Zero Draft v0
Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity[i] in Protracted Crises (CFS-A4A)

Technical Support Team, Rome, February 2014

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PREFACE

[To be drafted after Zero Draft has been considered by OEWG and Global Consultation.]

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

1. Natural and manmade disasters can directly affect the food security and nutrition of people and communities that are particularly vulnerable. In recent years this vulnerability has been exacerbated by food and financial crises as well as large-scale humanitarian crises, such as recurrent droughts in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.

2. Food insecurity and malnutrition are particularly severe, persistent and at scale in protracted crisis situations. Based on the criteria adopted for SOFI 2010[ii], in 2012 the approximate combined population in protracted crisis situations was 366 million, of whom approximately 129 million were undernourished between 2010 and 2012 (including conservative estimates for countries lacking data). This was approximately one-fifth of the global total of food-insecure people, or just over 40% of the total with India and China factored out. In the Sahel region, one in eight people are estimated to be food insecure in 2014, approximately 20.2 million people - a dramatic increase from 11.3 million in 2013.[iii]

3. In 2012, the mean prevalence of undernourishment in protracted crisis situations was 35%, compared with 14% in China and India combined, and 15% on average in the rest of the developing world.

4. For the purposes of this document the terms 'protracted crisis context', 'protracted crisis situation' and 'protracted crisis' are understood to be interchangeable. These terms describe contexts and situations that share certain key characteristics, while simultaneously recognizing that no universally agreed definition of the terms exist.

5. The absence of one or more of the characteristics listed here does not necessarily mean that there is not a protracted crisis situation, and no single characteristic identifies a protracted crisis. Characteristics include multiple underlying causes; recurrent human-made and/or natural disasters; duration or longevity; conflict and/or insecurity; weak governance; unsustainable and vulnerable livelihood systems; poor food security outcomes; poor agricultural growth; limited public and/or informal institutional capacity to respond to or address critical issues. Consequently, a considerable degree of heterogeneity among protracted crisis situations exists[iv].

6. A protracted crisis may be limited to a particular geographic area of a State, or a territory, and may not affect the entire population. Protracted crises may also have international, regional and transboundary aspects and impacts.

7. Numerous evaluations and other sources of evidence (see Annex C) have highlighted that existing policies and actions are frequently ineffective in addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises.

8. Some key limitations of policies and actions include: a narrow focus on meeting immediate food needs; limited impacts on underlying causes and resilience to shocks; poor context specificity; externally driven interventions that can undermine local priorities, capacities, priorities, needs, strategies and institutions; and poor timing or late delivery of responses, in particular emergency assistance in response to early warning signals.

9. The reasons for these limitations include: narrow scope of analysis (e.g. a failure to analyse historical trends, existing capacities and underlying causes); lack of commitment to support politically marginal communities; vested commercial, political and institutional interests; and conceptual, operational, policy and institutional divides between humanitarian and development actors (e.g. resilience building falls through the gap).

10. It is in the interests of everyone to address these limitations in policies and actions. Not only is it a fundamental human right for everyone to meet their needs for food and sustainable livelihoods, failure to do so impacts on economic growth, peace and stability for all.

11. A transformation in policies and actions is needed to ensure a comprehensive approach to addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises, which not only meets short-term, immediate food needs but also builds resilient livelihoods and food systems and addresses underlying causes.

12. Numerous evaluations of food security and nutrition policies and actions in protracted crises have consistently made recommendations for ways of transforming them, including:

    - Promote multi-stakeholder situation and response analysis as a pre-requisite for, and protected from, political decision-making;
    - Integrate actions for addressing underlying causes and building resilience into development policies and programmes;
    - Invest in, and scale up existing, social protection programmes in response to crises;
    - Ensure that an understanding of existing policies, institutions and capacities informs humanitarian response;
    - Diversify emergency response options to ensure context specific actions;
    - Ensure humanitarian actors can respond rapidly and operate according to humanitarian principles;
    - Distance political decision-making from the disbursement of funds (e.g. pooling funds which are automatically released according to changes in early warning indicators or triggers);
    - Raise public awareness of the social, economic and security benefits of prevention, mitigation and early intervention.

13. The evidence-based principles for action agreed in this document represent a political recognition and consensus about the limitations of many existing policies and actions, and what needs to be done differently. As illustrated in the Annexes, there is sufficient evidence from practical experience to conclude that such changes in approach are possible. This document aims to mobilize the political commitment and reduce the political constraints required to positively transform policies and actions for addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises.

OBJECTIVE, PURPOSE, SCOPE, ALIGNMENT AND AUDIENCE

Objective

14. The overall objective of the CFS-A4A is to contribute to improving the food security and nutrition of populations at risk of, and affected by, protracted crisis situations.

Purpose

15. The CFS-A4A seeks to encourage high-level political commitment by all stakeholders to:

    - Address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition, build resilient livelihoods and food systems and meet immediate needs in protracted crisis situations;
    - Transform policies, actions, investments and institutional arrangements based on evidenced-based policy guidance, illustrative examples and case studies.

Scope

16. The CFS-A4A principles are voluntary and non-binding. They should be interpreted and applied in accordance with national systems and their institutions, as appropriate.

17. Both Part 1 and Part 2 are integral to the CFS-A4A. The principles are described in Part 1, and how they can be implemented is presented through illustrative examples in Part 2.

Alignment

18. The CFS-A4A aligns with existing CFS policy guidance and recommendations, outlined in the "Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition" (GSF), from the perspective of addressing food insecurity in protracted crisis situations.

19. The CFS-A4A should be interpreted and applied consistent with existing obligations under both national and international law, and with due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional and international instruments. They are complementary to, and support, national, regional and international initiatives that address human rights and also initiatives to improve governance. Nothing in the CFS-A4A should be read as limiting or undermining any legal obligations to which a State may be subject under international law.

20. The CFS-A4A aligns with a number of broad principles and core values which provide a foundation for action. These include recognizing human dignity; doing no or less harm; respecting culture and custom; gender sensitivity and equality; participation and consultation; transparency and openness; empowerment; accountability and rule of law.[v] These are in addition to the humanitarian principles of humanity; neutrality; impartiality; and independence.[vi] The three mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development (economic, environmental and social), at the core of the process to prepare sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the post-2015 period, also inform this document.

21. Various international frameworks, for those who have subscribed to or endorsed them, are particularly important due to their specific relevance to protracted crisis situations. Relevant principles from these frameworks provide guidance on:

    (i) International engagement and how to improve the involvement of the international community in situations of conflict and fragility as a whole;
    (ii) Effective development cooperation between donors and developing countries, including ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability;
    (iii) Promoting sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility, partnerships to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of adversity, combating corruption and illicit flows, private sector and development and climate change finance;
    (iv) Priorities for action for disaster reduction, building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters.

Audience

22. The CFS-A4A is intended for all stakeholders that are involved in addressing, are at risk of, or are affected by, food insecurity in protracted crisis situations including, amongst others:

    - Food insecure protracted crisis-affected communities and affected populations;
    - All governments at all levels, including those of countries at risk of, and affected by, protracted crises and other countries, whose policies and actions may impact on food security and nutrition in protracted crises, including international cooperation and assistance
    - Non-state actors in protracted crisis situations;
    - Intergovernmental and regional organizations, including multilateral/international and regional financial institutions;
    - Civil society organizations;
    - Research organizations, universities and extension organizations;
    - Private companies, foundations and financial institutions (both domestic and foreign), including small, medium and large-scale farmers, food producer organizations and cooperatives.

23. The principles can be used by any stakeholder group, noting that each group has different roles and responsibilities. The roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in developing, implementing and monitoring policies and actions are highlighted within each

principle in *italics*. Roles and responsibilities are also highlighted in the 'Way forward' section at the end of Part 1. The principles strengthen the ability of a broad range of actors, at all levels, to develop appropriate and concrete policies and actions to address food insecurity in protracted crises, and identify key areas to focus efforts to promote enabling environments for improving food security and nutrition in these contexts.

24. The principles are intended to be integrated and incorporated into CFS members' and participants' policies and actions when addressing food insecurity in protracted crisis situations, particularly at the country level.

PART 1 – PRINCIPLES FOR ACTION

Introduction

25. Part 1 presents ten 'principles for action' to guide the development, implementation and monitoring of policies and actions to improve food security and nutrition in protracted crisis situations.

26. The principles seek to transform current ways of doing things in order to address the underlying causes and effects of acute food insecurity; to support emergence from chronic food insecurity by building more resilient livelihoods; and to ensure more timely and appropriate responses. Building resilient livelihoods requires improving food security and nutrition.

27. Achieving these core objectives requires levering humanitarian and development perspectives and resources, to maximise opportunities and mitigate counterproductive divides. This will result in more strategic sequencing, layering and integration of interventions in support of improved food security and nutrition.

28. The concept of resilience is already proving to be effective in linking humanitarian and development actions and ensuring a comprehensive approach to food security and nutrition. The concept is currently at the centre of policy discussions for various organizations, and is the focus of large-scale, often well-funded, interventions. Many CFS members' and participants' policies and actions increasingly adopt a resilience-based approach, understanding that the relationship between humanitarian efforts and development is more complex and dynamic than 'transition' from one to the other.

29. A number of common characteristics and central tenets of the term resilience have been identified, and shared understandings are in use in multi-stakeholder initiatives addressing food security and nutrition in protracted crisis contexts. These are explored in more detail in Appendix D.

30. It is becoming evident that the added value of applying a resilience perspective include, amongst others:

- Development programmes addressing uncertainty and volatility, protecting gains made;
- Humanitarian programmes designed with sustainable development in mind;
- Potential savings in the form of reduced humanitarian spend, avoided losses and development gains;
- Bolstering support for interventions that bridge relief and development;
- Complementing rather than undermining affected populations' existing absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities;
- Providing an entry point to ensure that both symptoms and causes of malnutrition are addressed in a comprehensive way, tackled from both the humanitarian and development angles.

Principles for action

31. **Principle 1** - Comply with existing international humanitarian and human rights obligations and be informed by CFS policy guidance, with a focus on protecting agriculture, food security and nutrition in protracted crises.

    (i) Ensuring food security and nutrition in protracted crises requires a renewed focus on human rights-based protection. Innovations have been developed in the way assistance is provided to affected populations in protracted crises which depend on farming, livestock, fish, forests and other natural resources, assets and available capacities for food security and nutrition. Given the threats facing poor and marginalized people and their assets, markets, public services and infrastructure, a protection agenda for agriculture, food security and nutrition, based on international humanitarian and human rights frameworks and obligations, is required.
    (ii) Applying the right to adequate food and related human rights principles (participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and rule of law) in protracted crises can improve targeting, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability and promote coherence between humanitarian and development efforts.
    (iii) A human rights-based approach requires an understanding of the obligations for protecting human rights, and the drivers behind rights violations, with corresponding response mechanisms that protect and promote rights holders.
    (iv) Building resilient livelihoods is a people-centred approach. Respecting the inherent rights of individuals or groups, and building the capacity for the realization of human rights, including the right to adequate food, follows from this.
    (v) Humanitarian principles should be respected by all parties operating in protracted crises. The concepts of 'doing no or less harm' and Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) can be entry points for more advanced approaches based on internationally agreed human rights frameworks. It is necessary to explore how best to balance humanitarian requirements and the need to work with national governments to build capacity and manage risks.
    (vi) The absence of good governance is a key characteristic of protracted crises; accountability can be weak in these instances and there is a need to reinforce and support mechanisms for ensuring that existing humanitarian and human rights obligations are respected and applied. Mechanisms should be put in place to monitor, document and address violations by states and other stakeholders.
    (vii) The GSF provides an overarching framework and a single reference document with practical guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by the CFS. The GSF provides guidance to improve coordination and guide synchronized action for food security and nutrition by a wide range of stakeholders in all contexts, including protracted crisis situations, and promotes human rights-based approaches.

32. **Principle 2** - Facilitate country-owned policies and actions for improved food security and nutrition, developed, implemented and evaluated with the active participation of all stakeholders.

