to the Africans. Some of the settlers chose to stay and are still farming today. Some of the farms left by the settlers were demarcated into smallholdings and given to Zambians for small-scale intensive farming. Because of this history, State land is characterized by large farms of 200 to 5 000 ha and smallholdings of 2 to 25 ha. Almost all commercial farms employ workers. In short, employment opportunities for wage labour are much greater on State land than on reserves and trust land, largely because of the differences in the scale of operations and level of investment.
Although opportunities for wage employment are much greater on State land than on traditional land, unemployment is also much higher on State land, because the extensive migration of the rural population has outpaced the capacity for creation of employment. It is not clear that private tenure arrangements alone can create employment. The higher demand for wage labour on State land cannot be attributed to the tenure system per se, but more to the comparatively high scale of investment which cannot be managed by family labour alone. In customary tenure, farming is not a business but a way of life for the people. Therefore, customary tenure only ensures a greater utilization of available labour. The strength of privatized tenure is greater employment creation for wage labour. Its weakness is that the employment opportunities created are not enough to meet the high demand for jobs caused by the excessive labour migration from communal areas.
Low incomes are generally associated with customary tenure, but they cannot be attributed entirely to the tenure system. They are rather the result of a host of socio-economic, political and historical factors, including the colonial bias against rural areas in the development of infrastructure, industries and essential services, and much slower economic growth on reserves and trust land than on Crown land. Because of the long tradition of rural-urban labour migration, the majority of rural households have historically suffered from labour shortages which constrained their production. Limited access to markets and technology, and controlled prices, especially for maize, further restricted income growth. At present, money transactions account for about 25 percent of all economic activity in reserve and trust land areas, the remainder consisting of subsistence production.
Leasehold tenure by its nature facilitates adoption of business approaches to farming. Because of the length of the lease, long-term investments are encouraged. The income-generating potential is therefore higher than under customary tenure. Greater access to markets facilitates income generation on State land.
A major advantage of leasehold tenure over customary tenure is that titles facilitate land sales which both generate income and move land resources to efficient producers. However, in the settlement area of Mazabuka district, 62 percent of the farmers indicated that they have no right to sell their land because they do not yet have title deeds. As a result, land accumulation by entrepreneurial farmers is hindered. A functioning legal system and an effective enforcement mechanism are required to reduce uncertainty related to land transactions. Without such arrangements to reduce the risk of challenges to land rights, the incentives to invest and to work hard are weakened.
Income generation through increased productivity is constrained under customary tenure because of limited investment. However, while private tenure may result in increased income, it does not guarantee careful use of the land. Both systems of land tenure, if accompanied by appropriate incentives, can improve rather than hinder income generation through increased productivity.
Customary tenure has historically been associated with subsistence farming. The colonial regime did little to change this because it saw the urban and mining economies as the basis of the territory's economic development, with agriculture fulfilling a supporting role by providing a cheap supply of food and labour. Commercialization was not sought for African farmers for fear of reducing the volume of labour migration, but this view was modified in the 1940s when the territory lost its self-sufficiency in maize for more than a decade and was dependent on imports. Colonial policy favoured the establishment of large-scale commercial farms on Crown land. Only such units were seen as capable of producing regular surpluses for sale and providing the level of efficiency and responsiveness to market needs that the country's administrators regarded as necessary. The bulk of the resources spent on agriculture went to European producers on Crown land (Wood and Vokes, 1990). The land reserved for them had the best soils, had access to the road and railway networks and was close to the areas with high food demand. At independence in 1964, the government moved in quickly to redress the imbalance caused by this dualistic approach to agricultural development by reforming services for the communal areas. The measures included the creation of lending institutions, expansion of extension services, development of cooperatives and provision of subsidies on inputs.
An increasing proportion of the population is now found in the small- and medium-scale farmer categories, while the subsistence and large-scale commercial farmers have declined in importance. Management practices have been improved. The increased market orientation of formerly subsistence farmers has not been even, but has occurred primarily in the already more agriculturally advanced Central, Eastern and Southern Provinces.
The production of livestock has not increased as much as crop production, largely because of management constraints, some of which are induced by the customary land tenure system. The grazing lands are communally owned and as a result are poorly managed. Since stocking rates are never monitored or controlled, some areas are overgrazed, and excessive erosion and general land degradation are the inevitable consequences.
