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South–South Cooperation Beyond the Myths

Rising Donors, New Aid Practices?

Edited by Isaline Bergamaschi,
Phoebe Moore and Arlene B. Tickner



International Political Economy Series

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Isaline Bergamaschi • Phoebe Moore • Arlene B. Tickner
Editors

South-South Cooperation Beyond the Myths

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|--|
| AAAJC | Association for the Support and Legal Aid for Communities |
| ABC | Brazilian Agency of Cooperation |
| ABRASCO | Brazilian Association of Graduate Studies in Collective Health |
| ACCI | Colombia Agency for International Cooperation |
| ACIRC | African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises |
| ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific Group States |
| ADECRU | Academic Action for the Development of Rural Communities |
| ADFD | Abu Dhabi Fund for Development |
| AEC | Association of Caribbean States |
| AECID | Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development |
| AID | Association of International Physicians |
| AFD | French Development Agency |
| AFKAD | Africa Brotherhood and Solidarity Association |
| ALADI | Latin American Integration Association |
| ALBA | Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America |
| ALBA-TCP | Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, Commerce Treaty of the Peoples |
| AMEXID | Mexican Agency of International Development Cooperation |

| | |
|--------------|--|
| ANC | African National Congress |
| APC-Colombia | Presidential Agency of International Cooperation of Colombia |
| APRM | African Peer Review Mechanism |
| ARF | African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund |
| ARV | Antiretroviral |
| ASA | Africa–South America Summits |
| ASBRAER | Brazilian Association of Technical Assistances and Rural Extension |
| ASDB | Asian Development Bank |
| AU | African Union |
| ESAFED | Aegean Health Association Federation |
| BADEA | Arab Fund for Economic Development in Africa |
| BAPA | Buenos Aires Plan of Action |
| BHEC | Brazilian Health Expert Community |
| BNDES | Brazil National Bank for Economic and Social Development |
| BRICS | Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa |
| CAF | Development Bank of Latin America |
| CARICOM | Caribbean Community |
| CELAC | Community of Latin American and Caribbean States |
| CII | Confederation of Indian Industries |
| CIVETs | Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, and Turkey |
| COMECON | Council for Mutual Economic Assistance |
| CPLP | Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DBSA | Development Bank of South Africa |
| DECTI | Special Division of Technical International Cooperation |
| DFA | Department of Foreign Affairs |
| DIRCO | Department of the International Relations and Cooperation |
| Diyanet | Directorate for Religious Affairs |
| DNP | National Planning Department |
| DPA | Development Partnership Administration |
| DSI | State Hydraulic Works |

| | |
|--------------|---|
| EDF | Electricity of France |
| ELAM | Latin American Medical School |
| Embrapa | Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of Western African States |
| ELN | National Liberation Army |
| EU | European Union |
| EXIM | Export-Import Bank of India |
| FARC | Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FGV Projetos | Fundação Getúlio Vargas |
| FICCI | Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry |
| Fiocruz | Oswaldo Cruz Foundation |
| FM | Woman Forum |
| FOCAI | Cooperation and International Assistance Fund |
| FONAGNI | Forum of Niasa's NGOs |
| FONGZA | Forum of Zambezia's NGOs |
| FTAA | Free Trade Area of the Americas |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| GODE | Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt |
| HIPC | Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative |
| HIV/AIDS | Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| HLF | OECD's High-Level Forum |
| HLSSD | High Level Strategic Security Dialogue |
| IADC | Inter-American Democratic Charter |
| IBSA | India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum |
| ICCR | Indian Council for Cultural Relations |
| IDB | Islamic Development Bank |
| IDC | International Development Cooperation |
| IFIs | International Financial Institutions |
| IHH | Humanitarian Relief Foundation |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| IR | International Relations |
| ISIL | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| ITEC | Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme |
| IT | Information Technology |
| JA | Environmental Justice |
| JICA | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| JIRCAS | Japan International Research Centre on Agriculture |
| Kizilay | Turkish Red Crescent |
| KOICA | Korean International Cooperation Agency |
| KSA | Kingdom of Saudi Arabia |
| Lao PDR | Lao Popular Democratic Republic |
| LDC | Least Developed Countries |
| LDH | Mozambican League of Human Rights |
| MB | Muslim Brotherhood |
| MDR | Ministry of Rural Development of Brazil |
| MEA | Ministry of External Affairs of India |
| MERCOSUR- MERCOSUL | Common Market of the South |
| MIC | Middle Income Country |
| MICAD | Ministry of Development and International Cooperation |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MINAG | Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture |
| MISAU | Mozambique's Ministry of Health |
| MRE | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MSF | Doctors Without Borders |
| MUSD | Million US Dollars |
| M&E | Monitoring and evaluation |
| NAFTA | North America Free Trade Agreement |
| NAM | Non-Aligned Movement |
| NAMA | Non-Agricultural Market Access |
| NAS | Narcotics Affairs Section |
| NDB | New Development Bank |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organisations |
| NHS | Mozambique's Primary Health Care System |
| NIEO | New International Economic Order |

| | |
|---------|---|
| NITC | New Information and Communication Technologies |
| Norad | Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation |
| NSC | North-South Cooperation |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| ODA | Overseas Development Aid |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OIC | Organisation of Islamic Cooperation |
| ONUMOZ | United Nations Operation in Mozambique |
| OPEC | Organisation of Exporting Petroleum Countries |
| PAHO | Pan-American Health Organization |
| PALOP | Portuguese Speaking African Countries |
| PAP | Pan African Parliament |
| PCRM | Regional Cooperation Programme for Mesoamerica |
| PDVSA | Petroleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anonima |
| PECS | Strategic Public Health Cooperation Plan for 2009-2012 |
| PEDSA | Strategic Development Plan of the Agrarian Sector of Mozambique |
| PFMA | Public Finance Management Act |
| PIS | Comprehensive Medical Program |
| PPOSC-N | Provincial Platform of Nampula's Civil Society |
| PPPs | Private Public Partnerships |
| PRSPs | Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers |
| RADEZA | Organizations Network for Environment and Sustainable Community Development |
| SA | South Africa |
| SACU | Southern African Customs Union |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SADPA | South African Development Partnership Agency |
| SAPs | Structural Adjustment Programmes |
| SCCG | Security Cooperation Coordinating Group |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SEGIB | Ibero-American Secretariat General |
| SELA | Latin American and Caribbean Economic System |

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|---------------|--|
| SRRP | Syria Regional Response Plan |
| TA | Technical Assistance |
| TCIL | Telecommunications Consultants India Limited |
| TDC | Triangular Development Cooperation |
| TEAM 9 | Techno-Economic Approach for Africa–India Movement |
| TICAD | Tokyo International Conference on African Development |
| TIKA | Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency |
| TSK | Turkish Armed Forces |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAC | National Union of Peasants |
| UNASUR–UNASUL | Union of South American Nations |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| USA | United States |
| US\$ | United States Dollar |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WB | World Bank |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |
| WP-EFF | Working Party on Aid Effectiveness |
| YTB | Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities |

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: South–South Cooperation Beyond the Myths—A Critical Analysis

Isaline Bergamaschi and Arlene B. Tickner

THE RISE AND FALL OF SSC

The concept of South–South cooperation (hereafter SSC) covers many layers of economic initiatives and political realities. In common parlance, it can include political, military, economic, or cultural relationships; humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation between developing countries; the allocation of financial resources for development projects and regional integration as well as the constitution of blocks—a common position and agenda in multilateral negotiations.¹ Historically, however, the concept finds its roots in the struggle for independence of Asian and African countries during the 1940s and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) a few years later. The ideas of a common identity, equality, and

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solidarity between less-developed countries; the defence of the sovereignty of newly independent states; and opposition to the “North” are thus core elements of SSC. From an economic perspective, development planning, state intervention in the economy, and import substitution through the consolidation of local production influenced the strategies of developing countries to varying degrees during the 1950s and 1960s.

The spirit of SSC materialized in the creation of coalitions among developing countries—the Group of 77 or G77 within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, as of 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO)—and led to some concrete achievements. The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was calling for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and products from developing countries were granted privileged access to Northern markets (e.g. the Lomé agreement between the European Community and the Africa–Pacific–Caribbean countries) as well as exceptions to the free-trade regime. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) united countries around a common agenda and successfully managed to put pressure on Western economies by increasing international oil prices during the 1970s. As recalled by Sachin Chaturvedi (2012, 18), the South Conference (now South Centre) was created in 1987 and identified the following major areas of SSC: finance, trade, industry and business, services, transport, information and communications, and people-to-people contact. SSC also covered Cuban or Chinese military support to governments or armed movements on the African continent.

As of the 1980s, SSC as a political project progressively lost momentum as a result of a number of factors. The spread of Cold War politics led governments in developing countries to progressively seek out international patronage and align with one of the two superpowers. The debt crisis during the 1980s forced Southern governments to accept the loans, advice, and conditions attached to assistance from International Financial Institutions (IFIs)—that is, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The ideological shift in developed countries (with Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom) created a context less favourable to the negotiation of a New International Economic Order wooed by developing countries’ governments. The fragmentation of the global South, with the “take-off” of East Asian countries and economic development in Latin America, also challenged the identity of a united “Third World” and impeded the establishment of a common agenda around shared economic and diplomatic interests in instances such as the United Nations (UN) or the WTO.²

Only during the 2000s did South–South links revive and gain strength because of economic growth and the consolidation of regional integration in some parts of the world, the election and ambitions of “revolutionary” or left-wing leaders in Latin America, the growing frustrations regarding North–South relations, the unpopularity of the reforms, and the austerity imposed by the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Such developments have triggered high expectations and a couple of myths.

SSC RISES AGAIN? POTENTIAL, EXPECTATIONS, AND MYTHS DURING THE 2000s

One, if not the most important, feature of contemporary international relations and political economy is the (re-)emergence of the “global South” in world politics. During the 2000s, developing and emerging countries had begun to form coalitions in multilateral organizations and establish ad hoc forums, such as the BRICS or the CIVETs,³ to promote their interests, agendas, and visions for global governance and international development.⁴

Accordingly, a marked rebirth of SSC has taken place. While Chinese cooperation and investments in Africa have multiplied in the past decades and surpassed those of many of the so-called traditional powers,⁵ Brazil (with the ABC, since 1987), the Republic of Korea (KOIKA in 1991), and more recently Mexico (AMEXID in 2011), India (the Development Partnership Administration in 2012), and South Africa (the Development Partnership Agency or SADPA in 2013), now have cooperation agencies of their own and are sometimes adapting their laws to scale up—that is, projecting new development practices in their respective regions and beyond. Through South–South diversification, emerging and middle-income countries (MIC) have seen their roles as regional leaders catapult them into positions as potential global leaders.

According to information gathered by Chaturvedi et al. (2012, 255), the volume of SCCs doubled in one decade and reached US\$20 billion in 2010, accounting for 9.5 % of the total amount of foreign aid in 2008. Although this is a very modest share of the total aid that flows worldwide, the qualitative, symbolic, and political impact of SSC has been considerable. Indeed, the categories of “North” and “South,” “donors” and “recipients,” and “developed” and “developing” countries are being blurred and challenged. At times the terms “North–South partnerships” or “multilateral arrangements” are renegotiated as traditional powers and international organizations feel the necessity to catch-up with ongoing shifts.⁶

The momentum gained by SSC, particularly in the 2000s, has had important implications for the restructuring of development agendas and aid practices, both globally and in developing countries. Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) encouraged and financed policy change for neighbouring like-minded countries led by leftist leaders (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba) in order to promote “socialist” development projects while allowing these countries to bypass IFI loans rife with conditionalities. Meanwhile, African governments have been welcoming financial support from donors, such as China, that typically do not impose conditions regarding governance and macro-economic choices. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America, competition between new and traditional donors in the “aid cartel” (Easterly 2003) has given aid-dependent governments strategic advantages and manoeuvring room to negotiate aid on better terms and to select their international partners.⁷

This book explores the aid policies implemented by donors of the global South in other developing countries. In doing so, it adopts a restricted definition of SSC, which as seen earlier, has represented broader realities historically. As a result, issues related to the impact of emerging donors on, and insertion (or lack of) into the global governance of aid, are only considered as secondary matters; and Southern diplomacies in distinct multilateral arenas (within the UN system or at the WTO level) and “clubs” (e.g. the BRICS, the G20, etc.)—that have already received wide coverage in the media and academic literature—are also not taken into account.

Expectations resulting from the revival of SSC are high, multifaceted, and have nurtured some myths about its potential benefits and dangers. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and alter-globalist activists see it as an opportunity to pursue the interests of developing countries and to advance progressive policies that counteract the neoliberal order espoused by Western governments and the IFIs.⁸ They also see potential for the revival of the assertive nonaligned and Third Worldism movements of the recent past, which were more effective at taking into account the interests, agendas, and aspirations of governments and populations in the global South.

Following George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 as part of the broader “war on terror,” the limitations of US leadership in the world became clearer, highlighting the importance of alternative cooperation strategies. The instabilities and inequalities triggered by contemporary globalization were violently underscored by the 2008 financial and economic crisis, and the global justice movement has burgeoned and

multiplied pledges for a change in the world economic and political order. Seeing Southern experts and civil servants engaging in capacity-building, experience and knowledge-sharing for development has been appealing to many—especially since Western economies have lost their legitimacy to “teach” the South economic lessons after the onset of the 2008 crisis—because it has borne the promise of a transfer of successful models to the poorest countries.

High expectations regarding SSC also come from recipient governments. South–South cooperation is a source of inspiration for replicating successful development models and serves as a wellspring of resources that traditional donors do not provide. This has been the case for loans provided by China for infrastructure projects in Africa. Traditional donors are concerned about creating “white elephants” and thus rarely finance such endeavours, which are used to build everything from airports to roads, to government buildings, to stadiums. Rwanda and Ethiopia explicitly claim to replicate the Chinese development “model” and Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa receives advice from Ha-Joon Chang, a UK-based heterodox economist whose academic work is mostly inspired by the experiences of late industrialization in East Asia.⁹

From an academic point of view, general interest in Southern diplomacies has evolved in tandem with that of private actors (i.e. banks and investors) in emerging economies and the diplomatic ambitions of the BRICS and MICs to increase their global influence. The topic has brought not only some fresh air into the international aid field as a set of practices but also as an object of study, including because it has led to an increase in the number of publications by scholars from the global South. The SSC concept has been seen as having the potential to introduce some diversity into development models and to contribute to a shift in the balance of power in decision making within an increasingly multipolar world.¹⁰

In the global North, it has led to concern and curiosity about changes in the international system, the role of new development cooperation actors, and the involvement of the global South and emerging powers. Interest in South–South relations indeed spans the globe—so much so that special summer courses, graduate programmes, and think tanks are being created to study Southern diplomacy and SSC in both developed and emerging countries specifically.¹¹

This book seeks to respond to the growing call within both academe and practitioner circles for more systematic analyses of current trends in international development cooperation. The following discussion of

the literature on SSC attempts to show that existing works have yet to explore its specificities and implications fully. The authors then present the innovative analytical framework used by the various contributors to this book.

CONTEMPORARY SSC: THE EXISTING LITERATURE AND ITS LIMITATIONS

Together with the diplomacies of Southern countries,¹² contemporary SSC has been the subject of renewed academic interest and enthusiasm, especially during the 2000s. The specialized literature on SSC highlights a number of characteristics and weaknesses exhibited by this kind of cooperation, which the following subsections discuss.

Focus on the BRICS

The SSC literature is dominated by the BRICS.¹³ In the development of specific case studies, China's foreign policy in Africa has undeniably drawn the most attention,¹⁴ due both to the volume of its aid and growing interest in this powerful global political and economic actor. This has sometimes obscured the activities and paradigms deployed by China in other regions, or by other Southern donor countries. Topping the list of the most attractive topics for scholars, China has been followed by Brazil; this is especially so since former President Lula's SSC policy was characterized by an Africa focus and the country generated high expectations regarding its domestic development records and its regional leadership before the economic slowdown and social protests became clear during the FIFA World Cup competition in 2014. India also has produced considerable interest, while South Africa's diplomacy has been studied not mainly through its aid policy—because it has not flourished in a way as linear and spectacular as other emerging countries (see this book's Chap. 6)—but through its diplomatic contribution to alternative multilateral debates and fora, such as IBSA (a diplomatic club gathering India, Brazil, and South Africa since 2003), or the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB), which is a bank created in 2015 by the BRICS as an alternative to the IFIs. The focus on the BRICS is problematic to the extent that they are not always representative of all Southern diplomacies and policies,¹⁵ and it leaves aside other donors.

*Seeing SSC Through the Eyes of Donors: Emerging Countries
and the International System*

When authors apply the tools of International Relations (IR) to the study of SSC, they usually refer to realist theory's core notion of "national interest," understood as the geostrategic or economic motivations driving SSC. Several works have questioned the nature of the SSC concept as a public policy, and its links with foreign policy considerations, highlighting the gap between claims and "real" interests to engage more actively in other developing countries.¹⁶

With emphasis placed largely on Southern donors, SSC often is portrayed as a symptom and a sign of the "emergence" of middle or great powers (i.e. China, India, and Brazil in particular) at the expense of more detailed accounts of the potential effects of SSC in recipient countries informed by in-depth field research.¹⁷ The attention thus is placed on the role of emerging donors on the international scene and the "geopolitics" of SSC.¹⁸ By doing so, existing works reproduce a bias found in most classical works within the field of IR—that is, the focus on donor motives (cynical or altruistic depending on the school of thought) to send human, technical, and financial support to developing countries¹⁹ at the expense of its meaning for, uses by, and insertion into recipient societies. Nowadays, many studies still envisage the aid policies of emerging powers from the perspective of their potential impact on the global aid architecture and landscape, and thus insist on its macro-effects on world politics (i.e. the challenges to the Western promotion of "liberal democracy" all over the globe) or on the international system itself—that is, the rise of multipolarity in world politics at the expense of US dominance.²⁰

Generalizations Versus Diversity

It cannot be denied that Southern donors share a number of common characteristics, some of which distinguish them from traditional ones. Financial support is not necessarily the biggest share of their aid—technical assistance usually plays a key role—and is delivered mostly through bilateral, rather than multilateral, channels. Aid projects, instead of aid programmes or budget support, are the dominant aid modality in SSC. In addition, its providers claim that SSC is different from the North–South by nature, as it complies with the principle of horizontality, solidarity and reciprocity and mutual benefit. Moreover, while in the past decades the conditionalities attached to traditional aid have proliferated and expanded

to cover not only every aspect of policy (e.g. economic reforms, good governance, institutional and social development) but also its process of elaboration and implementation (e.g. civil society participation, transparency, introduction of results-based management techniques), SSC claims to respect sovereignty, to adhere strictly to the principle of “non-interference” in domestic affairs, and to be devoid of conditionalities (Gould 2005). China, however, asks recipient governments to recognize the doctrine of “One China” against Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts for international recognition.

It would be erroneous to consider Southern donors as a homogenous category.²¹ Although they all claim to act out of horizontality and mutual benefit, these principles in reality have a variety of meanings and practical implications in each SSC scenario. The notion of “China’s exceptionalism” in Africa, a prominent feature in Beijing’s current engagement on the continent, seeks to structure relations such that they remain asymmetrical in economic content but are nonetheless characterized as equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing (i.e. mutual respect and political equality).²² Southern donors are not equally “new” in their engagement with other parts of the global South. Even though China has a long tradition of cooperation with African countries, Turkey is fairly new to the game. China mostly is interested in extracting the natural resources present on the continent so as to feed its own industries at home; whereas this is not an objective for the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Cuba, or the Republic of Korea. Brazil and Cuba are not similarly “powerful” or, on the contrary, horizontal in their relationships with poverty-stricken, aid-dependent countries. Despite a common rhetoric, each Southern donor uses specific resources and references to justify its actions, and does not equally claim to be different from its Northern counterparts.

Normativity and the Economic Focus

The topic of contemporary SSC has often been addressed by aid and development institutions and policy actors themselves,²³ along with scholars located within the fields of IR and development studies and frequently enmeshed in policymaking circles.²⁴ This has had the positive effect of providing dense descriptions of official initiatives and ongoing policies;²⁵ however, it has at times also held the risk of a lack of critical distance vis-à-vis the claims of Southern donors themselves and of the perpetuation of some myths associated with SSC.

An additional difficulty (i.e. the lack of public data on SSC) has stalled the production of both detailed and critical analyses. To date, many analysts have relied extensively on official discourses and policy documents produced by Southern governments as well as scarce quantitative data, as nontraditional donors are not committed to the norm of transparency instilled by the OECD-DAC,²⁶ often lack the institutional capacity to collect and systematise data, and are reluctant to publish information about their aid policies for fear of raising social contestations in their own societies. Because emerging economies are very unequal (i.e. between rural and urban areas, coastal and hinterland regions, educated-formal and illiterate-informal workers), the number of poor in these countries also tends to be high—arguably, most of the world’s poor live in emerging and underdeveloped countries. This is in contrast to some developed countries where there is a political base and social constituencies that favour sending aid abroad. The lack of quantitative data available sometimes has not been compensated for by use of consistent qualitative empirical fieldwork in the form of ethnographic and onsite observations by scholars.

A fair number of academic pieces adopt a normative or prescriptive posture, assuming the desirability of SSC *a priori*. Many are oriented towards an evaluation that emphasizes the benefits of SSC as well as the “limits” and “challenges” it faces²⁷ or the persistent “gap” between rhetoric and reality. They are interested in learning “lessons” from traditional aid or in offering policy recommendations for improving the implementation, coordination, transparency, or accountability of SSC.

The literature also suffers from an economic bias. When the effects of SSC are under scrutiny, it is mostly as a threat or opportunity in reference to *economic* development, and sometimes the discussion is being held in the absence of a multifaceted debate about its definition and the diverse ways of achieving it. This is a topic of immense controversy not only in the specialized literature but also in the policymaking world; historically, it has led to development strategies ranging from socialist, to protectionist projects inspired by dependency theory, to import-substitution strategies, to neoliberal structural adjustment during the 1990s or micro-finance.²⁸ Such normative concerns and ambitions are absent from this book because its contributors do not work on the basis of a specific, preconceived definition of development; and the individuals do not feel the urge to improve the practice or effects of SSC but rather to unpack and interpret them.

Overall, there is a vacuum of critical knowledge informed by fieldwork regarding SSC. As highlighted by Chaturvedi et al. (2012, 6), “SSC is not exposed to global scrutiny in the same way as are development aid flows from the OECD-DAC.” Benzi and Lo Brutto add that there is a lack of dialogue between works looking at North–South cooperation and SSC, and that the latter is often “excessively idealized.”²⁹

STRUCTURE AND RATIONALE: A CRITICAL SSC RESEARCH AGENDA

Given that most existing works on SSC are descriptive (not analytical) in nature and often are incomplete, this book builds on and complements them through a critical approach. The word “critical” is used here for three main reasons. First, it refers to the book’s objective to provide an independent and informed analysis through a non-economic lens. As such, SSC is not considered here as desirable *or* dangerous, but as one among many subjects of international study that must be approached and explained with existing theoretical and methodological tools. Therefore, the various chapters in the book look at the *politics* of SCC—that is, its political foundations, assumptions, and articulations with domestic politics in provider countries—and assess its sociopolitical effects in recipient countries through a dense, context-specific, and interactional account of its inner workings. The chapters also pay special attention to the ideas and ideologies, norms and institutions, bureaucratic categories and practices, professional representations, cultural bonds, and popular imaginaries that underlie and sustain SSC practices.

Second, “critical” is used in reference to those vital trends within IR that fuel our analytical framework, including critical (as opposed to conventional) constructivist thinking, inspired in particular by development anthropology and international political sociology. In line with some classical contributions in the field of development studies,³⁰ SCC is treated throughout the book as the outcome of a *social construct*—shaped by the dialectical relationship between knowledge and power—and as a project aimed at *governing poverty*, the global South, and/or international politics. In doing so, the authors build on existing sociological and anthropological works that address traditional foreign aid and that have explored knowledge and beliefs, evidence, representations and interactions, daily

practices and habits, and institutional and bureaucratic routines that drive long-established development policies and aid programmes.³¹ In the same vein as for traditional donors, SSC providers are “part of a political process in which the issues of development and politics are closely interwoven”,³² thus, there is an interest in the strategies that the providers deploy in order to gain and sustain legitimacy.³³ Surprisingly enough, similar socioanthropological analyses of SSC are few and far between (Brotherton 2008),³⁴ especially if one compares it with other topics.³⁵

Finally, the book heeds international political sociology’s invitation to look at the characteristics of professionals, the distribution of resources, and the power dynamics within political fields. Thus, an attempt is made to incorporate such approaches—elaborated mostly in reference to law or security in European and North American contexts³⁶—into the study of contemporary SSC policies. It is important to note that despite their diverse disciplinary origins, the scholarly works mentioned previously are not contradictory but rather complementary. The main reason for this is that they share a Foucauldian (and sometimes Bourdieusian) approach to power, and they pay great attention to the articulation between knowledge (including the form adopted by expertise) and practice and to the competition for resources and legitimacy as driving forces within the field of international aid. Constructivism also provides tools for unveiling the (self-)perceptions and (mutual) representations at play, as well as the roles and division of labour organizing the relationships between actors in the field of SSC.

In brief, this book sets forth a critical research agenda that aims to do the following:

- Produce innovative insights on SSC practices, norms, and professionals beyond an assessment of the donors’ motivations and of the policies’ impact on “development.”
- Shed light on SSC’s site-specific and localized meanings and outcomes in recipient contexts (instead of SSC’s articulation with, and impact on, aid’s global architecture).
- Take the diversity of SSC experiences seriously, including professionalization and politicization, legitimization and implementation, and to offer hypotheses and plausible explanations to account for the differences observed.
- Highlight the political—not mainly economic—underpinnings and effects of SSC in both donor and recipient countries.

- Include understudied SSC providers, such as Colombia, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, or the UAE, in order to turn attention away from just the BRICS. However, when the BRICS are studied, they are approached in a way that is uncommon in the literature. Chinese aid is examined through its actions in Laos (see Chap. 8) instead of Africa, on which numerous studies already exist. Brazil is explored in two distinct chapters, but through varied and original lenses: the role of civil society organizations in protests against its agricultural cooperation in Mozambique (see Chap. 11), and a sociological analysis of its *cooperantes* in the health sector (see Chap. 5).
- Incorporate aspects and actors of SSC, such as civil society movements (e.g. the case of Mozambique) and the private sector, that are rarely taken into account—because of an almost exclusive focus on diplomatic developments—but that play an essential role in SSC of at least India, Brazil, China and, to a lesser extent, Turkey.

In pursuing these objectives, the editors were fortunate enough to draw on a diverse array of analytical assets. The book brings together contributors based at institutions and/or coming from countries in the North (i.e. Université Libre de Bruxelles, SciencesPo in Paris, Middlesex University, University of Cambridge, the German Institute of Global and Area Studies – GIGA) and the South (i.e. Universidad del Rosario in Colombia, Universidad de los Andes in Venezuela, Qatar University, the Instituto de Estudos Sociais de Moçambique – IESE, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Ecuador, the Institute for Global Dialogue (South Africa)).

In addition, contributors include junior scholars, returning from the field with fresh information and ideas, and established scholars with more experience and knowledge about development, the International Political Economy (IPE), and South–South issues. A number of the authors are experts on the societies they describe (i.e. both donor and recipient countries). Although all of the chapters draw on original materials and empirical evidence that is not available in existing works, several contributors have been directly involved as civil servants in SSC agencies in the policymaking processes that they describe (e.g. Mehmet Ozkan at TIKA and Jimena Durán at the Colombian *Agencia Presidencial de Cooperacion*), and they adopt a reflective posture towards the categories and assumptions that dominate their professional milieu. Finally, the language skills of the book’s editors and authors allowed them to tap into the diverse array of literature produced on SSC in

English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese so as to compare views from the various continents represented in the case studies. As a consequence, the book also aims to promote the production of knowledge about global politics with a focus on and/or coming from the global South.³⁷ This is of particular importance at a time when debates about the actual “international” character of the discipline of IR, and its ability to account for global realities and globalization dynamics outside of the Western or developed world, are particularly salient in publications and at professional conferences.

THE CASE STUDIES

This book builds on qualitative methods—discourse and ethnographical analyses and case studies—and empirical materials that contributors have been privy to, including semi-directed interviews with the agents and/or beneficiaries of South–South cooperation and field and participant observations. Each of the chapters adopts a similar analytical framework, sensitive to at least one of the following points, depending on their relevance for the case under study: history, legitimacy, and conceptions of development and SSC; the politics and professionals of SSC; difference or convergence with traditional aid.

History, Legitimacy, and Conceptions of Development and SSC

Which conceptions of development and SSC guide the programmes of Southern donors? What kind of narratives do Southern donors use to guide, justify, and legitimize their policy in other developing countries? For instance, do they relate current SSC policies with past mechanisms (e.g. the G77, the OPEC) and ideologies (e.g. Third Worldism, the NAM), and if so, how? Which financial, human, and symbolic resources do they use to justify and legitimize their actions: historical links between countries; a shared past or cultural links; religion, ideology, and/or common realities? How do they relate SSC to their own development experiences, or its dominant contemporary representations?

Chris Alden and Ana Alves have shown that references to history—from the fifteenth century to the Cold War—have been central in the construction of China’s Africa policy.³⁸ In the case of Venezuela, prosovereignty, leftist, anti-imperialist, and Bolivarian³⁹ arguments played an important role in sustaining SSC. As the host of the OECD’s Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, the Korean

delegation organized several workshops and panels dedicated to the *Asian* development model, which is based on growth, industrialization, cultural values, and “good” institutions.⁴⁰

Such rationalizations also can be sector-oriented. SSC providers export their “know-how” to specific sectors. For example, in the case of Colombia, the focus is placed on the field of security (see Chap. 10); in Brazil on agriculture, food security, and the fights against HIV/AIDS (see Chaps. 5 and 11); while Cuba builds heavily on its know-how in health to project a sort of medical diplomacy (see Chap. 4).

The Politics and Professionals of SSC

Beyond geopolitical considerations regarding the “national interests” of Southern donors, how is SSC connected to their domestic politics?⁴¹ At the regional level, South–South cooperation was a major tool in justifying and defending Chávez’s domestic “revolution” against external “threats” in Venezuela (see Chap. 7). In Cuba, SSC helped to consolidate the socialist regime and unite its international alliances and influence (see Chap. 4).

Connections with domestic development imperatives can also be observed. It is possible to hypothesize, for instance, that the promotion of national firms and banks abroad is part of a wider effort made by these countries to sustain their economic growth (e.g. China, Brazil, India, Turkey, the Republic of Korea). As a consequence, the role of corporate interests is dealt with in those cases in which they are particularly relevant.

Domestic bureaucratic politics also are important because the SSC policies of the various Southern donors under study have not reached the same level of institutionalization and professionalization.⁴² Whereas Cuban doctors and Brazilian health *cooperantes* share common ideas, expertise, and interests, in Venezuela SSC is still highly presidentialized (i.e. a matter led directly and almost exclusively by the president himself).

Where there are cooperation agencies per se, who are the professionals in charge of developing and implementing SSC? What kind of professional training (e.g. finance, trade, development diplomacy, or agricultural) do they have? How are their ideas and norms built and framed? What informs their vision of aid recipients (e.g. the African continent), and how does this vision shape specific SSC programmes?⁴³

Contrary to traditional North–South aid, SSC knowledge, professionals, and practices do not originate from a colonial experience.⁴⁴ Some initiatives and policies, such as Colombia’s, place “knowledge-sharing” at the core

of their agendas and value the exchange of experiences between countries with similar levels of development. However, to date little is known about where this knowledge stems from, and how it is being produced, processed, and validated.

Difference or Convergence?

Trying to determine whether SSC is different from traditional aid is an impossible task, as both categories cover very dissimilar realities. Northern donors have developed diverse aid trajectories, depending on their history and colonial past (i.e. France, the UK, Portugal) or not (i.e. Switzerland, Nordic donors in Central America), their vision of democracy and development (i.e. the US, Germany), their international status as big or middle-powers (i.e. the Nordic countries), their domestic politics (i.e. political colour of their government and party politics, domestic support for aid) and the diplomatic sphere of influence (i.e. France's "backyard" in her former African colonies, the role of diasporas, private interests in developing countries), bureaucratic habits within aid agencies, among other factors.

In spite of this diversity, traditional donors (i.e. members of the OECD-DAC) are all committed to the promotion of the "post-Washington Consensus." The well-known "Washington Consensus" refers to the package of reforms (i.e. the privatization of public enterprises, the liberalisation of prices and trade, cuts in state budgets, anti-inflationary policies) imposed by IFIs on indebted governments as part of SAPs throughout the 1990s.

After questionable results, incomplete implementation, harsh criticisms, social unrest, and a period of aid fatigue, IFIs promised to revamp their lending practices according to a new set of core principles, which became known as the post-Washington Consensus. These encompassed the following: *ownership*, understood as recipient's commitment to structural adjustment reform; *poverty reduction*, a new development paradigm aimed at pursuing efforts to restructure the economy, while creating social safety nets and investing in basic education and health (Fine et al. 2001); and *civil society participation* so as to make the new strategic papers more inclusive.

These new principles have been enshrined in the Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PRSPs) introduced in developing countries in 1999 as a condition to be eligible to the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC). They are conceived as pluri-annual plans geared towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—a set of targets to reduce extreme

poverty adopted by the UN in 2000. PRSPs became an all-encompassing “new conditionality” on macro-economic policies and development strategies for developing countries (Gould 2005). When they deemed that governance conditions were met, traditional donors channelled an increased share of their financial flux through budget support—that is, funds are transferred to the recipient country’s Treasury instead of through parallel procurement systems—even though projects and programmes remain the dominant aid modality. This new aid architecture initially enacted by the UN and the IFIs enabled donors to extend their mandate, rebuild consensus, fix their legitimacy problems, and increase their budgets through unprecedented political and financial mobilization within the international community.

One last pillar, technocratic in nature, was added to this new aid architecture by the OECD-DAC, which is referred to as “the Paris agenda.” The Paris declaration on aid harmonization and effectiveness adopted in 2005 focused on aid modalities and processes so as to rationalize them, to make the use of aid more effective, and to reduce the transaction costs normally associated with it for recipient administrations. It draws on the principles of *ownership*, aid *coordination* (donors can better coordinate their interventions), *alignment* (donors align their interventions with national priorities and procurement procedures), and *mutual accountability* between donors and recipients.

The Paris declaration since has been complemented by the Accra Agenda for Action adopted in 2008 at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Ghana and the Busan Outcome Document endorsed at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in the Republic of Korea in 2011. Its implementation and follow-up is ensured by the DAC through mechanisms⁴⁵ in which emerging donors and recipient countries have been invited to participate. The MDGs, whose duration was 2000–2015, were replaced by a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) “to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all” during the period of 2015–2030.

What this book calls “traditional aid” refers to the aid policies of developed countries and of multilateral organizations committed to the post-Washington Consensus (i.e. the MDGs, now SDGs, and the Paris declaration). Not buying into the post-Washington Consensus is one distinctive feature of SSC (a “Beijing consensus,” for example, has been mentioned in reference to the Chinese SSC). However, this position is not shared equally by all Southern donors. The cases of Colombia and the UAE included in this book, for example, are representative of governments that do not oppose the post-Washington Consensus.

Traditional donors occasionally feel that their monopoly in the field is under attack and try to “keep the foothold”⁴⁶ by engaging with new donors in arrangements of “triangular cooperation” whenever possible (e.g. the US with Brazil or Colombia, the UK’s Department for International Development with China). These arrangements enable traditional donors to avoid the outlays (in terms of legitimacy and efficiency) of direct involvement. Their efforts have been uneven, but for some Southern donors, triangular cooperation presents some logistical, financial, and political advantages (e.g. cost-sharing, making use of existing infrastructures, and the diplomatic presence of traditional donors) and strengthens alliances with powerful allies and multilateral organizations.⁴⁷

Northern aid agencies and multilateral organizations also have attempted to associate and socialize “new” donors, especially China and Brazil, to the work and existing principles of the OECD-DAC, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank; to provide incentives to emerging donors to adopt existing norms regarding aid efficiency; and to “share the burden” of poverty and aid with them.⁴⁸ In some cases, a *rapprochement* between Southern and traditional donors has developed through socialization. For example, the government of Brazil uses the term “ownership” in reference to recipient leadership of programmes and aid management, while the government of Colombia is eager to learn and produce “best practices” for development. China has published a white paper on foreign aid strategy (2011); it is not very detailed but corresponds to the spirit of transparency instilled by the DAC. In Busan, representatives of China’s Ministry of Commerce spoke about their “aid” policy, which they have been reluctant to do for decades.

The chapters thus assess whether the various SSC providers under scrutiny (1) promote a development model that claims to be different from or alternative to the one promoted by traditional donors; (2) endorse and implement the OECD-DAC aid effectiveness agenda; and (3) agree to participate in triangular cooperation initiatives with traditional donors or prefer to protect their independence through isolated, bilateral intervention or with other Southern donors.

Representations and Interactions

How should the way in which Southern donors are integrated into the economic, social, and rural–urban fabrics of recipient societies, and their interactions with state or social actors, be defined? How are SSC professionals and projects perceived by their so-called “beneficiaries”?

South–South cooperation professionals’ modest living standards in recipient countries are believed to be an important difference in the midst of Northern expatriates, which is highly appreciated by recipient populations. However, resistance has been expressed too against the Chinese in Zambian mines or Brazilian agro-industry firms in Mozambique (see Chap. 11). On the other hand, while certain SSC protagonists have prioritized their regional neighbours as recipients of cooperation, the provision of cooperation has not necessarily eliminated regional contestations such as against Brazil’s leadership claims.

WHAT FOLLOWS

The book contains this Introduction, two parts of five chapters each, and a Conclusion. Part 1, Imaging and Shaping SSC, explores the ideas, identities, and actors that shape the South–South cooperation policies, and the imaginaries that sustain SSC programmes. Chapter 2 looks at the case of India and questions the “distinct” nature of the country’s cooperation with Senegal and Mozambique, especially through the role played by ideologies and the private sector. In Turkey (Chap. 3), successive governments have risen religion and social networks as pillars of their SSC policy. As part of their new interest for the African continent, Somalia has become a laboratory for Turkish aid and state-building efforts. The role of the economic benefits generated by SSC programmes is increasingly important and instrumental for the Cuban regime (Chap. 4).

Chapter 5 describes in detail how the *cooperantes* in the sector of health emerged in Brazil and have professionalized and consolidated as a community of experts, and how it is displayed in Mozambique. In South Africa, SSC was identified as a tool for the country’s new diplomacy after the end of apartheid; and as an emerging economy, the modalities of an SSC policy are not clear. After years of debate, the institutional issue—the long-announced creation of an independent agency for development cooperation—is still not solved and the main features and modalities of the country’s SSC policy are yet to be defined in practice. Sanusha Saidu explains why in Chap. 6.

Part 2, Is Another Cooperation Possible?, investigates the differences—claimed or real—between SSC and traditional aid and bridges between them. In some instances, as the case of Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez shows, rising donors are eager to invent new principles and

practices of aid (Chap. 7). Chapter 8 contrasts the two positions (i.e. radical difference or convergence with Northern donors) by looking at the cooperation programmes of China and the Republic of Korea in the People's Democratic Republic of Laos. The UAE's foreign aid programme historically has been based on claims of Muslim identities and pan-Arabic solidarity (Chap. 9). These specificities, Khalid Almezaini argues, tend to fade, though. This is due to the fact that the country entered the Organization of Economic Development and Cooperation, and as politics increasingly gets in the way. In other cases, such as Colombia (Chap. 10), they claim some differences but also their compatibility with traditional aid through active participation in triangular cooperation schemes with Northern donors. Chapter 11, the last one in Part 2, analyzes Brazil's showcase cooperation project in Africa, *Prosavana*, and shows how the promotion of the Brazilian agro-business model and companies that are fundamental to the programme have raised significant debates from Mozambican civil society organizations, who have successfully coalized with Brazilian social movements against both the official aid programmes and the government of Mozambique.

The Conclusion offers an innovative and critical comparative framework that puts the cases of the 10 rising donors under study in perspective, which can be useful for further analysis. It covers the following dimensions: (1) the status and profile of the donors under study in the field of development assistance, (2) the presidentialization and professionalization of SSC, (3) the role of the private sector and civil society in SSC, (4) the links between SSC and foreign policy objectives, and (5) the differences between SSC policies and their interactions with existing norms and traditional donors.

NOTES

1. Fernández, Ruben (ed.), *Cooperación Sur-Sur: un desafío al sistema de ayuda*. Medellín: The Reality of Aid. Quoted in Benzi, Daniele, and Giuseppe Le Brutto. "La cooperación Sur-Sur en América Latina a principios del siglo XXI (un enfoque menos indulgente)." In *Volver al desarrollo o salir de él. Límites y potencialidades del cambio desde América Latina*, edited by Liza Aceves and Hector Sotomayor, 217–250. México D.F.: Ediciones EyC.
2. On this, see Rist, Gilbert. *The history of development: From Western origins to global faith*. London/New York: Zed Books, 2002. First published in French in 1996.

3. The BRICS refers to a coalition between the governments of the following emerging countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The term was coined by the Goldman Sachs's Asset Manager and head of research Jim O'Neill in 2001 to highlight the role of developing economies in world finance. It initially did not include South Africa, and has since acquired a political, diplomatic dimension (Hounshell 2011). The group of CIVETs includes Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, and Turkey.
4. See, for example, Alden, Chris, Sally Morphet, and Marco A. Vieira. *The South in world politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Hurrell, Andrew, and Sandeep Sengupta. "Emerging powers, North–South relations and global climate politics." *International Affairs* 88 (2012): 463–484. On the role of small States in international politics, see Cooper, Andrew F., and Tim Shaw, eds. *The diplomacies of small states*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; and, for the specific case of multilateral trade negotiations, see Jones, Emily, Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck, and Ngaire Woods, eds. *Manoeuvring at the margins: Constraints faced by small states in international trade negotiations*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010.
5. The amount of trade between China and Africa is estimated to have multiplied by 20 in the past decade, making China the second trade partner after the US but before France and the UK. Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa equaled about US\$50 billion in 2007. There are about 750–850 Chinese firms present in Africa, in NTIC, transport, construction work (in this sector, they would be in charge of 50% of construction projects and contracts according to the OECD), trade, mines, and natural resources. Chinese cooperation amounted to US\$1 billion in 2005 and provided scholarships or training for 15,000 professionals, scientific cooperation. Fifteen Confucius institutes (cultural institutes) have been created in Africa since 2004 (see www.chinafrique.com) and China–Africa summits or China's presidential tours in Africa are gaining more political weight and attendees than French, the UK, or European similar initiatives. On China in Africa, see the founding works of Chris Alden: Alden, Chris, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds. *China returns to Africa: A rising power and a continent embrace*. London: Hurst, 2008; Alden, Chris. *China in Africa*. New York/London: Zed Books, 2007.
6. On this aspect, see Eyben, Rosalind, and Laura Savage. "Emerging and submerging powers: Imagined geographies in the new development partnership at the Busan Fourth High Level Forum." *The Journal of Development Studies* 49 (2013): 457–469.
7. This terminology is the one developed by Whitfield, Lindsay, ed. *The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Vickers, Brendan. "Africa and the rising powers: Bargaining for the 'marginalized' many." *International Affairs* 89 (2013): 673–693.

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PART I

Imagining and Shaping SSC: Ideas, Identities and Actors

CHAPTER 2

Malleable Identities and Blurring Frontiers of Cooperation: Reflections from India's “Distinct” Engagement with Senegal and Mozambique

Pooja Jain and Danilo Marcondes

INTRODUCTION

India offers a paradoxical spectre in international relations. The country is often subjected to the critique of not having a defined foreign policy,¹ but at the same time, it stands as an important international actor because of its geographical and economic dimensions, as well as recent membership in groups such as the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and BRICS—an association of the countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.² In light of academic and policy attention on India's foreign policy and ambitions, a wide number of analysts have devoted their attention towards India's engagement with the global South.

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Even though India's main area of influence has involved its immediate South Asian neighbourhood, contemporary literature is rife with India's growing presence in Africa.³

Within a frame of mismatched means, discourse, and expectations, this chapter looks at how India carves a distinct path for itself amid other emerging actors from the South as well as the continuation of North–South relations in Africa.⁴ It addresses the following questions: Which resources does it use to distinguish itself from Northern donors and other emerging donors? What does India do to be accepted by key actors in Senegal and Mozambique and to overcome obvious obstacles to engagement?

The chapter critically analyzes the claims of the “distinct” and “unique” nature of India's cooperation through examples from Mozambique and Senegal. These cases offer a good example of how India operates within its South–South cooperation (SSC) approach on the African continent in two contexts that are normally underexplored in the analysis of India–Africa relations. While the case of Mozambique provides an example of a scenario in which India operates in competition with China, Brazil, and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, the case of Senegal offers an example in which India positions itself in competition between Senegal's traditional donors (e.g. France) and new partners (e.g. China).⁵

The text here shows how India insists on creating a distinct place for itself which is complementary to efforts by other partners and donors, and it argues that identities (understood as dynamic and intersubjective constructs), narratives, common ideologies, perceptions, and patterns of self-presentation are instrumental in sustaining these efforts. India uses culture, history, and politics as resources so as to build concrete routes of cooperation and the legitimacy of its programmes in these aid-dependent African countries in a competitive aid field. Through the examples of Mozambique and Senegal, this chapter demonstrates the flexibility of India's positioning and its capacity to mobilize a varied set of noninstitutional resources based on its own interests and the geopolitical context of its partner countries. The chapter explores the ways in which India's presence on the ground challenges and reinforces official narratives of cooperation.

The research described here largely draws on the practice of India's bilateral relations with the two previously mentioned African countries, including the actors and networks involved in its pursuit, both

governmental and nongovernmental. The case studies are based on the fieldwork of the chapter's authors and are supported by academic literature and media reports. Jain conducted fieldwork in Senegal from January to February 2012, which included 25 formal interviews and several informal conversations. Marcondes conducted fieldwork in Mozambique between October and December 2013 including interviews with Mozambican government officials, representatives of "Northern" donor countries as well as with representatives of the United Nations (UN) system, civil society organizations, and several "rising donors".⁶

The chapter begins by briefly exploring the countries' historical and contemporary facets, which give India a distinct position in SSC with respect to other emerging and traditional donors. Further on, it discusses institutional and noninstitutional policy structures and the formal and informal networks of public and private actors involved in India's cooperation policy. The sections explore the similarities and differences in India's approach in Mozambique and Senegal. The conclusion section presents broader considerations drawn from the two cases as well as further implications for overall Indian foreign policy and relationships with African countries, as well as with the global South more broadly.

A DISTINCT PLACE FOR INDIA: DIFFERENTIATED RESOURCES AND ROUTES OF ENGAGEMENT

As, contrary to most Northern donors, India's engagement in Africa has not been rooted in the colonial past and post-colonial relationships, the country has had to embed and justify its SSC policy through alternative routes. These are differentiated, whether talking about Senegal or Mozambique, and build on history, politics, culture, and preexisting human bonds that shape the imagined identities and mutual perceptions of the actors involved.

Contemporary relations between India and Senegal are driven by perceptions of shared aspirations and challenges. As the largest democracy in the world, India's influence can be partly attributed to its historical position as having gained independence before Senegal, the current weight of its emerging economy, and even its sheer geographical size. It is also at the crucial point of climate change and development debates with a growing middle class and a significant population living below the poverty line.⁷ On the other hand, Senegal's influence and role in the regional

organizations cannot be overlooked. A small but thriving democracy, it has been deft in maintaining relations with its more traditional partners, such as France and the United States (US), while dexterously diversifying its partners and dealing with emerging partners such as China, India, Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf countries.

In the past, connections between India and Senegal were established from the period before both countries were even independent. Diouf (1999, 9) mentioned the similarity in Cheikh Anta Diop of the 1950s and the Indian nationalist historians of the 1920s and 1930s. The two refused passive subjugation to the colonial production of knowledge, which was embedded in power. While India was moving towards independence, in 1947, the proponents of Négritude⁸ collectively founded a magazine, *Présence Africaine*, edited by Senegal's Alioune Diop, and published it in Paris (Wallerstein 2005, 131). In addition, Leopold Senghor highlighted the common culture and origins between people of India and Africa. An admirer of the ancient civilizations of China and that of India, his first visit to India was after his visit to President Mao.⁹ Senghor also lauded the Indian Dravidian civilization through various poems and hailed India's prowess in scientific and technical developments.¹⁰

At the level of bilateral cultural relations, in December 2010, a 10-member Sidi Goma Group from Gujarat visited Senegal to participate in the World Festival of Black Arts and Cultures organized by the African Union and other collaborators.¹¹ The Siddi Group was funded by the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR).¹² Sidi Goma¹³ is a group of musicians belonging to Sufi tribal community of East African origin.¹⁴ The Sidis¹⁵ represent a blend of African dance and music with Indian Sufism.¹⁶ This example of their participation suggests attempts to create a link across geographies through cultural performances in the wake of the growing relationship between India and Africa.

Senegal does not occupy a similar position in the Indian imagination, though. Often the image of individual countries is subsumed to the global and continental image of Africa. Moreover, India still remains more familiar with Anglophone countries in East Africa and South Africa where more exchange is levered by the presence of the diaspora. Nonetheless, growing relations between India and Senegal have prompted governmental authorities to hold cultural festivals on the sidelines of diplomatic and business summits to which Senegalese cultural groups have been active participants. For instance, in 2008, ICCR organized an Africa Festival in New Delhi that was held in the same month as the first India–Africa Forum

Summit. It was a three-day cultural event named “Tribute to Africa” with participation from 12 African countries.

In June 2012, another two-day Africa Festival was held at New Delhi. A 12-member dance troupe from Senegal participated in this event. The performances were in New Delhi and other cities of North India.¹⁷ Another festival celebrating the confluence of Indian and African cultures and art forms was held in Ethiopia during the second India–Africa Forum Summit held at Addis Ababa in May 2012. Senegal was again a participant along with Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania.¹⁸ That said, the audience for these festivals was limited and the Indian public’s imagination remains largely devoid of a cultural reference when it comes to Senegal.

In Mozambique, the presence and representations of India are rooted in the independence struggle and, additionally, a human and social component—the diaspora. In the twentieth century, India was an important supporter of independence movements in what was then Portuguese Africa, especially because the country itself had experienced Portuguese colonialism until December 1961, when Nehru authorized the liberation of Goa from Portugal. In fact, Nehru’s decision had a direct impact on the Indian community in Portuguese colonies in Africa, particularly in Mozambique, where about 23,000 individuals were repatriated to India in retaliation for the liberation of Goa (Chhabra 1989, 38–39). India was one of the first countries to recognize Mozambican independence and this gave it considerable advantages especially in the early years after independence.¹⁹ An extensive exchange of visits followed. For example, Mozambique’s first president, Samora Machel, visited India in 1982 and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi repaid it with a visit in the same year.²⁰

Unlike the case of relations with Senegal, the existence of an Indian diaspora provides an additional dimension to the bilateral relationship between India and Mozambique.²¹ Historically, Indian migration to Mozambique was associated with restrictions that the then Union of South Africa established regarding the presence of the Indian population in the country around 1895, as well as to migration of Muslim traders from Gujarati in the nineteenth century. While in the case of Senegal, the shared colonial experience was more influential at ideological and philosophical levels, in the case of India and Mozambique, the two countries are connected by a closer practical element (Leite and Khouri 2011). India and Mozambique are also connected via some transnational Hindu communities based in Portugal and the United Kingdom (UK). According to Cachado (2014), Gujarati families migrated from

Diu to Mozambique when the latter ceased to be a Portuguese colony in 1961. Furthermore, when the civil war started in Mozambique after the country's independence, some of the families settled in Portugal during the early 1980s. Later, because of a lack of housing in Portugal, some resettled in the UK (Bastos 2006).

The way in which Indian and African actors frame their bilateral relationship is also telling of how identities are presented and enacted within SSC. For example, a significant display of "solidarity" from the Indian side took place in 2003 during the visit by then Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano; at that time the Indian government decided to write off a total of 90 million Indian rupees in debts dating back to credit lines provided to Mozambique in the early 1980s. Five additional lines of credit valued at US\$20 million were granted to Mozambique in 2003 (becoming operational in 2004), again in 2006; the last three were granted in 2008 (Khalid 2010, 10, 23). Indian actors have nonetheless continued to emphasize that economic and material interests alone do not explain India's relations with Africa. For instance, during the Third India–Africa Summit held in 2015, Prime Minister Modi stated that the partnership between India and Africa "goes beyond strategic concerns and economic benefits. It is based on the emotional links we share and the solidarity we feel towards each other."²²

South–South cooperation also finds its vigour in "catching up" in both Senegal and Mozambique. Enhanced relations to make up for the lost time and opportunity are key in the *mise en scène* of a confluence of interest and mutual benefits. It could be said that countries of the South with a shared history find themselves in a "time zone" of development different from that of the developed North. Baaz (2005) calls it development expressed in the form of "time lag." Going by a linear and singular trajectory of development, it is understood that an underdeveloped economy is several years behind a more developed economy and needs time to catch up. At the occasion of the Africa–India Conclave for Partnerships hosted by the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of India and the Chamber of Indian Commerce and Industries, it was reiterated often by the Indian hosts that Africa is where India was 10 years ago, which is very similar to how Brazil and China also see their African partners.

During a visit to India in 2004, Mozambican Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói stated that India was an older brother to Mozambique referring to the development of Mozambique since the time of independence.²³ Indeed, buoyed by rising growth rates and the upward

trajectories of emerging ones, certain countries in Africa, in this case Senegal, launched their own “emerging country plans,” which are discussed later in the chapter. However, what was said of technological advances in some fields was not isolated from the malaise of poverty facing India, the host country.

India also understands that it has areas with levels of development similar to some of the least advanced countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This intersection of developed and least developed identities within a country gives India a distinct place in SSC, which simultaneously strikes the chords of realpolitik and an emotional identification. To say it in Baaz’s terms ([2005](#)), the time lag between India and countries in Africa is much narrower, if not insignificant. Moreover, existence of similar levels of poverty suggests that the two geographies lie in the same time zone. Consequently, again the idea of a time-related hierarchy in development is also nullified in SSC between India and its African partners.

INDIA’S MALLEABLE IDENTITIES: FROM THIRD WORLD LEADER TO ECONOMIC GIANT

Within SSC, India finds itself in a peculiar space—the perplexed and constant schizophrenia that beckons the etiquette of “emerging.” Its identity as an emerging power but a developing country gives India’s contemporary South–South relations a dual swing of ambition and empathy. It can count on, and actively cultivates, some elements that facilitate closeness with African elites and societies and represent added-values when compared with traditional, Northern donors in Senegal and Mozambique.

One important asset draws on the symbolism of anti-colonialism and the Third World, nonaligned movement that India led and embedded during past decades. As shown in the first section, India was a source of inspiration and political support, and possibly a cultural and political model, during the years that followed the independence struggle in Senegal and Mozambique. According to Chhabra, India’s liberation of Goa had a significant impact on liberation movements in Africa, solidifying India’s image as a “champion of freedom” ([1989](#), 36).

The perceived identity and representation of India in Africa is also closely related to its role in the Third Worldism movement. At the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the G77 demanded improved terms of trade for Third World primary products,

preferential treatment for export of Third World manufacturers to developed countries, and increased financial aid from developed countries. This G77 agenda would become the basis for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 (Gellar 1982, 80–81). Given the importance of agriculture in the Indian and Senegalese economies, these countries are also at the heart of trade talks.

Historically, Senegal and India cosponsored the 1960 UN Conference on Trade and Development held in New Delhi. India and Senegal have shared common positions in agricultural commodity trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both countries stand for a reduction in unfair trade practices in the form of agricultural subsidies. They are also members of the G33, known as the “Friends of Special Products in Agriculture.” The two countries, along with the larger group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the African group, are sponsors of modalities regarding negotiations on geographical associations and “disclosure” relative to inventions of patent holders.²⁴

In India, the narratives of independence insisted on further South–South cooperation in the form of greater reliance and relinquishing of dependence-based relationships with the North. This international vision was supplemented with a domestic economy based on import-substitution and large industries. Even today, Indian and African leaders continue to underscore the spirit of the 1955 Bandung Conference. For example, during a visit to India in 2004, Mozambican Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói mentioned the cultural, historical, and geopolitical elements that reinforced the connections between the two countries, including the philosophy of nonalignment and the philosophy of SSC.²⁵

The scale and nature of the cooperation though has assumed greater economic, political, and strategic importance with India’s rise as an emerging economy and with Africa being the “rising continent.” Along the same line, the India–Africa Forum Summits started in 2006 as triennial events marking Indo-African cooperation. These summits also bring public and private actors and interests of SSC under one roof. During the first India–Africa Summit held in New Delhi in 2008, India announced the allocation of lines of credit worth US\$5.4 billion to Africa over a period of five years. At the second India–Africa Forum Summit, organized in Addis Ababa in May 2011, India offered lines of credit worth US\$5 billion, and an additional US\$700 million assistance grant for human resource development, transfer of technology, and building of new institutions.²⁶

The rhetoric and ideological prominence of socialism and nonalignment has somewhat faded in practice, though, as India has increasingly developed economically and embraced the rules of neoliberal globalization. For example, Manmohan Singh, the former President of India and one of the architects and major supporters of India's liberalization reforms during the early 1990s, was also the Secretary-General of the South Commission²⁷ (Report of the South Commission 1990). This contemporary liberal agenda of SSC is also a deviation from the post-independence inclination to socialism in most countries of the South including India, Senegal, and Mozambique. Nonetheless, liberalization and SSC are no longer contradictory in the narratives of economic growth that form the basis of the emergency of so many of the "rising economies" such as those of China, India, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea.

That said, a capitalist model of economy still falls out of line when it comes to domestic economic narratives in India. Additionally, the notion of equality and horizontal relationships, which form a basis of SSC, do not leave room for a "capitalist" narrative that evokes hierarchy and exploitation. India thus projects a shifting role and malleable—at times contradictory and ambiguous—identity of an economic giant and Third World leader, model of socialist development, and supporter of the current liberalized globalisation.

BLURRING FRONTIERS: THE STATE-CAPITAL MACHINERY FROM SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT TO PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

To move from a more internationalized perspective of understanding India's cooperation with other actors from the South, it would be worthwhile to understand in which ways the "international" dimension is shaped by the "domestic" dimension. This section dwells on the overlapping interests and associations of the public and private sector—the public-private partnership (PPP)—in India and the way it has steered India's SSC over time.

Providing the aid policy with greater institutionalisation has lagged behind—a reality not exclusive to the Indian context but also present in the cases of Brazil and South Africa, for example. India, which has been providing SSC since the 1950s, created a new agency in January 2012.²⁸ The agency is set up under the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Mr. Raghavan,²⁹ an Additional Secretary in

the MEA who was responsible for the DPA, suggests that the motivation to create the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) in the Ministry was to bring the entire range of India's external developmental assistance under one umbrella and to manage the formulation, appraisal, implementation, and evaluation of its projects more efficiently. One of the important messages of Raghavan's speech was to create greater public awareness about India's development cooperation and involve new and smaller actors from all sectors to replicate India's success at home outside its frontiers (see also Chanana 2010³⁰). For example, Mozambican officials were impressed by the Indian railway system and wanted India to cooperate with Mozambique in this area during the 1980s.³¹

More recently, the Indian credit lines were created to finance projects in areas, such as rural electrification, in which there is Indian expertise.³² India also has been a reference for Mozambique in the cashew nut production industry; some Mozambican factories use a foot-operated machine based on the Indian production model (Paul 2008). It is not clear, however, whether the streamlining at the implementation level extends to budgetary consolidation as well. Nevertheless, the Union Budget statement for 2013–2014 shows a gradual increase in aid to African countries under unplanned expenditures.³³

In addition to its weak institutionalisation, one distinctive feature of India's cooperation policy is the prominent role played by private actors in its design and implementation. If the philosophy was inspired mostly by a socialist vision of development, now the association seems primarily to guarantee inputs and markets to Indian multinational corporations. The convergence of business interests and that of the national political leaders started to surface even before the country became independent. The private sector motives were intricately linked to India's independence struggle. Gandhi saw big corporates as trustees of national wealth. The independence movement in India, buttressed by religious and nationalist sentiments, paved the way for nonprofit corporate giving (Ray 1979, 295–296, 316).

After independence, the growth of big corporate houses came to be enmeshed with national progress. Indeed, this phase was characterized by the confluence of private profits with national plan objectives. The government supported big corporations for economies of scale in line with the national goals of production. For example, in this context, the 2011 Annual Report by the MEA states that India is looking for new markets in friendly countries. Large Indian private companies, such as Tata, are

looking to expand globally. The intermingling of state and capital interests once again comes to the fore. The fusion of state and capital machinery is selective and based on mutually complementing capacities.

The importance of chambers of commerce, such as the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), in Indian cooperation over other state-led instruments, such as the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, could be explained by the fact that some of them already existed before independence. For example, the ITEC was created in 1964 only after India became an independent state; however, the CII was created in 1895 by a group of engineering firms.³⁴ The EXIM Bank CII India–Africa Partnership Conclave was started in 2004. The board of directors at the EXIM Bank includes members from the MEA, finance, commerce, industry, and public banks as well as academic institutions.³⁵ It thus acts as a platform to bring in various national actors with mutual interests. The platform is extended internationally in the form of partnership conclaves complemented with the additional capacity of a chamber of commerce.

In addition, the network of actors in SSC underscores the importance of mutual trust. Trust is important not just between the two countries but also among actors—public and private—from within the same country. The companies at the forefront of cooperation enjoy a positive reputation at home, and there is also a complementarity in the image of the company and the country, which makes it a path for “soft power,” creating avenues for new actors such as the film or television industry. In some cases, it is the already existing soft power that provides a favourably perceived historical basis for economic actors. For example, Indian films have been screened in Senegal since the 1970s (Colin 2007).

When it comes to Senegal, the political and economic stability of the country has encouraged Indian public and private entities to choose it as the regional hub for their offices. The same is true of the EXIM Bank of India—its regional office is located in Dakar. The geographic location of Senegal has also led Indian companies to favour it as a “gateway” to other Francophone countries in the West African region. A successful venture in Senegal provides a template for market analysis, risk assessment, and foray into other neighbouring countries.

To understand contemporary India–Senegal economic relations, one needs to go back to earlier engagements between the two countries. For example, in 1986 there were 25 Indian joint ventures in Africa,

out of which nine were in Nigeria³⁶ and one in Senegal. At the time, 80% of these joint ventures were by private entrepreneurs and most of them were import-substituting in nature with pharmaceuticals, textiles, metal alloys, machinery, and machine tools as major sectors of activity. For the joint ventures to be successful, the Indian government issued binding guidelines encouraging investment from Indian parties having the necessary manufacturing experience and technical expertise, the participation of the host country parties, and restricting the export of second-hand or reconditioned machinery (Kumar 1989, 154–155).