    (i) *National governments* are primarily responsible for the food security and nutrition of their citizens. They should own the development and implementation of national policies and actions, and provide an enabling environment for community level actions, to improve food security and nutrition. They should ensure that policies are driven by the needs and interests of all citizens, particularly those most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition.
    (ii) Governments are accountable, first and foremost, to their own people, and not to other governments; the principle of country ownership supports this. *External cooperation*

partners should provide support in ways that align with national food security and nutrition policies and plans developed in multi-stakeholder settings.

(iii) Country ownership requires multi-stakeholder participation, with priority given to the people and communities most affected by food insecurity, in order to ensure that policies and actions are people centred, respect and promote human rights-based approaches and have broad ownership. *All stakeholders*, whether national governments, cooperation partners, international organisations etc. should ensure multi-stakeholder participation. National stakeholders should be given priority in multi-stakeholder policy, coordination and practice spaces. *National governments and cooperation partners* should provide support and resources to ensure the capacity of all stakeholders to participate, including, for example traditional leaders, community-based organizations and women's groups amongst others, in affected communities.

(iv) In protracted crisis contexts, national institutional capacities are often compromised and inadequate, and are not able to deal with the situation. However, this is not a valid reason to by-pass national structures. *Cooperation partners* should respect the tenets underlying country ownership, as a key guiding principle of aid effectiveness and long-term solutions, i.e. with countries owning their development, including the vision, the priorities, the strategies, the implementation, and, where necessary, the capacity development, to achieve this.

(v) Improving food security and nutrition in conflict and fragility contexts can be particularly challenging. When national or in-state institutions have broken down, and in situations of weak governance, it may be difficult to identify suitable domestic partners and entry points for interventions. Furthermore, local partners and governments may be excluded because they are either involved in, or perceived to be parties to, violent conflict that exacerbates food insecurity, or are not in a position, for a variety of possible reasons, to address underlying food insecurity drivers and causes.

33. **Principle 3** - Ensure and support comprehensive food security and nutrition focused situational and response analyses to inform comprehensive policies and actions.

(i) Often food security analyses in protracted crises are narrowly focused on the impacts of natural hazards or shocks on food availability and peoples' ability to meet their food needs. This narrow approach fails to adequately take into account the political, economic and institutional causes of livelihood vulnerability, food insecurity and the livelihood and coping strategies and resilience of affected populations. This contributes to narrow, short-term policies and actions, which may help to meet immediate needs but fail to address underlying causes and, in some cases, exacerbate and prolong crises.

(ii) *All stakeholders* should ensure that their analyses are comprehensive in order that policy and programme responses can address underlying causes, build resilient and sustainable livelihoods and food systems, as well as meet immediate needs.

(iii) Comprehensive livelihood, food security and nutrition analyses require joint and coordinated assessments and monitoring by different humanitarian and development actors, especially the people most affected by crises. *National governments* should ensure that food security and nutrition analyses are integrated into broader poverty, fragility, risk and humanitarian assessments.

(iv) Wherever possible, *governments and other national stakeholders* should own, lead and coordinate multi-stakeholder assessment and analysis processes. It is vital to enable the participation of all relevant stakeholders in assessments and analysis in order to develop consensus on the situation and appropriate options for policies and actions.

(v) *All stakeholders* should aim to be objective and impartial in their analyses. However, it should be recognised that in reality stakeholders often have their own interests and political, institutional and other biases. Using common, internationally agreed standards and protocols, ensures that situation analysis is a technical process, and facilitates peer review amongst stakeholders.

(vi) Comprehensive analyses should consider issues including: global and regional policies and actions impacting on national and sub-national food security; the national and local political, institutional and security environment (distribution of power and wealth; public policies and regulations; institutional capacities; markets etc.), particularly as they influence food and livelihood security; the vulnerability context (shocks, hazards, seasonality etc.); people's livelihood assets and strategies and coping strategies, household resilience to natural and human-induced shocks, as well as outcomes such as food and income security; health and nutritional status.

(vii) In all protracted crises, but especially in conflict situations, it is critical to understand formal and informal systems of governance and management of land and other natural resources. This should include an analysis of the role, and arrangements, of local communities for natural resource management as well as participatory-based gender and stakeholder analysis to identify the bundle of rights (customary and otherwise) held by different people to a resource and modalities for access to it.

(viii) Where violent conflict exists, it is particularly important for *external cooperation partners* to integrate conflict and political economy analyses with food security analyses. The impact on peace and food security can be greater if the inter-relationships between these issues are taken into account in policy and programme design.

(ix) *All stakeholders* should undertake disaggregated analysis to understand the varying impacts of crises on the food security and nutrition of different vulnerable groups, including women, children, older and disabled people, minority and marginalized groups, as well as to capture variations in rural and urban contexts. Analyses should address gender roles and relations, to inform interventions aimed at supporting women's empowerment and citizenship, and gender equality more broadly.

(x) Regular monitoring of changes in livelihood systems and coping strategies, against baselines, in protracted crises is critical. This is fundamental for effective responses to address vulnerabilities and to build stronger household and community capacities to cope with shocks.

(xi) In protracted crises a significant challenge is often the lack of sufficiently comprehensive, nationally-owned data. The statistical and data collection capacity of national counterparts should be analysed and progressively enhanced, as required.

(xii) A range of policy and programme responses is required and available in protracted crisis situations (see Principle 4). There is no one-size-fits-all solution. A specific process of multi-stakeholder response analysis and decision-making is necessary, informed by evidence-based situation analysis, in order to decide on appropriate and effective options.

34. **Principle 4** - Design, support and implement comprehensive, resilience-focused policies and actions to address food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises.

(i) Comprehensive policies and actions for food and nutrition security in protracted crises should aim to prevent food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises by contributing to the elimination of underlying, structural causes (including conflict, poor governance and institutional weaknesses); protect and build resilient and sustainable livelihoods and food systems to mitigate the impacts of crises; and prepare for crises to ensure timely and appropriate responses.

(ii) The twin-track approach, endorsed as one of the "Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security" and referenced in the GSF, describes actions both to: (i) immediately tackle hunger and malnutrition for the most vulnerable, and (ii) build resilience and address root causes of hunger.

(iii) This model is particularly pertinent in protracted crisis situations, and proposed actions should be applied and adapted as appropriate. Lifesaving food security and nutrition support are building-blocks on which to develop resilience-building programmes and interventions at scale to reach the most vulnerable, and help to

safeguard resilience gains that may have already been made. Different types of interventions, drawing on the experience of all stakeholders, need to be synchronized and undertaken in a coordinated manner in order to successfully address food insecurity and progressively realize the right to adequate food in protracted crises.

(iv) *Governments* should ensure that comprehensive policies and actions to address food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises are integrated into broader national and regional development policies and programmes. Failures to address underlying causes and build resilience are failures of development policies and actors. *Governments of countries affected by protracted crises* and *other development actors* should take increased responsibility for addressing underlying causes and promoting resilient livelihoods and food systems in protracted crises.

(v) Programming for resilient livelihoods to improve food security and nutrition has a number of objectives, from meeting basic needs and contributing to civilian protection (i.e. livelihood provision), to protecting and assisting in the recovery of assets (i.e. livelihood protection) to improving strategies by strengthening institutions and influencing policy (i.e. livelihood promotion).

(vi) The importance of social protection and disaster risk reduction (DRR) as a means of "connecting the twin tracks" has been highlighted in the GSF. These approaches are particularly important in protracted crises as means of protecting and building resilient livelihoods and systems. *Humanitarian actors* should help build preparedness capacities to enable long-term social protection and DRR systems to be scaled up in response to cyclical shocks and hazards, which are common in protracted crises.

(vii) Other relevant programmatic options include innovative methods of procurement for food assistance, investments in non-agricultural as well as agricultural livelihoods, engagement of the private sector, use of cash-transfer programmes, cash-based interventions and community-based therapeutic feeding to treat acute malnutrition.

(viii) Food security interventions should be nutrition-sensitive, i.e. be designed to achieve improvements in nutritional status. This is central to building resilience. Well-nourished individuals are healthier, more productive and can manage shocks and stressors as they may arise.

(ix) Particular attention must be paid in the design and implementation of policies and actions to the nutritional needs of mothers, including pregnant and lactating women, and young children, particularly between conception, complementary feeding phase and aged two.

(x) Policies and actions should address the impacts of seasonality on food security and nutrition.

(xi) Agricultural research can potentially play an important role in revitalizing local, rural institutions and producer organizations for sustainable, resilient livelihood solutions, addressing food insecurity and supporting societal regeneration through transfer of knowledge, innovation and technology.

(xii) Wherever possible, participatory research, extension and farming service systems should be strengthened, particularly those that respond to the specific needs of smallholder and family farmers, with a particular focus on women farmers and youth.

(xiii) For interventions to be appropriate to context and local capacities, technology that works in and with communities should be promoted, which increase productivity, diversify production, enhance nutritional value and build resilience according to the tenets of sustainable development.

(xiv) Policies and actions to prevent food insecurity and malnutrition and to protect and build resilient and sustainable livelihoods and food systems are frequently neglected in protracted crises, but have been proven to be possible. Principles 5, 6 and 7 identify particularly important issues to address in this respect.

35. **Principle 5** - Safeguard the access of small-scale food producers and family farmers to productive assets and natural resources, promoting the stable and equitable governance of

tenure of land and other natural resources before, during and when emerging from protracted crises.

(i) Natural resources are the fundamental basis of many livelihoods in protracted crisis situations, both for survival and recovery. The access of small-scale food producers and family farmers to productive assets and resources that support food security and nutrition is both significant and critical in protracted crisis situations. It is a key component in solutions to hunger, poverty and improvement of rural livelihoods, as well as the improvement of health and education and socially, economically and environmentally sustainable development.

(ii) As a source of subsistence and natural resources, as well as a sense of community and identity, land often takes on deep political, socio-economic, emotional and symbolic meaning for people, making it a contested resource. Protracted crises can transform unequal land access from a structural source of poverty into a conflict multiplier. Disputes over land and natural resource tenure can drive and incite conflict, and are one of the most complex challenges faced in protracted crises. Ensuring that food security interventions address inequalities among groups, especially with regards to land, on a more permanent basis could reduce the risk of violent conflict.

(iii) *All stakeholders* should avoid actions that degrade natural resources essential to livelihoods and which may hinder access to those resources. They should seek to secure conditions of public safety that enable farmers, especially women, to access land for cultivation and harvest, people to access markets to buy and sell production, and people to access their families and social networks to help one another. Adopt proactive measures to protect women from resource-related physical violence and other security risks.

(iv) Environmental stability, conflict and food security are all affected by tenure, and also impact tenure itself. Effective management of land and natural resources can promote peacebuilding (mitigating a fall back into conflict and/or social unrest), support development and improve food security in protracted crisis situations. Negotiating the responsible management of communal resources (including water, land, forests, etc.) can serve as an entry point to facilitate agreement on other issues that are too difficult to tackle initially.

(v) Develop guidelines for all actors for managing and sharing scarce resources based on the analysis of the role of local communities and their traditional arrangements. Promote women's participation in formal and informal decision-making structures and governance processes related to natural resource management.

(vi) Together with local communities, facilitate the adaptation of traditional arrangements to changes in the immediate context, e.g. demographic, trans-border, climatic and other impacts.

(vii) Women in protracted crisis situations are often primarily responsible for meeting the water, food and energy needs of households and communities. Build on the opportunity presented by women's roles in natural resource management to avoid perpetuating inequity and undermining recovery from protracted crises; women have untapped potential as engines of economic revitalization.

(viii) Target and work with women in the informal sector whose economic support is vital to their families and communities and who, together with elders, can often have a major role in influencing conflict situations. Pursue gender equality, women's empowerment and sustainable natural resource management interventions in support of improving food security and nutrition and peacebuilding.

(ix) The "Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security" (VGGT) should be applied as appropriate. The VGGT provide relevant guidance in response to climate change, natural disasters and conflicts, including obligations under national and international law, with due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional and international instruments.

36. **Principle 6** - Recognize and better understand the interrelationship between violent conflict and food and nutrition insecurity; promote and integrate solutions for food security and nutrition into peace-building, transitional justice and governance related efforts.

    (i) Recognizing the negative impact that violent conflict and insecurity has on food security and nutrition, on both rural and urban livelihoods, we also recognize that food insecurity can also be a threat multiplier and/or driver of conflict and insecurity. Violence can both lead to, and be fuelled by, food insecurity.

