From Emergency Response to High Food Prices to Long-Run Strategic Support to Rural Livelihoods in Poor Countries Subject to Protracted Crises: Insights from Selected World Bank Projects

Note contributed by the ARD Rural Policy Team to the CFS High Level Expert Forum on Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises, FAO, Rome, 13-14 September 2012. Inquiries to: Mateo Ambrosio, mambrosioalbala@worldbank.org; Joseph Mizener, jam288@cornell.edu; and Christopher Delgado, cdelgado@worldbank.org.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AGP</td>
<td>Agricultural Growth Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFW</td>
<td>Cash For Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFSP</td>
<td>Global Agriculture and Food Security Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFRP</td>
<td>Global Food Crisis Response Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOB</td>
<td>Government of Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOE</td>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOH</td>
<td>Government of Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOT</td>
<td>Government of Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASIP</td>
<td>Liberia Agriculture Sector Investment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NaCSA</td>
<td>National Commission for Social Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAIP</td>
<td>National Agriculture Investment Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAP</td>
<td>National Social Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIU</td>
<td>Project Implementation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLW</td>
<td>Pregnant and lactating women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPEC</td>
<td>Smallholder Agricultural Productivity Enhancement and Commercialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Smallholder Commercialization Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFI</td>
<td>State of Food Insecurity in the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WUA</td>
<td>Water User Association</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

Developing countries increasingly wish to promote agricultural interventions that are more effective at increasing the resilience of rural livelihoods through being strategic, evidence-based, and inclusive. Countries subjected to protracted food crises are typically not different in this respect, but are constantly having to deal with urgent short-run issues that divert attention and resources from longer-term plans.

Protracted crises are caused by forces beyond the capacity of governments to control, such as growing pressure on land and water resources, increased climate variability, externally aggravated situations of conflict, and greater international grain price volatility. These forces tend over time to exacerbate existing stresses on these countries, often leading to “environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of their livelihoods over prolonged periods of time” (Macrae & Harmer, 2004).

Given that protracted crises often have a multiplicity of causes, governments, farmers’ groups, other civil society organizations, aid agencies, and the private sector subsequently face multiple challenges responding to them. Additionally, these challenges are not mutually exclusive, and are often collinear in nature. For example, all 22 of the countries identified as those experiencing protracted crises by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010 (SOFI 2010) have experienced human-induced elements of crises, such as conflict, and almost all have suffered a natural disaster, in recent years (Maxwell, Russo, & Alinovi, 2011). In order for an appropriate and effective response to be developed, these issues, in their full complexity, must be considered.

The paper aims to provide elements for discussion on some of the emerging issues and gaps in transiting from reoccurring emergency assistance to assistance focused on longer-term resilience of the livelihoods of the rural poor. Topics addressed include: (a) how to engage with governments, (b) the importance of ensuring government responses to shocks do not undermine building longer-term resilience, (c) the need for rapid response to government level needs and to be flexible to re-orient work and programming, and (d) problems of knowledge management and institutionalizing learning; and knowledge of context.

The paper will draw upon experience from selected country projects facilitated by two trust fund mechanisms managed by the World Bank, and in some cases implemented through other agencies, to identify insights for the three main SOFI 2010 recommendations: (1) improved analysis of protracted crises, (2) improve support for livelihoods and food security, and (3) reform aid architecture to be more effective (FAO; WFP, 2010).

Key insights on how to accomplish these things feasibly will come from selected cases that suggest a successful transition from emergency support to longer-term support for more resilient livelihoods and food security. Adequately assessing insights from the portfolio of donor, or even just World Bank International Development Association (IDA), projects is beyond the modest capacity of the present contribution. However, it is possible to look at a sample of countries subject to protracted food crises and their experiences under two very specific instruments: the World Bank’s Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP), targeted at fast-disbursing response under tight control, and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), targeted at country-led, strategic, evidence-based, and inclusive plans. Comparing countries that are all in protracted crisis, but have nevertheless been able,
within two to three years, to move from emergency response to a convincing GAFSP proposal should yield insights for how to get out of how to rely on perennial emergency assistance.

There is no claim that World Bank assistance as a whole captures either what these countries did for emergency food interventions after early 2008, or what countries have done since then for aid-effective agricultural development—it does not. It is even less appropriate to see GFRP and GAFSP—significantly less than 1/10th of overall World Bank assistance to agriculture—in this light. Rather the intention is to use insights from these projects to look at what happened in protracted crisis countries that needed food assistance in 2008/2009, but then were able to produce winning operational proposals for long-term agricultural investment in less than three years.

2. COPING WITH FOOD INSECURITY THROUGH IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM AID-EFFECTIVE RESPONSES

Until the 1980s, approaches to crises by large international organizations tended to be short-term; focusing on the immediate needs the situation presented. Policy discussion then turned towards matters of how to increase the sustainability of initiatives over time. Solutions often included large-scale investments in agricultural technology, transportation infrastructure, and other activities aimed at increasing productivity and resiliency of livelihoods. While these enhanced systems were beneficial and an essential aspect of long-term development, they were insufficient to fully respond to the multi-faceted challenges countries in protracted crisis faced. In response, a number of tools and instruments were developed that increased the institutional capacity to address protracted crises and move beyond the limitations of an “assumed linear progression back to normalcy after a shock or crisis, viewing relief, rehabilitation and development as sequential” (Alinovi, Hemrich, & Russo, 2008).

The GFRP was established in May 2008 to promote rapid response to high and volatile food prices through recipient executed projects. Its lessons learned largely revolve around how to quickly target specific outcomes involving food security, while providing alternatives to short-run interventions, such as those widely observed in 1974, that provided short-term relief but arguably then reduced the long-term ability of countries to feed themselves (such as export bans, forcible procurement of grain, pan-territorial pricing, large government buffer stocks, etc.).

GFRP assistance was fast-disbursing (less than three months on average from concept to effectiveness in the first year of operation). While GFRP focused on short-term, emergency response, it was intended to kick in after urgent humanitarian interventions, such as those typically promoted by the United Nations agencies in food crises (for example food aid), had already started. GFRP gave countries a menu of short-term response options ranging from increased fiscal space, to social protection and safety nets, to short-run agriculture support that increased access to seeds and fertilizer. To date, more than 40 million people have been reached in 47 countries through more than $US1.5 billion in investments.

The GAFSP has the broader objective of ensuring country ownership and capacity, thus promoting harmonization, alignment and continuity; the process followed is part of desired outcomes. It is a multi-agency, multilateral mechanism under external governance created by the World Bank in April 2010 in response to a request from the September 2009 Pittsburgh Summit of the G20. It focuses on working

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1 Full details are at: www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDS/IB/2008/06/30/000333038_20080630001046/Rendered/PDF/438410BR0REVIS10and0IDAR20081016212.pdf
towards long-term aid-effectiveness and aims to scale-up support to livelihoods and food security by raising agricultural productivity, linking farmers to markets, reducing risk and vulnerability, and improving non-farm rural livelihoods.

The Public Sector Window of GAFSP provides funding to proposals arising from country-led strategic investment plans that are in place following pre-existing aid effectiveness procedures in agriculture, such as the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) in Africa. To date roughly $US700 million in support has been provided to 18 countries, and is likely to directly impact well over 10 million beneficiaries. Proposals allow countries to compete against each other for available funds on the basis of criteria of aid effectiveness determined by existing aid-effectiveness processes, such as CAADP, and on the basis of need, as defined by Millennium Development Goals’ (MDG) poverty and hunger indicators.2

The working hypothesis of the paper is that evaluating insights of selected World Bank operations of both types (emergency food response and aid-effectiveness in agriculture) in the same country, and in the context of protracted crises, will help address good practice in transiting from emergency to long-term strategic interventions to support rural livelihoods in an aid-effective way.

3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Moving forward, it is critical to evaluate and analyze past programs, such as the GFRP and GAFSP, in order to identify insights that might be useful for future programming, maximizing their usefulness and avoiding the implementation of repeated mistakes. Common themes should provide applicable lessons that could be utilized on a more broad policy level for a variety of programs to increase aid-effectiveness and appropriately respond to the unique challenge of a protracted crisis.