Customary land tenure is not conducive to large capital investment because it is not sufficiently secure to protect this level of investment (Dorner, 1972). Evidence indicates that those eager to be commercial farmers have opted to leave their villages to acquire land where leasehold titles can be obtained (Chinene et al., 1993).
In post-independence Zambia, the differences in productivity between producers on State land and those on reserves and trust land have persisted, but these differences cannot be attributed to tenure systems alone. The advantages attributable to the land tenure system derive from the fact that leasehold tenure facilitates adoption of good farm management practices. However, leasehold land has been found to be considerably underutilized. Leaseholds are granted free of charge at a minimal ground rent, which is inadequate incentive to encourage optimal use of land; since land was allocated indiscriminately in the past, it often ended up in the possession of people without the means or intent of putting it to productive purposes; and cumbersome procedures for acquisition of land constrain expansion and limit land sales.
The association of customary tenure with subsistence agriculture has persisted. Proponents of private property rights (Chinene et al., 1993) argue that increased individualization of rights empowers farmers' ability to capture returns on investment in land. However, Migot-Adholla et al. (1991), in a study on indigenous land rights, observed no relationship between land rights and yields in Kenya and Ghana. Customary tenure, however, is considered to offer little incentive for investments to increase productivity. From the foregoing, it is apparent that there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that indigenous land tenure systems by themselves are a constraint on agricultural productivity. More research is required to reconcile the opposing views on the impact of the two tenure systems on productivity.
The cornerstone of customary land tenure is communal ownership of land resources. Individuals have no right to sell land assigned to them. People have equal access to the resources that nature has provided. Cropland is equitably distributed. Farmers therefore feel secure in the customary tenure system because they enjoy long-term rights to land without fear of dispossession of these rights.
There is a well-founded fear that proposed land reforms will make it easier for outsiders to get title deeds to land on reserves and trust land at the expense of the local people. When titling is introduced, wealthier and better-informed individuals may use their information advantages to claim land over which other, less informed individuals have customary rights. Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995) observed that even when there are no information advantages, titling based on the on-demand principle involves high costs that put the rural poor at a disadvantage. Thus titling has equity-reducing impacts. Bruce (1988) noted that during titling programmes, land grabbing by influential individuals who are able to use the rules in their favour does more to facilitate land concentration than transactions in the land market following the issuance of title.
The case for communal titles concerns common property resources such as communal pastures, forests and other marginal lands. The preservation of common property resources is desirable from an equity perspective, since these areas constitute an important social safety net for the rural poor. Privatization of these lands takes away this safety net. Providing a community title for these lands can protect communal rights from outside encroachment and prevent the exclusion of the rural poor from community property.
From the survey undertaken by the authors in Mazabuka district of Southern Province, it was clearly evident that the people living on reserves and trust land are not particularly enthusiastic about the calls for land reform or the offer to register their land rights, largely because they do not feel insecure with the existing system of landownership. Calls for land reform come largely from government officials, individuals on State land who still do not own land and others seeking to acquire more land to benefit from the lucrative land market that is evolving (Chinene et al., 1993). Although the plan to reform the land laws is well intentioned, there is a risk that if it is not adequately explained to the people on reserves and trust land, it will be misunderstood and lead to their displacement. Although the idea of privatization is now widely accepted in Zambia, appropriate safeguards are needed to protect vulnerable groups.
A significant feature of both customary and leasehold tenure is discrimination against women. Most of the ethnic groups in Zambia are matrilineal societies in which women have enjoyed a relatively high status, socially and economically. There is a disproportionate number of women in the adult population in Zambia's rural areas, with an average of 85 men to every 100 women. The two constraints that have limited women farmers are access to land and availability of labour. In most parts of Zambia, a married woman normally receives a field separate from that of her husband for her own cultivation activities. Women's first priority is to grow food for home consumption, after which they may also produce for the local or national market.
Since 1985, a procedure for obtaining title to land in areas under customary tenure has been in place (Government of Zambia, 1985). However, most rural women are unlikely to take advantage of this opportunity since they are much less familiar with bureaucratic procedures than men.
Married women not only contribute the bulk of the labour for household food production, but often contribute substantially to cash crop production as well. Nevertheless, wives typically do not control the product of their labour, since the husbands market any surplus and make the decisions about disposal of income.