Economic interests have expanded in the decades that followed; for example, the Tata Group, which also operates in Mozambique, was granted a contract to provide 350 buses to Senegal in 2005 (Naidu 2008, 124). One of the first forays of Tata in Senegal was replacing the old Mercedes and Renault buses in Dakar with new Tata buses as was necessitated and demanded by Senegal in accordance with its own plan for renewing local transport and increasing connectivity. During the CII–EXIM Bank India–Africa Partnership Conclave in March 2012,³⁷ the Indian Secretary for West Africa remarked that the India–Africa partnership was achieved through wider dissemination of Indian businesses and resource mobilisation for a long-term relationship. Encouraged by the transport project in Senegal, Tata also launched similar projects in the neighbouring West African countries such as Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire (as indicated during the interview with an a senior official from Tata West Africa).

In addition to formal platforms provided by the EXIM Bank and the chambers of commerce, PPPs work through unconventional channels. During an interview with an ITEC officer (January 17, 2011), the example of a successful Indian project in Senegal came up. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) based in Tilonia (Rajasthan), Barefoot College,³⁸ trains illiterate older women in harnessing solar energy for rural electrification. Barefoot has trained more than 7000 older women from Africa since 2007,³⁹ including seven women from Senegal.⁴⁰ Similarity in geographical conditions, with Rajasthan being a dry desert, was suggested as an enabling factor for cooperation. Another example is one of the companies listed with ITEC for ITC courses, NIIT Skills & Talent Development Company Limited,⁴¹ which also is based in Dakar. This could suggest the blurring of the lines between the government and the private sector where market and politics intermingle to provide opportunities for both political and market manoeuvre (Nye 2011, 80).

The second example also suggests how the Indian information technology (IT) industry works as a major “soft-power” prerogative of the state as well as a “selling point” for its IT companies. For example, the idea of the Pan Africa e-network project was proposed by former President of India Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam during the inaugural session of the Pan African Parliament⁴² held in Johannesburg⁴³ in September 2004.⁴⁴ The proposal was taken up by the Government of India with an approved budget of about US\$117 million. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs is the nodal agency and Telecommunications Consultants India Limited (TCIL) is the turnkey implementing agency for the project.⁴⁵ The project intends to connect all countries in Africa through satellite and fibre optic networks to provide tele-medicine, tele-education, e-governance, and other services through both public and private actors. TCIL suggests providing training services to their local correspondents in Africa in order to familiarize them with their telecom equipment and services. At present, 47 member countries of the African Union have signed up with TCIL for the project. All the countries in the East and West African regions have contracted for the implementation of the project. The Hub Earth Station for the project is located in Dakar.⁴⁶ Such programmes and initiatives, along with EXIM Bank-funded projects with PPPs, are the major axes of Indo-Senegalese development cooperation.

More recently, favouring bilateral public-private connections between countries of the South provides a new approach to development cooperation that has been largely associated with traditional donors and the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference institutions that have been mired in negative perceptions, especially related to the pernicious effects of structural adjustment programmes of the latter. If the interviews conducted in Dakar suggested that the rhetoric of competition is downplayed in diplomatic parlance, it is nonetheless obvious that the alternative offered by India is appealing to Senegalese authorities in the context of the competition between traditional and emerging donors at the country level.

Weary of traditional aid-based development models and related debt, the government of Senegal has been eager to promote development through alternative channels with an emphasis on moving up to the scale of an emerging economy and the development of a local private-sector fabric, which is integral to its development goals and job creation.⁴⁷ To this effect, the official message of the current Senegalese Ambassador to India emphasises the solid cooperation built with India through successful projects in both the public and private sector.⁴⁸ The Ambassador also mentioned in

his message that the “Emerging Senegal Plan” would scale the relationship between India and Senegal to new heights. The successful attempts of emerging countries in reducing poverty and the positive effects of SSC was mentioned in the Human Development Reports of 2013 and 2014.

Indian actors have continued to emphasize that economic and material interests alone do not explain India’s relations with Africa. For example, during the Third India–Africa Summit held in 2015, Prime Minister Modi stated that the partnership between India and Africa “goes beyond strategic concerns and economic benefits. It is based on the emotional links we share and the solidarity we feel towards each other.”⁴⁹ However, Mozambique has become an important energy provider for “emerging” India’s needs and its pursuit of economic interests, and promotion of India’s multinational corporations through PPPs have led to harsh criticisms stemming from social actors. As of 2009, the Indian state company, Coal India Limited (CIL), announced that it had been granted a concession with regard to the right to explore two coal blocs in Mozambique. According to the Indian press, *The Hindu*, 15% of the coal extracted would be used by Mozambique and the rest would be sent to India. As part of the agreement, the Indian company will have to participate in a social project that provides artificial prosthetics to Mozambicans who have been injured as a result of the explosion of a military storehouse in 2007.

It is important to situate the involvement of Indian companies in Mozambique within broader dynamics connected to the global supply and demand for natural resources. For example, in 2007, Tata Steel bought a 35% participation in a coal exploitation project owned by the Australian mining company, Riversdale Mining, for the total amount of AUD\$400 million. The purchase reveals that companies from emerging powers within the global South have, in some instances, taken over the role that was traditionally played by similar companies from the global North—and thus have been exposed to similar attacks. At the same time, the fact that the coal extracted from the mines also will be sent to the Tata—formerly the Corus Group plc—steel industries in Europe, as well as to India, reveals the intermediary role that India and Indian companies can play in terms of making viable the shipment of natural resources from the global South to the global North.

An additional interconnection between local and global chains is illustrated by the fact that India’s presence in Mozambique has expanded to the infrastructure sector, which is essential to guarantee mining exports. For example, the Indian company Ircon International in 2004 obtained

a concession to work on the rehabilitation of 600 km of the Beira railway and to manage the line for the next 25 years (Naidu 2008, 125; Khalid 2010, 13). Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that India's presence in the mining sector in Mozambique also has been the site of local disputes. Since 2013, the Indian mining company Jindal Steel⁵⁰ has been criticized by international and Mozambican NGOs for violating human rights and causing damage to the environment as part of its involvement in the Chirodzi coal mine in Tete Province (northern Mozambique).⁵¹ In January 2015, Mozambican miners and other workers went on strike at the mine. According to the press, this was the third strike since the mine's inauguration in 2013.⁵² Local actors have criticized Mozambican authorities for lack of action against the company and have accused the company of pressuring local community leaders in exchange of work in the mine.⁵³ When similar protests emerged in 2014, the Mozambican press reported that Jindal accused local NGOs of inciting violence and local community protests against the company.⁵⁴

Mining and energy-related investments constitute the greatest portion of Indian investment in Mozambique. In terms of bilateral trade, India is Mozambique's tenth largest partner, which places the country in a relevant position, however, below other BRICS such as South Africa, China, and Brazil. In addition, the country is also a pertinent destination for Mozambican exports, ranking as the fifth largest market. In this case, India is only behind South Africa and China, among the BRICS countries. In addition, in 2009 alone, India invested €400 million in Mozambique, making it the fourth largest investor in the country (Quina 2011). By 2015, Mozambique became the second largest recipient of Indian foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa.⁵⁵ Recent offshore natural gas reserves discovered in the country, close to the frontier with Tanzania, could have an impact on bilateral relations as a wider range of actors becomes interested in Mozambique's natural resources.

As a conclusion to this section, and even if it seems to be one of India's strength on the ground, this "institutional networking" mechanism where PPPs complement each other tends to blur the lines when it comes to sharing responsibility. It is difficult to speak about defined contours of accountability and at times even motivations when interfacing in cooperation occurs through actors with mixed identities and purposes.

“DISTINCT ENGAGEMENT” OR CONVERGENCE?: SECURITIZING INDIA’S COOPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

Adaption is a requisite in the Indian claim to a SSC, which is driven by the demand of its partner countries. Nevertheless, adaptation is also driven by India’s own interest in the partner country. A natural resource-driven collaboration is likely to witness more cooperation among actors from the public sector. A market-driven cooperation is likely to see greater participation by private companies. Similarly, the scale and nature of cooperation varies in regions of strategic importance such as the Indian Ocean countries.

To that extent, there is something different about India’s engagement in Mozambique if one compares it to its programme in Senegal—that is, peace-building and, increasingly, security-related activities. India’s solidarity narrative with Mozambique was reinforced by the country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping in Mozambique via the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) between December 1992 and October 1994. At the time, India contributed with an independent headquarters company,⁵⁶ an engineering and logistics company, staff officers, and military observers. Indian officers “provided humanitarian assistance, destroyed weapons and ammunition and supervised the disarmament of the parties involved as well as provided assistance in the organization of the elections” (van Royenn 2010, 12). This is a common element that India shares with Brazil, which was also a troop contributor to ONUMOZ and made it a symbol of its contribution to the stability of Mozambique after the civil war.

Defence and strategic issues are playing an increasingly important role in the India–Mozambique relationship. Mozambique’s strategic location within the Indian Ocean space makes the country an important ally for India’s efforts to exert influence in the region and shape a certain “Indian Ocean” identity according to its interests. Since the immediate period after independence, Mozambique identified India as an ally in the Indian Ocean. Mozambican officials at the time of the Cold War were interested in drawing “India into a cohesive movement to work out a strategy to keep the Indian Ocean free from superpower dominance and interference.”⁵⁷ The importance of the Indian Ocean to bilateral relations continues to this day. India’s contemporary security concerns in the Indian Ocean involve the threats of maritime terrorism; piracy; and drug, arms, and human trafficking. India’s relations with Mozambique in the defence

and security sectors illustrate existing Indian concerns with “hard power,” military power projection, and securitization of the Indian Ocean.

Part of India’s efforts involve display of the Indian naval capability. For example, “the Indian Navy has been active in its diplomacy in the Indian Ocean, providing maritime security cover during the African Union Summit in 2003 and the World Economic Forum in 2004 in Mozambique” (Mohanty 2012, 333). Such concerns go beyond mere diplomatic rhetoric and also include displays of material strength; as of 2003, at least 14 ships from the Indian Navy visited Mozambique. In addition, India and Mozambique have cooperated in terms of capacity-building and joint maritime training against piracy on the African coast. Bilateral agreements include a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation, signed in 2006, and bilateral meetings in 2008 and 2010. In March 2006, India and Mozambique signed a MOU for Indian patrols on the Mozambican coast (Dubey 2011, 198).

Mozambique’s acknowledgment of Indian “leadership” in this area can be illustrated by the fact that during a 2011 visit to India, Mozambique’s then Defence Minister Filipe Nyusi (its president as of January 2015) thanked the Indian Navy’s role in rescuing a Mozambican shipping vessel from pirates on its coast in 2010. In November 2014, the Indian Naval Ship *Teg*, one of the most modern ships within the Indian fleet, visited the Mozambican port of Nacala. The ship’s visit served two objectives; first, the donation of 200 drill-purpose rifles from India to Mozambique, which reinforced the projection of India as a reliable partner and leader within the Indian Ocean space. According to the Indian High Commission in Mozambique: “[T]his visit underscored India’s peaceful presence and solidarity with countries of the Indian Ocean Region.” Second, this projection involved a reaffirmation of India’s power and military capacity, expressed by the detailed description of the ship: “This ship is powered by four gas turbines and can achieve speeds in excess of 30 knots. Her formidable arsenal includes ‘state-of-the-art’ surface to surface and surface to air missiles, high calibre guns, anti-submarine torpedoes and rockets.”⁵⁸

The preceding examples illustrate how the rhetoric and a practice of Southern “solidarity” regarding the Indian Ocean space has been built by both Indian and Mozambican officials. This connection appears to be a key element for India’s global aspirations, particularly as it also faces contestations on the part of China regarding regional influence in the Indian Ocean.⁵⁹ India is concerned that Mozambique’s lack of sufficient resources to address security issues in the Indian Ocean may undermine

India's interest in the region. But this securitisation of Indian cooperation policy in Mozambique could paradoxically mark a convergence of India with "traditional," Northern donors also massively involved in the security sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. This convergence could be seen as a contradiction with the "distinct engagement" narrative promoted by Indian officials. It illustrates a growing interest on the part of rising powers to link South-South cooperation with efforts towards securing their maritime surroundings while also presenting themselves as responsible and reliable partners sharing Africa's security burden with traditional powers and multilateral organizations.⁶⁰

CONCLUSION

What makes India's cooperation distinct is based on a network of domestic actors and policies and its international positioning that borders on *moralpolitik* (Jaffrelot 2013). Mutual empathy for common development challenges and collective claims for a just world order makes India a less-condescending and domineering partner to deal with as was suggested in the interviews conducted by the authors in Mozambique and Senegal. Nonetheless, there is a clear emergence of a more pragmatic "business and *realpolitik*"-oriented approach, which distances itself from the ideologically motivated agenda of the Cold War years, according to Taylor (2012):

India's diplomatic strategy can no longer be said to be fundamentally grounded in an idealism predicated on South-South solidarity. Contemporary Indian foreign policy is more pragmatic than previous incarnations, and although New Delhi retains an interest in non-alignment and rhetorical notions of South-South commonality, the focus these days is very much on the importance of national interests, particularly economic in nature. (783)

Nonetheless, the implementation of such a pragmatic agenda can have serious consequences to bilateral relations, especially in contexts of fierce competition between "rising economies" and Western countries, as well as because of a growing awareness of the African countries of their newly empowered capacity for agency, in light of a multiplicity of "external partnerships." These elements, as noted by Dubey (2011), create challenges that have to be addressed by Indian policymakers as well as the country's private sector:

...[I]f the growing trends under the Indian private sector in Indo-African economic relations do not distinguish themselves qualitatively from North-South relations, then it will create problems for Indian moves in Africa. The economic relations of India with Africa under globalization are gainful for India, but they have to be qualitatively different from North-South relations as far as African perceptions are concerned. (199)

In addition, the case of its relationship with Mozambique reveals that India's overall dependency on energy sources cannot be underestimated. As Naidu points out, India currently "imports 75 % of its oil needs and this dependence is projected to rise [to] over 90 % by 2020" and the country is "set to become the third largest energy consumer by 2030" (2008, 118). Mozambique also shares borders with South Africa, one of India's major historical, political, and economic partners in Sub-Saharan Africa. Politically stable Senegal provides India with a gateway to Francophone West Africa and is a major exporter of phosphates to fertilizer-deficient India. As previously mentioned, Senegal is a part of the larger regional initiative Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM 9). In both cases, the geographic location and economic profile of the countries determines the choice of actors India deploys to further cooperation.

The peculiarities of India's relationship with Mozambique and Senegal are shared by indirect historical links. Senegal has a very small but thriving Indian diaspora from the "Sindhi" trading community, and interviews during fieldwork suggested that Indian Ambassadors to the region are often from the Sindhi community. Mozambique has a Portuguese-speaking Indian diaspora from the former Portuguese colonial territories in India.

In conclusion, even though it was not the intention of this chapter to capture the entire multiplicity of India's involvement in SSC, the authors argue that the two cases illustrate how as rising powers expand their economic interests, the moral discourse of South-South solidarity gives way to a foreign policy rhetoric that incorporates a more pragmatic language of shared growth and economic opportunities. Nevertheless, it is also important to acknowledge that the existence of a "normative South-South agenda" (Taylor 2012, 797) still remains in areas such as reform of global governance institutions, particularly the UN Security Council, in which support from African countries is crucial.⁶¹

On the ground, it appears that rising powers still value the need to reinforce a separate identity from the "Northern" donor community. For

example, in Mozambique, India, China, and Brazil are seen as tending to avoid associating and teaming up their development cooperation agendas with those of the “Northern” donors that provide general budget support to the Mozambican government.⁶² The ability to balance these goals, in light of geopolitical and economic competition as well as growing African agency, and nonetheless to provide for coherent foreign policy guidelines, is what will determine the success of India’s SSC-oriented foreign policy.

NOTES

1. See Malone and Mukherjee (2011).
2. Nonetheless, it is important to note that India’s ambition to play a leading role in international affairs is seldom matched by a corresponding number of foreign officials; see Malone and Mukherjee 2011.
3. Mawdsley and McCann (2011), Cheru and Obi (2010), Taylor (2012), to name a few.
4. Most academic contributions on Indian relations with Africa tend to emphasize relations between India and East African countries. See, for example, Narlikar (2010).
5. Chinese relations with Senegal are recent (between 1996 and 2005 Senegal had diplomatic relations with Taiwan).
6. Officials from the Indian High Commission in Maputo were contacted on several occasions and did not respond to requests for interviews. Information about India’s involvement in Mozambique was obtained from secondary resources including the interviews as well as archival research in Mozambique and the use of local media.
7. The World Bank, India overview. Accessed December 18, 2013; <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview>.
8. The cultural impact of French colonization led to a strong revival of the African culture and identity. Sheikh Anta Diop, an anthropologist from Senegal, made one of the most substantial efforts in reconstructing African history (Wallerstein 2005, 129). Another movement of cultural revival and reconstruction of identity was embodied in the “Negritude” movement. Aimé Césaire of Martinique was one of the fervent torchbearers of the movement. It was then carried forward by Léopold Sédar Senghor, a poet and the first president of Senegal (Wallerstein 2005, 131).
9. Cercle Richelieu Senghor de Paris, Intervention de Dev Koumarane—Senghor et l’Inde. Accessed January 5, 2014; http://www.cercle-richelieu-senghor.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61.
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 17. ICCR, Indian Cultural Programmes, April 2012–March 2013. Accessed January 5, 2014; <http://www.iccrindia.net/icd/icd-2012-13.pdf>.
 18. ICCR, Festivals. Accessed January 5, 2014; <http://www.iccrindia.net/festivalsindia.html>.
 19. India was in a privileged position in comparison to other countries. For example, FRELIMO independence leaders resented Brazilian support for Portuguese colonialism, which was part of the Latin American country's foreign policy until the mid-1970s, and made it more difficult for Brazil to develop relations with Mozambique in the early years after independence. FRELIMO denotes the Mozambican Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*)—the liberation movement that fought Portuguese colonialism between 1963 and 1975 and that has been the ruling party since independence.
 20. For a list of bilateral visits updated until June 2015, see <http://www.iafs.in/downloads/Mozambique.pdf>; accessed February 17, 2016.

21. According to Vines, current Indian diaspora in Mozambique is estimated at around 21,000 individuals (2011, 188). The Indian High Commission in Maputo states that there are between 15,000–20,000 nationals of Indian origin in Mozambique holding either Mozambican or Portuguese citizenship, and there are between 1500–2000 Indian citizens in Mozambique. Source: “The Indian Community in Mozambique.” Accessed February 17, 2016; <http://www.hicomind-maputo.org/maputo.php?id=Indian%20Community>.
22. “India offers Africa US\$10b in soft loans + US\$600m in grants + 50,000 in scholarships.” Club of Mozambique, 30 October 2015. Accessed February 3, 2016; <http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=business&id=2147492705&tipo=one>.
23. See “Moçambique prioriza cooperação sul-sul—segundo Balói.” *Notícias*, 2 December 2004. Accessed February 17, 2015; <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/politica/27676-segundo-baloi-mocambique-prioriza-cooperacao-sul-sul>.
24. Groups in the WTO, 2 March 2013. Accessed May 6, 2015; http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf.
25. See “Moçambique prioriza cooperação sul-sul—segundo Balói.” *Notícias*, 2 December 2004. Accessed February 17, 2015; <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/politica/27676-segundo-baloi-mocambique-prioriza-cooperacao-sul-sul>.
26. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Policy Planning and Research Division, Annual Report 2011–2012, New Delhi. Accessed January 6, 2014; http://fsi.meia.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/19337_annual-report-2011-2012.pdf.
27. The South Commission was established in 1987 and included individuals from various nations of the South, acting on a personal capacity. The Commission was headed by the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, with Manmohan Singh of India as the Secretary-General. The Commission included, among others, Eneas da Conceição Comiche, an economist and politician from Mozambique, and Marie-Angélique Savané, a political militant and feminist from Senegal (Report of the South Commission 1990).
28. During the fieldwork in Senegal in January and February 2012, DPA was not mentioned on either side. When questioned regarding the creation of such an agency in India, the officer interviewed (January 16, 2012) at the Indian Embassy in Senegal suggested being unaware of it.
29. Text of the speech of Mr. P.S. Raghavan, Additional Secretary, DPA, Ministry of External Affairs at Round-Table Mapping Experiences around International Development Cooperation New Challenges and Opportunities, Observer Research Foundation, March 5, 2013. Accessed July 23, 2014; <http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/documents/ospeech.pdf>.

30. See Chanana (2010).
31. See the comment by Aquino de Bragança, adviser to Mozambican President Machel, in 1980: “Railways is a strategic sector (...) and the Indian railway system has been, for us, a revelation.” See “Indo-African relations: Towards greater camaraderie,” January 22, 2014. Accessed February 17, 2016; <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indo-african-relations-india-finds-itself-on-the-side-of-new-nations-of-africa/1/409858.html>.
32. See “Visit of President Armando Guebuza of Mozambique to India,” 4 October 2010. Accessed February 17, 2014; <http://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?852/Visit+of+President+Armando+Guebuza+o+f+Mozambique+to+India>
33. For India’s participation and contribution to the African Development Bank, see African Development Bank Group, India, Background. Accessed January 5, 2014; <http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/topics/partnerships/nonregional-member-countries/india/>. India’s cooperation with Africa is said to have a long history spanning more than 29 years with intensification in efforts. In fact, India has not been suggested as one of the emerging partners of the Bank, such as China or Brazil have, but as a traditional partner, African Development Bank Group, Partnerships and Cooperation Unit. Accessed January 5, 2014; <http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/complexes/country-regional-programs-policy/partnerships-cooperation-unit/partnerships/>.
34. See http://www.cii.in/about_us_History.aspx?enc=ns9fJzmNKJnsoQCyKqUmaQ==; accessed February 17, 2014.
35. See <http://www.eximbankindia.in/board-of-directors>; accessed February 17, 2014.
36. The high concentration of joint ventures in Nigeria was because the country provided attractive financial facilities with considerable flexibility concerning debt equity ratio (Kumar 1989, 154–155).
37. One of the authors was able to attend the event and observe firsthand the interaction between Indian and African officials.
38. Barefoot College, accessed January 5, 2015; <http://www.barefootcollege.org/about/>.
39. “Ces grands-mères illettrées devenues ingénieries en énergie solaire.” *Slate Afrique*, 21 Octobre 2012. Accessed January 5, 2015; <http://www.slateafrique.com/96457/les-mamies-africaines-font-de-lenergie-solaire>.
40. “Solar Power! Retour des sept femmes au Sénégal.” Tostan France. Accessed January 5, 2015; <http://www.tostanfrance.com/actualite/2008081960/a-la-une/linde-et-lafrique-collaborent-pour-developper-lenergie-solaire-en-afrigue.html>; see also Lankarani, Nazanin. “Generating unlikeliest of heroes.” *International Herald Tribune*, 18 April 2011.

- Accessed January 5, 2015; <http://indiandiplomacy.in/Download/dpfile28.pdf>.
41. See NIIT Dakar. Accessed January 5, 2014; <http://www.niit.sn/>.
 42. For a history of the Pan African Parliament, see http://www.pan-africanparliament.org/AboutPAP_History.aspx; accessed January 6, 2014.
 43. African Union, Infosoc, Pan African e-Network (PAeN) for Tele-medicine and Tele-education. Accessed January 2, 2014; <http://pages.au.int/infosoc/pages/pan-african-e-network-paen-tele-medicine-and-tele-education>.
 44. It is relevant to note that in the very same year the Senegalese state took ITC-oriented policy measures (Kane 2013, 630).
 45. Set up in 1978, TCIL is an engineering and consultancy company. It is a wholly owned public sector enterprise working under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India; see <http://www.tcil-india.com/new/>; accessed January 6, 2015.
 46. Pan-African e-Network Project, <http://www.panafricanenetwork.com/>; accessed January 6, 2015.
 47. See Country Overview, World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/senegal/overview>; see also “Senegal on the way to an emerging economy,” accessed February 17, 2016; <https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2015/013015.htm>.
 48. Message of His Excellency Mr. Elhadj Ibou Boye, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to India, http://embserindia.org/?page_id=478; accessed February 17, 2016.
 49. ‘India offers Africa US\$10b in soft loans + US\$600m in grants + 50,000 in scholarships.’ Club of Mozambique, 30 October 2015. Accessed 3 February 2016; <http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=business&id=2147492705&tipo=one>.
 50. For the official website regarding Jindal’s operations in Mozambique. see <http://www.jindalafrica.com/mozambique>; accessed 3 February 2016.
 51. See “Jindal Steel and Power: Human rights and environmental violations in Mozambique.” *Facing Finance*, 2013. Accessed February 3, 2016; <http://www.facing-finance.org/en/database/cases/jindal-steel-human-rights-and-environmental-violations-in-mozambique/>.
 52. See “Mozambique: Workers on strike at Indian-owned coal mine.” *All Africa News*, 16 January 2015. Accessed May 6, 2015; <http://allafrica.com/stories/201501161480.html>.
 53. Emilio Sambo, “População insurge-se contra os maus-tratos da JINDAL em Tete.” *Verdade*, 19 May 2015. Accessed February 3, 2016; <http://www.verdade.co.mz/tema-de-fundo/35-themadefundo/53201-populacao-insurge-se-contra-os-maus-tratos-da-jindal-em-tete>.
 54. See “Jindal intimida activistas da ONG Justiça Ambiental.” *Verdade*, 18 June 2014. Accessed February 3, 2016; <http://www.verdade.co.mz/>

- destaques/democracia/46924-jindal-intimida-activistas-dalong-justica-ambiental.
55. Mauritius remains the first recipient of Indian foreign direct investment in Africa. See Joshua Kirshner, “India is helping Mozambique meet its energy needs—in good ways and bad.” *The Conversation*, 24 November 2015. Accessed February 17, 2016; <http://theconversation.com/india-is-helping-mozambique-meet-its-energy-needs-in-good-ways-and-bad-50788>.
 56. This refers to a military unit of between 80–250 soldiers, commanded by a captain or a major.
 57. See “Indo-Africa relations: Toward greater camaraderie.” *India Today*, 22 January 2014. Accessed February 17, 2016; <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indo-african-relations-india-finds-itself-on-the-side-of-new-nations-of-africa/1/409858.html>.
 58. See “Visit of INS ‘Teg’ to Nacala, Mozambique.” India’s High Commission in Mozambique. Accessed February 17, 2016; http://www.hicomind-maputo.org/news_detail.php?id=37.
 59. China and India have been competing for leadership in the Indian Ocean region; this has reflected on offers for development cooperation, investments, and military assistance from the two rising powers to different countries located in the Indian Ocean region. For further information, see Eleanor Albert, “Competition in the Indian Ocean.” Council on Foreign Relations, November 2015. Accessed February 17, 2016; <http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/competition-indian-ocean/p37201>.
 60. For example, Brazil has included training of African military officers from South Atlantic African states as part of its South–South cooperation portfolio with African countries. For a comparison between Indian and Brazilian approaches towards their maritime surroundings, see Adriana Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, “[Region-building by rising powers: The South Atlantic and Indian Ocean rims compared](#).” *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 10(1), 2014, 1–17.
 61. For example, Mozambique supports a permanent seat for India in a reformed Security Council and has supported India in its dispute with Pakistan by recognising Jammu and Kashmir as part of India and supporting the resolution of differences “on the basis of the Shimla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999” (Khalid 2010, 16).
 62. From an interview conducted by Danilo Marcondes with representative of “Northern” donor agency, Maputo, November 2013.

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The Turkish Way of Doing Development Aid?: An Analysis from the Somali Laboratory

Mehmet Ozkan

INTRODUCTION

One of the most novel parts of Turkey’s foreign policy since 2002 is its endeavour to be part of South–South cooperation (SSC) and to increase its visibility in development aid projects. This involvement—both at state and nongovernmental organization (NGO) levels—is particularly palpable on the African continent.

Turkey’s development aid policy is indeed just a different expression of a new foreign policy outlook towards various regions, which plays a supportive role in new openings. Ankara has been trying to develop its own understanding and implementation—a Turkish way of doing cooperation—based on experiences gained mostly from the Balkans and Central Asian republics. This chapter focuses on Turkey’s involvement in Somalia because that is where its efforts in Africa have been concentrated and the most visible, to the point that Turkey has been referred to frequently in international meetings and academic publications related to political affairs in the Horn of Africa. It is something new in recent history.

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This chapter first argues that at societal and institutional levels, religion along with trade are key drivers—and to some extent legitimizing elements—of Turkey’s policy in Africa. It then shows that on the ideational front, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia is closely linked to broader shifts in its foreign policy and corresponds to the fact that authorities see Africa from a totally different perspective compared to what used to prevail there even a decade ago. Turkey’s SSC takes Africa as a priority in which Somalia de facto stands as a laboratory. Finally, the chapter explores the specificities of the Turkish intervention in Somalia and shows, for example, that Turkey is actively working through development projects of governmental institutions and civil society organisations to provide support to reestablish community services. It concludes that it is difficult to talk about a clear-cut Turkish “development policy”; it is better approached as a practical experience, which is in progress and paving the way for alternative discussions. Based on interviews and interaction with officials in Somalia, Turkey, and the other Horn of Africa countries along with the primary and secondary sources, the main aim of this chapter is to shed light on Turkish experiences of undertaking development aid in Somalia.

SSC AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL: TOWARDS EXTENSION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

In this section, it is argued that Turkey’s official aid is very much connected to Ankara’s geographical and social interest as well as trade considerations with African recipient countries. Since its involvement in Somalia in 2011, Turkey has been eager to become a humanitarian and political actor on the continent rather than merely an economic power or donor. Turkish aid is a process of geographical extension and institutionalization.

Turkey started its aid activities as early as 1985. These became more coordinated once the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was founded in 1992. TIKA has coordination offices in 54 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Balkans, and Europe for delivering development assistance through technical projects and humanitarian activities. The agency is an autonomous organization under the tutelage of the Prime Minister. Its main function is to establish a bridge between development partners’ needs and relevant Turkish ministries and agencies. TIKA is also the main responsible state institution on Overseas Development Aid (ODA) reporting and data collection. It partners with a number of international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the European Union (EU) institutions. TIKA typically provides technical cooperation projects, direct investments, loans and credits, humanitarian assistance, peace-building assistance, and contributions to international organizations.

TIKA initially was established to help the transition of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. However, as of 2003 it was transformed into a more global aid agency and has expanded its area of operations. For example, in 1992–2002 TIKA conducted 2346 projects and activities in total, and its annual average number of projects and activities was only 256 ([Sahin 2007](#), 27). TIKA's total projects and activities, however, expanded to 2780 in 2003–2006, notably in Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa. TIKA-sponsored projects towards the Middle East and Africa rose from 45 in 2005 to 150 in 2006 ([Fidan and Nurdun 2008](#), 100). The first TIKA Program Coordinator Office in Africa was opened in Addis Ababa in 2005, followed by others in several additional countries. TIKA offices support development projects in their respective regions, and from these three offices it operates in 42 countries in Africa. With the opening of new embassies all over the continent—29 newly opened, now totalling 41—the number of TIKA offices in Africa is likely to increase as well, thus increasing Turkish aid flow to the continent.

The amount of TIKA's international assistance has increased substantially since 2004. The annual amount between 2002 and 2004 was about US\$80 million, while the annual average reached US\$700 million between 2006 and 2009 (TIKA 2015). In 2013, Turkey's ODA reached US\$3308 billion. Multilateral ODA accounted for 5 % of Turkey's total ODA in 2013, provided through the UN—amounting to 21 % of its multilateral ODA—as well as through the World Bank Group and regional development banks. Although Africa still represents a quarter of the TIKA budget, Turkish ODA to Africa increased by 67 % from US\$30.9 million in 2009 to US\$400 million in 2014. Aid to the least developed countries (LDCs) also has increased to US\$158.95 million in 2010 ([Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012](#)). The bulk of bilateral assistance was delivered as project and programme aid, technical assistance, and involvement in post-conflict, peace-building operations, and humanitarian aid.

Besides TIKA, Turkey counts on other aid channels. The second institution that provides international aid is the Ministry of Education and third is the military. The Ministry of Education usually provides scholarships to students and supports educational institutions abroad. The military is

involved mostly in training. The Religious Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) also need to be mentioned here. Through Eximbank¹ and the Ministry of Economy, Turkey also gives direct economic support to Africa's development; however, their involvements as state institutions are usually minor.

Since 2002, a new Turkish foreign policy has been established, which includes active participation in the fight against poverty and increasing development and humanitarian aid. The speed of change is impressive: In less than a decade, Turkey has shifted from having almost not-more-than-formal relations with Somalia to establishment of an increasingly comprehensive partnership. SSC did not exist until the early 2000s in Turkish discourse and practice. According to the Foreign Ministry website, net disbursements of a South–South cooperation budget (i.e. bilateral and multilateral) for Turkey were US\$602 million in 2007; while in the same year, it was US\$343 million for Colombia and US\$270 million for the Republic of Korea. Between 2002 and 2007, as the financial amount for the SSC was multiplied by 3 for Colombia and 4 for the Republic of Korea, the SSC fund increased by 20 in the Turkish case (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2012](#)).

TIKA and Turkish civil society organizations have been active for a long time in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Nevertheless, the country has experienced an increased interest and a rise in the amount of both official and unofficial aid to Africa in the last decade. Whereas Turkey recorded an approximately 7% annual economic growth rate until 2011, her ambition and scope of activities in the field of development aid have increased in tandem. In parallel with its economic dynamism,² Turkey has been continuously increasing its official development aid since 2004 and implementing open policies towards historically neglected areas in Turkey's foreign policy.

The basic reason for this geographical extension of influence to the African continent lies in the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy that basically has, at least, three dimensions: (1) a new geographical perception in Ankara's outlook towards the whole world, which accepts that Africa and Asia are not regarded as distant and troubled regions but as possible partners; (2) considerable efforts to reposition Turkey as a “central country” rather than a “bridge” between the East and West and to develop an institutionalized partnership with Asia and Africa in a changing global economy in order to play a more active role in international relations; and (3) an increase in activities in all regions and international organisations in order to contribute to regional and global peace (Ozkan [2011](#), 116–117).

Ankara's increasing interest in Somalia is part and parcel of this policy. Turkey's contribution as a donor was not visible until recently because it was both modest and poorly coordinated (Kulaklikaya and Nurdun 2010) but is increasingly palpable, especially in Somalia.

AFRICA AS A PRIORITY, SOMALIA AS A LABORATORY

The economic results of these new openings are much clearer in Turkey–Africa relations. For example, Turkey's trade volume with African countries was only US\$5.4 billion in 2003; by 2011 it had increased more than threefold, exceeding US\$17 billion, whereas China's trade with Africa was around US\$100 billion and Indian–African trade was US\$46 billion in the same year. Turkish investments in Africa are increasing steadily and were estimated to be US\$1 billion by the end of 2007 (Yildiz 2007). Trade thus has been an important accelerating factor in increasing Turkey's official development aid to Africa.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency's main areas of cooperation in Africa include agriculture, health, education, water and sanitation, vocational training, institutional-capacity development, and humanitarian assistance. Initiated in 2008, the Agricultural Development Program covers 13 countries: Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda and is likely to be extended in the future.

Turkey also gives economic support to Africa's development through international organisations, although multilateral aid only constitutes about 6% of Turkey's total ODA both in 2008 and 2009 (OECD 2011).³ In 2007, Turkey for the first time hosted a summit in Istanbul of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), where it committed US\$20 million in development aid for them and promised a further US\$3 million to be allocated in three years to combat the AIDS epidemic. In 2009, it made a modest donation of US\$0.5 million to the African Union budget. In May 2011, the Fourth UN Conference on LDCs was held in Istanbul at which 33 African countries participated. Turkey invited 650 businesspeople and investors to the conference maintaining that the biggest contribution to Africa was to be made through its entrepreneurs and its own resources (see <http://www.ldc4istanbul.org/>). At the end of the summit, participant countries agreed for the first time to establish a mechanism to monitor and follow-up on whether the promises and pledges were kept and also to issue an annual progress report for Africa.

Turkey's policy in Somalia is comprehensive and multidimensional. Emergency humanitarian aid was the first step in its involvement in Somalia. It was launched following the scores of deaths in 2011 caused by the drought and famine in Somalia and West Africa. Turkey became aware of this crisis through the international media, as it previously had not been an issue on its policy agenda. On August 19, 2011, then Prime Minister, now President Erdoğan, visited the capital city of Mogadishu, accompanied by a large delegation that included his wife Emine Erdoğan, his daughter Sümeyye Erdoğan, then Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ, then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and other ministers and executives (*Sabah*, 19 August 2011). Besides the fact that this was the first official visit to Somalia in 20 years, it brought this subject to the attention of the international community and of the Turkish public.

At that time, the goal of the Prime Minister and his delegation was mainly to provide emergency humanitarian aid for the people in need rather than to establish a long-term Somalia policy. Turkey sent a large amount of food aid and other necessities and launched a variety of campaigns to stem the crisis. The decision and concrete action garnered appreciation not only from the Somalis but also foreign countries. For example, Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud praised the way Turks are implementing development aid:

They taught the Somalis to drive the vehicles—that's what makes the difference. We have been constantly preaching to our international partners—"Don't do the work for us, do the work with us." This is the difference—the Turks are doing the work with us. They are training the Somalis, improving their capacity and introducing a new work culture to Somalia.⁴

This aid provided Turkey with legitimacy when it developed its subsequent policies towards Somalia.

Development assistance has been one of Turkey's "soft-power" strategies in recent years (Ali 2011). In Somalia, the country was invested in rebuilding its war-torn infrastructure—that is, the airport in Mogadishu and much-needed paving of roads between the city centre and the airport. This facilitated direct flights by Turkish Airlines that now connect Istanbul to Mogadishu.

Turkey provided Somalia with essential infrastructure projects without conditions attached. It built field hospitals and sent doctors much-needed medical supplies and equipment because they have to care for approximately 1200 patients daily. In addition, a hospital with a 200-bed capacity was opened. TIKA cooperated with the State Hydraulic Works

(DSI) to drill wells to provide for the water needs of 126,000 people. An Agricultural School was opened to educate Somalis on how to counteract drought and to foster awareness of the richness of their land. Turkey also helped to build a Fisheries Training School. Although Somalia has Africa's longest ocean strip, its ongoing civil war, which has continued for almost a quarter of a century, put an end to fishing on one of the world's most beautiful coastlines (*Zaman*, 24 February 2013).

Turkey has taken on leadership and sought external support for helping and restructuring Somalia. On August 12, 2011, it called on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for an emergency meeting (*BBC Turke*, 17 August 2011) in Istanbul regarding the famine crisis in Somalia. A total of ₺ 228 million (US\$105.5 million) was raised (SBN, 18 August 2011). During this meeting contributions were made and pledges announced by Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Gabon, Qatar, Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Senegal, with a request to others to follow suit.

The Turkish Red Crescent, one of the first aid agencies that went to the region, undertook to organize the distribution of the funds collected. Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Somalia, after his preplanned visit to West Africa from August 19–20, to observe the distribution of aid as well as to view the situation on the ground. He was joined by a delegation, which included Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, a large number of Turkish entertainers, media members, and businessmen (*Euronews Turke*, 19 August 2011). Statements made by Prime Minister Erdoğan during this visit urged the world community to help Somalia, stating that humanity's conscience is being tested because the situation in Somalia is truly severe (*Zaman*, 20 August 2011). Erdoğan's call for aid contributed to the increase of awareness and sympathy about the matter, especially in the Islamic world.

Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan focused on Somalia for a significant portion of his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 22, 2011:

No one can speak of peace, justice, and civilization in the world if the outcry rising from Somalia is left unheard. It is impossible for me to put into words the poverty and suffering I have seen in Somalia. The tragedy of Somalia, where tens of thousands of children died due to the lack of even a piece of bread and a drop of water, is a shame for the international community.

Erdoğan also stated that the conscience of humanity was under question, and he criticized the world for watching the events as if it were a movie

(*Saban USA*, 23 September 2011). Turkey has organized joint meetings about Somalia with the United Nations, called two Istanbul Conferences in May 2010 and June 2012, and participated in the meeting on Somalia held in London on February 23, 2012.

The significant amount of development and humanitarian aid Turkey has poured into the country, as well as increased commercial developments, are the main bridges of its new Africa policy. The efforts made in Somalia can be seen as a test case for the evaluation of its real impact in Africa, and Somalia is serving as a laboratory for Turkey's new engagement in African policy. Its engagement efforts try to establish Turkey's status as a political, not only economic, actor. As its relationship with Somalia continues to be strengthened, deputy prime ministers and many other ministers make official visits to follow-up on projects. As a result, Somalia has become a quasi-internal issue for Turkey's government and society.

A TURKISH WAY OF DOING DEVELOPMENT AID?

Turkey's involvement in Somalia should not be viewed in isolation. Although it has received the most attention, it should be perceived in the context of Ankara's wider Africa policy. Turkey has a long history of trade and other involvement in Africa, including Somalia, particularly during the Ottoman Empire. One can come across this type of legitimating discourse in both countries. During the past decade, Somalia has served as an ideal country for Ankara to display its model of humanitarian diplomacy. It is a fellow Muslim country and has massive humanitarian and development needs. Turkey's form of engagement in Somalia has some characteristics that makes it specific—that is, its social and religious dimension and its approach to “state-building.”

The Social and Religious Basis: From Civil Society-led Initiatives to a State-led Policy

In addition to government organisations, such as the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), NGOs have been actively engaging and supporting Turkey–Africa relations. It is worth noting that traditionally, the role of civil society in Turkish foreign relations has been quite limited, and usually it has played a complementary role to state policy. However, in the 2000s, probably for the first time during the Republican era, civil society organizations have not only contributed to foreign policymaking but also have followed the state. Conservative business associations ideologically and politically close to the ruling Justice and Development

Party have been the pioneers in opening up Turkey–Africa relations since 2002. International aid organisations, such as the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), have paved the way for the acceleration of Turkey–Africa relations since 2005, exemplifying the converging interests between state and civil society. This convergence can be explained partly as a result of the ideological proximity between these actors. The IHH has been responsible for many evolving works ranging from education and health to human development in 43 countries in Africa. Now it is especially helping thousands of people improve their vision through its Cataract Project conducted in hospitals in the Sudan. IHH directly contributes to numerous projects including drilling wells and setting up schools and hospitals in numerous African countries (Oruc 2007).

Many other civil society organizations (CSOs), such as *Dosteli, Cansuyu*, and *Teryuzu Doktorları*, are active in Africa. They serve the continent in many areas from education to health and also provide African students with scholarships to study at Turkish universities. This has led to close cooperation between CSOs and the state apparatus. Turkish CSOs have been instrumental in extending Turkey's geographical influence. Diyanet, until the early 2000s, did not play an active role in foreign policy, instead focused on the religious issues of Muslims in Turkey (Ozkan 2014).

On the contrary, in Somalia, the state initially led the policy and civil society organizations followed. In 2011, the first involvement of the Diyanet in Somalia was solely in the form of direct humanitarian aid. However, it has shifted the focus of its projects to fit the State's core purposes such as education, religious services, and bringing students from Somalia to complete religious studies in theology faculties in Turkey. Although the numbers kept fluctuating, as of 2014, there are 300 students studying in Turkey with the help of the Diyanet. It is estimated that the Diyanet has spent more than US\$3.5 million in total for its activities in Somalia since 2011.

In a way, the experience of civil society-led, state-followed initiatives in Turkey's Africa policy has reversed and now one can claim that the state has taken over the leading role. As its premise, the intervention of the Directorate for Religious Affairs in Somalia has been the consequence of an urgency to respond to famine and drought rather than the product of voluntary planning. Nonetheless, especially with the opening of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, the involvement of the Directorate has become more organized. As a result, the Directorate for Religious Affairs appointed an attaché for religious affairs to Mogadishu in the mid-2014 to expand relations in terms of religious understanding.

Religion and history are the two most important resources used to legitimize and support state-to-state relationships and for social relations in Muslim African countries. With its multidimensional foreign policy approach, religion has become one of Turkey's soft power elements, notably in Africa. Many CSOs operating in Somalia have been motivated by religious brotherhood and have motivated their individual donors through Islamic discourse. Similarly, Muslim solidarity helps facilitate understanding of why Turkish NGOs are well received and easily accepted by Somalians on the ground, despite the fact that Somalis are known to be very sensitive to foreign interference.

The following is a list, albeit possibly not exhaustive, of Turkish organizations and institutions present and active in Somalia, according to Akgün (2012):

- Aegean Health Association Federation (ESAFED)
- Africa Brotherhood and Solidarity Association (AFKAD)
- Anadolu Agency
- Association of International Physicians (AID)
- Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation
- Bashir Association
- Cansuyu
- Charity Stone
- Deniz Feneri
- Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet)
- Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)
- Doctors Worldwide
- Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms (IHH), Turkey
- IGMG Hasana Association
- IHH Europe
- Ihlas Holdings' Foundation
- International Security Research Association (ISRA)
- Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
- Ministry of Health
- Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)
- Red Crescent
- State Airport Authority
- State Hydraulic Works
- Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)
- Yardimeli

They provide feedback and expertise that feed into governmental strategy. Prior to the Second Istanbul–Somali Conference, a Somali Civil Society Groups' meeting was held in Istanbul on May 26, 2012. Somali's Traditional Opinion leaders, who elect the members of Parliament and Constituent Assembly, as well as scholars, civil society members, and diaspora representatives, intellectuals, youth and women representatives, discussed Somalia's current problems and options for the future.

The various foundations and institutions carry out projects either as a single organization or with a local partner. They also often cooperate with state institutions for these reasons: (1) to avoid overlapping with the work of public institutions and (2) to share experiences and expertise about the difficulties in the field for security and bureaucratic details. An office called the Somalia Coordination Council, led by the Vice-Prime Minister, regularly meets in Ankara to evaluate the situation in the field and coordinate these multiactor and multidimensional activities. This type of coordination at the country level is the first ever in Turkish foreign policy.

The human and social dimension of its programme in Somalia is accentuated by the scholarships provided to students who are willing to get a degree at one of Turkey's numerous universities. During Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Somalia on August 19, 2012, a promise was given to provide scholarships to more than 1200 Somali students (*Sabah*, 21 February 2013). To accomplish this, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) provided scholarships to 421 university-level students with Somali nationality since 2012; other state agencies, such as Diyanet, provide scholarships nearly 650 students residing in Turkey and around 400 in Somalia, both at university and high school levels. Since 2010, the Turkish government agency, YTB, has provided and coordinated Turkish scholarships and a special scholarship scheme is designed for African students.⁵ The scholarships has been distributed on the basis of an assessment of their income and needs.

As the author of this chapter has personally observed in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, students who want to study in certain departments, such as social sciences, agriculture, civil engineering, political science, and international relations, were given priority in relation to the needs of those departments. Turkey is the country that receives the largest number of Somali students with scholarships, currently approximately 1300. Students are expected, one day, to play a significant role in the social, economic, and political development of their country and to establish sustainable partnerships with Turkey.

Finally, Turkey contributes to the social reconstruction of Somalia through the Somali diaspora. In this context, Somalia's diaspora in various countries were interviewed, noting that it gave support to act together instead of being fragmented. A well-attended Somali diaspora meeting held in Istanbul during the summer of 2014 led to identification of problems as well as potential cooperation opportunities through workshops (Inanc 2014). Ankara's Somalia involvement has contributed to development of a culture of joint functioning between civil society and state institutions, and its Somalia policy works as a layered web with several actors and aspects.

A Specific Approach to State-Building?

Turkish authorities along with the UN organized a conference in Istanbul on May 21, 2012, entitled "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goal 2015." This conference's goal was to address water, energy, transportation, and racism issues; it was attended by 57 countries and 11 regional and international organizations. It set out a roadmap for the reconstruction of Somalia's state and introduced a five-point comprehensive plan, which included the following themes: the establishment of national unity, the creation of a new political system, a comprehensive structuring of the economy, the configuration of national Somali forces, and the development of the country (*Al-Shadid*, 10 December 2012).

In his 2011 speech at the UN, Erdogan expressed regret that Somalia's issues had been managed by the international community in Nairobi rather than in Mogadishu since the mid-1990s, while defending the principle of sovereignty of the Somali state. Although this critical rhetoric continued to exist, the official Turkish government and social aid organizations were working together to rebuild Somalia from scratch (Akgün 2012). Positively or negatively, if the experience of Turkey's help in the state-building process in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was not taken into account, then state-building was never at the core of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey has supported the establishment of some government-supported organizations and institutions, as well as some projects in various countries such as Afghanistan, Palestine, Tunisia, and Libya. Nevertheless, the experience in Somalia is different compared to the previous ones, as everything had to be rebuilt from the ground up. Moreover, Somalia's ongoing 20-year civil war and its legacies of chaos and a failed state left it with a situation that can be described as an unsystematic structure. Therefore, the Somalia experience marks the first for Turkey in terms of state-building.

This kind of policy requires a very comprehensive approach and significant knowledge of the local context. In considering how Western countries participated in state-building in Somalia in the post-colonial period, Turkey attempted to play a more supportive role. The tactic chosen by Turkey was to put forward local Somali actors and strengthen them while supporting various projects relating to emergency aid and developmental assistance. The Turkish authorities did not officially use a “state-building discourse” but promoted Somali actors’ ability to make their own decisions and to establish a mechanism that would allow them to stand on their own feet for the reconstruction of the country. In that sense, the Turkish approach to state-building can be described as building on and working closely with both social and institutional capacity, without referring to or mentioning the term “state-building.”

In addition, Turkey contributed to Somaliland, which had acquired a semi-independent status in 1991 and is reluctant to unify under the single state of Somalia. Turkey believes that it would be difficult, in terms of structuring a Somali state, to unite Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu under one “roof,” but it hopes to foster a political dialogue between these entities. In this context, Turkey has added another item to its policy in Somalia by acting as a mediator in talks between the central government and Somaliland (*Sabah*, 14 April 2013).

In this framework, Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül met with the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Hasan Sheikh Mahmud, and Somaliland’s President, Ahmed Silanyo, on April 13, 2013, at the Presidential Palace in Çankaya and brokered an agreement between the two leaders. The Ankara Communiqué was signed as the first step of a new process to resolve the conflict between the Federal Republic of Somalia and Somaliland. In a meeting that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also attended, the resolution of disputes between Somalia and Somaliland as well as a further deepening of relations between Turkey and the African countries were discussed, primarily within the framework of regional issues. Accordingly, both parties agreed to come together again in Istanbul within 90 days to shape their future and resolve problems. After realizing the second phase of the negotiations within the 90 days during 2013, another meeting to discuss the process of negotiations took place in Turkey in the Spring of 2014. Although the reunification of Somalia is unlikely, Turkish efforts have contributed to setting up a common forum where Somalis can at the very least talk about issues and attempt to solve them through dialogue.

The question here is whether there is a Turkish version of state-building that can be derived from Ankara's Somalia experience; and, if there is one, to what extent can it be differentiated from the Western experience. Turkey has one of the few embassies operating in Mogadishu along with the UK, China, and the US. It is too early to contend that there is a Turkish model of state-building; however, one can argue that what Turkey has done in Somalia has opened the way and that there is a chance for a possible reestablishment of Somalia's social and institutional structures.

Exporting Security—and Becoming a Target

Turkey tries to export security as well by providing support to the Somali central government in the area of security service training. Turkey dedicated a budget of ₺ 20 million for the restructuring of the Somali army and its police forces since 2011. One of its projects is to build a non-commissioned officers' school with a capacity of 100 student-officers in the first phase, followed by plans to start building the foundation for a professional military Ground, Air and Naval School. Turkey's General Directorate of Security, the Turkish General Staff, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have conducted various studies on how to best restructure the Somali army and police forces. Building an infrastructure, configuring, and training the Somali police are all part of Turkey's development assistance programme.

To this end, it brought 60 Somali police officers to Turkey, through the General Directorate of Security, then sent them back after they were trained at the Police Academy. The design of the Somali police uniforms also was handled by the Directorate. Subsequently, a team of more than 500 police officers was expected to go to Turkey to be trained in the upcoming years (*TimeTurk*, 4 March 2013). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is evaluating a project provided by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to restructure and train the Somali army, as requested by the Somali government. The initial phase of the project, which is intended to develop the fundamentals for a non-commissioned officers' school with a capacity of 100, has been planned as part of the project prepared by the TSK team; it was to include one brigadier, two lieutenant-colonels, two commanders, and one colonel in consultation with Somali officials (*TimeTurk*, 4 March 2013).

Al-Shabaab, an extremist group that controls much of Southern Somalia, launches periodic attacks against Turkish targets. Its goal is to try to discourage Turkey from continuing its aid activities in the country. For instance, in an attack targeting the Red Crescent aid convoy on April

15, 2013, 15 Somali aid workers were killed and 4 Turks were wounded (*Taraf*, 15 April 2013). Also, a Turkish businessman was assassinated at the hotel he was staying in Mogadishu on May 25, 2012. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for two more deadly attacks. One of them in October 2011 was a suicide attack aimed at public buildings in Mogadishu that led to the deaths of 70 students to whom Turkey had provided scholarships. This violence was perceived as an attack against Turkey, which then sent an air ambulance to treat the surviving injured students. Another major incident was a direct attack on a Turkish target. It was carried out by a suicide bomber located in front of an annex building of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu on July 27, 2013. One of the four Turkish special operations officers was killed in the clash and others were injured. On Twitter, Al-Shabaab has been accusing Turkey of supporting a non-Islamic and secular structure in Somalia.

The second major security issue in Somalia is the widespread problem of piracy on the coastline. Since 2009, Turkey has taken an active role in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and has provided military support to fight against this scourge in cooperation with the EU and the UN. The Turkish G-class frigate, *TCG Giresun*, joined the Combined Task Force 151, which was formed by the UN Security Council (*Hurriyet*, 17 February 2009). The *Giresun* frigate was sent on a four-month mission, starting on February 25, 2009, within the framework of the Turkish Armed Forces' authorisation to serve in the sea off of Somalia; the Turkish Parliament accepted this deployment on February 10, 2009.

According to the authorisation, which was valid for one year, the Turkish Armed Forces personnel would not engage in ground operations against piracy and armed robbery; instead, it would provide protection to Turkish merchant and military ships within its task area. A total of 263 personnel, including 32 commissioned officers, 150 non-commissioned officers as well as 9 specialized sergeants and 72 rank-and-file workers were to be aboard the frigate until its mission ended on June 25, 2009 (*Stratejik Boyut*, 17 February 2009).

After its mandate expired, the *Giresun* returned to Turkey. However, on June 19, 2009, a different frigate, the *Gediz*, was sent to the Gulf of Aden; its crew includes 28 commissioned officers, 156 non-commissioned officers as well as 10 specialized sergeants and 72 rank-and-file personnel (*Sabah*, 19 June 2009). Subsequently, the *TCG Gokova* frigate was sent to combat piracy after the return of the *Gediz* because of the expiration of its mandate in September 2009. There were total of 267 staff, including 30

commissioned officers, 158 non-commissioned officers, and 79 soldiers; they served on the frigate for five-and-a-half months, until February 2010, in the Gulf of Aden (denizhaber.com, 10 July 2013). On February 20, 2010, Turkish special forces SAT Commandos neutralized seven sea pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The TCG *Gemlik* frigate (F-492) indicated that SAT Commandos impeded pirates from attacking a Japanese ship in the Gulf of Aden (*Milliyet*, 21 February 2010).

In addition, on April 1, 2010, a Taiwanese flagged ship was hijacked and then on April 7, 2010, a Turkish bulk carrier, *YASIN-C*, was hijacked while on its way to within 270 nautical miles of Kenya's Mombasa port. The ship, with a crew of 25 Turkish nationals, was carrying bulk wheat, which it was being taken from the port of Mariupol in the Ukraine to Mombasa. In a statement delivered by the Turkish General Staff on April 1, the *Gallipoli* frigate had interfered with a pirate ship in the Gulf of Aden, which was preparing to attack other ships, and captured nine pirates (*Afrika Gundemi* 2010, 36–37). Again, in a Turkish General Staff statement printed in the *Afrika Gundemi* (2010, 36–37), the *Gallipoli* frigate reportedly organized an operation on April 18, 2010, with two speedboats near the northeast of the Seychelles against a pirate ship, which was close to the route of the Turkish-flagged ship *Servet-Y*. Following this operation, 13 pirates were neutralized and the materials used were captured.

CONCLUSION

Turkey's foreign policy has made a radical transition over the course of a decade. Its economy is growing rapidly, and it has become more outward-oriented and increasingly confident as a regional and global power. So far, Turkey's official development aid is connected to its geographical and social interests as well as commercial considerations. Turkey's opening to Africa and heavy involvement in Somalia have been part of this political and social interests, which has developed a different foreign policy compared to earlier decades. Although this opening and transformation in foreign policy is still in progress, the Somalia experience has increased Turkey's proficiency in developing its approach to aid and Africa.

Turkish presence in Somalia is different in some aspects, as compared to other actors within the region. First of all, the nature and implementation of humanitarian aid is quite distinct. Turkey's goal is to succeed with long-term development projects in the region mostly at a micro-level so as to affect people's lives directly. Second, the common religion of Islam

plays an important role in legitimizing Turkey's presence in Somalia and in creating trust between actors, as opposed to Western actors.

Despite these differences, Turkey's long-term sociopolitical existence and stability in the region depends not only on increasing trade relations but also on efforts to find durable solutions for the African continent's problems, which are similar to those in Somalia. If Turkey is able to contribute to peace and security in Somalia, it could then join the group of powerful political nations, along with the US, France, and Britain, who are interested in promoting the continent's economic and political stability, instead of being part of the group that only has economic interests in Africa (e.g., arguably, India and Brazil). To that extent, the Somali laboratory is for Turkey somehow similar to the Sudanese field for China, where economic interests and political circumstances in the country have led it to adopt a more political approach.

The Somalia example is not only an important turning point for Turkey–Somalia relations but also reflects Turkey's strategy to be one of the major players in promoting Africa's development. Its successes or failures could potentially shape the priorities of Turkey's Africa policy as well as determine how Africa and other actors in the region will perceive Turkey in the upcoming years.

NOTES

1. Turkish Eximbank is an official export credit agency and has been mandated to support foreign trade and Turkish contractors/investors operating overseas; see www.eximbank.gov.tr.
2. Turkey's nominal GDP in 2014 reached US\$806 billion. According to GDP figures, Turkey is the seventeenth largest economy in the world and the sixth in Europe; see "EU bilateral trade and trade with the world," 2013.
3. In 2008, Turkey donated US\$7.5 million to various African countries via international organizations, such as the WHO, WFP, and the Red Crescent, to assist them to cope with the effects of drought and other natural disasters. In 2008, Turkey donated US\$3.5 million in humanitarian aid through the WFP. For details see, Ozkan and Akgun (2010).
4. Interview with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Mogadishu, November 2014. Quoted in Wasuge (2016, 17).
5. For detailed information on Turkish scholarships, see the official website at <http://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/index.php/en/>; accessed August 28, 2014.

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Good-Bye *Che?*: Scope, Identity, and Change in Cuba’s South–South Cooperation

Daniele Benzi and Ximena Zapata

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1960s, Cuban South–South cooperation (SSC) has been a cornerstone of the regime’s revolutionary foreign policy. More than just a framework for collaboration, it has been a political strategy for the legitimacy and consolidation of the Cuban state, and a tool for shaping and promoting an endogenous “Third Worldism” ideology rooted in anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and international solidarity principles.

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As several scholars have suggested, Cuban internationalism is widely recognized and appreciated “from A to Z,” from Antigua to Zimbabwe, and from the proximities of Haiti to distant East Timor—that is, both in Latin America and in a surprising number of African and Asian countries (Kirk and Erisman 2009, 167). Despite its small size and the limits of its demographic and socioeconomic conditions, Cuba’s international cooperation includes a remarkable roster of partner countries that have benefited from its several projects and scholarships. These have been confined mainly to the areas of education and sports, as well as agriculture, military, and culture. There is no doubt, however, that the uniqueness of Cuban cooperation relies heavily on what has been called its “medical diplomacy” (Feinsilver 1993).

Based on the specialized literature on the topic, as well as on insights and results from in-depth fieldwork conducted in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Cuba over the period 2008–2012, this chapter provides an analysis of Cuba’s SSC, with a focus on its contemporary relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, especially with the members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP). Employing a sociohistorical and international political economy perspective, the authors critically engage with diverse explanations of the scope and the motivations behind Cuba’s cooperation over the past few decades. International and regional levels of analysis are used, as well as consideration of the main domestic factors that have influenced the orientation of Cuban international cooperation, including its peculiar political and cultural identity.

This chapter argues that Cuba’s engagement in Latin America, the Caribbean, and areas around the world through its internationalism has been vital to the country on several fronts, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In the domestic realm, it has allowed the nation to cope with economic difficulties and to strengthen the regime’s hegemony, forging a positive image and a revolutionary identity for the Cuban people. In the regional and international context, Cuban cooperation has meant improvements in terms of political ties, prestige, and recognition from developing countries on the basis of solidarity and humanitarian principles. This is, in short, a well-known “soft-power” argument that facilitates understanding Cuban internationalism.¹

Nevertheless, going beyond this approach, the chapter further argues that the transition the country is currently undergoing, and its full reinsertion into the Inter-American system, are likely to reshape Cuba’s

SSC dynamics. In particular, evidence is provided that the character of Cuban medical diplomacy since the 1990s has been gradually shifting from a predominantly political and humanitarian character to a more economic and market-oriented approach, as reflected in Cuba's remarkable earnings from the export of medical services. Paradoxically enough, given that it has rhetorically revitalized Cuba's revolutionary legacy, the chapter suggests finally that a milestone in this shift has been the increased collaboration with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that currently hosts more than 50% of expatriate Cuban collaborators.

EXPLAINING CUBAN INTERNATIONALISM

More than 20 years ago, Susan Eckstein bluntly posed the question: “Why did Cuba offer such extensive foreign aid ... when other Third World countries did not, when domestic economic problems were far from resolved, and when the government itself was a recipient of foreign aid?” (2003, 181). Countless and at times odd hypotheses have been formulated to explain Cuban internationalism: from Fidel Castro’s ego to a strategy of exporting the revolution or rather pharmaceutical products. Recently, Brotherton updated Eckstein’s query in these terms: “... [H]ow can we conceptualize the fact that a small, resource-poor nation such as Cuba has become a leading figure in delivering ‘humanitarian biomedicine’ to the world’s poor?” (2013, 131).²

Indeed, this is the core question of an intriguing and sometimes highly ideological and subtly politicized debate. In the same vein, both at the beginning and at the end of their study, Kirk and Erisman discuss the aims and reasons behind Cuban efforts abroad. But as these authors note, “... seeking a simple and straightforward rationale for Cuba’s medical internationalism is no easy matter” (2009, 178).

In the most comprehensive studies on the topic, a whole set of interpretations have been suggested. This is the case, for instance, of the works of Feinsilver, Eckstein, and Kirk and Erisman. Although these interpretations concur on many points, it is interesting to highlight the differing manner in which these authors explain the interplay among the different factors behind Cuban internationalism through time and space.

Through the lens of a realist approach, none of the scholars mentioned reject or overlook the link between the political and security concerns at stake for the Cuban regime’s survival and its international cooperation strategies. Nevertheless, there is some divergence regarding the weight assigned to these concerns as a significant driver of Cuban SSC policy.