Starting from the three recommendations in SOFI 2010, we propose the following premises to guide the assessment:

(1) Information is a critical asset to enhance the targeting and the impact of the interventions and raise awareness on unintended impacts. Consequently, it helps improve understanding of the drivers of structural food crises.
(2) Both immediate and long-term responses are not to be implemented in vacuum and need to be context-responsive, building when possible on previous efforts.
(3) Building on the governance in place needs to align responses with existing strategies and policies frameworks, to encourage a larger engagement of the government and local partners, and to link with existing coordination and collaboration platforms.
(4) Platforms for coordination and collaboration are an effective way of keeping communication channels, sharing information, including analytical work and building early consensus among partners.

The corresponding working questions are:

(a) What sources of information were used prior to, or during, implementation? Did this affect targeting, and if so, how were the constraints overcome?

2 Full details are at: www.GAFSPFund.org
(b) How were existing strategies and policy frameworks utilized in the project design and implementation? Are there any 'entry points' that contributed to increase ownership government attention to make more specific and ongoing efforts?

(c) What were the roles of various actors, and particularly local actors, in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of the project?

(d) What sort of results have been achieved or are expected to be achieved? Does the project contribute, directly or indirectly, to short, medium, or long-term purposes?

(e) What were the challenges and how have they been addressed by the project? Are there any unintended outcomes?

A sample of six countries, all listed as being subject to protracted food crises according to SOFI 2010, had food security related emergency project support under the GFRP, and later received support for a country-led, peer reviewed, inclusive long-term food and agriculture strategic plan from GAFSP. The group includes Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan. Following the classification of the SOFI 2010 on countries in situation of protracted crisis, between 1996 and 2010, two countries were mostly affected by human-induced disasters only (Liberia, Sierra Leone), one country mostly by natural disasters only (Haiti), and three countries by a combination of natural and human-induced disasters (Burundi, Ethiopia, and Tajikistan).

The selected interventions detailed here cover both immediate food security improvement and longer-term agriculture development. The selected GFRP programs provide a wide sample of interventions, but are not the only short-run responses in the country in question and in some cases are not the only ones supported by GFRP in the same countries. The GFRP sample here includes budget support operations (Burundi), cash-for-work schemes that provided supplementary incomes (Sierra Leone, Tajikistan), delivery of agricultural inputs (Ethiopia) and food to vulnerable population (Liberia), and capacity building on agriculture-related public and private organizations (Haiti). The GAFSP-funded interventions include longer-term programs mainly focused on water management and development of irrigation schemes (Burundi, Tajikistan, Liberia), improving access to farming inputs, technology and extension services (Ethiopia, Haiti), improving infrastructures and access to markets (Liberia, Sierra Leone). In two cases (Haiti, Tajikistan) were followed on by strategic aid-effective responses funded by GAFSP.

Although most of the operations in question are on-going (or even new in the case of GAFSP), the paper synthesizes available insights on how they have approached challenges faced during implementation of programs in protracted crises. The analysis uses project proposals, supporting documentation, insights from project supervision, and when available, insights from evaluation reports and impact assessments.

4. COUNTRY EXPERIENCES

Following the description of the methodology and the selection of the country cases, this section provides an overview on the selected countries cases as shown in Table 1. More detailed narrative is included in Appendix 2.

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3 In addition to the programs considered for the assessment, GFRP provided additional funding to an already ongoing safety net program in Ethiopia, for budget support operations in Haiti and Sierra Leone that allowed an extension of feeding programs in schools and health centers, or for extending cash-for-work programs in Liberia.
a) Burundi: supporting safety nets and improving irrigation

According the SOFI 2010, Burundi should be considered as subject to protracted crisis due to more than 14 years of “human-induced disasters” from 1996 to 2010. Between 2000 and 2008, humanitarian aid represented 32 percent of the total official development assistance (ODA). Ten years after the signature of the peace accords, Burundi still faces considerable challenges in terms of human development, economic growth and governability. As an agriculture-based country, low agriculture productivity strongly conditions any way out of poverty for smallholder farmers. Global food price spikes, at global and domestic levels, triggered the GFRP-funded emergency response in 2008, a budget support operation aimed at supporting suspension of custom duties and domestic transaction on 13 basic food items and serving school feeding programs. In addition, this response helped stabilize the macroeconomic and public finance objectives and improve access to primary education, particularly for girls.

The long-term program funded through GAFSP, supervised by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), will start in 2013 and is currently under design. In line with the country owned and CAADP reviewed National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP), the GAFSP-funded proposal seeks to improve water management and irrigation in the drought-prone regions of Imbo and Mosso and to foster agricultural intensification through improved technologies, productive assets, and the establishment of farmer field schools. The activities on water management use a catchment basin approach, though the existing governance on water management is still weak and technical assistance (TA) requirements are high. The proposal is in line with the intended sector reforms set out in the NAIP.

b) Ethiopia: strengthening local producers’ capacity for food production

Ethiopia is considered by SOFI 2010 as in a situation of protracted crises, due to 11 years of combined natural and human-induced disasters. Large investments, including in key agricultural public goods such as research and extension, market development and farming modernization stand behind the growth of Ethiopian agriculture productivity in recent years. The rural economy strongly relies on rain-fed smallholder agriculture and these gains are still vulnerable to disruptions associated with weather and limited farmer access to resources. The global food price crisis of 2008/2009 included increasing international fuel and agricultural inputs costs (by twice as much as food prices), whose eventual impacts on Ethiopia through the foreign exchange market threatened to reduce the ability to import fertilizer on time and thus to reduce crop yields and cereal production significantly. To prevent this, a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
<td>Low HDI after over a decade of peace accords, fragile economy, low productivity highest vulnerability among smallholder farmers lacking access to assets</td>
<td>Protracted crisis, but significant growth in agriculture productivity; highly reliant on smallholder farming</td>
<td>Low HDI, economy strongly reliant on under-developed agriculture, small-scale subsistence farming, and weakened public services</td>
<td>War ended in 2003, enhanced political situation, agriculture-based economy, under-developed sector constrained by weak water and land management</td>
<td>War ended in 2001, low HDI despite remarkable efforts, agriculture high growth potential and prioritized in public budget,</td>
<td>High vulnerability to exogenous shocks (including trade disputes, cotton global prices). Highly dependent to imported fuel and cereal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific concern for emergency response</strong></td>
<td>Impact on domestic markets of higher global food prices</td>
<td>Shortage of foreign exchange reserves during the global food and fertilizer price crisis</td>
<td>Maintenance of achievements in reform/modernization of the public administration</td>
<td>Impact on domestic markets of higher global food prices</td>
<td>Impact on domestic markets of higher global food prices</td>
<td>Impact of global food crisis on domestic market, harsh winter of 2007/2008, remittances drop, constrained agriculture activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GFSP response</strong></td>
<td><strong>Food Crisis Response Development Policy Grant</strong></td>
<td>Ethiopia Fertilizer Support Project</td>
<td>Strengthening the Management of Agriculture Public Services</td>
<td>Emergency Food Support for Vulnerable Women and Children</td>
<td>Co-financing of the National Social Action Plan</td>
<td>Public Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Management Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency response modalities</strong></td>
<td>Budget support. To support suspension of custom duties and domestic taxes on basic food items and create fiscal space to maintain food security and school feeding programs</td>
<td>To ensure adequate supply of fertilizer for smallholder farmers for 2009-10 agricultural season</td>
<td>To strengthen the key management functions of the Ministry of agriculture, especially to target investments to improve local agricultural support services</td>
<td>To maintain well-established program to make food accessible to vulnerable population (pregnant women, children)</td>
<td>Emergency relief through supplementary income (cash-for-work)</td>
<td>To provide temporary employment through public works program to food insecure people and to enhance water basin management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GAFSP response</strong></td>
<td>Financing for the National Agriculture Investment Plan</td>
<td>Additional Funding for Agricultural Growth Program</td>
<td>Re-launching Agriculture: Strengthening Agriculture Public Services II</td>
<td>Smallholder Agricultural Productivity Enhancement and Commercialization</td>
<td>Smallholder Commercialization Program</td>
<td>Public Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Resources Management II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supervising Entity</strong></td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)</td>
<td>World Bank (Investment activities), FAO (Technical Assistance activities)</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank (for adoption of higher yielding technologies) and World Bank (for technology transfer)</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aid-effective response modalities</strong></td>
<td>To improve water management and irrigation in the drought-prone regions of Imbo and Mosso, with investments in infrastructure and agricultural intensification through improved technologies, productive assets, and the establishment of farmer field schools.</td>
<td>To develop the untapped potential of well-endowed areas, including strengthening key advisory services, encouraging farmer organizations, and improving small scale infrastructure.</td>
<td>To raise the productivity of smallholder farmers, especially women, by improving access to seeds, fertilizers and technology.</td>
<td>Enhance the income of smallholder farmers, particularly women and youth, through sustainable irrigable land expansion, land husbandry improvement, and improvement of market access. It will also build capacity for adaptive agricultural research and improve agricultural advisory services.</td>
<td>Finance commercialization of smallholder farmers through better inputs, farm management training and linking farmers to market.</td>
<td>Support the rehabilitation of 18,500 hectares of irrigation schemes, as well as subsidy on rice input packages in the project zones under an input voucher scheme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
major GFRP-funded immediate response in Ethiopia focused on ensuring quick and adequate supply of chemical fertilizers for smallholder farmers (Fertilizer Support Project, FSP). In addition, some funding were sought for the ongoing Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP). The government's commitment and willingness to adopt such a solution reflected in the decision to restructure about half of Ethiopia’s Bank-funded projects to meet the needs of this program, which allowed a timely response, at some cost to other projects.

