Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture- FAO
Paiements des services environnementaux (PSE) dans les paysages agricoles
Ciblage des fournisseurs
Targeting the most efficient providers and making sure that the scheme does result in an improvement in the ecosystem service provision remains the greatest challenge.
PSE-récompenser le mauvais comportement?
"The ideal PES programme recipient is not the environmentally benign community too poor to do much harm to the forest, but rather the guy who had enough capital to buy a chainsaw, and is on the verge of putting it to work." (9)
PES programme investment will not deliver additional results if directed at those that already have a responsible environmental performance - the maximum added value of PES programme investment is with those whose environmental performance can improve the most.
This may not be the fairest option , but in economic terms is the most efficient and the financial survival of the scheme depends on it. It is also true that paying the "bad guys" can create perverse incentives where more environmentally friendly participants find no incentive to continue their good stewardship. A balance between fairness and equity will have to be negotiated in each context, perhaps offering different kinds of payment.
In fact many PES schemes do not specifically seek additionality as a primary goal and look instead for compensation for maintaining good stewardship roles of communities living within protected areas or in indigenous domains. The goal here is to support these communities in keeping traditionally sustainable land management and in doing so reduce the risk of worsening environmental conditions.
Conservation organizations also look to PES schemes as a source of sustainable finance for the appropriate management of protected areas. In Coahuila (Mexico), the water users of downstream Saltillo have agreed to make regular contributions to the management of the uptstream Reserva of the Sierra de Zapalinamé with a view to safeguarding its water stewardship role. In Costa Rica, the La Esperanza hydropower plant makes regular contributions the Monteverde Conservation League to support their work and ensure that the forest in the headwaters of its reservoir stays protected, thus insuring against future increase of sediment load in the water and increasing the plant's production costs.
(9)Sven Wunder, Is PES implementation presenting trade offs between conservation efficiency and fairness? POLEX: CIFOR's Forest Policy Expert List server Fast and effective Policy alerts In Katoomba East and South Africa Newsletter, August 2007. Accessed at http://www.katoombagroup.org/newsletter/ESA_Newsletter/Vol1_No9.html