Nor do they underestimate, especially regarding the 1960s and 1970s, the ideological elements in both the background of the Cuban revolutionary elite and the Cold War and decolonisation world context.³ But then again, political and moral value judgements, most of the time implicit, vary greatly across the literature.

Equally important, there has been a debate in Cuba and outside of it on whether its efforts of international cooperation have brought clear and tangible benefits. This debate started during the 1970s and has been much more recurrent since the 1990s. Nevertheless, no agreement has been reached among scholars. Ultimately, almost every informed researcher acknowledges that besides a “genuine humanitarianism,” “revolutionary fervor,” or a “moral economy” in the Cuban approach—not unlike other Northern and Southern cooperation models and practices—a truly political economy of Cuban internationalism has been present nearly since the beginning, despite not being a capitalist one until very recently. Once more, according to several authors, its functioning and evolution are rather diverse.

Although Kirk and Erisman (2009, IX, 17, 180) adopted Nye’s traditional soft-power approach, since 1989 Julie Feinsilver has used Bourdieu’s theory of “symbolic capital” to explain the Cuban case.⁴ In either theoretical interpretation, the basic idea is that medical internationalism has helped the Cuban government improve its political and economic ties worldwide and gain substantial support inside international organizations against the United States (US) embargo and other anti-Cuban policies. Conversely, this broad and positive reputation has been widely used by the regime to strengthen and legitimate itself domestically.⁵ In this sense, the studies provide a great deal of evidence.

Although Feinsilver (2013, 106) stresses a mix of idealism and pragmatism, according to Kirk and Erisman (2009), there is no need for prioritizing certain motivations over others in order to explain the fundamentals of Cuban internationalism:

In sum, pursuing and strengthening international alliances is indeed a key factor of this policy—but so too is a genuine spirit of human solidarity. As such, the analytical dynamics involved here do not revolve around making a sharp distinction between some sort of rigid hierarchical prioritization regarding state humanitarianism and status/soft power concerns. Instead, they need to be seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing; in particular, humanitarian policies tend to generate the moral authority from which soft power flows, while soft power’s need for moral authority tends to

promote and strengthen a dedication to humanitarian endeavors. These two considerations of medical internationalism do not, in other words, function as disparate policy-shaping variables but are rather inextricably intertwined as two sides of the same medical cooperation coin that can also ... contribute to Cuba's interest in enhancing its effective sovereignty. (181–182)

Yet, it is argued here that in this way these authors are missing a central point. As the following makes clear, the suggestion is that the soft-power and “symbolic capital” explanations are correct but incomplete, and that they probably will be superseded in due time.

The assumption is that Cuban internationalism has undertaken a major shift in nature and scope in the last 15 or 20 years. In terms of foreign policy, it will continue to pursue political and diplomatic goals. Similarly, Cuban professionals will keep on with humanitarian actions. Nevertheless, the transformation of Cuban SSC into a medical services export, propelled by a market-driven logic, probably will change both its international status and its significance in the domestic realm. Although there is not necessarily an incompatibility between diplomatic goals, humanitarian and ideological principles, and even some economic benefits, doubts arise when considerable amounts of money are at stake.

As soon as the early 1990s, Eckstein noted that since the previous decade Cuba's medical internationalism had begun to be notably commercialized. She argued that “[a] fine line evolved between medical aid provided in a disinterested manner and profiteering from sales of Cuban medicines” (2003, 193). However, the first real divide from the past can be seen during the 1990s crisis, when the new international landscape and the harsh domestic economic situation after the Soviet Bloc collapse “... led Castro to attempt to redefine the meaning and purpose of internationalism” (Eckstein 2003, 201). Fortunately, Cuba's health sector had been developing to such an extent that both medical products and services could be used domestically and abroad to meet at least part of the hard currency needs of the regime (Eckstein 2003, 196).

As a medical anthropology perspective reveals, by capitalizing its medical know-how and personnel “... the state is making commodities (rather than gifts) out of the very things that have served as the symbols of its success” (Brotherton 2013, 131).⁶ According to Brotherton, this twist is bringing considerable material and discursive changes in Cuban medical internationalism. This author notes that linkages between humanitarianism and political and economic agendas are quite diffused over the world,

and even that “[t]he commodification of humanitarianism is not a radical departure from Cuba’s foreign aid policies of the past” (Brotherton 2013, 147). He also contends, however, that it would be better to consider Cuban SSC as a form of “transactional humanitarianism,” that is to say, “... an assemblage of traveling actors, experts, practices, and specialized knowledge that are collectively marketed under the umbrella term ‘humanitarian’, yet are ostensibly embedded in market relations and shifting moral values of exchange” (2013, 131).

Accordingly, although this approach does not exclude traditional foreign policy and political considerations, it has been found to be particularly useful to highlight some important transformations that are taking place at the micro-sociological level of Cuban cooperation. The central point claimed by Brotherton (2013) is that what is drastically changing is the moral and ideological basis of Cuban internationalism; in his own words:

... [T]he moral economy of the gift, as creating bonds of solidarity, is increasingly being called into question. ... Physicians, traditionally understood to possess no economic value, but who impart their knowledge and expertise through a moral imperative of socialism, are now entangled in an economy of exchange. The surplus of Cuban-trained physicians who were supposed to cure the social ills of society and work to foster socialist morals and values are now luxury commodities, like those advertised in Cuba’s health tourism campaigns ... bartered and contracted out to foreign destinations to serve as accessible, affordable medical labor. This characterization of the revolutionary physician as a commodity for export speaks to another kind of a moral economy of exchange that warrants further consideration. (144–145)⁷

While the next section provides a short overview of Cuba’s international cooperation practices from the period in which the revolutionary regime came to power to the beginning of the twenty-first century, the sections that follow it show how the Cuban reengagement in Latin America, and especially with its ALBA-TCP key ally (i.e. Venezuela) has reinforced this shift during the last decade despite humanitarian and even revolutionary claims.

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CUBAN SSC “MIRACLE”: IDEOLOGY, IDENTITY, AND SOLIDARITY

The text here highlights the nature of Cuba’s internationalism, identifies its scope and features, and details the reasons for its resounding success.

The starting point is that Cuba's international cooperation has been deployed since the 1960s as an integral part of the Castro regime's foreign policy and political will to forge a distinctive national revolutionary identity. The Cuban cooperative framework adopted particular facets over time to adapt to both the complex challenges of a changing international landscape and Cuban domestic needs. In this sense, as Carlos Alzugaray states, it is clear that the Cuban regime's "anti-hegemonic" foreign policy since 1959 has been inextricably linked "... to the island's national interest of maintaining its independence, sovereignty and self-determination, none of which can be achieved in an international system dominated by one or a small number of big powers" ([2015](#), 18). Likewise, as suggested by Jorge Domínguez ([1989](#)) in the title of his milestone book, the main goal of Cuba's foreign policy has always been "to make the world safe for the revolution" in order to safeguard its own survival.

During the 1960s and part of the 1970s, Havana's policies mainly responded to a blend of revolutionary fervor and nationalism that resulted in a compelling commitment to support Third World countries in their fight towards independence. Cuba's cooperation in this period targeted revolutionary governments, guerrillas, and liberation movements in Latin America and Africa threatened by Western external aggression or attempts to overthrow Western regime allies. The main ideational factor behind Cuba's external assistance emerged from its own experience: without the support of the Soviet Union, the Cuban socialist revolution would have had minimal chances of survival against the United States.

Accordingly, Cuba sought to support Third World countries by giving them similar opportunities for resistance ([Grabendorff 1980](#), 9). This does not mean, however, as a consistent body of literature has widely demonstrated, that Cuba acted in Africa as a USSR proxy. Moreover, it is also important to highlight that the logic behind Cuba's involvement in Africa went beyond geopolitical interests and was justified by the government, drawing on past symbolism as a means of recalling the country's historical debt to Africa and the cultural African roots of its population ([Eckstein 2003](#), 186).

Although Cuban cooperation in Africa essentially took the form of military assistance, including the provision of training, funds, volunteers, and arms to guerrilla movements or revolutionary regimes, it also consisted of post-conflict assistance for internal stabilisation in the fields of education, health, and national infrastructure. An emblematic example of this kind of support was the assistance provided in 1961 and 1962 to the

National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria in its war for independence from France and in the context of a border conflict with Morocco in 1963. Besides military aid, Cuba sent its first medical brigade with doctors, nurses, dentists, and health technicians who set up a health plan system in Algeria (Kirk 2015, 21).

This mission represented the first significant medical cooperation involvement for Cuba during the Cold War. This would then be replicated in other African countries such as Mali (1965), the Congo (1965), and Guinea Bissau (1966), among others (Kirk and Erisman 2009, 70–76). During the same period, Chile benefited from Cuba's medical expertise after the earthquake that took place in the southern region of the country in 1960, despite Chile's right-wing government of the period (Kirk 2015, 19).

Since its involvement in Africa, Cuba's international collaboration has projected a positive image in most Third World countries and with new leftist movements. As Grabendorff argued, "... most African states view Cuban intervention in Africa as help in achieving independence through self-help rather than as a step toward the type of dependence which would result from a similar commitment by the super-powers" (1980, 5). Thus, in the wake of its revolutionary internationalism, Cuba's government, particularly the persona of Fidel Castro, became relevant actors in Third World politics. The city of Havana hosted several important meetings during this period, including the Tricontinental Conference (1966) and the Sixth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (1979). Additionally, it was over this period that the operational foundations of Cuban medical missions were developed. This marked the beginning of a long record of internationalism that witnessed an impressive expansion in the decades that followed.

After Che Guevara's death in 1967, Castro's government decided to abandon its initial broad strategy of supporting Latin American guerrilla movements. Nevertheless, Cuba continued to assist liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere during the 1970s and 1980s, and it supported Nicaragua's *sandinistas* (members of the Sandinista National Liberation Front party) when they came to power in 1979. Cuba's internationalist approach, however, adopted new features during this period, considered the "golden age" of the country's foreign policy. Its close ties to and economic support from the Soviet Union allowed the island to develop welfare programmes mainly in the fields of public health and education (Alzugaray 2015, 186). As a consequence, military assistance was slightly

reduced or complemented with civilian cooperation, which eventually became one of the central aspects of Cuba's external collaboration.

In this way, Cuban medical cooperation greatly expanded in the 1970s and 1980s and broadened to other fields to include full scholarships for studies in medicine, training of university teachers and sports specialists, construction of infrastructures, cultural cooperation, and technical assistance in establishing faculties of medicine in Third World countries.⁸ Cuba's foreign policy strategy in Latin America sought to improve its diplomatic relations with the many countries of the region with which it had broken ties in the early 1960s.

The most reliable empirical data shows the following figures that summarize Cuban's international cooperation success, according to Domínguez (1989), during this period:

By the end of 1986 more than 250,000 Cubans had served in Africa on a military and civilian basis. ... By mid-1987, 24,000 scholarship students were in Cuba from 82 countries (up from 21,000 from 69 countries in 1980). ... There were 4500 Cuban teachers abroad in 20 countries in 1983. ... By early 1987 more than 20,000 Cuban teachers had served overseas. ... In 1983, 3044 Cuban health workers ... were posted in 27 countries. ... In all, about 8 percent of Cuba's doctors and 2 percent of its nurses and health technicians were overseas. (171–172)

It is also worth noting that although most of Cuba's collaboration abroad was free of charge for the recipient countries, from the end of the 1970s a relevant initial shift in the logic of its internationalist practices took place. With an important drop in world sugar prices, an increasing debt with the West, and significant hard currency needs, Cuba took into account economic considerations in its international relationships and began charging for its services according to the countries' ability to pay (Eckstein 2003, 189). This was especially evident in the case of construction and health contracts (Domínguez 1989, 175).

It is estimated that internationalism generated US\$50 million in hard currency for Cuba in 1977, which represented approximately 9% of the value of its commodity exports. As for oil-rich Arab nations such as Libya and Iraq, Cuba charged them in hard currency. For instance, in 1981 the island would have received some US\$250 million from Angola as part of its military and civilian aid and about US\$100 million from Algeria, Libya, and Iraq from construction and technical aid contracts the same year (Eckstein 2003, 189).

Economic benefits derived from Cuba's assistance abroad also helped the country set the basis for the development of closer trade ties and exchanges with countries to which it provided aid, and as a result, its trade balance with Third World nations became positive (Eckstein 2003, 191). In addition, what is known as "tied aid practices" were occasionally part of Cuba's internationalism, particularly concerning educational missions—with the exportation of textbooks to Nicaragua and Angola, for instance—and construction contracts tied to cement acquisitions on the part of the recipients (Eckstein 2003, 192).

In sum, according to some analysts, Cuba's foreign policy until 1990 resembled that of powerful countries in the international system. However, with the collapse of its key economic and political ally, the Soviet Union, the Cuban government was forced to adjust to a new international scenario and to reconsider its orientation in a capitalist world economy, given its need to establish austerity measures against economic collapse. It became increasingly difficult for the country to maintain such an active international solidarity policy. Military operations ceased and teachers, physicians, and construction workers who had volunteered abroad gradually returned (Pérez 2006, 381–387). More relevant, as Andaya notes, were the economic difficulties faced by Cuba during the "Special Period in Time of Peace"—as Castro called the early post-Soviet era—that forced the state, as well as doctors and individuals, to operate in a global market economy and to be open to "... new significations that highlight the shifting material and moral economies of post-Soviet Cuba" (2009, 359).

The "Special Period" brought challenges in terms of the new economic significance of the interplay among *internacionalistas* (i.e. individuals directly performing international cooperation practices), the state, and the Cuban population, similar to those found in contemporary internationalism dynamics. Because the incentives promised by the government to *internacionalistas* (e.g. wage rises, pension benefits, housing priority access) could not be totally met during this period, volunteering for missions abroad was less attractive for Cuban professionals. Also, "[o]rdinary Cubans came to see internationalism as conflicting with their own basic needs" (Eckstein 2003, 198–200). In this, also playing an important role, was the relationship between the generation who lived during the beginning of the socialist revolution and the new generations.

Notwithstanding, as discussed in more detail in the next sections, it was not until 2008 with Raúl Castro's ascent to power that this "pragmatic shift" in its medical internationalism became officially embedded in Cuba's

international cooperation practices abroad, gaining priority over political and ideological issues (Alzugaray 2015, 181). Likewise, this period was characterized by a renewed focus of Cuban medical internationalism in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly towards its neighbours, although the country did continue to provide noteworthy cooperation in the Sub-Saharan region.

To sum up, internationalism has represented a defining element of Cuba's foreign policy, though cooperation strategies have displayed changing features over various periods. Nevertheless, the self-defensive character of Cuban cooperation has remained constant over time. The country's internationalism, as stated previously, has been successful not only in terms of its global reach, its multiple dimensions, and its highly positive reception in Third World countries but also as a critical device for the regime's survival and legitimization in a permanently hostile global environment and in the face of domestic hardship.

The factors that explain such a resounding accomplishment can be summarized as follows. First and foremost, leadership, ambition, and conviction in revolutionary international solidarity on the part of the regime was combined with the solid commitment to develop medical services both domestically and abroad. Fidel Castro's "obsession" to turn Cuba into a "world medical power," as described by Feinsilver (1993), was undoubtedly a key ideational element of its international policies. Large investment in health, research, and education over the last few decades has allowed the country to reach high levels of health standards that resemble or even surpass those of developed countries.⁹

It is important to note that economic factors also have formed part of its international projection. Cuba's anti-hegemonic orientation has not kept the government from procuring economic gains from its medical services. Beginning in the 1980s, the idea that medical services might generate income was strengthened, both abroad and within the country, in a dynamic known as "health tourism" (Álvarez and De la Osa 2002).

Second, Cuba's international cooperation success also can be explained by the state's capacity to predicate not only a socialist health ideology, which recognized universal free healthcare as a basic human right, but also the care of human bodies as a metaphor for social and political well-being. Its success in terms of practice and acceptance consequently led to the formation of a vast body of *internacionalistas*, personnel willing—not forced, albeit widely encouraged by the state in material and symbolic terms—to serve on missions abroad in diverse areas. The most recent data shows

that the number of physicians trained in Cuba has exceeded the needs of Cuba's own health system: there were 6.7 physicians per 1000 inhabitants in 2010, a figure that is triple that of the US (2.4) and Canada (2.07) in that year (*CIA World Factbook 2014*).

Third, part of the Cuban success rests not only on the levels of excellence achieved by its national health system and international cooperation programmes but also on the conditions in recipient countries—that is, the chronic lack of doctors and their inefficient geographical distribution caused by the unwillingness of national doctors to serve in certain areas and communities (Feinsilver 2009, 276). Another important factor is the minimal cost, or at least well under market rates, of the services provided and the wide range of expertise of the Cuban professionals.

Finally, with regard to the ideational factors of Cuba's assistance, the regime's ability to diffuse socialist values of solidarity as part of its international cooperation practices is another element worthy of note. Behind the work performed in the *internacionalistas'* missions lies a whole set of ideas, norms, and values that have been carefully developed throughout the years of the Revolution. In this sense, doctors are trained not only as technical experts but also as social workers, "guardians of health and life," and "revolutionary doctors"; they are an "army in white lab coats" whose values—distinguished from those of the market-driven healthcare models of the developed world—allow them to work in any country and in rural or urban areas where their services are most needed (Kirk and Erisman 2009, 31–32, 53).

Such solidarity characterizing Cuban internationalism, however, is increasingly at odds with the growing importance of the economic dimension of its international cooperation assistance. This potential tension no doubt will pose a challenge both to the *internacionalistas'* rationale and to the nature of Cuba's external collaboration itself.

CUBA'S SSC REENGAGING WITH LATIN AMERICA

To understand Cuba's position in today's Latin American and Caribbean context, it is necessary to bear in mind the economic, political, and social transformations that have occurred there since 1989.

In January 1990, Castro used the expression "Special Period in Time of Peace" to announce, for the first time in public, the regime of sacrifices and hardships that the nation would have to face because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist bloc. The importance

of this relationship for Cuba is fully highlighted by a single fact: Cuban economic exchange with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) reached 87.5% of total trade in the second half of the 1980s. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, this relation was modeled on a system of preferential tariffs, easy loans for development, compensation of trade imbalances, technical assistance, and military aid. Thanks to this, a high level of investment and social spending was guaranteed for at least two decades (Carranza 1995, 13–17). A progressive Sovietization of the Cuban economic model and the country's internal policy, as well as the reliance on a primary export economy based on sugar, may be considered a consequence of these privileged and probably necessary ties during the Cold War.

When the Soviet bloc collapsed, almost overnight the Cuban regime had to urgently address three related issues: (1) the adjustment of its economy to the drastically decreasing availability of material and financial resources, (2) the introduction of substantial reforms in economic organization, and (3) a rethinking of its international relations and the establishment of new ways of insertion into the world economy (Carranza 1995, 15). As Kirk and Erisman vividly put it, “Cuba was now on its own, an ideological orphan in a cruel capitalist world” (2009, 122). Accordingly, “[t]he logic of everyday life in post-Soviet Cuba was thus radically transformed under the rubric of ‘war time measures in times of peace’” (Brotherton 2013, 137). What is more, these changes had to take place in a context in which “... the effects of the end of the Cold War were given [to Cuba] in the opposite direction to the rest of the world” (Ayerbe 2011, 5). That is to say, US policies towards Cuba were tightened in order to bring down the Castro regime.¹⁰

To manage this new international scenario, the Cuban regime drew on some significant preexisting resources. As Alzugaray notes, Cuba “... was not lacking in options [among other reasons because] it had accumulated an important political capital as paladin of some of the most popular causes in the Third World international forums” (2015, 188–189). Since the 1990s, its foreign policymakers had shown a great “... ability to navigate the world of international organizations [as well as to strengthen ties] with what may be called [the] ‘progressive international civil society’” (Alzugaray 2015, 188–189).

Part of the new strategy was aimed at restoring and improving political and economic relations with Latin American and the Caribbean countries. Although the 1976 Constitution declared Cuba's commitment to

proletarian internationalism, its 1992 reform went further and positioned its ties with Latin America and the Caribbean at a higher level of importance within international solidarity practices (Eckstein 2003, 186).

In economic terms, the region represented less than 6% of the island's trade in 1989, while in 1993 this figure already exceeded 20%. Between 1990 and 1993, Cuban exports to Latin America and the Caribbean doubled from 7% to 14%, while imports grew from 7% to 47%, creating a significant disproportion in its trade balance (Carranza 1995, 15). Above all, as Carranza claimed, the bulk of Cuba's exports were not complementary but competitive with the rest of the region, whereas Latin American markets for biotechnology-based medicines and medical equipment—the only high-tech sector developed by the Cuban economy in those years—were dominated by multinationals, particularly from the US. As stated before, during this period awareness of the potential of services abroad steadily increased, given the high quality and quantitative skills achieved by Cuban professionals. Nonetheless, trade diversification and economic complementarity with Latin American nations would have been removed or greatly reduced with the entry into force of the US-driven Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

In the political realm, since the mid-1970s the Cuban government has attempted to normalize diplomatic relations with Latin American countries and, particularly during the 1990s, it pursued gradual participation as an observer or a full member in regional integration schemes by joining the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Association of Caribbean States (AEC), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the Rio Group, among others.

With few exceptions, well before the so-called “pink tide” brought to power various leftist governments, Cuba had already improved its relations with its neighbours. Certainly, as Kirk and Erisman argue: “It is no coincidence that diplomatic relations with [Central American and Caribbean] countries have improved significantly since the arrival of Cuban medical aid” (2009, 131). Actually, after the decrease in cooperation activities during the early 1990s, new and more ambitious projects were developed alongside traditional aid programmes, as well as in the second half of the decade. In some cases, these programmes were financed by triangular cooperation with various members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), agencies of the United Nations (UN), and more recently with some countries of the South (e.g. mainly Venezuela and, in the case of Sub-Saharan countries, South Africa).

Two major natural disasters that occurred in 1998 represented the beginning of the reengagement of Cuban medical cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean. After Hurricane Mitch severely affected Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua and Hurricane Georges devastated Haiti, thousands of Cuban physicians were sent to the most damaged and underserved areas of these countries to provide assistance and medical support. This prompted the Cuban government to develop a nationwide contingent (i.e. the Henry Reeve Contingent) to respond to natural emergencies, adding one more service to its international cooperation package (Kirk 2015, 32).

As in the case of its African partners, in addition to supplying emergency relief, Cuban doctors offered free medical training and support to develop sustainable public health policies with a dedicated emphasis on preventive medicine and local involvement in public health issues (Kirk and Erisman 2009, 128–135). Despite usually serving in poor rural areas—that is, in places where “no doctor has gone before”—the presence of Cuban physicians caused discomfort among local medical associations and private health sectors of some recipient countries. This is the case in Honduras where the College of Physicians widely criticized the country’s health preventive approach (as opposed to curative approach) and rejected their presence because of the supposed competition they bring to their jobs by charging no fees to the patients (Kirk and Erisman 2009, 135). However, popular acceptance from direct cooperation beneficiaries always has been quite high.

One of the most important contributions of Cuban internationalism in Latin America and the Caribbean has been the medical scholarships programme offered to students with low-income backgrounds who came from marginalized areas of the region. The creation of the famous Latin American Medical School (ELAM) in 1998, as Kirk and Erisman note, was initially inspired by the need to bring health professionals into the countries (i.e. Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras) devastated by Hurricane Mitch, and to train more locals than the medical schools already established in those countries with Cuba’s assistance (Huish and Kirk 2007, 83).

Since then, the programme has been expanded to the whole region and Africa, and as a consequence, thousands of medical students from around the world have graduated from the ELAM. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 7248 students from 45 countries have obtained ELAM degrees since 1999 and by 2010, there were 9362 students enrolled who came from 100 countries from the Americas, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands (WHO 2010).

In operational terms, the basic idea behind Cuba's most recent assistance approach in the region can be properly summarised as a two-stage strategy: “... [F]irst dispatching large numbers of doctors to deal with the immediate emergency and subsequently working to train doctors (mainly from underserved areas), so that eventually they can return and work in their home communities” (Kirk and Erisman 2009, 132). Moreover, according to Kirk and Erisman, Cuban authorities have developed distinctive models to organise and deploy the cooperation programmes the country offers:

One deals with those countries receiving support under the *Programa Integral de Salud* (PIS, Comprehensive Medical Program) which is set up by Cuban officials at the request of home countries. The recipient country provides housing, covers local living expenses, and pays a modest honorarium to the Cuban medical staff. ... The other model, encompassing some 36 countries, is a patchwork of arrangements all worked out in a bilateral framework with each country. (2009, 134)

As the next section describes, the latter approach has been adopted in Venezuela and other Latin American countries such as Bolivia or Ecuador. What is very different in the first case is the size of the programmes put in practice, and in the second, the triangulation made possible by Venezuela's financing.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Latin American political scenario could not have been better for Cuba to reengage with the region. As Lambie states, the failure of neoliberal experiments, the growing power of popular movements, and the leftist turn in the region provided a fertile ground to link Cuba's long revolutionary heritage and international solidarity tradition with the forces that began to share its values (2010, 220).

Nonetheless, since Raúl Castro formally took power, the shift towards an economic approach in Cuba's international cooperation practices has been widely accentuated. This was reflected in the document *Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución* (i.e. Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution)—the most outstanding project of economic reform publicly released since the triumph of the 1959 revolution—which was the result of the discussions held in the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba. The document has a specific section in which it addresses issues regarding its internationalism practices. It highlights the need to keep “... financial and statistical records, as required for assessment purposes; in particular, cost analyses” (Cuba.

cu 2011). What is more, along with the statement that internationalism deployed by Cuba would consider a payment that covers the costs incurred in its cooperation projects with third countries, the document calls for a strategy to secure new markets for the export of both healthcare services and Cuban medical and pharmaceutical products as a foreign trade guideline.

THE CUBA–VENEZUELA CONNECTION

Bilateral relations between Cuba and Venezuela stand out in Latin America and the Caribbean for the close connections established in the past 15 years. These relations have developed quickly over time, being reflected and articulated in a wide range of areas including cooperation, credit, investment and trade, traditional aid, joint international diplomacy, and military and security assistance.¹¹ Accordingly, as one of this chapter's authors has argued elsewhere, trying to isolate a “proper” or dominant area of SSC in these bilateral relationships is pointless (Benzi and Lo Brutto 2014, 405–443). Notwithstanding, as shown in the following, there is little doubt that a central part of these ties is the so-called “oil for doctors” arrangement, which usually (and quite simplistically sometimes) has been studied within a SSC framework.

The Cuba–Venezuela alliance plays a fundamental role in Central America and in the Caribbean basin through the integration project named Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP) and particularly through the Petrocaribe oil agreements.¹² This alliance should not be seen as just a South–South Triangular Cooperation partnership.

Particularly between 2005 and 2010, it also had a noteworthy impact on the political and diplomatic nature of inter-American relations. According to some authors it has weakened, at least to a certain degree, the US foreign policy agenda for the region.¹³ Conversely, Cuba's progressive reinsertion into the Latin American community and its multilateral institutions prospered to such an extent that the US government finally resolved to change its traditional standpoint regarding the “Cuban problem.”

The aim of this final section is to provide a basic picture of the Cuban–Venezuelan relationship both domestically and abroad in order to underpin the main argument of this chapter: the ongoing transition of Cuban internationalism into a medical services export. The contention is that while this alliance has rhetorically and symbolically revitalized a revolutionary discourse—“Cuba and Venezuela, two flags, one revolution” was the official slogan—it instead has boosted, perhaps irreversibly, the commodification process of Cuban SSC.

As is well known, “Cuba’s current medical cooperation program with Venezuela is by far the largest it has ever attempted” (Feinsilver 2013, 111). It started in 1999 as a humanitarian and disaster relief support programme, when a Cuban brigade arrived at the Vargas state in Venezuela to provide assistance to the population affected by a vast mudslide—later named the “Vargas tragedy.” The following year, the first Integral Cooperation Agreement between the two countries was signed. The agreement ratified the exchange of goods (basically oil) and services (mostly medical) on a highly preferential and cooperative, or fair conditions, basis.

According to various analysts, at the outset it resembled a sort of barter or some kind of compensation trade. However, it took the form of regular payments for professional services as soon as Venezuela’s political turmoil calmed after an attempted coup in 2002 and a strike in the state oil company and a lockout between 2002 and 2003 (Benzi and Lo Brutto 2014). It should be noted that Cuban support was crucial during the destabilization attempts against Chavez’s government. Meanwhile, oil prices began to increase rapidly. The strategic alliance was strengthened at the end of 2004 through the formal birth of the ALBA that aimed, on one hand, to deepen and widen existing cooperation towards a true integration project and, on the other hand, to make public a proposal to attract new allies.

Regarding bilateral ties, an ambitious programme was launched in 2004 consisting of export of massive medical and other professional services to support the Venezuelan social programmes called *Misiones* (Missions). According to Monedero, the idea of the *Misiones* was suggested to Hugo Chávez by Fidel Castro in order to stabilise the Bolivarian government (Monedero 2009, 13).

Under the *Barrio Adentro* (Inside the Neighbourhood) and *Misión Milagro* (Mission Miracle) programmes, more than 30,000 Cuban health professionals—among them physicians, nurses, dentists, ophthalmologists, and technicians—were to be sent to both urban and poor rural areas of Venezuela to provide primary and secondary medical care. A great number of Cuban professionals also have been working in educational, sports, and cultural programmes. To a lesser extent, some have been involved in agriculture and administrative and logistical areas. Medication, medical equipment, and other facilities produced in Cuba or commercialized by the Cuban government were supplied.¹⁴

Additionally, the Bolivarian government granted thousands of scholarships to study medicine in Cuba, and a branch of the ELAM was opened in Caracas. Likewise, as a part of the Cuban–Venezuelan

agreements, Cuba arranged to provide full training to 5000 healthcare workers and 40,000 doctors in Venezuela, and it offered medical scholarships for 10,000 Venezuelan medical and nursing students to attend Cuban medical schools (Feinsilver 2013, 114).

Even though numerous conflicts occurred with local medical unions and some sectors of Venezuela's population fearing the "Cubanization" and the loss of jobs, nonetheless the communities served by Cuban doctors have been in general or overall very grateful for the attention given to them. Initially, the Missions were a great success for the Bolivarian government both in political and social terms. Notwithstanding this, over time several problems arose concerning Cuban cooperation in Venezuelan social programmes. Although a good deal of books and academic articles have been published celebrating the positive aspects of this cooperation,¹⁵ to the best of the authors' knowledge no systematic study has been published so far addressing its critical facets.¹⁶

Although Cuban medical assistance was supplied initially for emergency and humanitarian purposes, it soon morphed into a much more ambitious goal—that is, reform of the whole Venezuelan health system. However, a diverse array of sources have suggested that its progress and institutionalization has been anything but effective. Furthermore, problems also arose concerning the participation of Venezuelans who were supposed to progressively replace Cuban personnel. In both cases, it seems that a lack of planning and coordination between the Cuban Medical Mission and local authorities has been responsible, at least in part, for these problems (Benzi and Lo Brutto 2014, 430–435).

The economic benefits of such agreements have been enormous for Cuba. By 2008, Feinsilver (2008, 121) had already noted that the export of medical services was the most prosperous prospect on the economic horizon for Cuba:

Data for 2008 demonstrates that Cuba earned about US\$5.6 billion for the provision of all services to Venezuela, most of which were medical, although the figure includes teachers and other professionals. The total value of Venezuelan trade, aid, investments, and subsidies to Cuba for 2008 was US\$9.4 billion. (Feinsilver 2013, 120)

Although an overall estimation of Venezuelan aid to Cuba is almost impossible since the available figures include oil provided for joint ventures, concessional financing for oil purchased, payment for professional services, and other items, Piccone and Trinkunas reported a level of

subsidy estimated at US\$9.97 billion in 2008 and US\$7 billion in 2010, accounting for 16% and 11% of Cuba's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), respectively (Piccone and Trikunas 2014, 3). It should be noted that the word "subsidy" or even "aid" is carefully avoided by Venezuelan and Cuban officials, preference instead being given to expressions such as "solidarity contributions," "cooperative advantages," or simply "fair trade."

At any rate, using data from the Cuban trade balance, Mesa-Lago calculated a substantial overpayment for professional services.¹⁷ In this sense, Piccone and Trinkunas (2014) correctly assert that Cuban professionals:

... are paid much less than their government receives from Venezuela in payment for their services. As of 2010, Venezuela paid Cuba approximately \$11,317 per month on average for each professional it provided. By contrast, Cuban doctors reportedly receive \$425 per month, although this is more than double what they received six years ago. ... Cuban doctors would be [paid] only up to \$64 a month back home. (4)

Whether or not these figures are accurate, they provide sufficient evidence to conclude that "... these services are both a major item in the Cuban-Venezuelan trade balance, as well as a significant source of revenue for the Cuban government and for Cuban workers abroad" (Piccone and Trinkunas 2014, 4).

At the micro-sociological level, while Venezuelan people learned directly from their doctors that Cuban society was not the paradise on earth portrayed in the official discourse, "... medical diplomacy has provided an escape valve for disgruntled medical professionals who earn much less at home than less skilled workers in the tourism sector" (Feinsilver 2013, 120). They could bring home several cargo boxes of various kinds of goods unavailable in Cuba such as televisions, DVD players, stereos, brand-name clothes, and many other products for personal use, gift giving, or merchandising (Feinsilver 2013, 120–121; Brotherton 2013, 141). In this way, Feinsilver notes, "... it has helped defuse the tension between the moral incentives of socialist ideology and the material needs of Cuba's decidedly hardworking and no-less-dedicated medical personnel" (Feinsilver 2013, 121).

Nevertheless, the massive deployment of doctors on foreign missions and the consequent deterioration of domestic healthcare programs caused various problems on an island where the socialist regime's legitimacy, at least in part, relies on a universal and accessible healthcare system (Brotherton 2013, 143) As Brotherton emphatically puts it:

*As more Cuban physicians participate in strategic aid programs such as Barrio Adentro or Operación Milagro, many Cuban citizens are starting to ask why Venezuelans are more deserving of the gifts of Cuba's medical aid programs than Cubans themselves. Why is it so hard to find a family physician in a country with an apparent surplus?*¹⁸ (135–136)

Consequently, in 2008 the well-known Cuban Family Doctor Programme was reorganized, taking into account not only people's complaints but also the medical services export commitments.

Furthermore, the same author noted: “... a palpable shift in the popular discourse among every day citizens on the rationale behind the increasing departure of physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and even teachers, to go on medical missions.” He further adds: “The discourse of humanitarianism was no longer at the forefront of many of these discussions. Rather, the focus was now, without fail, on *los venezolanos* (the Venezuelans)” (Brotherton 2013, 133–134). Indeed, for those who for whatever reason have become familiar in recent years with Cuban *internacionalistas*, it is not surprising to find that their humanitarian ethic is “... merged with a personal desire not only to travel, but also to acquire material goods.”

This seems especially true for the younger generations of Cuban professionals. Since everybody knows how difficult life is for Cuban physicians in Caracas and other places, as is the case of all seasonal migrants (albeit Cubans are strictly controlled by their government), many of them seem to consider the Mission “a sacrifice ... [they are] willing to undertake to be able to save enough money to return to Cuba and live well” (Brotherton 2013, 142). On the regional level, some of the programmes carried out by Cuban cooperation in Venezuela have been replicated by other members of ALBA and Petrocaribe on a smaller scale. The primary literacy campaigns and Operation Miracle were the most visible and effective in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. Later, under the evocative name of “national heroes,” medical and social campaigns were deployed in order to assist disabled persons.¹⁹

This chapter argues that ALBA should be considered a counterhegemonic project aimed at reviving the legacies of both Simón Bolívar and José Martí, as well as the national-revolutionary and Third-Worldist tradition.²⁰ As Feinsilver notes, however, “ALBA also has created an opportunity to expand the reach of Cuba's medical diplomacy well beyond anything previously imaginable” (2013, 111). Venezuela's financial support has been the key to several initiatives for the expansion of Cuban cooperation.

In this context, conditions also were given for Cuba's export of a range of medical products. According to Feinsilver, "Cuban exports of medicine to ALBA countries increased by 22% from 2008 to 2009. ... It is quite likely that other countries receiving Cuban doctors will also purchase Cuban vaccines, medicine, medical supplies, and equipment" (2013, 120).

This may be about to change, though. According to available data and current political trends, a sudden or progressive decoupling of the Cuban-Venezuelan alliance is likely to occur. Since Raúl Castro came to power in 2008, it has been clear that the close alliance established by ex-presidents Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro has not been part of the new president's agenda. Nevertheless, Cuba was already immersed in a solid reciprocal dependence with Venezuela. At present, because of the fall in international oil prices and political instability, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is no longer able to subsidise Cuba's economy, which still largely relies on Venezuelan aid. Yet, the Bolivarian government even so requires the medical services and the political and security counseling that it receives in return for the aid provided to Cuba. This potentially disruptive dependence has been examined already by various scholars, mainly focusing on the consequences for the Cuban people and its economy.²¹

As seen, however, already in 2009 Raúl Castro pointed out that Cuba's socialism "update" would need, along with new economic policies and the diversification of commercial partners, to increase the production of those services that produce hard currency. Since then, thousands of Cuban physicians have been sent to Brazil to support the programme known as *Más Médicos* ("More Doctors"). This often called "pragmatism," even though it is "imbued with strong revolutionary idealism about humanitarian assistance" (Feinsilver 2013, 122), clearly reminds one of what some authors have termed the "commodification of humanitarianism" (Brotherton 2013, 147).

CONCLUSION

Since the Cuban revolutionary regime came to power in 1959, SSC has been a fundamental component of the country's foreign policy and one of the most outstanding mechanisms of rapprochement with developing countries from all over the world. From any perspective, Cuba's internationalism has undoubtedly represented a success for the country on multiple dimensions. At the international level, it has acted as a protective shield in a permanently hostile environment, significantly contributing to

the regime's survival and legitimization on the world stage. At the domestic level, internationalism, and especially its medical diplomacy, have provided the country with material capital including economic gains from contracts, credit, and trade, which have helped the island sort out some of its economic difficulties. Likewise, a large number of countries have benefited from the wide range of services offered by Cuba in several areas of expertise such as health, sports, construction, education, humanitarian and disaster assistance, among others.

Although the motivations behind Cuba's internationalism have been sustained on a basis of genuine solidarity since the very beginning, its contemporary practices on the ground evidently show an important economic shift in Cuba's approach to cooperation that is challenging the very humanitarian and ideological foundations on which it was initially conceived. The "revolutionary fervor" in Cuba's orientation to internationalism has been gradually fading since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and nowadays, in a context of the urgent economic reforms needed by it, a truly market-oriented approach is taking its place.

Going beyond traditional approaches to foreign policy, which no doubt have been able to explain many Cuban SSC dynamics, the understanding of its complex character has been complemented here by taking a look at the micro-sociological level of these practices, as well as sharing those perspectives that have shown a progression towards the commodification of humanitarianism in Cuban internationalism. These dynamics take place within Cuba's SSC in Latin America, particularly the one promoted by Cuba's connection with Venezuela under the framework of the ALBA. Indeed, as has been shown, the Cuban connection with Venezuela and the cooperation programmes deployed in the region have reinforced, paradoxically and perhaps irreversibly, the commodification process of Cuban internationalism.

NOTES

1. Joseph Nye coined the concept of "soft power" in the 1990s. In an article published in [2006](#) he referred to it in these terms:
Power is the ability to alter the behavior of others to get what you want. There are basically three ways to do that: coercion (sticks), payments (carrots), and attraction (soft power). ...A country's soft power can come from three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).

While Nye basically conceived it as a great traditional powers' source of power, Kirk and Erisman (2009) convincingly argued that

. . . from its very inception, the Cuban Revolution has in various ways served as a beacon and an inspiration to Third World governments and political movements, thereby suggesting that soft power is not necessarily synonymous with the traditional great powers. Within this context, Havana's medical assistance programs can be seen as an intriguing effort to exercise the LDC soft power proposition. (18)

2. The author explains the concept of "humanitarian biomedicine" as follows: Most contemporary humanitarian efforts in the field of global health address what anthropologist Andrew Lakoff (2010) identifies as two regimes of intervention: global health security and humanitarian biomedicine. While not mutually exclusive, global health security, he argues, is more concerned with global disease surveillance and targeting national public health infrastructure. Humanitarian biomedicine (e.g., MSF), on the other hand, is concerned with addressing the lack of adequate access to basic health care needs. (Brotherton 2013, 151).
3. This includes not only broad anti-imperialist, internationalist, and socialist principles but also a peculiar conception on the revolutionary power of health and medicine. Both the personality of Fidel Castro and the figure and legacy of Ernesto Che Guevara have played a very important role in this regard.
4. See cites in References: Feinsilver (1993) and Feinsilver (1989).
5. Even though the two approaches seem to complement each other, it is worth noting that Kirk and Erisman somewhat disagree with Feinsilver in the following terms: "Where we disagree with her analysis is the importance that she attributes to the by-products of this Cuban approach—the conversion of symbolic capital into material credit. While this may be true in some cases, we believe that in fact the explanation for Cuba's extraordinary medical internationalism is rather more complex, with a variety of important factors at play" (Kirk and Erisman 2009, 171–172).
6. For a similar approach, see also Andaya (2009), cited in References.
7. *Emphasis* in original.
8. According to Kirk (2015, 37), faculties of medicine that employ Cuban professors have been established in Yemen (1976), Guyana (1984), Ethiopia (1984), Uganda (1986), Ghana (1991), Gambia (1999), Equatorial Guinea (2000), Haiti (2001), Guinea Bissau (2004), Venezuela (2005), and Timor-Leste (2010).
9. According to the *CIA World Factbook*, in 2015 life expectancy in Cuba, for instance, reached 78.39 compared to the US (79.68) and the UK (80.54); the infant mortality rate in Cuba was 4.63 per 1000 births in 2015, while in the US and Canada it reached 5.87 and 4.65, respectively.

10. As Alzugaray (2015, 188) notes:
In this context, a ‘new policy’ toward Cuba took shape starting with the George H. W. Bush administration and was essentially followed by William J. Clinton’s, and reinforced by George W. Bush’s. Marked by the Baker Memorandum of March 19, 1989 (Mujica Cantelar 1991, 67–68; Smith 1991, 77–89) and the Torricelli (1992) and Helms–Burton (1996) acts of Congress, this policy renewed with vindictiveness the effort to overthrow the Cuban government and produce the reversion of the revolution, starting from the widespread premise that without Soviet support Cuban socialism could not survive. According to this reasoning, the only thing necessary to bring about that outcome was to reinforce the coercive pressures, mainly economic.
See also LeoGrande and Kornbluh (2014), cited in References.
11. See cites in References: Romero (2010, 107–114); Romero (2011, 159–202); Romero (2015); Chap. 7 in Kirk (2015); and Piccone and Trinkunas (2014, 1–12).
12. See cites in References: Benzi (2016, 77–91); Muhr (2012); Aponte (2014); Benzi and Zapata (2013, 65–89); and Benzi, Zapata, and Vergara (2015, 163–203).
13. See cites in References: Piccone and Trinkunas (2014, 1–12); and Corrales and Penfold (2011).
14. See cites in References: Benzi and Lo Brutto (2014, 417–428); Kirk and Erisman (2009, 154–162); and Kirk (2015, 96–117).
15. See cites in References: Kirk (2015); Brouwer (2011); Sánchez (2006); and Ubieta (2006).
16. But see cites in References: D’Elia and Quiroz (2010); D’Elia and Maigon (2009); D’Elia and Cabezas (2008); and D’Elia (2006).
17. See cites in References: Mesa-Lago (2015, 1–43); Mesa-Lago (2012); Mesa-Lago (2011, 4–18); and Mesa-Lago (2008, 45–74).
18. *Emphasis* in original.
19. For a detailed description of these programmes, see Kirk (2015), cited in References.
20. See the footnote 63.
21. See cites in References: Vidal (2014, 1–8); and Mesa-Lago (2015, 1–43).

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The South–South Partnership Puzzle: The Brazilian Health Expert Community in Mozambique

Paulo Esteves and Manáira Assunção

INTRODUCTION

Brazilian engagement in South–South cooperation (SSC) initiatives has garnered extensive interest and debate over the last decade. A significant literature on Brazilian practices within the field of international cooperation has been produced by academics and development experts within and beyond national boundaries. Debates around Brazilian SSC largely depart from a kind of evidence-based statement about the role of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (*Agência Brasileira de Cooperação*, ABC) in coordinating and deploying development projects in partner countries. Yet, the argument is that these approaches are often looking at the wrong places.

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Equipped with a Northern gaze, analysts are looking for Brazilian development experts, organized in and through a development agency. It is presumed that this sort of agency ultimately is responsible for designing and executing development projects. However, neither the development expert, nor a development agency, is in charge of a clear mandate and endowed with the resources to conduct Brazilian SSC projects. Very often, the same analysts avow that the ABC carries out its projects through more or less autonomous implementing agencies. In this context, Brazilian SSC is characterised as fragmented.

Evidence from field research conducted in 2014 and 2015 in Brazil and Mozambique shows that the exact opposite is true. Rather than being fragmented, Brazilian development practices are highly heterogeneous, particularly because they are rooted in the diverse experiences of expert communities designing and implementing public policies in Brazil. In place of development experts, Brazilian SSC is conducted by *cooperantes* who participate actively in a given expert community in education, food security, agriculture, or health. These sectorial expert communities ultimately authorize and legitimize their practices within the field. This new gaze offers a nuanced comprehension of Brazilian development practices; instead of observing it from the top-down (i.e. the federal government, Ministry of Foreign Relations, or ABC), the analysis needs to depart from the bottom-up by paying attention to the sectorial expert communities.

Two propositions, which have been reinforced within the SSC literature, are noteworthy: (1) the shared experiences of countries in the global South distinguish the practices of South–South providers, Brazil included, vis-à-vis Northern donors¹; and (2) the principles of SSC are substantially different from those of traditional donors. These propositions underpin the practices of partnership, allegedly the distinctive mark of SSC. Traditional development assistance establishes a clear differentiation between donor and recipient through vertical practices of donorship. SSC, however, asserts isonomy between agents, who thus can engage in horizontal practices of partnership (Esteves and Assunção 2014).²

This chapter interrogates how the partner position is enacted. In doing so, the authors want to address partnership not as a given, but as a puzzle. What are the conditions of possibility that authorize these agents to be partners? Taking the case of the Brazilian Health Expert Community (BHEC) and its international footprint as an example, the chapter intends to unpack the partner position and its attempts at translating shared experiences into policy solutions. The supposed enactment of the partnership is critically examined by evaluating the diverse interpretations that arise at the end of the translation chain—namely, at the recipient end.

By illustrating changes in the reception of the initial message, the resulting sociopolitical space created is one of the disputes over this development project's objectives. Disputes are associated with the existence, or absence, of a shared vocabulary (e.g. on what constitutes the health object). Thus, the partnership puzzle is critically assessed by exploring the means of transferring and translating development objectives from one developing country to another.

Drawing from a sociological/anthropological literature on international development, the text here argues that Brazilian development practices are highly heterogeneous because of actors' social embeddedness in diverse networks or sectorial expert communities. The insertion of the Brazilian health agents into the international development field is enacted by a particular understanding of the health object. This knowledge is then shared and negotiated throughout what is referred to as an *SSC fold* in health.

The establishment of a horizontal partnership is dependent on the mutual enrolment of a subject partner's position. This represents the condition in which both positions, those of the provider and the beneficiary of SSC, coincide. Contrary to the perspectives that emphasize the negotiation of common meanings and the resulting mutual enrolment of actors, the analysis focuses on the power relations embedded therein. The misfits are presented within the chain of strategic translation in SSC. The translation process is, thus, one of intimate struggle. The issue has been less explored in the context of SSC, and the literature has concentrated on the motivations and principles of SSC and its opposition with North–South cooperation—or the “gap” between SSC rhetoric and practice.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section proposes an interpretative analysis of the emergence of BHEC. This analysis allows the authors to tell the story of how the health expert community was constituted in Brazil. It describes the “breeding” of the community, its professional education, recruitment, and socialization. Based on a knowledge-producing apparatus and a training and socialization regime, it is argued that the BHEC has had, since its inception, an international reach, particularly in its relationship with the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO).

During the 1990s, the BHEC's international presence was boosted through its engagement in multilateral debates and minilateral arrangements such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), or the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), and South–South cooperation

projects. These have allowed the BHEC to bring itself into international settings and to expand its operational reach, and constitute what is called here an SSC fold in health.

The SSC fold of the Brazilian Health Expert Community gathers together agents from different countries around a shared understanding of health and healthcare. The SSC fold creates a common reality and fosters a “pool of common language” through the promotion of a shared vocabulary in health. The chapter argues that this commonality conceals the differences among agents, constitutes partner positions, and ultimately enables the partnership itself. Thus, the partner–subject position is articulated throughout the internationalization of the knowledge-producing apparatus and the training/socialization regime within South–South networks and cooperation initiatives in health—the SSC fold.

Taking SSC practices in the Mozambican healthcare sector, and exploring the case of the antiretroviral (ARV) factory in Mozambique, the chapter’s second section argues that the partner position is challenged by the ways in which the Mozambican health expert position is structured. Besides the fact that they actually play within the SSC fold in health, they do not belong exclusively to it. These experts are involved not only with their own domestic issues but also in other networks, knowledge systems, and agendas. They do not share the language or vocabulary of the SSC fold in health. This irreducible difference makes the partner position extremely problematic, emphasizing structural differences between Mozambican and Brazilian health experts. Instead of replicating the BHEC’s languages and values, Mozambican agents open a chain of translations that ultimately blurs the partnership.

Therefore, the transnational expert community cannot be understood as a space for policy transfer. Although Brazilian experts and their institutions play a central role in establishing the transnational community, the resulting sociopolitical space is not a one-way street, where Brazilians are to teach their partners how to build their own domestic healthcare system. The common language or vocabulary is always subject to particular interpretations, which are overdetermined by the agents’ structural positions. Once Mozambican health experts occupy a position different from that of partner, they turn the SSC fold into an open political space where disagreements, as the text argues, take the form of strategic translations. The diverse networks and sociohistorical processes in which expert communities are embedded have been understated in the context of the shared South–South experiences.

THE BHEC'S GENESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO HEALTH

The genesis of the BHEC encompasses a process in which the very definition of health was at stake. Indeed, a health expert community locates the expertise not only within the (national) health sector but also in a specific understanding of “health” where particular narratives and discourses about healthcare and (national) healthcare systems are endorsed.³ The BHEC defines *health* as a complex issue encompassing a broad set of social determinants such as the promotion of quality of life (see definition in *Saúde* 1986, 4). Nevertheless, such a definition was achieved after fierce contestations between opposing forces.

The constitution of a health expert community in Brazil is closely associated with the dynamics of the sanitary movement during the military regime (1964–1985). Its origins can be traced to the inception of preventive medicine departments in the 1950s, and to the incorporation of this field of knowledge into the curricula of medical schools in Brazil in 1968 (Escorel 1999; Escorel, Nascimento, and Edler 2005). The body of knowledge generated and disseminated within, these departments helped to establish the boundaries of a field of knowledge and practice based on a specific understanding of health.

This knowledge-producing apparatus was distinguished by a peculiar developmental approach to health.⁴ In fact, during the 1970s and early 1980s, some of the perspectives and key concepts around which the health expert community organized itself were settled: first, the concept of the social determinants of health (Buss and Filho 2007), and second, a view of public health that combines universal primary healthcare with democratic participation and social control mechanisms. This combination situates the object of health, its policies, and even the healthcare experts, at the intersections of the field of development.

As follows, health experts have been constituted through their mutual engagement, exchange of knowledge, and information within central healthcare institutions. Healthcare experts were fashioned, so to speak, at the juncture of two configurations: (1) a knowledge-producing apparatus and (2) a training and socialization regime, which encompass a vast array of techniques that reproduce a specific body of knowledge. Ranging from curriculum design, handbooks, journals, internship practices, conferences, and participation in policy arenas, these practices have come to constitute experts and their object of expertise in particular ways.

During the 1970s, two institutions became central to the advancement of discussions on public health reform and the consolidation of the health expert community: the Brazilian Centre for Health Studies (*Centro Brasileiro de Estudos de Saúde, Cebes*) and the Brazilian Association of Graduate Studies in Collective Health (*Associação Brasileira de Saúde Coletiva, ABRASCO*). These institutions, along with academic departments of preventive medicine, soon became landmarks of a field of knowledge and practice in which policy alternatives could be formulated and advocated, with the objective of influencing national development in general and healthcare policies in particular.

During the early 1980s, amid the democratization process in Brazil, a community of health experts, characterized by significant integration, was already formed. This integration was materialized by common values, which limited the number of its participants and contributed to the increased volume and quality of interactions between its members. The developmental approach to health established the community's boundaries, authorized a given set of choices and enabled the health expert to be the authoritative voice in the field of public health.

The series of interviews conducted during the field research identified the perception, shared by many of the sector's agents, that in Brazil, the spheres of domestic politics, international health policy, and international cooperation are inextricably linked. For many informants, there is a need for a strong foothold at international fora in order to promote domestic choices and policies. For them, this necessity became clear after the universal right to health was constitutionalized in 1988. Indeed, the prevailing narrative among the public health community agents in Brazil associated the process of constitutionalizing the right to health with the international operations of Brazilian state actors in the field of health.

The construction of a public healthcare system, guided by the principles of universality, comprehensiveness, equity, decentralization, and social control, is not seen as the result of domestic political disputes, exclusively. According to this narrative, such a move was consolidated through resistance against the market-oriented reforms advocated by international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank,⁵ and through the promotion of international standards concerning the right to health and the definition and provision of global public goods.

From Inside Out: BHEC's International Folds and Their Channels

The resistance against the World Bank's policies became a landmark of the BHEC self-narrative. But it is important to remember that its agents' international foothold precedes the Bank's entrance into the field of health and was key for building the community. Indeed, the making of the BHEC took place under a broader international framework in which health was described by the movement for health reform both as a condition and a result of development processes. During the 1960s and 1970s, members of the movement were already active participants of international debates taking place within international organizations such as PAHO, the World Health Organization (WHO), and United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).⁶ By the end of the 1970s, health as a domain of knowledge and political intervention was understood as the result of a set of social determinants. So far this new-born health expert community was not circumscribed to its national borders. Community-based experiments in public health could be found all over the Global South, particularly in Latin America, notably throughout the 1970s (Werner and Sanders 1997; Irwin and Scali 2007).

As one informant pointed out, this kind of experiment was well under way even sooner, stating that "in 1963, in Brasilia, an entirely new project was created (...) it was focused on the primary healthcare to the families, to the extent that we refuse to use Brasilia's Central Hospital. Instead we used a local facility at the periphery as a school-hospital." Throughout Latin America, this kind of experiment was supported and diffused through PAHO's regional offices. As this informant continued to assert, from this experience, PAHO invited him to organize the Medical School in other places in Latin America and many years later, to transform the medical residency program focused on primary healthcare into an international course offered in Washington, DC, for physicians in the region.

Moreover, beyond its role as a knowledge hub, PAHO became an important space and instance of consecration, where local experiences could be legitimized and diffused.⁷ PAHO's authority for validating a set of given practices and reproducing them through educational programs all over Latin America was pivotal for the consolidation of expert communities in countries such as Brazil. While on the one hand, the organization provided political and material support for training activities in which the

developmental disposition of health was preserved and reproduced, on the other, PAHO was instrumental for bridging the gap between training activities and policymaking.⁸

The Pan-American Health Organization also became the setting of a founding experience of international cooperation. Technical cooperation was asserted as the way various national communities should relate to each other. As José Roberto Ferreira, the PAHO's Human Resources and Research Director, claimed, technical cooperation should be contrasted with and should ultimately replace technical assistance, a practice used extensively during the 1950s by former colonial rulers as part of their incipient aid policies in newly independent countries of Asia and Africa.

In a paper presented in 1976, Ferreira established this distinction based on the understanding that the latter was seen as a unidirectional process of knowledge transfer that reinforces developed and underdeveloped positions within the international system while the former would be the way to "join efforts towards a common purpose" (Ferreira 1976, 336).⁹ According to Ferreira, technical cooperation fosters autonomy and self-reliance, and thus is a strategic act:

To the extent that the decision can be put into practice, the differences that characterize distinct levels of development are erased implicitly, and the central motivation then becomes the quest for autochthonous solutions, based on local creativity and adaptation of relevant knowledge, constantly emphasizing local issues. (1976, 336)

Ferreira's perspective on technical cooperation is highly representative of a perception and category of action shared by Brazilian health experts. This category of action was underpinned by the belief that underdevelopment was a common condition in the Third World. Technical cooperation between developing countries would be the vehicle in which national experiences could cross national borders and would be implemented in different settings.

[In] this action (technical cooperation), the strategy becomes more important than the external resource, and instead of promoting actual knowledge, it transfers the sum of acquired experiences of other developing countries in similar contexts that have already been tested under identical conditions and are meant to serve the new project. (Ferreira 1967, 337)

A common critique of traditional assistance in the health sector is their disease-based and technology-driven character with a short-term view. Against a backdrop of dissatisfaction with traditional health policies, the BHEC was formulated within a broader international community in which, instead of being equated with disease control or curative practices, health should be seen as an indicator of the “overall social and economic development of the community.”¹⁰ This developmental approach to health emphasizes the social determinants of health and supports specific policies around the principle of primary healthcare, as well as the necessary democratization of the healthcare system. This conceptual web and its policy models are key to understanding how the Brazilian health expert has been framed.¹¹ An expert is able to figure his object of expertise according to these prevalent models within the community.

The health expert also is able to formulate and execute a policy, which fits and reinforces the model already established within the community. Moreover, he or she has the necessary skills and ability to operate within broader spaces, figured in international terms either as the Third World, the Global South, or Latin America. Technical cooperation or SSC is a specific category of action that, while presupposing a common partner position, enables a relationship based on horizontality, mutuality, and exchange (i.e. partnership). According to this prevalent narrative, the BHEC was fashioned, in and of itself, as a community of *cooperantes*, whose expertise is to travel across international spaces, but whose authority emanates from particular, nationally derived understandings of health and policy solutions.

Although the BHEC was crafted both in domestic as well as international settings, its consolidation deepened its international presence. The community’s international expansion created a space in which the interaction and integration between experts from a variety of settings was facilitated. Its international insertion took place through three fronts: multilateral, minilateral, and SSC.

On the multilateral front, participation in international fora and in intergovernmental organizations, including the WHO, World Trade Organization (WTO), and UN General Assembly, was marked by the promotion of principles such as universal access to quality healthcare and medicine. In minilateral settings, the BHEC’s international reach consisted of supporting these positions in political arenas such as PAHO, UNASUL,

and CPLP.¹² In these arenas, the BHEC's international practices entail the establishment of common action plans and structuring networks aimed at strengthening national healthcare systems. As such, the community presents itself as experts engaging in international politics and health agendas and thus reinforces the consolidation of an international health community as a space defined by a shared vocabulary in health, or what the present authors refer to as a "pool" of common language.

Within the International Association of National Public Health Institutes launched in 2006, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) has helped to establish the Network of National Health Institutes (*Rede de Institutos Nacionais de Saúde*) under two subnetworks—one for South American countries and another for the Portuguese-speaking countries (Fraundorfer 2015, 71). These dynamic networks are intended to strengthen national healthcare systems. The South American Institute for Health Governance, the Network of National Schools in Public Health, and the Network of Technical Schools of Health are initiatives promoted both within UNASUL and CPLP. These institutions and networks focus on knowledge production and training and for many informants, they present a partial isomorphism with Fiocruz. For this reason, the authors argue that these minilateral arrangements (including institutions and networks) constitute SSC folds in health.

Within these processes, knowledge-producing apparatuses, as well as training and socialization regimes, are replicated. For Brazilian *cooperantes*, the developmental disposition of health policies should guide research and training activities abroad. Their developmental approach to health is deeply embedded within action plans and can be seen as a fundamental output/outcome of minilateral structuring networks. Thus, within these international folds, Brazilian *cooperantes* reproduce and protect representations through diffuse agency and influence in networks, enabling political connections and creating common realities.

Ultimately, the internationalization of the knowledge-producing apparatus and training/socialization regime is responsible for articulating the partner position. The establishment of horizontal partnerships is symbolically enacted through the identification of shared problems and viable policy solutions around the health object, which is disseminated along structuring networks. Nevertheless, as discussed in the next subsection, despite the efforts of Brazilian *cooperantes*, these networks and their members are vastly heterogeneous.

***The SSC Fold in Health: Generating a Common Reality
within the CPLP?***

The BHEC's expansion among Portuguese-speaking countries took place via the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). A Strategic Public Health Cooperation Plan (PECS) for 2009–2012 was established after the 1st Meeting of the Health Ministers of the CPLP in 2008. Aimed at strengthening national systems and ensuring universal access to quality healthcare services, the plan emphasized training activities and institutional capacity-building (CPLP 2009; Buss and Ferreira 2010b, 110). The plan was organized around the concept of “structuring cooperation.” Brazilian structuring cooperation in public health, under the SSC fold, is often contrasted with traditional approaches “guided by vertical programs, linked to specific diseases, which, apparently, would have little impact on the health systems and on outcomes for populations” (Almeida et al. 2010, 28).

Therefore, according to Brazilian health experts, the SSC fold and its structuring rationale in health entails a double innovation. First, it breaks with passive knowledge transfer and technology as has been identified within the context of traditional technical assistance supplied by Northern donors. Second, it translates the objective to create fundamental institutions for health systems into specific programs to deliver structural change in partner countries (Ventura, 2013).

It can be argued that, throughout the CPLP's strategic plan, the BHEC is able to unfold itself and attract Portuguese-speaking experts. These health experts receive training at Brazilian facilities,¹³ presenting an opportunity to actively engage with Brazil's health experts. Additionally, research in public health has been fomented locally, particularly in the context of strengthening the National Health Institutes' capacity. In the case of Mozambique, a fourth-master class in public health was formed by 2014. The Master Course in Health Science is offered for health agents in Mozambique.¹⁴ It was inaugurated in 2008 and has a significantly high turnover of students, with approximately 10 theses being defended per year (Fiocruz 2013).

The implementation of the CPLP's strategic plan and its structuring networks is aimed at articulating an international fold (i.e. the SSC fold in health) in which the developmental approach to health is to be replicated. Within this context, the role of the international agent changes substantially. The developmental approach to health underpins the concept

of structuring cooperation and has consequences for the implementation of SSC programmes and projects; designed within the SSC fold in health, they do not stem from a common reality. Instead, the SSC fold *generates* a “common reality.” Within the fold, the Brazilian and Mozambican health agents would share a common reality, its problems and potential solutions. Moreover, as a homogeneous space, the SSC fold is expected to conceal asymmetries and structural differences between participants.

The concealment of differences within the SSC fold under structuring health cooperation projects make Brazilian and Mozambican health experts “partners.” The enactment of the partner position and the official establishment of horizontal partnerships are, then, based on a seemingly common reality. The partner–subject position assumes a transition in roles in which both positions, those of providers and beneficiaries of cooperation, coincide. It suspends not only the asymmetries among agents but also the borders between those expert communities, which through the partner position follow a common goal (i.e. health development) independently of their national contexts. As the next paragraph describes, there has been a shift in the cooperation rationale between developing countries. In the Brazilian health context, it suggests the necessity of a broader environment, or a transnationalized space, for generating a common reality in which national boundaries and problems are substituted by policy solutions developed by the South, for the South.