The GAFSP-funded proposal seeks to support the development of local institutions and mechanisms. The proposal in Ethiopia consists of three components: agricultural production and commercialization, rural infrastructure and technical assistance. The proposal targets regions with high agronomic potential and is expected to benefit two million households. It does so by providing additional funding to the Government's Agricultural Growth Program (AGP), which is supported by a number of Development Partners. In line with the sound participation of stakeholders during the AGP formulation, the program puts in place a participatory approach to the provision of extension services, the construction of rural infrastructure and the strengthening of farmer associations. The World Bank and FAO are the supervising entities. The proposal expects potential contributions from the private sector, though reforms remain to be done in the policy environment and in the inputs supply and credit markets.

c) Haiti: fostering capacity building to cope with risks in the highly vulnerable context

In Haiti, the situation of protracted crises is mainly characterized by reoccurring natural disasters in the 11 years between 1996 and 2010. All the while the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti has experienced severe constraints in social services, economic opportunities and public infrastructure. The economy is strongly agriculture-based. Small-scale subsistence farming, limited public goods and weak private markets seriously constrain agriculture productivity growth. The GFRP response to the higher food prices in 2008 adopted a capacity-building approach to enhance public delivery of basic public services, improve efficiency of public spending in agriculture and rapid support to farmers (including a farmer registry, a smart-subsidy scheme, and a Sector Environmental Unit to quickly transfer new technologies from research and development (R&D) centers at the local level). This response strengthened key management functions of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development’s (MANRRD)

The long-term response funded by GAFSP follows on the immediate response by GFRP, in terms of building capacity within the MANRRD under the post-earthquake National Agriculture Investment Program (2011-2016). In line with the Investment Plan and the National Agriculture Extension Strategy, the proposal aims to increase agricultural extension services to small farmers in most vulnerable regions, and to make available financial assistance to government in cases of an agriculture sector emergency. Activities focus on strengthening the supply and demand of agriculture services and innovation, productivity increases through technology adoption, mainstreaming nutrition and gender into agriculture investments, and reduction of natural resource degradation. The World Bank acts as supervising entity on activities related to the strengthening of public services for promoting technology transfer, and the Inter-American Development Bank on activities related to the adoption of higher yielding technologies.
d) Liberia: improving access for vulnerable groups to increase capacity to respond to shocks

Liberia’s classification as a country subject to protracted crises, as per the SOFI 2010, stems from 14 years of conflict between 1996 and 2010. Despite a stabilizing political situation, Liberia still faces economic and institutional constraints impeding growth. As a poor, agriculture-based economy, underdeveloped private markets, single-crop production and weak land and water management stand as major limitations to improve contribution of agricultural activities to ensure food security in the country. One of the GFRP-funded immediate responses supplied vulnerable women and children by continuing a well-established school-feeding initiative of the World Food Programme (WFP). With a simple objective and a well-targeted response, the program engaged local partners in the implementation, improved malnutrition rates and stabilized school attendance.

The GAFSP-funded proposal departs from this nutrition-related approach of the immediate response to address sustainable medium and long-term investments in the sector. The program will increase the income of smallholder farmers, particularly women and youth, through irrigable land expansion, land husbandry improvement, and improvement of market access. Following stronger commitment from the government and significant efforts to promote local markets, this proposal concretizes a number of national reconstruction and development agendas that have been developed in Liberia over the past six years. The African Development Bank is the supervising entity.

e) Sierra Leone: promoting local assets to develop agricultural capacity

As in Liberia, the classification of Sierra Leone as a country in protracted crisis in SOFI 2010 is explained by 15 years of conflict from 1996 to 2010. Sierra Leone is now showing significant progress towards reconstruction and democratization. Agriculture is essential to an emergence of economic growth. Following a public commitment of the President, agriculture is now at the forefront of the government’s development efforts, and public sector investments accounted for nearly 10 percent of the national budget, in line with CAADP targets. The GFRP-funded response provided emergency relief through a cash-for-work program to provide income support for households. The implementing national agency was the National Commission for Social Action, which had been strongly engaged in the post-conflict recovery activities. In addition to the impact on well-being and nutritional status of the households, one of the bonus outcomes of the GFRP program was that rebuilt social facilities contributed to social cohesion and strengthened the community relations needed for peace and stability.

In line with the shifting in funding from the post-conflict and emergency relief to long-term development, GAFSP funding aims to increase agriculture productivity. The proposal builds on extensive consultations among local stakeholders. The specific objective is to promote smallholder agricultural commercialization through production intensification, diversification, value addition, and marketing, as well as developing small-scale irrigation infrastructures to boost rice production, a major staple in the country. The Supervising Entity is the IFAD, with support from FAO.

f) Tajikistan: tackling vulnerability through increased incomes and enhanced irrigation management

Tajikistan is considered to be in a situation of protracted crisis by SOFI 2010 due to eight years of combined human-induced and natural disasters, along with another three years of natural disasters only. With 46 percent of the population living below the poverty line, Tajikistan is the poorest country in
Central Asia. The country remains highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks, given its dependency on imported fuel and cereals, to the world prices for cotton and aluminum exports. Following the global food crises, Tajikistan was affected by a harsh winter in 2007/2008 and a significant drop in remittances that pushed the most vulnerable parts of the population into significant food insecurity. GFRP funded a public works program to provide temporary employment to food insecure rural populations rehabilitating farm-level irrigation and drainage network, in selected high food insecurity districts. TA was included to introduce water basin management as a basis for overall management of Tajikistan's water resources.

Building on the achievements of the immediate response, the government presented a proposal for funding to the GAFSP mechanism. The proposal, supported by extensive consultations, established that the poor state of irrigation network was a key factor for the low agricultural productivity in the country. GAFSP funding will support a multi-pronged approach to improving irrigation and drainage including: rehabilitating secondary canals to improve water delivery at the farm level, financing the preparatory work for the introduction of a water basin management system, and developing water management policies. The proposal includes working to strengthen the legislative and operational framework for local Water User Associations (WUAs) and a clarification of the roles of local and national authorities. The World Bank is supervising entity.

5. LESSONS LEARNED

Using the World Bank’s experience in countries experiencing protracted crises, through the Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), lessons have been identified that contribute to improved efficiency and accelerated implementation in a number of different projects.

a) Focus on a limited set of clear and measurable results

Simple designs and straightforward objectives are more likely to be implemented successfully.

