Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

Office of Evaluation

Terminal Evaluation of the Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) – GCP /INT/979/GFF

Terminal Evaluation Report

January 2014

Final Report

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Office of Evaluation (OED)

This report is available in electronic format at: http://www.fao.org/evaluation

For further information on this report, please contact:

Director, OED
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 1, 00153
Rome, Italy
Email: evaluation@fao.org

Acknowledgements

The following report represents the views of the independent assessment mission on the performance and achievements of the Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP - GCP/INT/979/GFF) project. The evaluators wish to thank most sincerely the various governments for hosting the evaluation mission; we are most grateful to the staff of the various government ministries and agencies, and the FAO staff at HQ and in the field, and indeed all other partners, for their hospitality, patience and cooperation during the evaluation.

However, the evaluators had to struggle with one major constraint: (often personal) differences of opinion, perhaps caused by unclear governance arrangements, had a major negative influence on ASP implementation throughout its lifetime. The evaluators have not been able to account well for these factors: it is obvious that personal animosities and antagonistic decision-making processes had a decisive influence on the workings of the ASP, but (of course) these factors are not well documented. The TSU's support work was affected by this; for the evaluators, this complex situation meant that information received was often anecdotal and "on background", making it difficult to come to a balanced assessment of the TSU work itself.

In addition, the evaluation was at least initially seriously constrained by a lack of available documentation within FAO. Perhaps due to the fact that the evaluation started at a time when the ASP had been operationally inactive for almost two years, much of the required documentation – apart from overall progress reports – was not available from the FAO documentation system. The information situation improved after the country visits, when ASP partner agencies made their reports and documents available.

Organization of the Evaluation: Country Visits and Writing Period

The evaluators visited Morocco, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania in June 2012 in order to get a better impression of the workings of the ASP (see mission schedule in annex). Every country visit was well organized by the FAO Representation and the partner institutions; the evaluators are appreciative the frank and constructive manner in which information was provided. The write-up of the evaluation was long delayed: initially due to scarcity of information and slow returns of evaluation questionnaires, then by illness and subsequent work overload of the evaluation team leader. Our sincere apologies to all concerned.

Composition of the Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team comprised:

Mr Bernd Bultemeier: FAO Evaluation Manager and Evaluation Team Leader
Dr Mohamed Abdallahi Ebbe (Ould Babah): Senior Entomologist/Consultant

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements		i
Table of Contents		ii
Acronyms		iii
Executive Summary		iv
1	Evaluation Rationale and Focus	1
1.1	Background to the Terminal Evaluation	1
1.1.1	Purpose of the Terminal Evaluation	1
1.1.2	Scope of the Terminal Evaluation	1
1.1.3	Methodology of the Terminal Evaluation	2
1.1.4	Terminal Evaluation Team	3
1.2	Background of ASP	4
1.2.1	Objectives and Purpose of TSU / ASP	5
1.2.2	Funding of TSU / ASP	9
2	Assessment According to Evaluation Criteria	9
2.1	Relevance (Problems and Needs)	9
2.1.1	Consistency with Country Needs and Objectives	10
2.1.2	Project Design	10
2.1.3	Coordination and Oversight Arrangements	11
2.1.4	Gender Mainstreaming	12
2.2	Effectiveness (Achievement of Purpose)	12
2.2.1	A Comprehensive Approach	13
2.2.2	Procedural Issues	13
2.2.3	Capacity-building and Training	14
2.3	Efficiency (Sound Management & Value-for-Money)	14
2.3.1	Project Management	14
2.3.2	Budget Utilization	15
2.3.3	Partnerships	18
2.3.4	Government Support	18
2.3.5	Project Reporting and M&E Issues	19
2.4	Impact (Achievement of Wider Effects)	19
2.4.1	Increased Capacity for Dealing with Obsolete Pesticides	20
2.4.2	Impact in Countries	20
2.5	Sustainability (Likely Continuation of Achieved Results)	23
2.5.1	Continuing Efforts to Remove Obsolete Pesticides	23
2.5.2	Future Initiatives	23
3	Main Conclusions	24
4	Key Lessons Learned	25
5	Key Recommendations	26
Annexes		27
Annex 1.	Terms of Reference of the Terminal Evaluation	28
Annex 2.	Terminal Evaluation Team – Profiles	51
Annex 3.	Itinerary and List of People Met	52
Annex 4.	Evaluation Instruments (copies of questionnaires)	54
Annex 5.	List of Documents Reviewed	58

