

*Potential role of live animal markets  
and the environment in human  
exposure to avian influenza viruses*

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*Objectives*

- Review data on presence of H5 and other avian and animal strains in live-animal markets and other environments
- Potential role of markets in human exposure
- Data on virus survival in environment
- Data on where virus is being isolated during outbreaks and inter-outbreak periods


## Live poultry markets: Not all the same



- Fixed cages / vs temporary ?
- Unsold poultry held overnight?
- Cage materials?
- Market hygiene practices?
- Species of poultry sold


HK LPM during Dec 1997  
*H5N1: Chicken-19.5%; Geese 2.5%*  
*Duck 2.4% (Shortridge et al. 1999)*

Avian influenza viruses: HK LPM  
 HK Poultry markets: 1999-2001



Unpublished data

## *Surveillance of H5N1 viruses in apparently "HEALTHY" poultry in live poultry markets in mainland China*



- Why is isolation rate in markets so high?
- Very different to the farm-level perceptions.

*Li et al Nature 2004; 430: 209-213*

### Isolation rates: Depends where you look



### Bali 2005

- Community survey
  - 9 districts; Backyard flocks, small farms
  - 1202 swabs: H5N1=0
- 3 live poultry markets
  - 2 of 3 markets had H5N1
  - 133 swabs: H5N1=9 (7%)



*K Santia, AA Gde Putra, G Samaan and others - unpublished data*

# Live poultry markets maintain and amplify avian influenza viruses

Senne et al. 1992

Bulaga et al Avian Dis 2003; 47: 1169-76

Kung et al. Avian Dis. 2003; 47: (S3) 1037-41

Farms →



Wholesale poultry market

→



Retail poultry Market


H9N2 isolation rates

<0.1%

0.5%

5%

## Influenza viruses amplify in live poultry markets: Impact of "rest day" in retail markets on H9N2 isolation rates in chicken



Kung N et al. Avian Dis. 2003; 47: (Suppl 3) 1037-41

Live poultry markets maintain, amplify AND  
**DISSEMINATE** avian influenza viruses

Farms



Wholesale poultry market



Retail poultry market




*Kung et al Emerg Infect Dis 2007*  
*Senne et al 1992*

**H9N2 isolation rates in live poultry markets in Hong Kong:  
1999-2006: Impact of interventions**

*Impact of rest days, removal of quail and turnover on H9N2 virus isolation rates*

*Poisson generalized linear model adjusted for temperature, humidity, number of poultry sold, market factors, market rest days*



Adjusted relative risk: Virus isolation

	Baseline	1xRD	1xRD -Quail	2xRD -Quail
Chicken	1	0.73	0.61	0.56
Minor poultry	1	0.42*	0.40*	0.37*

\* = p<0.05

*Lau et al EID 2007: 13: 1340-7*

## *Poultry markets a risk factor for H5N1 disease?*

### Case-control:

- Hong Kong 1997: *Mounts et al JID 1999; 180: 505-8*
  - 15 cases vs. 41 matched controls
  - Exposure to LPM: OR 4.5 (1.2-21.7), p,0.045
  - Consumption of poultry or undercooked poultry, working in poultry industry (nil): NS

### Anecdotal:

- China Oct 2005-Oct 2006: *Yu et al EID 2007; 13: 1061-4*. 20 cases; 6 urban
  - Of 6 urban cases,
    - all visited LPM within 2 weeks of onset, 5 within 1 week of onset
    - Only 1 had any other exposure to poultry
    - None had exposure to poultry outbreaks, dead poultry, etc
  - But NO CONTROLS
- Indonesia June 2005-Feb 2008: *Kandun et al. Lancet 2008; 372: 744-49*
  - 127 cases, 2% LPM exposure, 21% exposure unclear.

## *Survival of LPAI and HPAI viruses in water*

### Temperature and salinity effects survival times

#### Time needed to lose 90% of infectivity

- At 17°C, no salinity,
  - LPAI H5 or H7 viruses take 29-111 days
  - HPAI H5N1 viruses take 16-26 days
- At 28°C, no salinity,
  - LPAI H5 or H7 viruses take 4-20 days
  - HPAI H5N1 viruses take 4-5 days

*Brown et al Avian Dis 2007; 51: 285-9.*


#### H9N2 virus (3.3 log<sub>10</sub> EID<sub>50</sub>/ml)

- *Survival in poultry water troughs after use: 3 days*
- *Fresh tap water: 12 hours*

*Leung et al EID 2007; 13: 1380-2*

## Survival of H5N1 virus in dry or wet feces

H5N1/97



Shortridge et al Virology 1998; 252: 331-42

H5N1/2004

Survival at 37°C in wet feces for 6 days compared to 2 days with H5N1/97

Webster RG:

[www.who.int/csr/disease/avian\\_influenza/labstudy\\_2004\\_10\\_29/en](http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/labstudy_2004_10_29/en)

## Survival of LPAI on porous and non-porous surfaces

- Inoculum of  $10^3$ - $10^4$ /ml
- **Non porous surfaces:** Steel, tiles, gumboot, tyre, plastic, feather, egg shell: virus remains **detectable for 72 hrs**
- Porous surfaces:
  - Wood: 2 days
  - Egg tray, cotton or polyester fabrics: <1 day

*Tiwari et al Avian Dis 2006; 50: 284-287*

## *Heavy environmental contamination during H5N1 outbreaks, Cambodia*

- Environmental samples collected in households within 1km of outbreak (avian or human)
- 14/43 households had positive environmental samples.
- In 14 positive households: 27/77 samples H5 RT-PCR positive (but culture negative)
  - Wet feces 2/4; pond water plants 1/2;
  - Mud under animal cages 2/4; ponds 4/19; yard 1/3;
  - Soil swabs: beneath houses on stilts 3/7; poultry places 5/7; poultry ranging places 2/4; feathers of dead poultry 3/6.
- Control households negative (Vong – pers comm)

*Vong et al EID 2008; 14: 1303-5.*

## *Summary*

### *Live poultry markets:*

- Amplify virus activity
- One key place to do systematic surveillance
- Source of infection to humans
- Disseminates infection back to farms
- Management interventions can have dramatic effect on virus load in markets

### *Virus survival*

### *Virus contamination*

- In village / farm environment
- Markets??



## *Gaps in knowledge*

In H5N1 endemic regions

- Live poultry markets
  - *Longitudinal surveillance on virus detection*
  - *Effect of market type and poultry mix*
  - *Impact of market interventions on virus circulation*
  - *Role in disseminating virus back to farming system*
- Environmental contamination and virus survival
  - *Methods for efficient virus isolation from environmental samples*
  - *Village settings*
  - *LPM setting including contamination of surfaces and poultry carcasses*
- LPM exposure as a risk factor for human disease: Case control studies

## *Real world*

- Rural poultry farm, poultry die off started 4 days ago, owner suspected avian flu H5N1
- Called in for urgent help.....
- .....poultry buyer
- Surviving poultry purchased, to be sent to...
- .....live poultry markets
- And the dead poultry.....?



Any surprise that LMP are a hot-bed of infection?

The question is not why there is human infection,

Rather, it is why there is so little!

*Thank you*