In Liberia, the GFRP project, Emergency Support for Vulnerable Women and Children, was designed as one of three GFRP operations in a package that supported the government’s strategic response to the food price crisis. This strategic response targeted: mitigation of domestic pass-through of global food price increases, access to food among vulnerable households, and promotion of food crop production. Each GFRP operation focused on a single government objective/target. In addition to a stand-alone project for getting food quickly to the vulnerable households that were most affected by the food crisis, the other GFRP projects were an agricultural productivity intervention and a cash-for-work employment program, both as additional financing to ongoing projects.

The GFRP project in Ethiopia was simple in that it basically provided the foreign exchange to support fertilizer imports at a time when foreign exchange reserves were critically low in the country. It used the existing fertilizer system in Ethiopia without addressing possible policy and organizational reforms that could have delayed the project’s implementation. The government’s willingness to restructure about half of its World Bank-funded projects to meet this critical showed the high priority accorded to it. The World Bank took advantage of the flexibility of the procedures and the GFRP to respond in a timely manner. As a result, the project was implemented very quickly.
The simplicity of a short-run emergency response should not be at the expense of compromising long-term reform efforts.

In Ethiopia, despite the quickness and efficiency in setting up and delivering the response, the arrangement under the GFRP project allowed the public sector enterprise Agricultural Input Supply Enterprise (AISE) to emerge as the sole importer. This arrangement may have contributed to more timely allocation of foreign exchange and procurement of fertilizers. Yet it could also be construed as delaying the reform effort being supported by the World Bank and other donors to promote fertilizer marketing reform, including greater private sector participation.

b) Support a country’s own efforts towards building capacity

A strong commitment from government and partners is needed to prepare and implement emergency programs speedily and effectively. Country ownership early on favors preparedness in response later.

In Liberia, the government was quick to respond to the food crisis by quickly outlining its strategic vision and was prepared to take hard decisions, such as radically reducing taxation on major food imports as a means of alleviating the impacts of rising prices on the population. The program was consistent with the priorities articulated in the government’s strategic emergency response to overcome the food crisis of 2008, which was designed after intensive consultation with civil society and development partners, including the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank. To support the implementation strategy, the government established a School Feeding Unit within the Ministry of Education, headed by a Director, as well as a cooperation partner with WFP and appointed staff to support implementation, including regional coordinators and county and district-level monitors. The government showed a strong sense of ownership and took timely measures to sanction principals who violated the code of conduct guiding project-implementing agents.

In Burundi, the GFRP intervention was aligned with a program agreed between the government and a group of donors (the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway) that provided emergency relief to the country’s poorest regions and to the most vulnerable groups. Following the Bank’s approval of the GFRP program (August 13, 2008), and before the government had transferred the funds to WFP as implementing agency, both government and WFP agreed on a number of measures to prepare program implementation. Between September and October 2008, these measures included: setting-up a Steering/Monitoring Committee with eight representatives of central government departments; selection of three poor, food-insecure provinces (Muyinga, Ngozi and Kayanza), and of the schools to be included in the program; and carrying out orientation seminars for members of the Steering/Monitoring Committee, including provincial education directors and local inspectors responsible for the schools that had been selected.

Where there is clear national leadership and a transparent policy framework in place, budget support can be especially suitable for providing expedited emergency response.

Especially for import-dependent countries, fiscal space is essential to ensure funding to social protection programs, but is especially vulnerable to financial crises, as in 2009. The experience in Burundi is quite illustrative regarding how timely and useful budget support can potentially be. The program included: suspension of custom duties and taxes on basic food items, sustaining school feeding programs in
primary schools in vulnerable provinces, and expanding emergency humanitarian relief. Two conditions were especially relevant. First, the government did not wait for donor assistance to design and begin to implement activities aimed at mitigating the impact of the crisis. The duty/tax exemption component was in place months before approval of the funding; consequently, one of the objectives of the new funding was to help the government finance and implement that particular measure. Second, the emergency assistance operation was not an isolated development policy operation, but it was integrated into larger budget support activities supporting a comprehensive policy reform package.

Technical assistance can play a decisive role in aligning an immediate response with government priorities and lay the foundation for more strategic interventions.

In Tajikistan, the GFRP project included a TA component aimed to directly support two working groups established by government to implement the government program for agriculture sector reform. The success of the GFRP project led to a larger, complementary project funded through GAFSP to create further temporary employment in rural areas with low income and raise crop production over a wider area. The GAFSP funding ensures long term and sustainable improvements in irrigation by building on the results of the GFRP-funded technical assistance to introduce integrated water resource management, including the formation and strengthening of WUAs and the establishment and operation of a new institutional framework for river basin management.

c) Build on mechanisms and structures in place nationally

In fragile countries with weak institutional capacities, response timeliness and long-term country resilience benefit from working with reputable existing domestic institutions.

In Sierra Leone, the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) was the executing agency for the GFRP response, responsible for fiduciary management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and reporting, as well as overseeing implementation and providing support to local authorities though the regional network of technical staff. NaCSA is a semi-autonomous agency that was transformed from an emergency post conflict program to a community driven program in response to the immediate needs of Sierra Leone. NaCSA has its roots in the former Ministry of Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation which transformed in 1998, in the midst of the civil war, the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (NCRRR).

In Liberia, very little time was required for mobilization because WFP was already on the ground. WFP worked very closely with key government institutions (the School Feeding Unit of the Ministry of Education and the Nutrition and Maternal and Child Health Division of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) to build national capacity and instill national ownership. The project was designed as additional financing to on-going WFP activities in Liberia, particularly its school feeding and nutrition programs. The decision by the government to select WFP as the implementing agency was appropriate, given the huge capacity constraints in Liberia and WFP’s significant experience in the implementation of school feeding and nutrition programs.

By engaging and collaborating with other partners, the responsibilities and obligations of the parties involved need to be clearly defined to make a response effective.
In Burundi, the GFRP program was the first time that WFP managed a program funded by the government and directly implemented by government agencies (instead of delegated to non-governmental organizations (NGOs)). The respective obligations of the government and WFP concerning the new implementation mechanisms (by government agencies instead of NGOs as in previous WFP-financed school feeding activities in Burundi) and the financial contributions should have been more clearly defined in a tripartite document also involving the World Bank. The negotiation of these documents might have delayed the initial response to the emergency situation, but probably could have facilitated the eventual solution of other funding and implementation problems and – perhaps more importantly – created opportunities for long-term collaboration.

In Tajikistan, the GFRP project management unit established a coordination mechanism to share responsibility with the local government counterparts. The arrangement was legally defined by Framework Agreements (FAs) between the responsible parties. In addition, a formal agreement was signed with the Ministry of Amelioration and Water Resources Management to ensure appropriate housing, care and maintenance of procured machinery and equipment at the ministry’s rayon level branches, and appropriate and exclusive use of the machinery and equipment for further canal and drain cleaning operations within the same rayon’s. This was to continue until machinery and equipment could be handed over to suitably established operation and maintenance agencies with good machinery care and maintenance arrangements.

Crisis response can illustrate the need for strategic investments by revealing existing bottlenecks and constraints.

In Ethiopia, the logistical and capacity constraints of importing both large quantities of fertilizers for the GFRP-funded project and food aid through the Djibouti port were not seen as critical (in the sense of potentially not feasible) during preparation and appraisal. Ethiopia had been importing fertilizers through Djibouti for a long time. Generally, there had not been conflict between fertilizer imports and food aid coming in through that port, since the commodities generally came in at different times of the year (fertilizers between January and May and food aid mostly between June and December). 2009 was a difficult year with the high food and fuel prices and poor rains. Poor rains created a humanitarian crisis requiring higher amounts of food aid. Fertilizer imports were also high and continued well into August in 2009. As a result, not only was there competition between food aid and fertilizer imports for the facilities at the Djibouti port, but also for inland storage facilities and trucks.

When limited capacity is anticipated, stronger efforts are needed to keep an up-to-date and credible record of progress.