    (ii) Peace-building, improved governance, reduced fragility and transitional justice related interventions and strategies at country, regional and global levels are crucial to emergence from protracted crisis and to create enabling institutional environments for viable food systems to underpin food security and nutrition. International organisations should encourage peacebuilding and the resolution of protracted crises, and many of these interventions address food insecurity. Relevant food security actors are encouraged to engage with conflict mitigation and similar processes to the fullest extent possible, through conflict sensitive measures.

    (iii) Conversely, food security programming has potential positive spill-over effects and opportunities that are wider than addressing hunger and malnutrition in protracted crisis affected populations. Improved food security and nutrition can contribute to sustainable peace-building objectives through improved social cohesion and participation, equity, capacities, trust and legitimacy, amongst others.

    (iv) Well-designed community-driven programmes can improve food security and nutrition, reducing tensions and conflict drivers, building confidence, identifying and voiding causal factors, preventing a deepening of food insecurity, recapturing a sense of 'normalcy' and enabling more sustainable livelihood recovery pathways.

    (v) *National governments and cooperation partners* should ensure that country-owned, managed and implemented initiatives aimed at supporting transitions towards stability, adequately and clearly reflect food security considerations.

37. **Principle 7** - Actively support and ensure institutional capacities and good governance.

    (i) *National governments* should pursue good governance objectives, recalling that good governance is essential to the realization of all human rights, including the elimination of poverty and ensuring a satisfactory livelihood for all.

    (ii) Structural factors, including failed institutions, are often at the root of protracted crises, and also play an important role in further fuelling crises. Poor governance and weak institutional capacity are key characteristics of protracted crises, which exact a heavy toll on informal institutions and can severely weaken social networks that might otherwise buffer the adverse networks of crises.

    (iii) The process of developing, implementing and evaluating policies and actions for addressing food security and nutrition in protracted crises should be: consensus oriented, participatory, accountable, transparent, equitable and inclusive, coherent with international human rights obligations, efficient and effective in achieving results

    (iv) Governance challenges, especially where there is a propensity for violence, are substantial and complex. Recent analyses stress the need for direct support to institutions to address food insecurity in protracted crises; strengthening legitimate institutions and governance structures to provide security, justice, jobs and social services are also crucial to break cycles of violence. Investments in food security and nutrition interventions can be an effective tool in promoting better governance through strengthened trust and legitimacy, amongst other benefits, and need to be made in tandem with local, national, regional and international efforts.

    (v) *All stakeholders* should understand the political power, interests and governance framework in a protracted crisis so as to ensure that interventions do not undermine existing formal and informal structures that are successful and accountable. Identifying

functioning systems that support and enable local livelihoods within existing local institutions and other stakeholder networks, and then supporting and rebuilding them and associated institutional frameworks, is vital. It helps ensure appropriateness, acceptance and the sustainable improvement of food security, and ensures resilience-building is rooted in the local context to the maximum extent possible.

(vi) It is important to avoid compartmentalizing roles among aid providers, particularly of food assistance, and government partners. There is a risk that provision of social protection can, over time, lead to an indefinite responsibility for providing basic social services. A preference for working with local civil society institutions alone, rather than formal institutions linked to the state, can undermine local government and foster parallel governance systems. To mitigate this, the technical and logistical capacity of government and other local institutions to play more central roles in service provision and social protection needs to be constantly enhanced.

(vii) Where there is poor governance, there are greater incentives and more scope for corruption. Similarly, corruption undermines governance to the extent that it distorts policy decisions and their implementation. The promotion of good governance helps combat corruption, complementing efforts that target corruption more directly, such as participatory, community-driven processes, raising public awareness and strengthening the capacity and functioning of national anti-corruption commissions, where they exist.

(viii) As capacity for good governance improves, it is important that partners work with government and other institutions to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities regarding the provision of infrastructure, security, and enabling conditions for peace and stability.

(ix) Informal or customary institutions, including those responsible for social protection, dispute resolution and justice, often remain or emerge to fill critical gaps when national institutions have failed. In some cases, these may have the potential to play a key role in addressing food insecurity in protracted crises.

38. **Principle 8** - Ensure multi-year, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms, aligned with country-owned plans, which effectively link short- and long-term responses and interventions.

(i) Resource commitments, be they domestic and/or international, need to consider the long timeframe needed to improve and overcome food insecurity in protracted crises. *Aid providers* are encouraged to create multiannual, flexible mechanisms and funding that, (a) facilitate multi-sectoral approaches to tackling food insecurity, (b) address the structural causes of food and nutrition insecurity at the regional and country levels, and (c) which may result in lower operational costs deriving from early response and longer-term planning.

(ii) Long-term resilience-building programmes need to be able to adapt to changing circumstance. *Aid providers* are encouraged to provide support with built-in flexibility, that can readily adapt to the challenges presented by protracted crises, and which are able to scale up in response to new shocks and stressors.

(iii) A plethora of mechanisms already exist; *aid providers* should closely analyse and consider how these can be better aligned and used, and how coordination of different actors can be improved. Greater flexibility and collaboration between development and humanitarian funding and programming help define the responsibility for addressing underlying vulnerability to crises more clearly, and better enable programmes to act to prevent food security crises from escalating into situations of acute need.

(iv) *Aid providers* need to ensure that short-term funding restrictions do not inhibit resilience-building opportunities. Interruptions or delays in support, including bureaucratic or procedural ones, will negatively impact on addressing food insecurity in vulnerable communities. Agile operational policies allowing for flexibility and

adaptability to sudden context changes are required, with concomitant capacities and skill-sets.

(v) A major shift is required to manage food security risk responsibly through resilience-building and early action and response, rather than transferring this burden to vulnerable people who are least able to cope. An organizational stance of risk management rather than risk aversion is necessary to stimulate early response to early warning signals of a crisis, and thereby save livelihoods as well as lives. Recognition amongst practitioners, governments and donors that sometimes the predictions may be wrong, but that overall this is better risk management, is essential. *Governments and the international community* should absorb this risk, rather than affected populations.

(vi) The provision of support should not undermine local capacities and governance structures. Investing in local government and community decision-making helps to ensure that interventions and programmes remain both informed and responsive. Flexible assistance programming, enabling people to combine their own resources and capacities with resources provided through either domestic or international support, should be promoted.

(vii) *Aid providers* therefore need to be prepared to consider risking greater levels of up-stream investment in protracted crisis situations. Reasons for not investing in ex-ante risk reduction to improve food security and nutrition in protracted crises may be compelling, but not doing so makes little sense in the long-term, and can lead to a situation of entrenched humanitarian assistance.

39. **Principle 9** - Ensure and integrate systematic learning from experience in addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises to continuously improve policies and actions.

(i) The collective experience, tried and tested approaches and lessons learnt over many years by different stakeholders in seeking to prevent and address food insecurity in protracted crises should inform future actions, and future practice needs to be accompanied by systematic learning and knowledge management approaches.

(ii) Approaches and strategies should remain context specific to be effective. Current practice and methods should continue to be challenged, improved and new approaches adopted that are contextually appropriate.

(iii) Mechanisms for monitoring and analysing food security and nutrition, and measuring household resilience to food insecurity in protracted crisis situations should continue to be developed in order to underpin evidence-based programmes and secure on-going improvements. In order to support this, all stakeholders should be capacitated to plan, implement and monitor programmes and projects that address food security and nutrition in protracted crises.

(iv) Improve official early warning capacity and effectiveness by investing in national early warning capacity, based on a comprehensive review of existing capabilities and needs in at-risk areas.

(v) *Aid providers* should consider developing platforms, programmes and processes to ensure early action takes place, by building short-term capacities into longer-term programmes which can adapt and scale-up in response to early warning signals.

40. **Principle 10** - Improve accountability to all stakeholders, including affected populations, to ensure that prevention and response to food insecurity in protracted crises happens in a timely manner, and respects the rights of individuals affected by crises.

(i) Failures of accountability have been identified as one reason why severe food insecurity situations persist, particularly in protracted crisis situations with weak governance structures and imperfect or absent democratic institutions.

(ii) *Institutions and components of agencies and governments* engaged in designing and implementing responses should be accountable to affected populations. Specifically,

they should ensure that, throughout the programme cycle, all segments of an affected community (considering gender, age and diversity) receive the information they need to make informed decisions, can participate or be fairly represented in the decisions that affect their lives, and can provide feedback and make complaints about the assistance or services provided to them. Special efforts should be made to ensure that affected people are protected from any form of exploitation or abuse, including sexual, by anyone associated with the implementation of the response.

(iii) Prioritization of actions based on early warning data and information, multi-stakeholder consultation, human-rights and results-based approaches and realistic objectives helps promote greater accountability for the food security outcomes achieved.

(iv) Further develop tools to identify the roles and functions played by various stakeholders to address food insecurity in a protracted crisis situation, in order to assign responsibility for specific functions to designated actors. Use such tools to examine which designated responsibilities to improve food security and nutrition in a protracted crisis are being met or not in order to determine remedial action necessary.

(v) *All actors* involved should institutionalize effective multi-stakeholder accountability mechanisms at all levels and phases of protracted crisis to ensure the achievement of results of policies and actions.

(vi) *All actors* involved in applying the principles outlined in the CFS-A4A, as well as existing laws and norms affecting interventions to improve food security and nutrition in protracted crisis situations, are accountable for their decisions, actions and resulting impacts.

(vii) *All stakeholders* should work on common frameworks for results-based approaches in order to address food insecurity in protracted crises, drawing on the experiences of existing regional platforms, aiming to improve linkages between early-warning and early action.

(viii) In order to justify response options, it is preferable for them to have been tested and shown to work. *Relevant actors* should work together to test new approaches and demonstrate success. These kinds of partnership could help to underpin joint long-term, flexible programming, designed to be timely and responsive, in vulnerable regions experiencing protracted crises. This will help to inform the design of interventions to bring the most benefit to those in need; to avoid doing harm; to produce some assumptions on change pathways that can serve as a basis for monitoring; and to inform the type and scale of interventions required to improve food security and nutrition.

The way forward

41. *All CFS members and participants* have the responsibility to disseminate these principles and promote their use in the development, implementation and monitoring of policies and actions at global, regional, national and local levels.

42. Dissemination will be supported through implementation of the CFS Communication Strategy, capitalising on existing networks.

43. *National governments* are encouraged to voluntarily facilitate and institutionalize multi-stakeholder processes involving the following:

    (i) Using the CFS-A4A principles to review and further develop national policies, actions, investments and institutional capacities for addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises;

    (ii) Sharing of plans and lessons learnt with other CFS stakeholders, including policy and strategy documents, operational guidelines, tools and outcomes of evaluations (e.g. via a multi-stakeholder knowledge platform).

44. This includes reviewing, developing and implementing policies and actions within at risk and affected situations, and in other countries, whose policies and actions may impact on food security and nutrition in protracted crises, including international cooperation and assistance.

45. *Donors, cooperation partners, international organisations, businesses and civil society organisations* are also encouraged to facilitate their own participatory reviews of policies and actions and share their lessons learnt and plans for improving food security and nutrition, through the CFS.

46. Reviews and monitoring of policies and actions should be in line with the five principles set out in the GSF[vii] and be informed by the CFS endorsed "Framework for Monitoring CFS Decisions"[viii]. Monitoring should ensure accountability to at risk and affected populations and enable them to provide feedback during implementation of policies and actions. Monitoring mechanisms should build on existing mechanisms at global, regional, national and local level.

47. The principles outlined in this document provide a reference against which progress can be measured. They allow all stakeholders the opportunity to judge whether their proposed actions, and the actions of others, are appropriate and relevant, and to be accountable for the same.

48. The CFS is the global forum where all relevant actors can learn from each other's experiences, and assess progress towards objectives and purposes of the CFS-A4A and the continued relevance, effectiveness and impact of the principles for action.

49. The CFS-A4A principles will be incorporated in future versions of the GSF, and should be reviewed and updated by the CFS every five years on the basis of lessons learnt.

50. At the global level, the *CFS Bureau and Advisory Group* should oversee the establishment and work of a multi-stakeholder technical working group (TWG). The *TWG* should: provide and facilitate demand led support to regions and countries to develop, implement and monitor policies and actions; collate and disseminate lessons learnt (e.g. through a knowledge platform); and support the updating of the principles for action by the CFS. Existing capacity should be used, wherever possible. The working group should report to the CFS Bureau and Advisory Group at least annually, and according to the guidance adopted in a Framework for Monitoring CFS Decisions.