Customary land tenure is consistent with the African traditional way of life which hinges on strong family ties and lineage control over land. The primary landholding unit under customary law is the family, whose members hold land collectively. On communally owned land, all members of the community are entitled to use a fair share of available resources. Any attempt to replace customary tenure with individualized tenure could disrupt some of the basis of social cohesion.
Customary land tenure has a number of disadvantages, however, which limit the benefits derived from communal ownership of land discussed above. At independence, the tenure institutions left by colonialism continued, except that Zambians were allowed to settle on State land. Communities are less cohesive and social interactions are less strong on State land than on reserves and trust land. Landowners confine their activities within the boundaries of their own holdings.
From the onset of colonialism, the British South Africa Company expressed concern over the dangers of shifting cultivation, especially the chitemene system of northern Zambia practised for centuries. The chitemene system involves the lopping and sometimes felling of indigenous trees and the burning of the cut wood to generate mineral ash for incorporation into the soil. The resulting gardens are cultivated for about six years, during which the soil is leached of its nutrients by the relatively high rainfall of northern Zambia. The gardens are then abandoned for another area of new woodland. Woodland can then regenerate in the vacated areas.
In 1909, the colonial administration restricted chitemene practices to areas close to villages. The concentration of gardens close to villages led to a rapid depletion of soil fertility because of continuous cultivation without allowance of sufficient time for fallowing. Throughout the colonial period, African farmers were restricted to the reserves and trust land where soils were marginal. The combination of restricted land access and agricultural practices resulted in excessive erosion. In a bid to curb the erosion hazard, the colonial administration developed compulsory conservation measures. While temporarily successful, these measures provoked hostility and resistance on the part of farmers. After independence, the compulsory conservation regulations were abandoned.
Currently, the major causes of land degradation on reserves and trust land are deforestation, poor cattle management and uncontrolled fires. Land degradation and deforestation in the communal areas leads to a whole cycle of environmental problems, particularly erosion. Deliberate dry-season burning of vegetation for hunting purposes is common on reserves and trust land. In northern Zambia the chitemene shifting cultivation system is another major cause of deforestation. On the communal grazing lands, poor cattle management is the root cause of degradation of natural resources. The numbers of cattle on the grazing lands are not controlled, and this omission results in overstocking in some areas, which in turn causes accelerated erosion and a reduction in palatable grazing.
After independence most of the settler farms, which had been in production for more than 40 years, fell into the hands of Zambians. Some of these farms relied heavily for many years on chemical fertilization, a practice that has continued to this day. Very few farmers invest in liming of the soils to counteract the acidity buildup, which causes an eventual decline in yields.
Serious environmental problems are evident under both privatized and customary tenure. Most of the land degradation problems are prevalent in both systems of tenure. However, the level of severity may differ for some problems. For example, acidification resulting from fertilizer use is a problem in both systems of tenure, but chemical land degradation is more severe on State land where commercial farmers invest more heavily in fertilizers. Overgrazing is a problem associated with communal land and is a direct consequence of the tenure system. Under privatized tenure the problem is less serious because control of the stocking rates is facilitated by the enclosure of grazing areas.
Most of the other land degradation problems result more from management practices than from tenure systems, as evidenced by the fact that the problems occur nationwide, irrespective of the tenure system. Sustainable rural development involves managing resources successfully to satisfy changing human needs, while maintaining or enhancing the quality of the environment and conserving natural resources. The increase in population and commercialization of agriculture suggest that for rural development to be sustained, customary land tenure must adapt to these challenges.
The cultivation practices that existed before colonialism were sustainable. Shifting cultivation was not as damaging to the environment as it is today because the population was low and thus long fallow periods were used, which allowed the vegetation to regenerate. The increase in the population and commercialization of agriculture demand adaptation of customary tenure to facilitate adoption of good management practices that sustain the productivity of the land. The future of shifting cultivation practices will be unsustainable unless innovations such as agroforestry technologies are introduced.
The reserves and trust land comprised areas that were undesirable to the white settler community during the colonial era. They have therefore less potential than State land. Development of infrastructure was much slower than on State land. The majority of the people in trust and reserve areas are still as poor as they were at independence. Whether customary tenure is to blame for this condition is debatable. Customary land tenure is not compatible with business approaches to farming. Farming is taken as an ordinary way of life and not as a business. Little is done to conserve the soils because when their productivity declines, the farmer simply moves to another village and starts again. Despite the constraints, customary land tenure has continued to survive because it is a product of the peoples' culture and values and is consistent with the African way of life.