The GFRP-funded project in Ethiopia provides relevant lessons in this respect. Given the weak role of the market, the amount of fertilizer imported in Ethiopia by the public sector is based on an estimation of demand by the Government for the coming season. Such estimation is carried out over a period of about six months every year and is based on a cumbersome administrative process that involves various levels of the government. There is a tendency to include a contingency amount at each level which contributes to large overstocks that fluctuate from year to year. In addition, farmer’s actual demand for fertilizers in a particular year can vary significantly from estimates, depending on the amount of rainfall and the price of fertilizer. Farmers also seldom apply the recommended dosage and often combine chemical fertilizers with organic ones to reduce costs.
**d) Ensure local participation**

Consultations and incorporation of local actors is an effective way to build capacity and mobilize resources for response implementation.

In **Sierra Leone**, projects were approved by the Project Approval Committees, on which the Local Councils, the NaCSA, and other stakeholders were represented. Communities and localities expressed their interest and nominate components of interventions through a simplified identification and consultation process. Maintenance of the roads thus rehabilitated devolved to the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) and Local Councils, who are being empowered by the grants from the central government for roads maintenance (in part supported by the World Bank Decentralized Service Delivery Project).

In **Tajikistan**, overall management for the GFRP project was with the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and (MLRWR) and the Administration of the Khatlon Oblast. Decisions regarding the identification of priorities and selection of works to be carried out were taken with participation of the officials from *mahalla* and *jamoats*, local government units corresponding to districts and sub-districts. Additionally, the Project Management Unit actively involved local branches of government in the establishment of preliminary assessments of the demand for on-farm and off-farm systems' rehabilitation. The effective liaison with national and regional governments facilitated efficient project implementation and the transfer of ownership of tools, machinery and rehabilitated irrigation and drainage (I&D) systems, in line with national procedures. In most of targeted *jamoats*, local authorities and communities fulfilled a critical role in project delivery that allowed a large numbers of beneficiaries and reducing possible conflicts on the selection of sub-projects.

A larger engagement of partners at local level, especially community groups, may require additional resources for community capacity building and training activities.

In **Liberia**, the strategy to support the development and training of Parent and Teacher Associations (PTAs) in the implementation of the school feeding programs empowered some communities to be more involved with school activities. The project also enhanced the government’s capacity at the national, county, and community level. Training in food management, monitoring, food calculation, and record-keeping was targeted to monitors, supervisors, national and regional coordinators, district and county focal persons, school principals, and teachers. In addition, public officers at the county level gained useful work experience conducting joint implementation, supervision, and monitoring activities with WFP staff.

In **Burundi**, *Comités de Gestion* (Steering Committees) were created in all the schools involved in the school feeding program and included representatives of parents, students and school management. These *Comités* played a significant role not only in the management of the school feeding programs, but also in other aspects of school management, including ongoing consultation between parents, teachers and school principals on educational objectives and school performance.

Relying on existing capacities may involve additional monitoring efforts, especially when it comes to ensuring an accurate targeting of the response.

In **Burundi**, the implementation of the School Feeding Program component was affected by the time required to select schools, inform communities, develop the required infrastructure, and train
participants. School selection was based on proposals made by the provincial directorates of the Ministry of Education. Initial estimates of future beneficiaries of the GFRP-funded school feeding program (120,000 children from 60 primary schools) were unrealistic. A major factor was the fact that the school selection process gave priority to small rural primary schools, where school enrollment rates were particularly low. Subsequently, close to 50 percent of the pre-selected schools had to be eliminated because they did not have all the required infrastructure facilities (water supply, storage, and latrines). Although parents were able to build some of these facilities, the number of schools finally selected for the program was reduced.

In Tajikistan, the irrigation schemes funded through the GFRP project at jamoat level were to be selected for rehabilitation on the basis of certain criteria and involved cash for work (CFW). CFW beneficiary selection was initially predicated by demand, since a desire to work for wages nominally set at lower than market rates was deemed to be sufficient for eligibility. When supply exceeded demand, criteria relating to vulnerability and unemployment were added. Alternative modes of indirect inclusion of otherwise eligible beneficiaries were found (e.g. through other family members or community volunteers). However, beneficiary lists prepared for this in advance by the local jamoats were found to often include some who were clearly not in the target population. There were also possible shortfalls in social targeting relating to the applied wage rate, perhaps too high. Resolving these issues and screening and finalizing the manual labor beneficiary lists, required considerable extra efforts on the part of the project’s social mobilization NGOs.

e) Monitor, measure, and analyze cross-cutting impacts

Emergency responses can have indirect and perhaps unanticipated impacts that need to be monitored and measured.

In Liberia, although the operation did not incorporate education sector objectives, it nevertheless contributed to increased and stabilized school attendance for boys and girls in the project area, enhanced children’s ability to focus in class and created awareness about the critical role of education for both boys and girls. Food rations for pregnant and lactating women (PLW) distributed at clinics and health centers caused more women to deliver in a clinic or health center and the share of babies with live birth weights less than 2,500 grams to decline. Ministry of Health statistics indicate that since the inception of the intervention, the number of PLWs seeking healthcare has been on the rise.

In Sierra Leone, the Cash-for-Work (CFW) program provided jobs for youth that provided them and their families with income for the duration of the program. According to focus group discussants, direct beneficiaries were busy with the work, leaving them with little time to engage in a fighting or other destructive behavior previously observed under conflict. The group also revealed that CFW guidelines stipulated that beneficiaries who engaged in any form of violence would no longer be eligible to work in the CFW program. According to the beneficiaries, this condition reduced conflict in the beneficiary communities.

In Tajikistan, a transparent and accountable system of payments within the GFRP intervention resulted in opening of access to public assistance programs and other social mainstream activities to the previously excluded rural poor, through the processing and securing of personal identification documents (e.g. passports), social fund and tax system registrations, and bank accounts, all of which were needed to formalize the numerous individual manual labor contracts and to effect the corresponding payments for manual work under the project. In addition to the manual work wages, the
Fostering inter-sectoral linkages can enhance the prospects of achieving higher levels of impact.

The effectiveness of interventions such as a school feeding program (as in Liberia) involves bulk haulage of grain, and thus depends on the quality of roads and bridges and vehicles, and thus quickly shows where bottlenecks are and thus information for future investments in rural infrastructure.

In Ethiopia, exogenous shocks and climate variability reduce expected returns on investments and potentially limit participation by poor, risk-averse households. As such, investment in sustainable land management, small-scale infrastructure, and market access have been incorporated into the GAFSP project design, to substantially reduce risk and increase participation. Increased incomes from the Agriculture Growth Program (AGP) will enable farmers to build assets, which in turn will reduce vulnerability to shocks and enable them to take advantage of investment opportunities. The AGP will link with complementary projects to introduce insurance mechanisms.

In Haiti, socio-environmental considerations have been carried over from needs assessments and risk management mechanisms developed through the GFRP project, to be incorporated into the development of the activities funded by GAFSP through: (i) creation of an environmental unit (UTES) within the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MANRRD); (ii) establishment of a full-time Gender Specialist position at MANRRD; (iii) assessment of the specific needs for the empowerment of women in the agriculture sector, and mainstreaming of lessons into investment program design; and (iv) increased attention to watershed management approaches to promote the environmental sustainability of interventions. Furthermore, the management of natural resources in upper watersheds through sustainable agriculture and livestock practices is considered a key aspect for Haiti’s adaptation to climate change and is at the center of the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) currently under preparation.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The preceding discussion suggests the following general insights across specific lessons.

- Participation and ownership are key to the success of strategies addressing situations of protracted crisis, as they are for longer-term agricultural development under more favorable conditions.
- Data and analysis need to be generated and used, and the key stakeholders beyond governments and international development partners need to be engaged along with governments and international partners in moving forward.
- Robust monitoring and evaluation systems are critical for building the trust necessary for dealing with the especially sensitive issues under protracted crisis, as well as for efficiency and effectiveness.
- National and international partners need to be willing to establish and build institutions that can become repositories of knowledge and expertise.
- Capacity-building is essential to supporting countries’ efforts to cope with an emergency while building resilience.
- Predictability of foreign assistance to support country-led plans is vital to encourage national leaders to make the hard choices and key investments necessary for change.
These can be elaborated on from the country cases, following the three main SOFI 2010 recommendations.