Acronyms

AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
ASP	Africa Stockpiles Programme
ASP - P1	Africa Stockpiles Programme - Project 1
ASPIC	Africa Stockpiles Programme Implementation Committee
Basel Convention	The Basel Convention on Control of Transboundary movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal (1989)
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CESA	Country environmental and social assessment
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CILSS	Comité permanent inter Etats de lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel
CLI	CropLife International
DGF	Development Grant Facility
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMTK	Environmental Management Tool Kit
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFEM	French Facility for Global Environment
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
IPM	Integrated Pest Management
IVM	Integrated Vector Management
MNA	Middle East and North Africa Region
MTDT	Multi-donor Trust Fund
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	National Implementation Plan
NSC	National Steering Committee
OPMS	Obsolete Pesticides Management
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAN Africa	Pesticides Action Network Africa
PAN UK	Pesticides Action Network United Kingdom
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit
POP	Persistent Organic Pollutant
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PSMS	The Pesticides Stock Management System
Rotterdam Convention	The Rotterdam Convention on Prior Inform Consent Procedures for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998)
SAICM	Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management
SCB	Secretariat of the Basel Convention
Stockholm Convention	The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)
TAD	Technical Adviser for Disposal
TF	Trust Fund
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSU	Technical Support Unit
TTL	Task Team Leader
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
WWF	World Wildlife Fund for Nature

Executive Summary

Background to the Terminal Evaluation

ES1. The Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) was a strategic partnership of intergovernmental organizations whose development was led by FAO, regional organizations such as NEPAD, non-governmental organizations such as Pesticides Action Network (PAN) and World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), the private sector as represented by the pesticide manufacturers' association CropLife International (CLI), and financial institutions led by the World Bank. A steering committee (called implementation committee=ASPIC) was supposed to provide implementation oversight of the ASP. Implementation of the ASP was led by the World Bank as GEF Implementing Agency.

ES2. FAO's role in the ASP was as Technical Support Unit (Component 2) providing technical advice to the country teams to support their national execution. These were supported by the Cross Cutting and Monitoring and Evaluation component (Component 3) headed by WWF and PAN, and the Project Coordination component (Component 4), both with World Bank funding.

ES3. The TSU's overall mandate was to support the Country Operations (ASP Component 1) by: providing technical advice and oversight of ASP implementation at country and programme level; providing focused technical support in conjunction with project management units (PMUs) in the implementation and execution of country project components; coordinating appropriate response and ensure timely delivery of technical assistance of partners and donors to countries participating in the ASP; and providing assistance to countries in the drafting of project proposals related to but not covered by the ASP project and mobilize bi-lateral or other donor financing to support these activities.

ES4. In accordance with the Project Document, the independent Terminal Evaluation was to be undertaken at the end of the project implementation. By 2012, most substantive TSU activities had come to an end (very few activities took place after 2010; more detail in main report), so that the evaluation almost resembled an ex-post evaluation. The Terminal Evaluation purpose was defined as to determine progress being made towards achievement of outcomes and to assess the impact that the TSU has made on its stakeholders. It was, inter alia, to:

- review the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of project implementation;
- analyse effectiveness of implementation and partnership arrangements;
- identify lessons learned about project design, implementation and management;
- highlight technical achievements and lessons learned;
- assess levels of project accomplishment; and
- synthesize lessons that may help improve the selection, design, and implementation of future GEF activities

ES5. The evaluation was conducted in three phases: i) document review of available documentation, ii) country visits (June 2012), iii) questionnaire circulation to main stakeholders in country and partner institutions, and soliciting additional information material and additional contacts through email, Skype and telephone. Feedback to stakeholders was provided through debriefing presentations and circulation of preliminary findings.

***Evaluation Criteria and Summary Assessment*[1]**

ES6. The Evaluation Criteria and the assessment given by the evaluation team are as follows:

- **Relevance (Problems & Needs):** Highly Satisfactory i.e. highly relevant to all ASP partner countries;
- **Effectiveness (Achievement of Purpose):** Marginally Unsatisfactory i.e. many outcomes achieved, but with time lags owing to slow start-up procedures and dissent among Programme parties;
- **Efficiency (Sound Management & Value-for-Money):** Marginally Satisfactory i.e. the TSU provided much of the TA required, but weak collaboration among Programme parties at times had a paralysing effect on project progress;
- **Impact (Achievement of Wider Effects):** Marginally Unsatisfactory i.e. Disposal of obsolete pesticides has happened in some countries and will take place in the near future in others – but this was achieved much later than anticipated in the original project document. It must be noted that disposal of obsolete pesticides from participating countries was beyond the mandate and financial capacity of the TSU;
- **Sustainability (Likely Continuation of Achieved Results):** Satisfactory i.e. sustainability may be affected by budget constraints in some countries, but several countries have contributed substantial amounts from their own funding; and in every ASP country, the issue of POPs has received much attention.