PART 2 – TRANSFORMING PRINCIPLES INTO ACTION

Appendix A – Illustrative examples of policies and actions

A.1 Introduction

This Appendix is targeted at policy makers and decision makers responsible for the design and implementation of policies and actions to address food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises. It aims to inspire and guide them in developing and implementing policies and actions in line with the principles in the CFS-A4A.

Users of this Appendix are encouraged to explore the examples, guidance and tools in more depth and contact those involved in the development of these policies, programmes, guidance and tools in order to learn from the experiences of others and identify approaches which are relevant in their own context.

The Appendix contains the following types of resource in relation to the principles:

- Examples of national policies and actions (including programmes) for addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises. Good practice examples are sometimes limited – hence the need for the CFS-A4A. Some examples are provided of policies and actions which do not adhere to the principles in order to illustrate their limitations in addressing food insecurity and malnutrition;
- Examples of global and regional initiatives which aim to support the development and implementation of policies and actions at regional and country levels;
- Examples of guidelines and tools which may be of help in implementing the principles;
- Possible actions to be implemented to operationalize the principles.

The inclusion of examples in Appendix A does not imply endorsement by the Committee on World Food Security or individual Member States and other participants. They are provided for illustrative purposes only. They have been selected by the Technical Support Team which supported the drafting of the CFS-A4A according to the following criteria:

- Clearly linked to the elements of the principle they come under and help show how that principle can be turned into action;
- Reflect different types of protracted crisis context, with examples not used more than once if possible;
- Prioritise national policies and actions, led by national governments and other national stakeholders but also provide examples of global and regional level policies and actions of regional entities, International Organizations, donors, international NGOs where they illustrate the principles.

As stated in the 'Way forward' section of Part 1, decision makers and programme managers are encouraged in the future to share their own examples of policies, strategies and plans, operational guidelines and tools and outcomes of evaluations, lessons learnt etc.

The examples provided in Appendix A are intended to be a starting point for building a public repository of good practice and tools as a resource for all countries and stakeholders in their efforts to prevent, mitigate and respond to food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises.

Principle 1

A.1.1 Malawi: towards a National Food and Nutrition Security Framework Law[1]

Malawi is a country with high levels of chronic food insecurity, which has, in the recent past, experienced recurrent, acute food crises as a consequence of natural disasters. A quarter of Malawians are 'ultra-poor', having an income below the estimated cost of food providing the minimum daily recommended calorie intake.

Approximately half of all children under the age of five show signs of chronic malnutrition. An estimated 48 percent are too short for their age (stunted), 30.6 percent weigh too little for their age (underweight), and 11.4 percent weigh too little for their height (wasted). Droughts and floods push on average approximately 265,000 more people into poverty each year and cause an annual average loss of 1.7 percent of GDP.

Malawi has a wide range of well-formulated and well-intended policies and strategies to accelerate progress in the realization of the right to adequate food. What is missing, however, is a more solid framework to bring together and build synergies between the multiple policies, strategies and programmes. Such a framework could ideally be grounded in law, through a National Food and Nutrition Security/Right to Food Framework Law. The Special Rapporteur was encouraged by the support expressed by interlocutors within Government and civil society for such a framework law. Initial steps have already been taken in this direction through discussions on a 'Draft Food Security Bill' prepared in consultation with civil society organizations through the National Right to Food Network.

The Special Rapporteur is encouraging the Government to revive this proposal in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including Parliamentary Committees, Malawi Law Commission, Malawi Human Rights Commission, civil society organizations, farmers associations and the private sector.

A.1.2 Sierra Leone: creating community-based dispute resolution mechanisms for mediation and resolution of food security and right to food challenges[2]

The provision of paralegal services free of charge to a community in Sierra Leone enabled local solutions to challenges while reinforcing accountability and transparency. Led by the Access to Justice Law Center, the experience demonstrates an alternative way of resolving disputes between citizens or communities and public administration officials where formal litigation is too costly, inaccessible or not culturally acceptable.

The experience evolved in four stages:

1. raising awareness on rights, and introducing the role of paralegals in the community;
2. establishing voluntary community oversight boards whose members act as a gateway to the community and a communication channel between the law centre's mobile paralegals and the community;
3. identifying, discussing and mediating cases through paralegals;
4. referring complex or unresolved issues to the supervising attorney at the law centre.

Mediation involved community members, third parties linked to the State and stakeholders operating in the district. Eleven reported cases involving food security included resolution of a dispute between a landowner and the Sierra Leone Agricultural Research Institute, and a case against a construction company that had appropriated properties belonging to three community members, destroying crops, without compensating the landowners.

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[1] Source: End of mission statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Malawi, 12 to 22 July 2013 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13567&LangID=E

[2] Source: FAO 2012. Guidance Note: Integrating the right ot adequate food into food and nutrition security programmes. Rome. http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3154e/i3154e.pdf

Community members have been empowered to report issues that affect their livelihoods and that would otherwise have been neglected. A process in which communities assume control in addressing these issues has been initiated through the establishment of community oversight boards to monitor the activities of paralegals and assess whether these activities bring benefits; to provide information to the community; and to create a learning environment for peaceful mediation of disputes involving food, through awareness raising on rights.

Principle 2

A.2.1. Haiti: the Commission for the Fight Against Hunger and Malnutrition (COLFAM) – an inter-ministerial platform for food security and nutrition policies[3]

Emergencies are recurrent in Haiti, often jeopardizing potential gains in the fight against malnutrition. In addition to the devastating earthquake in 2010, flooding in the north of the country as a result of Hurricane Sandy destroyed several nutrition rehabilitation centres. Other areas have suffered from a decrease in agriculture production due to damaged crops. Haiti is thus looking for ways to ensure that emergency response and preparedness are fully integrated into their approach to tackling food insecurity and malnutrition.

The national-level Commission for the Fight Against Hunger and Malnutrition (COLFAM) is responsible for the strategic direction of the ABA GRANGOU, the National Strategic Framework of the Haitian Government to fight hunger and malnutrition. Nine ministries, seven autonomous agencies, the Haitian Red Cross (HRC) and 21 government programmes are federated, strengthened and harmonised under the ABA GRANGOU strategic framework.

ABA GRANGOU implements programmes through government ministries in three strategic areas: (i) social safety net programmes to improve the access to the food for the most vulnerable; (ii) agricultural investment programmes to increase the domestic food production; and (iii) programmes which deliver essential services including health and nutrition programmes, improved water and sanitation infrastructure and crop storage to the most vulnerable families.

The COLFAM consists of representatives from the office of the President, the office of the Prime Minister, key line Ministries and the Parliament. The National Coordination Unit of ABA GRANGOU (UNAG) is responsible for the execution and coordination of activities set out in this national framework.

UN agencies contribute to the ABA GRANGOU and COLFAM through a technical committee on nutrition at the national and departmental levels, as well as through sectoral round tables. IFAD is an example of an international organization which is supporting the development of country owned policies and actions through multi-stakeholder participation.

A.2.2 Sahel and West Africa: the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR)[4]

Across the Sahel region, an estimated 20 percent of the population (12 million people) are chronically food insecure and vulnerable to the impacts of drought, poor harvests, rising food prices and conflict. Similar to the situation in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel is experiencing a shortening of the gap between hunger crises, with major events in 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2012 undermining the coping abilities of the region's population.

In 2012, the European Union launched a new partnership to strengthen resilience from future crises in the Sahel. The initiative, Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Resilience (AGIR-Sahel), seeks to ensure that the people in the Sahel can better cope with future droughts. AGIR-Sahel

[3] Source: http://scalingupnutrition.org/sun-countries/haiti
[4] Sources: http://globalallianceforaction.com; http://www.oecd.org/site/rpca/agir/#nrp; http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/resilience/agir_en.htm

starts from the premise that while emergency response in crises such as those that hit the Sahel in recent years is crucial to saving lives, the time has come for a sustained effort to help people in the Sahel cope better with recurrent crises, with a particular effort towards the most vulnerable people.

AGIR-Sahel aims to foster improved synergy, coherence and effectiveness of resilience initiatives in the region. Its objective is to "…structurally and sustainably reduce food and nutritional vulnerability by supporting the implementation of Sahelian and West African policies". The Alliance is placed under the political and technical leadership of ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS and it is based on existing platforms and networks, particularly the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA). Building on a 'Zero Hunger' target within the next 20 years, the core approach of the Alliance is to channel the efforts of regional and international stakeholders towards a common results framework. A Regional Roadmap, adopted in April 2013, specifies the objectives and main orientations of AGIR, with countries defining 'National Resilience Priorities'.

AGIR-Sahel illustrates a regional alliance approach with shared objectives, and complementary actions at three levels: i) local, by supporting local communities and endogenous initiatives and mechanisms; ii) national, by supporting investment programmes and existing consensus-building mechanisms; and iii) regional, by supporting the regional plans and mechanisms put in place by the three regional organisations (ECOWAS, UEMOA, CILSS). This international alliance brings together governments, regional organisations and their international partners, as well as civil society.

Principle 3

A.3.1 Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of the Congo: National food security situation analyses using the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)[5]

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) was designed to meet the needs of decision-makers by providing them comprehensive, timely and actionable knowledge on the food security situation in different areas. The IPC approach not only complies with the principle of ensuring and supporting comprehensive food security and nutrition analyses, it is also consistent with other principles in the CFS-A4A:

- Comprehensive - analyses underlying causes, risks, resilience and outcomes;
- Evidence based;
- Multi-stakeholder;
- Common analytical framework;
- Enables technical consensus to inform decision-making;
- Protects technical, human rights-based analysis from political and institutional interests;
- Monitors changes and provides early warning.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Since 2008, there has been growing institutionalization and government ownership of the IPC approach. At first the IPC process was led by FAO, but later ownership was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. In recent years the government has taken the full leadership of the IPC, while FAO and WFP provide funding, administrative and technical assistance. IPC has been influential in DRC in drawing attention to humanitarian emergencies and protracted crisis situations both in the Eastern part of the country (South and North Kivu in particular), and in the Western part of the country (Equateur). IPC analysis results are used, for example, to guide Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funding decisions in DRC and donors' decision-making and funding allocations.

Afghanistan: IPC started in Afghanistan in 2012 and initially there were numerous difficulties, such as lack of data, low capacity and security concerns. Despite these issues, IPC has been successfully implemented, and in a short period of time has gained wide support from the government, donors and other stakeholders. The coverage and quality of the analysis

[5] Source: http://www.ipcinfo.org/

has improved and it now covers the whole country. Institutionalization of the IPC in the country is continuing with sustained interest and support from the government, IPC partners, and donors.

A.3.2 South Sudan: resilience analysis as an indicator of project impact[6]

Building resilience is one of the most powerful means to mitigate – or even prevent – food insecurity and malnutrition. This needs to be reflected in how humanitarian and development responses are developed. Resilience is the capacity that ensures that shocks do not have long-lasting adverse development consequences, including a household's food security.

Working with partners, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) has developed a methodology to measure households' resilience to food security threats caused by natural and human-induced shocks. The Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) model identifies and weighs what factors make a household resilient to food insecurity and traces the stability of these factors over time. In the analytical framework of RIMA, resilience explains why one household returns to a desired level of food security while a similar household does not. The model provides the evidence base to design, deliver, monitor and evaluate assistance to populations in need more effectively, based on what they need most.

In South Sudan, the resilience index is being used as an impact indicator of a project to improve community stability and sustainable food security. A baseline was completed in 2012; the final survey will take place once the security situation has stabilized. A comparative analysis will reveal the impact of the re-emergence of violence on the resilience of the target population and area. The findings will be used to, (i) regularly monitor progress and achievements in terms of food security outcomes of project households, (ii) synthesize lessons learned, providing donors and stakeholders with the knowledge to inform future planning and investments, and (iii) provide detailed food security profiles, with details of socio-economic conditions, agricultural production and resilience.

This innovative work contributes to the growing body of evidence on the role of resilience analysis in improving responses to crisis affected populations, and will guide improvements in the design of future analysis.