From the onset of colonialism to the present day, State land has had the advantages of better soil resources, better infrastructure and high investments by both government and individuals and consequently has offered a much better quality of life for the people. This explains the high population drift from agricultural to mining and industrial areas.
The land tenure systems in Zambia are founded on social, cultural and economic concepts influenced by the persistent dualism imposed by colonialism. Customary tenure is the dominant system governing land administration on 94 percent of the land mass of Zambia. To eradicate rural poverty rural farmers must be transformed into business-oriented farmers. This shift will inevitably result in demands for changes in tenure systems. The land laws must be able to respond positively to these demands.
The failure to make agriculture the mainstay of the Zambian economy may be attributed in part to the weakness of the tenure systems in facilitating agricultural development. For efforts to eradicate rural poverty to succeed, the economic value of land should be recognized. Nonetheless, customary tenure is dynamic. Its character has changed over the years because of increases in population and intensification of agriculture. This process of adaptation could be facilitated by non-tenure measures, including the development of markets and other infrastructure and the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices.
Despite the strengths and weaknesses of the tenure systems in place, both are so entrenched that substitution of one for the other is not feasible or practical. The two systems are expected to coexist in the foreseeable future. A new land law should serve different interests in different parts of Zambia. It must recognize customary tenure, but the demarcation of the country into State land and traditional land is no longer justified and should therefore be eliminated.
The excess involvement of the State in land transactions is not compatible with the spirit of economic liberalization. There is therefore a need to make leasehold tenure more secure than it is now. To ensure food security, it is important to involve the rural people in the land delivery process to enable them to obtain title to the land. With title, the farmers would have opportunities for better land resource management and access to agricultural credit. Consequently, production per unit area could be expected to improve.
To avoid undesirable effects, titling programmes should be accompanied by publicity campaigns to ensure widespread knowledge of the rules and procedures.
The discrimination against women in both customary and privatized tenure is real. In customary tenure, women do not inherit land. In both patrilineal and matrilineal systems, the rights of women to land are not recognized. In privatized tenure, women are required to meet some conditions not demanded from men before they are allocated land. The new land code must eliminate any form of discrimination so the full potential of women farmers can be realized.
The tenure systems must facilitate private initiatives by Zambians. Zambians employed in urban areas must be attracted to invest in their villages of origin. At present such people are investing in State land where leaseholds are obtainable, thus depriving the rural areas of both investment and expertise.
The sustainable development of the rural areas is critical to alleviation of rural poverty. Specific recommendations are the following.
Binswanger, H.P., Deininger, K. & Feder, G. 1995. Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations. In J. Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan, eds. Handbook of development economics, Vol. 3B. Handbooks in Economics, Vol. 9, p. 2659-2772. Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK, Elsevier Science/North Holland.
Bruce, J. 1988. A perspective on indigenous land tenure systems and land concentration. In R.E. Downs & S. Reyna, eds. Land and society in contemporary Africa. Hanover, New Hampshire, USA, University Press of New England.
Chinene, V.R.N., Hansungule, M., Maimbo, F., Mwape, F. & Place, F. 1993. Land and tree legislation, customary tenure and agroforestry practices in Eastern and Southern Provinces of Zambia. Madison, Wisconsin, USA, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin. (Mimeo).
Dorner, P. 1972. Land reform and economic development. Harmondsworth, England, Penguin.
Government of Zambia. 1985. Procedure on land alienation. Land Circular No. 1. Lusaka, Zambia, Ministry of Lands.
Hansungule, M. & Mwansa, T.K. 1993. Land tenure reform in Zambia: another view. Paper presented at the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform, Lusaka, Zambia, 21-22 July.
Migot-Adholla, S., Hazell, P., Blarel, B. & Place, F. 1991. Indigenous land rights systems in sub-Saharan Africa: a constraint on productivity. World Bank Economic Review, 5: 155-175.
Mvunga, M. 1977. Land law and policy in Zambia. Ph.D. dissertation. Lusaka, Zambia, University of Zambia.
Wood, A. & Vokes, R. 1990. Commercialization of agriculture. In A.P. Wood, S.A. Kean, J.T. Milimo & D.M. Warren, eds. The dynamics of agricultural policy reform in Zambia. Ames, Iowa, USA, Iowa State University Press.