Overall, the summary assessment for the Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) is a qualified 'Satisfactory' with special attention drawn to the shortcomings in ASP governance and coordination[2].

Main Conclusions

ES7. The TSU support to the ASP can be seen as a 'qualified success' in terms of its efforts to provide sound technical advice to the ASP; good results towards POPs disposal have been achieved but after long delays on the part of other ASP implementing partners. Many of the inefficiencies and conflicting actions seem to be due to inconsistent guidance from programme and project documents and unsatisfactory governance structures which did neither clarify the institutional responsibilities nor provide clear definitions concerning the roles of the various parties in the execution of the ASP.

ES8. Differences on procedure and an almost dysfunctional institutional set-up for ASP coordination and management conspired to delay progress on a massive scale. Lines of command were unclear, and differences of opinion among ASP partners frequently remained unresolved.

ES9. This represents a missed opportunity, since the ASP was a very strategic and high-profile programme that aimed at completely removing all obsolete pesticides, including POPs pesticides, from all African countries in a phased programme lasting 15 years, by developing sufficient national capacity in each country to effectively prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides in Africa.

---

1 The reader should keep in mind that it is difficult to judge the TSU performance in isolation from the rest of the ASP; e.g. impact by definition has to refer to the ultimate aim of ASP: disposal of obsolete pesticides. TSU management contends that constraints and delays experienced by ASP were the result of slow progress with other components and relate mainly to disposal "which was not a TSU role". However, the TSU project document specified that that TSU would provide "country focused technical support related specifically to the execution of the prevention and disposal components of the ASP projects".

2 Definitions according to the GEF Secretariat's six-point scale system: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S), Marginally Satisfactory (MS), Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), and Highly Unsatisfactory (HU).

ES10. The first phase of the ASP (ASP-1) was scheduled to last four years and cover up to 15 countries in two groups. An initial group of six countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia) were prioritized for early quantification and removal of their obsolete pesticide stockpiles and implementation of a comprehensive programme of measures to strengthen national capacity in the management of pests and pesticides with the objective of preventing further accumulation of obsolete pesticide stocks. In addition, a project in Nigeria was implemented to quantify obsolete pesticide stocks and implement a programme of measures to prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides. These country projects together with their institutional structures that support them constituted the ASP-1 project. The plan was to prepare an additional group of countries during phase I where follow-on projects would be implemented during a second phase.

ES11. Country Operations (Component 1 of the ASP) were funded by grants by the World Bank directly to the countries. FAO's role in the ASP was as Technical Support Unit (Component 2) providing technical advice to the country teams to support their national execution. These were supported by the Cross Cutting and Monitoring and Evaluation component (Component 3) headed by WWF and PAN, and the Project Coordination component (Component 4), both with World Bank administered funds.

ES12. The work programme was implemented in all seven countries listed above. In addition, the TSU launched scoping missions in ten additional countries that meet the eligibility criteria for entry in the ASP. The missions were designed to determine the level of readiness to participate in the ASP in terms of priority needs (i.e. emergency considerations of known stockpiles), political support, and status of obsolete pesticide inventories, among others.

ES13. The strength of the TSU work was the preparatory work on country projects for incorporation into the ASP, the coordination and provision of technical assistance to participating countries, and overseeing the standard of technical operations in all ASP related activities. In addition, the TSU provided guidance and the tools to assist countries in implementing their ASP projects including developing capacities in the use of the tools and guidelines where necessary. At the programme level, the TSU established the procedures and standards for the design and delivery of training; production of technical guidelines for clean-up and prevention operations; assistance in managing technical aspects of procurement and supervision of specialized contractor; advice on linking countries with other specialized agencies and organizations; enhancement of health and safety; assessment of laboratory capacities and oversight of monitoring and evaluation.

ES14. At the country level, the TSU provided technical and specialized expertise required for preparation, design, implementation, supervision and monitoring & evaluation of country level activities (clean up and disposal activities, prevention activities, capacity building activities and country programme management activities). Training modules (on, among others, inventory-taking, the use of PSMS[3], pesticide management and the development of a prevention framework) have been delivered to complement the variety of the guidelines produced.

