Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture- FAO

Paiements des services environnementaux (PSE) dans les paysages agricoles

La Division de l'économie du développement agricole (ESA)EnglishEspañol

Ciblage des fournisseurs

Targeting the most efficient providers and making sure that the scheme does result in an improvement in the ecosystem service provision remains the greatest challenge.

Niveau de paiement

Ultimately, farmers' decisions to participate depends on costs (investment required, risk of loss of income or of food security) in relation to the compensation being offered (implementation costs that support additional income from the PES programme, improved productivity and food security).

To secure the participation of the selected providers the PES scheme must offer them payment levels and types attractive enough to convince them to join the programme. Not all farmers provide the same benefits when participating in the programme, and ideally schemes should offer differentiated levels of payment to correspond to these differences. In practice, it would be very costly to do this adjustment to each provider, and so PES schemes often offer only a set of differentiated payment levels - for more on this see table 4.2.

Table 4.2- Adjusting payment levels- from flat rate to monitored outcomes

Criteria

Description

Advantages/ Disadvantages

Best opportunities

Flat rate based on input

 

flat rate based on opportunity cost of land use/management adopted (input) easier and cheaper to administer moderately effective if combined with highly prioritized eligible areas

The PES national programme in Costa Rica offers flat rate payments for conservation, reforestation and agroforestry

Prioritized differentiated rates based on estimated output

differentiated rates based on estimated output: comparison between baseline and environmental services delivery potential of land use/management adopted

more expensive to design (establishing different categories)

 

effective if based on scientifically sound estimates of environmental services provision

The Mexican National PES scheme uses payments rates proportional to the expected outcome - landowners protecting cloud forests get a higher rate. In Central America, a Silvopastoral PES project (RISEMP) used indices of additional ES generated to calculate payment. In the Silvopastoral project (RISEMP) indices of additional ES generated were used to calculate payment

 

Monitored environmental services provision

differentiated payments according to actual performance in environmental services provision (only adopted in carbon schemes)

 

more expensive to administer as it requires continuous monitoring and updating of payment terms; highly effective in insuring environmental services delivery

good for high value environmental services

This differentiation is generally made based on the grade of change to land use or management change required - the more change the higher the cost for the farmer (but also the higher incremental environmental services provision)- see examples indices used to capture this different grades of improvement in tables 4.3 and 4.4 below.

More frequently, PES schemes define the scheme's requirements (i.e. reforestation of degraded lands or forest conservation) and offer a flat rate to all eligible farmers (10) that are willing to comply with them, or a few differentiated levels according to the environmental services delivery potential of habitat the farmer would be protecting or improving. In some cases, offering a flat rate can be more politically acceptable and more appropriate in places of strong community ties.

Table 4.3. PES scheme in Jesus de Otoro, Honduras (US$/ha/year) (11)

Forest Conservation

 

 

 

Primary forest

5.5

 

 

Secondary forest

4.1

 

 

Young forest

2.8

 

 

Improved Land Management Practices Adopted

Two practices adopted

Three practices adopted

Four practices adopted

Short cycle crop

5.5

8.3

11

Permanent crop

8.3

11

13.8

Agro-forestry

11

13.8

16.6

 

Table 4.4. Environmental Service Indices in the Silvopastoral Project in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua (points per hectare, unless otherwise specified) (12)

The environmental service index attempts to assess the level of environmental services generated by different types of land use. It combines two indices: an index for biodiversity and an index for carbon sequestration.

•  The biodiversity index assigns a number from 0.0 to 1.0 from most unfriendly to biodiversity to most friendly.

•  The carbon sequestration index assigns 0.1 points per tonne of carbon sequestered.

•  The two indices are added to arrive at a single environmental services index which influences the level of payment

Land Use

Biodiversity Index

Carbon sequestration index

Environmental Service Index

Annual crops (annual, grains, and tubers)

0

0

0

Degraded pasture

0

0

0

Improved pasture with recently planted trees

0.3

0.4

0.7

Windbreaks (per km)

0.6

0.5

1.1

Diversified fodder bank

0.6

0.6

1.2

Shade-grown coffee

0.6

0.7

1.3

Diversified timber plantation

0.7

0.7

1.4

Riparian forest

0.8

0.7

1.5

If payment is set above the level the farmers were willing to accept, the scheme will have a higher cost than necessary. Plus, if the scheme works on a first come, first served basis, then it might also leave the best suppliers out. If in turn, the PES scheme has strong income-support goals, it's important to make sure the most environmental effective providers are included as well.

A useful method to further adjust payment levels at a low cost is to let providers self-select themselves. Once the environmental priority area is identified, opening a "reverse auction" to the farmers within the area, requesting that they propose the minimum compensation they are willing to accept, will single out those that are willing to adhere to the PES scheme's requirements at the lowest cost. The programme implementers can then further select volunteers based on the best match between payment required and environmental services delivery potential (13).

Regardless of the method used to set the payment level or type of payment offered, it is often the conditions to adhere and the rules to comply with the programme that determine whether farmers will be able and willing to participate. This is especially relevant for the poorer groups. For more on this, see Pro-poor PES section .

Making sure that the PES scheme fosters land management options that fit with the user's interests and capacities, and that can provide them with direct benefits (such as increased productivity or diversified sources of income) will increase their interest in implementing them well, and in the long run, with less emphasis on the payment offered.

(10)see previous section for more on the selection of providers

(11)adapted from Kosoy, N., Martinez-Tuna, M., Muradian, R. & Martinez-Alier, J. 2007. Payments for environmental services in watersheds: Insights from a comparative study of three cases in Central America . Ecological Economics/Elsevier, 61(2-3): 446-455

(12)adapted from Pagiola, S., Agostini, P., Gobbi, J., de Haan, C., Ibrahim, M., Murgueitio, E., Ramírez, E., Rosales, M. & Ruíz, J.P. 2004. Paying for biodiversity conservation services in agricultural landscapes, World Bank Environment Department Paper No. 96. Environmental Economics Series. Washington, DC, World Bank

(13)For an example of application of this technique, see the case of the Australian Bush Tender scheme in box 19, page 96 of The State of Food and Agriculture 2007