\textit{a) Analysis and understanding of protracted crises}

Targeting is critical to both efficiency of resource use and the chances of success in reaching the vulnerable. A prompt response should not come at the expense of failing to prioritize those who are the most vulnerable. The evidence from Burundi and Tajikistan shows that the key role of engagement of local partners in crafting the response—and specifically in targeting. In some cases, additional monitoring efforts are necessary to ensure accuracy.

Emergency response can also have unintended positive impacts for long-term development goals. Interventions can be more effective by targeting ‘drivers of change’ through simple responses with cross-cutting impacts. The case of Liberia, with increased school attendance rates or pregnant women and young mothers seeking healthcare, is a good example. The experiences from Tajikistan and Sierra Leone show impacts on reducing violence in a post-conflict context, and on reducing social exclusion. Cash-for-work programs in Sierra Leone provided avenues to prevent violence in the beneficiary communities, and in Tajikistan helped reduce social exclusion through the formalization of manual labor contracts. Demonstrating these impacts through better monitoring and evaluation helps maintain the continuity of effort necessary to transit to a longer term perspective.

The urgency for providing a response at the onset of an emergency limits the time available to carry out an in-detail appraisal and preparation of the response components. However, early and comprehensive assessments before crises become acute have been instrumental in identifying and outlining elements for targeted responses.

\textit{b) Support for livelihoods and food security}

The objective suggested by the title above is extremely complex, yet the evidence from emergency responses clearly shows the wisdom of simple, well-focused actions with straightforward, monitorable objectives in situations of protracted crisis. Furthermore, emergency responses should build on previous and ongoing responses and on partners already operating in the affected area, to the extent possible. Likewise, emergency responses should carefully consider any risk of jeopardizing long-term reform efforts. Additional financing to ongoing projects, as in Liberia, greatly reduces overhead costs and speeds things up.

Emergency responses also contribute to building resilience by consolidating national institutions, as in the case of the National Commission for Social Action in Sierra Leone and the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education in Liberia. Working through local staff is still often the most efficient option and it becomes instrumental for building capacity. When the available technical and managerial skills are weak, interventions should promote a ‘learning-by-doing’ approach and put added emphasis on monitoring and supervision activities.

Decentralization of human and financial resources to sub-national levels are likely to be necessary for better targeting and increased participation of local actors, with benefits for efficiency and the sustainability of effort. Mobilization in projects of the Parents and Teachers Associations in Liberia, the Comites de Gestion in Burundi and the Local Councils in Sierra Leone are cases in point. However experiences in some of the other country experiences surveyed suggest that increased reliance on local
actors needs to be balanced with increased efforts at independent monitoring for early detection of emerging issues.

c) Reforming aid architecture

The long-run sustainability of effort is usually not the first priority in emergency operations, but increasingly will need to be considered under situations of protracted crisis, almost by definition. Alignment with true government priorities is the premier route to ensuring that efforts aligned with projects will continue once funding for the project in question is over. The key is to help governments of countries under protracted crisis do what is needed to have and own strategic investment plans for agriculture and food security that are both technically sound in addressing the drivers of food insecurity under protracted crisis, and that have also been widely accepted by stakeholders within the countries concerned. Technical soundness and stakeholder buy-in taken together require improving the evidence base of planning through peer review and consultations with relevant parties, especially farmer groups and the private sector in agriculture and nutrition.

The need for more strategic, more evidence-based, and more inclusive country led plans is of course the main motivation of aid-effectiveness programs such as CAADP in Africa, which has been operational since 2003, but only took off more recently when it looked as if donors might change their funding plans, at least to some extent, to fit the process. Having an aid architecture that provides tangible incentives to countries to be serious about using the evidence base, using peer review, undertaking consultation and promoting inclusion is still a larger work in progress that goes beyond the scope of this paper. The key point for present purposes is that supporting the efforts of the countries to prepare such strategic and policy frameworks that are both sound and owned by the stakeholders is in fact also the key requirement to get countries out of protracted crisis. There are not a lot of short-cuts, but the longer term path is now known and can be followed, if there is the will to do so.

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ANNEX 2 - Detailed overview on the country cases

Burundi

It has been 10 years since peace accords were signed, ending a long, socio-political crisis in Burundi; however, its human development indicators (HDIs) are some of the lowest in the world, it continues to face limited capacities of government institutions, governance issues, climate change, land tenure problems, market underdevelopment, has failed to harness water resources, and its economy remains precarious. Those who are most vulnerable are smallholder farmers. Poverty is strongly linked to low agricultural productivity, associated with the small scale of farms, rapidly increasing population, soil degradation, lack of equipment and technical and financial capital, and an inability to access quality agricultural inputs and land.

The objective of the Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) Food Crisis Response Development Policy Grant in Burundi was to help the Government of Burundi (GOB) reduce hunger, prevent an increase in poverty and social unrest from high food prices, and ensure the fiscal stability needed to foster medium-term social and economic development through the global food price crisis. While the project had to be prepared rapidly and was based on analytical underpinnings of previously completed assessments, rather than a detailed appraisal of the individual program components envisaged by the government to cope with the ongoing food price crisis. Still the program achieved overall expected outputs and outcomes, and supported suspension of custom duties and domestic transaction taxes on 13 basic food items; for example, the volume of food purchased was significantly higher than envisaged, and the number of schools served (106) was also significantly higher than the number initially expected. This helped create the fiscal space for strengthening food security and school feeding programs.

The project was primarily an emergency relief operation designed to mitigate the impact of sharp increases in international and local food prices by increasing access to food to the most vulnerable groups in the most vulnerable regions. There were also some long-term benefits associated with this project as it allowed for the support and stabilization of the overall macroeconomic and public finance management objectives of the government’s economic strategy. It also aimed at improving nutrition and living conditions in poor, rural, food-insecure areas, as well as improving access to primary education, particularly for girls, and enhancing the efficiency of the primary education system by reducing dropout rates.

Moving forward, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) project, Financing for the National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP) for Burundi, was approved in May 2012. This additional financing for the NAIP will seek to increase the availability and quality of food by contributing to the improvement of water management and irrigation in the drought-prone regions of Imbo and Mosso, with investments in infrastructure and agricultural intensification through improved technologies, productive assets, and the establishment of farmer field schools. This project will also be co-financed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) that is also taking advantage from the GAFSP Grant to leverage additional funds from potential donors. While the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has been chosen by the GOB to act as the project’s Supervising Entity (SE), the project will be placed under the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and implemented by an autonomous management and coordination unit within the ministry. Additionally, the project’s formulation will involve a number of assessments, which will be based on consultations with a broad range of stakeholders and development partners, who will also be involved with the project’s implementation.
This project primarily aims to contribute to a number of long-term development goals, hopefully in a move from a protracted crisis situation. Financing greater investment in infrastructure and agricultural inputs should lead to an increase in crop and livestock production by raising productivity and leading to a rejuvenation and more optimal management of soil and water resources. It will also contribute to growth in human capital capacity, through activities aimed at strengthening human resources capacities of national institutions and farmers organizations in the areas of organization and management. While this project will start in 2013, the GOB has made strong commitments to mobilize the necessary human, financial and institutional investments to see the NAIP’s mission carried out. In addition, this project will compliment other programs by other development partners aimed at reducing the poverty of the rural poor and reducing food insecurity, as well as coordinate with other ministries to address issues such as land tenure, environmental problems, and other factors affecting the marketing and development of agribusiness in Burundi.

**Ethiopia**

Over the past several years there has been significant productivity growth of the Ethiopian agricultural sector. This has been attributed to a number of factors; including, greater investment in agricultural infrastructure, market development, and increased use of improved agricultural inputs. However, Ethiopia continues to face a protracted crisis of food insecurity for many years, and the economy still remains highly reliant on smallholder agriculture and a disruption or slowdown in growth can have significant consequences for the national economy and the well-being of the population. Such growth has been threatened due to the global food crisis, which led to high international food prices, high fuel costs, and high costs of agricultural inputs.