ES15. In addition, the TSU supported (with WB inputs) ASP countries in setting up and adopting an M&E system for project implementation at country level, which was initiated and made operational in all ASP-1 countries, as well as being circulated in FAO for use by other projects. Online user help and technical guidance were developed in support of the system, which will be put to use in new countries.

ES16. However, differences of opinion regarding applicable rules and procedures led to massive delays and sometimes stoppages of work at country level. In the eyes of the TSU implementers, particularly WB rules and procedures seemed not to take account of the specific needs of ASP countries, and also did not seem to do justice to the urgency of some situations. This refers both to

[3] FAO's pesticide database system.

procedures governing the Country Environmental and Social Assessments (CESA)[4] as well as WB procurement activities, and also the development of country grants[5].

ES17. This also affected the recruitment of longer-term technical experts (called technical advisers on disposal/TADs) by another ASP partner (CLI), which in turn increased TSU's workload as the in-country support to be provided by the TADs was often lacking due to late recruitment. (The in-country experts were not to be hired by FAO due to a perceived conflict of interest.) By the time the evaluation mission took place, some disposal operations had been concluded, others were under implementation, but several countries still has to initiate the disposal operations. (This sometimes also had to do with the fact that in several ASP-1 countries, higher quantities than expected of obsolete pesticides were found, requiring an adjustment of budgets and timeframes.)

ES18. The TSU participated in large number of joint supervision missions (mostly with WB, CropLife International and WWF) and also organized many dedicated technical support missions; the final number of missions was higher than foreseen in the original TSU work programme and budget.

ES19. More specific Conclusions are summarized under the two main headings of the TSU project document[6]:

Technical Support at Programme Level

1. Technical assistance for the development of a data base (PSMS) has been provided; PSMS is being used in several ASP countries;

2. Development and delivery of training of trainers (TOT) sessions has led to satisfactory results;

3. Assistance to the countries in the development of a national M&E plan; this has been realized in some countries satisfying national needs but the consolidation at programme level is incomplete;

4. Establishment of a (global) help desk to provide advice and guidance on all aspects of the prevention and elimination of obsolete pesticides has not been formally established; however, the TSU has provided more TA missions than scheduled to African countries and consistently responded to questions and requests on relevant matters from countries and other organizations;

5. Organization of an annual lessons learnt workshop was envisaged in the project document but not established; The ASP Steering Committee meetings in which all programme countries participated were seen as a substitute.

---

[4] CESAs were governed by WB safeguard provisions, which are meant to ensure that Bank operations do no harm to people and the environment. However, the WB procedures turned out to be more time-consuming (and in TSU eyes, also more cumbersome) than expected. The TSU perceived the stockpiles as an existing danger that needed an urgent response, while the WB procedures seemed to focus on an overall minimization of risks, without factoring in the time dimension.

[5] TSU felt sidelined by the WB in the development and implementation of country grants; formally perhaps correct as this was WB's mandate under ASP Component 1, but it affected TSU's ability to play its role as a full-fledged partner.

[6] Please note that the workplan/mandate of the TSU changed in the course of project implementation; this will be documented in the main report

6. Periodic review of international regulations related to the ASP technical components and development of country guidance documents/fact sheets; this was not done per se, but FAO guidelines have been adapted and/or revised;

7. Coordination of technical inputs from various contributing organizations to ensure that country needs are effectively met and that high standards of advice are maintained; it appears that TSU never properly assumed a coordination role due to the unclear governance structures of the ASP;

8. Assessment of project progress against work plan and objectives; the TSU participated in Supervision Missions, but was forced to take a back seat vis-à-vis the WB by virtue of the fact that the role of the TSU in project supervision had been excluded from grant agreements between the World Bank and countries – the results of some supervisory missions (e.g. to Morocco) seem to have been controversial – in addition, the TSU has limited involvements in the support to countries in ASP-1 since a WB decision in 2010 to restructure the country level grant agreements;

9. Establishment and maintenance of a "compliance matrix" for all ASP related activities to detail all relevant international and national regulations and standards applicable to each individual component of the ASP; this activity seems to have been abandoned;

10. Revision of existing FAO technical guidelines as well as drafting and publication of new technical guidelines on obsolete pesticides; a complete set of technical guidelines has been developed to support all technical aspects of project delivery at country level;
11. Development of framework disposal tender documents for use by countries issuing tenders for obsolete pesticide disposal; this has been covered by technical guidelines – the actual tender process involved also the other ASP parties[7];