While during the 1970s and 1980s technical cooperation was seen as a vehicle through which common experiences could travel within the Third World, in the 2000s, structuring cooperation highlights the possibility of transplanting health institutions across different settings. Structuring cooperation is a category of action introduced by the Brazilian *coopérantes*. It presupposes a much broader environment than technical cooperation. Although the latter posits a common underdeveloped position, the former requires a common reality, a common vocabulary, and a common set of shared values. As a category of action, structuring cooperation assumes that agency is enabled by a developmental approach to health.

Structuring cooperation is possible only under the conditions created by the BHEC’s international fold. It assumes a common reality, a homogeneous space where these institutions can be built. Thus, at least when looked at from the top-down, a coherent representation of how public health systems should be structured is authorized within these networks. Nonetheless, when looked at from the implementation end, or from the bottom-up, these representations are far from coherent or stable.

At this point, the implementation of the development programmes becomes dependent on a common reality and a shared vocabulary generated by the BHEC's international fold.

What happens, however, with structuring cooperation when agents do not share the same vocabulary, and there is no space for engagement with strategic translation? What happens when the other does not engage with the cooperation process as a partner? Development anthropologists David Mosse and David Lewis have suggested that implementation depends on “the mutual enrolment and the interlocking of interests ... that produce project realities ... the congruence between problems and interventions, the coherence of policy logic, and the authority of expertise” (2006, 13–14). For Mosse and Lewis, the project's coherence cannot be seen as a matter of design or of policymaking but as an issue of “translation.”¹⁵ Rather than a common vocabulary, a development project requires a process of strategic translation between the development of the institution's rationale and the rationalities in locus (recipient area) (Olwig 2013).

The next section looks at the creation of the ARV factory in Mozambique. It illustrates how structuring projects got off the ground and, indeed, translated. It questions whether local agents bought into the policy idea, and whether it was integrated into the social and political trajectory of Mozambique's healthcare field. By exploring the way Mozambique's health agents historically related to traditional donors, NGOs, and foundations on HIV/AIDS issues vis-à-vis the construction of an integrated national health system (i.e. structured position), it is possible to infer the multiple interpretations that arose from Mozambican stakeholders' translation of the Brazilian development project.

TRANSLATION AND THE ROLE OF PARTNERS: MOZAMBIQUE'S STRUCTURED POSITION IN HEALTH

The development of Mozambique's health sector serves as a prime example through which to consider donor dependence. It consists of a complex web of actors engaged in cooperation activities that, by the end of the 1990s, already included more than 20 bi- and multilateral agencies and 60 NGOs at work (Pavignani and Durão 1997). The major deficiency within this sector points towards problems of coordination.

Mozambique's primary healthcare system, the National Health System (NHS), was established in 1975 following its independence. Shortly thereafter, however, between the 1980s and 1990s, it experienced major

cuts in health delivery, services, and posts as a consequence of the civil war. Although government social spending declined drastically, foreign aid and NGO service providers in health entered the country and spread tremendously. This process resulted in a disarticulated national healthcare system and a parallel structure created by NGO services in the country (i.e. “the NGO model”). This “NGOization” of public policy impeded the consolidation and integration of policies into one national healthcare system (i.e. NHS) and caused severe issues of coordination. Even though projects have been integrated into NHS programs, control over the budget and ownership of projects remain significant issues.

According to Pfeiffer (2003, 734), in low-income countries the World Bank has retreated in the promotion of private healthcare and has supported moderately public-sector health services as part of debt relief operations. This has enabled the Mozambican government to redirect more resources to the NHS. To deal with the plethora of NGOs and aid agencies, Mozambique’s Ministry of Health (MISAU) established the Kaya Kwanga Code of Conduct in 2000. The document sought to secure alignment between MISAU’s priorities and technical assistance, as well as the enhancement of the Ministry’s institutional capacity to channel and manage aid.

Nevertheless, the partnerships established between MISAU and major donors have been under constant tension. As Pfeiffer (2003, 734–735) argues, a “public-private partnership” discourse still figures prominently within the World Bank, and the Kaya Kwanga document configures a voluntary agreement between Mozambique’s government with donors. Enforcement in cases in which these guidelines are violated is still absent and the document has no instructions for the conduct of NGOs in the country. Arguably, funding activities are likely to continue to be channelled through the parallel structures established by NGOs. The relationship between Mozambique’s government and local and foreign health workers seems to be of particular relevance considering the development of the NGO model; as Pfeiffer suggested, major problems are related to the establishment of long-term professional relationships, based on trust, which could “restore measures of self-determination to health systems” (2003, 735–736).

The HIV/AIDS policies implemented in Mozambique are particularly illustrative of these issues. Indeed, policies indicate a firm foothold in the structured position within the health field, where not only the government

of Mozambique but also its own health expert community stands. The HIV/AIDS issue has been high on the donor agenda. Arguably, programmes for it are increasingly being integrated with other health services, which strengthens infrastructure and services in remote and rural areas. Nevertheless, there has been a tendency of cutting back in HIV/AIDS funding with an expected shortage on antiretroviral medication delivery.¹⁶ According to the WHO, HIV prevalence among adults aged 15–49 years is 10.8% (latest figure is 2013). Approximately 500 new cases of HIV/AIDS can be tracked per day, totalling 1.4 million people infected by 2010. Estimates point towards lack of ARV treatment with less than 40% being cared for (UNAIDS 2010, 97).

Beginning in 2000, the issue received increased attention from the government, which has made it into a national priority by way of the first National Strategic Plan to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases and HIV/AIDS 2000–2002, putting prevention at the heart of its strategy. Since June 2004, the government has provided free large-scale ARV treatment. Still, major obstacles include stigma and discrimination, the lack or poor quality of the health infrastructure, weak legal and social protection systems, as well as low literacy rates affecting the design and implementation of HIV/AIDS campaigns, inadequate and unreliable supplies of drugs, among other factors. The situation has been further aggravated not only by the shortage of health agents but also by the way professional training is supplied by traditional donors, NGOs, and private foundations. Training puts the emphasis on service being disease-specific or related to immunization tasks, with minor impacts on capacity-building of new health workers.¹⁷

The case of HIV/AIDS illustrates the prioritization of drug funding over and above the recruitment and training of health agents, which sheds light on the bottlenecks in terms of human resources. By 2005, MISAU adopted its own model of health counselling centres and AIDS care within the public healthcare system. Three years later, the Mozambican government decided that all AIDS treatment services should be integrated into the public healthcare system, so parallel facilities were closed. The paradigm¹⁸ adopted for service integration into the public healthcare system, however, could not cope with the major deficiencies and obstacles (e.g. those cited previously).

These issues bring attention to how the relationship between traditional bi- and multilateral donors and NGOs has structured MISAU's and the Mozambican government's perceptions towards health.

The dependency loop is still operating, where sustained financial and human resources scale up in HIV/AIDS and other health services are needed in order to build a sustainable national healthcare system. According to Hog (2014), in the health sector a doubled discourse prevails according to which Mozambique's government is structured around the contradiction between increased aid dependence and vulnerability, and an agenda that prioritizes ownership and autonomy over national development processes.

This section seeks to clarify the partner-subject position from the Mozambican site. Although a full picture of Mozambique's health agents' training and socialization regime cannot be provided here, it is possible to assess MISAU's and the government's approach towards HIV/AIDS according to the historical trajectory of health policies presented earlier. Most important, HIV/AIDS services have focussed on prevention with a missing link between both prevention and treatment. Despite the policy shift by the beginning of the years 2000, when MISAU started providing ARV treatment to patients who could not afford to pay, there still seems to be insufficient public pressure for treatment. This could explain why the local production of medicine is not seen as necessary for the development of the country's health system. What is striking considering the number of people affected by HIV/AIDS is that the issue has not entered the political arena and there is no visible involvement by the Parliament and political parties.

Overall, the perception exists that Mozambique is too poor to afford an integrated HIV/AIDS programme (Hodges and Tibana 2012, 12). Apart from the inputs of health professionals and specialized NGOs, who understand treatment of HIV/AIDS within a broader rights-based approach, the issue remains dependent on external factors such as the fall in medicine prices or pressures by the international development community (Hodges and Tibana 2012). The contradiction between health development and the medical relief paradigm has certainly not been resolved within the Mozambican health community. Thus, in order to assess the partner position, it is important not only to analyze the development practices of the partner country (i.e. Brazil) but also the beneficiary and its recipient history vis-à-vis the international development community and the global health agenda.

Such an understanding permits to formulate the partner in which the partner-subject positions have to be assumed in order for the partnership to be fulfilled and the projects' development objectives accomplished. Otherwise, the project will take another road according to national

(i.e. Mozambican) stakeholders' interpretations and domestic/internal disputes. The next subsection provides a general picture of Brazilian health cooperation in Mozambique and then provides evidence for the sake of the argument by presenting the case of the ARV factory.

The Brazil–Mozambique Health Partnership and the ARV Factory

The General Agreement on Technical Cooperation between the Federal Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Mozambique dates back to 1981. Some 20 years later, cooperation initiatives grew significantly. And by 2013, Mozambique became Brazil's main partner with 14 official projects overall (Abreu 2013). In 2008, Fiocruz established its first ever Regional Office in Maputo; it is responsible for coordinating the technical cooperation projects in the region and signals the institutionalization of the Foundation at the international level. The BHEC's international presence is therefore enhanced via Fiocruz's articulation capacity with various national and international cooperation agencies on the ground. The office is in line with Brazil's SSC policy to establish structuring cooperation. Thus, Brazil's experience and accumulated expertise in health constitute the main elements that support national healthcare institutions in partner countries, consolidating its position as an enabler for the improvement of health conditions in partner countries (Fiocruz 2012).

Fiocruz's pivotal position as a PECS/CPLP coordination institution is indicative of how the BHEC's international folds, particularly within the South–South axis, are highly valued within the global health field. The Collaborative Structuring Networks in Health as the RINS and RESP-CPLP, and the Malaria Network of CPLP, demonstrate the community's increasing capacity to offer specialization in strategic planning and management of public health. The Regional Office has facilitated diverse workshops for the exchange of experiences between Portuguese-speaking countries, creating space for policy dialogue between health professionals and high-level representatives to discuss public health issues in their respective countries.¹⁹

This operation is threefold: healthcare, professional/educational training and information, and communication and memory in the field of health. The health partnership thus established has the potential to adequately address the issues of professional relationships and autonomous national healthcare systems (or are at least as represented in its official

discourses). Nevertheless, the SSC fold in health underplays the necessity for translation processes, pushing towards the suspension of national communities' boundaries and fostering a shared vocabulary for public health policy.

Brazilian health experts assume that training, institutional strengthening, and especially the construction of local facilities would acquire the same meanings as in their home country's health policies. Nonetheless, the success of the SSC fold also depends on whether the beneficiary actually occupies the partner position or not. In other words, the SSC fold depends on successfully accomplishing the translation process, meaning that the initial message (i.e. project's objective) has been received by the beneficiary.

On the African continent, drug donation is a common practice because the production of quality pharmaceuticals at competitive prices and their integration within local markets is believed to be unachievable. In Mozambique, high donor dependence can be attributed to drug import in foreign currencies. The National Drug Policy adopted after independence and the MEDIMOC were initiatives aimed at managing and coordinating pharmaceutical import and export (Pavignani and Durão 1997).²⁰

Fighting AIDS is one priority action of the technical cooperation provided by Brazil to Mozambique. However, the drive towards strengthening Mozambique's health-industrial complex appeared more recently on the SSC horizon. It encompasses the support of an integrated system with a health-development approach. As follows, three areas are prioritized: (1) the expansion of access and quality assurance of ARV drugs and other medicines, (2) the strengthening of the national regulatory agency for medicines, and (3) the development of popular pharmacies. It is within these contexts that Brazil's cooperation initiatives in health claim a structuring character, as well as the establishment of a horizontal partnership, which attends to the principles of solidarity, nonconditionality, and a demand-driven approach; all of which are considered by many informants as the basis of a genuine partnership.

The project to install an ARV factory was announced by Brazil's President Lula da Silva in 2003 under the title *Protocolo de Intenções sobre Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica na Área da Saúde*. The demand-driven character of the project has been questioned in this context. The project's initial objectives, however, did purport not only to satisfy the increasing demand for ARV drugs in Mozambique and other Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOPs) but also to create a local structure for production and management as well as a regulatory capacity.

On the one hand, the quality control of imported medicines is to be granted nationally. On the other hand, it aims to tackle dependence on pharmaceutical donations by promoting generic manufacturing.²¹ The project is the first public pharmaceutical institution on the African continent (Fiocruz 2012a, *apud* Fraundorfer 2015, 74) and arguably an unprecedented technology transfer in international cooperation (Roa and Silva 2015, 12).

Brazil's technical cooperation encompassed training, equipment and raw material procurement, and design of the factory, as well as the overall management of the project (Russo et al. 2014, 4). This meant that the Brazilian Ministry of Health and Fiocruz were involved with the transfer of technologies within a long-term framework, establishing all of the processes, from production to acquisition, from regulation to suppliers. Under the heading of conceptual and practical capacitation, Fiocruz was to register 21 medicines, monitor and evaluate the activities, and ensure the technical and administrative development of the factory through training of staff and researchers.

From 2003 and 2008 a feasibility study was conducted by Fiocruz to evaluate the technical and economic aspects of the factory (Roa and Silva 2015, 12). The total cost of the physical infrastructure was estimated at about USD\$18 million, an amount that the government of Mozambique was not prepared to pay by 2009. One year later, the Brazilian mining company, Vale SA, contributed to the construction of the physical infrastructure.²² Within nine years the infrastructure work was finalized, and its first medicine (*Nevirapina*) was delivered to MISAU in October of 2012. By 2011, the factory was registered as Mozambican Pharmaceutical Ltd (*Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos*, SMM), signalling plans to extend its production beyond antiretroviral drugs.

Implementation processes have been going on for more than a decade now. Initially, the estimated duration for the project was 18 to 24 months. The schedule was reoptimized at various times so as to adjust to a variety of difficulties (e.g. bureaucratic procedures, gaps and uncertainties in funding). At this point, the status of the factory is private, with a 100% government share; however, this remains an unresolved issue. Moreover, as illustrated by the certification processes underway, a rigorous inspection needs to be guaranteed in order to produce the (21) drugs for which the factory was initially designed (Roa and Silva 2015, 12).

The WHO's medications list also has an important say in the factory's portfolio. The lack of absorption of the intended technology transfer and development of capacity for the quality-assurance system remain major

barriers to successful implementation. Another relevant element for the project's traction and future viability, as cited by professionals in the field, is the favourability of the political context (e.g. changes in government) as well as the relationship with the Minister of Health on both ends.

Therefore, besides these essential ingredients for the successful implementation of the factory's objectives, it is important to analyze how "health problems" are understood by an expert community and translated accordingly to this understanding within horizontal South-South partnerships. A series of interviews conducted in Mozambique in 2014–2015 reveal the scepticism of many Mozambicans (e.g. public servants, NGO activists, and academics) towards the ARV factory. According to some informants, the factory will not contribute in any fundamental way to changing the health landscape in the country, either because of the lack of local expertise or because of the technological gap between the ARV factory and similar facilities in the North.

For one Mozambican health expert, even the fact that "India offers to Mozambique medicines at a very low price, perhaps cheaper than the ones that will be produced by the factory" supports the proposal for the factory to become a research laboratory. For him, "this is what Mozambique really needs."²³ Other informants associate the launch of the factory with hidden Brazilian corporate or trade interests. One informant stressed the fact that neither the Mozambican nor the Brazilian governments were able "to explain the relationship between the factory and Brazilian private investments in the country." For some Mozambicans, the government should not spend public funds on the factory; instead, the facility should be privatized. In that case, for them, Mozambique does not need the factory at all.

In any scenario, the lack of local political support for the project is noteworthy. Although the projects already in place within the PECS/CPLP framework seem to demonstrate a high degree of integration between Brazilian and Mozambican health experts, the case of the ARV factory points to the fragilities of the BHEC's SSC fold. The meaning of the factory varies enormously between the experts on the Mozambican side, providing evidence for the insufficient or indeed lack of common vocabulary shared between Brazilian and Mozambican health communities. Contrary to what is assumed by the SSC actors and the establishment of horizontal partnerships, the provider and the beneficiary do not seem to occupy the same subject position.

The existence of structured positions within the SSC fold in health in Mozambique reveals how and why the claimed horizontality can be undermined in the field. Beyond concerns with efficiency and policymaking, this observation tackles the issue of how Brazil's expert community needs to deal with its history of domestic battles and social movements, which promoted the issue of HIV/AIDS, as well as access to medicines versus the backdrop of Mozambique's highly stigmatized society towards the disease (to emphasize the most extreme differences).

Brazil's cooperation initiatives in the health arena suggest that some deficiencies observed within traditional donor practices, such as underemphasizing professional training and overfocussing on short-term project outputs (i.e. disease-specific, geared towards immunization and campaign) are not alien to Brazilian SSC programmes in the health sector in Mozambique. Mozambican health experts' understandings of health and healthcare systems are structured along a set of historical dispositions, and in particular, their engagement in other cooperation arrangements such as those formed with Northern bilateral donors and NGOs.²⁴ Thus, the beneficiary's embeddedness within diverse networks and sociohistorical processes are paramount for the exercise and formation of the partner-subject position within SSC arrangements. As evidence from the fieldwork in Mozambique suggests, the notion of structured positions in health serves the purpose of establishing the partnership as a puzzle, and critically assessing the BHEC and Brazilian development practices backed by the Mozambican case study.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to interrogate the conditions of possibility for the enactment of a partner position and consequent engagements in horizontal partnerships. To deal with this general question, it began with an analysis of the BHEC, which can be conceptualized in terms of a knowledge-producing apparatus and training/socialization regime and, in particular, by the creation of a specific developmental approach to health. The BHEC was formed in and through an internationalized context in which multilateral and regional organizations, such as PAHO, have been pivotal for the consolidation of the expert community by way of varied technical cooperation initiatives. These have established a set of practices, which have been reproduced through educational programs, and have bridged an important gap between training activities and policymaking.

The three arenas of the BHEC's international insertion, particularly in terms of technical cooperation, have framed the relationship between the diverse national communities through which the developmental approach in the health field has constantly been reaffirmed. In minilateral settings (e.g. PAHO, UNASUL, and CPLP), the BHEC was able to establish common action plans and structuring networks, channelling and facilitating the implementation of cooperation projects. In the case of the CPLP, the definition of strategic axes and structuring networks, as well as the implementation of structuring projects, created a common space for Brazilians, Mozambicans, and Portuguese-speaking health experts. This particular space has been referred to as the South–South cooperation fold in health. This fold is structured in accordance with the developmental approach to health and replicates the knowledge-producing apparatus and training and socialization regime that Brazilian health experts have built at home.

The SSC fold preserves and reproduces a developmental approach within the health field and attempts to expand it through structuring networks and projects. More important, this SSC fold, as a space in which the BHEC tries to expand its reach, is to enable political connections and to create a common reality and vocabulary. The commonality established within the SSC fold conceals the differences between agents, blurring their actual position and asserting a partner subject position.

Therefore, the chapter argues that the partner position is enacted by a common reality and a “pool of common language” and vocabulary fostered by the SSC fold. It is precisely the process in which local differences and particular enunciations are removed that ensures the possibility of a horizontal partnership. To establish a genuine partnership, *cooperantes* from both sides of the Atlantic have to occupy the same subject position. As has been presented earlier in the case of the ARV factory, it assumed various meanings depending on the structural position the agents occupied. The interpretations or strategic translations ranged from the factory being transformed into a research facility, or becoming a private enterprise, or that in fact it should not exist at all.

Nevertheless, development partners' common reality is shared between a heterogeneity of actors, who, as the implementation process allows one to understand, do not speak the same language and do not use the same vocabulary. This irreducible difference makes strategic translation indispensable and unavoidable. That is to say, development partners do not occupy the same subject position; once these agents are embedded within

diverse networks and sociohistorical processes, they will make use of the SSC fold vocabulary in a very particular way.

This explains why the structural positions, as has been argued throughout this chapter, have to be taken into consideration on both sides of the cooperation arrangement. It is thus productive to analyze the structured positions of development partners in the field of health, and their consequences, with respect to the three elements that guided this research: (1) the international system or global health agenda, (2) national development paradigms, and (3) the (constitution of) health expert communities and their international engagements.

The case of the ARV factory points to the problems of neglecting the necessity of translation processes, which not only assumes a common language in health but also ultimately conceals differences and suspends national borders. Instead of supplementing the health expert community by supralocal associations and networks, the SSC fold constitutes a space of dispute, most notably regarding the terms of the translation. The partnership puzzle illustrated here by the Brazil–Mozambique health partnerships brings attention to the fragilities of the SSC fold in health, providing insights into why the claimed horizontality of SSC projects is being undermined and challenged. At stake is the erosion of the rationale behind structuring cooperation.

The challenge to the partner–subject position allows one to understand the SSC fold not as a space of transfer and learning, as envisaged under the notion of structuring cooperation, but as one of strategic translation where a common language and vocabulary is always subject to particular interpretations, which furthermore are overdetermined by the agents' structural positions. Even though the SSC fold might show resilience, the disputes around the definition of a common health vocabulary and their consequent public health policies need to be analyzed in order to understand and further explore the meanings of the subjective partner position and the practices of experts that constitute these partnerships.

NOTES

1. For a critical perspective on this statement, see Cesarino (2012).
2. Although it is worth noting that within traditional donor practices significant changes and reform proposals for redrawing the relationship between donors and recipients has been in course, it might be argued, as well, that

bilateral donors within the DAC-OECD do not represent a homogeneous group per se.

3. See Leander and Aalberts (2013) on the co-constitutive processes through which the [health] expertise and the [health] object are said to generate each other simultaneously.
4. On the knowledge-producing apparatus see Cesarino (2013), who argues that the Brazilian *cooperantes*, in fact, come to (learn how to) engage with local actors without a specialized apparatus for producing development-related knowledge (p. 45), but are nonetheless involved in the formation of new sociotechnical assemblages across the Southern Atlantic (p. 1). In another publication the author (2012, 526) affirmed that Brazilian South-South cooperation with its own knowledge-producing expert apparatus is still in its “heroic” phase.
5. See World Bank (1987); Escorel (1999) and Escorel et al. (2005); Almeida (2006).
6. See Irwin and Scali (2007); Werner and Sanders (1997).
7. While discussing the field of cultural production, Bourdieu presents instances of consecration as institutions which “on the one hand ... conserve the capital of symbolic goods, and, on the other hand, institutions [such as the educational system] which ensure the reproduction of agents imbued with the categories of action, expression, conception, imagination, perception, specific to the ‘cultivated disposition’” (1984, 121).
8. On PAHO’s role in integrating training experiences and public policies in Brazil during the late 1970s, see de Santana (1986); Nunes (1998).
9. See Ferreira (1976).
10. See WHO and UNICEF (1978).
11. On the identity of [development] experts, see Mosse (2011); Mosse and Lewis (2006); although we reemphasize the necessity of engaging in the discussion on the BHEC by not localizing these experts in an international development agency as has been common within the analysis of Northern development experts.
12. See Buss (2011).
13. One example is the project that supports the training of researchers and teachers at Fiocruz’s units, such as *Instituto Oswaldo Cruz*, *Instituto Nacional de Infectologia*, and *Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública*, to strengthen the research capacity and research development in the National Health Institutes of CPLP countries.
14. This master programme is sustained by the *Instituto Oswaldo Cruz* and the *Instituto de Pesquisa Clínica Evandro Chagas*. It receives financial support from CAPES and CNPq, two Brazilian public entities to foment research activities in the country, and the TC-41 (MS-OPAS).

15. Translation works in two directions at once: the negotiation of common meanings and definitions, and the enrollment and cooptation into individual and collective objectives and activities (Mosse and Lewis 2006, 14).
16. For more information on decreasing funding of HIV/AIDS in Africa, see <http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/health-group-donor-cuts-hurting-africa-aids-fight/>; https://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/HIV_AIDS/Docs/AIDS_Briefing_ReversingAIDS_ENG_Feb2012Update.pdf
17. Vujicic et al. (2011) review human resources for health (HRH) and the related activities of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the Global Fund, and the World Bank within developing countries.
18. As Ooms (2008) argues, the government had two choices for financing the response to HIV: either through the health development paradigm (i.e. sustainability, domestic resources, self-determination, and sovereignty) or through the medical relief paradigm (i.e. dependency, foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, and an exceptional response).
19. See, for example, International Symposium on Training and Management of Human Resources for Primary Health Care, organized by CO-LUFRAS (*Colloquio Luso-Francês em Saúde*); Workshop on Primary Attention (April 2013); Seminar on Incorporation of New Technologies for Tuberculosis Control and Meeting of National Coordinators on Tuberculosis Programmes (May 2013).
20. MEDIMOC (*Empresa Estatal de Importação e Exportação de Medicamentos*) was created in 1997 in order to manage the import and export of pharmaceuticals. As a state company, since 1986, it has the task of distributing medicines at the central level for the NHS. MEDIMOC has been a major player in coordinating drug imports with donors and their earmarked funds (Pavignani and Durão, 1997).
21. It is important to note that the factory is directed towards primary production (a first phase with six ARVs and eventually a seventh type in a second phase). The idea of the laboratory was to provide information on the quality of the imported drugs and to contribute to testing new methodologies; although secondary and tertiary production are not covered (active production of pharmaceutical ingredients, APIs). Lícia de Oliveira, coordinator of the project, affirmed in this context: "It is true that some people do not give much relevance to the packaging of the medicine, believing that it is the simplest phase of production, but, for us, this is a very important and complex phase" [T.A.]. Available at <http://www.pmaputo.gov.mz/noticias/2012/junho/julho/fabrica-de-antiretrovirais-abre-dentro-de-dias-em-maputo/>.

22. It is worth noting that the involvement of Vale was highly criticized at that time by civil society organizations in both Mozambique and Brazil. It remains an issue for the government's official distinction between development cooperation initiatives and trade/investment activities on the African continent.
23. Interview in Maputo, Mozambique, 13 March 2015.
24. The same is true for the structured position of the CBES concerning, for example, the relationship established with PAHO, which led to specific bridges between training activities and policy models.

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South Africa’s Development Diplomacy and South–South Cooperation: Issues of Institutionalization and Formalization?

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INTRODUCTION

Following South Africa’s reemergence into the international system as a global citizen after 1994, the country has continuously aligned its foreign policy principles to the values and norms that underscored the anti-apartheid struggle, captured in President Mandela’s 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article.¹ (Mandela 1993). In it, Mandela sketched out the country’s future foreign policy direction based on the principles and values of human rights, justice, democratization, respect for international law, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence. Such ideals were built around the view that post-apartheid South Africa’s national interests had to be balanced against the global realities of a rapidly changing international order, while at the same time not abandoning international friends that supported the anti-apartheid struggle. The pivot to this post-apartheid foreign policy stance was Afrocentrism in that the engagements and partnerships Pretoria would forge

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with multilateral institutions, and significantly with the Global North and Global South, always were to be in the broader developmental interests of the continent.

Moreover, it was understood that democratic South Africa's foreign policy identity emphasized a need to become what Mandela called a "responsible global citizen" by dispelling its apartheid past towards that of a successful transition to legitimize its place in the world. In short, the basis on which South Africa premised its foreign policy ideals and principles revolved (and still does) around the interplay between the domestic and the international spheres, wherein Pretoria perceives itself as a "bridge-builder" working as part of "progressive forces globally ... for a better and just world order"² (Nkoana-Mashabane 2011) and which, supposedly, eschews any perception that it seeks to satisfy parochial interests.

Within this orientation of a foreign policy vision, South–South cooperation (SSC) has become one of the pillars anchoring Pretoria's global identity. From the Mandela presidency to the Zuma Administration, SSC has been seen as the basis on which South Africa seeks to promote and advance a global governance reform agenda through the prism of empowering multilateralism, especially from a Southern perspective.³

Based on the preceding, this chapter examines how South Africa conceptualizes its policy of SSC in terms of a development assistance perspective. The reasoning for examining South Africa's development cooperation pronouncements is to align it with the overall emphasis of this edited book, as well as because Pretoria's South–South policy is very widespread in its definition and policy impacts. Thus, the factors that highlight South Africa's role as a development cooperation actor perhaps more closely corresponds to how Pretoria views its engagements in South–South partnerships.

From this point of view the focus of the argument in this chapter is to understand the insights into Pretoria's articulation of its SSC engagements by examining the principles and ideals that have shaped and influenced the country's development assistance policy's trajectory in this regard. The latter will be done by reflecting on the rhetoric that surrounds the government's approach to SSC when it comes to practical implementation of its policy interventions, especially in the arena of development cooperation. Finally, in assessing on how the country positions itself on South–South cooperation, the chapter concludes by identifying what successes have informed Pretoria's position on SSC as well as the challenges that confront the South African government's future engagements as it relates to its development aid policy.

THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK OF SOUTH AFRICA'S SSC: A MIDDLE OR IDEATIONAL ACTOR?

At the very outset it should be stated that trying to contextualize South Africa's South–South cooperation policy within a theoretical framework remains a difficult task. This is because South Africa's foreign policy appears to be very broad in nature and scope with a multiple set of identities that requires a series of paradigm explanations to explore the choices and behaviour Pretoria exhibits in any given situation. This is probably so for most countries in the current milieu of the international setting.

In trying to formulate a template that explains South Africa's behaviour globally, Schoeman uses "middle power" or "emerging regional middle power" status as the basis to characterize its international identity.⁴ Schoeman argues that during the period between 1994 and 2003 South Africa's "emerging middle power" role was premised on how Pretoria articulated its policy engagements between the Global North and the Global South.⁵ This was based on the view that South Africa demonstrated certain characteristics of performing a "special role" in both the global and continental security-development architecture. This was reflected in two ways: (1) Pretoria was seen by the Global North as playing a significant role as a normative and moral actor in shaping a global governance agenda that conformed to how northern developed countries thought of what should constitute a rules-based system; and (2) the belief by the government, led the African National Congress (ANC), that South Africa had a significant international responsibility because the world looked on Pretoria as providing "leadership, new ideas and break-throughs in deadlocked situations."⁶

The interpretation that South Africa could be a middle power both in the traditional sense as well as in the regional and continental setting was seen by South African policymakers and, in particular the first foreign minister Alfred Nzo, as an objective of multilateral diplomacy. The idea was that South Africa could "strengthen 'a rules-based system which limits the possibility of unilateral actions by major powers' [with] the practical advantage [of providing] the opportunity for smaller parties 'to participate on an equal footing on the world stage.'"⁷ Clearly this perception of South Africa's ability to exert influence and to act as a mediator was driven by how Pretoria was "seen as a trendsetter in its unilateral [domestic] decisions to ban anti-personnel mines and to destroy surplus small arms, to 'denuclearise', [to set] progressive legislation on privatised security and

its involvement in the ‘Kimberley Process’⁸”,⁹ notwithstanding that it also became a signatory to the International Criminal Court by domesticating the Rome Statute.

Others, such as Smith, highlight that the notions of “soft power” also underscore the identity of South Africa as a “middle or emerging regional middle power.” Smith suggests that the identification of soft power with respect to South Africa is more aligned to the “ideational rather material forces.”¹⁰ She argues the latter point in the international relations framework of constructivist theory where engagements in the international system are based on how ideas and interests are interlinked. Moreover, in comparison to its material wealth, South Africa’s moral capital has been perceived as significant given the international community’s elevated status of the country’s peaceful democratic transition and the iconism of Mandela as a human rights champion.

From the preceding, it would seem that South Africa’s identity in SSC is a combination of middle and ideational power that Pretoria seeks to exhibit by mainstreaming the transformation of the global system based on an even distribution of power. To this end Pretoria is explicit that the unbalanced nature of the international setting that is still a remnant of the post-World War II period needs to be reconstituted along the lines of strengthening the rules-based system that reflects current realities of shifting centres of power and underscores a just and equitable world order.¹¹ The latter is defined by what the ruling party, the ANC, ascribes as its own historical experience borne out of the anti-apartheid struggle where member states of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) showed solidarity and lent support for a fairer distribution of power and resources in South Africa.¹²

Nevertheless, apart from just the normative aspect, there are also the other attractive elements that South Africa advocates as part of its SSC engagements—namely, peace mediation and development assistance. The latter is seen by Pretoria as enhancing the levers of its identity of being a global actor that acts as a bridge-builder—that is, a view held by both countries in the Global North and the Global South that South Africa still occupies a “special role” in global politics. This special role is informed by the opinion that post-apartheid South Africa offered a renewed impetus to Africa’s role in global politics. It also was based on the notion that post-apartheid South Africa demonstrated “a peaceful political transition” that could be a beacon of hope for the rest of the continent.

For the post-apartheid South African government, however, the bigger issue was linked to establishing a less-than-aggressive engagement with the African continent based on cooperation and partnership. Haunted by the apartheid regime's institutionalized racist approach to foreign relations, the ANC-led government was determined to define its foreign policy identity foremost as being an African actor, premised on the view that South Africa's foreign policy was intrinsically linked to the political, economic, social, and cultural development of Africa. This was the most important feature that shaped what South Africa saw as part of its international engagements and still remains a strategic consideration in Pretoria's global deliberations. This is an issue that will be reflected on later on in the chapter.

The rest of the chapter focusses on both the articulation and practice of South Africa's South–South cooperation actions based on the way the government defines its aid architecture. But first, a sketch of the principles that define Pretoria's SSC follow.

SOUTH AFRICA'S SSC PRINCIPLES

Pretoria's principles of South–South cooperation are built around these three aspects:

- Participating and supporting the formulations of positions by the developing countries in significant global platforms such as the G20, the G77+China, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Conference of the Parties on Climate Change.
- Being part of an international setting, both in the North and the South, where it can promote the objectives of the Africa Agenda¹³ and, more broadly, those of the South.
- Strengthening bilateral relations with countries from the south that assist in enhancing national development priorities and the African agenda, which is also built around the socioeconomic development nexus.¹⁴

Embedded in the preceding principles is the importance of agency. South Africa strongly advocates for the Global South to play a significant role in the international architecture of decision-making processes that directly impact the South's development agenda. Rooted in the values

of the April 1955 Bandung Conference,¹⁵ Pretoria also emphasizes that by working from the inside the Global South can effectively bring about balanced institutional changes whether in respect of market access, global reforms, and trade and investment deals. For instance, in 2007 when South Africa chaired the G20 it focused on International Monetary Fund (IMF) governance reform. In this regard Pretoria led efforts around the 2008 quota modifications and voice reforms. The latter saw the inclusion of purchasing power parity as a component of gross domestic product (GDP) in the quota formula.

In 2010, South Africa, together with South Korea, which was nominated as cochair of the working group on development, pushed for the inclusion of infrastructure in the development agenda of the grouping. In 2011 South Africa was included as one of the cochairs of the working group, which together with South Korea and France provided the necessary leadership when the issue of development was introduced into the G20 agenda. Other areas where South Africa has played a significant role in the G20 is on tax reforms, the illicit flow of capital, the financial inclusion for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and price fixing. On the trade front, Pretoria has aligned itself with the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) coalition of 11 countries where it is pushing for a trade regime that supports industrial development for developing countries. Working through coalitions in prominent global institutions is seen as way to lobby for, as well as forge, concrete partnerships of mutual interests aligned to Pretoria's global governance agenda.

It also is important to mention here how South Africa identifies development cooperation within the principles of its South–South engagements. In one respect South Africa's identity as a development actor is caught between how this role was defined previously under apartheid as a way to win friends and support for an illegitimate regime. On the other hand, it is about transcending this apartheid-associated role towards one that is more about being a legitimate actor in global development diplomacy borne out of the view that it can make a meaningful contribution to socioeconomic development in Africa and other developing countries.

It is here that the dilemma arises about the labelling of whether Pretoria is a “donor” or “development cooperation” partner. In one respect South Africa wants to align its development diplomacy identity along the lines of mutual interests, benefits, and respect that is seen as being linked to the principles of SSC. Nonetheless, on the other hand, the very nature of being a development actor tends to create asymmetrical power relations.

This is where an uncomfortableness sets in for South Africa and others (e.g. India) who are not entirely convinced that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) definition of aid represents an equal development partnership.

To be labelled as a donor places such countries in the same paradigm of an unequal relationship, which is at the centre of the sensitivities around the aid-recipient engagement. Even though emerging Southern actors (e.g. China, Brazil, India, and South Africa) do not want to ascribe to what they see as an OECD–DAC paradigm of development assistance or aid, the difficulty is that taking on the such a role does have implications of uneven engagement with recipient countries.

In the case of South Africa this is a real concern because it premises itself on the reform of the global multilateral system, where the dominant paradigm of the OECD–DAC also is considered part of that agenda. Moreover, for Pretoria, being identified as a “donor” complicates and contradicts the notion that South Africa is dominate powers. So, South Africa’s own view of “hegemony” and “dominance” is seen as labelling that needs to be avoided because it is precisely this that Pretoria is challenging as part of its multilateral diplomacy in which it is trying to change the rules-based system through its so-called middle, or soft-power, capabilities.

Therefore, espousing the principles of South–South cooperation in development diplomacy seems to be what South Africa considers as an appropriate framework on cooperation through partnership as it signifies a so-called sense of equity, noninterference, and shared development burdens that can be addressed collectively. The following section examines South Africa’s role as a development actor.

SOUTH AFRICA AS A “LATE” BUT NOT “NEW” DEVELOPMENT ACTOR: THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE FUND

South Africa is not a new actor to development cooperation assistance. The establishment of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)¹⁶ in 1910 in fact is considered as the beginning of South Africa as a development actor; through a common revenue pool Pretoria contributed to a development fund—that benefited other SACU partners. The overall focus of SACU since its inception in 1910 has shifted towards becoming a mechanism for expanding economic and development integration. Following political developments in the region after 1990, SACU had

undergone a reconstitution and a new agreement was negotiated to effectively respond to the needs of member states.

Under the new agreement the following structures were included: Council of Ministers, Commission, Tribunal, and Secretariat. Furthermore “the five SACU countries share a common external tariff and share the proceeds of customs and excise duties in accordance with a separate revenue-sharing formula for each element. In addition, a developmental subsidy is built into the excise duty formula so that SA can aid its poorer neighbours.”¹⁷ In this regard South Africa’s contribution to the development subsidy has come under some criticisms. Besides the fact that South Africa provides more than it receives from the revenue pool, there also is not a monitoring framework for South Africa to glean whether the development subsidy that it provides is being used to support and strengthen better conditions for transparency and democratic governance such as in the case of Swaziland.

During apartheid the minority government also instituted what it called the Economic Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund of 1968. The fund essentially was aimed at winning political legitimacy from other African states and “buying votes” at the UN to overcome international isolationism. Some of the countries that have been beneficiaries of the fund include Lesotho, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Equitorial Guinea, Comoros, and Paraguay.

After 1994, there were debates about how South Africa would continue its development cooperation. Part of the policy debate was how South Africa would fashion its programme of development assistance. During this time there were a number of avenues that constituted the country’s instruments of delivery. These included supporting regional infrastructure, peacekeeping interventions, conflict mediation, technical assistance that included capacity-building and training support for elections, education and tax strengthening programmes; to these were added initiating and providing financial and institutional capital for regional and continental mechanisms such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Such initiatives were aimed at reviving the continent’s political and economic place in the global system and formed part of the ARF initiative of President Mbeki initiated in early 2000.

Much of the focus of South Africa’s development cooperation activities focussed on Africa because the continent formed a pivotal emphasis on

the post-apartheid government's view that its vision of a "better world" was intrinsically aligned to an African agenda premised on peace, stability, and development. The latter became the priority and flagship development cooperation focus of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), renamed the Department of the International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) under the Zuma Administration in 2009.

Despite having a strategic concentration on Africa, the framework underpinning Pretoria's development activities needed to be reformed. In 2000 the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) was established through an act of Parliament and formally adopted in January 2001. The fund was essentially formulated in order to provide some cohesion to South Africa's development initiatives, reflect a changing political landscape, and repeal the previous apartheid fund. The ARF's initial funding was drawn from the apartheid fund where, according to Vickers, it had as its start-up funds around US\$30 million.¹⁸ Table 6.1 provides an overview of some of the main project funding activities under the ARF until 2010 (in South African Rands. 1 R is approximately US\$0.071).

During the period 2014 of 2015 approved projects, according to a presentation to the 2015 DIRCO Parliamentary Committee, included the following:

- Humanitarian assistance to South Sudan R 15 000 000
- Drought relief in Namibia R 100 000 000
- Humanitarian assistance to Palestine R 11 200 000
- Emergency relief to Ebola disease R 32 500 000
- South Africa contribution to Lesotho peace process R 20 000 000

Other examples of the broad nature of the ARF's focus in Africa included the funding of cultural activities such as the preservation of ancient manuscripts in Timbuktu in Mali and the writing off of almost R44 million in long-term loans—mainly those made to African countries in previous decades.¹⁹

The ARF highlights the country's foreign policy pillars. According to its mandate, the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund was simply aimed at enhancing political and economic cooperation between South Africa and other countries, notably in Africa underpinned by the promotion of integration, human resource development, socio-economic development, humanitarian assistance, conflict mediation, and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Table 6.1 Overview of ARF Funding

| <i>Country/institution</i> | <i>Amount</i> | <i>Project name</i> | <i>Status/ comments</i> | <i>Year initiated</i> |
|--|---------------|---|--|-----------------------|
| Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) | R101 million | Public service census | Project in progress | 2008 |
| | | Capacity-building in decentralization programme | Project in progress | 2008 |
| | | Establishment of a public service training institute (ENA) | Project in progress | 2008 |
| | | Assistance with building of dam | Project plan being finalized | 2008 |
| Seychelles | R27 million | Infrastructure rehabilitation of Seychelles port | Project finalized | 2008 |
| Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) | R52 million | Humanitarian Assistance Project (R42 million) | Last tranche paid in February 2010 | 2007 |
| | | Land mine removal (R8 million) | Project plan being finalized | To begin in 2010 |
| | | Sports complex (R2 million) | Project plan being finalized | To begin in 2010 |
| Guinea Conakry | R172 million | Rice production | Project in progress | 2008 |
| | | Electricity stabilization | Project in progress | 2009 |
| | | Emergency cleaning of the Capital City | Project in progress | 2009 |
| | | Construction of Kindia Museum | Suspended because of political instability | 2009 |
| Guinea-Bissau | R1 million | Pledge to contribute to UN anti-drug trafficking efforts in Guinea-Bissau | Project completed | 2008 |
| Zimbabwe | R300 million | Economic recovery programme (R300 million) | Money transferred | 2009 |
| | | Agricultural assistance programme | Project in progress | 2008 |

(continued)

Table 6.1 (continued)

| <i>Country/institution</i> | <i>Amount</i> | <i>Project name</i> | <i>Status/ comments</i> | <i>Year initiated</i> |
|--|---------------|---|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Lesotho | R13.5 million | Election observation missions to presidential and run-off elections | Project completed | 2008 |
| | R100 million | Building of the Metolong Dam | Project in progress | 2009 |
| | | Construction of the Sani-Pass to Mokhotlong Road | Project in progress | 2009 |
| Mali | R20 million | Revitalization of Timbuktu Manuscripts Project in Mali | Project in progress | 2009 |
| Sudan | R27 million | Training of Southern Sudan administration in public government | Project in progress | 2007 |
| African Ombudsman Research Centre, University of KwaZulu Natal | R3 million | Establishment of African Ombudsman Research Centre | Project plan being finalized | To begin in 2010 |
| Pan-African Women Organization(PAWO) | R11 million | Funding of PAWO conference | Project finalized | 2008 |

Source: DIRCO Presentation 2010: Parliamentary Committee

The Fund receives money that is appropriated through Parliament, which is done by the passing of a “money bill.” The process of allocation is made following the unveiling of the national budget, which is presented by the Finance Minister before the joint sitting of Parliament at the beginning of each financial year. Besides Parliamentary allocations money can be received as payments for loans made by the ARF, interest on loans and investments made by the ARF, or from any other source. In terms of its institutional framework the ARF is identified as a Schedule 3A Public Entity in terms of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1999. This means that its autonomy is limited and its function is to carry out a specific economic or social function of the government.

In the case of the ARF, because it receives money through the Parliament, which is considered as a statutory body, the financial governance of the Fund is carried out by the Auditor General’s office. Because of the nature of the Fund, it is subject to the direction of the Foreign Affairs Minister under the control of the Director-General’s office;

however, allocation of project finances must be done in consultation with the Minister of Finance. To help facilitate the process, there is an advisory committee comprised of members from DIRCO and the National Treasury (i.e. Ministry of Finance). The role of the advisory committee is to make recommendations to both Ministers on the disbursement of funds through loans or other financial assistance.

The nature of the financial assistance offered under the ARF is considered to be “untied” grants and mostly are identified as discretionary funding. According to the latest 2014–2015 annual report by DIRCO, the allocation of funds by Parliament for the period was R277 556 million. This was a significant drop from the 2013–2014 allocation of R485 442 million. Officials in Parliament indicate that despite the dramatic decrease in allocation, the Fund has a healthy reserve that can sustain the ARF’s operations. Future projections are that South Africa’s overall development assistance budget could be drastically slashed to less than R100 million because of fiscal austerity measures that the Finance Ministry is considering putting into place in order to address the domestic economic crisis.

This decline in funding is a worrying sign for South Africa’s future disbursements, even though it remains a small donor with significant social and political capital. The decrease in spending may compel the South Africa government to exercise fiscal prudence and shape its role in the big leagues of Southern providers. The austerity measures will be applied to the 2016–2017 budgetary framework, which means that the National Treasury allocation to the ARF could be greatly reduced and/or negligible. Justification by National Treasury is that the South African economy is undergoing financial contraction with poor growth levels. Apart from the ARF, South Africa is also a strategic actor in IBSA and BRICS.

FROM IBSA TO BRICS

In 2003 South Africa joined Brazil and India to initiate a trilateral grouping called India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA),²⁰ which was labelled at the time and (continues to be seen) as the practical expression of South–South cooperation. IBSA’s establishment was meant to increase the leverage of the South at the bargaining table by redressing the marginalization of poor nations from the global economy, reducing poverty, and offering a policy space for effective and efficient engagement between the North and the South as equal partners in global governance issues. The idea behind the formation of this trilateral grouping was that the three countries

shared common purposes that were held together by the fact that all three countries were democracies and aspiring towards the same development values and goals. The impetus behind IBSA is to simply equalize the political and economic landscape of the international system by restructuring relations between the rich countries of the North and the seemingly poor countries of the South in order to develop a cohesive voice on the following priorities around global governance:

- To reform of global multilateral institutions, most notably the UN Security Council with a view of securing a greater voice and decision-making power in international processes and organizations for the South.
- To establish an alternative economic and development cooperation paradigm in economic fora, especially in terms of the 2001 Doha Round of trade negotiations linked to the G20 agricultural coalition; the focus was on social democratic views and the importance of state interventions to secure social outcomes and poverty reduction, among other things.
- To strengthen South–South economic cooperation.
- To consolidate multilateralism through the promotion of the rules-based system, and greater equity among states at the international level.

One of the flagship programmes of IBSA is the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger Fund, which is aimed at financing projects that advance social development. Initiated in 2004 and operationalized in 2006, the IBSA Fund is administered by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Office in New York, which is now called the Office on South–South Cooperation. Contributions to the Fund are made annually by each country in the amount of US\$1 million. So far the Fund has disbursed approximately US\$29 million in project financing. Figure 6.1 provides a breakdown of the geographical disbursements, allocation of disbursements by projects, and approvals according economic status of countries.

Seen as part of South Africa's trilateral development cooperation, the IBSA Fund also forms part of the country's broader SSC interests. The Fund falls under the institutional mandate of DIRCO. Even though there is impetus in the ministry for the IBSA as a platform and the continued contributions to the Fund, it seems that such enthusiasm has not extended to other government agencies and ministries. For instance, the




Fig. 6.1 IBSA overview of spending and projects

Source: UNDP: IBSA Development Fund, 2015 Portfolio of Projects Report.

National Treasury, which oversees all incoming and outgoing monetary assistance, does not provide any oversight as to how the IBSA Fund is administered. The latter is managed through DIRCO. In addition, the weakness of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms around the Fund has resulted in growing concerns in respect of whether contributions to it results in any economic backward linkages for South African private and state-owned enterprises.

Despite political commitment to IBSA, changes in the domestic leadership landscape, especially in Brazil and South Africa, saw the momentum for IBSA begin to waiver. In Brazil the transition from Lula to Dilma

Rousseff and the incumbency of Jacob Zuma as South Africa's President in 2009, brought into focus issues of continuity with regard to foreign policy priorities. In the case of Brazil, it has been argued that with Rousseff being Lula's appointed successor, Brasilia's global policy priorities would remain stable. Similarly, for South Africa there were indications that a Zuma presidency would remain committed to consolidating the African Agenda and that of its broader strategic orientations found in its foreign policy engagement.²¹ Nonetheless, soon the Zuma's Administration began to show a particular predisposition in how it would like to display its brand of global diplomacy. Under President Zuma the continuity in foreign policy related to maintaining the Global South Agenda was retained, but in time this became more focused on Pretoria becoming part of the Brazil–Russia–India–South Africa (BRICS) association. Despite reaffirmations to IBSA, it does seem that BRICS was more a strategic intention for the Zuma Administration, leading to the view that his government was eager to expand South Africa's Global South identity beyond IBSA.

The formal announcement in 2009 of the BRIC club as an inter-state platform came when the inaugural Summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia. The emergence of the BRIC opened up the landscape of the Global South to a broader set of coalition formations. It was not until China's formal invitation to President Zuma to join the club in 2010 that questions emerged around the existence and viability of IBSA.

South Africa's admission into the BRICS was a culmination of efforts by President Zuma to follow a BRIC-centric foreign policy offensive.²² During the first 18 to 20 months after his inauguration as State President, Zuma visited all four nation countries to push South Africa's credentials as a potential BRIC member. The appeal to join the so-called illustrious club of Southern countries was premised on the view that South Africa could offer what the president himself believed was immense trade and investment opportunities as well as Pretoria's geostrategic significance. He marketed the country's well-established economic infrastructure as a significant platform that could be utilized to access other African markets. The visits, of course, also served to drum up support for Pretoria's bid for one of the permanent seats in a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC). The lobbying paid off when at the G20 Summit in Seoul in November 2010, "the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that South Africa had 'officially' applied to join the BRIC forum."²³

For Brazil and Russia it would appear that South Africa's admission would have expanded the geographic coverage for the forum, especially

at a time when China and India were seen to be escalating their footprint efforts globally—that is, across the South and particularly in Africa. Moreover, the Brazilian government affirmed that Pretoria would bring a depth to the BRIC forum that would underscore a strong commitment for political action regarding issues concerning African affairs and consensus around the international agenda. India's reaction remained muted although the viewpoint that seemed to prevail in New Delhi was that India also had been instrumental in pushing for South Africa's membership in the BRICS.²⁴

South Africa's push for an African regional office of the New Development Bank highlights that Pretoria sees BRICS as more than just consolidating a Global South identity. The establishment of the Bank in fact is seen to complement the Zuma government's push for more infrastructure financing of regional and continental projects. This is where distinguishing between BRICS and IBSA is significant. The contribution of US\$10 billion that South Africa will be making to the development reflects the massive scale of how BRICS overshadows IBSA. It also means that management of how funds are allocated will be institutionalized through governance frameworks of the Bank that are already set up. The focus on infrastructure financing fits into South Africa's broader development programme around its African Agenda.

In view of the preceding, Kornegay aptly describes this shift in the Zuma government's foreign policy strategic orientation and vision as "BRICS Globalism vs. IBSA Trilateralism,"²⁵ With BRICS setting out a more cohesive and dynamic agenda, the IBSA focus seems to be weakening with scheduling issues, capacity constraints, and an overall duplication of the work groupings that were institutionalized under IBSA and also created under the BRICS. There has been a sense that China had deliberately invited South Africa into the BRICS in order to dismantle IBSA. Even though the latter is strongly refuted by both the IBSA countries and Beijing, it does seem that the prominence of IBSA has lost its appeal though political will still exists with claims that IBSA offers a better alignment to the SSC framework of development assistance.²⁶

Despite the fact that the Tenth IBSA Summit is still pending, it is becoming increasingly apparent that all emphasis is being placed on BRICS as the preferred platform for strengthening SSC. With BRICS launching its own finance development bank, issues of whether the IBSA Development Fund²⁷ remains sustainable is of concern.

Therefore, as Kornegay intimates, “the problem confronting IBSA, given the ambivalence of its three governments, is the extent to which BRICS has so thoroughly overshadowed it, thereby obscuring IBSA’s potential to assume a more dynamic role in the respective foreign policies of the different partaking countries.”²⁸ The same probably holds in the context of how South Africa perceives IBSA and BRICS in the context of realizing its SSC priorities.

CREATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP AGENCY

In June 2007 the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), hosted its 52nd Policy Conference in Midrand, Johannesburg. One of the resolutions to emerge out of the conference was the creation of an institutionalized development agency that would manage both incoming and outgoing development assistance received and disbursed by Pretoria.²⁹ The idea being that a more structural approach should be adopted that is able to institutionally manage South Africa’s growing development assistance and that can be underscored by a common set of principles in respect of core areas aimed at promoting socioeconomic development, good governance, peace and post-conflict reconstruction, and regional integration in Southern Africa. By 2009 President Zuma had announced in his inaugural State of the Nation Address that the creation of such a structure—to be known as the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)—with all the technical, legal, and formal frameworks supposedly completed by 2013.³⁰

This approach to harmonizing and rationalizing development assistance activities was deemed in some quarters as a way for Pretoria to strategically position itself as a major player in the development arena. It was noted by some officials in government that South Africa needed to rebrand itself as a development actor, from being just reactive to requests from recipient countries under the ARF,³¹ to becoming more proactive in pursuing its self-interests. Even though the latter demonstrated openness about how Pretoria intended to strengthen its development cooperation identity and soft-power capabilities, there still has been a sense of hesitancy to be explicit that this is based on its own vested interests. This was captured in the 53rd ANC National Conference outcomes document, which described the need for the establishment of SADPA³² to assist the South African government in realizing a “vision of a better Africa through African solidarity and mutual assistance.”³³ The broad functions of SADPA are to:

- Develop policy guidelines on outgoing South African development cooperation and ensure coherence throughout the government in their implementation.
- Support programmes and projects for outgoing development cooperation partnerships and use the Fund to support programmes and projects.
- Provide technical advice on foreign policy in the area of development cooperation.
- Build and maintain close cooperation and liaisons with international development cooperation agencies and other stakeholders on behalf of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation.
- Maintain oversight for all South Africa's officials on outgoing development cooperation and assistance (e.g. for bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral partnerships) with countries, development institutions, civil society, and the private sector.
- Conduct an annual accountability audit, and monitoring and evaluation for all outgoing development cooperation.
- Ensure effective management and administration of the Partnership Fund for Development.

The proposed programmes under the SADPA structure are the following:

- Humanitarian support
- Human resource capacity-building
- Post-conflict reconstruction and development
- Good governance: building capacity for elections
- Economic cooperation
- Trilateral and/or multipartner cooperation
- The IBSA Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger

According to media reports in 2013, SADPA was promulgated as a government component. But the SADPA Bill still has to be presented to the Parliamentary Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. In addition, in order for SADPA to officially disburse funds the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund has to be repealed and replaced with the proposed Partnership Fund for Development.

At the time of writing this chapter, the deadlock over the formalization of SADPA and presentation of legislation to Parliament seems to relate to the issue of convergence between the Finance Ministry and DIRCO. Part of this impasse relates to the ongoing issues that surround the ARF in terms of continuing concern over how the money is disbursed and spending on projects takes place. According to the Auditor-General's report to Parliament, in recent years compliance to legislation and monitoring mechanisms regarding the ARF appear to be weak and vague.

As a result, in terms of SADPA, it would seem that the DIRCO ministry wants to have complete oversight over the Agency including signing off on outgoing assistance. From confidential discussions that were held in late 2015 with experts and officials inside and outside of government circles regarding the stalemate in the Cabinet over whether there should be one or two signatures (i.e. both DIRCO and Finance Ministers signing off on disbursements), two issues became apparent: (1) that DIRCO should be the main line-functioning ministry where SADPA is located, which is keeping in line with practices by its Southern partners such as Brazil, China, and India; and (2) that President Zuma should intervene to end the protracted deadlock.

While the issue remains unresolved, the structure of the framework also has come under scrutiny. The question is whether SADPA should be formalized as a fully implemented agency. The idea of agency has raised concerns in some political quarters about whether such a framework fits in the definitional context of SSC. It would seem that the proposed agency may in the end become closely associated with an OECD–DAC definition of development cooperation.³⁴ The issue also is being debated in Parliament where DIRCO officials have argued on various occasions in their presentations to the Portfolio Committee on International Relations that the current institutional framework of ARF is limiting. Though, now it appears that there is also indecision about whether SADPA should remain as a Fund instead of evolving into an agency.

In addition, some experts³⁵ have cautioned that South Africa should keep the framework of SADPA more aligned to the principles of South-South cooperation or consider the model that India has adopted as a division in the Ministry of External Affairs called Department of Public Administration (DPA). The unit, which is flexible and not strict in operationalization, had undergone similar institutional challenges in trying to find a framework that fit with Delhi's SSC identity.³⁶

UNPACKING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SSC

The difficulty in assessing South Africa's development assistance under the rubric of SSC is that there is no formal policy framework that defines how the two are interlinked from a content and conceptual perspective. Moreover, despite having the ARF Act, which sets out the purpose and principles of what informs Pretoria's role as a development actor, the challenge for Pretoria is trying to find the balance between how it wants the continent and the world to see it in the context of being a development actor, and what it sees as its role as a legitimate actor in this regard. This is especially so when it comes to its interactions between the Global North, the Global South and, indeed, that with the African continent. Therefore, to illustrate this dichotomy in South Africa's development assistance paradigm it is important to understand how the issues that Alden and Schoeman describe in the quote that follows inform the behaviour of Pretoria as a development actor:

Acting against the apartheid era presumption that South Africa was “an island of European civilization” on the continent, [President] Mbeki articulated a discourse of South African inclusion in Africa bolstered by his commitment to fostering an African renaissance and the advance of regionally based multilateralism. In adopting this stance, along with a decidedly anti-imperialist discourse on questions like Zimbabwe, he sought to deflect any suspicion that an activist post-apartheid government would use its material power for coercive purposes in Africa.³⁷

Pretoria's own battle of trying to define its identity in terms of fitting and reintegrating into the Continent as an African actor also must be seen in light of the scepticism around whether the post-apartheid state sees itself as part of the continent. But perhaps what is really significant is the perception among the other African states of Pretoria being caught between navigating two spheres: where in one respect its identity tends to be seen as exhibiting Western-defined values and principles, while in another it seeks to expound the image that its own development interests are intrinsically linked to an economically and socially developed Africa like the African Renaissance. Such competing interests complicate how South Africa's national interests, as well as its strategic orientation on the continent, makes it a competitive development actor. Not wanting to

be labelled as pursuing what it considers as selfish interests, the politics of solidarity under the banner of SSC appears in part to have fueled the Mbeki Presidency's shift towards adopting a more African-centric view in its development engagements that include trade, investment, and more inclusive trade agreements.

Understanding the challenges surrounding the lack of support with respect to President's Mandela own weaknesses in Africa, President Mbeki forged a more diplomatic approach through a programme of action that focused on the policy of the African Renaissance. The policy emerged in many ways as the strategic orientation through which partnerships were forged that were aimed at spearheading the view of enabling the continent's reintegration and inclusive participation into the global system. The idea simply meant that the Mbeki Administration steered the country away from a "going at it alone" approach to one that embedded partnerships built around the vision that supported the same ideals and principles as those that informed Pretoria's African Agenda.

In this regard, the Mbeki government as well as the ANC used such opportunities as a way to build consensus around mutual interests with like-minded African partners, such as Nigeria, who demonstrated shared values towards:

- Rebuilding Africa's economies
- Striving for peace, stability, and development across the continent
- Realigning Africa's institutional architecture in line with the continent's needs in the twenty-first century
- Pushing and ensuring that Africa's development agenda was internationalized through the NEPAD programme and placed as a priority on the agenda of the G8, the IMF, and other multilateral platforms

Of course, for the Mbeki presidency the strategic formal system of focusing on Africa as the first priority in South Africa's development cooperation engagements, and by extension of its commitment to SSC, provided the impetus in justifying the need for Pretoria to undertake an international activist approach that advanced and institutionalized a leadership orientation in multilateral engagements. This continues to be a strategic consideration for the Zuma government.

Habib explains the Mbeki era of global governance engagements as being interlinked with development diplomacy, as that which is best "understood as the product of a second generation national political elite

who are cognizant of the country's weaknesses in the global order, and yet are intent on its deracialisation and restructuring on a more equitable foundation.”³⁸ This notion of what Habib identifies as the second-generation nationalism also defines the second priority in South Africa's development partnership and interactions—namely, what revolves around complementing the African focus with a push for strengthening South-South cooperation and solidarity. Threaded into this platform of forging Southern partnerships is the view that such mechanisms would leverage not only South Africa's voice but also that of the African continent that it seeks to represent in the international agenda for development.

The formation of the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum represents the third aspect of South Africa's development diplomacy of trilateral development cooperation. In this regard having a platform that is shaped by consensus and does not predicate itself on relying on a framework that borrows from the Global North or the OECD–DAC model provides for a development cooperation arrangement that is more aligned to what these three countries see as framework for SSC. But perhaps it is the small quantity of funds that makes the IBSA Fund manageable.

The institutionalization of the BRICS represents the fourth framework of South Africa's SSC in development diplomacy. The establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank and South Africa's push for an African regional office of it highlights Pretoria's need to access much-needed capital for the infrastructure development financing in Africa. The emphasis on the infrastructure angle represents another dimension to how South Africa seeks to enforce its South–South development cooperation. The latter also is interpreted as a way of enabling access to development finance away from the traditional IFIs as well as cementing an alternate nonhegemonic Western global narrative that seeks to offset and counteract what is interpreted as dominance and influence over the mechanics of multilateral agencies. Based on a two-track process South Africa like its Southern partners is seeking to simultaneously level the global development cooperation governance playing field while being part of and leveraging access to institutions, such as the BRICS Bank, which it perceives as part of its broader development diplomacy efforts. Under the Zuma government this seems to be gaining in traction.³⁹

Under the Zuma presidency the extent of South Africa's role in development diplomacy and cooperation activities has been elevated from the Mbeki government in which the Zuma Administration is emphasizing

an overarching South–South agenda by playing the “African card” in platforms (e.g. the BRICS and the G20) as well as in fora such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation and the India–Africa Forum Summit.