A.3.2 Pakistan: Livelihoods Recovery Appraisal (LRA) multi-stakeholder methodology[7]

The LRA is a survey tool adopted by the IASC Food Security Cluster in Pakistan to measure the impact and recovery from successive (annual) major flooding events in the southern part of the country, and the resilience of flood affected households. It is a multi-stakeholder tool, endorsed by Government at local, provincial and federal levels, developed and implemented in a highly participatory manner through the Pakistan Food Security Cluster.

Preliminary results are shared and discussed by stakeholders at the Provincial level, and workshops are held to generate consensus around the findings and the implications for programming. The LRA has been repeated over three successive years (2011, 2012, and 2013) allowing a longer-term analysis of trends in livelihoods and the effectiveness of interventions designed to support recovery.

The analysis is comprehensive and addresses both immediate and underlying causes of vulnerability whilst also providing an assessment of the quality, quantity and appropriateness of livelihood support in a context of chronic exposure to natural hazards and complex governance challenges

Repeating the survey over successive years provides an important evidence base for sustained and targeted support to communities and households affected by protracted and repeated

[6] For more information: http://www.foodsec.org/web/resilience/measuring-resilience/en/
[7] See: http://foodsecuritycluster.net/countries/pakistan

shocks. Large sample sizes permit highly accurate estimates to be made regarding the status and trajectory of human, natural, physical, financial and social capitals as well as food security outcomes at the household level.

Principle 4

A.4.1 Horn of Africa: IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) and regional Resilience Analysis Unit

In response to the severe drought that devastated the region in 2010/2011, the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was tasked with coordinating the design and implementation of an IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) Strategy.

The Strategy was developed with IGAD specialized institutions as well as public and non-state actors in member states and other stakeholders affected by drought or involved in responding to its effects, including CGIAR and UN agencies and development partners.

Between 2013 and 2017, this Strategy will guide and inform the process of implementing drought resilience initiatives at national, regional and international levels, united and harmonized under the overall coordination and leadership of the IGAD Secretariat. The Strategy recognizes the need for a comprehensive and holistic approach to combating chronic food insecurity and malnutrition, and addresses deep-seated poverty and environmental degradation to build the resilience of communities and households to the effects of droughts and other shocks in the region. Seven priority intervention areas include:

- equitable access and sustainable use of natural resources;
- market access, facilitating trade and availing versatile financial services;
- equitable access to livelihood support and basic social services;
- disaster risk management capabilities and preparedness for effective response;
- generation and use of research, knowledge, technology and innovations;
- conflict prevention, resolution and peace building;
- coordination mechanisms and institutional arrangements and improving partnerships.[8]

In 2013 IGAD requested FAO, UNDP, UNICEF and WFP to create a Resilience Analysis Unit (RAU) to support the Strategy through improved resilience measurement and analysis at the regional level. This collaborative 5-year partnership will ensure that IGAD, its Member States and other relevant stakeholders develop and have the future capacity to complete robust resilience analyses for evidence-based programme and policy design, implementation and impact assessment.

The IDDRSI Strategy illustrates the development of a common framework for developing national and regional programmes designed to enhance drought resilience by drawing on innovative approaches, and building sustainability in the IGAD region.

A.4.2 Ethiopia: a mixed relief-and-development programme[9]

Adopting a resilience perspective infers the creation of policies and actions that innovatively bridge the relief and development sectors. In the last decade, Ethiopia's government and various international development partners experimented with novel programmes that blend relief and development elements.

[8] IGAD. 2013. The IDDRISI Strategy - IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative. (http://www.itacaddis.org/docs/2013_09_24_07_50_06_IDDRSI%20Strategy%20Revised%20January%202013.pdf).
[9] Sources: Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 53, March 2012. 'How Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is responding to the current humanitarian crisis in the Horn' (http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-53).

Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was set up in 2005 by the government as part of a strategy to address chronic food insecurity. It was an innovative solution to two major problems: (i) the *ad hoc*, uneven, and unpredictable nature of traditional transfer programmes and, (ii) the commonly held view that an excessive focus on relief was inhibiting sustainable rural development. By combining social protection with public asset building, the PSNP contributes to both relief and longer-term development.[10]

The PSNP provides cash or food to people who have predictable food needs in a way that enables them to improve their own livelihoods – and therefore become more resilient to the effects of shocks in the future.

However, there are times when a shock results in transitory food insecurity, the scale of which is beyond the mainstream PSNP to address. This requires additional temporary support. In this event extra funding comes from the PSNP's Contingency Budget and, when that is exhausted, the Risk Financing Mechanism (RFM). The RFM allows the PSNP to scale up in times of crisis, and is designed to reduce the 'typical' timeline for humanitarian response, so that households receive assistance before a crisis makes itself felt.

The 2012 GHA report notes that the early response to warnings and early scaling up of the PSNP helped significantly reduce the overall impact of the 2011 food crisis. The cost per beneficiary in areas where the scaled-up programme was used was estimated at USD 53, compared with USD 169 where a traditional humanitarian food aid response was used.[11]

As an example of a long-term, country owned social protection programme which builds resilient livelihoods and can be scaled up to respond to shocks, the PSNP has much to offer in lessons learned and the development of similar approaches elsewhere.

A.4.3 Innovative programming: cash transfers

There is growing evidence that cash transfers have a range of positive effects and are good value for money. Using cash transfers and vouchers can be a rapid and cost-effective way to deliver assistance in protracted crises. Under the right conditions it can empower beneficiaries to make decisions and choices about their own needs as well as boost local markets and economies without detrimental inflationary side effects.

A growing number of donors and agencies are implementing cash-based programmes and developing appropriate policies, including:

- The UK's Department for International Development's (DFID) Bilateral Aid Review 2010 – 2011 announced increased commitments to cash transfer programmes with significant funding to Kenya, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Bangladesh.[12]
- The EU has made cash and voucher programmes a sector priority. Between 2007 and 2010 the proportion of funding to these types of programmes more than doubled and now all ECHO food assistance programmes in Haiti and Pakistan contain either a cash or voucher element.[13]
- In 2008 WFP implemented its policy on 'Vouchers and Cash Transfers as Food Assistance Instruments: Opportunities and Challenges'. Since then its cash and voucher programming

[10] 2013 Global Hunger Index. Welthungerhilfe/International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)/Concern Worldwide (http://www.ifpri.org/ghi/2013)
[11] Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2012 (http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/GHA_Report_2012-Websingle.pdf)
[12] Source: Department for International Development (DFID), 2011. Available from http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Articles/cash-transfers-literature-review.pdf
[13] Source: European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), 2013. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/sectoral/cash_en.htm

has increased substantially with the number of planned projects increasing from five interventions in 2008 to 35 in 2010.[14]

In 2012, Somalia received USD 33 million in humanitarian cash transfer programmes[15]. A variant, cash-for-work (CFW), provides immediate cash relief while setting the base for medium term recovery. It does this by rebuilding both livelihoods and infrastructure. Work opportunities provided by CFW ensure that vulnerable people remain in their communities, thereby avoiding more displacement and keeping social ties intact. When combined with other interventions, CFW helps build the roots of stability that will prevent crises from recurring.

As the use of cash transfer programmes in humanitarian situations has gained increasing recognition, the feasibility of scaling up and measuring their effectiveness, particularly from a gender perspective, is now being explored in more detail. Including beneficiaries and their communities more systematically in monitoring and evaluation of cash transfer programmes, and considering gender and nutritional issues in design[16], should improve programme effectiveness.[17]

A.4.2 West Bank and Gaza Strip: urban agriculture as a response to food insecurity

Urban agriculture approaches in West Bank and Gaza Strip are being shown to boost long- and short-term food security and nutrition, income and employment generation as well as contributing to empowerment and social inclusion. In the context of restricted access to land, food inflation, rapid urbanization and very high population density, household and roof-top gardens are playing a vital role in building Palestinian households' resilience.

Building on community innovations several local and international civil society organizations in Gaza, including the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees and Oxfam Italia and have developed urban and peri-urban agricultural development programmes which help support the following elements:

- Urban agriculture value chains;
- Urban water-harvesting projects;
- Integrated land rehabilitation and cultivation;
- Local market access;
- Innovation and research;
- Small and micro-enterprises;
- Enhanced productivity and reduction of food waste;
- Enhanced nutrition and safe food production systems.

International agencies and organizations are also recognising this approach. Since 2011 FAO has supported 550 rooftop and backyard gardens in Gaza, and has also piloted aquaponics systems. These are a vertical rooftop or backyard garden connected to a fish tank. This integrated production system capitalizes on the synergies between aquaculture (fish farming) and horticulture (vegetable or fruit growing), and can work where there is no land, very little space and where resources are scarce.

Waste water from the fish tanks is used to irrigate the vertical rooftop gardens, and acts as an organic fertilizer, increasing vegetable and fruit production without the need of chemical fertilizers. Conversely, vegetable waste products are used to feed the fish. Aquaponic systems

[14] World Food Programme (WFP), 2011. Available from http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp232630.pdf
[15] Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (GHA), 2013. Available from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/GHA-Report-2013.pdf. Based on analysis of UN OCHA FTS data.
[16] See http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ib79.pdf, p.6 for insights from Niger into cash transfers and nutritional outcomes.
[17] Department for International Development (DFID), 2013. Available from www.gov.uk/government/news/dfid-research-transforming-cash-transfers

are an inexpensive source of animal protein and vitamins and thus greatly improve the diets and health of vulnerable households.[18]

Principle 5

A.5.1 South Sudan: use of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGTs)[19]

Endorsed in May 2012 the VGGTs were the first major output of the reformed CFS, hailed as a landmark decision. The VGGTs promote food security and sustainable development by improving secure access to land, fisheries and forests and protecting the legitimate tenure rights of millions of people, many of whom are poor and food insecure. The VGGT is a reference document for design of new land administration projects – a recent example is the design of the new Integrated Land Administration project in Serbia.

No country can implement the VGGT as a whole, since the spectrum of themes included is vast. Each country has its own priorities and, equally important, different stages of development vis-à-vis each theme. Countries are therefore advised to undertake a self-assessment of their governance of tenure situation.

South Sudan plans to use the VGGTs to develop an Agricultural Land Tenure Policy and action plan for its implementation and monitoring. The government has requested technical and institutional support from FAO for this. The Agricultural Land Tenure Policy will be aligned with principles in the VGGTs and the Framework and Guidelines of the African Land Policy Initiative. It will be a consultative process engaging key stakeholders from national and state level and provide the foundation for, and create synergies with, on-going and anticipated land tenure support initiatives.

FAO and the UN Economic Commission for Africa are in the closing stages of signing a Memorandum of Understanding that strengthens linkages and realizes synergies between the Guidelines and the Africa Land Policy Initiative across the whole region.

A.5.2 North Kordofan State, Sudan: SOS Sahel's experience of conflict transformation between pastoralists and farmers[20]

The following example illustrates the potential for development projects to exacerbate conflict over natural resources and the importance of working with existing customary institutions even in a situation of unrest and uncertainty.

The aim of the project was, "To design and implement a long term strategy over a period of 10 to 20 years for managing the forest resources of El Ain reserve and the surrounding buffer zone in a sustainable way, while taking into account certain urgent needs of local people, namely: safeguarding access to renewable energy; arresting rapid environmental degradation". There were four main implementation foci - extension promoting several natural resource oriented activities (e.g. improved stoves; micro-catchments, village nurseries etc.); promotion of local management of forests; research work and dissemination of lessons learnt.

The project targeted villagers living around the El Ain forest, working with them to identify ways to conserve local forest resources by reducing demand for fuel-wood and building materials. Local people identified how the forests would be managed, by whom and for what purpose and began to rehabilitate existing forest.

The project made real progress but, after some time, it became clear that the exclusion of pastoralists, who also relied on resources in the area, was threatening the sustainability of the

[18] See: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/33680_fao.pdf
[19] See: http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/
[20] Source: http://www.sahel.org.uk/pdf/Securing%20the%20Commons%20No.5%20(English).pdf

achievements and could potentially exacerbate existing tensions between pastoralists and resident farmers. The situation was made worse when the government allocated a vast area of pasture to a private company.

The project decided to act to help resolve the situation. Not doing so threatened to reverse many of the achievements realised by the local community, with the support of the project, over the previous eight years. The project undertook training in the analysis and resolution of conflict together with members of the community, government and civil society groups who traditionally deal with conflict situations. The project then identified an area that they knew well, in which they could pilot an approach to conflict resolution with the support of local leaders and the community.