12. Consolidation and reporting of all technical data from the countries (inventory, safeguarding, disposal, training, prevention initiatives, capacity development, etc); the 2012 TSU PIR claims that systems for monitoring and evaluation of implementation of EMPs, safeguarding and disposal strategies plus implementation of pesticide management components have now been developed (most of it should be available from PSMS);

13. TSU and FAO assistance to countries in the drafting of project proposals to find bi-lateral/alternate donors; as of 2012, FAO has received GEF approval for projects in Botswana, Eritrea, Mozambique; individual country PIFs are being prepared and submitted for prevention and disposal of obsolete pesticides in Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, and Morocco (an ASP Phase I participating country which the World Bank dropped from the programme before completion of its project), and a regional PIF has been submitted for the Enforcement of registration and post registration capacities for the Prevention and Disposal of Obsolete Pesticides in CILSS countries.

Technical Support at Country Level

1. Responding to requests for assistance from country projects was to be provided mainly in the areas of inventory, environmental risk assessment and safeguarding – TSU support has been given until January 2011 (and some other assistance from non-ASP funds even beyond) and by 2012, 12 core training programmes were implemented; a positive indication was that more consultants were coming from within the Region, but (in the words of the 2012 PIR) capacity to provide environmentally sound disposal technology remained low in the Region;

[7] According to the TSU, a framework was initially developed between FAO and the World Bank procurement specialists, but later abandoned along with any involvement of FAO in the review of tender documents and bids received.

2. In addition to physical inputs, the TSU project document also included the idea of a "Help Desk" for direct country support and continued inputs from the TSU for the preparation of technical guidelines; the Help Desk did not materialize, but assistance with guidelines adaptation was provided beyond the scheduled amount, and the TSU consistently responded to questions and requests for guidance from countries and other organizations;

3. The TSU was also supposed to perform a supervisory and project oversight role regarding ASP country teams: to review final decisions made by the country teams and forward comments to the ASP Programme Coordination Unit and ultimately to the PCU at the World Bank for follow-up action; this system does not appear to have been established due to the conflicting interpretations regarding oversight roles within ASP in general;

4. According to the project document, an important role for the TSU was to liaise with donors or contributing organizations and recipient countries to ensure that there was no duplication of technical inputs, all requirements for technical inputs to countries are met, and rules for procurement of services can be applied by countries: there is not much evidence that TSU has been able to perform this role;

5. TSU M&E were to happen at the frequency two missions per year to each country: the TSU fielded a total of 56 joint supervision and/or additional technical support mission to the participating countries. The TSU developed an M&E framework, but ultimately M&E requirements were defined by and data was gathered in the context of WB supervisory missions – no independent TSU reports detailing achievements, issues, outstanding actions, work-plan for the coming period and lessons learnt (as stipulated in the TSU project document) were produced.

Key Lessons Learned

The Key Lessons Learned are:

1. The project design for the TSU support work to the ASP was deeply flawed. The TSU project document was not a stand-alone project document: core parts of the project logic were borrowed from the ASP programme document – the performance indicator were taken from the overall ASP targets; the TSU was never meant to be a separate project in itself. This resulted in an inconsistent definition of the TSU role. On the one hand, TSU appears to have been given the (limited) role of technical service provider (production of training manuals and guidelines, technical trouble shooting, assistance with tender specifications, etc); on the other hand, TSU was supposed to perform a liaison, monitoring, oversight and coordination that also other ASP partners (in particular, the WB) claimed for themselves.

2. Governance and oversight mechanisms in the overall ASP programme were not clearly defined, and TSU performance and effectiveness suffered as a result. (In particular the relationship between FAO and WB seriously deteriorated to the extent that ASP was no longer working as it was envisaged.) Already a 2008 evaluation report stated that "implementation of the first phase has encountered challenges, particularly relating to the partnership structure, internal and external communication, as well as timely country implementation". Despite this early finding, the actual governance structures in ASP (ASPIC and the Stakeholder Forum) were apparently never formalised or adequately communicated either. The FAO and WB "components" of the ASP programme went their separate ways and worked more or less in isolation from each other.