CONSOLIDATING THE ROLE OF AN SSC DEVELOPMENT ACTOR

Returning to the issues sketched out previously, the issue at hand is how one should interpret South Africa’s policy rhetoric on development cooperation in practice. According to the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the impression is one that conceives and defines South Africa’s role as “a progressive agent for positive change.”⁴⁰ In formulating such an image Pretoria envisions itself to be, as Alden and Schoeman describe, “a global player which includes elements of mediator–integrator, bridge, anti-imperialist agent, developer, and regional leader and protector.”⁴¹ Clearly, in articulating these competing roles, the question is how best to capture South Africa’s approach to development cooperation in the broader context of SSC.

It would seem that it is one in which it is caught somewhere between trying to underwrite the rules of the game and to undertake the provision of public goods based on what it sees as its national interests interlinked with that of the Southern Africa region and the continent; at the same time South Africa seeks to forge partnerships and collaborations on the basis of consensus and cooperation on matters of multilateral reform and mutual interests with African and Global South actors. Straddling these multiple sets of identities needs to be examined with regard to how each of these roles serves what is in South Africa’s core values versus its interests. This can be differentiated in several contexts where Pretoria’s representation as being a development actor needs to be strengthened.

The first is that as a development actor, South Africa’s role in the broader SSC framework is less important compared to that of other partners, especially those of BRICS. To this end South Africa will have to define its identity more than just by trying to play “catch up” or to be on a par with its partners from the South in material terms. From this perspective the South African government may have to define its development cooperation framework more in the context of being an interlocker through the proposed structure of SADPA. This is definitely an area where the SADPA structure can strengthen South Africa’s orientation towards greater development partnerships.

Second, whereas “... in practice, [South Africa has] assumed the role of peacemaker and negotiator in Africa,”⁴² this has not always translated into tangible outcomes for Pretoria in strengthening its engagements as a development actor in the continent. This is in part because of the trust deficit that South Africa experiences in Africa. Hopefully, through the establishment of SADPA, levels of mistrust can be reduced with the institutionalization of engagements. This will help decrease not only the negative perceptions of South Africa’s interests in pursuing a development diplomacy agenda in the continent but also manage its development cooperation through a structured framework. This could alleviate Pretoria’s own inhibitions of being labelled as a regional hegemon or to take on a more explicit “donor” role, especially where the government can show that its interests and objectives with those countries are that of trying to assist.

Third, by seeking to formally institutionalize a development cooperation framework the government needs to make coherent decisions regarding how money is to be spent. At the moment, under the ARF most of the disbursements are done by untied grants. But if South Africa wants to increase its profile in the development cooperation arena, it will need to define how it is going to disburse funds and whether such funds are going to be delivered as “tied” money. Linked to the latter also is contemplation of whether South Africa will provide lines of credit given the economic situation it is facing of a pending downgrade to junk status by international credit ratings agencies. Also compounding the economic vulnerability of the country is that, despite having reserves under the ARF, there are already indications that the National Treasury is going to be reducing the budget allocation to the ARF. These various issues related to the financing mechanism of South Africa’s development cooperation structure are pulse points for what will be the future trajectory of the country’s role as a development actor.

Under the proposed framework of SADPA, it does seem that the financial uncertainty is being addressed; it is argued that the framework will not disburse loans but act more as a facilitator of transactions. It seems that the dispensing of funds will be left to the domestic development financial institutions such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC). Moreover, despite potential budgetary cuts, SADPA’s source of money will be from multiple funding pots including public and private stakeholders, investments, international donors, and revenue from projects. Although with a credit rating cut to junk status looming, international donors and private investors may be more cautious of their financial commitments to the Partnership Fund for Development.

Nevertheless, the SADPA framework will have to consider what kind of projects it will prioritize and how to consolidate South Africa's role as a development actor. At present it probably will be those grants (including in-kind assistance), as well as technical cooperation programmes, that advance a democratic governance norm trajectory.

Fourth, are the issues of monitoring, evaluation, and oversight regarding the impact of South Africa's development cooperation engagements. In the current policy environment DIRCO's reporting mechanism to Parliament is weak and very general in response to effects. The current practice of reporting is broad and just states what has been disbursed in terms of activities, with almost no targets set to measure how impacts are being monitored. The Portfolio Committee in Parliament has raised concerns in this regard (Table 6.2).

To this end it is anticipated that the new development cooperation structure managed under the auspices of SADPA will develop strict and rigorous monitoring and evaluation criteria based on more project site inspections. The need for a robust monitoring and evaluation framework also will require a narrower set of assessment tools for reviewing the selection of projects as well as feasibility studies. The latter will require a professionalized development cooperation bureaucracy—that is, including technical experts and diplomats—under the new structure that has the requisite capacity to work with other ministries, especially the Finance Ministry and the Department of Performance, Monitoring, and Evaluation, to initiate more effective aid frameworks.

In part, South Africa will have to consider how the principles of aid were set out in the Paris Declaration, the Accra Conference, and more recently the Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness adopted at the 2011 Busan Conference; they should form part of a new monitoring and evaluation (M&E) structure. The difficulty will be that, while Pretoria in principle aligns to these global aid effectiveness protocols, it will need to find a balance between how such frameworks will fit into its broader principles of SSC and its growing trajectory towards the Global South. Into this mix consideration also must be given to whether the M&E framework will be a one-size-fits-all, especially when the private sector is involved. Here it may be useful to engage with corporate structures that can assist in setting targets for evaluation. Having such a coherent M&E structure also will provide Parliament with a better-coordinated strategy in their oversight functions around the government's mandate and the impact on development cooperation, which at present is vague.

Table 6.2 Key Performance Indicators, Planned Targets, and Actual Achievements

| <i>Programme, activity, or objective</i> | Actual achievement, 2013–2014 | Planned target, 2014–2015 | Actual achievement, 2014–2015 | Deviation from planned target to actual achievement, 2014–2015 | Comment on deviations |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of requests responded to for the quality assurance and review of project proposals in preparation for the ARF board meeting | 100% of requests responded to for the quality assurance and review of project proposals in preparation for the ARF board meeting have been achieved | 100% of requests received responded to timely as per objective of project plan | 100% of requests responded to for the quality assurance and review of project proposals in preparation for the ARF board meeting have been achieved | None | None |
| Number of ARF structures and processes convened to identify and recommend projects | 23 project proposals have been reviewed and submitted to committee meetings | 4 Advisory Committee meetings held to consider project proposals for recommendation | 5 Advisory Committee meetings held to consider project proposals for recommendation | 1 ad hoc Advisory Committee meeting held | Urgent project proposals had to be considered by the ARF Advisory Committee |
| Percentage of approved disbursement processed | 100% of approved disbursements distributed during this reporting period | 100% of approved disbursements distributed during this reporting period | 100% of approved disbursements distributed during this reporting period | 13 approved ARF projects disbursements processed | None |

Source: DIRCO Annual Report 2014–2015

Fifth, SADPA is supposed to manage and coordinate all aspects of South Africa's outgoing development cooperation, including bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral partnerships. The National Treasury will have control over all incoming assistance. SADPA is to function as a central hub for how South Africa conducts its international development cooperation. But, of course, given the depth of development cooperation activities carried out across the country, this would require that SADPA also include the development partnerships and engagements of subsidiary national actors. Trying to map out the level of development cooperation that takes place at the provincial, local, and city to city levels is a mammoth undertaking, which at present has not even played a part of the discussions regarding the new SADPA structure.

Finally, the inclusion of the private sector as a stakeholder is an area that warrants greater attention. The role that the private sector can play in Public–Private Partnerships has not been adequately explored, but it is one that can assist the South African authorities in providing more efficacy to its development cooperation both in monetary and nonmonetary terms. Unfortunately, the private sector and the government need to have more robust discussions about how each can complement the other under the new SADPA structure. For this to happen the level of trust between the two sides needs to be addressed, especially in the current global architecture where the private sector is seen as a strategic actor in the attainment of the sustainable development goals.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to provide a general overview of South Africa's development cooperation framework as it fits into the discourse of SSC. To this end it would seem that South Africa's approach to development cooperation is one that is embedded in the view of partnerships defined by the principles of South–South cooperation. The flagship programme of this approach is the ARF, which strengthens the foreign policy focus of the African Agenda. In turn, the latter aligns Pretoria's national interests to a vision that a better Africa provides South Africa with the relevant legitimacy for it to see itself as championing the interests of the underdeveloped and marginalized countries. In broader terms development cooperation is seen as a vehicle to advance South Africa's foreign policy to address challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, and marginalization in Africa and the South. But then is this enough to constitute a pragmatic policy of development diplomacy and SSC?

Unfortunately, South Africa has no formal policy that defines the practical contours of how development cooperation is achieved through strategic orientation in foreign policy decision making. This is further weakened by the absence of a clearly defined SSC policy. The latter is often interpreted through the prism of assuming leadership positions in international institutions in order to influence outcomes through coalition-building.

The role that Pretoria undertakes in bilateral, multilateral, and trilateral development cooperation partnerships, and more importantly with the pending establishment of SADPA brings into focus whether Pretoria's practices of development diplomacy through SSC can be realized in practice given its own domestic political and economic tensions and weaknesses. Such limitations are seen in the perceived tensions between rhetoric and reality where Pretoria's development cooperation needs to effectively consider:

- Inconsistencies between stated policy and practice
- Tensions between values (e.g. adhering to a human rights infused focus) and interests
- Ambiguity between a nonhegemonic focus in foreign affairs yet taking a more proactive approach to its development cooperation engagements based on expanding its self-interests
- Balancing domestic priorities with international obligations

With the new structure of SADPA still pending, the future direction of South Africa's programme of development cooperation may have to become more specific as to what it intends to achieve as a development actor. In this regard the current format of SADPA is more of a technical document rather than a strategic focus and orientation of what defines South Africa's paradigm of development cooperation. This means that Pretoria has to be have a coherent conceptual policy that not only incorporates the broad ambit of South-South "cooperation in the exchange of knowledge, skills transfer and technical know-how in trade, investment and finance."⁴³ One that, however, also signals how South Africa intends to carry out its development programme in a manner that plays to its strengths. One such area that needs to be reflected on is how South Africa will align its interests with developed and developing partners, especially because Pretoria's development assistance in material terms is negligible. Here, developing strategic partnerships based on how South Africa can utilize trilateral engagements as a way to pursue the objectives that serve its foreign policy interests will be significant.

NOTES

1. Mandela, Nelson. 1993. "South Africa's future Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5).
2. Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite. 2011. *Remarks by Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, on the occasion of the O. R. Tambo Dinner during the Heads of Mission*, Velmore Conference Centre, Pretoria, 14 July. Available at <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0715.html> (accessed 15 November 2015).
3. See Kornegay, Francis, 2012. "South Africa and Emerging Powers" in, *South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 1* edited by Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA Publishers, pp. 204–205.
4. See Maxi Schoeman, 2004. "South Africa as an Emerging Power 1994–2003" in *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004* edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp. 349–367.
5. *Ibid*
6. *Ibid*, pg. 354
7. *Ibid*, pg. 354
8. The Kimberley Process is a joint initiative between governments, business and civil society aimed at stemming the flow of trade in diamonds (known as rough or conflict diamonds) being used to finance conflicts. Initiated around 2000 the process has seen the adoption of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which imposes strict requirements on members to demonstrate that the shipment of rough diamonds as conflict free. For more see: <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com>
9. *Ibid*, pg. 365
10. Smith, Karen. 2015. "Soft Power: The essence of South Africa's foreign policy" in *South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 1* edited by Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk. Pretoria: AISA Publishers, pg. 69.
11. See Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012. *White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy: Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu*, Pretoria, pg. 6.
12. Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere, 2004. "South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity?" *Review of African Political Economy* 31(100), pp. 283–297.
13. The African Agenda is defined by Pretoria as peace, stability and development. The view by the South African government is that peace and stability are prerequisites for development to take place across the continent. The drivers or focus of the African Agenda is: 1) Strengthen the capacity of the African Union and its structures; 2) Strengthen and Support governance and technical decision-making capabilities at the regional level, especially

in SADC; 3) Contribute and Strengthen Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development among African states; 4) Advocate and Support an African standby Force aimed at promoting and strengthening peace and security across the continent. In recent years South Africa has seen its membership of BRICS as assisting African countries gaining a better foothold in relations with BRIC partners through the African Outreach Platform that was established in 2013 at the Durban BRICS Summit. In addition, during its rotational presidency of the UN Security Council in January 2012 South Africa presented and got Resolution 2033 approved which advocated for closer relations and alignment between the UNSC and AU on peace and security interventions. Under President Jacob Zuma South Africa proposed the creation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), as an interim measure, while the African Standby Force was being finalized in 2015. More recently the African Agenda has focused on strengthening regional integration and cooperation as key drivers of Africa's development processes. The New Partnership supports this for Africa's Development, which South Africa spearheaded under the Mbeki Presidency with Nigeria and Algeria. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is the other part of the peace and stability approach that South Africa led on when the Constitutive Act transforming the Organization of African Unity into the African Union was adopted in 2001. Finally South Africa places the African Agenda as the heart of its global activities based on the view that Africa's political, economic and social development is integral to its own development nexus.

14. See Department of Public Monitoring and Evaluation (2015) "Background Paper: South Africa and the Global Arena", *Twenty Year Review: South Africa 1994–2014*. Op cit. pg. 17
15. The Bandung Conference took place in 1955, Indonesia. The Conference laid the foundation for solidarity against colonialism, imperialism, and the Cold War. The conference sketched out an ideological roadmap of non-alignment based on the values of mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, non-interference and non-aggression. 2015 marked the 60th Anniversary of the conference where in the spirit of Bandung is evolving to include current realities such as global political and economic governance reforms, non-traditional security threats and better monitoring modalities in development cooperation. See Mulakala, Anthea. 2015 "Reflecting on 60 Years of South-South Cooperation: Then and Now," *Asia: Weekly Insights and Analysis*, 4 November. Available at: <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2015/11/04/reflecting-on-60-years-of-south-south-cooperation-then-and-now/> (accessed on 10 December 2015). Also See Chaturvedi, Sachin. 2012. "Development Cooperation: Contours, Evolution and Scope" in *Developing Cooperation and Emerging Powers: New Partners or*

- Old Patterns* edited by Sachin Chaurvedi, Thomas Fues and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. UK: Zed Books, pp13–36.
16. The countries are: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa.
 17. See Ensor, Linda. 2015. "SA 'not getting a fair share' of regional customs revenue", *Business Day*, March 9. Accessed May 25, 2016. Available at: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2015/03/09/sa-not-getting-a-fair-share-of-regional-customs-revenue>
 18. Vickers, Brendan. 2012. "Towards a New Aid Paradigm: South Africa as African Development Partner", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol 25(4), pg. 5.
 19. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO): *Annual Reports of African Renaissance Fund* (2004/2005, 2006/2007).
 20. For more on the IBSA grouping, see Naidu, Sanusha. 2006. "IBSA: A Pragmatic Voice of the South or Vending Machine of Competing or Diffused Interests" in *Synopsis*. Vol. 8(2), June. Centre for Policy Studies: Johannesburg. Available at: http://cps.org.za/cps%20pdf/Syn8_2_Jun2006.pdf Accessed December 15, 2015. Also see Landsberg, Chris and Lesley Masters. 2015. "IBSA Trilateral Constellation and its development fund? Values pioneers in development cooperation?" The *South African Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 22. Issue 3.
 21. See Naidu, Sanusha, 2013. "South Africa and the BRIC: Punching above its weight" in *New South African Review 3: The Second Phase – Tragedy or Farce?* edited by John Daniel, Prishani Naidoo, Devan Pillay and Roger Southerall. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, pp. 298–300. In this chapter Naidu highlights that in the initial period of the Zuma Administration there was a sense of continuity that South Africa's foreign policy was seen as remaining committed to the policy doctrines of the Mbeki. Naidu goes on to highlight the Zuma Presidency showing bold leadership in highlighting when it noted continued support for the International Criminal Court as well as demonstrating a more enduring approach to smoothing out regional tensions with Angola.
 22. See Naidu (2013), *op cit*, for more on SA's membership into the BRICS.
 23. Freemantle, Simon & Jeremy Stevens. 2011. "Beyond the Diplomatic Applause: Threats and Opportunities underlying South Africa's Bric Invitation," *Standard Bank Research Reports: BRIC and Africa (Economic Strategy)*, January 26. Johannesburg.
 24. Interview with a strategic think tank on India's foreign policy issues, New Delhi, 13 January 2016.
 25. See Kornegay, Francis.2015. "South Africa and the Global South in Critical Perspective" in *South African Foreign Policy Review: Volume 2* edited by in Lesley Masters, Siphamandla Zondi, Jo-Ansie van Wyk and Chris Landsberg. Pretoria. AISA Publishers, pp. 233–236.

26. Interview conducted with *IBSA Division*, South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 28 October 2016. Similar interviews were conducted in Brasilia (Brazil) with the *Institute for Applied Economic Research* (IPEA), 8 December 2015, and in New Delhi with the *Research Information Systems* (RIS), 10 January 2016.
27. Each IBSA member contributes only US\$1 million annually to the Fund while the BRICS Development Bank sees contributions totalling US\$10 billion by each member in the initial stages.
28. Kornegay.2015. *Op Cit*, pg. 236.
29. See ANC 52nd National Conference Resolutions.2007. December 20. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2536>. Accessed December 15, 2015. Also see The ANC 53rd National Conference Resolutions. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/res/2013/resolutions53r.pdf>. Accessed December 15, 2015. pg. 46.
30. See Le Pere, Garth. 2015. "Critical Themes in South Africa's Foreign Policy: An Overview" *Strategic Review for Southern African*. Volume 36. No 2. Available at [http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol36\(2\)/04-le-pere-pp-31-56.zp39575.pdf](http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol36(2)/04-le-pere-pp-31-56.zp39575.pdf). Accessed January 20 2016. Pg. 48.
31. See Elizabeth Sidiropoulos.2012."South Africa: development, international cooperation and soft power" in *Developing Cooperation and Emerging Powers: New Partners or Old Patterns* edited by Sachin Chaurvedi, Thomas Fues and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. Op cit, pp. 216–242 for an overview of South Africa role in international development cooperation.
32. For more SADPA, see Besharati, Neissan Alessandro. 2015."The Case of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)" in *Institutional Architecture and Development: Responses from Emerging Powers* edited by Elizabeth Sidiropoulus, Jorge A. Perez Pineda, Sachin Chaturvedi and Thomas Fues., Johannesburg: Jacana Media, pp. 186–206.
33. See ANC 53rd National Conference Resolutions, op cit, pg. 46.
34. Confidential Interview, DIRCO, November 2015.
35. Confidential interviews, India, Brazil, and South Africa, November, 2015, December 2015 and January 2016.
36. Confidential Interview Research Information Systems (RIS), New Delhi, India, 13 January 2016.
37. Alden, Chris and Maxi Schoeman. 2013, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in transforming the global order", *International Affairs*, 89 (1), pg. 113.
38. Habib, Habib. 2013. *South Africa's Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects*. Johannesburg. Wits University Press, pg. 199.

39. See Naidu, Sanusha 2015. ANC Discussion Document: Mapping a Foreign Policy engagement? *SABC Online*. October 10, 2015. Available at: <http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/d7645b804a27edea2ebeba53d9712f0/ANC-discussion-documents:-Mapping-a-foreign-policy-engagement-20151010> Accessed October 31 2015. Also see ANC Discussion Document prepared for National General Council Meeting, "A Better Africa in a Better and Just World" August 17, 2015. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2015/relationsz.pdf> Accessed August 30, 2015.
40. Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite, 2012. SA's aim: champion of Africa's interests abroad, *Sunday Independent*, January 15. Available at: <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-277305566.html> Accessed October 10, 2015.
41. Alden and Schoeman. *Ibid*, pg. 116.
42. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012. *Ibid*.
43. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).2010. *Economic Development in Africa Report: SSC: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership*. Geneva: UNCTAD.

PART II

Is Another Cooperation Possible?
Cultivating Difference, Building
Bridges

Venezuela and South–South Cooperation: Solidarity or *Realpolitik*?

José Briceño-Ruiz

INTRODUCTION

Venezuela has been an actor in the recent wave of South–South cooperation (SSC) that has developed since the beginning of the new millennium. The logic of Venezuelan SSC, however, has transformed since the rise to power of Hugo Chávez Frías in 1999, and in particular after his victory in the recall referendum convened by the Venezuelan political opposition in 2004. Chávez’s aim was to transform Venezuela’s foreign policy, and he was committed to expanding relations with the global South beyond the traditional Venezuelan space of cooperation and influence. A favourable context of high oil prices allowed Chávez to develop an “oil diplomacy” and to launch initiatives of cooperation in energy, education, and health. Similarly, spaces of political dialogue, such as the Africa–South America (ASA) summits and the China–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) summits, were supported.

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In the 2000s, these practices were extended and transformed and Venezuela in the Chávez era became an important actor in the global South. In addition, as a middle-income country, it was a major driver in the new dynamics of SSC both in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as beyond the Western Hemisphere. This chapter analyzes the increasing involvement of Venezuela in initiatives of SSC, their motivations and scope. It also shows how Venezuelan authorities tried to distinguish their SSC policy from traditional forms of North–South Cooperation (NSC).

The main argument presented here is that the promotion and diversification of initiatives of SSC are closely related—or even conditional—to the foreign policy objectives of the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution.” Ideology, the domestic political cycle, and the vision and personality of Chávez are key to understanding Venezuela’s SSC. The construction of a multipolar world, the fight against neoliberalism and capitalism, and the promotion of a new model of noncapitalist regional integration have had great influence in the design and implementation of cooperation with countries of the global South.

The first section of the chapter is devoted to analyzing the political motivations of the Venezuelan SSC initiatives by linking these later to the global foreign policy objectives promoted by Caracas. The second section examines the cases of concrete programs of SSC in the spheres of political cooperation, technical assistance, and economic cooperation with countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. The concluding remarks evaluate whether Venezuelan initiatives are based on solidarity or *realpolitik* and highlight possible trends for the future of SSC during the post-Chávez era.

THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC REASONS OF VENEZUELAN SSC

The literature dealing with the drivers of SSC highlights the diverse nature of the initiatives led by developing countries. In contrast to NSC, SSC would not be based on economic or political self-interest but on solidarity with other countries of the global South. In contrast to NSC, which supposedly is based on charity and benevolence, SSC claims to be framed by claims of mutual benefit and solidarity (Mawdsley 2012, 265). Thus, while NSC would be motivated by self-interest and conditionality, SSC would be based on post-colonial solidarity and nonconditionality. Similarly, NSC would be based on the superior knowledge, institutions, science, and

technology of donors, which normally do not give access to or transfer that knowledge. By contrast, SSC implies the sharing of expertise based on the direct experience of pursuing development (i.e. improvement of circumstances) in a poor country.

The claim of solidarity as the motivation of the SSC is however a contested issue in the realms of International Relations and International Political Economy (Mawdsley 2012, 263–264). Motivations are crucial because they are closely related to the values that SSC aims to promote. These values are manifested in certain practices and interactions of SSC that aim to set up a particular type of global or regional order. Moreover, SSC also is promoted because of political and strategic reasons. From the Bandung Summit to the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) group, SSC has been associated with goals such as the southern countries' increase of bargaining power, the reform of global institutions, the democratization of international relations, and the challenge of Northern hegemony. Certainly, the logic and instruments of SSC are different from those of NSC, which is manifested in principles such as nonintervention, respect for sovereignty, and nonreciprocity. Thus, as Benzi and Zapata assert, the SSC experiences “unequivocally suggest that the direct and symbiotic relationship between aid, foreign policy and security, trade and economic interests and power projection inherent to the North South Cooperation also exists in the case of South–South [cooperation]” (2013, 68).

The case of Venezuela confirms the political and strategic motivations of SSC. Venezuela became a significant player in the field of international cooperation during the Chávez era. International cooperation is not something new in the Venezuelan government international behaviour. However, the preferential area where Caracas developed its programs, such as the Puerto Ordaz Agreement (1976) and the San José Agreement (1980), was the Caribbean Basin. These two initiatives were based on certain premises that one also can find in the initiatives fostered in Hugo Chávez's administration.

First, both the Puerto Ordaz and San José agreement sought the projection of Venezuelan interests and narratives into the Caribbean. In a context of decolonization of the Caribbean islands, revolutionary civil war in Central America and the expansion of Cuban influence in the region—even in Venezuelan neighbours such as Grenada and Guyana—the programs of cooperation were linked to a narrative of the defence of democracy that was considered a national foreign policy goal. Behind the narrative, the interest was to preserve the stability of the area, a region that

was crucial to Venezuelan national security and even its economy because the Caribbean Sea is the major trade route for Venezuelan exports, mainly oil. This interest in the Caribbean region remained in Chávez strategy, even if the defence of democracy was minor.

Second, these initiatives used oil as a foreign policy tool. Thus, Carlos Andrés Pérez was the initiator of the so-called “oil diplomacy,” in which oil was an instrument to promote Venezuelan international projection. At the global level, Venezuela had been a member of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since its early years in the 1960s, and during the Carlos Andrés Pérez (1973–1979) administration supported initiatives such as the formation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and, at Latin American level, the creation in 1976 of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA).

Despite these continuities, in particular regarding oil diplomacy, the Hugo Chávez foreign policy aimed at producing a rupture with other aspects of the traditional policy had promoted by Venezuela since 1958. The expressions “oil diplomacy” and “petro politics” refer to two different phenomena: (1) the result of applying force and hegemony to control this energy resource and (2) the use of oil wealth to influence events in other countries (Arriagada 2006, 1). Arriagada points out that oil diplomacy is nothing new to Venezuela. As a founding member of the Organization of Exporting Petroleum Countries (OPEC), Venezuela managed to stabilize its own oil income in the long run. Following the increase of oil prices in 1973–1974, Venezuela perceived itself as a regional power that could use its oil wealth to influence other countries in the region (Poertner 2011, 87). With the Puerto Ordaz Agreement signed in December 1974, Venezuela agreed to deliver oil to six Central American countries (i.e. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) under favourable financial terms. The San José Accord (1980) integrated Mexico as an oil exporter and expanded the use of partially loan-based oil sales to Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica, in addition to the other six countries. The agreement introduced a loan scheme involving 30% of the oil sales, which would be repaid at an interest rate of 4% over five years (Poertner 2011, 88).

Since the period 1999–2004, Venezuela’s foreign policy began to be restructured again on four new premises: (1) the promotion of a multipolar world, (2) the Bolivarian ideal of regionalism, (3) the fight against neoliberalism, and (4) the strengthening of SSC. During his electoral campaign in 1998, Hugo Chávez presented some of his main foreign policy ideas:

The world in the 21st century will not be bipolar, it will not be unipolar either, thank God it will be multipolar; we have the North American pole, the European pole, the Asian pole will reunify, China is rising, the Asian tigers have a great strength to rise, too. Well, I think that we have the right to impulse this trend, we have an obligation to build a real global pole in this part of the world, in this part of the American continent. Venezuela has an ideal location for this, from a geopolitical perspective, to be a sort of a hinge between Mercosur, the Andean Community of Nations and the Caribbean. ... Our North is the South. (Chávez in *Movimiento Quinta República* 1998, 108)

Once Chávez was in power, the National Plan of 2001–2007 introduced the bases of Venezuela’s new foreign policy. One of the main objectives enacted in this document was the promotion of a multipolar world; through the promotion of concerted action among developing countries and international cooperation, Latin American and Caribbean integration and the diversification of relations.¹ Section 5.3.2 of the Plan states:

The strengthening of relationships between Latin American, African and Asian countries will be possible if the organisms of consultation and conciliation such as the G15, G77, the non-aligned movement and the Rio Group improve their means of actions. Venezuela will strongly support such attempts. (República Bolivariana de Venezuela 2001, 157)

Chávez highlighted the need for a multipolar world, which in reality meant the rejection of the post-Cold War global order that had initially been based on the “unipolarism” of the United States (USA). For Chávez, this situation produced serious asymmetries in the international system and, as a consequence, he stated that “alternative poles of power” should be created in order to restore some balance. The promotion of a multipolar world led Chávez to foster “an independent foreign policy,” which was manifested in closer relationships with countries (e.g. Cuba, China, Brazil, Iran, and Russia) in the perspective of contributing to the construction of alternative poles to unipolarism.

Another pillar of Chávez’s foreign policy was the promotion of Latin American regionalism. Thus, he tried to rescue Simón Bolívar’s plan to create a Latin American community of nations, which would become a pole of power in the world. This objective was part of Chávez’s government program for the period 2000–2006; it asserted that “the Bolivarian dream to constitute a great Confederation of racially mixed nations of the continent

is still valid. This is not a utopia. Rather, it is crucial to strengthen and to give consistency to all and each of the nations of our political, cultural and geographic space” (Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo 2003). This strategy excluded the USA and rejected its proposal of establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Briceño-Ruiz 2006, 2011a).

The fight against neoliberalism became a foreign policy goal once the Bolivarian Revolution decided to modify the strategy of economic development based on the Washington Consensus. This objective was related to the goal of furthering a Latin American–Bolivarian approach to regional integration and cooperation. Chávez rejected not only the adoption of neoliberal policies at the domestic level but also criticized the project of a new regionalism in the Americas, in particular initiatives such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the FTAA.

Another objective of the Chávez government’s foreign policy was SSC. Venezuelan diplomacy initially intended to reactivate mechanisms of cooperation among developing nations, such as the Group of Fifteen, the Group of Sixty-Seven, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Group of Rio, among others. Venezuela also participated in the creation of the G20, a group of underdeveloped countries created at the World Trade Organization Trade Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun, Mexico, in November 2003.

A key element of this strategy was “oil diplomacy,” which had a twofold dimension. The first one was global: the restoration of the OPEC as a player in the determination of the prices of this product, as exemplified by the holding of an OPEC Summit of Heads of State held in Caracas in 2000. For Chávez, oil was a mechanism to foster SSC beyond the Caribbean Basin. Venezuela maintained special terms for the sale of oil to Central American and Caribbean countries, but also included new countries (e.g. Uruguay, Paraguay, and even Argentina). Similarly, Venezuela promoted joint ventures with countries (e.g. Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba) for the construction of refineries. Moreover, Chávez furthered the creation of a South American pipeline to send gas from Venezuela to Argentina. All these initiatives were part of more comprehensive proposals (e.g. Petrocaribe or Petroamerica).

In the context of rising oil prices, Chávez enhanced energy-related SSC and publicly launched the oil assistance programme for the Caribbean (i.e. Petrocaribe) in June 2005. Petrocaribe was conceived as a “coordinating and managing organization of the production, refinery, transport and supply of oil and gas in the Caribbean … with an institutional platform that includes a general secretary and a cooperation and investment fund.” Under this platform, Venezuela would supply oil with partial soft financing: 15 years of grace and an interest rate of 2% annually (Serbin 2010, 109–110).

Petroamerica was established as a continental alliance between oil state companies, under the of Petrocaribe base—Petrosur (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay) and Petroandina (i.e. Colombia, Perú, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) (Serbin 2010, 144). Petroamerica is framed under the *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America or ALBA),² and according to official documents this regional scheme is based on the principles of solidarity and complementarity between the peoples (PDVSA 2016). When an agreement was signed with the Dominican Republic, Chávez presented the philosophy of the programme in a speech:

Venezuela possesses the first oil reserve in the world and the first gas reserve on the continent. ... We would like to share it ... in priority with the people in our neighbour countries, our brothers. In our view it is not fair that, with such quantities of oil and gas amongst us, there are electricity cuts in the Dominican Republic, that there is a lack of electricity for the development of Northern Brazil, that Colombia does not have enough electricity for the peoples at the border, in the South or in the West, that Haiti is deprived of the electricity plants to provide hospitals with energy, Grenada and all these brothers of ours. It is not fair, Venezuela has revived its deep Bolivarian roots and we would like to show it with more than words, with the true unity that will make us free.³ (Chávez, quoted in PDVSA 2016)

Another innovative aspect of the SSC strategy was the concrete actions of financial aid and technical assistance, sometimes as a donor, other times as a receiver, with China, Russia, Byelorussia, Iran, and some African countries (Briceño-Ruiz 2006). The new phase in the conceptual construction of the Venezuelan foreign policy began in 2004. The traditional interest in the Caribbean Basin had remained in the early years of the Chávez government and a new agreement to provide oil in special conditions to this region was reached in 2000—the Caracas Energy Agreement. The innovation of this later was the inclusion of Cuba, excluded both from the Puerto Ordaz and San José agreements because of geopolitical reasons. Similarly, SSC was included as one of the goals of the Government *Plan de la Nación 2001–2007*. Notwithstanding these initiatives, SSC certainly was not the main concern in those years, marked by the establishment of the bases of the new government—that is, the approval of a new Constitution, and what it was called the re-legitimizing elections in 2000.

Later, Chávez's major political concern was to remain in power in a context of growing political polarization that led to a failed coup d'état in April 2002 and an oil strike furthered by technocrats of the

Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, Sociedad Anónima (PDVSA), in December 2002–January 2003. Chávez succeeded in both cases and the opposition's attempts to overthrow his government failed. Despite those failures, the opposition decided to convene a recall referendum that took place on August 2004. The result overwhelmed the opposition: Chávez won with 59% of the votes. At that moment, a new era of Chávez's power started, characterized by political and economic hegemony.

Once Chávez controlled the Venezuelan domestic political system, he was able to develop an international strategy to position the country as an important actor in hemispheric and global affairs. The increasing hostility vis-à-vis the USA, blamed for having supported the opposition sectors during the failed coup d'état of 2002, produced a transformation of the narrative based on a criticism to unipolarism to anti-imperialism, closer to the discourse followed by Fidel Castro since the 1960s. By the same token, after the adoption of "socialism for the twenty-first century," the anti-capitalist discourse complemented the criticism to neoliberalism. At that moment, the problem for Chávez was not a particular way to understand capitalism (i.e. neoliberalism) but the capitalist system itself.

Chávez relaunched his international agenda and a new foreign policy strategy was designed (see Briceño Ruiz 2011a; Gonzalez Urrutia 2005; Serbin 2008). In this context, South–South cooperation and regional integration in Latin America were fundamental goals in Venezuela's international strategy. Caracas played a crucial role in the creation of the UNASUR and CELAC. The Chávez government applied for full membership in Mercosur and ALBA was transformed from a unilateral Venezuelan initiative into a regional bloc aimed at developing a new model of regional integration (see Briceño-Ruiz 2011a, b). In the field of SSC, the favourable conditions created by high oil prices allowed authorities to create new programmes and initiatives in Latin America, the Caribbean, and in the other regions of the Global South, particularly in Africa.

DIVERSITY OF MODALITIES OF THE VENEZUELAN SSC

After 2004, the Venezuelan government advanced a diversity of political, technical and economic forms of South–South cooperation.

Political cooperation is related to the objective of constructing a multipolar world. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Chávez became a leader in the promotion of regional initiatives of political dialogue

and cooperation through UNASUR and CELAC. The objectives of UNASUR include finance, infrastructure, social policies, and the solution of political crisis, in order to provide an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS).

The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America has been the real instrument of political cooperation in which Venezuela has had a hegemonic role. While the ideological diversity in UNASUR and CELAC led on many occasions to the quest for a minimum common denominator, the ideological uniformity in ALBA has allowed adoption of policies that coincided with the Venezuelan foreign policy objectives. Born in December 2001 as a Venezuelan alternative to the FTAA, ALBA became a regional space after the signing of the Havana agreements in December 2004. It then became a mechanism of regional cooperation in social and economic spheres based on cooperation, solidarity, and complementarity. This is the reason why it is described in the official documents of its member countries as a new model of regional integration. Finally, ALBA is an instrument of political cooperation meant to establish a multipolar world and to promote anti-imperialism, a narrative that Chávez (and currently Nicolás Maduro Moros) created and that leaders have shared—for example, Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Raúl Castro (Cuba), or Rafael Correa (Ecuador).

Political cooperation in ALBA is linked to the confrontation with the USA and the criticism of the international order and its institutions both at global and regional levels. ALBA has been a space to promote an alternative view of democracy (i.e. participative democracy) that contrasts with the traditional representative democracy fostered by the USA and the OAS in the Interamerican Democratic Charter (IADC). ALBA has had common positions vis-à-vis coup d'états in Honduras (2009) and Paraguay (2012) and the political crises in Ecuador in 2010 and Venezuela in 2014; it always has rejected attempts to remove the governments of those countries. Finally, ALBA also has adopted common positions on global issues—for example, in the Copenhagen Climate Summit held in the Danish capital in December 2009.

The second dimension of Venezuelan actions is *technical* cooperation. Venezuela has been mainly a receptor of technical cooperation from other countries of the Global South. In the Latin American sphere, Venezuela has strengthened its technical cooperation with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Cuba in sectors such as health, agriculture and agro-food, environment, energy, and education, among others. In the case of Argentina in

2010, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and the Argentinean President, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, endorsed 25 cooperation agreements, some of them devoted to promoting technical cooperation in energy, the construction sector, and food production.

In 2010 Venezuela also signed various agreements on technical cooperation with Brazil, examples of which are the Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a National System of Production of Seeds of High Strategic Value; another memorandum concerned the creation of productive centres in the Venezuelan states of Bolívar, Amazonas, Anzoátegui, and Monagas. Venezuela subscribed in 2010 to an Agreement of Cooperation on Food Security and Sovereignty with Uruguay that included technical cooperation. In the field of the petroleum industry, Venezuela has provided technical assistance in oil refining to Ecuador and in the production of gas to Bolivia.

Economic cooperation is the area in which Venezuela has developed major programmes with the Caribbean and Latin American countries. At least three areas of cooperation can be seen: social, financial, and energy. The initiatives of economic cooperation are linked to the goal of promoting new forms of global and regional relationships beyond the logic of competition that is implicit in neoliberalism. As a consequence, they are related to the foreign policy objective of fighting against laissez-faire economic liberalism.

Cooperation in the social arena is related to what has been known as the “internationalization of the *Misiones*”—namely, the implementation in certain Latin American and Caribbean countries, mostly members of ALBA, of the social programmes put into practice in Venezuela since 2004. The *Misiones* were social plans in the fields of health and education developed with the assistance of the Cuban government. One of these programmes is the *Misión Milagro*, which provided free medical attention and free eyes surgery to low-income people in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Belize, Ecuador, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, Chile, Nicaragua, and Argentina.

It has been alleged that “Miracle Mission has helped 3,470,206 patients around the world, although mainly in Latin America” ([Telesur 2014](#)). However, specialists argue that “it is not clear how many patients have really been examined or treated by *Misión Milagro* since 2004 [because] there are often contradictory reports in the literature, coming mostly from newspapers. Most of those reports tend to be non-scientific and strongly focused on political propaganda” ([Furtado et al. 2010](#), 397). Beyond this debate, what is clear is the leading role of Venezuela in its implementation. The

beneficiaries are sometimes transported to Venezuela and operated on by Cuban doctors; other times, the beneficiaries go to Cuba; and, in other cases, the doctors and medical equipment travel to the beneficiary countries (Ojeda Medina 2010, 169).

Another example is the *Misión Yo sí Puedo* (“Yes I can”), a social programme also managed by Cuban specialists; its goal is to teach illiterates how to read. As an instance of triangular SSC, *Yo sí Puedo* is to a large extent financed with Venezuelan resources but implemented by Cuban specialists. According to Cuban president Raúl Castro, more than 5,000,000 people are now literate because of the *Yo sí Puedo* programme (CubaSi, 20 April 2015). These initiatives’ purpose is to export the Venezuelan social model represented by the *Misiones*.

Financial cooperation aims at creation mechanisms to diminish Latin American and Caribbean dependence on multilateral financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Examples of this are the Bank of the South, formally set up in December 2007, and the ALBA Bank, created in 2008. These initiatives have had an irregular development. The Bank of the South was originally conceived as kind of South America substitute to the IMF; however, this idea was not supported by various countries of the region. Later, the Bank was planned as an institution to finance economic development, but because the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) and the Brazilian Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (BNDES) played such a role, doubts emerged about the creation of overlapping institutions. The same applies to the ALBA Bank; it is not a suitable institution to deal with financial crisis but a source of financing for projects in areas such as health, education, energy, and so on.

The financial dimension of the Venezuelan SSC was developed mostly at the bilateral level. The oil boom allowed Caracas to provide assistance to like-minded leaders in Latin America, including US\$8.6 billion in financing to the Argentinean government (2005–2008) by underwriting its sovereign bonds, US\$300 million in Ecuadorean sovereign bonds in 2005, and US\$100 million in Paraguay in 2007 (Labaqui 2014, 38).

The flagship programme of the Venezuelan SSC in the energy sector is located in Petrocaribe. It was created in 2005 as an extension of the Caracas Energy Agreement endorsed in 2000. The Preamble of the agreement creating Petrocaribe states that the initiative aims at contributing “to the energy security, social and economic development, and to the integration of the Caribbean countries, through the sovereign

use of energy resources, all of this based on the integration principles called Bolivarian Alternative for America (ALBA)” (Petrocaribe Energy Cooperation Agreement 2005, Preamble).

According to Benzi and Zapata (2013, 76), Petrocaribe has four dimensions: (1) a financing scheme of part of the energy bill of the member countries, (2) measures to reduce intermediate and transport trade costs of oil and its derived products, (3) a social development fund, and (4) the promotion of energy efficiency. The financing scheme is by far the most important dimension of Petrocaribe.⁴ Beyond this, investments in social and development projects should be implemented with the resources saved on oil purchases on special conditions. Thus, according to Acuña (2014):

[O]nce Petrocaribe members obtain loans from Caracas for the purchase of oil, they can then redirect the savings they have made as they see fit, or apply to the ALBA–Caribe fund, which then helps with further financing for projects in housing, the provision of water and electricity to impoverished communities, or the creation of roads among other developmental objectives. (73)

In contrast to the Caribbean Basin, Africa has not been a geopolitical priority for Venezuela. Caracas established diplomatic relations with Egypt and Ethiopia during the 1950s, and the Venezuelan government supported the autodetermination and independence of the African territories during the 1960s. Afterward, leaders (e.g. Carlos Andrés Pérez) made efforts to expand relations with some African countries in the context of Third Worldism and the NAM. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan presence in Africa until 2004 was quite limited because just eight embassies were opened—Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Namibia, South Africa, and Kenya. Similarly, Venezuela approved only 30 cooperation agreements with African countries between 1957 and 2004 (Mata Carnevali 2012a, 158).

Under Chávez’s aegis, Venezuela actually reshaped the pattern of relations with Africa. According to Lucena Morelo (2013, 137) the country’s interest in Africa was framed under a new conception of the national foreign policy, focused in the creation of a multipolar world and the construction of a new geopolitical global map. It was a political move more than an economic one (interview with Camille Forite, RFI Español 2012). Thus, for example, at the February 2013 Africa South America Summit held in Malabo, Guinea Equatorial, the Minister of Foreign Relations Elías Jaua read a letter from Chávez that had a post-colonial and anti-imperialist tone:

The numerous imperialistic invasions and bombings, which discard political and peaceful solutions to domestic conflicts in different nations of Africa, were seeking to impede the consolidation of the unity of the peoples of Africa and, consequently, the deepening of their relations with the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean. ... Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the neo-colonial strategy has divided the most vulnerable nations of the world so as to impose a slaver-like relation of dependence...⁵

In the Venezuelan National Plan of 2007–2013, the chapter entitled *Nueva Geopolítica Internacional* (New International Geopolitics) puts the emphasis on becoming a key actor in the development of a multipolar world, by diversification and creation of new power poles (see República Bolivariana de Venezuela 2007). In this framework, Africa gains importance for global integration through the development of South–South exchanges (Forite 2012, 65).

Before Chávez, the embassies in Africa were “served by a lonely and ‘punished’ official, while in the domestic service, only two people dealt with African issues” (Matta Carnevali 2012b, 19). In 2005, Chávez modified that situation and created the Vice-Ministry for Africa as the branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for dealing with African affairs. An African Agenda also was approved to heighten cooperation with African countries in diverse areas such as energy, communications, education, science, technology, finance, health, culture, environment, transportation, and tourism. The goal was to promote an economic complementarity with Africa, even considering forms of Triangular Cooperation with Brazil, China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia (Lucena Morelo 2013, 139). In this context, Venezuela established diplomatic relations with 21 African countries. By the same token, 136 cooperation agreements were approved between 2004 and 2010 (Forite 2012, 67).

In the field of *political* cooperation, Venezuela participated as an observer in the African Union in 2005, the League of Arab States (that includes 10 African countries) in 2006, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) in 2009, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 2009 (Mata Carnevali, 2012b, 21). Chávez participated in the Summits of the African Union held in Banjul (2006) and Tripoli (2009). He also visited Gambia, Mali, Benin, Angola, South Africa, Algeria, and Libya (Mata Carnevali 2012b, 21).

The promotion of the Africa–South American Summits was a key element in the Venezuelan strategy. Certainly, in 2005 ASA was an idea of the presidents of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Brazil, Luiz Inácio (Lula)

da Silva, but Chávez contributed to it and became a main promoter of the creation of a mechanism of political dialogue between Africa and South America. As a result, the second ASA Summit was held in Margarita Island, Venezuela, in September 2009, with the presence of 30 leaders of both regions. The Summit was an opportunity for Chávez to present his view of the international system and of the role that peripheral regions (e.g. South America and Africa) should play in it. In his speech to open the Summit Chávez highlighted various aspects such as the construction of a multipolar world (Chávez 2009). The Summit's Final Declaration addressed issues such as the reform of UN Security Council. In the sphere of security, topics discussed were: the fight against human trafficking and nuclear proliferation, a commitment to international peace and security, and peaceful dispute settlement. The principle against the threat or use of force in international relations also was considered (see Declaration of Nueva Esparta 2009).

South-South cooperation also has been developed in the sphere of *technical* cooperation, albeit more moderately than with the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Thus, approximately 350 students from 20 African countries (i.e. Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Western Sahara, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Togo) have studied medicine and social sciences in Venezuela. Moreover, more than 100 Venezuelan expert technicians have gone to Algeria and Egypt to strengthen their energy sector (Mata Carnevali 2012b, 22).

Venezuela's economic cooperation in Africa mainly involves social programmes in the areas of health and education. *Adopta una Escuela en África* (Adopt a School in Africa) was launched in 2007 and has been implemented in 16 African countries. According to the Venezuelan Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations for Africa, Reinaldo Bolívar, the initiative has reached about 70,000 school-age children. It is a programme of assistance through which the Venezuelan embassies provide financial assistance to schools with shortages, by furnishing school supplies and helping with repairs to and maintenance of their buildings (Giacchi 2012, 54). Cooperation in health involved offering medical attention to African children with severe heart diseases at the Pediatrics Hospital Dr. Gilberto Rodríguez Ochoa in Caracas (Mata Carnevali 2012b, 21).

The focus on Africa and the proliferation of initiatives of SSC with African countries have been part of a general strategy that aims at increasing the Venezuelan presence in the global South. Similar efforts have been

made to further closer relations with countries in the Middle East (e.g. Syria and Palestine) and Euro-Asia (e.g. Iran, Byelorussia, and China). In the particular case of Africa, an additional factor that accompanied the SSC programmes was an increasing recognition at domestic level of the heritage of the Venezuelan Afro-descendent population, a factor especially highlighted by Hugo Chávez.

LOGIC AND FUTURE OF THE VENEZUELAN SSC: SOLIDARITY OR *REALPOLITIK*?

The Venezuelan government narrative highlights that the initiatives of SSC towards Latin American, the Caribbean, and African countries are not based on the traditional logic of self-interest, especially in the sphere of trade and investments. In contrast to the logic of benefits implicit in the NSC programmes, it alleges that Venezuela has been promoting new forms of associative relations based on solidarity, complementation, and mutual understanding. These principles have become the driving forces of schemes of regional integration (e.g. ALBA) or cooperation initiatives such as *Petrocaribe*, *Yo sí Puedo*, *Misión Milagro*, or *Adopta una Escuela en África*.

In this narrative, no economic or trade compensation has been behind these initiatives but rather a genuine interest in promoting links with countries that have experienced similar histories of colonization and imperialism. Similarly, the Venezuelan narrative also excludes any sort of altruism behind its SSC initiatives, but it has put forward the idea of mutual benefits among countries that also may help Venezuela to overcome some of its economic or social problems. In this narrative, the principles of horizontality, consensus, and equity have inspired the Venezuelan actions of SSC.

As Daniel Hellinger (2011) argues:

Venezuelan influence comes from both soft and hard power. Its soft power is ideological, stemming from the public rhetoric of Hugo Chávez and the relative success of its domestic model in achieving democracy as well as economic and human development. Its hard power comes mainly in the form of ‘oil diplomacy.’(57)

Venezuela presents itself at the regional and global scenario as a country that shares the benefits of the “oil boom” through a generous policy of cooperation with countries that would have serious financial problems if they had to pay for oil at international prices.

The “hard power”—namely, the oil diplomacy—is the mechanism used to build strategic alliances with countries that subscribe to the narrative of solidarity. The crux of the matter is that such a narrative is also related to foreign policy objectives promoted since the restructuration of the Venezuelan political system in the early 2000s. In other words, the actions of SSC in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa are related to Venezuela’s foreign policy goals.

It is normally argued that Venezuela’s cooperation actions are not oriented towards promoting economic interests. Nevertheless, oil diplomacy also has aimed to improve the Venezuelan influence in production and distribution of energy. Thus, the three African countries (i.e. Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria) with which Chávez envisioned expanding relations are OPEC members, and the reason behind the choice was their shared, common interest of defending oil prices. It is true that at first glance no economic interest is apparent for Petrocaribe, even if political and strategic goals existed. Nevertheless, failed initiatives, such as Petrosur, Petroandina, and Petroamerica, were intended to increase Venezuela’s presence in the energy markets of the Latin American countries.

The political goals of the Venezuelan SSC initiatives are easier to see. Fred Halliday has argued that revolutionary states aim at exporting the political and economic changes that they have promoted at a domestic level to the global level: “[R]evolutions have aspired to the internal transformations of societies, but equally they have sought to alter relations between states and nations. ... [I]n ideological and programmatic terms, a revolution aims to transform a society within: it has equally to be international, or it is nothing” (1999, 3). In the case of Venezuela, objectives, such as the construction of a multipolar world, a new international balance of power, and the reshaping of the logic of economic development by rejecting neoliberalism, clearly imply a challenge to the international status quo.

Initiatives, such as ALBA, Petrocaribe, and the rapprochement to Africa, are closely related to those foreign policy objectives. Venezuela, as a revolutionary state, needs to construct alliances and coalitions to advance its alternative agenda and the promotion of new forms of SSC are clearly related to that. This is a reason why economic cooperation is directed mainly towards countries with similar ideological projects (e.g. Cuba, Bolivia, or Nicaragua). In the case of the English-speaking Caribbean, the objective is to obtain the support of entities with recognized voting power in institutions such as the OAS. Thus, for example, when some members of the OAS Permanent Council proposed discussing the political crisis

Venezuela experienced in 2014 because of massive demonstrations that were violently suppressed, Venezuela's major allies were the Mercosur, ALBA, and Petrocaribe members.

In the case of Africa, relations were furthered especially with leaders who shared with Chávez his anti-systemic view of international relations such as Libya at the end of Mouhamad Gaddafi's era or Algeria ruled by Abdelaziz Bouteflika. In addition, oil played a crucial role in this process. Petrocaribe was politically attractive to the Caribbean countries because of the context of high oil prices after 2003. It was possible to pay for programmes (e.g. *Mision Milagro*, *Yo sí Puedo*, and *Una Escuela para África*) because of high oil prices. Algeria and Libya expanded their relations with Caracas due to ideological affinities but also because of their common interest in the framework of OPEC.

Ideas and interests explain the Venezuelan SSC initiatives. The Venezuelan SSC goal was to promote the diffusion of a narrative about the model of society, promoted by Chávez, through what Forite (2011, 117) has called "Social Oil-Diplomacy." At the same time, the Venezuelan government used SSC to build alliances to disseminate its revolutionary foreign policy agenda. Its South–South cooperation developed through oil diplomacy is closely related to the Venezuelan national political process, the export of the Bolivarian revolution, and the search for global leadership (Benzi and Zapata 2014, 74). Thus, although ideas on solidarity could be influential in the design of the Venezuelan SSC initiatives, interests matter and *realpolitik* has definitively played a crucial role in the plans directed towards Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa.

The result of the SSC strategy promoted by Hugo Chávez was an increasing role for Venezuela in Latin American regional politics. He became a real regional leader committed to promoting regionalism and paid the cost of such leadership. This was quite clear in the case of ALBA. Chávez succeeded in promoting what some authors have described as a "post-liberal regionalism" (Sanahuja 2010) or a "post-liberal regional order" (Chodor and McCarthy-Jones 2013). The convergence of Chávez with the ideas and strategies of other "post-liberal" regional leaders (e.g. Néstor Kirchner and Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva) led to a new period in the recent history of Latin American regionalism. Diana Tussie and Pia Riggirozzi (2012) have described it as post-hegemonic—because of the end of the neoliberal hegemony predominant during the 1990s—with a strong regional focus. In the case of Africa, the Venezuelan presence on the continent increased to levels unheard of in the diplomatic history of the country.

Doubts exist about the possibility of continuing the SSC initiatives after the death of Hugo Chávez and the overwhelming economic crisis that Venezuela has been experiencing in the last several years. Chávez was a charismatic leader who was able to effectively influence the regional agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean and, although to a lesser extent, in the global South. His successor, Nicolas Maduro does not enjoy such charisma and his ability to influence the regional agenda has proven quite limited. Chávez promoted initiatives (e.g. the Bank of South, Petrocaribe, the South America Gas Pipeline) that had an impact on discussions in regional schemes (e.g. UNASUR and ALBA). Maduro has not made a single proposal that has been seriously considered by his Latin American partners.

By the same token, leaders of the Venezuelan political opposition and a good part of the Venezuelan society have criticized Maduro's government for continuing to finance ALBA, in particular Petrocaribe, in the context of a deep economic crisis. Similarly, UNASUR also has been criticized because of its role as a mediator in the solution of the political crisis that followed the public protest of 2014. For opposition leaders, UNASUR has a bias in favour of the Venezuelan government position. In other words, Maduro has to deal with ever-decreasing political support for the SSC initiatives. This is evidence the weakness of the Venezuelan SSC strategy. That is, the low level of social participation and Chávez's personal bias in its design have produced a very low degree of understanding of what SSC is about and a similar low degree of social support. During the period of high oil prices, Venezuelan society was mainly unaware of the South–South cooperation; however, when the economic crisis became more acute, criticism of initiatives (e.g. Petrocaribe) has increased, thus threatening the sustainability and institutionalization of Venezuela's SSC programme.

On the other hand, although Maduro has preserved the foreign policy objectives promoted by Chávez and an interest for SSC, the fall of oil prices makes it extremely difficult to maintain some of the initiatives. Thus, ALBA and Petrocaribe are experiencing a critical moment. The Venezuelan economic problems have reduced the capacity of the country to finance some social programs in the spheres of education and health that were the flagships of this regional group. In other words, the scenario that allowed the expansion of Venezuelan SSC initiatives has changed, and there are signals that their continuation is in jeopardy.

South–South cooperation with Africa has experienced a similar crisis. The *rapprochement* to the African continent was basically a commitment of Chávez that has decreased after his death. Venezuela's

economic difficulties, which have affected ALBA, also have influenced the SSC policies towards Africa. In reality, if cooperation with the Latin American neighbours is currently difficult to defend for the Venezuelan government, policies, such as *Una Escuela en África*, are even more difficult to sustain.

As a consequence, the future of the Venezuelan SSC initiatives is uncertain. Maduro has to survive the profound political and economic crisis and the popular disenchantment with SSC that led to a victory of the political opposition in the legislative elections of December 2015. Even if Maduro succeeds in that effort, SSC should be revisited because, on the one hand, the financial logic (if any) behind it is only viable in a context of high oil prices and economic stability; it appears that this is not going to happen, at least in the near future.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of SSC in the achievement of Venezuelan foreign policy objectives is contested. For example, the recent development in the old Venezuelan border dispute with Guyana shows the low efficiency of Petrocaribe in the consolidation of a regional alliance led by Venezuela. Guyana has been a member of Petrocaribe since 2005 and has received large amounts of oil sold under special conditions; however, the rise to power to the conservative David Granger led to a bilateral crisis in 2015 when the exploration of oil in waters under dispute caused a strong reaction against the Venezuelan government. The countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional cooperation and integration scheme of the English-speaking Caribbean countries (most are also members of Petrocaribe), supported Guyana in the dispute.

There is an alternative scenario: if the crisis in Venezuela during the latter months of 2016 intensifies, a political change could take place there. This is not illusory because the legislative elections of December 2015 showed the trend. If that happens, there are reasons to believe that a new government definitely will review the current Venezuelan SSC strategy.

NOTES

1. “*El mundo del siglo XXI, que ya se asoma sobre el horizonte, no será bipolar, tampoco unipolar, gracias a Dios será multipolar; allí tenemos el polo norteamericano, el polo europeo, se reunifica el polo asiático, China se levanta, los tigres del Asia aunque tuvieron un resbalón tienen una gran fuerza para levantarse. Bueno, creo que nosotros tenemos derecho a impulsar con mucha*

fuerza en esta parte, tenemos obligación además, necesidad además, de impulsar la conformación para el mediano plazo, de un verdadero polo de poder mundial en esta parte del mundo, en esta parte del continente americano. Venezuela está ubicada allí de manera ideal, vista geopolíticamente, para ser una especie de bisagra múltiple entre Mercosur, la Comunidad Andina de Naciones y el Caribe... Nuestro Norte es el Sur.”

2. ALBA is an intergovernmental organization that aims at promoting integration and cooperation between Latin American and the Caribbean countries. The name “Bolivarian” refers to the ideology of Simón Bolívar, the nineteenth-century South American independence leader, but many specialists in Simón Bolívar’s thoughts reject that he was not actually truly committed to anti-imperialist or anti-US ideas as promoted in ALBA. The word “alternative” refers to both the original establishment an alternative to FTAA, a US-led trade project based on the logic of open regionalism, and later to the rejection of the trade agreement that some Latin American countries signed bilaterally with the USA. It is also an alternative because it promotes a vision of regional integration that would not be based on neoliberal policies and US hegemony on the continent. Proposed originally by Chávez at a Summit of the Association of Caribbean States held en Isla Margarita, Venezuela, in December 2001, ALBA became a bilateral process in 2004, when Cuba and Venezuela signed various agreements at a Summit held in Havana in December of that year. ALBA became a regional group in 2006 with the incorporation of Bolivia and Evo Morales’s proposal of a Treaty for the Peoples. It afterwards expanded to include Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Nicaragua, Honduras, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines. Honduras withdrew in 2010 after the coup d'état that toppled President Manuel Zelaya.
3. “*Venezuela tiene en su territorio la primera reserva de petróleo del mundo y la primera reserva de gas de todo nuestro Continente, desde allá desde el Polo Norte, desde Alaska hasta la Tierra del Fuego como se dice, tenemos la primera reserva de gas aquí mismo en el Caribe, queremos compartirla con el Norte, con el Sur, con el Este y con el Oeste y en prioridad con nuestros pueblos vecinos, nuestros pueblos hermanos. No nos parece nada justo que teniendo nosotros tanto gas, tanto petróleo, haya apagones frecuentes en Dominicana, el Norte de Brasil no tenga energía para el desarrollo, Colombia no tenga energía suficiente en los pueblos de la frontera, o en el Sur y en el Oeste; Haití no tenga ni siquiera para las plantas eléctricas que le dan energía a los hospitales; Grenada y todos estos hermanos países, no es justo, Venezuela ha recuperado su profunda raíz bolivariana y queremos más que decirlo demostrarlo, uniéndonos de verdad para ser libres.*” Retrieved February 12, 2016 from

http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/readmenu-princ.tpl.html&newsid_temas=46

4. It allows paying the value of imports of crude oil according to a sliding scale: above US\$30 per barrel, 25%; at above US\$40, 30%; above US\$50, 40%; above US\$100, 50%. The balance is payable over 25 years at 2%, falling to 1% at prices above \$40/bl., with a grace period for repayment of 2 years (Girvan 2008, 7).
5. “*Las diversas invasiones y bombardeos imperiales, desestimando toda opción a soluciones políticas y pacíficas de los conflictos internos que se iniciaron en diversas naciones del África, tuvieron entre sus objetivos principales, frenar el proceso de consolidación de la unidad de los pueblos africanos, y en consecuencia, minar el avance de la unión de estos con los pueblos latinoamericanos y caribeños (...) La estrategia neocolonial ha sido, desde inicios del siglo XIX, dividir a las naciones más vulnerables del mundo, para así someterlas a una esclavizadora relación de dependencia. Es por esto que Venezuela se opuso radicalmente y desde un inicio a la intervención militar extranjera en Libia.*”

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Emerging Donors on the Field: A Study Case of China and South Korea in Lao PDR

Camille Laporte

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to study the coexistence between emerging donors and traditional donors in the field of development cooperation in Laos—officially the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). It explores how these two types of donors socialize on the ground, how they compete, how they cooperate, and how they exert a normative influence on each other.

The analysis offers a global view of the aid system in Lao PDR with a focus on two emerging donors: China and South Korea. Indeed, at the international level, these two donors have had diverging strategies concerning normative cooperation and coordination with traditional, OECD-DAC donors. South Korea joined the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Development Cooperation (OECD-DAC) in 2011 and has committed to reform its development aid practices so as to align on the Paris Declaration and then the Busan Partnership. The country often is not considered as an emerging donor anymore and has transformed its practices in the field. On the other hand, China participates

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a minima to the international negotiations and coordination exercises with other donors at the country level, and cultivates its difference and autonomy from DAC donors.

Focusing on the case of Lao PDR is interesting for two reasons. First, it is a country where China and South Korea have a great diplomatic influence and strong industrial and economic interests. Laos is a country where Asian emerging donors are in their sphere of influence and thus where they have more capacity to resist the influence of international norms spread by traditional donors. Second, the government of Laos adopted a local version of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness in 2006, called the Vientiane Declaration. Because China and South Korea ratified this declaration, their practices are supposed to have evolved in terms of transparency, monitoring, alignment, harmonization, and coordination with other donors.

Lao PDR is a country rarely taken into account by development studies, so a lot remains to be discovered. The analysis provided here is the result of a participatory observation of two months conducted in a development agency in Vientiane, Lao PDR. It is based on empirical material, including 15 interviews and numerous informal discussions with emerging and traditional donors, participation in four donors' coordination meetings, observations, and a study of strategic and operational documents produced by Korean and Chinese development South–South cooperation (SSC) agencies operating in Lao PDR.

The first part of this chapter deals with an historical analysis of emerging donors' involvement in Lao PDR and provides general data about this cooperation, which has been characterized by its opacity. Then, it presents the notion of an “Asian culture” of development aid, which was proclaimed by Asian donors in the OECD's High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan in 2011. This culture has been claimed to encompass norms and practices appropriate to Asian countries and that differ from the ones of Western donors. The chapter then investigates the extent to which Chinese and South Korean sectorial distribution of aid varies from traditional donors', and how donors coordinate in Lao PDR.