A key outcome was a negotiated agreement between Gagrur farmers and the Sebeihat pastoralists, over the use, access and management of common property resources in the area, which resulted in improved inter-community relations, recognition of the rights of pastoralists and reduced conflicts between herders and farmers.

A.5.3 Closing the gender gap: improved returns[21]

The State of Food and Agriculture 2010–11 makes the 'business case' for addressing gender issues in agriculture and rural employment. The agriculture sector is underperforming in many developing countries, in part because women do not have equal access to the resources and opportunities they need to be more productive.

The gender gap imposes real costs on society in terms of lost agricultural output, food security and economic growth. Promoting gender equality is not only good for women; it is also good for agricultural development. Women make essential contributions to the rural economy of all developing country regions as farmers, labourers and entrepreneurs. Their roles are diverse and changing rapidly, so generalizations should be made carefully. However, there is a consistent fact across countries and contexts: women have less access than men to agricultural assets, inputs and services and to rural employment opportunities.

Women in protracted crisis situations are often primarily responsible for meeting the water, food and energy needs of households and communities. SOFA 2010-11 found that giving women farmers the same access to assets and finance as men could help increase yields on their farms by 20 to 30 per cent. Similarly, it was shown that, on average, improvements in child health and nutrition achieved by a USD 10 increase in women's income would require an increase of USD 110 in a male's income.

In protracted crises, particularly those affected by conflict, where women's roles in agriculture tend to expand, this could raise total agricultural output and significantly strengthen recovery and food security and nutrition.

Principle 6

A.6.1 Sudan: Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT)[22]

NMPACT was an operational response in a complex and protracted emergency that innovatively addressed an incipient food security crisis.

The programme promoted a Nuba-led response to the needs of the people of the Nuba Mountains in Sudan, which had been subject to conflict since 1985. NMPACT started in 2002 after part of the region had been excluded from official assistance for more than a decade; traditional sources of livelihood had been destroyed, with little access to traditional farming land, and many had been internally displaced.

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[21] State of Food and Agriculture, 2010-11. http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i2050e/i2050e.pdf

[22] Source: Pantuliano, S. 2005. Changes and Potential Resilience of Food Systems in the Nuba Mountains Conflict (available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/af141e/af141e00.htm).

NMPACT was a multi-agency, cross-line programme, born out of a two and a half year consultative planning process that included the majority of national and international actors operating in the area. The emphasis on promoting local leadership and grassroots capacity, and strong ownership by counterparts were critical aspects of the approach. Notable for having brought together an array of actors around common 'principles of engagement', NMPACT was the only operational programme in the Sudan to which both warring parties subscribed during the conflict.

Creating an enabling environment in which interventions could be implemented to address both short- and long-term needs and better support conflict transformation and peace-building processes in the region, NMPACT broke from traditional externally driven responses to food insecurity. Drawing on lessons from Operation Lifeline Sudan, it adopted an approach that focuses on capacity building, sustainable agriculture and market revitalisation, alongside conflict transformation and peace-building.

As a partnership based on principles of engagement, NMPACT resulted in coordinated and effective efforts to address the key determinants of conflict and food insecurity.

A.6.2 The Somali Compact: a country led, multi-stakeholder, statebuilding and peacebuilding strategy, integrating food security and humanitarian objectives[23]

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the 'New Deal'), was developed through the forum of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The Dialogue consists of the g7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners, and international organisations.

The New Deal is an agreement between fragile states and partners to change the policy and practice of engagement. It recognises that: "Processes of political dialogue have often failed due to lack of trust, inclusiveness, and leadership. International partners can often bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of harmonising with the national and local context, and support short-term results at the expense of medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by building capacity and systems".

The New Deal proposes key peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, focuses on new ways of engaging, and identifies commitments to build mutual trust and achieve better results. There has been some concern that the New Deal does not adequately reflect food security and nutrition concerns, for example robust food security indicators are not well reflected in fragility assessments.

The Somali Compact, is an example of an overarching strategic framework for coordinating political, security and development efforts for peace and statebuilding, based on New Deal principles.

One of the strategic objectives of the Somali Compact is to, "Revitalize and expand the Somali economy with a focus on livelihood enhancement, employment generation, and broad-based inclusive growth." It is recognized that the economy has a critical role to play in Somalia's statebuilding and peacebuilding processes, including employment generation, particularly for youth and women. It is a stated priority to "…provide prioritized support to the productive sectors, specifically agriculture (farming, livestock and fisheries)." A further priority is to "…promote the sustainable development and management of natural resources by developing legal and regulatory frameworks and building capacity in key Natural Resources Management (NRM) institutions."

[23] Sources: http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf; http://www.newdeal4peace.org/about-the-new-deal/; http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/new-deal-for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf

Stakeholders in the Somali Compact are committed to humanitarian principles and ensuring full access to people in need. The 2013-15 humanitarian strategy, which focuses on both life-saving needs and building resilience to drought and other shocks, is considered as integral to the Compact.

A.6.3 Food assistance in Mindanao, the Philippines: peacebuilding before peace[24]

The World Food Programme's (WFP) programme in Mindanao combined immediate interventions to meet humanitarian needs and medium- to longer-term measures to support rehabilitation, recovery, and development.

Activities included school meals, mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN), food-for-work (FFW) and food-for-training (FFT), and assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs). Activities were concentrated in poor municipalities of Mindanao affected by conflict, as identified by the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

WFP commissioned an evaluation of the programme's effectiveness between June 2006 and March 2009, which showed that WFP's activities indirectly supported the peace process. IDPs reported that the international presence gave them hope for the future and assurances for eventual return to their places of origin. Although there was some concern about creating a dependency on food aid, the IDPs stated that they would indeed return as soon as security conditions permitted.

School meals were effective in bringing more children to school and improving food access at the household level. They also increased community participation: parents claimed to have grown closer as a community, and become better able to trust members and be more sensitive to others' needs. School meals also strengthened the opportunities for dialogue between the government and targeted communities.

FFW and FFT took place on a limited scale, but had a positive impact on the community. People became more cooperative and took on new projects together. The FFW projects did not increase dependence on external support, and provided valuable in-kind support to families.

It was clear that WFP's presence and activities promoted peacebuilding in the region. Beneficiaries and other stakeholders told the evaluation mission that WFP's presence provided a buffer from hunger and also from hopelessness. WFP activities encouraged communities to work together and had a positive psychological impact. The food assistance programmes provided peace dividends that helped foster a sense of stability among the people most affected by the conflict in Mindanao.

Principle 7

A.7.1 Mozambique: the role of traditional institutions[25]

Informal institutions at village-level often substitute for missing formal institutions and safety nets, and tend to persist even during periods of crisis, including tension with central government. When village-government relations improve, sometimes with the intervention of NGOs, experience shows that more resilient and flexible local institutions can be revitalized and strengthened to take on new roles and responsibilities, particularly in natural resource management and rural development planning.

[24] Source: Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011.
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp238358.pdf

[25] Source: Marsh, R. 2003. *Working with Local Institutions to Support Sustainable Livelihoods*. Rome: FAO. (http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5083e/y5083e00.htm).

A deeper understanding of traditional institutions and "local social order", offering forms of mutual assistance and community ties, has been found to play a key success factor when trying to build understanding and capacity for better governance in vulnerable regions. Values can be more readily transformed at this level to allow for further capacity development. Conflict resolution interventions are better initialised involving smaller, traditional institutions, where bonds of community solidarity and mutual assistance reside, rather than state institutions.

In four communities in Mozambique key local institutions supporting livelihoods and alleviating poverty were identified. Analysis of participation in, and the perceived importance of, local institutions to households indicated that in all four study villages the church was the most important (particularly for women), followed by traditional authorities and political parties.

The remarkably peaceful resettling of internally displaced persons after the civil war in Mozambique has been largely attributed to the critical role of traditional authorities in settling land claims and providing land access to newcomers.

A.7.2 Operationalising anti-corruption frameworks[26]

The goal of development assistance is to reduce poverty and support countries in their development. To improve aid effectiveness, developments partners — both aid providers and aid recipients — have a shared role and responsibility in preventing one of the main breakdowns in effectiveness: corruption.

In protracted crises, aid assistance injects valuable resources into resource-poor and often insecure contexts with high levels of need. Assistance may not reach the most vulnerable populations. The complexity of operating in these contexts makes addressing corruption – and the taboos surrounding it – particularly essential for aid agencies. Without systems in place that can address corruption pro-actively and comprehensively, future aid flows are jeopardized. This was especially evident in Somalia where major donors withheld aid in recent years. Along with Afghanistan and the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, Somalia has the worst perceived level of public sector corruption according to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2013.

Anti-corruption approaches are more effective when community-driven monitoring efforts and accountability mechanisms are in place. The Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa (RACP) 2011-2016, a joint UN and African Union initiative, facilitates the elaboration and implementation of two key policy and political frameworks - the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (2003) and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) (2003).

The programme adopts a multi-track strategic approach which combines policy research and analysis, with training and capacity development, peer learning and knowledge and information sharing and documentation of best practices on anti-corruption, as well as policy dialogue. The project engages at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, and works with civil society and National Anti-Corruption Institutions through training on monitoring and reporting, as well as workshops that bring together partners to form viable 'action plans'.

Principle 8

A.8.1 The African Risk Capacity (ARC) [27]

The ARC is a novel partnership between the African Union, UN agencies, philanthropic foundations and aid providers which aims to be "…an African-owned, standalone financial entity

[26] Sources: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013 and http://www.auanticorruption.org/uploads/Regional_Anti-Corruption_Programme.pdf.

[27] For further information refer to the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Briefing Book and see http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/.

that will provide African governments with timely, reliable and cost-effective contingency funding in the event of a severe drought by pooling risk across the continent."

Using a sophisticated risk model developed by the UN World Food Programme (WFP), ARC translates country specific rainfall data into an approximate "response cost". Countries pay premiums, based on probable risks, to an index-based insurance mechanism. This pools the risk of a drought occurring across several countries, taking advantage of weather system diversity across Africa; it is unlikely that droughts will happen in the same year in all parts of the continent, so not every participating country will need money at the same time. In addition to paying their premium, countries also need to develop national contingency plans for how potential ARC payouts will be used to assist affected populations.

Currently, between appeals for assistance and its delivery, households are often forced to adopt short-term survival strategies, e.g. selling productive assets like livestock, reducing food consumption and pulling children out of school. These strategies can undermine future resilience and reverse development achievements; loss of livelihoods can have long-term repercussions on households and communities.

This new kind of funding mechanism, based on risk rather than crisis management, seeks to improve the efficiency of drought responses, allowing countries to provide more timely assistance to the least resilient and most vulnerable populations, protecting development gains and reducing both the short- and the long-term costs of assistance. ARC aims to catalyse a better risk management system for Africa and provide the capacity building support required to implement it. It is estimated that an ARC contingency fund of USD 250 million could save African countries and donors nearly USD 1 billion over 20 years.

A.8.2 Somalia: the importance of remittances

Remittances, now globally become more than three times larger than official development assistance[28], have had significant impacts on poverty and food security. Remittances can help to reduce poverty, leading to reduced hunger, better diets and, given appropriate policies, increased on-farm investment.[29]

Populations in protracted crisis situations are often dependent on remittances from family members and relatives elsewhere. More than 40 percent of Somalia's population receive remittances from overseas - over four million people - estimated at around USD1.2 billion a year. Families across the country use the cash to cover basic household expenses, with over 70 percent using the money they receive through remittances to pay for food expenses.[30] A loss of remittances in can thus pose significant food security risks.

Related research on cash transfers, an effective response option relative to food aid, demonstrated that it was possible to maintain cash transfers to Somalia in response to the 2011 famine, while maintaining due diligence. The local money transfer system was highly efficient, and agencies were able to avoid diversion of funds, through careful monitoring and engagement.[31]

The significance of remittances is often underestimated. In 2013, a decision by Barclays Bank to close its Somalia accounts had the potential to severely disrupt the flow of remittances. In September 2013, the 47th Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Extraordinary Ministerial Council established a special support facility for the Somali remittance industry, and

[28] Remittances accounted for USD 40.8 billion in 2011, and development assistance comprised USD 15.1 billion. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2013).
[29] SOFI 2013
[30] Source: 'Family Ties: Remittances and Livelihoods Support in Puntland and Somaliland Study Report' (2013), FSNAU.
[31] Source: Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher transfer programme - Phase 2: April 2012-March 2013. http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7749-cash-transfer-somalia-monitoring-me.

endorsed practical recommendations proposed by the Somali Money Services Association (SOMSA).