The GFRP contributed to the Government of Ethiopia’s (GOE) efforts to ensure that there would be adequate supply of chemical fertilizers for smallholder farmers for the 2009-2010 agricultural season, through the Ethiopia Fertilizer Support Project. Given the emergency aspect of the situation, which was primarily dictated by the Ethiopian agricultural cycle, there was not time to conduct detailed background studies or meetings with stakeholders; instead preliminary assessments were based on an internal review of earlier studies of the agricultural and rural sector. Additionally, the Fertilizer Support Project used the existing fertilizer system opposed to addressing policy and institutional reforms. At the close of the project, crop production and cereals yields were generally deemed above the five year trend. Additionally, due to an unexpected drop in fertilizer prices, more than enough fertilizer was procured.

This project was explicitly designed as a short-term emergency measure in order to prevent the deterioration of production and yields during the global food and fertilizer price crisis, through the provision of fertilizer. Still, there are some positive long-term implications of the work of the project. The GOE and the World Bank worked together to develop a transparent procurement system, which will continue to allow for an efficient use of funds and contribute to the development of good governance on the part of the GOE. This project also benefited greatly from the GOE’s high ownership and commitment to the project; for example, the GOE demonstrated flexibility and was willing to restructure about half of Ethiopia’s Bank-funded projects to meet the needs of this project and allowed it to respond in a timely manner to the GOE’s needs.

The GAFSP provides additional funding to the GOE’s Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) and its initiatives involving institutional strengthening and development, market and agribusiness development,
small-scale agricultural water development and management, small-scale market infrastructure development and management, management capacity at all administrative levels (federal, regional, zonal, woredas levels) and monitoring and evaluation. The design of this program involved a series of consultative workshops that involved multiple stakeholders such as governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as the private sector, and it will focus on scaling up practices with a proven track record in Ethiopia. While the World Bank and FAO are the Supervising Entities of the GAFSP funding, IDA and a number of other development partners also provide additional support to the AGP. The GOE Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) is taking the lead role in the implementation of the overarching AGP.

Financing the AGP is expected to have long-term development effects in Ethiopia. The AGP seeks to support the development of local institutions and mechanisms as part of its primary sub-components; for example, through activities aimed at strengthening agricultural and rural development partners linkages advisory councils (ARDPLACs), adding and strengthening extension and public services, and farmer organizations. In addition, given the GOE’s substantial financial commitment to the agricultural sector, along with its comprehensive and consistent set of policies and strategies focused on reflecting the sector in the country’s development aspirations, its strong commitment to financing agriculture and rural development over the next decade is expected to continue beyond this particular project. Though the project has only recently started, the implementation status and results thus far have reported satisfactory progress, and it is expected that increased incomes from the AGP will enable farmers to build assets, which in turn will reduce vulnerability to shocks and enable them to take advantage of investment opportunities.

**Haiti**

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, experiencing a severe lack of educational and economic opportunities, basic social services, and adequate public infrastructure. While the agricultural sector plays a primary role in the country’s economy, the quality and productivity of the land is limited by the prominence of small-scale subsistence farming, a lack of agricultural extension services, developed food supply chains, and limited access to rural finance markets. As a result, exogenous shocks, such as the recent natural disasters and commodity price fluctuations, severely affect the population; especially, the rural poor.

The World Bank’s Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) sought to address these issues, which were exacerbated by the recent global food price crisis, through its project *Strengthening the Management of Agriculture Public Services*. This project financed the strengthening of the key management functions of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MANRRD), enabling it to prioritize and target investments that would improve local agricultural support services. The conceptualization and execution of this project was led by the own staff and institutional structure of MANRRD (not by a separate PIU), involving a social assessment and stakeholder analysis, with MANRRD taking total ownership of it, contrary to other projects in the past. Despite a few delays, progress was achieved in all the planned activities of the project. Additionally, thanks to flexibility with the allocation of resources, MANRRD was able to reallocate funds to priority activities in institutional strengthening as the situation changed and priorities were adjusted after the 2010 earthquake.

Aspects of this project hold short and medium-term benefits for Haiti, as trainings and services allowed the Government to quickly and effectively support farmers to strengthen their ability to sustain their livelihoods through emergencies; however, this project seeks mostly to address long-term institutional
development issues in Haiti. Investments were made in MANRRD’s institutional capacity to provide basic public services, increase and improve the efficiency of public spending in the agriculture sector, and to increase efficiency and accountability of sector actors; all by supporting MANRRD in its ability to design and implement public policies and instruments to alleviate the effects of food price volatility, reducing market distortions, and supporting sustainable growth by extending rapid and direct support to farmers. In addition, a variety of risk management mechanisms were developed; such as, a farmer registry which serves as a transparent and cost-effective way to reach farmers with smart subsidies and basic public services, a Sector Environmental Unit (UTES) within MANRRD which implements monitoring of indicators and the project’s safeguards, and the establishment and strengthening of a number of research and development (R&D) centers and extension providers aimed at ensuring that small-scale agricultural producers incorporate sustainable technologies and practices into their work.

The broad objective of the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program’s (GAFSP) recently approved project in Haiti, *Relaunching Agriculture: Strengthening Agriculture Public Services II*, is to strengthen the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development’s (MANRRD) capacity to implement the Government of Haiti’s (GOH) National Agriculture Extension Strategy (2011-2016), to increase agricultural extension services to small farmers in most vulnerable regions, and to make available financial assistance to the GOH in cases of an agriculture sector emergency. The Supervising Entities (Ses) are the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and the MANRRD will be the implementing partner for this project. This project mainly involves the scaling up or application of existing technologies and best practices in Haiti, such as outlined in the National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP) with the expectation that this will allow for growth and increased stability of small farmer incomes, a reduction of environmental degradation, and overall increased food security.

This project will have significant long-term impacts as it seeks to improve the market for agriculture technology and innovation, invest in agricultural and natural infrastructure in Haiti, and reinforce and build capacity for MANRRD to lead, guide and bring coherence to the agricultural sector development and investments in animal and plant health control and protection to facilitate flows of information and technology among people and organizations, and to promote the interaction and participation among sector actors. In addition, this project has short and medium-term implications as it improves access for smallholders to agricultural inputs, providing work opportunities, and mainstreams nutrition-sensitive and gender considerations into investments, which should increase productivity and contribute to increased incomes and nutritional status of smallholders and the rural population in Haiti.

**Liberia**

Liberia suffered through a protracted war from 1989 to 2003. Since then the political situation in the country has greatly improved; however, the war left much of Liberia’s economy, institutions, human capital, and infrastructure in ruins, which has impeded growth. The agricultural sector, in particular, faces significant constraints to growth, which is critical due to its prominent role in the country’s economy and its populations’ livelihoods. Specific constraints to growth involve weak land management and water control systems, limited production intensification and crop diversification, restricted market access due to poor food value chains, and low institutional capacity.

The objective of the GFRP project *Emergency Food Support for Vulnerable Women and Children* was to ensure access to food for the most vulnerable households, despite a sharp rise in food prices due to the global food price crisis. This was accomplished by providing additional funding to school feeding programs for pre-schools and primary schools in five counties in Southeast Liberia, which exhibited the
most severe chronic malnutrition rates. While WFP was the implementing partner for this project, the Government of Liberia (GOL) also showed a strong commitment to the project and was very responsive in all matters during preparation and implementation, which was critical to its success. Also, WFP worked very closely with key government institutions to build up national capacity and instill national ownership of the project, including the School Feeding Unit of the Ministry of Education and the Nutritional and Maternal and Child Health Division of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.

The GOL was very quick to respond to the global food price crisis, which is did utilizing intensive consultation with civil society and development partners, including the UN and the World Bank. The project had a simple, straightforward objective, which was to contribute to the continuation of a well-established program to make food accessible to vulnerable women and children most affected by the crisis. Still, indirect, long-term implications are expected, especially due to the critical nature and long-term developmental impact for young children to receive adequate nutrition during their formative years. Other significant impacts were the increased capacity of participating local partners, increased and stabilized school attendance, and increased number of PLW seeking healthcare.