Despite a kind of labour division between traditional donors and emerging donors, there are some areas of strong competition between these two categories of actors, notably in the field of hydropower, a strategic area of economic growth in Lao PDR. The argument here is that in this unique sector, emerging donors' growing presence tends to “downgrade” the status of traditional donors and to weaken the influence of international socioenvironmental standards in the eyes of the Lao PDR government.

A GROWING INVOLVEMENT OF EMERGING DONORS IN LAO PDR

Lao PDR is an insular country of 237,000 km² located in Southeast Asia and had an estimated population of 6.77 million people in 2012. The country is one of the “least developed countries” (LDCs) and 23.2% of the population (1.7 million people) lives under the poverty line.¹

In 1986, Lao PDR adopted a “new economic mechanisms” and then in 1988 agreed to a first structural adjustment programme with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The country’s gross national income (GNI) was about US\$28 billion in 2012² and multilateral and bilateral overseas development aid (ODA) represented 6.2% of this total.³

The specificity of Lao PDR, notably compared with African developing countries, is that emerging donors represent a significant share of the ODA allocated to the country, which enables them to compete with traditional donors for influence over the government’s development policy. Most of the emerging donors involved in Lao PDR are neighbouring countries (i.e. China, Thailand, Vietnam) or Asian countries (i.e. South Korea) that have developed strong economic, political, and diplomatic ties with it. Indeed, these four countries are the major foreign direct investors (FDI) in Laos. From 2000 to 2012, they accounted for 86% of total FDI in Laos, with US\$4.9 billion from Vietnam, US\$4.2 billion from Thailand, US\$3.6 billion from China, and US\$619 million (MUSD) from South Korea.⁴

Figure 8.1 presents the evolution of emerging donors’ ODA in Lao PDR from 1997 to 2013 in MUSD. According to the data available, China was the first emerging donor to massively invest ODA funds in Lao PDR. Official statistics indicate that Chinese aid to Laos started in the early 2000 (Oraboune 2010). Aid volume was around 39 MUSD and, despite some fluctuation during the first half of the 2000s, it has remained high since 2008, reaching approximatively 47 MUSD.

South Korean development aid began in 1997 and was really subsidiary until 2006 (Oraboune 2010). Then, aid volume increased sharply to attain 30 MUSD in 2013. Lao PDR has become a priority in South Korea development aid policy in accordance with the commitment made by the government after its entrance into the OECD–DAC to focus its aid funds towards LDCs. In the press, Korean officials emphasize the will of the government to reinforce its development cooperation with the




Fig. 8.1 ODA from emerging donors (1997–2013), in MUSD
Source: Ministry of International Cooperation ; DAC-OECD.

government of Lao PDR. By example, Kwon Young-Eui, a representative of the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in Laos declared that “Lao PDR has become one of our primary concerns in Asia in recent years.”

Other emerging donors, such as Thailand or Vietnam, are currently developing their cooperation projects for development in Lao PDR (see Fig. 8.1). In total, emerging donors’ ODA represented 31% of the total development assistance received by Lao PDR in 2012–2013. Regarding traditional donors, Japan is, by far, the most involved in Lao PDR with an average ODA of 83 MUSD from 1997 to 2012. Australian aid has also rapidly grown since 1997, rising from 14.3 MUSD to 53.9 MUSD.

Figure 8.2 shows the ODA volume of the four first traditional donors in the country from 1997 to 2012. Besides, these donors contribution of funds have been allocated by the Asian Development Bank to Lao PDR,




Fig. 8.2 ODA by traditional donors (1997–2012), in MUSD

Source: DAC–OECD statistics, according to the Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS).

approximatively 79 MUSD in 2012. These data clearly show that the most dynamic bilateral donors in Lao PDR are Asian.

This concentration of Asian donors makes of Lao PDR a good test case to examine the idea of an “Asian development culture” that would gather together Asian donors and developing countries under a set of common values such as respect of sovereignty, “win–win” strategies, alignment on national priorities, autonomy, appropriation, and so on (DAC–OECD 2012). This set of common values is supposed to go beyond the dichotomy between donors and beneficiaries, or DAC donors and non-DAC donors, and unite Asian countries into a “normative community.” Thus, Asian emerging donors, and to a lesser extent, traditional donors adopt a “cultural” approach of development cooperation. This approach says that, because Asian donors share a common history and culture with the developing countries of Asia, they are better-equipped to understand the local contexts. As a consequence, their interventions should be perceived as more legitimate by the beneficiaries, and overall their interventions should be more efficient.

OTHER IDEAS: AN ASIAN “CULTURE” OF SSC DEVELOPMENT?

A critical assessment of the “Asian way” of accomplishing development cooperation is needed. Does the Asian ideology of SSC really transcend the normative opposition between DAC–OECD donors and emerging donors? And how do Asian donors conceptualize it? To answer this question, this section analyzes the principles that govern Chinese and South Korean cooperation for development.

First of all, it is important to underscore that the nature of “Asian values” has been debated by politicians and researchers for decades in Asia. The concept of Asian values was developed during the 1990s by Lee Kwan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, in opposition to Western values of individualism and liberalization. It emphasized social harmony, sovereignty, noninterference in civil and political rights, collectivism, and authority. In 1994, Kim Dae Jung, former president of South Korea, strongly criticized the Asian values concept promoted by Lee Kwan Yew, arguing that opposing Asian and Western culture is a doublespeak to legitimate authoritarian regimes against human rights and the freedom of expression. Kin Dae Jung stressed that the Asian values are a rich source of democratically oriented philosophies (Kim Dae Jung 1994). If Asian countries have a specific history and political culture, it is compatible with political freedoms and a liberal economy, he argued.

In the field of development aid, China and South Korea always have drawn attention to their autonomy from Western standards and practices and their will to promote an alternative model of international cooperation. Since 1964, Chinese development aid has been directed by eight principles, according to Zhou Enlai:

1. Equality and mutual benefit
2. Absence of conditions or privileges
3. Reduction of the burden for recipient countries
4. Achievement of self-reliance and independent development
5. Cost-effectiveness (i.e. Less investment, quicker results)
6. Provision of the best-quality equipment and materials of its own manufacture
7. Local control over technical assistance
8. Absence of special demands or amenities for Chinese experts

These principles emphasize ideas of mutual benefits, equality, respect of States' sovereignty and effectiveness. Development aid is presented as a short-term tool to stimulate the economic growth of developing countries.

In 2011, in its White Paper on Foreign Aid, China presented a modernized version of those principles (The People's Republic of China 2011):

1. No political conditions. China respects recipient countries' right to independently select their own path and model of development, and it believes that every country should explore a development path suitable to its actual conditions.
2. Equality, mutual benefit, and common development.
3. Realism and the quest for the best quality possible. China provides foreign aid within the reach of its abilities in accordance with its national conditions and tailor-made to suit the needs of recipient countries.
4. Adaptation, innovation, and constant improvement.

In July 2014, China issued a second White Paper on Foreign Aid that underscores the stronger focus of Chinese aid for LDCs and on social and rural development (The People's Republic of China 2014).

Before the end of the 2000s, South Korea had not formally enunciated a set of good practices regarding its ODA policy. Yet, in its communication about foreign aid, the South Korean government regularly emphasized several principles such as the respect of recipient sovereignty, tied aid, mutual learning, the focus on Asian countries, the promotion of the *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement) development model, and so on (Eun Mee Kim, Pil Ho Kim, Jinkyung Kim 2013). The *Saemaul Undong* is a modernization programme of South Korean rural areas implemented by President Chung-Hee Park during the 1970s. Its objective was to develop South Korea's countryside in order to limit the rise of inequalities between the rural and urban areas in a context of industrialization and urbanization.

The *Saemaul* programme aimed to empower the rural communities so that they became autonomous in their own development. It is based on the spirit of diligence, self-help, solidarity, and national development through community movements. The government brought material, technical, financial, and administrative aid to the communities. It was considered as a success because the average income of the beneficiary households has increased almost fivefold in less than 10 years (Bondaz and Allard 2014). Yet, beyond its economic success, this model has been criticized in South Korea, notably by liberal parties in opposition to conservative political

movements and by some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) because it was diverted from its original objectives to serve the authoritarian policy and regime of President Park.⁵

Today, the South Korean government tries to highlight the economic success of the *Saemaul Undong*, presented as a philosophy more than as a political agenda: “The *Saemaul Undong* bolstered people’s will to live for the better, without relying solely on the government’s help, by boosting their motivation and diligence, their self-help and their cooperation” (former Prime Minister of South Korea, Goh Kuhn 2014). In 2011, President Lee Myung-Bak clearly promoted the *Saemaul* movement as the model of the South Korean development cooperation. His successor Park Geun-Hye has reinforced this orientation and a partnership was signed with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2013 for the promotion and experimentation of the *Saemaul Undong* in aid-recipient countries. During the first Global Saemaul Leadership Forum held in 2014, the President of South Korea, Park Geun-hye, said:

Korea will share with the international community its experiences and knowhow of the *Saemaul Undong*, which led to the ‘Miracle on the Hangang River’. I will make every effort to implement a global *Saemaul Undong* and make it a core international cooperation project in order to create a world of sharing and a caring global community.

The same year, the budget allocated by the South Korean government for the exportation of the movement rose by 36% (Bondaz and Allard 2014). The *Saemaul Undong* often is promoted through rural development programmes in the same way that it was developed in South Korea. Yet, this push for the exportation of the *Saemaul Undong* leads some to doubt it. For example, a representative of the South Korean NGO ODA watch declared in the press: “The movement was successful here given the unique political, economic, cultural and historical conditions of South Korea back then. It is a fallacy to propagate the movement to Asian and African countries that have different backgrounds.”⁶

In 2010, in an attempt to support its application for membership into the OECD-DAC, South Korea committed to improve its foreign aid practices, following six objectives: (1) increase the volume of aid and the share of donation in development aid; (2) be more selective in terms of aid beneficiaries and aid sectors; (3) put in place a results-based management system sensitive to the needs of partner countries; (4) work on the basis

of South Korean development experience and its comparative advantages; (5) promote the implication of private sector and civil society in projects and programmes; (6) build capacities regarding the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of aid to improve its effectiveness (KOICA's website, <http://www.koica.go.kr/english/main.html>).

A common Chinese and South Korean principle on international cooperation for development is putting the accent on respect of recipient countries' sovereignty. The South Korean government believes that its developmental success is partially because of the fact that when it was a developing country, it kept some distance from the economic models that donors wanted to impose. For example, during the 1970s, Park Jung-Hee maintained South Korea's Heavy-Chemical Industry economic development plan despite the pressure of international donors (e.g. the World Bank, the IMF, or the US) to adopt a more liberal, service-oriented, and less labor-intense economic system. South Korea always had tried to preserve its political and economic independence from donors and to adapt Western "good recipes" to its national context (Chun et al. 2010).

As well as South Korea, Chinese official discourses on development cooperation emphasize that China suffered from the attempts of occidental countries to interfere in its governmental choices. Thus, China is committed to not stipulating that its aid adhere to a set of political and economic reforms. The notions of noninterference, alignment, and appropriation are very important in "the two donors" ODA policies. Paradoxically enough, however, South Korea and China want to export their developmental model to beneficiary countries. This is particularly obvious in the case of South Korea that has ambitions of exporting a modern and democratic version of the *Saemaul Undong* into Southern countries, including Lao PDR.

South Korea and China also have a common tradition of tying their development aid to their economic interests. This practice reflects these two countries' "win-win" approach of development aid, which is characterized by mutual economic benefits for development aid partners. This practice can appear contradictory to the idea of noninterference and unconditioned aid also promoted by these donors. To align on DAC-OECD good practices' on aid effectiveness, untying aid has been big challenge for South Korea. Following DAC recommendations, Korea has made efforts to reduce tied aid to the LDCs (OECD 2008, 24). To that end, the Korean government has created a "Roadmap on Untying Aid" and claims that the objective to untie 75% of its overall ODA by 2015 had already been reached by 2013 (KOICA 2013).

Therefore, it appears clear that if China and South Korea share a common approach to development aid policy on some points, the latter had to adjust its aid principles and practices after joining the OECD–DAC. From then, beyond untied aid, South Korea has focused its ODA efforts on LDCs (e.g. Laos), on contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and on improving its coordination with other DAC donors. It also has reinforced its monitoring and evaluation practices and has increased the proportion of the total multilateral and grants aid of its ODA.

Consequently, with these reforms, now South Korea's ODA practices should be closer to Western principles than to the Chinese ones, at least in terms of sectorial distribution, management, and norms. In Lao PDR, one of the major changes observed since South Korea joined the DAC–OECD is its better coordination with Western donors.

COORDINATION IN LAOS

Coordination among donors has been an important axis of reform of the development aid system in Lao PDR for the last decade. In 2006, the Lao government and the DAC donors involved in the country elaborated a local version of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: the Vientiane Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This declaration aimed to adapt the Paris Declaration principles to the Lao national context in order to facilitate their appropriation by national development stakeholders.⁷ Its main goal was to improve coordination and exchange of information among donors and with the government. It planned the institutionalization of annual round-tables gathering all donors and domestic stakeholders of development cooperation (National Assembly, ministries, the Lao Women's Union, the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the People's Supreme Court, the Lao Red Cross, etc.). Furthermore, the Vientiane Declaration led to the creation of ten sectorial working groups on natural resource management and environment, education, health, agriculture and rural development, illicit drug control, UXO (anti-mining activities), governance, macroeconomics, infrastructure and private sector and investment. Among emerging donors, China, South Korea and Thailand participated in the preparatory meeting and signed on to the Declaration, while Vietnam refused to do so.

As South Korea was signatory of the Paris Declaration and engaged in a process of reform in order to join the OECD–DAC, its ratification of the Vientiane Declaration was not a surprise. The reasons of Chinese

ratification raise more questions. For several years, China was showing signs of improvement in the transparency of its cooperation for development. The White Paper of 2011 was a clear-cut symbol in that sense, providing for the first time in history some quantitative data on Chinese foreign aid (e.g. volume, geographical distribution, income of recipient countries, debt cancellation operations, etc.).

Yet at the international level, China remained reluctant to be a part of initiatives for improving coordination and accountability among donors. If China did sign the Paris Declaration, they did so as a recipient and not as a donor. Furthermore, during the aftermath of the 2011 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, China refused to commit to the framework of monitoring and evaluation of donors' and beneficiaries' progress towards the objectives fixed by the Busan Global Partnership for Development.

China's decision to ratify the Vientiane Declaration can be explained by the fact that it was not binding. Also, the Vientiane Declaration was presented as a governmental initiative and not as an artefact of Western donors. As we will see, China's commitment to respect the principles of the Vientiane Declaration falls mainly rhetoric. More broadly, emerging donors' participation into coordination mechanisms is variable.

Chinese involvement has been rather limited and passive. China and the Chinese ambassador attend the annual national roundtables and provide some vague quantitative information on its ODA, but never make official public statements during these events unlike his counterparts from India, South Korea, and Japan.

China (as well as Thailand) does not participate in the sectorial working groups and does not attend other, formal or informal, donors' coordination meetings either.

In an interview conducted in 2012, a representative of a European aid agency in Laos declared: "The Chinese are totally absent of aid coordination and harmonization structures. These structures emanate from the OECD-DAC and the DAC members are the only ones to participate." Our observatory participation in Lao PDR enabled us to see that the ripple effect of the institutionalization of the Vientiane Declaration on emerging donors' practices seems low. According to a representative of a European aid agency:

Lao PDR institutionalized the Vientiane Declaration on aid effectiveness. It is a big step towards a harmonized and transparent implementation of

development aid. It also permits a better alignment of aid projects on the government's priorities. Yet, Laos' commitment to respect the standards of the Paris Declaration has no effect on emerging donors' practices because the government has a weak governance and not enough power of contradiction against neighboring powers, such as Thailand, China or Vietnam to push them to follow these standards in their aid projects.⁸

Furthermore, China and Thailand refused to be a part of the "aid monitoring platform" created by the Laotian government in 2011 in order to (1) "provide a detailed report of ODA in Laos including South-South cooperation; (2) underline the impact of the government's efforts to support the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in Laos; (3) provide a vector for an effective discussion on donors' strategies of aid implementation.

This situation is not specific to Lao PDR. In other developing countries, China has been reluctant to join donor-organized consortia. Chinese aid officials explain that they have little in common with other donors, and that "it would be inconvenient for Chinese officials to be seen by aid recipients as collaborating with Western donors" (Reilly 2011).

Besides, none of the groups or subgroups sector is chaired or co-chaired by an emerging donor. During our participatory observation in Laos, we have noticed that the negotiation process in national roundtable process and sector groups were led by OECD-DAC and multilateral donors. Even South Korea participates shyly to the discussions between donors and the government and its ministries. In terms of aid planning, emerging donors seemed to prefer bilateral discussions with Lao stakeholders, while the issue of monitoring and evaluation remains far from their concerns, except maybe for South Korea who has strongly enhanced its monitoring and evaluation capacity since its entrance into the OECD-DAC. Chinese officials and experts regularly explain that they consider the established national government as the only legitimate aid partner (Reilly 2011).

The weak dialogue and coordination between traditional and emerging donors is reflected in aid implementation. Western donors have often no idea of the aid projects planned by China and get information in the press, by chance on the ground, or via public announcements released. It was for example the case in 2006 when the President Hu Jintao pledges for 45 MUSD of economic and technical cooperation and debt forgiveness (Reilly 2011).

Until today, there has been no experimentation of "triangular" cooperation in Lao PDR.⁹ The donors interviewed tend to believe that

this kind of cooperation is unlikely in Lao PDR. For them, China and Thailand do not want to work jointly with OECD–DAC donors and shun this kind of opportunities. On the other hand, traditional donors do not insist too much on cooperating with countries perceived as “little democratic and transparent.” The feeling of a strong cultural gap between Western and emerging donors is very present in Lao PDR. This feeling is regularly expressed by donors from both sides and has been reinforced recently by the fact that emerging donors promote an “Asian culture of development”. Yet, this cultural gap is highly relative. Indeed, in few years South Korea has moved from the status of an emerging donor with whom it was impossible to cooperate to the status of a “legitimate” donor considered as a peer by Western development agencies. Indeed, even if South Korea does not yet fully respect all the good practices promoted by the OECD–DAC, its entrance into this structure was a very strong symbol which has changed its international reputation as a donor.

OTHER PRIORITIES?: COMPARING SECTORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

The nature of interaction and cooperation between traditional and emerging donors in Lao PDR also can be explained by the sectorial distribution of their respective ODA funds. This section offers a comparison of this distribution between South Korea, China, and traditional donors. More specifically, it examines the evolution of South Korean aid since it has committed to embrace the OECD–DAC standards. Then, new data on Chinese aid sectorial distribution is provided. The data collected facilitates the perception that a division of labour between traditional and emerging donors is emerging in Laos.

Figures 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5 show a quantitative representation of sectorial aid distribution of three different actors. These figures demonstrate that traditional donors’ aid is more diversified than Chinese and South Korean aid. Traditional donors tend to give a higher priority to sectors geared towards poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs such as health (14%), education (15%), or agriculture and forestry (30%). An important part of their aid funds is also allocated to the infrastructure sector (20%), while aid for the environment, trade, and governance sectors is marginal.

South Korea puts an intense focus on infrastructure too (75%); however, for several years it has tended to diversify its portfolio in accordance with




Fig. 8.3 Sectorial distribution of aid from traditional donors (2012–2013)
Source: Aid Management Platform, Ministry of Planning and Investment—Laos.




Fig. 8.4 Sectorial distribution of South Korea's aid
Source: Aid Management Platform, Ministry of Planning and Investment—Laos.




Fig. 8.5 Sectorial distribution of China's aid

Source: Aid Management Platform, Ministry of Planning and Investment—Laos.

the OECD-DAC recommendations to focus more on MDGs (DAC-OECD 2011). In its discourses, KOICA representatives emphasize their resolve to develop projects in three prioritized areas: education, health, and rural development. The increase is particularly significant for the health, agriculture, and forestry sectors in which South Korea was absent from prior to the 2000. A KOICA project manager interviewed during the field research in Laos in July 2012 explained:

[A]s Laos is part of the least developed states, there is a lot of room for improvement. KOICA has decided to focus on health, education and agriculture in the future and to encourage the government to prioritize projects in these areas through its cooperation with international donors. KOICA's biggest achievement was the construction of the Lao National Children's Hospital in 2011, the first of its kind in the country.

In June 2013, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea announced that his country would put in place a capacity-building project for Souphanouvong University in Luang Prabang Province. One year later, the agency of KOICA in Lao PDR affirmed the launch appropriation of a US\$5 million project for the development of technical equipment and human resources for medical imaging for the police hospital in Vientiane.

In February 2015, in the sector of agriculture, KOICA provided a grant of US\$14 million for an integrated rural development project in Laos; it is set to start in late 2016 and run until 2019. KOICA also regularly funds irrigation projects aimed at boosting agricultural development. These numerous announcements from South Korea illustrate the dynamic rise in its development aid in Lao PDR. This focus on the MDGs sectors also allows South Korea to increase its share of untied aid to Laos.

Korean aid often comes along with a provision of expertise from South Korea. Experts supervise or are responsible for the implementation of most of the projects. KOICA officials think that the strength of South Korean SSC for development is its numerous overseas volunteers “who are serving in Laos”, plus some ad hoc professional expertise on specific projects.

Importation of foreign technical assistance (TA) and expertise was a common practice among Western donors until the 1990s. It has declined somewhat, given that the international good practice is to favor the employment of a local workforce to reinforce local capacities. The persistence of TA reveals South Korea’s determination to spread the *Saemaul Undong* to developing countries. A field mission conducted in Lao PDR in 2012 showed that Korean officials promote this model during workshops and projects of technical assistance, especially in the context of rural development undertakings.

In interviews with Lao newspapers, South Korean developers were proud to report the impressions supposedly expressed by Laotian officials who have benefitted from technical assistance: “During my training sessions in Korea, I was deeply impressed with the *Saemaul Undong* which motivated the country’s development in the past, said Khamsay Soumounthong, a local provincial official”; or, “Though details may be different in Laos, I believe that we have much to learn from Korea’s history and the *Saemaeul* campaign.” Korean media thus suggests that South Korea has become a normative power and a development model in Southeast Asia.

Concerning Chinese development cooperation, it has focused on even less sectors: infrastructure (75%), macro-economics, and the private area. Although China is a signatory to the MDGs, its aid practices seem not to be geared towards their achievement, at least in Lao PDR. For example, China has financed numerous “prestige projects” such as the sports facilities for the SEA Games of December 2009, most of the stadiums, and the congress centre in Vientiane. China also is very active in the construction of roads and bridges.

In 2015, China's biggest ODA commitment in Lao PDR was the funding of a high-speed railway between Vientiane and the Laos–China border.

This focus on the transportation infrastructure is aligned with the Laotian government's development strategy, which considers that the lack of access to roads is one of the major causes of underdevelopment in numerous villages in the Northern and Southern regions of the country.¹⁰ A working Lao official expressed this effort in an interview held in 2012: "Roads are the main factor in reducing the number of poor villages. The reason the number remains high is because many villages have no road access. Some of them have small roads but they are not practicable [usable] year round."

These infrastructure projects also serve Chinese interests in the country in terms of trade and investment. According to James Reilly (2011, XX?):

Support for prestige projects, such as hotels and stadiums, offer diplomatic payoffs for Chinese leaders and construction opportunities for China's state-owned firms. China's infrastructure projects, particularly transportation and energy production, also meet economic needs within Laos. These "win-win" projects thus fit neatly within Chinese norms of development.

A good example of this win–win strategy is the "Phongsaly-China road project" to connect Phongsaly Province, located at the extreme North of Laos, to the Chinese border; it was 95% funded by China. According to Chinese representatives, the project has a dual motivation: first to facilitate transport of goods between China and Lao PDR, and thus enhance trade and investment between the two countries, and second to contribute to the raising of living standards in the Phongsaly Province. Furthermore, the project will provide employment and training of Lao workers during the road construction process, thus developing the skills of local people. Yet, projects funded by China often are executed by Chinese workers, which makes them highly visible throughout the country. China also places ostentatious commemorative stones or Chinese flags in front of every facility it contributes to build.

Thus far, the growing share of multilateral aid through the Asian Development Bank is a sign of the socialization of China to OECD standards (Reilly 2011), as well as its efforts (even if limited) to be more transparent on its aid volume and sectorial repartition in Laos. China also has become more and more involved in agriculture development for the past several years. As in 16 other countries, China has been supporting

the establishment of agricultural technology demonstration centres in Lao PDR. As explained in its White Paper of 2014, this assistance consists in “dispatching agricultural experts to provide consultations and conduct technical cooperation, and training technical and managerial personnel on agriculture. Chinese agricultural experts took an active part in the agricultural planning of the recipient countries” (Chinese People Republic 2014).

This analysis of the foreign aid sectorial distribution in Lao PDR therefore shows that a kind of “division of labour” between emerging and traditional donors is happening. While traditional donors have the priority to push for projects in the “human development” sectors covered by the MDGs, emerging donors focus on more “productive” sectors of development (e.g. industry, transport, trade, infrastructure, etc.). The case of South Korea is particularly interesting insofar as it reveals the transformation of practices implemented in the field after that country entered into the OECD–DAC and committed to untie its aid as well as focus more on the MDGs.

This division of labour benefits the government of Laos. Indeed, emerging donors fund some projects with few conditions whereas traditional donors may no longer be willing to finance them because they have to prioritize sectors included in the MDGs. Yet, as shown earlier in Figure 8.1, there is some overlap between traditional donors and emerging donors’ *pré-carrière*. For example, traditional donors still are largely present in the sector of infrastructure, while emerging donors invest more in this area of development. If it is true that Western donors often focus on health, education, or social facilities, they remain interested in contributing to the development of the energy sector, notably through the construction of dams. Consequently, a fierce competition has emerged among donors in the field of hydropower, which is growing rapidly in Lao PDR because the government has decided to promote the country as the power “battery” of Southern Asia.

CONFRONTING PRACTICES AND TENSIONS IN THE HYDROELECTRIC DAMS SECTOR

Energy is an ideal study case to analyze the arising competition between traditional and emerging donors. Indeed, in this sector of activity in which these two categories of donors are very active, the Lao government seems to “downgrade” traditional donors in favour of emerging donors who offer less conditioned aid. Traditional donors have more and more difficulties cooperating with the government in this sector while maintaining high-level requirements in terms of social and environmental safeguards.

With the Seventh National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011–2015) and the National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy

to 2020, the Lao government wants to promote high economic growth (8% per year) in order to generate income and to reduce poverty. The government aims to eliminate its inclusion in the LDCs category by 2020. To reach this goal, the development of hydroelectricity appears to be the key for Loa PDR (possible to suppress this fragment too) because it can provide significant financial resources through production and export of electricity (AFD 2013). To develop this sector, the government needs to rely heavily on SSC development aid. Indeed, domestic public funds are scarce, notably because of inferior management of the public finance sector. According to the French Development Agency, poor management of the collection of taxes was the cause of a loss of 151 MUSD for fiscal year 2011–12 and of 164 MUSD for the year 2012–13 (AFD 2013).

Traditional multilateral and bilateral donors have used to fund hydroelectric dams since the 1970s. Yet, since the beginning of the 2000s, emerging donors has tended to take the lead on this central sector of Lao PDR economic development. The first hydroelectric projects implemented in Laos during the 1970s were principally funded by multilateral development banks (e.g. World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNDP) and bilateral donors (e.g. Norad, JICA).

Funding was provided mainly in the form of concessional loans to *Électricité du Laos* (Electricity of Laos), as was the case for the Nam Neung Dam—the first dam in Laos—which was administrated by the World Bank and then by the Asian Development Bank. Yet, during the 1990s, the negative environmental and social impacts of large dams were intensely criticized by international NGOs fighting for environmental protection. Consequently, to avoid undermining its international reputation, the World Bank, followed by most of the multilateral and bilateral donors, stopped funding large dam projects (AFD 2013).

During this period, multilateral organizations followed by bilateral donors expanded environmental and social norms in order to improve their capacity to minimize the risks of sizable infrastructure projects in developing countries. With these new sets of norms, they came back in the hydroelectric sector at the end of the 1990s, notably in Lao with the Nam Theun 2 dam project, expounded to be a “model” of social and environmental good practices. Yet, emerging donors had started to invest in the sector with less conditioned and normative funding.

Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show the evolution of sources of financing from 1970 to 2013 in the sector of hydropower and the share of funding disbursed by donors during this period. The Nam Theun 2 case study is




Fig. 8.6 Chronology of dam funding (1970–2013)

Source: French Development Agency, 2013.




Fig. 8.7 Repartition of dam funding per donor (1970–2013)

Source: French Development Agency, 2013.

interesting because it crystallized the tensions between traditional donors and the government of Laos about normative conditionalities and monitoring of the social and environmental impacts of development projects.

The Nam Theun 2 dam in Lao PDR was financed by the World Bank, the French Development Agency, the European Investment Bank, UNDP, EDF, and a consortium of Thai Banks; it has been a *cas d'école* in terms of environmental protection and social compensation/safeguards. The dam's construction was preceded by more than 10 years of social and environmental feasibility studies. It was conditioned by more than 100 safeguards for the protection of the environment, resettlement, and social compensation of the 13 displaced villages. During its seven years of construction, 170 monitoring missions were organized, including those of independent experts (Laporte 2015).

All this social and environmental engineering has been effective in limiting the negative impacts of the dam but has been costly (60 MUSD in 2012), caused some delays in its construction, and engendered tensions between stakeholders—that is, the Lao government, donors, and the project's operator, the NTPC Consortium (Laporte 2015).¹¹

Tensions between donors and the government of Laos about environmental and social norms were intense and were exacerbated by the fact that emerging donors do not impose such preconditions to finance dams. The government found that social and environmental measures imposed by donors were too costly and inconsistent with the local context. Authorities argued that the objectives set by donors could create an economic and social gap between the displaced population and the region's other villages, which would promote migration to the dam area or demands by neighbouring villages (Laporte 2015).

Consequently, the Lao government now tends to prefer emerging donors' aid that has fewer conditions with regard to environmental and social good practices. Western donors have more and more difficulties working with the government in the hydroelectricity sector in the face of emerging donors' concurrence. For the last 10 years, they have funded very few projects of dams. Interviews held in 2012 with representatives of multilateral and Western bilateral development agencies in Laos revealed that the Lao government is now reluctant to cooperate with traditional donors in the field of hydropower because of all the safeguards and good practices that condition such aid.

This reluctance has been exacerbated by the fact that emerging donors offer to fund dam projects with minimal, or no, social and environmental constraints. Some Western stakeholders of the Nam Theun 2 dam project think that "they have gone too far in terms of social and environmental compensatory measures," and that it has engendered the government's defiance to funding from traditional donors. According to them, the only solution to compete with emerging donors in the field of hydroelectricity would be to lower their requirements with respect to social and environmental good practices; however, this appears to be incompatible with international standards. Besides the competition of emerging donors, another reason of traditional donors' withdrawal from the hydropower sector is that they have had to focus on the challenges of the MDGs.

As shown earlier in Figs. 8.6 and 8.7, China and Thailand are, by far, the main donors in the sector of hydroelectricity. Yet, South Korea appears as a new and dynamic player in the game. It shows a strong resolve to enhance its share in the financing of hydroelectric infrastructures in Lao PDR. In February 2015, KOICA provided a grant of 2 MUSD for a dam project on the Nam Ngum River and dispatched a group of Korean experts to Vientiane in order to conduct a prefeasibility study for a master plan for the project. A resident representative of KOICA declared in the

press that this project was the first step towards an enhancement of SSC between South Korea and Laos in the field of hydropower.

This year, South Korea, through the Economic Development Co-operation Fund (EDCF) also will contribute some funds for the development of the Xepien-Xenamnoi hydropower plant, which will cost US\$1 billion. This hydropower plant is supposed to improve irrigated agriculture and rural development. EDCF representatives in Laos claimed that this project is based on “a similar one that was carried out in Saemaul Undong, a model community development project in the Republic of Korea, and will be used to provide integrated irrigation for agriculture in Songkhone and Champhone districts of Savannakhet province and to boost livelihoods in these targeted regions.” This is an illustration of how South Korea has been promoting its developmental model in Laos.

On the field, the confrontation between the traditional and emerging donors models of development is highly visible. For instance, Chinese and Thai practices of forcing relocation of the indigenous population with very limited or no compensation are regularly condemned by traditional donors and NGOs. Concerning the seven dams project on the Ou River, for example, the NGO International River has alerted the international community about the weakness of environmental and social measures planned by Chinese operator 5 (Sinohydro) and financer (Bank of China):

With the exception of Dam 2, environmental impact assessments of the other six dams and Resettlement Action Plans for affected communities have not been released publicly, as required by Lao law. Sinohydro’s own environmental policy—which restricts the company from being involved in hydropower developments in national parks—is also being violated due to the planned inundation of sections of the Phou Den Din NPA. (International River 2006)

A representative of a European aid agency in Laos explained in an interview that the displacement of population and negative environmental impacts caused by Chinese hydropower and/or mining projects prevent a sustainable development to occur in Laos. He argues that in the long term, emerging donors’ practices could generate an additional burden for traditional donors, who would have to support people affected by the damaging impact on their livelihoods and protection of the environment. Traditional donors therefore feel they have to “fix” the damages done by emerging donors; damages that could prevent the achievement of the MDGs.

Traditional donors have insufficient means to pressure emerging donors to strengthen social and environmental safeguard measures in the framework of their large infrastructure or mining projects. The exception is the Se Xet 2 Hydropower Project built in 2009 and funded by China through concessional loans and for which feasibility studies and monitoring were funded and realized by Norway (AFD 2013). The pressure on China to improve its practices in terms of social and environmental safeguards should come from the Lao PDR government. Yet, forced displacement and resettlement of the indigenous population have been common in government policy to reinforce its political control on remote areas of the territory (Shoemaker 2007).

CONCLUSION

In short, if Asian donors promote an Asian way of carrying out SSC for development, the fact remains that the countries utilize very diverse strategies. South Korea has an ambiguous position, promoting its unique model of development while adopting reform to respond to the international standards of the OECD–DAC. China acts as an “isolated actor” showing its opposition to Western donors’ development aid practices and refusing to participate actively in international and local coordination of the mechanisms of donors. The main common points of these two donors’ approach to cooperation for development is the emphasis put on the notions of “self-help” and “autonomy” of the southern population and the development of a more equal partnership between donors and aid recipients.

The empirical analysis of emerging donors’ practices in Lao PDR presented here has demonstrated that there is very little dialogue and coordination between traditional and emerging donors. So, on the ground, the normative influence of the OECD–DAC donors is limited despite the institutionalization of the Vientiane Declaration. In Lao PDR, three major donors (i.e China, Thailand, and Vietnam) do not follow international good practices on aid effectiveness, coordination, harmonization, mutual accountability, and so on. As a consequence, the countries appear to exhibit minimal importance or to be mere technocratic artefacts.

Nevertheless, South Korea has significantly transformed its practices since it joined the OECD–DAC. Its ODA to Lao PDR rose sharply and diversified to social sector such as rural development and/or health. South Korea also has improved its coordination with other donors and its monitoring and evaluation practices towards providing more

effective aid. At the same time, the country's ambition is to spread its domestic developmental model into Lao PDR, and more broadly to preserve its image as a unique donor with practices that differ from Western ones. This ambiguous position seems difficult to maintain in the long term without losing legitimacy.

Another interesting point of this study is the observation of the division of labour occurring among donors with emerging donors focusing on projects that Western donors funded 20 years ago; at the same time these latter donors have reoriented their ODA towards the social sectors covered by the MDGs. Nonetheless, if OECD-DAC and multilateral donors have abandoned transportation or the urbanization infrastructures, they remain interested in energy infrastructures that offer a great development potential for Laos. In this sector, a competition has arisen between traditional and emerging donors.

This competition seems to give the government of Lao PDR increasing bargaining power vis-à-vis their donors and greater leverage in choosing its development partners. Sometimes this happens at the expense of social and environmental norms. In sectors where emerging donors and traditional donors are both engaged, the Lao government seems to turn increasingly to emerging donors, notably because they offer less conditioned aid. Thus, emerging donors are not encouraged to integrate social and environmental norms or international standards on aid effectiveness into their ODA practices.

The case of Lao PDR is specific because emerging donors involved in the country are in their direct sphere of influence and have long-standing and strong diplomatic ties with the government. It can be hypothesized that in contexts where their influence is weaker, emerging donors are more permeable to the pressure of Western donors and their standards. Furthermore, the process of the socialization of emerging donors observed at the international level in the long term could result in a transformation of their practices at the local level, even in contexts where they have more flexibility to act according their domestic standards such as in Lao PDR.

NOTES

1. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/lao-pdr>, 02/20/2015.
2. Ibid.

3. OECD–DAC, World Bank, Laos Development Aid Statistics, www.oecd.org/dac/stats.
4. <http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/50075285.pdf>, 02/20/2015.
5. For more details about the *Saemaul Undong*, see Bondaz and Allard (2014).
6. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/01/180_145648.html
7. www.rtm.org.la; accessed March 27, 2014.
8. Interview with an agent of the French Development Agency, Vientiane, July 3, 2012.
9. Triangular cooperation refers to an aid programme implemented jointly by a traditional donor, an emerging donor, and the government.
10. Lao official working on poverty reduction illustrated this idea in an interview held in 2012.
11. Despite all these safeguards some international NGOs consider that the indigenous population was inappropriately compensated (International Rivers 2010).

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From Identities to Politics: UAE Foreign Aid

Khaled Salem Al-Mezaini

INTRODUCTION

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, emerged in the early 1970s. While these states were in their early years of formation, they opted to channel a significant percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP)—10% in the case of the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—and of their much-needed public resources to fund foreign assistance. Given these numbers, it is surprising to note that the Arab Gulf donors (i.e. UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) are systematically ignored and absent from the literature dealing with aid, in general, and South–South cooperation (SSC) in particular. This chapter seeks to fill in this gap by focusing on the UAE.

Despite some similarities, the main four aid donors from the Gulf also have differences regarding the volume of aid, objectives, distribution, and characteristics. The UAE is considered the second largest donor from the Middle East and among the most generous donors in relation to their GDP, where it gives about 1.17% according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Similar to other

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Arab aid donors, UAE's aid demonstrates how a small state in international relations can rise from being marginalized to one of the most influential states in the Middle East.

The chapter argues that the UAE foreign aid has transformed significantly during the last seven years and moved from being influenced by identities and ideas to being dictated by political interests and the government's security concerns in the region. Between the 1970s and the late 1990s, Arabism and Islamism, to a great extent, had been the most influential factors in UAE aid distribution. Since 2003, however, the political changes in the region have forced the UAE to alter its aid programme. This change was based on who received aid in the region and why. In particular, countries that witnessed the so-called "Arab Spring" have been receiving more aid.

To examine the transformation of the UAE's foreign aid policies since the 1970s, the chapter consists of the following sections. First, it analyzes the drivers of the UAE's aid policy, showing that they consist of Arab solidarity and culture rather than South–South solidarity or Third Worldism rhetoric. Second, it examines the UAE's current compliance with the norms within the OECD and the United Nations (i.e. the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs). The third and last section analyzes the increasing politicization and securitization of the UAE's aid since 2011 within the context of the so-called "Arab Spring," which has led to the rise in developmental aid—intertwined with political aid—and the subsequent marginalization of the Global South.

The available literature and sources on Gulf aid is very limited. Therefore, the study used both academic and nonacademic literature—that is, mainly private reports, newspapers, and government resources. Because of the fact that Gulf donors' have inadequate reporting mechanisms, many aid reports that exist are in fact published by regional and international organizations (e.g. the OECD or the UN). For the UAE, full details of its aid activities have been published by the newly established Ministry of Development and International Cooperation (MICAD) created in 2013.

THE DRIVERS OF THE UAE'S AID: ARAB SOLIDARITY AND ISLAM ARE MORE THAN SOUTH–SOUTH RHETORIC

United Arab Emirates's aid history is quite recent if one compares it with, for example, British, Japanese, American, or even German aid. The UAE began officially providing aid in 1974, but it started with Abu

Dhabi in 1969 before the establishment of the UAE federation. Since the emergence of the UAE as an aid donor, though, the country has continuously occupied the position of the third largest aid provider among the Arab countries, being surpassed only by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Almezaini 2012).¹

The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) became the UAE's main aid agency in 1974. As the UAE's wealth grew, its volume of aid increased, particularly following the increase in oil prices during 1973–1974 (Almezaini 2012).² The UAE started providing aid only to those states that shared the same language and a similar culture; as a result, more than half of its financial assistance went to Arab countries. Following Neumayer (2003), Villanger (2007) demonstrated that a typical Arab recipient country received 22 times more bilateral Arab ODA as compared to a typical non-Arab recipient country during the period 1974–1997.³ This type of aid thus has been criticized for being "political" aid. Van den Boogaerde (1991) argues that it is evident that political developments in the receiving Arab countries have been determining the level of disbursements.⁴

After 10 years of existence, however, the UAE's membership in regional and international organizations, and its prominent role in the region, had led to the expansion of its geographical distribution of aid (Almezaini 2012).⁵ Before the emergence of this state, tribes and people of the Coast of Oman provided limited aid for various reasons. Aid-giving was perceived as an obligation for Muslim countries Islam of the Arabian Peninsula, which was an important motive and justification for the building a tradition of cooperation and philanthropy (Almezaini 2012).⁶ *Zakat* (obligatory alms-giving), *sadaqa*, and *waqf* (non-obligatory charity and action) are types of Islamic aid that have had considerable influence on the UAE's citizens and leaders. Furthermore, traditions of generosity have been mentioned to emphasize its role in aid practice.

Before the establishment of the UAE federation, a volunteer from the Emirate of Sharjah in UAE named Mubarak Bin Saif collected a considerable amount of money to support the Palestinians between 1936 and 1947. During the crises of 1947–1948, in the run-up to the establishment of the state of Israel and the first Arab–Israeli war, meetings were held in Dubai and Sharjah to collect donations for the Palestinians (Almezaini 2012).⁷ The UAE's official foreign aid program started in 1971, the same year that the state was formally constituted, but Abu Dhabi had joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and

the OPEC Fund for Development in 1967. The amount of aid given to OPEC funded by Abu Dhabi was counted on multilateral levels only. On the bilateral level, the UAE started giving aid through its own fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD). At the time, no other aid institutions existed, nor do any statistics. So, no records of any charity could be found.

The dramatic increase in oil prices during 1973–1974 was a turning point for the UAE's modern history and marked a pivotal point in their foreign policy. According to Heard-Bay, in 1974 after the price of oil had almost quadrupled over a span of seven months, "Abu Dhabi reached a record by giving some 28 per cent of that year's income in foreign aid" (1996, 381).⁸ Similarly, other GCC aid donors followed the models of the UAE and Kuwait by establishing their own aid funds. In particular, Saudi Arabia began the Saudi Fund for Development, which started operating in February 1975. Since then, governmental and nongovernmental aid institutions and charities have proliferated in the UAE. In addition, the UAE is a member of the OPEC Fund for Development and the Islamic Bank.

More recently, the UAE established a new ministry dedicated to international assistance. The Ministry of International Cooperation and Development was formed in 2013 to replace the Office for Coordination of Foreign Aid created in 2008. The following are its objectives:

- To develop a foreign aid policy that enhances the development role of the UAE at the regional and international level.
- To develop and manage a quality aid programme that helps to enhance the effectiveness and impact of development activities in partner countries.
- To strengthen the role and participation of the UAE in international humanitarian responses.
- To enhance cooperation with other donor countries and with regional and international development organizations.
- To contribute to the management of global aid issues.
- To ensure that administrative services are efficient, transparent, and comply with quality standards.⁹

For many years, the role of identities in the foreign policies of most Arab states has been significant. Because of the high personalization of the foreign policies of the Gulf States, identities have determined their

external behaviour since the 1960s. South–South cooperation between Arab States can be examined within two different ideologies/identities: first, Arabism or Arab Nationalism; second, Islam and the rise of various Islamic movements.

Arab Nationalism and Arab Solidarity

Arabism is a political ideology referring to the cultural uniformity of the Arab countries, and the desire for political unity in a specified demarcated territory (Arab Nationalism) (Dawisha 2003, 13).¹⁰ The sense that Arab countries should stand together because of their cultural similarities influences most leaders in this part of the world. Most Arab countries played a variety of roles in order to support Arab–Arab cooperation. Oil-producing countries in this region opted to provide financial assistance.

The former president of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (from 1971–2004), was among the most popular supporters of Arab nationalism. During the 1973 war between Israel and the confrontation between states (i.e. Syria, Jordan, and Egypt), he supported the oil embargo on countries supporting Israel. Following this embargo, and the subsequent increase of oil prices, foreign aid rose in volume and became a significant tool in the foreign policy of the UAE and other Arab Gulf donors. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development was established to provide financial assistance to Arab states.

According to the Fund, its activities are “characterized by a number of important aspects that make it a model of cooperation and Arab economic integration, and a reflection of outstanding joint Arab action.”¹¹ Further, according Eric Neumayer (2003), the most striking examples (of Arab solidarity) for this are multilateral agencies such as the Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt (GODE); however, a certain bias towards Arab countries is apparent in other multilateral and bilateral programmes as well.¹² During the early years, particularly the 1970s, the UAE provided aid exclusively to Arab states without any conditions.

Stephen M. Walt pointed out that the need to confront Israel effectively had brought Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia together between 1970 and 1973, but the pressures of peacemaking drove them apart; the process was gradual because maintaining a common front increased their bargaining leverage and preserved the material benefits of Arab Solidarity (e.g. financial assistance from the wealthy oil states) (1987, 131).¹³ More recently, in 2012 the four Gulf States’ donors (i.e. Qatar, KSA, Kuwait, and the UAE)

agreed to provide aid worth a total of US\$5 billion to Morocco during the period 2012–2017 to build up its infrastructure, strengthen its economy, and foster tourism (Tok 2015).¹⁴

Religion: The Role of Islam

Religion always has been a motivating factor for the GCC countries when it comes to aid distribution. Neumayer (2003) has shown in an authoritative study that poor Arab and African countries are more likely to receive aid from the GCC countries because Arab solidarity and Islam play a prominent role when Gulf donor countries assess the needs of recipient countries. In particular, charitable and aid practices are considered one of the major obligations in Islam.

The Islamic Development Bank (IDB)¹⁵ is one the main multilateral donors through which foreign aid is given by Arab countries. On the one hand, countries need to be a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in order to be a member of IDB. The agenda of the IDB itself, however, is first and foremost to promote social and economic development in Muslim countries, which further reinforces the Islamic nature of aid distribution to the Arab countries in the region.

The GCC also has disbursed nonofficial aid to promote Islam (Villanger 2007). As donor countries, they are known for maintaining a noninterventionist policy when it comes to distributing aid. The recipient countries are given the freedom to distribute aid in the way they deem fit for their needs, and the GCC countries do not necessarily keep track of aid or follow-up on its use. Reports from the Abu Dhabi Fund during the 1980s particularly said that the objective of aid given by Arab countries was to help them in an unconditional manner, which was justified by the Islamic mindset in which people help without asking anything in return. Consequently, Arab countries also were inclined to give large grants as opposed to loans in the early stages.

Another factor that weighs in the religious characteristic of aid from the GCC is Islamic charity and alms in the form of *zakat* and *sadqa*. *Zakat* is mandatory while *sadqa* is a voluntary practice. The latter is much closer to the current understanding of charitable or aid-giving. Although the payment of *zakat* is not institutionalized in the UAE, a majority of citizens considers it their religious and moral obligation to give alms. The establishment of the *Zakat* Fund in the UAE signifies that religious motives have been a determining factor for aid-giving. This Fund was established

in 2003 and seeks to increase awareness of *Zakat* and to revive this duty of charitable giving. Islamic doctrine also dictates that such charity needs to be distributed among needy Muslims first before giving it to others.

Moreover, the number of governmental and nongovernmental charities in the UAE that use religion to collect donations in the Emirates increased in the past 15 years to reach more than 30. Since September 2001 and the beginning of the international war on terrorism, however, nongovernmental and religious private charities began to be monitored because of the fear that financial support might reach terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Consequently, the use of religion as a motivating factor to get public donations began to play a limited role.

The UAE's Aid: Is It South–South Cooperation?

The UAE recognizes the importance of SSC. Gerd Nonneman points out that “indeed, South–South Cooperation has been realized in the Middle East, particularly regarding Arab Solidarity”(1988, pXX?).¹⁶ The Arab Fund for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) covers only countries that were members of the Organisation for the African Union, not any in the Arab League (Ulrichsen 2012).¹⁷ More recently, the UAE hosted the G77 South–South High Level Conference on Science and Technology,¹⁸ was involved in the Group of 77, and the Doha Declaration in 2005. United Arab Emirates also initiated and hosted Abu Dhabi Dialogue on Contractual Labour for Cooperation between Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia in 2008, marking a regional cooperation within the Global South that included Arab Gulf States.¹⁹

In 1969, Abu Dhabi established Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, which in 1980s was renamed the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. The UAE sought to provide aid to Arab countries initially because of culture similarities. Non-Arab or non-Muslim countries received no aid. Arab and religious identities played a significant role in determining aid by the UAE during 1970s. The UAE and other Gulf States were criticized for providing “political aid” rather than aid that met the objectives of SSC.

Consequently, in spite of the fact that most of its aid is allocated to developing countries, the UAE does not claim or stand out for its commitment to and promotion of SSC. This is because its aid traditionally has been guided by Arab solidarity more than by solidarity with the Third World,

and also because the UAE is now a member of the OECD. Additionally, the country bought into, and is committed to comply with, the main components of the global aid agenda led by multilateral organizations, such as the OECD and the UN, that are dominated by traditional donors and Western countries.

Furthermore, what UAE and other GCC donors lack is cooperation between their agencies when it comes to SSC. Although the UAE has built a good image around itself at the international level as a major aid donor, it still has not strengthened its position as a major donor under the umbrella of South–South cooperation. China, as a major donor, has managed to increase its aid to in-need countries in Asia, and its cooperation with regional and international aid agencies. Evran Tok (2015) describes the South–South partnership model of China and its Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) compatriots, and the traditional development aid formula of major multilateral organizations including the OECD–DAC, the World Bank, and the IMF.²⁰ He adds that the *Khaleeji* model (Gulf model) is materially focused, generally avoiding the DAC-preferred service provision style of ODA.²¹ Tok (2015) argues that the strength of the *Khaleeji* model lies in its flexibility and malleability, and in the willingness of the Gulf countries to try new approaches (i.e. cooperation with developing countries).²²

Gulf cooperation (including the UAE) is not ideological, with no allegiance to one particular strategy and far less ownership of the principles of SSC than emerging economies (Tok 2015).²³ Nevertheless, they are more willing at present to focus on SSC as economic challenges face many donors. Given the economic strength of the Gulf and the fact that certain countries in the region are well established as donors, the “opportunistic” nature of *Khaleeji* (Gulf) aid could allow Gulf States to act as a “Gateway of influence” between North and South (Tok 2015).²⁴

COMPLYING WITH EXISTING AGENDAS: THE OECD, THE PARIS DECLARATION, AND THE MDGs

In 2014, the UAE officially became a member of the OECD and became a participant in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The UAE minister of International Cooperation and Development, Sheikha Lubna Bint Khalid Al-Qasimi, pointed out that “the UAE’s accession to the Development Assistance Committee confirmed the UAE’s role in the field

of international development, which culminated in being named the most generous donor state in the world for development assistance in 2013, in proportion of its national income.”²⁵

The UAE’s membership occurred after the country began providing government reports of its aid flows and activities to the OECD–DAC. The UAE was the first country outside the DAC’s membership to do so, and this helped the country gain a level and reputation of transparency internationally. In 2014, the OECD indicated that the UAE reported the highest ODA–GNI ratio (1.17%). The exchange of information with international organizations helps the UAE keep track of its finances while creating some trust in its government. The OECD also noted in its 2014 report that up to 93% of the UAE’s foreign aid was in the form of ODA.

For the UAE, the DAC is of strategic importance for creating more visibility for its aid activities and engaging with other aid donors. Foreign aid was an exclusive tool of Western states and the OECD a selective club. The UAE is the first country from the Arab Middle East to access membership. Although a ministry of aid was created, some work remains to be done to create better report mechanisms and differentiate between governmental and nongovernmental aid.

Although the UAE is not officially one of the signatories of the Paris Declaration, it has been very active in implementing its objectives since 2005. It is not clear why the UAE has not signed the Paris Declaration. Nonetheless, in order to meet its objectives, it has developed better aid institutions to monitor, report, and coordinate with other aid donors. This has strengthened its position as a rising donor both at the regional and international level.

The UAE has endorsed the MDGs and has geared its aid towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals through bilateral and multilateral aid channels. As for any other donor, though, it is difficult to say which goals the UAE has undertaken to reach. Government officials report that the UAE is trying to overcome global challenges such as food security, climate change, water insecurity, and infrastructure development. Regarding the actual distribution and type of aid, the government provided 94% as developmental aid, 2.45% as humanitarian aid, and 2.95% as charity aid according the UAE’s 2013 Foreign Aid Report (2013, 8). African countries received about 83.27% of the total aid in 2013.²⁶ As per its agenda, the country is currently prioritizing the eradication of poverty and hunger, along with developing global partnerships for development,

while trying to achieve the MDGs locally. The projects initiated by the UAE in needy countries are aimed at improving food supply, promoting environmental sustainability, and biodiversity conservation, as well as better water management, child vaccination campaigns, and meaningful support for global polio eradication efforts; all these in a move to deal with new and emerging global challenges.²⁷

Officials frequently have reiterated the commitment of the UAE to the MDGs over the years. For instance, in 2007, the UAE and the United Kingdom (UK) issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment of MDGs, especially in the field of education. The statement says: “The United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom hereby reiterate their commitment to the UN Millennium Development Goals, which call for the enabling, by 2015, of every child to complete primary education.”²⁸

In a similar manner, the UAE has shown its pledge in fulfilling the targets set by the MDGs with a statement at the UN General Assembly, “Thematic Debate on the Millennium Development Goals,” meeting in 2008. Maitha Salem Alshamsi, Minister of State and Head of UAE Delegation at the General Assembly said:

The UAE is of the firm conviction that eradication of poverty and hunger is a major step towards the reinforcement of peace and the maintenance of security in the world. We recognize without any doubt that succeeding in overcoming these challenges requires a strong global partnership in which the developed and developing countries assume their responsibilities which were agreed on in the Millennium Declaration and other conferences and forums on development, in particular the Monterey Consensus. In this regard, we urge the developed countries to fulfill their commitments to achieve the 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income for Official Development Assistance to developing countries, and alleviate or cancel their debts.²⁹

In November 2014, Minister of International Cooperation and Development Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi reaffirmed the UAE’s commitment to the MDGs; she said: “While we must continue our efforts in this regard for the next two years, we also need to plan for the future, and ensure the UAE’s alignment with and support for the post-2015 development agenda.”³⁰ Similarly, in 2015 the UAE participated in the process in Rio that led to the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in the context of the post-2015 Development Agenda. Furthermore, the UAE hosted the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu

Dhabi.³¹ The UAE's "vision 2021," which is a set of objectives and goals that the country seeks to achieve by 2021, also targets sustainable development through improving air and water quality and increasing the share of clean energy.³²

This chapter has shown so far that the specificities of the UAE's aid policy lie in the promotion of religious and cultural identities (i.e. Islam and Arab solidarity) rather than a Third World spirit. Indeed, in past years, authorities have aligned on existing international norms and agendas such as the MDGs, SDGs, and the Paris Declaration. The latest regional dynamics and politics, however, have recast the UAE's aid. Since 2011, several trends have dominated its aid policy: the rise of humanitarian aid and the absolute priority given to countries that have experienced the "Arab Spring" for the pursuit of political and security objectives.

THE ARAB SPRING: POLITICIZATION, SECURITIZATION, AND MARGINALIZATION OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Before the Arab Spring, the UAE aid always had been dictated and justified by cultural factors (e.g. identity, culture, and ideology). Therefore, the majority of its aid went to Arab countries. As the regional dynamic changed, the orientation and allocation of UAE aid between recipient countries shifted; those who support the UAE's initiatives and maintain good political links have received more aid (e.g. Morocco). Nonetheless, states that have limited cultural and religious similarities with the UAE also used to receive a good percentage of aid (e.g. countries in Africa and Asia) in the form of concessional loans and sometimes grants. The diversity of the UAE's aid recipients was very visible before 2010. Though, the so-called Arab Spring began to reshape not only UAE's aid but also the other Arab Gulf donors (e.g. Saudi and Qatari aid).

Since 2011, the regional dynamics, perceived domestic threats from non-state actors, and increasing instability in the region have led to a significant change in the aid behaviour of the UAE. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement in Egypt encouraged its advocate to increase its political demands across the Middle East. For the leaders of the UAE, the MB posed a serious threat to state stability and called for the securitization of foreign policy. Consequently, it has influenced, to a great extent, the orientation and objectives of the UAE aid programme. By mid-2011, a great percentage of aid began to be dictated by political interests and security priorities in the region.

To balance the increase of political and developmental aid, the UAE increased its humanitarian aid. Therefore, between 2011 and 2015, foreign aid objectives can best be described as the interrelationship between ideas, identities, interests, and political orientations. Figure 9.1 reflects to a great extent this interaction.

In 2013, the UAE provided US\$90 million for humanitarian emergencies, making it number 21 on the list of largest donors to official humanitarian assistance.³³ Over the past decade, the UAE has been number 18 among the largest government providers of humanitarian assistance, and its annual rate increased by 113% in 2013.³⁴ Despite the fact that the UAE is part of the regional coalition in the war in Yemen, it has been among its largest humanitarian donor, providing unprecedented financial and technical assistance to the Yemeni people. Since April 2015, the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and other regional coalition forces, decided to contribute to fighting against the Houthis rebels who overthrew the Yemeni government. Those rebels were viewed as a serious threat to the Arab Gulf States, which led the coalition forces to engage, for the first time, in military operations against them.

Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are the largest contributors to the operation in Yemen. Consequently, the amount of aid from these two countries is the largest. The objective of humanitarian aid is to support the stability of the areas controlled by the coalition. It is believed that the




Fig. 9.1 Interrelationship between aid objectives

amount of aid provided by all forces involved in this conflict is meant to win the hearts of the Yemeni people to support the operation.

Of the UAE's overall humanitarian assistance during the last 10 years 54% has gone to countries in the Middle East.³⁵ Between 2008 and 2012 89% of the UAE's humanitarian assistance went to countries classified in the 2014 OECD *Fragile States report*³⁶—for example, to the Sudan (US\$124 million), to Syria (US\$93 million), and to the West Bank and Gaza Strip (US\$87 million).³⁷ Those countries who maintain good relations with the UAE, and/or are in line with its regional policies, tend to receive a consistent amount of aid. For example, because of the close relationship between the leadership in the UAE and Morocco, the latter consistently has received financial support. This is similar with other regional donors—namely, Saudi Arabia that increased its amount of aid to Egypt because of a strong relationship with its current leadership.

Priority clearly has been given to the countries that have experienced the “Arab Spring” so as to support stability and counter the rise of non-state actors—that is, the MB that later managed to win the election in Egypt in 2012. Before the collapse of the government of Husni Mubarak (president of Egypt before the Arab Spring), Abu Dhabi had a strong relationship with him. Because of the threats the Muslim Brotherhood posed towards the UAE and the instability in the region, the UAE increased its financial aid. In particular, it has made aid available to countries who were against the MB. In 2013, the UAE provided US\$12 million to the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) appeal, accounting for 1% of all funding. Moreover, the UAE provided US\$192.2 million of developmental food aid in 2009, the majority of which went to Yemen (55%) and Syria (42%).³⁸

The UAE offered US\$3 billion to support the Egyptian economy after the army ousted the Islamist president in 2013. The country announced that it would make a US\$1 billion grant to Egypt and a US\$2 billion loan; loan was to take the form of an interest-free deposit with Egypt's central bank.³⁹ This increased dramatically in 2015 when the UAE pledged US\$4 billion to Egypt; this clearly reflects that motives of this type of aid is political. That is, it is aimed at helping the government to fight the Muslim Brotherhood and to contribute to Egypt's economic development. Nevertheless, the UAE government argues that this aid comes under the so-called Arab Solidarity idea. In addition, a vast majority of the UAE's

overseas aid from 2012 to 2014 has gone to Egypt, as it recovers from one of its most unstable periods in decades. The OECD reported that the UAE aid's programme soared by 375.5%, largely because of the exceptional support extended to Egypt in 2013.⁴⁰

One the other hand, the UAE also is supporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa who have been affected by turmoil and poverty through the Red Crescent Authority, including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, the occupied Palestinian territories, and Lebanon. The United Arab Emirates Red Crescent Authority ranks fourth on the list of the UAE's top donors with US\$154.19 million in foreign assistance in 2013. Because of the increase number of Syrian refugees, the UAE public engaged in donating not only a large amount of money but also is supporting the state's policies towards the Syrian crisis.

Therefore, the promotion of humanitarian aid within the Emirates has increased to create further awareness. In particular, one can see lots of humanitarian aid going towards providing shelter and building camps for refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. This shows the solidarity of the UAE with its fellow Arab citizens who have been affected by the current crises in Syria. In addition, it is considered to be a part of the responsibility of the UAE because of its participation in the international coalitions against ISIL in Syria. Although there is no evidence, coalition forces increased aid to support refugees in order to stop them from joining ISIL, which also is offering consistent financial assistance to refugees to recruit and gain legitimacy among the vulnerable population.

This aid was provided in different ways. There has been development aid that was to help build schools, health clinics, and housing units. There have been public– private partnerships, in particular the US\$40 billion housing project on which the UAE's Arabtec Holding is working. The intention is to build a million homes and there was the Dh3.67 billion offered to the Central Bank of Egypt to stabilize the banking sector. The aid was spent on developmental and humanitarian and charitable projects in 71 countries and on one global project. The occupied Palestinian territories received the most support from the UAE Red Crescent in 2013, where more than 600 houses were rebuilt by the National Society in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip. Yemen and Jordan followed, and projects in these two countries focused on supporting orphans and on the provision of relief services and support for Syrian refugees, respectively.⁴¹ As a result of this new geographical and political focus, aid to countries in the South has declined significantly (Tables 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3).

Table 9.1 UAE's Foreign Assistance, 2011–2013

| Year | <i>In AED billions and as percentage of total</i> |
|------|---|
| 2013 | 20.46 (94.60%) development 0.53 (2.45%) humanitarian 0.64 (2.95%) charity |
| 2012 | 5.07 (86.95%) development 0.4 (6.94%) humanitarian 0.36 (6.11%) charity |
| 2011 | 6.86 (88.65%) development 0.63 (8.08%) humanitarian 0.25 (3.27%) charity |

Source: UAE Foreign Aid Report, 2013

CONCLUSION

Foreign aid from the Gulf States, and the UAE, in particular, is becoming more visible than ever. Although there is a significant rise of new donors, the UAE has received little attention. Even though it is a small state, the UAE occupies a significant place in the world's aid realm. Although the balance of its aid distribution weighs more towards North African and Arab countries, it also has been an active donor to countries in Asia over the past 35 years.