Efforts to facilitate and support remittances can make a difference to livelihoods in protracted crises, and help strengthen mutual accountability between the international community, national authorities and citizens.

A.8.3 Flexible funding mechanisms

Aid providers rarely fund in holistic way and often prefer to support humanitarian, transition or development interventions separately. This inevitably means that work is less well connected, and also requires greater administration. However, there are an increasing number of efforts to strengthen the integration of humanitarian and development actions through more flexible funding mechanisms and policies. These have facilitated timelier responses to context changes.

- ***'Crisis modifiers'***, pioneered by USAID/OFDA in Ethiopia, enable a more integrated, agile and flexible approach. This has been shown to be an effective asset protection mechanism. The Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative II (PLI-II) Crisis Modifier provides direct funding to USAID/Ethiopia to protect development gains during times of shock. Small grants allow partners to provide a quick response in the event of a small and/or localized issue that would otherwise set back larger development activities. Activities are generally no longer than a few months[32]. The routine adoption of 'crisis modifiers' in development programmes in drought prone areas, for example, would allow for quicker and smoother adaptation to extreme circumstances.
- ***Norway's transitional assistance budget line 162.70*** was introduced in 2002 to cover assistance to countries and areas recovering from conflict and natural disaster. Institutionally and financially, transitional related assistance fell between traditional long-term development assistance and more short-term humanitarian assistance. Experience from the field revealed that the time-span between the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance from a country and the initiation of long-term development cooperation was often too long. A flexible system of financing was required to ensure continued support for active peacebuilding processes and reconstruction work.[33]
- The ***European Union's 'Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience' (SHARE)*** flagship initiative was launched in response to the effects of the delayed response to the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis, with the goal of improving the ability of people, communities and countries to face recurrent crises. SHARE seeks to break the vicious cycle of drought, hunger and poverty through sustained coordination between humanitarian and development assistance. With allocations of over EUR 270 million in 2012 and 2013, SHARE aims to boost resilience by improving the opportunities of farming and pastoralist communities to make a living and the capacity of public services to respond to crises.[34]

Principle 9

A.9.1 FAO-IFAD: capacity development support[35]

FAO and IFAD launched a joint USD 2.6 million initiative to help developing countries, particularly fragile states, manage public investments in small-scale agriculture more effectively. The focus is on countries where weak governance structures can mean that development

[32] Source: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/ethiopia/427391/PDF%20files/OFDA%20EThiopia%20Overview%20_2_.pdf
[33] Source: Norwegian Peacebuilding Policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead. Evaluation Report 2/2004. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0044/ddd/pdfv/210674-rapp204.pdf.
[34] Source: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/resilience/share_en.htm
[35] Source: IFAD Press Release: 'IFAD and FAO target small-scale agricultural projects facing challenges $2.6 million grant to help countries manage public investments'. 2 October, 2013. http://www.ifad.org/media/press/2013/44.htm

projects face challenges in delivering results. Up to 15 projects in ten countries will be targeted over a two-year period, with priority given to projects that are already under way, but that are encountering difficulties.

FAO's Investment Centre Division, which leads the FAO's efforts to generate increased investment in agriculture and rural development, will work with countries to improve their ability to plan and implement investment programmes funded by IFAD.

The goal is to improve capacity at local and national levels to plan, manage and implement agricultural investment programmes, resulting in better developmental outcomes. The initiative focuses on training, mentoring, practical learning and guidance materials, sharing good practices and documentation of the most common institutional and capacity constraints faced by different actors.

Improving governance, project management and knowledge sharing skills helps build a solid foundation for the implementation of future projects, though a better understanding of constraints, building on experience in these challenging contexts.

This initiative is a solid example of identifying and addressing capacity gaps that compromise stakeholders' ability to plan, implement and monitor programmes and projects to address food security and nutrition in fragile states.

A.9.2 Horn of Africa 2011: learning lessons, making changes[36]

The catastrophic effects of the international community's delayed response to the 2011 food insecurity and famine in the Horn of Africa, despite numerous early warnings, has led to a number of changes in policy and practice when responding to forewarned emergencies.

Various evaluations and analyses of the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis response have flagged similar recommendations for future actions. These include more preventative action, less risk aversion by donors, greater flexibility in funding, better use of cash transfers and social safety nets (including at scale), a more organized framework to improve response to early warnings, and multi-year funding cycles. Since the 2011 experience, various stakeholders have made improvements to policies and actions, building on lessons learned, including:

- In late 2012 the UN announced a three-year Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for Somalia, the first of its kind. This innovation has since been followed with a similar three-year UN Strategic Response Plan for the Sahel (2014-2016);
- The Nairobi Strategy[37], developed by African leaders and international partners at the Summit on the Horn of Africa in September 2011, outlined a number of commitments to address many of the issues highlighted by the 2011 crisis. It was agreed that the crisis reflected "...long-term under investment in drought-prone areas" and a new approach was required in which policies and programmes would have a "...primary objective of building resilience to future climatic and economic shocks." This new approach and focus should "...encompass the continuum of relief, recovery, reconstruction, innovation and long-term development towards sustainable development to ensure drought resilience and ensuring food security."
- Subsequent appeals saw an increase in the amount of cash transfer programming, reflecting an understanding that, in Somalia at least, the food crisis was also due to conflict-induced high food prices that people could not afford, as well a drought-induced food shortage.

[36] Sources: Horn of Africa Learning and Accountability Portal (http://www.hornofafricaportal.org/evaluations); Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013 (http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/GHA-Report-2013.pdf).
[37] See: http://aigaforum.com/news/Nairobi_Strategy_091411.pdf

Principle 10

A.10.1 West Bank and Gaza Strip: Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) in practice

Organizations fail to respect the communities they work with when they are not, at a minimum, transparent about their role, their agenda, and what communities can expect from them. Further, information and effective communication are key aid deliverables in their own right. Aid agencies therefore need to gain specific understanding of the information needs of communities they are assisting, and then strive to meet those needs to the fullest extent possible.

FAO project participants in West Bank and Gaza Strip were surveyed regarding AAP, including on current standards of information provision and their information needs. They advised that information can be manipulated and used as a tool of power, and emphasized that everyone should have equal access, rather than favouring men by posting information where women don't go. They reported that they currently receive information about interventions, the inputs they will receive and who are targeted. The types of additional information they asked for included updates, when items will be delivered and if they are delayed and why, information on the selection criteria, clarification of the targeting, who the project personnel are, and who to contact.

A.10.2 Building social accountability - the Mwananchi programme[38]

The Mwananchi programme works to strengthen citizen engagement with governments across six African countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia), working with sixty-six organisations in over 200 local communities. The aim is to increase transparency and to hold governments to better account. The programme name, Mwananchi (mwah-nah-'n-chee), is the Kiswahili word for 'citizen'. It implies a responsible and hard-working member of the public – exactly the type of person the programme is designed to benefit.

Findings from the programme suggest that there are three major issues with the way social accountability initiatives are currently designed and implemented:

- Failure to engage with the with incentives at the heart of collective action problems;
- Theories of change that fail to take advantage of learning by doing;
- Generic support to 'cookie cutter' agents of change, rather than first identifying the right process to create change.

To combat these challenges, a focus on context-specific processes, or 'interlocution processes', is recommended, by which selected actors, or interlocutors, can orchestrate changes in citizen-state relations at various levels and a retreat from standardised tools which fail to produce the right results in different contexts.

The Mwananchi Justice Agenda Project (MAJAP), implemented by World Voices Uganda, has increased access to justice through informal community-justice systems (known as Bataka courts), part of a strategy to empower the ordinary citizens in the setting of their own justice agenda. Formal courts are frequently difficult for rural people to access, making justice prohibitively expensive. Instead, citizens are able to get decisions on disputes within their own communities, linking justice to community relationships and conflict resolution. This may also reduce reoffending, something formal mechanisms often fail to achieve. By providing ordinary people with an avenue to access affordable justice, the Bataka courts increase their self-determination and capacity to engage in debates. World Voices has now produced a handbook to allow the Bataka model to be implemented in other parts of Uganda.

[38] Sources: http://www.mwananchi-africa.org/ and UKAid. *Rethinking social accountability in Africa: Lessons from the Mwananchi Programme* by Fletcher Tembo (http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8561.pdf).

A.10.3 Kenya and Myanmar: impact of accountability mechanisms[39]

Accountability is believed to matter because it is understood to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian and development programming by ensuring that goods and services are relevant to people's needs, which helps ensure sustainability; that where accountability systems support community participation in programmes they can contribute to political and social empowerment; and that accountability can make programmes more efficient, by allowing people to identify and correct mismanagement and waste.

Recent research provides some evidence of the efficacy of accountability mechanisms on the quality and impact of assistance. Focused on benchmarks from the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) Standard[40], and drawing on case studies in Kenya and Myanmar and a literature review, results are compelling. Accountability mechanisms were found to have:

- Improved targeting of assistance, the kind of interventions and location of services - community participation provided agencies with a better understanding of local vulnerabilities;
- Strengthened trust between agencies and local communities;
- Contributed to 'trust dividends' with communities in insecure environments;
- Optimised use of resources and promoted value for money;
- Enhanced community ownership of projects.

These results indicate that accountability mechanisms have a positive impact on development and humanitarian outcomes, and should be regarded as essential contributions to the overall development process. More evidence is required to build on these findings.

[39] Sources: Featherstone, A. 2013. *Improving Impact: Do accountability mechanisms deliver results?* A joint Christian Aid, Save the Children, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership report. (Available at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/accountability-impact-report-2013.pdf).
[40] http://www.hapinternational.org/what-we-do/hap-standard.aspx

Appendix B - Case studies

B.1 Introduction

This Appendix presents three case studies in order to:

- Illustrate national, multi-stakeholder processes for developing, implementing and monitoring relevant policies and actions;
- Share preliminary lessons learnt and, where feasible, plans of action resulting from country-led, multi-stakeholder reviews of existing policies and actions, informed by the CFS-A4A principles;
- Inspire others to transform policies and actions for addressing food insecurity and malnutrition in protracted crises.

The primary audience of the case studies are high-level policy makers in national governments. As stated in the way forward section of Part 1, all stakeholders are encouraged to use the CFS-A4A principles for action, illustrative examples and case studies to guide the establishment or strengthening of multi-stakeholder processes for developing, implementing and monitoring policies and actions, and to share plans and lessons learnt with others through the CFS.

The inclusion of these case studies does not imply endorsement by the CFS or individual Member States and other participants. They are provided for illustrative purposes only.

CFS Members and Participants had the opportunity to make suggestions and/or volunteer to be considered as a case study. Three countries agreed to develop case studies, namely: South Sudan, Yemen and Brazil. The CFS-A4A Technical Support Team (TST) considered that case studies from these countries would be valuable in illustrating how the CFS-A4A principles can be transformed into action. Final versions of the case studies will be included in Annex B of the final draft CFS-A4A.

B.2 Outline of broad content of case studies

South Sudan and Yemen

Case study sections to include:

- Description of the country context with insights into the food security situation and protracted crisis characteristics.
- Description of methodology, including constraints and limitations, and how this informs development of national, multi-stakeholder processes for developing, implementing and monitoring relevant policies and actions.
- Preliminary national, multi-stakeholder analysis of national context through the lens of the CFS-A4A principles, including possible integration and coherence with other broader, related processes and structures.
- Conclusions and policy recommendations for various stakeholders, and description of plans to take these forward.
- Graphics and illustrative text boxes.

Brazil

Case study sections to include:

- Description of current Brazilian cooperation for food security and nutrition in countries at risk of, and affected by, protracted crises.
- Description of the methodology for establishing an on-going, national, multi-stakeholder process of reviewing and planning Brazilian policies and actions.
- Preliminary national, multi-stakeholder analysis of current Brazilian approach and actions.
- Outline strategy for Brazilian cooperation for food security and nutrition in protracted crises.
- Plans and commitments of different national stakeholders to strengthen Brazilian cooperation for food security and nutrition in protracted crises.