3. The ASP partners seem to have been unable to commit themselves fully to a spirit of partnership; from the limited evidence available to the evaluators, there were fairly frequent arguments concerning the role of the various partners in the ASP governance/management

set-up as well as their mandates to be fulfilled. Opportunities to come to terms with an unsatisfactory situation (for example, the 2008 evaluation report) apparently went unheeded: a highly visible programme such as ASP would have benefited from senior management intervention – but this unfortunately did not happen in the ASP[8]. By 2010 (in the context of an Implementation Committee/ASPIC meeting) it became obvious that ASP would not continue as a joint programme: the WB announced that future projects would be integrated into the WB's agriculture work programme, and no more have an ASP identity.

4. In sum, the ASP performance (and in consequence, also the TSU support role) fell short of expectations because of a flawed design process, insufficient efforts at reconciling design with reality during implementation, a lack of flexibility on the side of ASP partners to re-define their roles as well as their procedures, and the absence of senior management interest in the performance of what should have been a flagship programme for all concerned agencies.

5. However, there has been an overall benefit of the ASP: FAO has been able to develop guidance and systems which now benefit obsolete pesticide work globally. Many countries now benefit from access to systems such as PSMS, to guidelines on inventory, container management, Environmental Risk Assessment, Storage etc., which were developed and elaborated under ASP. Also, significant advances were made in development of training materials and awareness materials. The ASP also helped to establish models for project design and tools to support implementation that have guided similar projects. In addition, the FAO unit that hosted the TSU has provided follow-up support to several ASP countries after the termination of the ASP.

Key Recommendations

As ASP has ceased to exist and follow-up activities have taken a different shape, this evaluation report has only a few key recommendations, mostly to FAO:

Recommendation 1 Multi-agency projects are by definition more complex than single-donor, single-agency projects. During the design phase of future multi-agency activities, special care therefore needs to be given to the review and consultation process.

Recommendation 2 Likewise, design and implementation shortcomings can under normal circumstances be identified and rectified, for example through a competent M&E system, functioning governance arrangements, and stakeholder workshops. In ASP, although these elements existed, they were not enough to prevent the deterioration of the working relationships. Future projects, especially if they involve multi-agency collaboration, should make sure that the project approach and management set-up is validated not too long after project launch, and throughout implementation.

Recommendation 3 A potential flagship project – such as ASP – needs high-level attention. Although it appears that senior management in all involved institutions were at various stages aware of delays and coordination issues in ASP, there was not enough demonstrated commitment by senior management to keep the project on track. Future projects should design key events where senior management can be briefed on progress and exercise a certain amount of oversight.

[8] The TSU claims that on several occasions attempts were made to generate discussions between FAO senior management (ADG-AG, ADG-TC, DDG) and WB Management - but these attempts were not documented (at least not seen by the evaluation), and produced no results.

1 Evaluation Rationale and Focus

1.1 Background to the Terminal Evaluation

1. The Terminal Evaluation was organized in accordance with the Project Document, which foresaw the launching of an independent Terminal Evaluation. By 2012, most substantive TSU activities had come to an end (very few activities took place after 2010; more detail in main report), so that the evaluation almost resembled an ex-post evaluation. The Terminal Evaluation purpose was defined as to determine progress being made towards achievement of outcomes and to assess the impact that the TSU has made on its stakeholders.

2. The evaluation was conducted in three phases: i) document review of available documentation[9], ii) country visits (June 2012), iii) questionnaire circulation to main stakeholders in country and partner institutions, and soliciting additional information material and additional contacts through email, Skype and telephone. Feedback to stakeholders was provided through debriefing presentations and circulation of preliminary findings.

1.1.1 Purpose of the Terminal Evaluation

3. The Terminal Evaluation had the following specific objectives:

- review the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of project implementation;
- analyse effectiveness of implementation and partnership arrangements;
- identify lessons learned about project design, implementation and management;
- highlight technical achievements and lessons learned;
- assess levels of project accomplishment; and
- synthesize lessons that may help improve the selection, design, and implementation of future GEF activities.

4. One could add that the evaluation also had the aim to document lessons learned so far.

1.1.2 Scope of the Terminal Evaluation

5. The Terminal Evaluation was to assess the project according to internationally accepted evaluation criteria, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In addition, mainstreaming of gender issues was also intended to a criterion for assessment. Within these criteria, the evaluation was to analyse the following features of the programme, as appropriate.

a. Relevance of the initiative to: the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides; the GEF III-POPs Strategy under which the project was approved; ASP countries development priorities and needs for to the sustainable management of the pesticides; FAO Global Goals, Organizational Result A3 and Core Functions.

b. Robustness and realism of the theory of change underpinning the project, including logic of causal relationship between inputs, activities, expected outputs, outcomes and impact (against specific and development objectives) and validity of indicator.

c. Particular attention will be paid to the validity of assumptions and risks as initially identified in the project document and whether unforeseen issues are affecting negatively project implementation and progress towards objectives.

d. Quality and realism of the project's design, including:

[9] This proved difficult, as not many records were readily available within FAO.