Criticism of the UAE has recently increased because of its roles in North Africa. The country is aware of its commitment to MDGs and South–South cooperation, yet political instabilities in the region have changed its aid priorities. Like many other donors in the region, the UAE's aid orientation is affected by the changing dynamics in the Middle East and more clearly intertwined with foreign policy and security imperatives. The years from 2001 until today reflect the changes during the 1970s when aid was aimed at supporting only the Arab countries. Egypt and the other confrontation states (i.e. Jordan and Syria who participated in war against Israel) in 1970s received a great percentage of the UAE's aid because of the political important of Egypt and the close relationship between the latter and the UAE. At present, the Arab Spring appears to reflect the aid behaviour in the 1970s between not only the UAE and Arab countries but also most of the Gulf donors.

The interaction of diplomatic and developmental aid has become a prominent feature in the UAE aid since 2011. It is not clear whether aid to Egypt, for instance, is considered developmental aid. Maybe it is

Table 9.2 UAE's Aid to Africa, 2009–2013

| <i>Year</i> | <i>2009</i> |
|--------------------|----------------|
| <i>Africa</i> | |
| North Africa | 245,869,511 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 665,057,219 |
| Unspecified | 210,000 |
| Total | 911,136,730 |
| <i>2010</i> | |
| North Africa | 196,126,941 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 532,284,140 |
| Total | 730,475,733 |
| <i>2011</i> | |
| <i>Africa</i> | |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 465,346,467 |
| North Africa | 491,203,514 |
| Total | 957,567,746 |
| <i>2012</i> | |
| <i>Africa</i> | |
| West Africa | 312,649,529 |
| East Africa | 520,252,730 |
| North Africa | 405,462,834 |
| South Africa | 2,318,368 |
| Total | 1,259,880,074 |
| <i>2013</i> | |
| <i>Africa</i> | |
| North Africa | 17,568,462,121 |
| West Africa | 225,399,662 |
| South Africa | 2,421,983 |
| East Africa | 246,102,581 |
| Total | 18,103,834,237 |

Source: UAE Foreign Aid Report, 2013

developmental in nature, but the increasing amount of aid to Egypt and other North African countries clearly shows that there is a relationship between politically motivated aid and that of developmental objectives.

Nonetheless, the UAE humanitarian aid reflects its commitments to support the “Global South” and achieving some of the MDGs. Although Table 9.1 indicates that humanitarian aid constitutes about 2% of its total aid, it remains among the highest in the world. Because of the political

Table 9.3 UAE's Aid Distribution, 2009–2013

| <i>Donor</i> | <i>United Arab Emirates</i> | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|---------|
| <i>Aid type</i> | <i>Total Official, Net</i> | | | | | | |
| <i>Unit</i> | <i>US\$, in millions</i> | | | | | | |
| <i>Year</i> | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | |
| | | | | | | <i>2013</i> | |
| Developing countries, total | 2416.18 | 1258.39 | 955.95 | 379.65 | 684.01 | 1005.93 | 5388.64 |
| Africa, total | 366.83 | 782.81 | 86.08 | 109.82 | 150.14 | 183.84 | 4760.16 |
| Africa, total | 279.74 | 695.5 | 56.67 | 12.73 | 86.26 | 11.76 | 4692.97 |
| America, total | 87.09 | 87.31 | 28.21 | 96.54 | 63.85 | 171.31 | 58.67 |
| America, total | North and Central America, 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 5.49 | 0.42 | 0.44 | 1.39 |
| South America, total | total | | | | | | |
| Asia, total | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 5.06 | 0.22 | 0.15 | 1.15 |
| Asia, total | Far East Asia, total | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.43 | 0.2 | 0.29 | 0.24 |
| | South and Central Asia, total | | | | | | |
| Oceania, total | Middle East, total | 1894.58 | 460.97 | 852.32 | 207.9 | 507.69 | 654.26 |
| Developing countries, unspecified | 11.89 | 63.14 | 3.75 | 0.83 | 0.13 | 0.57 | 0.15 |
| Developing countries, unspecified | 1038.47 | 59.95 | 230.92 | 98.33 | 194.04 | 253.96 | 216.13 |
| | 844.22 | 337.88 | 617.65 | 108.72 | 313.52 | 399.71 | 242.59 |
| | — | — | — | — | 0.05 | 5.15 | 0.31 |
| | 0.45 | — | 10.38 | 32.84 | 22.72 | 138.74 | 141.49 |

Source: From data obtained from oecd.org

instabilities in the Middle East, the UAE also has been among the largest donors to refugee services in the world. It has responded to the Syrian Crisis, where in 2012 and 2013 it provided, nearly US\$83.53 million.⁴² In 2013, the UAE opened the Emirates–Jordanian camp in the Mrijib Al Fhood area near Al Zarqa city at a cost of AED36 million (about US\$12 million).⁴³ By March 2015, the UAE's aid aimed at alleviating the suffering of those affected by the Syrian Crisis has amounted to more than AED1.34 billion or US\$364 million according to the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development.⁴⁴ Because of the continued crisis in the Middle East, the UAE's aid programme will continue to be dictated by security and regional dynamics.

Overall, it appears that UAE aid continues to increase year after year. It constituted about 1.33% of its GDP in 2013 and has exceeded the target of 0.7% set by the UN. With the decline of international oil prices and the UAE's military involvement in Yemen, however, will its aid continue to increase? Previous experience indicates that there is solid relationship between aid and oil prices. During the 1970s, when oil prices went up, Gulf aid increased dramatically and then declined in mid-1980s after the fall of oil prices. The future of the UAE's aid and relationship with the South hinges on oil prices.

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Going South to Reach the North?: The Case of Colombia

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INTRODUCTION

Colombia (along with Chile and Cuba) is the fourth largest provider of South–South cooperation (SSC) in Latin America after Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico (SEGIB 2012). This chapter highlights the particularities of Colombia’s SSC policy. Some of its drivers are similar to those of other countries and can be traced to economic improvement (i.e. it has become a middle-income country) and growing interest in using SSC as a tool to increase regional and international influence as an emerging power. Others, however, are more atypical and are linked to the fact that Colombia has long been considered a “problem country”—given its prolonged armed conflict and drug trafficking problem—and now is trying to convert to being a model provider of “best practices”¹ in development sectors.

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Contrary to many of the cases analyzed in this book, Colombia's SSC policy does not stem from a leftist philosophy nor does it exhibit strong ideological (i.e. Cuba, Venezuela), religious (i.e. UAE, Turkey), or cultural components (i.e. India, the Republic of Korea). It also does not claim to be radically different from traditional aid (unlike China or Brazil). On the contrary, one of the Colombian SSC's main areas of focus—security—is at the heart of the agendas of some donors in the North, especially the United States (USA), and in regions such as Latin America. As a result, the country is not reluctant, but rather willing, to collaborate (and even triangulate) with its Northern counterparts.

The chapter constitutes a first attempt at identifying the theoretical and analytical foundations of Colombia's SSC policy, especially during the government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–), when it has been undergoing considerable maturation and institutionalization. It is argued here that the rise of SSC is part of a broader official effort to improve Colombia's image in the world and to renegotiate its international status and that, to a great extent, the country is “going South to reach the North.” In a rather paradoxical fashion, SSC policy is aimed at getting closer to Northern partners and multilateral organizations, rather than increasing autonomy or leadership in the global South per se. This, in the understanding of Colombian leaders, is a source of power and prestige, and an important component of a new narrative of “national success” being marketed by state authorities. The argument builds on a careful description of two case studies. On the one hand, Colombia's contribution to the development aid multilateral agenda, both through the promotion of South–South and triangular cooperation at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in particular its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and in the context of the post-2015 development agenda within the United Nations (UN) system. In both instances, Colombia has presented itself as a bridge between the world's “North” and “South,” “developed” and “developing” nations, “traditional” and “emerging” donors, and has proposed concrete avenues of cooperation between them. On the other hand, the chapter explores one policy sector of peculiar relevance, security, and explains how Colombia is working closely with the USA to export its “model” in Latin America by means of “triangular cooperation” schemes.

From an analytical perspective, the chapter makes use of two ideas rooted in early “constructivist” foreign policy thinking and in Latin American international relations (IR). The notion of role conceptions,

conceptualized originally by Holsti (1970), refers to the existence of national roles (e.g. “leader,” “nonaligned,” “middle power,” “mediator,” “revolutionary,” among others) held by policymakers. These form the basis of their decisions and actions, and the responsibilities and functions that they believe their countries should fulfil at international and regional levels (Holsti 1970, 245–246). Once constituted by policy elites, national roles condition the image that countries project abroad as well as the paths of action that they will follow in the conduct of their foreign policy.

Contrary to (neo)realist theory’s portrayal of states as “units,” Holsti (1970) shows not only that they differ in terms of their role conceptions but also that states can carry multiple (and evolving) roles, depending on the context and the foreign counterparts in question. The idea is used here in order to trace the multiple channels through which the Colombian government has attempted to improve its image internationally and to present itself to the international community as a responsible and reliable partner. In addition, the concept of “associated dependent development” (Cardoso 1973; Evans 1979), drawn from the dependency school, is used to depict Colombia’s role in the division of labour and interactions with the USA in the context of their triangulated security cooperation. Empirically, the chapter builds on several sources, including:

1. Field observations and interviews with Colombian representatives, as well as OECD and DAC staff, carried out in Paris, Bogotá, and Busan in the Republic of Korea during the Fourth High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness in 2011.
2. Confidential personal interviews conducted with Colombian, Mexican, Honduran, Guatemalan, and the US government, military, and police officials between 2013 and 2015.
3. Direct participation, in this case by former Colombian Presidential Agency of International Cooperation (APC-Colombia) professional Jimena Durán, in several governmental meetings concerning the post-2015 development agenda, as well as close documentation of APC-Colombia’s participation in meetings with the OECD-DAC—from a recipient perspective in APC-Colombia’s Directorate of Demand—and in the negotiation of triangular cooperation initiatives.

The first section of this chapter presents the origins and main characteristics of Colombia’s SSC programme and argues that it has to be understood as part of a broader attempt to change the country’s foreign

policy orientation starting in 2010. The second section shows how, in the context of a changing aid field, the promotion of SSC at the OECD–DAC has allowed the Colombian government to present the country as a bridge between traditional aid and emerging donors. The third section explores SSC initiatives in the security sector, and the modalities and implications of Colombia’s close collaboration with the USA in Latin America. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion about the role of SSC in the country’s evolving national role conceptions.

COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND SSC: NEGOTIATING A NEW INTERNATIONAL ROLE AND STATUS

Most scholarship on Colombian foreign policy maintains that the country’s international relations have reflected two conflicting views of the country’s place in the international system: (1) that its peripheral, subordinate status allows for marginal leeway and warrants strict alignment with the United States; and (2) that the diversification of foreign ties, in particular with Latin American neighbours, would increase Colombia’s negotiating power and create relative margins of manoeuvre in its dealings with the US. These views have underwritten two distinct foreign policy doctrines, termed *respice polum* and *respice similia*, respectively (see Tickner 2007 for an overview of the study and manner of Colombian foreign policy).

In practice, foreign policy normally has alternated between the two principles, depending on the administration, issue area, and circumstances involved (Tickner 2003, 172). During the governments of Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998–2002) and Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002–2010), however, Colombia’s diplomacy was very much geared towards partnership with the Washington, given the need to garner international support for managing the armed conflict (Tickner and Pardo 2006). Indeed, Tickner (2007) argues that the strategy adopted by both administrations can best be described as “intervention by invitation” because of Colombia’s explicit gesturing towards greater US involvement in the country’s internal crisis.

Nevertheless, after assuming the presidency in 2010, Juan Manuel Santos began taking steps to diversify the country’s international partners, secure new allies, and mend and strengthen relations with Latin America,² while also maintaining Colombia’s close and privileged relation with the United States (Ardila 2011). Within this context, the country’s position as a SSC provider gained importance as a tool of foreign policy, along with more active engagement with global development debates and new

aid modalities. This renewed foreign policy framework includes more proactive participation in multilateral organizations (Ramírez 2011) and seeking new partnerships. Its purpose has been twofold:

1. To promote economic development, conceived as a result of free trade, the liberalization and promotion of foreign direct investment, and the settlement of businesses and industries in the country (Ocampo 2015, 28). For example, Colombia implemented a long-awaited free-trade agreement with the USA in 2012 and with many others, including Canada, the European Union (EU), and Israel.
2. To secure broad international support (i.e. political and financial) for the peace process between the government and the largest guerrilla organization, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC); the conflict resolution process began in 2012 and likely will lead to a signed agreement in the near future, as well as to subsequent “post-conflict” phase (Bergamaschi et al. 2016).

As domestic conditions have improved with economic growth and modest social policies designed to reduce poverty and, to a lesser extent, inequality, and the prospect of peace increases, the Santos administration multiplied efforts to improve the country’s image abroad. Between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, predominant international literature perceived Colombia as a weak state on the verge of collapse and threatened by guerrillas and drug cartels, with alarming levels of violence perpetrated by all non-state violent actors, including paramilitary groups, an economic and governance crisis, and high levels of corruption.

Though, by 2004 policymakers in Bogotá and Washington, think tanks, international and regional financial institutions, and the media slowly began to refer to Colombia as a country that, with the help of the US, had been able to avert disaster (Tickner and Callejas 2015, 241–242). Since then, the perception and role conception of Colombia—conveyed by its promoters inside the country and its international partners abroad—definitely has changed from a “problem country” to a “success story” and even a model (Tickner 2014).

In the paragraphs that follow the argument is that SSC reflects and serves this new foreign policy orientation (on this, see also Nivia 2013) by going through its evolution, main objectives, and priorities (i.e. sectors and beneficiaries). Overall, there has been an evolution in the institutional framework, which provides a stronger and strategic position

to international cooperation, and a broadening of its geographical scope, themes, and instruments that are linked with the new role and image the Santos government is seeking to build up on the international scene.

Colombia's SSC has prioritized Latin America and the Caribbean mainly because of geographical proximity, regional, and commercial factors. The first cooperation initiatives were provided for under regional integration mechanisms such as the 1968 *Corporación Andina de Fomento* (Development Bank of Latin America, CAF), the 1969 Andean Pact, and the 1975 *Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe* (Latin American and Caribbean Economic System, SELA) (Sanin 2013; Guaqueta 1995). Colombia was one of the first countries in Latin America to create a Special Division of Technical International Cooperation (DECTI) during the 1970s, which was attached to the National Planning Department (*Departamento de Planeación Nacional*, DNP), and was in charge of the management of the cooperation received and offered. The coordination was ensured with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) (Tassara 2013). Following the signing of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) in 1978, a special division was created within the DECTI to lead the technical cooperation between developing countries, albeit without the necessary means to implement cooperation activities.

It was only in 1982 that specific funds were assigned to finance cooperation activities, with the creation of the *Fondo Caribe* (Caribbean Fund) as the first national account aimed at operationalizing the cooperation commitments (Sanin 2013). Two years later, the fund amounted to US\$70,000 (Guaqueta 1995). In the 1980s, Colombia offered technical assistance (Uribe 2009) and cooperation agreements were signed with Guatemala, El Salvador, Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, and Guyana (Sanin 2013). Objectives, such as regional integration, the establishment of joint positions concerning trade negotiations, guaranteeing access to markets, and strategic handling of maritime border disputes with Nicaragua and Venezuela, were key drivers of these initiatives (Guaqueta 1995).

From the mid-1990s until 2011, Colombia's cooperation policy and institutional framework were reshaped several times in an effort to give them a more strategic direction, as an instrument for the country's own development (as a recipient) and foreign policy objectives (as a provider of SSC). In 1995, the Caribbean Fund was transformed into the *Fondo de Cooperación y Asistencia Internacional* (Cooperation and International Assistance Fund, FOCAI), with a broader geographical scope (no longer limited to the Caribbean) to fund all Colombia's contributions

to international organizations and SSC activities. Its management was assigned to the Colombia Agency for International Cooperation (ACCI), authorized by the presidency in 2003. International cooperation was included in the National Development Plan for 2002–2006, and the first “Strategy of International Cooperation” was adopted for 2004–2006.

In 2005, SSC was given a higher priority and an enlarged status in the government apparatus when *Acción Social*—the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation—was created to supervise the execution of all the presidency’s social programmes, including cooperation ones (Sanin 2013). In 2011, *Acción Social* was dissolved and the Presidential Agency of International Cooperation of Colombia (*Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional* or APC-Colombia) was set up exclusively to manage international cooperation: both the external funds received by Colombia and its offers to other countries (Tassara 2013). The creation of APC-Colombia under the Santos administration was perceived as a clear sign of the willingness to reinforce the institutional framework of international cooperation by giving it more visibility on its own. APC-Colombia is in charge of managing international cooperation from a technical perspective and the funding of SSC activities, all in coordination with the foreign policy guidelines defined by the MRE.

International cooperation is thus treated as a strategic and political matter and is firmly linked to the government’s domestic agenda, as its management is coordinated by the presidency (Schonrock and Buchelli 2010) so as to underscore its importance and exploit its potential (APC-Colombia 2012). International cooperation and SSC are recognized as instruments of development, regional integration, and foreign policy that allow deepening relations with other developing countries and foster the promotion of trade, investment, and development opportunities (Tassara 2013; APC-Colombia 2013). In the early 2000s, Colombia’s cooperation policy still pursued regional integration and leadership, but it combined other foreign policy objectives such as reshaping the country’s image and gaining international status. As emphasized by Tassara, for the first time in its history, Colombia does not conceive of international cooperation as a tool to mobilize external support and resources to solve the domestic conflict, but as a vehicle to empower it to “learn how to be globalised” (National Development Plan 2010–2014, quoted by Tassara 2015).

The resources available to the FOCAI have risen significantly since 2007, growing from US\$410,000 to US\$1,020,000 in 2011 (Tassara 2013). Colombia’s budget for SSC then reached US\$5.6 million.

During 2009–2010, it has been estimated that Colombia performed and cofinanced 211 projects and actions with 40 countries (Tassara 2015, 121).³ Nevertheless, since 2014 FOCAI's funds have diminished because of budgetary cuts in all governmental organizations following the reduction in international oil prices.

The increase in FOCAI's budget corresponds to the strengthening of SSC policy in Colombia. For the first time ever, the “National Strategy for International Cooperation” (2012–2014) included a chapter concerning the sectorial and geographic priorities of SSC. Since 2009, regional strategies have been developed. The first one, the Caribbean Strategy, defined the following priority sectors: technical labour formation, culture, risk management, and food security. Subsequently, regional strategies were developed: the 2010 Regional Cooperation Programme for Mesoamerica (PCRM) and the 2011 Integral Strategy of Security Cooperation.

With the objective of diversifying the country's regional and IRs beyond the US and Latin America, strategies geared towards new regions have been adopted—that is, the 2012 South-East Asia Strategy, the 2013 Africa Strategy, and the 2013 Euroasia Strategy (Nivia and Ramos 2015). Nevertheless, 65% of the international cooperation offered by Colombia focuses on Central America and the Caribbean (Tassara 2013). For example, during 2010–2014, the Caribbean strategy benefited more than 100 participants in 20 countries; the security strategy reached 16,000 beneficiaries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa; and within the framework of PCRM, 110 cooperation activities were conducted with more than 2600 beneficiaries (Nivia and Ramos 2015). Colombia has played a leading role in fostering a Programme for the Consolidation of SSC through the Ibero-American Secretariat General, known by its Spanish acronym as SEGIB (Nivia 2013, 113).

Colombia prioritizes SSC activities in the following areas: modernization of the state (20.8%), protecting the environment (17.5%), education, culture and art (14.7%), productive development, and labour (12.3%) (Tassara 2013). Documents published in 2015 also list these SSC activities: security, social protection, culture, sports and entertainment, productive development, public government and good governance, assistance to victims of armed conflicts, reconciliation, and memory (APC-Colombia 2015, 5).

BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AID AND SSC IN A CHANGING ARENA

Contrary to other Latin American donors analyzed in this book (especially Cuba, Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Brazil), Colombia does not present its aid as an alternative to traditional variants. Given that it is still an aid-recipient, the government in Bogotá is anxious to preserve good relations with its Northern donors—mostly, the USA, the European delegation, Spain, and UN agencies (e.g. the UNDP and the International Organization for Migrations)—and to avoid placing SSC above traditional aid. In this context, APC-Colombia developed a dual narrative that guarantees continued eligibility and access to aid resources by stressing the country's remaining challenges—that is, peace-building, rural development in conflict areas, national levels of inequality, and environment conservation (APC-Colombia 2015a)—that call for the continued support by the international community. At the same time, Colombia presents itself as source of knowledge and technical experience of value to other developing countries through SSC (APC-Colombia 2015a).

Colombian leaders and civil servants are eager to share “best practices” with developed and like-minded countries in a wide range of public policies. Bogotá has privileged a demand-driven approach that guarantees the alignment and promotion the ownership of its SSC activities (TT-SSC 2011a), and places emphasis on knowledge-sharing between countries with similar levels of economic development, according to the Building Block Proposal (2011):

There is a need for a better understanding and more systematic *learning from the development experiences, particularly, from emerging economies, Middle Income Countries [MICs]* and key development partners. Partners will work together to foster *knowledge sharing* activities around key development challenges in order to learn and adapt the experiences, institutional arrangements and successful initiatives put in place by MICs and other development partners.

This, it is argued, makes Colombian SSC different from, but not incompatible with traditional aid, as the country's active participation in the Paris Agenda and in the elaboration of the post-2015 agenda clearly shows. Although the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) countries were reluctant to engage in the OECD–DAC works on aid efficiency, Colombian representatives have been willing to work with the Committee to make existing norms and standards of aid suitably efficient for SSC.

Colombia signed the Paris Declaration as a recipient of aid in November 2007⁴ after having taken important steps domestically towards improving the coordination and ownership of the aid flowing into the country as of 2003 (Castañeda 2014, 234–235). After representing Latin America at the OECD’s High-Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra in 2008, Colombia became a member of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), the directive in charge of following up on the implementation of the Paris Declaration’s principles and of the Partner Country Caucus. The delegation coming from Bogotá made a visible and important contribution by putting SSC on the agenda. Together with Indonesia, Colombians led the Task Team on South–South and triangular cooperation starting in March 2009, and the Building Block dedicated to this topic on the way to the 2011 HLF in Busan.

A High Level Event on South–South Cooperation and Capacity Development was hosted in Bogotá in 2010, with the goal to “implement the mandate of the Accra Agenda for Action and promote a greater role for, and increased effectiveness in, SSC” (The High Level Event on South–South Cooperation and Capacity Development 2010). The Bogotá Statement Towards Effective and Inclusive Development Partnerships that was released after the event is illustrative of Bogotá’s rationale, contribution to the DAC-led agenda on aid efficiency and harmonization, and its own “role conception” in the global aid architecture:

SSC is not a substitute for, but a complement to, North–South development cooperation. ... We aspire to mutually enrich and adapt the aid effectiveness principles and SSC based on the diverse experiences and good practice from SSC, and to further explore complementarities and synergies between SSC and North–South cooperation. While recognizing the need to respect the uniqueness and particularities of SSC, we also recognize the value and relevance of these principles in the practices of SSC. ... We shall continue to engage in the global dialogue on development, to promote the integration of aid effectiveness principles and good practices as advocated by the Paris and Accra High Level Forums and by the positive experiences emerging from SSC practices, enriching the aid effectiveness agenda and contributing to overall development effectiveness.⁵

As indicated in the Building Block Proposal, called “South–South and Triangular Cooperation: Unlocking the potential of horizontal partnerships for better development outcomes,” delivered by the governments of Colombia and Indonesia and their allies in November 2011, “the North–South-oriented processes are being widened, although not substituted, by the South–South perspective.”

Precisely because it claims to be compatible with traditional aid, the statement promoted by Bogotá was signed by a mere 11 countries, among which only Colombia, Peru, and Mexico represented Latin America. Disagreements between participants even made it impossible to reach consensus and deliver a full Final Declaration (Ayllón Pino 2013). As a consequence, Colombia's posture in the aid effectiveness debate and within DAC spaces has not been well received by many donors of the global South with strategies that are rooted in the claim of being different from traditional donors and aid practices. In the region, only Mexico shared Colombia's position, in contrast to more reticent countries, such as Brazil and Argentina that endorse the Paris Declaration as aid recipients but not as donors, or Cuba and Venezuela that have not adopted the Paris Declaration for ideological reasons (Ayllón Pino 2013). Nevertheless, the initiative was welcomed by the DAC Secretariat at the time, and it made sense for Bogotá officials, given their unique conception of SSC and broader foreign policy objectives.

Understanding the momentum gained by the Colombian initiative to promote South–South and triangular cooperation requires a certain degree of contextualization within the broader context of the OECD–DAC, which has been undergoing an identity crisis of sorts. During the past 20 years, traditional categories of “donors” and “recipients” and “developed” and “developing” countries have become fuzzier and have been replaced by a more complex reality characterized by the fragmentation of the Third World between least-developed countries and rising economic powers and the increasingly significant share of new players in the aid crowd (Eyben and Savage 2013). During the last decade, as the role of emerging donors in international development assistance has increased, the DAC’s efficiency, relevance, and legitimacy has been put into question because the OECD and DAC are selective multilateral organs comprised only of developed countries. As a result, after 2008, the Committee began to seek out associations with aid-recipient countries and emerging donors (Bergamaschi and Soulé-Kohndou 2016, Bergamaschi 2016).

Yet, the BRICS were unwilling to participate and be co-opted. The governments of India, China, and Brazil, for instance, have maintained that SSC is different and that their commitments to DAC norms and standards can only be “voluntary” (Busan Outcome Document 2011). They blame the OECD for being an exclusive “rich club” and refuse to abide by the rules defined by an organization that denies them decision-making power. For this reason, they systematically prefer to discuss SSC in the more inclusive arenas of the UN system (Bergamaschi and Soulé-Kohndou 2016). On the contrary, the delegates of some countries

(e.g. Rwanda and Colombia) seized the DAC's invitation to promote a better image of their countries from within an organization that they did not have access to until then (Bergamaschi 2016).

As such, the Colombian initiative was welcomed by the DAC. Indeed, although adapting the Paris Agenda to SSC is a challenge for the Committee, it is far more favourable than the “exit” strategy adopted by the BRICS. The Colombian proposal was a two-way process that was viewed as mutually beneficial for Bogotá and the DAC. On the one hand, the Task-Team was about providing policy recommendations based on the specific knowledge and experience of Southern countries—in particular, of Colombia (Alzate in CEPEI, n.d.)—to feed into the discussions in the perspective of the 2011 HLF on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. This materialized through a real attempt to inject some Southern experience and knowledge into a DAC-driven process through what Bogotá called “a unique evidence-based approach.” Thirty-one case studies of successful South–South and triangular cooperation were produced in collaboration with Colombian public entities and civil society organizations as well as universities to showcase “a rich source of experiences ... from all over the developing world, demonstrating the potential of SSC to enrich the aid effectiveness agenda” (The High Level Event on South–South Cooperation and Capacity Building 2011).

On the other hand, Bogotá showed a willingness to “foster the implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action by mapping and analysing SSC practices and identifying good practices of SSC in the context of aid effectiveness” (TT-SSC 2011a, b), to explore complementarities between North–South and South–South cooperation, and to adapt the aid effectiveness principles to SSC (TT-SSC 2011b). Additionally, Colombia expressed an interest in reforming DAC’s sources of knowledge and evidence.

Still, for the OECD, this meant that traditional aid and SSC are compatible (instead of contradictory or competing) and that the DAC’s norms still reach out of their membership, thus legitimizing the Committee in the global architecture of aid governance at a time when its role was severely questioned in an increasingly competitive arena (Bergamaschi 2016). The DAC’s initial hope that putting SSC on the agenda and that Mexico or Colombia could act as brokers to have the BRICS on board was long-lived. After Busan, discussions about how to adapt the Paris principles to SSC have taken place at the DAC, although the topic has somehow lost momentum at the DAC and transferred to the UN (Bergamaschi 2016).

On the Colombian side, a historical tradition of ideological proximity to the West and the USA made *rapprochement* with the DAC possible. Namely, Colombian authorities' prevalent role conception is not conducive to the articulation of a vision of development that is antagonistic to or opposed as an alternative to the post-Washington Consensus. As hinted at briefly in the previous section, the country has remained the strongest political and economically of the United States in South America, especially after the "turn to the left" experienced in many countries of the region during the early 2000s. Colombia has for a long time followed an overall free-market development strategy and its government implements neoliberal economic policies that are close to the "sound" market-oriented policies usually promoted by the OECD.

The best testimony of this is President Santos's formal request to join the organization, submitted to the Secretary-General in 2011, and the start of the admission process in 2013. Membership to the OECD is perceived and framed by authorities as a step towards modernity, and a way to join the league of developed countries (i.e. to change the country's international status) (Crespo 2012). Uniting with developed nations also is supposed to serve another of the government's objectives: to attract foreign direct investment (Presidencia de la República 2013).

A posteriori, it transpires that Colombia's participation in the works related to the Paris Agenda at the DAC between 2009 and 2011 sustained President Santos's project to join the mother organization, the OECD. One of the initiative's main promoters argued in an interview that the South-South and triangular strategies provided "*an opportunity to project internationally and propose an alternative to leftist SSC in Latin America*" and that "*the task-team has given Colombia unprecedented visibility in the organisation.*"⁶ According to another official at the Colombian embassy in Paris, it helped the country's authorities show interest in and compliance with DAC and OECD norms. Yet, with discussions concerning SSC and the Paris Agenda losing momentum at the DAC, the topic also has lost impetus in Bogotá, and currently, the urge and "political will" to apply the post-Busan agenda as a donor are not strongly felt (CEPEI 2014). As the accession process to OECD advances, the possibility of joining the DAC has not yet been discussed officially.

Under the same logic and with the leadership of the *Cancillería* (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Colombia's diplomats recently had an active role in the negotiations of the new, post-2015 development agenda that replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the UN in 2000.

In the Conference for Sustainable Development—known as Rio+20—held in 2012, the international community adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a concept initially coined by Paula Caballero, then the Director of Economic, Social and Environmental Affairs at the *Cancillería*. The Colombian Ministry deemed that to raise awareness and international mobilization, the new agenda needed a list of indicators like the MDGs before them; however, with an additional reference to the environment.

The initial reference to the “green economy” was replaced by “sustainable development” and Colombian diplomats lobbied to gain support from the leaders of developed and developing countries, until the notion and related policy actions, sectors, and indicators were put on the multilateral agenda (El Tiempo 2012; El Espectador 2012). Colombia is part of the Open Working Group on SDGs and María Angela Holguín, Colombia’s Minister of Foreign Relations, was a member of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (CEPEI 2015).

Colombia has initiated two key propositions that are intended to operationalize the SDGs and that show, once again, the country’s willingness to enhance its influence (significantly on development issues) as well as its “role conception” as a “bridge” between the North and the South in multilateral agendas. The first proposition is known as the “modular approach,” and it seeks to recognize the interdependence between the various development goals. The second proposition is known as the “dashboard” and is based on the need to establish a baseline, which means a limited number of goals and indicators for developed and developing countries on the basis of which all can establish their own national objectives and targets (CEPEI 2015).

With this second proposition, the Colombian *Cancillería* offered an option able to reconcile the universality of the development goals with the need to reinforce their appropriation and adaptation to national contexts (*Cancillería n.d.*). This pragmatism and differentiation regarding implementation, which reflects a concern put forward by emerging and developing countries, helped conceal the divergences in terms of needs, means, and capacities between participants of the North and South.

Moreover, Colombia has confirmed its commitment with the SDGs by the creation of the High Level Interinstitutional Commission for Enlistment and Effective Implementation of the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the SDGs, which seeks the alignment of national priorities with them (DNP 2015). In this context, Colombia has included the SDGs into its strategic framework for international cooperation

(Hoja de Ruta 2015-2018). APC-Colombia also has committed to promoting South-South and triangular cooperation as a complementary means for the implementation of the SDGs and will report its contribution to their accomplishment (APC-Colombia 2015), thus demonstrating goodwill, shared responsibility, and a promise of burden-sharing to developed countries.

In keeping with Colombian authorities' ideological proximity to traditional donors, logic of conciliation and bridge-building, APC-Colombia and the Ministry of External Affairs seek to increase Colombia's participation in triangular cooperation with traditional donors and multilateral organizations. Colombian officials define triangular cooperation as follows (APC-Colombia 2014):

A form of alliance for development that relies on the participation of:
(a) at least one traditional donor or multilateral organisation, (b) at least one developing country providing cooperation (pivotal country) and
(c) at least one recipient country which seeks to seize, adapt, enrich and co-create solutions to understand one development topic on the basis of the complementary strengths of each stakeholder.

For Bogotá, triangular cooperation constitutes "*a bridge* between South-South and North-South cooperation" (The High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development 2011).

Since 2010, Colombia has increased its participation in triangular initiatives as a pivotal country and has accrued cooperation experiences with Germany, Australia, the USA, South Korea, the Central African Republic (CAR), Japan, Canada, and the Inter-American Development Bank (APC-Colombia 2016), as well as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Development Programme, and the World Bank. In 2014, the country apportioned US\$100,000 to triangular initiatives (Nivia and Ramos 2015). Triangular partnerships are considered technically and politically strategic by Colombian the administration for they contribute to improving their reach into the global South, while allowing alliances with Northern partners.

According to Nivia and Ramos (2015), the will to build stronger relationships with Asia and Africa is a major motive to engage in triangular cooperation. Because Colombia had little previous experience or diplomatic presence to capitalize on to establish SSC projects in these regions, making use of the infrastructure and existing means of a traditional

donor or multilateral organization was key. Consequently, Colombia's active engagement in triangular cooperation constitutes an important contribution in the country's quest for a different image and a solider position in the international system.

The last section of this chapter analyzes the inner workings of triangular cooperation through the case of the security sector, which sheds light on how SSC helped the country position itself as a partner for Northern donors while also improving its image. The collaboration between the USA and Colombia in this realm is geared towards sharing Colombian expertise in the security realm—acquired largely as a result of long-standing US assistance through Plan Colombia—with various countries on the subcontinent. The section argues that Colombia cooperates with its traditional ally, the USA, and acts as a proxy for Washington, thus reproducing its asymmetric relationship in the process. Within a scheme of “associated dependent cooperation,” however, Bogotá also benefits from this partnership in many ways, and the country has made use of SSC and triangulation in order to position itself as a regional (and international) security provider.

“ASSOCIATED-DEPENDENT COOPERATION”: COLOMBIAN COOPERATION IN THE SECURITY SECTOR⁷

To explain Colombia's provision of aid in the security sector, it is important to recall some facts about its experience as an aid-recipient first. Colombia is the fourth largest aid-recipient in Latin America after Paraguay, Bolivia, and El Salvador (SEGIB 2012). Although this does not mean that the country is aid-dependent—aid represents only 0.4% of its GDP (CEPEI, n.d.)—the aid received is extremely political in the sense that it is tied to the country's long-standing armed conflict and to its drug trafficking problem. Colombia's main donor is the US, the continued support of which has been largely the result of Bogotá's prolonged alignment with Washington's foreign policy concerns and strategies throughout the decades.

Colombian leaders have been able to present themselves alternatively as a tool for the containment of communism in Latin America during the Cold War—mainly because of its fight against leftist guerrillas; then as an ally against narco-trafficking and drug cartels in the 1990s; and, after September 11 2011, as a partner in the “war on terror.” In the early

2000s, President Uribe secured US support by labelling the FARC as “narco-terrorists” devoid of political status and agenda, and he supported President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003.

This long-lasting collaboration has taken a somewhat different route in the recent years, as the United States and Colombia have offered joint SSC programmes in Central and Latin America. Within the context of the High Level Strategic Security Dialogue (HLSSD) initiated by Presidents Obama and Santos in February 2012, both governments now aim at creating greater synergy between each country’s international security cooperation strategies. Several months later, at the Summit of the Americas meeting in Cartagena, the two leaders announced a Regional Security Cooperation Action Plan to support capacity-building in Central America, the Caribbean, and West Africa. A Security Cooperation Coordinating Group (SCCG) was instituted to develop and present a yearly action plan to the representatives of both governments, and an International Cooperation Division, affiliated with the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), was created inside the US Embassy in Bogotá.

According to the Colombian Ministry of Defence, between 2010 and May 2015, police and military training was provided to more than 26,400 officials from 72 different countries in areas as diverse as land, air, river, and sea interdiction; police testimony; lie detector use; handling of explosives; intelligence; psychological evaluation operations; and JUNGLA command—the elite counternarcotics programme designed originally by the US and now administered primarily by the Colombians. Approximately 87% of these services were offered by the Colombian National Police. Since approximately 2003, the number of trainees has grown exponentially, signalling the increasing importance of Colombian training in the country’s international cooperation strategies.

Notwithstanding the number of nationalities trained, cooperation has focused largely on a group of countries to which distinct problems related to illicit drugs and organized crime have migrated—namely, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and to a lesser degree, Mexico (serviced primarily by the Washington directly). These also are at the top of the list of US security priorities in the Western Hemisphere. Western Africa, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Ghana, Gambia, Togo, and Senegal also have received Colombian training under the auspices of the EU and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Colombian government opened a new embassy in Ghana in 2014 with the goal of increasing its training portfolio on the African continent.

The resulting triangular schemes rely on the following division of labour between participants: the US provides funding, logistical support, supervision, and vetting for human rights violations of those third country recipients that receive Colombian training. At the same time, Colombian government puts up and pays the salaries of its security personnel who act as trainers; mainly, they are elite forces' members of the police previously educated by the United States, and, to a lesser degree, from their army, navy, and air force. In addition, it provides technical input and equipment and training sites within the country.

More interesting from an analytical perspective, this specific mode of triangulation allows the United States to "lead from behind" while the Colombians can "follow from in front." The US reading of this arrangement states that, "as the United States helps Colombia, Colombia helps the United States to help others." For Washington, having the Colombians take the lead is efficient because of their regional reputation of combating guerrillas and drug cartels and because it is cost-effective, both in financial and political terms. Mobilizing Colombian trainers is less expensive than US ones, and relying on Colombian intermediaries spares the Washington the risks of being accused of "imperialism" by its South American partners.

For instance, given Mexican sensitivity towards US interventionism, cooperation provided by Colombia is not triangulated but rather strictly South-South, even though in many ways Colombia acts as a proxy for Washington in this country too. This international security cooperation regime also is very much in line with the post-September 11 "light footprint" approach to security and defence in which capacity-building of local partners and their deployment in Third World countries, instead of direct US involvement, has become a key element (Luján 2013).

The types of knowledge provided by Colombia are derived largely from its previous and ongoing alliance with the United States and the aid (e.g. material, political, financial, training) received in the context of Plan Colombia. This ambitious state-strengthening, counternarcotics, and counterinsurgency strategy was deployed during the late 1990s, allegedly in order to save the state from the brink of collapse (Borda 2012; Tickner 2007; Tokatlian 2001). US policymaking circles thought that the country was undergoing a severe security crisis, and that the FARC would take over if counteractive measures were not taken immediately. Given the implications of both state collapse and insurgent victory for US economic and security interests in Colombia and the Andean region more broadly, a multibillion dollar assistance programme was devised in order to build capacities for fighting the drug traffic and the guerillas more

effectively. In parallel, President Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) initiated a peace dialogue with the guerrillas that eventually failed. Nevertheless, in what has frequently been described as an “extraordinary transformation” (DeShazo et al. 2007), and despite pending allegations of significant human rights violations, Colombia’s security situation has continued to improve because of the second Uribe government (2006–2010).

Triangulation is best analyzed through the lens of “associated dependent cooperation” (Tickner 2016). This concept is derived from the work of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1973) and Peter Evans (1979) on dependent development, which the two authors describe as the coexistence of a “core-periphery” divide that perpetuates asymmetry, the partial overlap of core and peripheral interests, and non-zero sum interactions. Indeed, Colombia’s status as a security provider is premised on recognition of the superiority of US knowledge and efforts to gain favour within the core-periphery structure rather than challenging it.

Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to say that Colombia is purely dominated and passive in the triangular cooperation schemes established with its traditional international patron. Indeed, Bogotá enjoys a constrained, but real agency and leverage, and its close collaborations with the United States generates returns and benefits both in the domestic and international spheres. The strategic relationship reinforces Colombia’s status, which shifted from a “laboratory” for the US security policy to a partner and a security “exporter.” This has allowed the Santos administration to gain legitimacy at the regional and world level.

On the other hand, from the Colombian perspective, triangulated security cooperation aims at reinforcing reciprocity from Washington. In the ongoing debate about the “war on drugs,” the increasingly critical positions adopted by the Colombian President Santos—who has spoken out publicly on the need to reevaluate current strategies and in May 2015, decided to suspend aerial fumigation of coca crops, one of the centrepieces of Plan Colombia—have not been subject to “punishment” on the part of the US. Finally, this asymmetrical strategic association is seen as key to guaranteeing the continued support of Washington, which is deemed fundamental by Bogotá. Because the Santos government hopes to conclude peace negotiations with the FARC—and hopefully initiate talks with the remaining insurgent group, National Liberation Army (ELN)—international assistance to monitor and finance the post-conflict scenario is essential. A new version of Plan Colombia, called “*Paz Colombia*,” is under discussion between both capitals at the moment of this writing (mid-2016), and President Obama announced that he was “seeking a big aid increase” (Landler 2016).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that Colombia's SSC programme is different from that of other countries because of its use of traditional aid and actors—namely, an agenda focused on security in Latin America and a willingness to reconcile the existing principles and norms of traditional aid and the innovative practices of Southern donors. More broadly, SSC has reflected and served the Santos government's attempt to redesign Colombia's place in the world and renegotiate its international status from "problem" to "model." This is the essence of what has been described here as "going South to reach the North."

Yet, the phrase is insufficient to capture the multiples meanings, uses, and effects of Bogota's SSC. Efforts focus primarily on Central and South America, and representatives of APC and the *Cancillería* have attempted to act as the spokespeople of Latin America and to coordinate South–South cooperation discussions at regional meetings at the same time. Consequently, SSC is geared not only towards the North but also is part of a regional ambition and incipient attempts to gain influence beyond Colombia's traditional diplomatic interlocutors (e.g. in Asia and Africa). In this sense, the Colombian case suggests that there may be less of a contradiction or zero-sum game than is normally thought to be the case between getting closer to big powers and existing multilateral organizations on the one hand, and the quest for regional leadership and new partners and routes of engagement on the other. Similarly, the supposed antagonism between continued and voluntary "associated dependence" towards the US and the exercise of greater agency in a changing regional and international environment is less than clear. There is some mimicry in the way Colombian security experts replicate and export what they have learned from previous training (Tikner 2016).

Viewed simultaneously as a bridge, strategic partner, broker, and proxy, Colombia's national role conception and policies as a donor are malleable and flexible enough to play distinct parts in various settings and to pursue multiple, even conflicting, objectives on the different, diverse scales (e.g. bilateral, regional, international) of international relations. In sum, the Colombian case underscores the usefulness of the idea of national roles (Holsti 1970), especially as it sheds light on how distinct role conceptions can lead to changes in foreign policy conduct, as well as distinct behaviours that at first glance might seem inconsistent.

NOTES

1. Colombia defines “best practices” or *buenas prácticas* as a set of actions that present excellent results for development in a specific context, and which could have similar results when applied to similar contexts. Colombia assembles best practices from public and private actors, which then become part of the country’s SSC portfolio (APC-Colombia 2014).
2. During the Uribe administration in particular, relations with neighbouring countries, Ecuador and Venezuela, were highly conflictual and actually broke down on several occasions, in large part because of ideological differences between the right-leaning Colombian president and his leftist counterparts. Tensions with these two countries and with South America in general reached their height in 2008, when the Colombian armed forces staged a cross-border attack against a FARC camp inside Ecuadorian territory.
3. This data is only an estimation, as public information on development cooperation is scarce and not always reliable, follow-up and evaluation incipient. This is not specific to Colombia but rather a common feature of SSC donors. Numbers are usually a mix of development activities (i.e. conferences, seminars) and full-scale development projects. APC-Colombia is currently pursuing a two-fold objective: (1) enhance the number of projects versus activities, and (2) improve and systemize the information about SSC.
4. Following adherence to the Paris Declaration, Colombia participated in the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, and in the Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, as a recipient country. Colombia was the only Latin American country to participate with Bolivia.
5. Emphasis by the authors.
6. Enrique Maruri Londoño, former director of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia, interview with Isaline Bergamaschi, Bogotá, August 21, 2012.
7. This section draws from Tickner (2016).

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Resisting South–South Cooperation? Mozambican Civil Society and Brazilian Agricultural Technical Cooperation

Jimena Durán and Sérgio Chichava

INTRODUCTION

The rise of new development actors, such as Brazil, China, or India, has led to a wave of questions concerning their nature and motivations as donors. Analysts and policymakers ask whether these new actors promote sustainable development cooperation, and whether their motivations and practices vis-à-vis African countries are different from “traditional” donors. The rise of these questions is limited not only to academic circles but also occurs within civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media.

Since Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s presidential mandate (2003–2010), the participation of Brazil in the international development arena has increased

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considerably, with a special interest in strengthening and diversifying its relationships throughout the Southern Hemisphere, especially with Africa. This is the case in Mozambique, with which Brazil has in past years consolidated stronger economic, political, and cooperation relations, and that is becoming Brazil's most important African partner (Chichava et al. 2013).

It is in Mozambique that Brazil, in partnership with Japan, is implementing the most ambitious agricultural programme in Africa, called ProSavana. Its main goal is to develop Northern Mozambique's agricultural potential, and in particular to transform the Nacala Corridor, covering an area of approximately 14 million hectares (ha), into a highly productive agricultural zone. It is inspired by Prodecer, a Japanese–Brazilian joint partnership programme that transformed Brazil's tropical savannah (known as *Cerrado*) into one of the most prosperous agricultural regions in the country and in the world.

However, ProSavana has been heavily criticized by CSOs in Mozambique, Brazil, and Japan. Although its promoters describe the programme as a way to revolutionize Mozambican agriculture, Mozambique's CSOs, supported by foreign partners (i.e. mostly Brazil and Japan) have condemned the lack of transparency surrounding ProSavana's specific implementation details and the poor participation of communities in its formulation and planning. The CSOs claim that ProSavana will benefit only Brazilian and Japanese economic interests as well as Mozambican elites, while marginalizing local small farmers. To sustain their arguments, they use the experience of Prodecer in Brazil, which in their view is not as successful as is considered by the governments of Brazil and Japan, having marginalized local small farmers and impoverished local soils because of the extensive use of pesticides. For these reasons, various Mozambican CSOs started a campaign to persuade the three governments to suspend, rethink, and reformulate the programme, and to focus its support on small farmers while guaranteeing transparency in the process.

On the basis of the ProSavana programme, this chapter explores Brazilian South-South cooperation (SSC) through the lenses of CSOs' opposition, explaining how Mozambican CSOs, accompanied by its Brazilian and Japanese counterparts, have tried to exert control of SSC while demanding accountability regarding the real economic interests at stake and the implications for local communities. ProSavana has been the subject of various studies because it acts as a laboratory for Brazil's SSC in the sector of agriculture but also regarding its narratives, its trilateral character, and its potential effects (Chichava et al. 2013; Fingermann

2014; Funada-Classen 2013; Clements and Fernandes 2012; Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013). The intent here is to feed into the debate around Brazil's SSC and ProSavana by discussing the CSOs' role as active players that question the interests behind it. Indeed, this question is relevant in the context of rising accountability demands in international cooperation, the internationalization of civil society as well as democratization, rural development, and dissension in Mozambique.

This analysis draws on fieldwork carried out in Mozambique between 2012 and 2015.² It is accompanied by the review of primary and secondary literature on Brazil's SSC, civil society activism in Mozambique, and ProSavana. The chapter first analyzes Brazil's SSC principles, its mechanisms, and its links to foreign policy. Building on this, the chapter introduces ProSavana, Brazil's role in it, and its trilateral character. The last section tackles the narratives and mechanisms of protest that CSOs use and their engagement with their international counterparts.

BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTRUMENTS

Brazil's South–South engagement is not a new phenomenon, and in this sense it does not represent a rupture with its foreign policy tradition. Brazilian foreign policy principles of nonintervention, autonomy, pacifism, and universalism, plus the self-image of being a “middle power” in the South³ (Lima 2005) have influenced Brazil's identity as a donor while giving coherence to the country's foreign policy.

Brazilian discourse promotes a spirit of equality, claiming that the partnerships are based on mutual benefits, co-responsibility, and the communion of interests among developing countries (Ayllón and Leite 2010). Following this line of thought, Brazilian cooperation claims to be demand-driven, differentiating itself from traditional donor's supply-driven, paternalistic, and vertical approach. Additionally, Brazil claims that its cooperation is based on the principle of solidarity, which means: (1) the lack of commercial or lucrative basis in its cooperation initiatives, (2) the absence of conditionality and interference in the beneficiary's domestic affairs, and (3) the common identity among partners and the right to development (Ayllón and Leite 2010). Despite this position, the Brazilian official discourse does not deny the economic and political interests behind SSC, arguing that it can be, at the same time, altruistic and mutually beneficial (Leite et al. 2014; Amorim 2010).

From Brazil's point of view, its cooperation is based in a partnership for development, where the efforts and benefits are shared among all the participants (Valler Filho 2007; Barbosa 2012) and where the principal objective is mutual development. Indeed, during Lula's mandate, development was placed at the centre of domestic and foreign policies, stressing the humanistic perspective of diplomatic action while pursuing the goal of national development (Dauvergne and Farias 2012).

Regarding modalities, Brazil prioritizes knowledge transfer and exchange (i.e. technical cooperation) above other instruments,⁴ as the country does not have the intention to become a large donor in terms of financial disbursements (Ayllón and Leite 2010). Brazil sees itself as a "knowledge database" that shares national best practices with countries that face similar challenges (Leite et al. 2014), while presenting its successful programmes and experiences as more suitable for other developing countries than the solutions proposed by traditional donors. The narrative also highlights its better understanding of poverty, Brazil being a developing country itself (Abdenur 2007).

Technical cooperation is given priority on the grounds that it is cost-efficient, relevant for other developing countries, and in line with the principles stressed earlier. The resources for technical cooperation almost quadrupled between 2005 and 2010, representing 6.3% of the overall investment of US\$923 million in 2010⁵ (IPEA 2013), focused mostly in South America (68%) and Africa (22.6%). The Brazilian Cooperation Agency⁶ (ABC is its acronym in Portuguese) coordinates technical cooperation, while the Brazilian domestic institutions implementing the programmes and policies in Brazil are in charge of their execution. For example, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), affiliated with the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, is the leading institution executing cooperation initiatives in agriculture development. The practice of having domestic institutions transfer their knowledge to their counterparts is often highlighted as an added-value of Brazilian cooperation. Nevertheless, the engagement of such different actors with varied international agendas and interests of their own brings an important degree of complexity to Brazilian SSC and makes it difficult to assess.

Despite the importance that cooperation has gained in Brazil's foreign policy, the legal framework remains a limitation because it does not allow the allocation of national resources abroad for the benefit of a third country.⁷ During the mandates of Presidents Lula or Rousseff, there have

not been any changes made to strengthen ABC's capacity or to change the institutional framework. Nevertheless, Dilma made two big announcements in 2013 concerning the future of Brazil's development cooperation:

1. The creation of a new agency of cooperation, trade, and investments for Africa and Latin America, which will serve as "... [a] funding agency. But is also a business agency. It is an agency to facilitate investment" in Rousseff's words (*Brazil Africa 2013*).
2. Rousseff asked the new foreign affairs minister, Luis Alberto Figueiredo, to lead the formulation of a White Paper on Brazil's foreign policy. Although the first proposal has not taken off yet, it is clear that a more pragmatic approach of SSC is taking place. For example, Rousseff has already scaled down the rhetoric and big announcements concerning new technical cooperation compromises from Brazil to Africa, and the few announcements made consisted of plans to reformulate existing development cooperation agreements from Lula's years that had not been implemented fully (*Hochstetler 2013*).

Another key to understanding Brazilian technical cooperation is the enhancement of alliances with member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and multilateral agencies through triangular partnerships.⁸ In Brazil's official narrative, the establishment of triangular development cooperation (TDC) alliances with Northern or traditional partners is not seen as contradictory with SSC principles. In fact, the ABC (*2014b*) states that:

Although bilateral cooperation is a priority in its foreign policy, the Brazilian Government believes that such partnerships constitute a triangular sum of efforts that adds value to the specific and complementary initiatives undertaken by bilateral channels of South-South cooperation. Triangulation is thus understood as a type of Brazilian South-South cooperation.

As of 2014, Brazil has developed TDC with the following partners: Japan, Germany, the United States (USA), Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and France; and had already developed triangular cooperation with Spain and Canada (*Itamaraty 2014*). In 2007, ABC counted 19 ongoing triangular cooperation projects (*Itamaraty 2007*) and by 2011 there were 31 of them in various phases of negotiation and implementation (*Ayllón 2013*). The Brazilian government employs a similar discourse to

justify triangular cooperation (e.g. altruism and pragmatism). Indeed, the association with a Northern donor or multilateral agency is perceived as a way to expand the impact of the transfer of knowledge and public policies, while sharing the financial burdens. They also highlight the role of cultural ties (e.g. with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries) and the strengthening of relations with key partners (Abdenur 2007).

Brazilian scholars and diplomats have understood its SSC, in a bilateral or trilateral arrangement, as a foreign policy instrument that enables the forging and strengthening of political and economic alliances with other developing countries and the enhancement of its international insertion and prestige. Indeed, Brazil's recent emergence as a provider of international development cooperation is tied to its increased foreign activism as a global economic and political player. This strategy is understood as the search for autonomy through diversification of external relations and a way to counterbalance asymmetries with international powers and to guarantee the search for economic development (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007).

PROSAVANA IN MOZAMBIQUE: BRAZIL'S SHOWCASE PROJECT IN AFRICA

Brazil and Mozambique relations have gained importance since Lula's mandate, to the point that the country is today one of the most important partners for Brazil in Africa. For example, trade has increased considerably, reaching \$US146 million in 2012 (CCBM 2013). Brazilian economic groups, such as Vale Do Rio Doce's concession to explore the Moatize coal mine (the biggest in the country), next to construction firms (e.g. Odebrecht and Camargo Correa) are now present in Mozambique.

In terms of Brazil's cooperation, in 2011 the fiscal resources allocated to Mozambique reached a total of US\$32,000,738, of which US\$22,157,013 represented bilateral cooperation and US\$9,843,770 trilateral cooperation (ABC 2014a). Moreover, Mozambique is the recipient of the most innovative and important cooperation initiatives undertaken by Brazil—for example, the construction and establishment of an antiretroviral (ATV) factory in Maputo, a donation by the government with the participation of Brazilian companies and under the execution of Fiocruz (see Chapter 4 in this book); and the ProSavana programme to develop the Nacala Corridor's agriculture potential.

ProSavana is inspired by the development experience of the Brazilian tropical savannah accomplished through a 30-year long cooperation programme with Japan, known as Prodecer (1979–2001). Its promoters, including Brazilian and Japanese key actors (e.g. Embrapa, JICA, CAMPO, etc.), claim that it was responsible for transforming the Brazilian *Cerrado* into one of the most productive regions in the country, turning Brazil into a global producer of soybeans (the second after the USA). This achievement allegedly came about thanks to a systemic approach that combined the development of technologies, the improvement of the soil, and the promotion of cooperatives and investment (*Economist, The* 2010). Despite these facts, Brazilian researchers have criticized Prodecer as a state-led colonization programme that promoted the concentration of land and foreign ownership, producing negative environmental impacts and social inequalities (Clements and Fernandes 2012; Inocencio 2010).

In 2009 the then-senior vice president of JICA, Kenzo Oshima, and the then-director of ABC, Marco Farani, signed a Memorandum confirming the commitment to a “Japan–Brazil Partnership Programme for the Development of the African Tropical Savannah” based on the *Cerrado* experience. The partnership was meant to replicate that experience in Mozambique and initially was established between then Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and Brazilian President Lula da Silva at the L’Aquila G8 meeting in 2009, as part of the Global L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (ProSavana 2009). Afterwards, the agreement to develop ProSavana was signed by the three countries on November 10, 2010 (ProSavana–TEC 2011).⁹

ProSavana envisions supporting commercial large-scale production systems and small-holder subsistence agriculture through cutting-edge technology through the Brazilian and Japanese experiences and conservation agriculture techniques. The ProSavana programme is composed of three main components (i.e. projects): (1) ProSavana–PI focuses on research, technology, and institutional capacity-building; (2) ProSavana–PD meant for the definition of an agro-industrial development plan; and (3) ProSavana–PEM is aimed at developing agricultural pilot models to increase agricultural production (Embrapa 2012).

The implementation of ProSavana started in 2011, and its overall timeframe is for at least 20 years. For operational purposes, ProSavana’s components are managed as individual projects, each of which has its institutional and execution arrangements. The first component, ProSavana–PI, is mainly implemented by Embrapa with the Mozambican Agrarian Research Institute (IIAM) and the Japan International Research Centre

on Agriculture (JIRCAS), a key Japanese institution in the development of Prodecer in Brazil's *Cerrado*. ProSavana-PI was the first component to be implemented. Its duration is five years and its budget is US\$13.4 million (ProSavana-Project I 2010).

During the field research performed in Mozambique in 2012, when ProSavana-PI was starting, there was great enthusiasm by the Mozambican, Brazilian, and Japanese counterparts in terms of the advantages of the trilateral arrangement, emphasizing Mozambique's cultural proximity with Brazil and the Japanese experience as strong added-value assets of the programme. Later research shows that the development of ProSavana-PI has since then been affected by conflict among the Brazilian and Japanese teams based on the difficulties from the Brazilian side to execute the resources, especially because of the bureaucratic requirements of ABC, differences in the approaches to cooperation and agricultural practices, and cultural and language differences (Fingermann 2014). In December 2012, ABC appointed a permanent representative to Mozambique, who was the first representative appointed in Africa, which is unusual to ABC's functioning but was intended to answer to the implementation and coordination challenges of ProSavana, as well as the initial criticism that was starting to arise from civil society at the time.

The second component consists of the formulation of the Master Plan (ProSavana-PD) that defines an integrated agro-industrial development plan. JICA, ABC, and the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA; formerly known as the Ministry of Agriculture, MINAG) coordinate this component, and its estimated budget is US\$7.7 million (Fingermann 2014). The execution of this component is under the responsibility of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV Projetos) from Brazil; Oriental Consulting and NTC International, two Japanese consulting companies; and the MASA. The Master Plan should include: (1) proposals for agriculture development projects in the corridor, (2) proposals for management structures to support the corridor's development, and (3) proposals for quick pilot impact projects (Chichava et al. 2013). In 2013, a leaked copy of the Master Plan fuelled criticism from CSOs that it was a programme that promotes agribusiness. This delayed the presentation of the final version that was expected that same year and it was finally published in March 2015 as the "Zero Draft" (Wise 2014; UNAC 2015).

The last component, ProSavana-PE, seeks to increase the agricultural production levels in specific target areas through the development of agricultural models. The main institutions involved are the Mozambican

Ministry of Agriculture, JICA, the Brazilian Association of Technical Assists and Rural Extension (ASBRAER), the Brazilian National Service for Rural Learning (SENAR), and the Ministry of Rural Development of Brazil (MDR). This component will run until 2019 and has an estimated budget of US\$15 million (Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013).

ProSavana is being implemented within a 14-million ha area in the Nacala Corridor,¹⁰ and it is expected that the project will directly support 400,000 small farmers and indirectly benefit 3.6 million agricultural producers (Embrapa 2012). Moreover, a large increase in public and private investments is expected in the Nacala Corridor, particularly in sectors such as agriculture production and infrastructure; although private investments are not components of the ProSavana projects per se.

JICA and Embrapa's representatives in Mozambique confirmed the “win-win-win” logic of the ProSavana programme in several interviews conducted between July and December 2012. Indeed, in the programme's narratives, the SSC logic of mutual benefit is translated into the triangular cooperative alliance. A high-level official from Mozambique's Ministry of Agriculture interviewed in 2012 recognized that there were political and economic interests behind the ProSavana programme, which was not perceived as a problem because everybody wins from the arrangement. Indeed, the possibility to replicate *Cerrado* and Embrapa's experience in Mozambique, as well as the prospective inflow of private investments and the modernization of agriculture, was often praised by Mozambican officials (Chichava et al. 2013).

For Brazil and Japan, another important gain stemmed from the participation of private firms through direct investment in the region. In fact, the development of ProSavana has been accompanied by initiatives to foster the engagement of the private sector in response to the business opportunities that could be facilitated by the programme. For example, the Nacala Fund launched in 2012 is expected to mobilize US\$2 billion in Brazil and Japan to support large-scale agribusiness and the integration of small-holder farmers into value chains (FGV Projetos 2012; FGV Projetos 2013). That same year, Mozambique, with the support of JICA, launched the Fund for ProSavana's Development Initiative with the objective of enhancing the private sector in order to involve small farmers through contract farming (Ikegami 2015).

The interest in fostering private investments in the operationalization of ProSavana is clear, and part of a strategy that seeks to promote Mozambican agricultural development and the internationalization

of Brazil's agribusiness. The Mozambican government has approved ProSavana and has confirmed that it is aligned with the 2011 Strategic Development Plan of the Agrarian Sector; PEDSA is its acronym in Portuguese (Macua 2014). Despite this fact, the "win-win-win" logic and the alignment of ProSavana with Mozambican priorities is contested by Mozambican CSOs, who are engaging in strong opposition, revealing a new role for them in the SSC landscape.

MOZAMBICAN CSOS' STANCE AGAINST PROSAVANA: MAIN JUSTIFICATIONS AND DEMANDS

The Brazilian and Mozambican public media covered the campaigns promoted by Brazil and Japan to foster investment through ProSavana, highlighting the business potential agribusiness opened up by this triangular cooperation programme. For example, some Brazilian media stated: "Mozambique offers cheap land to Brazilians" (Terra 2011) or "Mozambique offers land to Brazilian soy" (*Folha de São Paulo* 2011). On the other hand, Mozambican media referred to ProSavana as the example of "Brazilian neo-colonialism" and to technical cooperation as the "Trojan horse" of Brazilian economic interests in Africa (*Folha de São Paulo* 2011; Rafael 2011; Matutações 2012).

Mozambican CSOs share the suspicion of Brazilian development initiatives and have raised clear-cut concerns about ProSavana and its impact on Mozambican small farmers in the Nacala Corridor. The *União Nacional dos Camponeses* (National Union of Peasants, UNAC), *Justiça Ambiental* (Environmental Justice, JA), *Plataforma Provincial da Sociedade Civil de Nampula* (Provincial Platform of Nampula's Civil Society, PPOSC-N), and the *Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais* (Academic Action for the Development of Rural Communities, ADECRU) are the most active. Since 2012, through the international peasants' network, Via Campesina, Mozambican CSOs have established links with international and regional movements, especially with Brazilian social movements, such as *Sem Terra* (Without Land), and Japanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as *No! To Land Grab*.