Appendix C – Compendium of key policy and reference documents

[A compendium and reference guide to key relevant policy and reference documents relating to food security and nutrition in protracted crises, mapped against the structure and principles presented in Part 1. All references are provided in the original language only.]

PREFACE - Background and Rationale

Committee on World Food Security (CFS). 2010. *CFS 2010/6 - Policy Roundtable addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted crises: issues and challenges*, 36th session CFS, Rome. (available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/019/k8865e.pdf).

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PART 1- Principles for Action

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Principles for action

***Principle 1* Comply with existing international humanitarian and human rights obligations and be informed by CFS policy guidance, with a focus on protecting agriculture, food security and nutrition in protracted crises.**

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Appendix D – Glossary

[Additional terms will be added to the Glossary in subsequent versions of the Zero Draft]

Accountability
The means through which power is used responsibly. It is a process of taking account of, and being held accountable by, different stakeholders, and primarily those who are affected by authority or power.[41]

Food security
For the purposes of this document, the term is used in line with the definition provided in the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (2013)[42]. The term 'food insecurity' is understood to include the nutritional dimension as integral. In this regard, where useful for the purposes of additional clarity or precision, the term 'food security and nutrition' is also used.

Good governance[43]
There is no single and exhaustive definition of 'good governance', nor is there a delimitation of its scope, that commands universal acceptance. The term is used with great flexibility; this is an advantage, but also a source of some difficulty at the operational level. Depending on the context and the overriding objective sought, good governance has been said at various times to encompass: full respect of human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, transparent and accountable processes and institutions, an efficient and effective public sector, legitimacy, access to knowledge, information and education, political empowerment of people, equity, sustainability, and attitudes and values that foster responsibility, solidarity and tolerance.

However, there is a significant degree of consensus that good governance relates to political and institutional processes and outcomes that are deemed necessary to achieve the goals of development. It has been said that good governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law. The true test of 'good' governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.

Institutions
An often used definition of institutions, appropriate for protracted crisis situations, is "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, are human-devised constraints that shape human interaction".[44]

Policies and actions
For the purposes of this document 'policies and actions' encompasses investments, plans, strategies, programmes, institutional arrangements and architecture.

Protracted crises
As noted in the 'Background and rationale' section of Part 1, for the purposes of this document the terms 'protracted crisis context', 'protracted crisis situation' and 'protracted crisis' are understood to be interchangeable. These terms describe contexts and situations that share certain key characteristics, while simultaneously recognizing that no universally agreed definition of the terms exist.

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[41] Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), 2014. http://www.hapinternational.org/what-we-do/hap-standard.aspx
[42] Available at: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docs1213/gsf/GSF_Version_2_EN.pdf.
[43] Description taken from OHCHR
http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx
[44] North, Douglass (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press.

The absence of one or more of the characteristics listed does not necessarily mean that there is not a protracted crisis situation, and no single characteristic identifies a protracted crisis. Consequently, a considerable degree of heterogeneity among protracted crisis situations exists.

The various definitions presented below illustrate the fact that the same situations have been characterized, even contemporaneously, as complex emergencies, protracted crises, fragile states or post-conflict transitions by different actors. Indeed, there is a certain amount of overlap between complex emergencies, fragile states and protracted crises. However, the classification of the situation is critical as it can have significant implications for policy and programming. For example, characterizing a situation as a complex emergency brings humanitarian issues to the forefront and often leads to a response led by the international community with an emphasis on emergency food assistance. In contrast, intervention in a fragile state focuses more on developing the state's capacity to deliver services to its citizens.

The term 'protracted crisis' (as used in the CFS-A4A) is preferred as it focuses on understanding and addressing both short- and longer-term issues and recognizes that multiple causes are at play for a prolonged period of time. Varying perspectives inform the basis on which such descriptions are based, including donor, international financial institution (IFI), government self-assessment and international specialized agency:

- *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010: Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises (SOFI 2010)*[45]
  The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) used three measureable criteria to identify protracted crisis situations:
  - Declared a food crisis (i.e. reported in FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System on food and agriculture [GIEWS] list) requiring assistance in eight of the previous ten years;
  - Ten percent or more of external assistance received as humanitarian aid since 2000;
  - Included on FAO's list of low-income, food-deficit countries.

  SOFI 2010 noted that some protracted crisis situations are limited to particular geographic area of a country and may not affect the entire population. For example, Uganda appeared on the list in 2010, but the protracted crisis was limited to the northern and north-eastern parts of the country. A territory, such as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, can also be considered as being in protracted crisis, and was among the case studies presented in SOFI 2010.

- *Department for International Development (DFID)*[46]
  The Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) definition used by DFID includes situations in which part of a country, or a region, is fragile. A fragile and conflict-affected situation can exist within an otherwise stable state or regionally, i.e. affecting one or more states. The methods for defining and classifying fragile countries often differ between agency, for example, the definition used by OECD states that these situations are found in places where "…governments lack the political will and/or capacity to fulfil the basic conditions for poverty reduction, development, security and human rights." (OECD, 2007). DFID's approach is to use a combination of the three most widely accepted assessment frameworks; the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)[47] indicators, the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index (FSI)[48] and the Uppsala Conflict Database.[49]

[45] See FAO/WFP. 2010. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010. Rome. (available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1683e/i1683e.pdf

[46] See DFID. 2012. Results in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations. (available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67437/managing-results-conflict-affected-fragile-states.pdf).

[47] See: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/06/02/000356161_20110602025428/Rendered/PDF/622550PUB0CHIN000public00BOX361476B.pdf

[48] See: http://ffp.statesindex.org/

[49] See: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php

- *g7+ countries*[50]
  The g7+ is a group of self-declared eighteen conflict-affected and fragile states. The g7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The main objective of the g7+ is to share experiences and learn from one another, and to advocate for reforms to the way the international community engages in conflict-affected states.

  The g7+ is a key contributor in the International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (IDSP)[51], part of the OECD's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). The g7+ has been a major stakeholder in the development of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States[52], presented and widely endorsed in November 2011, at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and developed through the forum of the IDSP.

  In the period 2012-2015 seven g7+ countries will pilot the New Deal, monitored through a peer-to-peer mechanism which includes support through international partners, but as a country-led and country-owned process to transition out of fragility.

- *World Bank*[53]
  The World Bank-African Development Bank-Asian Development Bank Harmonized List of Fragile Situations is produced annually as part of its work (mainly through the International Development Association (IDA)) on post-conflict reconstruction assistance to fragile and conflict-affected countries, and operationalizing the recommendations of the World Development Report 2011[54] which proposes a renewed framework to guide the international community's work in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

  For the harmonized list, fragile situations are determined by having either, a) a harmonized average Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. This list includes only IDA eligible countries and non-member or inactive territories/countries without CPIA data. CPIA score rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions.

- *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*[55]
  The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), through the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), has monitored aid and other financial flows such as foreign direct investment, remittances and domestic revenues since 2006.

  The annual report aims to provide policy and decision-makers in donor countries and fragile states with a tool to monitor the levels, trends and quality of past and future resource flows (aid and beyond) in situations of fragility, and highlight issues and countries of concern. Forty-seven fragile states and economies were used for the 2013 quantitative analysis, drawing on the 2011 Failed State Index, the World Bank-African Development Bank-Asian Development Bank harmonised list of fragile and post-conflict countries for the year 2012 and the World Bank income classification (August 2012).

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[50] See http://www.g7plus.org/
[51] See http://www.oecd.org/international%20dialogue/aboutthedialogue.htm
[52] See http://www.newdeal4peace.org/
[53] See the World Bank Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY14. (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1269623894864/HarmonizedlistoffragilestatesFY14.pdf).
[54] See: http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000356161_20110602025428
[55] OECD. 2013. FRAGILE STATES 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world (available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.pdf)

Resilience

The increasing focus on resilience is driven by the desire to avoid repeated impoverishment, food insecurity, malnutrition and suffering caused by frequent, recurrent or protracted shocks. Like any other emerging concept, there are multiple definitions on what resilience means. Several of these definitions are outlined below and are the ones most used by UN agencies, international organizations, donors and other development actors currently championing the concept of resilience:

- *The Office of the United Nations Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction*: "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions."
- *The Global Alliance for Action for Drought Resilience and Growth*:[56] "The capacity of vulnerable households, families, communities and systems to face uncertainty and the risk of shocks, and to withstand and respond effectively to shocks, as well as to recover and adapt in a sustainable manner."
- *The Food and Agriculture Organization*: "The ability to prevent and mitigate disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover and adapt from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving livelihoods systems in the face of threats that impact agriculture, food and nutrition (and related public health)."
- *World Food Programme*: "The capacity of people, communities and countries to resist and recover from extreme events."
- *USAID*: "The ability of people, households, communities, countries and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth."
- *UNDP*: "A transformative process of strengthening the capacity of men, women, communities, institutions, and countries to anticipate, prevent, recover from and transform in the aftermath of shocks, stresses and change."
- *DFID*: "The ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses (such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict) without compromising their long-term prospects."
- *OCHA*: "The ability of communities and households to endure stresses and shocks."
- *The Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR):* "The capacity of vulnerable households, families, communities and systems to face uncertainty and the risk of shocks, to withstand and respond effectively to shocks, as well as to recover and adapt in a sustainable manner."[57]

Regardless of the source there are central tenets that resonate in all of the above definitions. Fundamentally, resilience is about the inherent capacity (ability) or strength of individuals, communities and institutions to withstand/cope, recover, adapt and transform in the face of specific shocks. This means all interventions in the wake of a crisis begin with identifying and building upon existing capacities and resources. Some definitions also include anticipating and/or preventing shocks, but this is not a common element across the examples presented here.

Small-scale food producers and family farmers

For the purposes of this document, references to small-scale food producers or to family farmers are meant to include smallholder farmers, agriculture and food workers, artisanal fisherfolk, herders/pastoralists, indigenous peoples, the landless, urban poor, women and youth. This is in

[56] A network of over 51 donor and international development partners convened by USAID.
[57] The Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) – Sahel and West Africa Regional Roadmap, 2013, p. 8.

line with categories identified in the Reform of the Committee on World Food Security (2009) document.[58]

[58] Available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/018/k7197e.pdf.

Endnotes

[i] For the purposes of this document, the term food security is used in line with the definition provided in the "Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition" (GSF). The term 'food insecurity' is understood to include the nutritional dimension as integral. In this regard, where useful for the purposes of additional clarity or precision, the term 'food security and nutrition' is also used.

[ii] Recognising that the methodology deployed in SOFI 2010 used three of a number of possible measureable criteria, and that the list therein is not definitive.

[iii] 2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan: Sahel Region, January 2014 (http://www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/sahel-humanitarian-response-plan-2014-2016). For the purpose of the Strategic Response Plan, the Sahel region covers: Burkina Faso, northern Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, northern Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia.

[iv] This heterogeneity is reflected in the fact that the same situations have been characterized, even contemporaneously, as complex emergencies, protracted crises, fragile states or post-conflict transitions by different actors. The variety of definitions and typologies employed, particularly around the term 'fragile' states can have implications for food security related policy and programming. The term protracted crisis is preferred as it focuses on both short- and longer-term issues, as well as underlying multiple causes for food insecurity and malnutrition. See Appendix D for additional information.

[v] These principles are explored and expanded upon in a number of places, including the CFS endorsed "Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security" (VGGT).

[vi] United Nations General Assembly A/RES/46/182 endorses humanity, impartiality and neutrality; A/RES/58/114 endorses independence.

[vii] Second Version of the GSF (October 2013), p.46, states the five principles that should apply to monitoring and accountability systems are: a) They should be human-rights based, with particular reference to the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security; b) They should make it possible for decision-makers to be accountable; c) They should be participatory and include assessments that involve all stakeholders and beneficiaries, including the most vulnerable; d) They should be simple, yet comprehensive, accurate, timely and understandable to all, with indicators disaggregated by sex, age, region, etc., that capture impact, process and expected outcomes; e) They should not duplicate existing systems, but rather build upon and strengthen national statistical and analytical capacities.

[viii] CFS 2013/40/8 (http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/029/mi320e.pdf).