- Duration;
- Stakeholder and beneficiary identification.
- Institutional set-up and management arrangements;
- Approach and methodology;

e. Financial resources management, including:
   - Adequacy of budget allocations to achieve outputs and promote outcomes;
   - Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions in matching budget adjustments to implementation needs and project objectives;
   - Rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation.

f. Coordination, Management and implementation:
   - Effectiveness of management, including quality and realism of work plans;
   - Efficiency and effectiveness of operations management;
   - Gaps and delays if any between planned and achieved outputs, the causes and consequences of delays and assessment of any remedial measures taken;
   - Efficiency in producing outputs;
   - Effectiveness of internal monitoring and review processes;
   - Efficiency and effectiveness of coordination and steering bodies, e.g. the ASPIC;
   - Quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO to the project, including the Lead Technical Unit, the Budget Holder and project Task Force.

g. Timeliness and adequacy of resources and inputs made available through co-financing from participating countries and resource partners.

h. Extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and timeliness, and the expected outcomes have been achieved.

i. Use made by the project of FAO's normative products and actual and potential contribution of the project to the normative work of the Organization. In particular, the team will assess the use made by the Programme of the international instruments and FAO Technical Guidelines developed for the obsolete pesticides programme and the implementation of the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, whenever appropriate, as well as of any other relevant methodological and technical document developed by FAO. Equally, the team will identify potential products by the Programme for wider diffusion of lessons learned.

j. Overall performance (cost-effectiveness) of the project/programme: extent to which the initiative has attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives; this will also include the identification of actual and potential positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

k. The catalytic role of the programme in supporting the creation of an enabling environment with a view to achieve sustainable global environmental benefits.

6. Based on the above analysis, the evaluation will draw specific conclusions and formulate recommendations for any necessary further action by Government, FAO and/or other parties to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-up action. The evaluation will draw attention to specific good practices and lessons of interest to other similar activities. Any proposal for further assistance should include specification of major objectives and outputs and indicative inputs required.

1.1.3 Methodology of the Terminal Evaluation

7. Under the overall guidance of the FAO Office of Evaluation:

- The evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms & Standards[10];
- The evaluation will adopt a consultative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. Triangulation of evidence and information gathered will underpin the validation of evidence collected and its analysis and will support conclusions and recommendations.
- The evaluation will make use of the following tools: review of existing reports, semi-structured interviews with key informants, stakeholders and participants; direct observation during field visits. To the maximum possible extent, standardised interview protocols and check-lists etc will be used throughout the evaluation, so as to ensure comparability of findings across countries.
- The evaluation will include the following activities:
  i. desk review of the project document, outputs, monitoring reports (e.g. Project Inception Report, PSC Reports and reports from other relevant meetings; Project Implementation Reports; quarterly, six-monthly progress reports, annual PIRs), and other internal documents including consultant and financial reports;
  ii. A review of specific products including the annual work plans, publications and other materials and reports;
  iii. Interviews with staff and national institutions involved in project implementation including the, other members of the ASPIC as relevant; the Lead Technical Unit and Budget Holder, National coordinator and related national counterparts (the list of key contacts is included as annex 4);
  iv. Phone interviews with project staff in the countries that will not be visited, to canvass their views on achievements, issues and ways forward;

- The evaluation team will visit three of the seven participating countries, namely Morocco, Tanzania and Tunisia in order to capture a varied perspective of the different context in which the programme operates and the specific challenges and progress. The selection criteria included the state of progress, allowing a mix of more and less advanced, location of FAO offices, time and cost considerations, and were agreed by OED, the TSU and the FAO GEF Unit in the Investment Centre Division.
- The team will independently decide which outputs and outcomes to assess in detail, within resources available, after consultation with OED and programme management. The evaluation will adopt a consultative and transparent approach with internal-external stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. Triangulation of evidence and information gathered will underpin the validation of evidence collected and its analysis and will support conclusions and recommendations;
- The evaluation will make use of the following tools: review of existing reports, semi-structured interviews with key informants, stakeholders and participants, supported by check lists and/or interview protocols; direct observation during field visits; surveys and questionnaires; the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework[11]; the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework for assessment of project results[12].