The collaboration with Brazilian and Japanese social movements and organizations has helped build and consolidate the criticism of ProSavana, drawing from the Prodecer experience in Brazil (Cabral and Leite 2015). For example, the UNAC (2012) strongly criticized ProSavana, stating:

The project was inspired by an earlier agricultural development project implemented by the Brazilian and Japanese governments in the Brazilian Cerrado (savannah), where large-scale industrial farming of monocrops (mainly soybeans) is now practiced. This Brazilian project led to a degradation of the environment and the near extinction of indigenous communities living in the affected areas. The Nacala Corridor was chosen because its savannah has similar characteristics to the Brazilian Cerrado, in terms of its climate and agro-ecology, and because of the ease with which products can be exported.

Justiça Ambiental describes the Brazilian model as a failure where “more than 65 million Brazilians are in [a] situation of food insecurity and millions of people struggle for access to land for food production as a means of ensuring livelihood” (JA4Change 2013).

In October 2012, the concern of Mozambique’s civil society groups became more intense and UNAC,¹¹ the major farmer’s association in the country, released the first statement against ProSavana (UNAC 2012); it accused the project of land-grabbing and the report received worldwide attention. That same year UNAC and ORAM, a Mozambican rural support NGO, received support from the Brazilian NGO, Federation of Organs for Social and Educational Assistance (FASE) and international foundations to visit the state of Mato Grosso, with the goal of gaining a better understanding of the experience of Prodecer. The interviews and images collected during this trip were assembled in the documentary “Face Oculta do ProSavana” in which the effects of agribusiness in rural communities and on the landscape in Brazil are presented in parallel with the threat that ProSavana poses in the Nacala Corridor (Farmlandgrab.org 2013). According to Shankland and Gonçalves (2016), the documentary served as an important tool in the contestation of ProSavana in Mozambique because it was shown and discussed at UNAC’s regional meetings and local and international CSOs encounters; it reinforced the message that there is an undeclared agenda behind ProSavana based on the Prodecer experience.

Following this, in 2013, 23 Mozambican CSOs and movements circulated an “Open Letter” to the presidents of Mozambique, Japan, and Brazil, where they demanded the suspension of the activities of ProSavana and proposed the establishment of dialogue mechanisms with civil society. Mozambican and international CSOs, including ones from Brazil and Japan, and various individuals, especially Japanese academics, signed this letter (UNAC et al. 2013); it denounced the lack of transparency and public democratic debate around the establishment of ProSavana and its

impacts for the rural Mozambican population. The letter also denounced the entry into the area of multinational corporations that risk hampering the autonomy of rural families (UNAC et al. 2013).

This Open Letter was handed to Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Following these developments, in September 2013, Japanese CSOs released a joint “[c]all for the immediate suspension and fundamental revision” of ProSavana; it stated that the drafting of the Master Plan, the preparation of the Quick Impact Projects, and the pilot projects funded by the ProSavana Development Initiative Fund were starting without a proper consultation with Mozambican CSOs (AJF et al. 2013).

On June 2, 2014, in what can be described as the climax point, Mozambican CSOs launched the “No to ProSavana” National Campaign. In addition to UNAC, JA, and ADECRU, the following organizations joined the initiative: *Fórum Mulher* (Woman Forum, FM), *Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos Humanos* (Mozambican League of Human Rights, LDH), *Associação de Apoio e Assistência Jurídica as Comunidades* (Association for the Support and Legal Aid for Communities, AAAJC), Livaningo, ActionAid Moçambique, and Kulima. The campaign was their response to the silence of Shinzo Abe to the Open Letter; it was followed by the organization of a conference in Maputo on July 24 of the same year at which representatives from Mozambican, Japanese, and Brazilian CSOs participated, as well as international CSOs and scholars.

During this conference, CSOs denounced the negative impacts that had already started to affect the Northern Mozambique population. For instance, UNAC's Vice-President Ana Paula Taucalé mentioned that in the district of Monapo (Nampula province, about 3000 ha of land were taken from the local farmers for the production of soybeans¹² (Via Campesina 2014). Even though, no confirmation or further information concerning this denunciation could be found, it seems that a large-scale agribusiness has not arrived in the Nacala Corridor (Wise 2014).

The complaints addressed against ProSavana and the Mozambican, Brazilian, and Japanese governments raise various criticisms, taking into account the role of each government in ProSavana's implementation. The Open Letter from the CSOs demands from Brazil a compromise to engage into cooperative relations with Mozambique based on solidarity among the people (i.e. appealing to its principle of solidarity) and urges that development cooperation should not be used as an instrument to facilitate land-grabbing (UNAC et al. 2013). The perception from UNAC's advocacy team in Maputo was as follows:

Brazilian cooperation in agriculture has two faces: the first one is very aggressive and focused on commercial agriculture, where the Mozambican farmers will end up as employees of the Brazilian large-scale projects and there will be no reinforcement of family agriculture; this is ProSavana. The second is a friendlier dimension characterized by projects like the Native seeds rescue with the Brazilian organization *Movimento Camponés* (MCP), where reinforcing the Mozambican farmers is a priority. What is the priority for Brazil and for the Mozambican government? ProSavana, it seems.¹³

The Open Letter also condemns the Japanese cooperation policy with Mozambique, and the way in which it advances private interests and mega-projects' investments in agriculture, energy, and infrastructure (UNAC et al. 2013). The CSOs claims towards Brazil and Japan, as donors, address the lack of transparency concerning the economic motivations and interests involved in the ProSavana programme. Indeed, they question the "win-win-win" logic, denouncing the economic and commercial motivations behind ProSavana. For example, ADECRU (2014), a Mozambican academic movement, stated in 2013:

Japan is responsible for: (i) Expenditure of financial, material and human resources for the development of [the] logistics of Corridor of Nacala (ports, roads, railways) to export soya, maize, cotton production to Japan, in order to face the Niponic demand for animal protein and fibre. (ii) While Brazilian companies take control of [the] productive component, including the fertilizer market, seeds and machinery, so the Japanese corporations are intended to take over the logistic market and the commercialization.

Civil society organizations also strongly criticize the Mozambican government's choices regarding development policies, reclaiming accountability for the development of the ProSavana programme. First, the call to then Mozambique's President Guebuza is a reminder of the importance of subsistence agriculture for rural communities, and how the arrival of multinational corporations will inevitably severely affect the livelihood of small farmers (UNAC et al. 2013).

The opposition to ProSavana is set in a broader debate concerning the best way to reach rural development: give priority to large-scale foreign investments or promote small-scale commercial farming (The Oakland Institute 2011). It is important to keep in mind that Mozambique is a predominantly rural country with the majority of the population depending on agriculture (approximately 70%), characterized by low productivity

and production, even while it is recognized for having significant amounts of available arable land.¹⁴ During the period 2004–2009, the Mozambican government supported large-scale concessions of land and foreign investments to access capital, technology, and increase productivity.

This strategy has been shown to be problematic because several cases of conflict between investors and local communities were registered with regard to the displacement of communities without proper compensation, disputes over natural resources, and lack of transparency in the land grant process¹⁵ (The Oakland Institute 2011; Aabo and Kring 2012). In this context, CSOs have played an important role in disseminating land rights, collecting information and evidence, assisting the delimitation of community lands, and lobbying regarding land rights and the rural development policy (Topsoe-Jensen et al. 2015).

Moreover, the criticisms addressed towards Mozambique's government and ruling party, Frelimo, highlight the links between Mozambican elites and the foreign investments promoted in the Nacala Corridor and beyond (Ndhaneta 2012). Although foreign firms mobilize the major land concessions and investment projects, domestic elites have played a central role in facilitating the acquisition process and even benefiting from it (Fairbairn 2011); they use their influence to obtain land for themselves or serve as agents for investors, by putting pressure on local authorities. This has led to land conflicts with local communities and to the improper use of land by investors around the large land concessions distributed during this period, which reflects negatively on the ruling party (Oakland Institute 2011).

The practice of opacity denounced in ProSavana is not characteristic to this programme but has displayed some continuity in Mozambican politics since independence in 1975. It is important to recall that during the pre- and post-independence periods in Mozambique's history, civil society's capacity to exercise its right often has been limited and denied. After independence in fact, Mozambique was ruled by a single-party system led by Frelimo (i.e. the current ruling party), where the emergence of CSOs was not allowed. Moreover, from 1976 to 1992, the country experienced a civil war that opposed Renamo (i.e. the current first opposition force) right to govern. It was only when a multiparty system was inaugurated in the 1990 Constitution, and with the first multiparty elections held in 1994, that associations and the establishment of CSOs was allowed. Since then many types of CSOs have emerged (e.g. service providers, advocacy groups, and think tanks), and official statistics formally recognized 4853 associations in 2004 (Topsoe-Jensen et al. 2015).

Despite the progress, important obstacles to the empowerment of CSOs remain, including the narrow political space produced by the ruling party's firm control of political life and institutions, the lack of resources and capacities, and fragmentation between movements and organizations (Pereira 2011; FDC 2007). Having said that, the support of international CSOs, mainly from Japan and Brazil, for the initiatives led by UNAC, JA, or ADECRU has been a key element in generating better visibility of the actions undertaken by Mozambican groups. It is important to acknowledge that Brazilian social movements are very vibrant, with great abilities to mobilize domestically, especially about land issues, and have been instrumental in organizing the global justice movement—the first cooperation schemes between CSOs in the South.¹⁶

In the case of the anti-ProSavana activism by Mozambican CSOs, support from Brazilian and Japanese ones through the use of international platforms (e.g. GRAIN, Via Campesina, or multicountry civil society gatherings) to discuss ProSavana, or the completion of various trips and encounters to collect evidence in Brazil and Mozambique, has helped to strengthen the claims of Mozambican CSOs. Equally, the actions of the CSOs are producing positive effects leading developers of the programme to their claims and provoke more participation regarding ProSavana. For example, after the concern presented by CSOs during the July 24, 2014, Conference, the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique was forced to respond (MINAG 2014), as follows:

Governments involved in this (triangular) cooperation are making efforts and will continue to do so in order to accommodate and address the concerns expressed by the Mozambican civil society organizations, and (they will) also (continue) to dialogue with representatives of civil society organizations in Japan and in Brazil in order to ensure a transparent, inclusive and participatory environment for dialogue. From this perspective, we reaffirm that we remain open and available to dialogue with all stakeholders and interested part[ie]s in contributing to the building of the programme, as well as the future of agriculture in the country, always in a transparent way.

Additionally, from April 20–29, 2015, the ProSavana promoters organized public consultations and dialogues with CSOs and local communities in the provinces of Niassa, Nampula, and Zambezia to discuss the Draft Zero of the Master Plan published in March 2015 (UNAC 2015). According to Skankland and Gonçalves (2016), the mobilization of CSOs also had productive effects on the way ProSavana is presented today in the new “Zero Draft” of 2015,

compared to the leaked Master Plan of 2013. In the first version emphasis was placed on the development of export-oriented commodities and large-scale investments; however, on the contrary, the 2015 version emphasized subsistence, small-holders' agriculture, and local markets.

Regarding the investment initiatives promoted by Brazil and Japan, broader dynamics to foster private sector involvement continues in the Nacala Corridor. For example, the Nacala Fund initiative has been separated from the official ProSavana programme; it is now to be promoted without the Japanese and Brazilian development agencies and negotiated directly between the FGV Projetos and the Mozambican government (Amorim 2014). This suggests that the transnational private investment component has been cut off from the official version of the development cooperation programme, rendering it less visible and less subject to criticism (Shankland and Gonçalves 2016).

In spite these things, the challenges and debates around ProSavana are not finished. From the perspective of the CSOs, the consultations were marked by irregularities such as the obstruction to the participation of the farmer and peasant organizations, the lack of on time information about the Zero Draft, and the broad participation in the consultation meetings of ProSavana and government supporters (ADECRU 2015). According to the 2016 “No to ProSavana” campaign, because of the criticisms raised and the pressure from the Japanese government, the Mozambican government agreed to perform a second round of consultations (ADECRU 2016). They started in January 2016 with a meeting in Nampula facilitated by MAJOL Consultoria e Serviços LDA—hired by JICA in December 2015 with the objective of creating a mechanism for dialogue with CSOs concerning ProSavana. The meeting ended with UNAC’s denunciation of attacks on its members from the consultants (UNAC 2016).

It must be noted that if CSOs are not happy with ProSavana, and the way the issue must be solved is not consensual among them. Some, mainly based in Maputo (e.g. UNAC, ADECRU, and JA) advocate the suppression of the programme. Still others, mainly from the areas where the programme is expected to be implemented, think it only needs to be revised, adjusted to the local realities, and involve CSOs and local farmers in all ProSavana processes in order to protect their interests (UNAC 2016; Justiça Ambiental 2016). Those CSOs include: *Plataforma de Organizações da Sociedade civil de Nampula* (PPOS-C-N), *Fórum de ONGs do Niassa* (Forum of Niassa's NGOs, FONAGNI), *Fórum de ONGs da Zambézia* (Forum of Zambezí's NGOs,

FONGZA), and *Rede de Organizações para Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Comunitário Sustentável* (Organizations Network for Environment and Sustainable Community Development, RADEZA). The PPOSC-N, which is one of the most influential CSOs in Mozambique, clearly states that it is not against ProSavana itself but the way that the programme is implemented (*Notícias* 2013, WhampulaFax 2016). This has led to some frictions among organizations and is negatively affecting the reach and impact of their actions.

Finally, the CSOs' contestation of ProSavana occurs in a context of the increased polarization of the actors involved in development cooperation. New questions and actors are emerging in the global agenda, promoting transformations into the international development cooperation system. Decentralization, strategic partnerships between public and private sectors, transparency, and efficacy issues have gained visibility in international debates (Gonçalves 2012). Moreover, civil society's inclusion in the meetings on aid effectiveness after the Paris Declaration opened up government–government dialogue to these other players who profess to be representatives of aid beneficiaries (Cabral and Leite 2015).

The emergence of self-claimed civil society spaces demonstrates the broadening of CSOs mobilizations to the international cooperation arena, demanding from donors more accountability, transparency, and participation in decision making. According to Cabral and Leite (2015), the mobilization against ProSavana can be understood as a transnational civil society movement that opened new accountability channels between the local communities in Mozambique and the Brazilian constituents, demanding greater transparency and responsibility concerning the SSC policy in Brazil. Moreover, the pressure for greater transparency and accountability has resonated in Brazil, where foreign policy and the democratization of development policy are gaining momentum in public debate (Ação Educativa 2013; Cabral and Leite 2015). Table 11.1 summarizes the various actions that CSOs have undertaken against ProSavana.

Table 11.1. List of CSOs Actions Against ProSavana

| <i>Activity</i> | <i>Objective</i> | <i>Participants</i> | <i>Date</i> |
|--|---|--|--------------------------|
| Joint Statement—Leaked copy of the Master Plan for the ProSavana programme in Northern Mozambique confirms worst | <p>Leaked copy is dated March 2013 and the CSO statement makes it clear how the governments of Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique are “paving the way for massive land grab.” According to the statement the Master Plan seeks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) To push farmers away from traditional cultivation towards intense cultivation practices based on commercial seeds and chemical input. (2) To push farmers into contract farming arrangements with corporate farms. (3) To envisage the business opportunities of private companies that can benefit from the Nacala Fund. (4) To end peasant agriculture. <p>Letter addressed to the Presidents of Brazil and Mozambique and the Prime Minister of Japan to suspend ProSavana activities. Addressed to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA, calling for immediate suspension and fundamental review.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Justiça Ambiental, JA (Mozambique) – <i>Forum Mulher</i> (Mozambique) – Friends of the Earth (Mozambique) – Association for Rural Advancement – Comunidades Ecologistas de la Ceiba – Livaningo CSOs and social movements from South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria, Uganda, Honduras, Spain, Zambia, Denmark, and Mozambique, 23 in all, signed this statement. | 29/04/2014 |
| Open Letter from Mozambican CSOs and movements Japanese civil society statement on ProSavana | <p>More than 23 Mozambican CSOs and 43 international organizations.¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – ATTAC Japan – Citizens Concerned with the Development of Mozambique – Africa Japan Forum – Japan International Volunteer Centre, JVC – Oxfam Japan | <p>More than 23 Mozambican CSOs and 43 international organizations.¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – ATTAC Japan – Citizens Concerned with the Development of Mozambique – Africa Japan Forum – Japan International Volunteer Centre, JVC – Oxfam Japan | 28/05/2013 30/09/2013 |

| <i>Activity</i> | <i>Objective</i> | <i>Participants</i> | <i>Date</i> |
|---|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| Documentary, <i>Face Oculta do ProSavana</i> | Video based on images and interviews in Brazil and Mozambique that shows the effects of agribusiness in Mato Grosso (Brazil) and compares it with the threatened Mozambique Nacala Corridor. | Documentary was made by UNAC and ORAM with the support of the Brazilian NGO, Federation of Social and Educational Support Organizations. | 2013 |
| Fifth General Assembly of ADECRU | Political letter from ADECRU's General Assembly manifests the inconformity with the progress of agribusiness in the country, through mega-projects (e.g. ProSavana). ADECRU advertises “the dangerous Japanese policy and presence in Mozambique” and protests against the New Alliance for Food and Nutrition and the ProSavana programme. | ADECRU | 20/12/2013 |
| ADECRU's position on the visit of Prime Minister of Japan to Mozambique | Relative to the visit of M. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan in which PPOS-C criticizes that the support from the Japanese government corresponds to the logic of colonialism and to protecting international capital interests. | UNAC | 9/01/2014 |
| Press release—Platform of Nampula's Civil Society (PPOS-C-N) | One of the central discussion topics was the emergence of land conflicts and land-grabbing in Mozambique. In this sense, resistance mechanisms against ProSavana were discussed. | UNAC | 13/01/2013 |
| UNAC's General Assembly | Peasant leaders from Mozambique confirmed their position against ProSavana. A resistance agenda was settled: | UNAC | From 29/04 /2014 To 1/05/2014 |
| The Nampula Declaration (UNAC 2014)— Ordinary General Assembly | – UNAC will no longer tolerate ProSavana and promises to legally sue the national and foreign citizens involved in it. | UNAC | 1/05/2014 |

| | | |
|---|--|------------|
| Joint Mobilization—“ <i>Não ao ProSavana</i> ” | Launch of the National Campaign, “No to ProSavana.” | 02/06/2014 |
| Second Triangular Conference of the People of Mozambique, Japan, and Brazil | Debate surrounding the ProSavana programme and the development priorities of Mozambique. | 24/07/2014 |
| Joint Mobilization—“ <i>Não ao ProSavana</i> ” | Launch of the national campaign with the objective of stopping implementation of the programme. | 02/06/2014 |
| “Land Grabbed, Life Stolen”—video launch | Shows: (1) how ProSavana steals land of local population with complicity of the Mozambican political elite; (2) resistance of land-loss farmers. | 1/09/2015 |

Source: Compilation by the authors based on the press release, journals' information, and CSO websites

CONCLUSION

This chapter discusses how Mozambican CSOs have been critical towards the Japanese–Brazilian–Mozambican ProSavana programme, demanding accountability and transparency from its proponents. It also shows that the mobilization against ProSavana, indeed has been convincingly pushed by the Mozambican CSOs. The transnational alliance with Brazilian and Japanese counterparts is playing a key role in strengthening mobilization and giving it international resonance. Brazilian and Japanese counterparts have provided information and evidence concerning the negatives impacts of the Brazilian *Cerrado* experience, in particular the marginalization of small farmers in favour of the big capital, as well as on the negative effects on the environment. In sum, CSOs have been challenging ProSavana through open letters addressed either to the presidents of the three countries' proponents of the programme or to the institutions involved; this is being done through videos explaining and showing what they consider will be and are the negative effects of ProSavana, public meetings with farmers living in the areas affected by the programme, and seminars and demonstrations.

Criticisms about the lack of transparency and information from ProSavana's promoters put into question the win–win–win logic and narrative of ProSavana as a triangular development cooperation programme that replicates the SSC principles of mutual benefit and solidarity. Critics focus on the real motivations behind ProSavana, specifically the potential access for Brazilian agribusiness to large-scale land investments in Mozambique and its implications for local communities. Civil society organizations condemn the replication of the *Cerrado* development model and its negative impacts on small-holders, land tenure, and the environment, as well as the transfer of Brazil's land conflicts and inequality in development and land distribution (Mello 2013).

Indeed, South–South donors export their development models (in spite of “similarities” and “common challenges” justifications) and links with private investments, making them susceptible to similar criticisms made about traditional donors regarding the imposition of models and the exploitation of Africa's resources at the expense of local communities. The alliance of Brazilian CSOs and social movements with Mozambican CSOs has helped not only to give more visibility to the anti-ProSavana campaign and to produce effects in the evolution of it but also has been shown to develop the debate about international development cooperation and the democratization of foreign policy in Brazil.

On the other hand, the anti-ProSavana campaign is set in the broader context of Mozambique's rural development debate concerning large-scale investments and rural development policy. Because of continued criticisms, ProSavana's promoters have responded by opening consultations and dialogues with CSOs and local communities as well as the release of a revisited Master Plan that separates ProSavana from the commercial and private investments components. In spite of these efforts; there are no indications of a more strategic or straightforward policy to engage civil society with the implementation of the programme and how the private sector is going to engage in the Nacala region's agricultural development.

Because of all these reasons, the ProSavana programme and Brazil's SSC in Mozambique will continue to face criticism and will have to accommodate some of the CSOs' demands if it is to be a long-term political and economic success. This of course will also depend on the way CSOs coordinate their actions in order to pressure promoters of the programme. If divisions among them grow, their ability to have a coherent and credible agenda will be affected.

NOTES

1. The authors thank Isaline Bergamaschi and Phoebe Moore for their comments on earlier drafts of the text.
2. Approximately 20 interviews were performed with Mozambican, Brazilian, and Japanese government officials and technical experts involved in ProSavana in Maputo and Nampula, and also with representatives from Mozambican CSOs, international organizations in Mozambique, and Mozambican academics.
3. The narratives about Brazil being a “middle power,” “intermediate power,” “system-affecting state,” “emerging power,” or a “regional power” are common throughout Brazilian foreign policy literature (Hurrell 2010; de Soares and Hirst 2006). These narratives have had an impact on the perception of Brazil being an intermediary between the North and the South, implying that the country has a special place or role among the other developing countries.
4. The different modalities are educational cooperation, scientific cooperation, humanitarian cooperation, refugee protection, and contributions to international and regional multilateral organizations (IPEA 2013). Brazil also has established instruments such as investment lending by the Brazilian National Development Bank, debt relief, and concessional lending; however, these are not considered development cooperation.

5. Contributions to international organizations, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian cooperation represented most of Brazil's international development cooperation resources for 2010, with 33.7, 36, and 17, respectively (IPEA 2013).
6. Brazil's federal government established ABC in 1987; it is linked to the Ministry of External Affairs. ABC's mission is to coordinate, execute, and plan Brazil's international cooperation received and offered.
7. In order To overcome this limitation, ABC has relied on transitory agreements with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for the execution of technical cooperation programmes (Cabral and Weinstock 2010).
8. Trilateral Development Cooperation or Triangular Cooperation is characterized by the partnership of a "traditional" donor (member of the OECD or a multilateral agency) with a pivotal country from the global South that works with a beneficiary country (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). This type of arrangement is not new in the development-cooperation landscape; nevertheless, its impressive expansion in the last several years is quite new. In the academic and policy-briefings literature, the terms "trilateral" and "triangular" are often used synonymously.
9. Japan and Brazil's cooperation started in 1959 in a wide range of sectors that include agriculture, health, environment, and so on, with Brazil as a recipient. In 1985, Japan and Brazil began the first triangular cooperation scheme through the Third Country Training Programme (TCTP). In 2000, both countries agreed to form the Japan–Brazil Partnership Programme, which confirmed their commitment to promote triangular cooperation. ProSavana is framed under this agreement as a Joint Project (Sakaguchi 2012).
10. The area confirmed exactly is the region between the latitude 13°S to 17°S. This area covers the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa, Tete, and Zambezia (ProSavana 2013).
11. UNAC describes itself as a movement of peasants from the family sector; it was founded in 1987 and officially registered in 1994. It contains numerous members, including CSOs that operate at the provincial, district, and local levels, as well as individual peasants.
12. The expansion of monocultures (e.g. soybean) is perceived as a problem by CSOs because of the environmental impacts (i.e. use of pesticides), the fact that it is destined for export markets (i.e. does not contribute to the improvement of food security), and the low impact on job creation (Clements and Fernandes 2012).
13. Interview with Advocacy Advisor from UNAC, August 2, 2012, Maputo, Mozambique.
14. Only 6 million ha of the potentially 36 million ha available were cropped in 2005 (Aabo and Kring 2012).

15. In Mozambique, the state owns the land and investors must apply for the right to use and develop it. Communities have automatic rights to the land they occupy and are encouraged to obtain the formal title. An individual or company interested in obtaining the right to use land must present a development plan, and there must be consultation with the local community to confirm the land is available.
16. On this, see Bergamaschi, Isaline, Tania Navarro Rodriguez Tania, and Heloise Nez. "Latin Americans at the World Social Forum in Dakar: The relationship between the alter-global movement and the institutional sphere." In *Observing Protest from a Place: The World Social Forum in Dakar*, edited by Johanna Siméant, Marie-Emanuelle Pommerolle, and Isabelle Sommier, 157-178. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2105.

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Conclusion: South–South Cooperation Experiences Compared and the Way Forward

Isaline Bergamaschi and Jimena Durán

This book is not a comparative exercise *per se*. The guidelines presented in the Introduction were shared and discussed with all of the contributors; however, ultimately, each of them was free to put the emphasis on certain aspects of the theoretical framework so as to best reflect the specificities of their respective cases. Not all of the points mentioned (e.g. compliance with the Paris Declaration, the role of ideas, etc.) are relevant to all the South–South cooperation (SSC) providers covered in the book. The editors were anxious to let authors focus on what is most relevant in the case

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at hand and to let research questions emerge from observations of the cases and fieldwork rather than from a common list of imposed *problématiques* defined ex ante.

This flexible and adaptable methodology helped create room for the diversity of contemporary SSC experiences that are observable in the world. Therefore, the focus on the role of religion and Islamic associations in the case studies about Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Chaps. 2 and 8, respectively), the importance of the private sector in the chapters dealing with India (Chap. 1) and Brazil (Chap. 4), and the salience of security objectives and triangular cooperation in the one that explores Colombian SSC (Chap. 9).

In addition to individual contributions, the authors answered a couple of additional questions related to decision making in SSC, factors and actors shaping its practice, and issues related to the identities and positioning of SSC providers. The diverse aspects covered in this book were common to all authors, thus enabling the final images to be presented through a comparative lens in this Conclusion, including aspects that were not necessarily mentioned in the various chapters.

The information provided was gathered into graphs, tables, and typologies, which come with appropriate descriptions and analyses. They are structured along several analytical axes: (1) the status and profile of the donor in the field of development assistance is the first. The two sections that follow cover: (2) the factors and actors that sustain and shape SSC by looking at ideas, ideologies, and identities, and (3) the presidentialization versus professionalization of SSC. Then comes (4) the role of the private sector and civil society in shaping and implementing SSC. The next axis, (5), explores the links between SSC and foreign policy objectives, and (6) discusses the differences and interactions of SSC with existing norms and traditional donors. Here the intention is to lay out and interpret the diversity of SSC experiences rather than to *explain* them in a causal, positivist sense.

STATUS AND PROFILE IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Although most donors of the South claim a core of similar principles—“solidarity,” “horizontality,” “noninterference,” and “mutual benefit”—that, they argue, distinguish them from traditional aid, in reality diverse philosophies and practices, ideational, and practical norms are associated with their

aid. While some focus on knowledge transfer (Colombia), others invest in infrastructure (China). The modalities of aid delivery methods differ as well as the sectors of intervention and regional areas of attention—that is, health for Cuba, agriculture and health for Brazil, and security for Colombia. The objective of this section is to present the diversity of SSC experiences by focusing on how its providers are positioned (i.e. structural and material factors) and position themselves (i.e. self-perceptions and perceptions by others) in the field of international development assistance. It combines the following three attributes:

- (1) Novelty in the field: Is the country new in the practice of development assistance, and/or what is new about it?
- (2) Being an aid-recipient or not: Their positions and constraints as SSC providers.
- (3) Elements of self-presentation and perception in the field through references to the traditional categories of “donor,” “aid,” and “SSC.” Here it is necessary to understand whether the countries under study identify as “donors” providing “aid” and are committed to “South–South cooperation.”

This comparative analysis points to the fact that despite the enthusiasm associated with contemporary SSC, most Southern donors actually are not “new” to the field of development assistance. South Africa has been a modest donor since before the formalization of apartheid (1948), China has been providing cooperation since the 1950s, Cuba and India since the 1960s, and the UAE and Colombia since the 1970s. A government programme for students from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean to study in Brazil dates back to 1965 (*Programa de Estudante Convenio Graduação*, PEC-G). It was largely inspired by efforts to engage with what was then the Third World during the time of Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy (1961–1964).¹ Only the Republic of Korea and Turkey have started to provide assistance to other developing countries relatively recently, in the 1990s.

Often, such programmes have gained in importance and visibility during the 2000s (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela), as Southern donors found new interests in SSC, as the rise in the price of commodities gave them additional room to manoeuvre, and as traditional aid volumes decreased. The increase in SSC has been linked to economic development in most cases, but also political change, particularly democratic transition. South Africa

has provided aid since the establishment of the apartheid regime but in a very limited way, and the money was used to win legitimacy. After 1994, it was more about being a legitimate development actor and about strengthening development diplomacy. In this context, what matters for current and future research is to explore the evolution of SSC (i.e. meaning, practices, and effects) throughout time and the differences between past and present.

Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, India, China, and Colombia are still aid recipients, even if the volume of the aid they receive is structurally decreasing as these countries become classified as “emerging” economies or “middle-income countries” (MICs).² This means that they are in the situation of being both donors and recipients at the same time, a situation that creates specific opportunities and constraints. These do not affect and are not handled in the same manner by the governments. Here three profiles can be distinguished and are described in the following subsections.

Emerging Economies

Some emerging economies continue to receive aid. This aid often is justified more by political and economic factors because Northern countries use aid as a tool to enhance investments, the establishment of businesses, and trade with those economies with high potential. High levels of inequality and gaps in socioeconomic development between various regions of emerging countries also justify that aid still be given. The share of aid in the national GDP is marginal and virtually can be neglected. As a result, duality does not affect the way emerging donors define themselves and behave in the field of international development assistance; at the same time, they can receive external funds and, as SSC providers, be critical of traditional aid and donors, including by referring to their experience as aid-recipients.

MICs in a Dual Situation

Here reference is made to Turkey and Colombia. The dual situation affects these SSC providers more than the emerging economies. For instance, in Colombia, the government depends on accessing external funds to finance the post-conflict scenario, while maintaining a relation of dependency with the USA, and it is eager to consolidate its relationships with both North and South partners. In the past years, this has led

authorities to acknowledge and publicize the importance of international development assistance in the domestic peace-building process and not to be too critical of traditional aid as an SSC provider, stressing the complementarity between the various types of aid. In those donor-and-recipient countries, there can be tensions between the will to continue being eligible for aid and the will to claim a leadership role and distinguish themselves from traditional aid. These countries usually have to handle duality and adopt distinct postures in a variety of international contexts—namely, in regional spaces with partners of the global South and in multilateral and international spaces with Northern partners—to combine divergent identities interests as donors and recipients.

SSC Providers That Are Not (Anymore) Aid-Recipients

Some of the countries under study are no longer aid-recipients, given ideological options, the existence of an economic income in the country (i.e. oil in the UAE, oil and gas in Venezuela) and/or levels of economic development (i.e. in the UAE and the Republic of Korea). This status of independence towards traditional donors does not determine how these SSC providers relate to and interact with them. For political reasons, the Republic of Korea and the UAE are close to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and existing multilateral norms while Cuba and Venezuela are in open opposition to them. Contrary to Venezuela, though, Cuba receives aid from some European countries (e.g. France, Spain, and Switzerland) and from Canada (i.e. a major donor during the 1990s).

Now this section turns to how SSC providers perceive and present themselves in the field of aid: Do they identify as “donors” providing “aid” and committed to “SSC”? For authorities, which principles are the most important to describe and refer to the aid/SSC programme, and how do they claim to implement them in practice?

Most SSC providers refuse to consider and present themselves as “donors”: Brazil calls itself a “development partner,” Colombia says it is a “partner country” (*país socio*), and Cuba prefers to be known as a provider of “international solidarity.” The term “donor” often is eschewed as it carries a (negative) connotation of hierarchy and usually is associated with traditional Western donors that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In this sense, India and South Africa also prefer to use the terms “SSC” and “development partner.” China has talked about itself as a donor since the White Papers on

Foreign Aid of 2011 and 2014. Nonetheless, Chinese authorities often use other terms, such as “partner,” in their discourses towards their Southern counterparts. Venezuela helps their “friends” and “brother countries” (*paises hermanos*). Conversely, the UAE, since 1971, and Turkey have no problem using the word “donor,” nor does the Republic of Korea, especially since the country joined the OECD-DAC.

Brasilia and Pretoria claim to set up “development partnerships,” not aid. China speaks more frequently of “development assistance” than “aid.” In their international statements or in the press, Chinese authorities prefer to speak about “international/technical cooperation,” “funds,” and “international partnerships.” Nevertheless, often it uses the term “aid” when referring to its humanitarian activities. The same is true in India, where aid is usually referred to as “disaster aid” or humanitarian and development assistance, and where the budget officially uses the terms “grants” and “loans” to foreign governments. Bogotá does not speak of “aid” but of SSC, technical cooperation, exchange and transfer of knowledge, and best practices. Cuba refers to “*cooperación*” and Venezuela to solidarity and friendship. The UAE, Turkey (especially since 2002), and the Republic of Korea call their actions and policy “aid.”

Representatives of most of the countries studied in the book claim to be committed to SSC. China’s posture, however, is somewhat ambiguous: governments signed several agreements with the United Nations (UN) to promote “South–South Cooperation and Trilateral Cooperation.” Chinese representatives also include themselves in the “South” when they speak to aid beneficiaries. Nonetheless, it seems that Chinese authorities also wants to be considered an equal to “Northern” countries and China to be fully included in the category of “developed countries.” La Havana speaks of SSC and “international solidarity.” The Republic of Korea does not use the term “SSC” at all because its leaders consider it as a Northern country. The UAE officials do not use it either but rather refers to “solidarity” with those culturally close to them (“Arab Solidarity”) and “cooperation” with the rest of aid-recipients.

South–South cooperation providers value similar principles, but there are some important nuances in their posture and the practice of it in the field. It is important to note that SSC as a term is not bound to a common or specific framework, which gives the cooperating countries room to “customize” it, interpret it, and employ it according to their interests. In spite of the common principles (e.g. respect of sovereignty), each country can introduce its own specificities into such terms in keeping with

its individual interpretations.³ Brazil puts forward solidarity, horizontality, shared knowledge, nonintervention, mutual benefits, co-responsibility, and the communion of interests. Their SSC policy is demand-driven and devoid of conditionalities.

For China, SSC is based on equality, sovereignty, horizontality, and a win-win condition. Aid comes without conditionalities (except concerning not recognizing Taiwan), and it is based on China's past experience of development; it is tied with Chinese economic interests and largely focuses on technical assistance, the import of equipment and raw materials, infrastructure, industry, natural resource development, and agriculture. Colombia insists on the relevance of shared knowledge and experience-sharing. As for Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, and Colombia, the demand-driven character of SSC is a key priority in their practices, and there are no conditionalities attached to it.

In the case of Colombia, this is put into practice when a partner country makes an official request to the Colombian government (the *Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación* or the Ministry of External Affairs) to access a specific "best practice." Nevertheless, most of the cooperation responds to political engagements made by the Ministry of External Affairs in regional or bilateral spaces (e.g. the *Comisiones Mixtas*). Colombian authorities aspire to fully implement the demand-driven principle and in order to do so, the *Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación de Colombia* organizes workshops, which are based on the assessment or *perceptions* of the needs of partner countries, where Colombian institutions present its cooperation offer and best practices to their counterparts in partner countries. Subsequently, it is expected that the partner countries will make their specific demands to the agency.

India values solidarity, equality, mutual benefit, and shared knowledge. Turkey's most important considerations are solidarity, shared knowledge, experience-sharing, brotherhood, and global responsibility. Ankara's aid claims to help the society, not the state or governing elite. Turkey does not make direct monetary transfers to beneficiary institutions, and projects are executed directly by Turkish authorities.

Abu Dhabi puts forward solidarity, and Pretoria highlights political solidarity, mutual benefits, respect for sovereignty, the pursuit of common development interests, shared historical burdens, peer and mutual learning, and equality. In the current context of engagement, development cooperation is considered reactive to partners' needs. With the creation of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA),

the rationale for its leaders is to become proactive, too. Caracas places SSC under the values of solidarity, cooperation, and complementarity. No condition has been established but ideological criteria are crucial when selecting partners.

FACTORS SUSTAINING SSC: IDEAS, IDEOLOGIES, AND IDENTITIES

Ideas and ideologies are key resources in imagining and legitimizing the practice of SSC; however, they vary across cases and time. The editors asked the contributors to identify the importance of left-wing or market-based ideas, religion, anti-imperialistic ambitions, the Third World spirit, references to cultural and historical proximity, common political struggles, and so on.

Contributors' observations show that while left-wing political ideas are irrelevant to understand today's SSC policies of Turkey, the UAE, India, Colombia, and the Republic of Korea, they have played a key role in Cuba, China, and Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Brazil. It is interesting to note, however, that all the chapters' authors state that ideas and ideologies of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and Third-Worldism, which once sustained SSC, are less salient and are being replaced by foundations such as mutual interest, shared development needs, and common realities; this, they claim, is in line with the contemporary realities that countries face domestically and internationally.

As underscored by Pooja Jain, the Bandung and G77 spirit in the case of India has more or less disappeared and has been replaced by common claims to dignity, distributive justice, and equal representation in international organizations. This is also the case in Cuba, where the ideological foundations under which cooperation was conceived are fading to make room for a market-oriented approach, translated into the "commodification of humanitarianism." The domestic and policy changes in China have been translated into a shift from ideological emphasis to a more pragmatic approach (Bräutigam 2008), aligned with the patterns and dynamics of contemporary globalization.

This also is increasingly the case in Brazil under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, who has made announcements about devising a more pragmatic approach to SSC. South Africa distances itself on this matter, as the debate is not so much structured along a right or left divide but focuses on how to enhance foreign policy (i.e. the geostrategic issues and what the country wants to achieve in a global setting).

The project to establish an anti-imperialistic model of international relations and interactions between Southern countries has played a crucial role for the authorities of Cuba, India, China, and Venezuela, an important one for Brazil, and has been irrelevant elsewhere. The will to contribute to the emergence of a multipolar world is fundamental for the latter countries, except for China; neither is it for Turkey. Venezuela's increase of SSC since the 2000s was framed under the new foreign policy paradigm of the *Chavista* regime, where the search of a multipolar world gained a central place as an overall foreign policy objective. On the other hand, governments of the UAE, Colombia, the Republic of Korea, and India say that they are inspired by a free-market, "pragmatic" logic.

The discursive positioning of SSC providers often recalls characteristics that present them as closer and equal to their recipients or "partners." Religious and community values matter for Turkey and the UAE's representation and legitimization as aid providers. The case of Turkey illustrates how Ankara deems religion a resource of "soft power" to legitimize and support state-to-state relationships. For the UAE, religion has played a key role in motivating aid, based in Arab solidarity and Islamic charity.

References to culture, history, politics (i.e. common struggles like colonization), and human links (i.e. migrations) are highly significant in most cases. For India, the UAE, Turkey, and Brazil, a common/shared language is seen as facilitating the possibility of cooperation. For India, China, South Africa, and Cuba, the focus is on history, culture, and politics rather than the human dimension; this is so for the Republic of Korea too. These references are marginal only in the case of Colombia, where authorities insist on the importance of shared knowledge about development experiences between countries facing similar challenges more than anything else.

The next two sections deal with the actors in charge of designing and implementing SSC—namely, executive powers and the professionals involved in decisions and policymaking and non-state actors—with an eye towards showing how their leverage and weight differ in each context.

SHAPING SSC: PRESIDENTIALIZATION VERSUS PROFESSIONALIZATION

The graph in Fig. 12.1 reflects the level of personification (i.e. importance of the president in policymaking) and of professionalization of SSC, as the formation of a professional staff of civil servants with a specific expertise




Fig. 12.1 The role of the presidency versus professionalization

and, possibly, shared beliefs and a common identity. This section also looks at the politicization of SSC, in terms of the degree to which it is part of the political debate and party politics.

The role of the president is very robust in the cases of Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, and strong in the case of the UAE and the Republic of Korea. For Cuba and Venezuela, this may be because of the centralistic forms of exercising power domestically. Although the commitment to SSC is continuous despite political change in Cuba, in Venezuela its promotion and management was highly personalized and related to the leader, President Hugo Chávez. In the case of Colombia, the influence of the president is decisive in all issues and topics of foreign policy, while the diplomatic corps is weakly institutionalized, and politicized (Tickner 2007).

As the Indian democracy works along the lines of the British parliamentary system, the power of the presidency is marginal, but the Prime Minister is nodal in SSC policy. Individual leaderships matter; for instance, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, played a crucial role in promoting SSC. That said, the Ministry of External Affairs is the top body when it comes to SSC and development assistance policy. The role of the president is weak, but increasing, in China. There the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Commerce are in charge, even if the president makes more and more announcements about foreign aid. The autonomy of SSC

vis-à-vis the presidency and foreign policy is clear-cut only in Turkey and the Republic of Korea; it is weak everywhere else. In South Africa, the creation of an aid agency with staff that specializes in development assistance is anticipated to increase the autonomy and professionalism of SSC.

Politicization, understood as the level of debates and controversies in party politics and public debate, is weak in all cases, except Venezuela and South Africa, where it is “strong” according to the book’s contributors. In Venezuela, the opposition started to question sending aid abroad as international oil prices dropped and the country found itself in a severe economic crisis. While the political and economic crisis deepens in Venezuela, the future of its SSC policy will depend on the administration led by the successor of President Hugo Chávez, Nicolás Maduro. Its sustainability is at stake.

In South Africa, politicization is intense and often is seen as strengthening over how the country defines its development cooperation identity in the context of SSC or OECD-DAC alignment. In Brazil, President Lula has been criticized by some members of the opposition for prioritizing the global South and cooperating with Haiti and Africa. Politicians mentioned that some areas in the poorest states of Brazil had statistics similar or worse than those in Haiti and the African countries, and they questioned why Brazil should be mobilizing resources to help those countries while it has domestic problems of its own.

The high presidentialization and weak politicization of SSC does not obstruct its professionalization in most cases; however, this takes different forms for each country and undergoes constant change and adaptation (Pineda, Sidiropoulos, Fues, 2015). Overall, the contributors deemed that the professionalization of SSC is between weak and strong. Professionalization is very effective in Turkey and in Cuba, and strong and increasing in Brazil, Colombia, and the Republic of Korea.

The case of Brazil is interesting because cooperation is conducted by “cooperantes” that participate actively in expert communities (e.g. health, agriculture). Their character as a professional group, with power in Brazil’s bureaucracy, and in the African field cannot be understood by focusing on the development agency, ABC, because it obeys its own logic and rules of functioning, as is described in Chap. 5. The professionalization of staff remains weak but is increasing in the UAE, South Africa, India, and China, but it is weak in Venezuela. South Africa’s development assistance programme is politicized but not professionalized, which is recognized as a weakness by the government. Both dimensions are expected to consolidate now that the country is formalizing the creation of an aid agency.

Patterns of presidentialization and professionalization do matter for the institutionalization and sustainability of SSC. If it has revived and become one salient dimension of contemporary international relations, the fact that it remains highly controlled by the executive in many cases, and financed by rises in commodity prices, could affect its continuity because of political changes and a drop in those prices (i.e. Venezuela after Chávez).

OTHER ACTORS SHAPING SSC: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY

South–South cooperation remains mostly a *governmental* policy linked to foreign policy, therefore the role of non-state actors in shaping and implementing its policies overall remains weak (with some exceptions), but it is on the rise. The weight of the private sector is insubstantial in Venezuela; weak but increasing in Cuba and Colombia; between weak and strong and increasing in Brazil, depending on the sectors of intervention; strong in the Republic of Korea; strong and increasing for Turkey, the UAE, and China.

The case of Cuba is unusual because the role of *economic interests* in SSC is strong but does not materialize through the private but rather through the public sector—that is, it is the government that sells its medical services to other governments and thus benefits from much-welcome economic income. This helps it handle and mitigate the effects of economic difficulties and international, especially the USA's, boycott measures against the island.

The role of the private sector in South Africa's development cooperation has not always been clear. The government's relationship with the domestic private sector often has been characterized by historical relations of mistrust, especially along racial lines. Although policy frameworks were put in place to address weaknesses in the engagement, such platforms did not always provide a coherent basis for pursuing common interests and often led to a breakdown in dialogues. The legislating of economic empowerment policies to nurture a Black industrial and entrepreneurial class also is aimed at encouraging and strengthening engagements with the state's economic diplomacy efforts and cooperation. In terms of its focus, the South African government is recognizing the need to pursue relationships with the private sector in trilateral development cooperation, especially with regard to infrastructure financing.

In the case of India, the private sector has a very solid influence on the design and implementation of the SSC policy, through the participation in joint platforms, the development of public-private partnerships (PPPs), and as an element of India's soft power (e.g. the case of the ITC sector). In China, several reforms during the 1990s and 2000s further embedded the idea that aid should generate "mutual benefit." For example, in the case of China's engagement in African agriculture, this translated into the linking of aid with business opportunities for Chinese enterprises as a way to increase benefits from aid and to consolidate the achievements of cooperative projects (Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2009).

Colombian officials, especially the *Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación*, are willing to report and foster initiatives with the private sector in countries of the global South, and to consider strengthening "coalitions" between the public sector and private foundations and firms as well as to share Colombian "best practices," whether they come from the public or private sector. Colombian authorities refer to "strategic alliances," and these are perceived as a way to reinforce the country's capacity to provide SSC and to "increase the benefit of international cooperation to partner countries" (APC-Colombia 2015) (See Fig. 12.2.).

Civil society's engagement in SSC is not significant in most cases. It is weak in Cuba, Brazil, India, China, Colombia, and Venezuela; between




Fig. 12.2 The role of the private sector and civil society

weak and strong, and increasing, in the UAE; strong and increasing in the Republic of Korea; and very strong, and increasing, only in Turkey. Turkish Islamic associations indeed have been instrumental in establishing links with communities in Africa for decades.

In South Africa, if civil society organizations (CSOs) are part of global networks (e.g. OXFAM) and are pursuing engagement with the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) countries, the G20, climate change, and other social development initiatives on inclusive sustainable development, they have not shared in engagements with the new development agency (i.e. SADPA). The role of civil society and the private sector is expected to increase as the government institutionalizes its development cooperation programme and once the SADPA bill is presented for public comment.

Although the role of civil society is not recognized formally in the institutional apparatus, social movements have been vocal in opposing Brazil's agricultural projects in Mozambique, thus broadening the spectrum of actors involved in SSC and counterbalancing state domination and presidentialization of SSC policy. Independent of official objectives and rhetoric, SSC is not a merely intergovernmental matter: SSC between social actors is underway against specific projects in Mozambique, in connection with other initiatives promoted by the global justice movement.

LINKS BETWEEN SSC AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

SSC is framed as closely related to the foreign policy objectives of all SSC providers. This should not come as a surprise, nor does it necessarily contradict the ideas and ideologies attached to SSC mentioned previously. This articulation is explored through three lenses here:

- (1) Is SSC, for authorities, articulated to a project of regional integration?
- (2) Is SSC articulated to a project/ambition of regional leadership?
- (3) Is SSC articulated to a project/ambition of global leadership?

South–South cooperation serves a project of regional integration for all the providers covered in this book except for Turkey, China, and the UAE. It is very clear for Latin American donors: Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia—especially at the beginning of Colombia's international cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean—as well as the current

important role in the *Alianza del Pacífico*. It is interesting to note that these countries do not privilege the same instances of regional integration; because political and ideological differences, initiatives, and organizations have proliferated and competed in Latin America in the past 15 years. For example, Brazil and Colombia are not members of ALBA, an alliance between Cuba and Venezuela that extends selectively in the region; and Cuba is not a member of Brazil's regional project, *União de Nações Sul-Americanas* (UNASUR). The UAE promotes regional *solidarity* to create *stability* rather than integration as such.

Beijing clearly conceives of SSC as a means of achieving “regional influence” in and on South East developing countries. This strategy is not limited to neighbouring countries because it reaches into Africa as well. Officials of Brazil and Venezuela too have regional leadership ambitions. The goal of being a regional leader seems to be limited to the Caribbean, and in the security realm to Central America, in the case of Colombia. For representatives of South Africa, SSC is about mutual benefits and partnership more than regional leadership. SSC is not a matter of regional leadership for the leaders of Turkey and the UAE.

The answer to the question “Is SSC articulated to a project/ambition of *global* leadership?” is “Yes” only for Brazil, China, and Cuba. The ambitions conveyed through SSC are exclusively regional for Caracas—even if President Chávez pursued a foreign policy strategy that took him to far-away places such as Iraq (at the time of Saddam Hussein), Iran, Belarus, Libya, or Vietnam. SSC is used neither at the regional nor international levels by Abu Dhabi. For Pretoria, SSC is perceived as a tool for promoting a reform of the global architecture. In Cuba’s case, international cooperation has been a key element in the island’s foreign policy since 1959, since the establishment of the Cuban revolutionary regime; and it has served to the rapprochement and legitimization of the country’s administration with developing countries all over the world. Two of the contributors (Mehmet Ozkan, Chap. 2, and Jimena Durán, Chap. 9) state that, for Turkey and Colombia, SSC is not about global leadership and highlight a very interesting point: for authorities, it is about international *insertion* and *recognition*—that is, the need and desire to be seen and treated as a model, success story, or reliable partner by Western cohorts. This is exactly the contrary for Venezuela under Chávez, where SSC served to counterbalance Western powers; the purpose was to reject the conventional norms, hierarchies, and more implicit rules dictated by the international order and its dominant players. Indeed, Venezuela’s SSC has been understood as counterhegemonic and could be interpreted as “voluntarily deviant.”⁴

Finally, if SSC is closely entrenched in foreign policy imperatives, the articulation between the two elements, its meaning and implications, are differentiated across countries, depending on whether they are BRICS or small states. In the case of the BRICS, the rise of SSC is related to their “emergence.” As the case of SSC shows, the latter should be seen as a *process*, not as a linear or inevitable outcome as tensions arise. As for entrants into regional and/or global leadership, Brazil best exemplifies the tensions at the core of SSC. Indeed, when hegemonic motives and exported models of economic “success” are combined with corporate interests, SSC can generate criticisms and trigger contestation and resistance just like traditional aid does.

It appears that SSC has been a particularly powerful tool for small countries (e.g. the UAE) and revolutionary regimes with few powerful international allies—for example, Cuba after the end of the Cold War and Venezuela during the 2000s. SSC also seems efficient as a symbolic means of cultural-public diplomacy to change a country’s international image and status; this is so for the Republic of Korea that has shifted from a poor to a developed country, then to donor and model. In addition, Bogotá is trying to move Colombia’s image from problema to security exporter.

In its articulation with foreign policy, apparent ambiguities and contradictions are at the heart of SSC. Donor-and-recipient countries are seeking to reconcile their perceived dependence towards Northern countries with increasing agency and autonomy in international affairs; regional integration and leadership; alliances with other countries of the global South; and, sometimes, greater proximity with partners in the North and with multilateral organizations.

In general, and independent from the level of economic development and diplomatic weight of the countries described, two important trends in SSC can clearly be observed: the rise of security imperatives and economic and/or corporate interests.

The Rise of Security Imperatives

The tendency to incorporate security objectives with, or instead of, development goals in SSC is palpable in India’s policy in Mozambique and the Indian Ocean, in Turkey’s engagement in Somalia, in the triangular cooperation schemes established between the USA and Colombia in Central America and the Caribbean, and in the patterns in the UAE’s humanitarian assistance in the Middle East. This, to a certain extent, leads

these countries to converge with Western agendas⁵ and/or collaborate with Northern powers (i.e. the USA in Latin America, the USA and the EU in the Middle East and African Horn). In that sense, they do not offer more alternative solutions to the world's security challenges than do the classical antiterrorism packages.

The Rise of Economic and/or Corporate Interests

In the case of the BRICS countries, SSC is clearly a tool to facilitate the internationalization of the rising multinational companies, trade with potential markets, the extraction of resources, and so on. This is obviously the case of India, Brazil, and China. For Cuba, the commodification of SSC policy, specifically medical diplomacy, creates a financing source for the regime. The rise of economic interests at the heart of SSC usually is accompanied by a decline in left-wing ideologies, particularly in China and India, where previous references to socialist planning have faded.

DIFFERENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITH TRADITIONAL AID DONORS

This final section analyzes SSC's differences and interactions with traditional aid donors. It explores three dimensions of SCC and its providers in particular (Table 12.1):

1. Their membership in existing multilateral organizations, especially the OECD and the OECD–DAC.
2. Their compliance with existing multilateral norms in the aid field and their willingness to collaborate with traditional donors.
3. Their claims to “do things different” from traditional donors.

Out of the nine donors or SSC providers, three are members of the OECD (i.e. Turkey, the Republic of Korea, and the UAE, more recently). Colombia applied for membership in 2011 and its official adhesion process started in 2013. The UAE and the Republic of Korea are also members of the OECD–DAC (Fig. 12.3).

The second comparative point deals with compliance with the existing norms of aid (i.e. the compliance of SSC providers with traditional aid principles), mostly the Paris Declaration, the MDGs, and the SDGs

Table 12.1 Membership in the OECD

| <i>Is country a member of the OECD?</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>No</i> |
|---|------------------------------|---|
| Cuba | | X |
| Turkey | Since 1961 (founding member) | |
| Brazil | | X |
| UAE | Since 2014 | |
| India | | X |
| China | | X |
| Colombia | | Request for membership made in 2011. The process formally started in 2013. |
| Venezuela | | X |
| South Africa | | X – But aligns to OECD–DAC policies of aid effectiveness. |
| South Korea | Since 1996 | |
| <i>Is country a member of the DAC?</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>No</i> |
| Cuba | | X |
| Turkey | | X |
| Brazil | | X |
| UAE | Since 2014 ⁶ | |
| India | | X |
| China | | X |
| Colombia | | X |
| Venezuela | | X |
| South Africa | | X |
| South Korea | Since 2010 | |

adopted by the UN. Collaboration is measured by means of the SSC providers' willingness to work with traditional donors through triangular cooperation arrangements.

Compliance with traditional aid is weak for revolutionary regimes (i.e. Cuba, Venezuela) because of their ideological orientations and criticisms against multilateral organs that they deem dominated and manipulated by large, Northern powers. Nonetheless, as stressed by Daniele Benzi (Chap. 3), interestingly both countries tend to stress and overemphasize their domestic MDG accomplishments. Most BRICS (i.e. Brazil, India, China) countries are weakly compliant too, but for other reasons: Typically, they are reluctant to buy into the OECD's framework because the organization is based on selective membership and an exclusive decision-making scheme—that is, it only includes developed countries.




Fig. 12.3 Compliance and collaboration with traditional aid

South African elites wonder why emerging donors should conform to the OECD-DAC framework that is still uneven and that they have not been involved in shaping. They opt for unwavering compliance with global multilateral initiatives, which to them reflect a more universal development cooperation agenda and model than does OECD-DAC. They promote a better coordination with the Paris Declaration, though.

Compliance with the existing norms of aid is very strong for Turkey and the UAE—both countries are members of the OECD. Colombia has applied to be a member of the OECD. Here it might be useful, though, to clarify that lately, Bogotá’s commitment has been weaker regarding the Paris Declaration but has been very evident vis-à-vis the post-2015 development agenda and the SDGs.

Not surprisingly, the UAE and Colombia are very willing to work with traditional donors and to engage in triangular cooperation schemes. Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and India also are willing to do so, whereas China, Venezuela, and the Republic of Korea are not awfully interested. In the latter case, it is important to underline that officials in Seoul identify as belonging to the group of Northern countries, not to the global South, but are endowed with the knowledge and experience of “Asian” late industrialization.

Regarding the last comparative point, Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, China, and Venezuela claim to strongly promote an alternative vision of development. India, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea do so as well. This is because of the promotion of an “Asian model of development” based on official interpretations of South Korea’s experience and lessons of economic development. Unsurprisingly, the countries close to the OECD (e.g. the UAE and Colombia) do not claim to promote an alternative model of development in recipient countries; however, Turkey does (Fig. 12.4).

The claim to “do things different” from, as compared to traditional aid, is shared more broadly by all the Southern donors included in the book. This is very strong in Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, and China; strong in South Africa, India, the UAE, Colombia (the latter two, however, do not claim to promote an alternative vision of development), Venezuela, and the Republic of Korea. According to the chapters’ contributors, the claim to difference is growing in all cases, except for South Korea. Since the country is a member of the OECD, though, Seoul has been eager to align more strictly on the OECD–DAC priorities and standards (see Chap. 7); thus, it projects a potentially ambiguous discourse that seeks to reconcile specificity and added-value, which is the “Asian” model of development but complies with dominant norms. This led the country to participate in alliances that had been willing to change the terms of the debate and to put economic




Fig. 12.4 Claiming difference

growth, industrialization, and other sources of development aid financing on the multilateral agenda for the OECD-DAC's Fourth High-Level Forum on Effective Development Cooperation held in Busan in 2011.

In this context, the editors argue that SSC's impacts, results, and evaluations are increasingly important issues. For example, Southern donors claim to do things differently, but they still are deprived of the instruments, indicators, and, often, basic information systems to show how they do so. They contend that their definitions and approach to impacts and results differ and do not buy into existing DAC standards, but often are short of empirical evidence, genuine knowledge, and alternative measurements to sustain their arguments.

Transparency of information is still weak for most SSC providers and donors because updated data concerning the projects, resources, and actors engaging in SSC are scarce. In some instances, this is not the result of a lack of political will but of a lack of capacity to assemble the material, especially to measure and inform the human elements of SSC (e.g. in Brazil or Colombia). In this field, SSC providers could come up with interesting contributions and original views. This is particularly urgent given that, despite their rhetoric anchored in Third Worldism, the nonaligned spirit, anti-imperialism, history and identities, and/or cultural values, the structure of SSC does not always strike as so radically different from traditional aid.

The interest of China and Brazil in natural resources (e.g. mines, oil, and agriculture) in Africa does not challenge the international division of labour and the modalities of the continent's traditional insertion in the world. For that reason, efforts to promote technology transfer (e.g. in the health sector in Mozambique) and knowledge-sharing (e.g. in the Republic of Korea and Colombia) hold more promise for innovation and horizontality in the practice of development assistance.

Last, but not least, it is important to emphasize that the lack of Southern donors' autonomy vis-à-vis traditional aid cannot be captured only by their willingness to work with traditional by donors. Their engagement in triangular cooperation schemes. Like the focus on the human nature of SSC, technical assistance, or knowledge transfer is nurtured not only by a special vision of development assistance but also is justified by the scarcity of funds allocated to SSC; this is so even in emerging countries, where economic leverage and the political basis for sending aid abroad are minuscule.

The “human dimension” is, of course, an interesting and distinct feature of SSC that could create close and sustainable relations of proximity and horizontality between participants. Nevertheless, it also can impede the possibility to “scale up” in the field of development assistance and to provide incentives to establish collaborations with traditional donors at the expense of autonomy. Southern donors are tempted to benefit from the links and infrastructures of traditional donors in countries of the global South located outside of their region or customary zone of influence.

As already mentioned, Southern donors have yet to show their ability to produce alternative knowledge and evaluation systems about development and cooperation. There is even some *mimicry* about the “best practices” exported through SSC by Colombia (Tickner 2016; Bergamaschi et al. Chap. 9) and Brazil; civil servants of these two countries “teach” today what they have been taught as aid-recipients by traditional donors in the past—respectively, the USA in the field of security and Japan in the sector of agriculture. (For more on this, see the description of and affiliations between the projects, Prodecer in Brazil and the ProSavana in Mozambique, in Chap. 10).

For financial reasons among others, Colombia coalesced with the World Bank in order to systematize SSC information and knowledge in the process related to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Assistance driven by the DAC and then jointly with the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The World Bank likes to call itself “the Bank of Knowledge” and would not abandon its de facto quasimonopoly on the production of knowledge about development and poverty internationally. The UNDP supports cooperation agencies in emergent and middle-income countries: ABC in Brazil (Cabral and Weinstock 2010) and the *Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación* in Colombia, through a project “institutional strengthening of APC-Colombia.”

As shown by Erthal and da Fonseca (2013),⁷ the porosity of Southern donors to traditional donors’ initiatives to co-opt them, or to keep the upper hand on SSC, are also visible in knowledge and training. Many young Latin American professionals have been trained in Spain thanks to grants and courses provided by the *Agencia Española para la Cooperación Internacionla y el Desarrollo* (AECID), the *Fundación Carolina*, and Galicia, among others. There they learn about development, governance, triangular cooperation, and the possibility of building “bridges” between the North and the South. The penetration of traditional donors into SSC schemes happens not only in like-minded countries (e.g. Colombia,

Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Peru) but also in countries governed by so-called “revolutionary” administrations such as Ecuador and to a lesser extent Bolivia.⁸

The government of Germany offers a course called “Triangular Cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean: International Competence Building” to international cooperations’ professionals in partner countries that are linked to its Triangular Cooperation Fund for the region. The Republic of Korea’s authorities tend to be positive about their country’s experience as an aid-recipient, and run a training programme entitled “Korea’s Development Cooperation Policy.” It focuses on their general approach to development and international cooperation; it is aimed at civil servants from Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the field of international cooperation.

As a result of what has been described here, it is not clear whether Southern countries are willing to make the financial sacrifices, and the political choice, to build domestic support for sending aid abroad, investing in research and development to prove their added-value, and *in fine* to maintain their autonomy towards traditional aid and donors.

NOTES

1. This point was suggested by Danilo Marcondes (see Chap. 1).
2. The Colombian case may be an exception here: the structural decrease may be temporarily interrupted when the government and FARC sign a peace agreement. The Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperacion and the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion are expecting a 30% increase at this occasion, but these are mere estimations as donor contributions are typically not predictable.
3. We thank Pooja Jain for suggesting this point.
4. The sociological notion of “deviance” has been applied to foreign policy analysis by Sidani, Soraya. *Intégration et deviance au sein du système international*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2014.
5. The “merging” between development and security in global governance led by the West has been highlighted by Duffield, Mark. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books, 2011.
6. The UAE is the first participant in the DAC and, as such, can take part in all nonconfidential meetings of the Committee. However, “the UAE will not take part in formal decision-making processes and cannot serve as Chair or Vice-Chair of the DAC or its sub-committees.” Source: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/uae-participant-dac.htm>

7. See: Abdenur, Adriana and Joao Da Fonseca. "The North's Growing Role in South-South Cooperation: Keeping the Foothold." *Third World Quarterly* 34 (2013): 1475-1491.
8. We thank Daniele Benzi for suggesting this point. He is investigating this aspect in his ongoing research projects.

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