



DYNAMICS OF FMDV STRAINS EMERGENCE AND SPREAD WITHIN REGIONS; PROGRESS AND GAPS TO ACHIEVE RAPID THREAT DETECTION

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


Pool 3: FMD Endemic - or multiple Epidemics?

- Epidemic: higher FMD incidence than usual, unpredictable
- New epidemic waves emerge every 1-2 years in Eurasia

FMD notifications in Pool 3: 1990-2011

Number of FMD Notifications per month in Eurasia
source: OIE and WRL databases (FMD Bioportal)






FMD notifications in Pool 3: 1990-2011

Can we Predict these epidemic events?? and so...

- Prepare
- Prevent

3P's

Number of FMD Notifications per month in Eurasia
source: OIE reports and WRL (FMD Bioportal)






Recent FMD Events in W. Eurasia

Serotype-strain	First detected	Epidemics	Associated Factors
A-Iran-05 (11 sublineages)	2003: Iran	2006--? Iran, Turkey	Vaccines not protective (A-Iran-96, then A22)
O-PanAsia-2 (7 sublineages)	India 2001 (Iran 2005)	2007, 2010 Iran, Turkey	-increased animal movement (meat prices) -waning immunity from last O epidemic -decreased protection from vaccine
Asia 1	Late 2008: Pakistan	2011--ongoing Iran, Turkey	-Shamir vaccine not protective --no natural immunity (previous incursion in 2004)




Sub-lineages of A-Iran-05






Sub-lineages of O-PanAsia-2






O PanAsia 2: Large surge in outbreaks in Turkey and Iran in 2010





FMDV Asia 1

Postulated Spread 2009-2011*



* Based on samples and information submitted to the FAO World Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease



How can we reduce the impact of these epidemics?

- Detection and monitoring of threats
- Early recognition of events/epidemics
- Effective and feasible mitigation options
 - Prevention and control





Threat

Threat (Merriam-Webster):

- 1 : an expression of an **intent** to do harm
- 2 : something that threatens
- 3 : an indication of something **impending**

In this case, the threat is a situation that increases the chance of an **event** (in this case, an epidemic)

...but the event hasn't happened YET





Threat detection

Routine monitoring of indicators:


- **Host:**
 - Level of immunity
 - Vaccination-generated
 - Previous infection
- **Agent:**
 - New strains - how know which will cause greatest impact?
 - Increased virulence, infectiousness
 - Low vaccine matching
- **Environment:**
 - Animal movement patterns: related to price differentials, festivals
 - Regional FMD situation...events in neighbouring countries



Monitoring: the Host

Iran 2010: Proportion of epi-units vaccinated per district

- Naive animals
 - Waning immunity
 - Population turnover
- Need to follow over time
- Correlation of vaccination coverage with immunity ?







Monitoring: the Agent

- How identify *a priori* which strains pose greatest threat?
 - Prone to spread, high virulence

200 bp
100 bp
© ClustalX 1.2.4 (http://www.ebi.ac.uk)





Monitoring: the Environment

- Large scale animal movements
 - price differentials could be indicator
- Events in neighbouring countries:
 - Regional communication, networks (lab & epi)

Prices (in USD per kilo) for live cattle and beef (young male animals)

<i>Country</i>	Live		Meat	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>
Turkey	3.7	6.7	6.2	10.5
Iran	2.3		7	
Georgia	1.5	2.0	4.2	4.3
Armenia	1.6	2.7	3.9	5,4
Azerbaijan	4	4,5	6,2	6,5



Threat detection in practice: 2010 WRL Report

“Notably, an **Asia 1 epidemic may be due in EurAsia**, since cases are occurring in Pakistan, whilst other countries including Iran and Turkey with high levels of circulating O and A viruses will by now have a low population immunity to this serotype (last seen in 2004). Increased imports and movements of live cattle and small ruminants into and through the Middle East from Africa and through new trade routes may also increase the risk of African strains being introduced. “



What should the response to threats be??

Will depend on:

- Sensitivity, specificity and predictive value of alert system...how likely is an event and
- How serious would that event be ??

May include:


- Vaccine development
 - Expensive, takes time
- Increased biosecurity -
 - Especially effective when 'threat' is time-limited (eg festivals)
- Enhanced surveillance...facilitate early event detection
- Communication, enhance awareness: locally & regionally



Event recognition

- Early detection to facilitate early response
 - Detection is National responsibility
- Routine monitoring & surveillance essential...”Real-time”
 - Must define what is ‘normal’ to recognize what is not normal
 - Need high quality data over time

Turkey: 2009-2010






Event recognition: Define criteria to 'trigger' further investigation

- Increased number of cases reported
 - Could be automatic algorithm
 - Requires good reporting system for suspect cases

**FMD in Iran Oct 2010-Dec 2011:
Clinical reports and serotypes by month**





Event recognition: Define criteria to 'trigger' further investigation

- Unusual clinical presentation
 - Higher mortality
 - Age of affected animals
- FMD in vaccinated animals





Event recognition: Define criteria to ‘trigger’ further investigation

Criteria: are a “screening” test:

- High sensitivity (detect all events),
- There will be false alarms
- Therefore they are signal for further investigation

Response to Event:

- Minimize spread/impact: biosecurity, movement controls, vaccination



Progress & Gaps

Progress:


- Regional coordination & communication:
 - lab networks: getting more results, faster
 - Regional Roadmaps
 - FMD remains sensitive issue
- Data for surveillance (TurkVet, Iran Gis-vet)

Gaps:

- A lot of data is collected...but analysis and applying information to improve strategies is not yet routine
- More coordination between field, lab, epidemiologists
 - Need to improve information flow about samples (so lab knows clinical picture, and field knows results in timely manner)



Monitoring - is a key principle of the PCP





Summary 1

- FMD in ‘endemic’ areas is actually characterized by epidemic waves that sweep across regions
- Precipitated by certain conditions (“threat”) related to host-agent-environment
- These conditions should be monitored to detect when threat-level is increased...(colour coded alert?)
 - Multiple Indicators should be developed and should consider host, agent and environment factors
- When threat detected: an appropriate response must be implemented...contingency plan



Summary 2

- “Event” detection is different from ‘threat detection’ because indicates early stages of epidemic already started
- Constant monitoring and surveillance, data analysis is critical...need to combine lab and field data
- Sensitivity, specificity & predictive value key attributes for both ‘threat’ and ‘event’ detection
- Early detection for early response...contingency planning, practical & effective mitigation options urgently needed



Acknowledgements

- Sequencing (Jemma Wadsworth)
- Defra grant SE2939
- Iranian Veterinary Organization colleagues
- SAP Institute and GDFC: Turkey
- Syed Jamal, Pakistan

Thank you!