GAFSP financing in Liberia will support the implementation of sustainable medium and long-term investments in agriculture guided by the Liberia Agriculture Sector Investment Program (LASIP); in particular, its Smallholder Agricultural Productivity Enhancement and Commercialization (SAPEC) Project. The development of SAPEC has been based on the analysis of existing interventions, along with a number of national reconstruction and development agendas that have been developed in Liberia over the past six years. The African Development Bank (AFDB) is the Supervising Entity (SE) for this project, as it has experience in Liberia and comparable advantages in agricultural and infrastructure development. The implementation of SAPEC, and the associated GAFSP-funded elements of it, will be led by the Ministry of Agriculture’s (MOA) Program Management Unit (PMU).

While SAPEC is scheduled to begin shortly, the Government of Liberia, has shown commitment to promoting the agricultural sector, which aims at increasing productivity, developing agricultural value chains, and increasing technical capacity the sector; all of which, with a special emphasis on food crops. By supporting LASIP, GAFSP funds will enable Liberia to rebuild and maximize the agricultural sector’s contributions to economic growth, employment and income generation, food and nutrition security, and overall poverty reduction. The program will increase the income of smallholder farmers, particularly women and youth, through irrigable land expansion, land husbandry improvement, and improvement of market access.

Sierra Leone

Since the end of a decade-long civil war in 2001, Sierra Leone has made significant growth towards recovery, reconstruction, and democratization; however, it remains one the poorest countries in the world. Beginning in 2008, with a public commitment by the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, agricultural development has come to the forefront of the government’s development efforts, and its public investment in the sector has reached nearly 10 percent of the national budget. The agricultural sector is recognized as having potential to bring about economic growth, employment opportunities, and increased stability, which has been reflected in programs aiming to reduce poverty, protect livelihoods, and increase food security.

The $US8 million GFRP project, Co-financing of the National Social Action Plan (NSAP), supported a Cash-for-Work (CFW) program under NSAP which supported household food access and minimized the
The nutritional impact of the global food price crisis through incremental income support. The National Commission for Social Action (NACSA) was the executing agency, responsible for fiduciary management, M&E, and reporting, and oversaw implementation and provided support to local authorities though the regional network of technical staff. All works were demand-driven, with specific requests having originated from and/or confirmed with relevant communities, chiefdoms, districts, or other local government authorities.

The initial goal of this project was to provide emergency relief through supplementary income on the part of the CFW initiatives, and the subsequent stability resulting from decreased unemployment. Still, there are significant long-term implications as well. For example, the various CFW projects helped vulnerable communities to restore infrastructure and services and build local capacity for collective action. The Beneficiary Impact Assessment found that the project reflected the collective felt needs of the community and contributed to rebuilding social facilities necessary for social cohesion, and strengthened the community relations needed for peace and stability. This program has even been scaled up under the World Bank’s $20 million Youth Employment Support project (YESP), which contains $10 million of financing for Cash for Work implemented by NACSA.

The GAFSP project in Sierra Leone aims to increase agricultural productivity through the financing of two components of the Smallholder Commercialization Programme (SCP) Investment Plan, which is part of the country’s National Agricultural Investment Programme (NAIP). The specific objective of the support is to promote smallholder agricultural commercialization through production intensification, diversification, value addition, and marketing, as well as developing small-scale irrigation infrastructures to boost rice production, a major staple in the country. The Supervising Entity for this project is the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), while the Government of Sierra Leone will also engage the FAO as the implementing partner. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Security (MAFFS) will be the lead implementing agency of the project. The development of the SCP is the result of extensive analyses utilizing consultation and a series of meetings with various local stakeholders, development partners, experts, and government agencies in Sierra Leone. Additionally, many of its components are scaled up versions of previously successful projects, and take into consideration established national strategies and frameworks.

Since the end of the civil war in 2001, funding has begun transitioning from post-conflict and emergency relief to long-term development. For example, this project hopes to result in the formation of 1000 farmer-based organizations (FBOs), which will receive organization and business management skills, increasing their capacity to support agricultural development. Activities such as these will improve overall agriculture and food security planning, coordination and monitoring to better align programs to the NAIP. It will also foster smallholders’ capacity to increase productivity and better market their product and to develop small-scale irrigation. It has also been determined to have great potential to increase the short and medium term food security and wealth generation of some of the most vulnerable in Sierra Leone, through activities such as those aimed at increasing the adoption and accessibility of higher yielding technologies and agricultural inputs. For example, the implementation of some activities will involve farmers’ labor, which will increase incomes.

**Tajikistan**

Tajikistan is the smallest and poorest of the Central Asian economies, with a population of 7.6 million, of whom 46 percent live below the poverty line. The economy remains highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks, nevertheless, including regional trade and border disputes, volatility in world prices for cotton
and aluminum, and the continued crisis in the Euro-zone. Tajikistan’s high dependence on imported fuel and cereal exacerbates this vulnerability, particularly given the prospect of rising future prices for these commodities and the continued depreciation of its currency. This combination of poverty and vulnerability, at both macro and household level, continues to justify increased commitment of the Government and donor community in strengthening the country’s agricultural sector and achieving sustainable improvements in food security.

The objective of the GFRP-funded Public Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Management Project for Tajikistan was to increase household food security despite the global food crisis, the particularly harsh winter of 2007-2008, a significant drop in remittance income, and the constraint to domestic food production caused by inadequate drainage and irrigation. This was accomplished through a public works program to provide temporary employment to food insecure rural people, by rehabilitating the farm level irrigation and drainage network in selected high food insecurity districts. The project also contributed to improved food security at a national level by financing the technical assistance needed to introduce water basin management as the basis for overall management of Tajikistan’s water resources. Due to the emergency nature of the project, much of the analysis and assessments made during the planning process were based on previous or ongoing reports. This project was deemed successful, as there was a high level of achievement regarding its objectives. Achievements as compared to the project outcome indicator target values given ranged from 95 percent to 173 percent of the target values.

The major focus of this project was to implement a public works program to renovate drainage and irrigation infrastructure in Tajikistan. In the short-term, these actions provided temporary employment to food insecure households and it increased crop production in the medium-term. Still, the primary and long-term contribution of this project was to the nascent reform of the water sector and considerably improved infrastructure, which led to the improvement of collector and drainage canals, the renovation of irrigation canals, fortified spillways, the construction of outlet gates, and the increased capacity of community-level and public institutions. The undertaking of needed irrigation and drainage infrastructure rehabilitation through an emergency public works project with a major manual labor component represented a novel development project concept and approach for the Bank that has been judged to have been eminently successful. Building on these experiences and achievements, the following project continued the response to the protracted nature of the stresses in Tajikistan.

The recently approved Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) project in Tajikistan is the Second Public Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Resources Management Project (PAMP). In order to prepare for the implementation of this project a broad array of analyses were considered in addition to the lessons learned from the first stage of the project, which allowed the GOT to identify the appropriate response to its protracted crisis, involving extensive consultations with stakeholders, the research community, civil society, and private sector and development partners, which contributed to the determination that the poor state of the irrigation network was a key factor contributing to low agricultural productivity in Tajikistan. While the World Bank is the project’s SE, the implementation will involve substantial ownership by local actors. Between now and 2016, the expected closing date of the project, preliminary key results expected include 850,000 man days of temporary employment and a 15 percent increase in crop production on 75,000 hectares of irrigated arable land due to improved irrigation and drainage services.

GAFSP funding will support a multi-pronged approach to improving irrigation and drainage including: rehabilitating secondary canals to improve water delivery at the farm level, financing the preparatory
work for the introduction of a water basin management system, and developing water management policies. Through this, it will help to enhance the administration capacity of the irrigation system and water management. Currently, many farms do not have water gates or water meters to regulate usage and the pricing of water usage is based on a flat rate model instead of a more sustainable volume-based model. GAFSP funding will strengthen the legislative and operational framework for local Water User Associations (WUAs) and a clarification of the roles of local and national authorities. This enhanced capacity will allow all stakeholders to have more input in irrigation policies, system maintenance, and fee setting. The considerable emphasis on the strengthening of WUAs will be the basis for involving local communities in water resources management and for building the capacity for continues sustainable management of irrigation beyond the project lifetime. WUAs address the need for water users to assume more responsibility for financing and managing water resources through secondary and tertiary canals.