1.1.4 Terminal Evaluation Team

8. The Evaluation Team comprised:

[10] http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards

[11] The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework identifies five different capitals (human, social, natural, financial, and physical), each including different assets. It helps in improving understanding of livelihoods, in particular of the poor. For more information, among others: http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_pdfs/section2.pdf

[12] SWOT is a widely used strategic planning tool, useful also in the assessment of development interventions, to canvass their strengths and weaknesses, as well as future perspectives. It is particularly used in focus groups, but it can be adapted to individual interviews as well.

- Mr Bernd Bultemeier: FAO Evaluation Manager / Team Leader
- Dr Mohamed Abdallahi Ebbe (Ould Babah): Senior Entomologist / Consultant

1.2 Background of ASP

9. The Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) was a strategic partnership of intergovernmental organizations whose development was led by FAO, regional organizations such as NEPAD, non-governmental organizations such as PAN and WWF, the private sector as represented by the pesticide manufacturers' association CropLife International and financial institutions led by the World Bank. A steering committee (ASPIC) was supposed to provide implementation oversight of the ASP. Implementation of the ASP was led by the World Bank as GEF Implementing Agency.

10. The ASP aimed to completely remove all obsolete pesticides, including POPs pesticides, from all African countries in a phased programme lasting 15 years. The ASP also aimed to develop sufficient national capacity in each country to effectively prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides in Africa.

11. The first phase of the ASP (ASP-1) extended over four years and worked with up to 15 countries in two groups to fulfil the objectives of the programme. An initial group of six countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia) were prioritized for early quantification and removal of their obsolete pesticide stockpiles and implementation of a comprehensive programme of measures to strengthen national capacity in the management of pests and pesticides with the objective of preventing further accumulation of obsolete pesticide stocks. In addition, a project in Nigeria was implemented to quantify obsolete pesticide stocks and implement a programme of measures to prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides. These country projects together with their institutional structures that support them constituted the ASP-1 project.

12. The Country Operations (Component 1 of the ASP) were funded by grants by the World Bank directly to the countries. FAO's role in the ASP was as Technical Support Unit (Component 2) providing technical advice to the country teams to support their national execution. These were supported by the Cross Cutting and Monitoring and Evaluation component (Component 3) headed by WWF and PAN, and the Project Coordination component (Component 4), both with World Bank funding.

13. The work programme was implemented in all seven countries listed above. In addition, the TSU launched scoping missions in ten additional countries that meet the eligibility criteria for entry in the ASP. The missions were designed to determine the level of readiness to participate in the ASP in terms of priority needs (i.e. emergency considerations of known stockpiles), political support, and status of obsolete pesticide inventories, among others.

14. Simultaneously, FAO undertook projects with similar objectives outside the ASP in Mozambique and Eritrea.

15. The TSU's overall mandate was to support the Country Operations (ASP Component 1) by:
- Providing technical advice and oversight of ASP implementation at country and programme level
- Providing focused technical support in conjunction with project management units (PMUs) in the implementation and execution of country project components;
- Coordinating appropriate response and ensure timely delivery of technical assistance of partners and donors to countries participating in the ASP; and
- Providing assistance to countries in the drafting of project proposals related to but not covered by the ASP project and mobilize bi-lateral or other donor financing to support these activities.

16. FAO's activity in the ASP-1 terminated at the completion of activities in December 2011. The country projects and programme were not completed at this time and the World Bank has received for further funds from GEF and is now attempting to complete ASP-1.

17. The TSU was funded principally by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with contributions from the Netherlands, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The Project finance amounts to around USD 4 901 930. FAO is both the GEF Agency and the executing agency of the project.

1.2.1 Objectives and Purpose of TSU / ASP

18. The overall ASP was launched with the express objective completely removing all obsolete pesticides, including POPs pesticides, from all African countries in phased programme lasting 15 years.

19. The overall ASP had overall four components: (1) Country operations; (2) Technical support (i.e. the FAO TSU project); (3) Cross-cutting activities; and (4) Project coordination. The FAO project document focused on Component 2 which is the Technical Support Unit for the ASP, but never quite managed to give it a separate identity for the global ASP. The Technical Support Unit (TSU) component was hosted by FAO and was to deliver to country projects the highly technical and specialized expertise required for preparation, design, implementation, supervision and monitoring & evaluation of country level activities outlined under Component 1. This included technical advice requested by the PMUs for preparing and implementing country projects. At the programme level, the TSU was to: establish the procedures and standards for the design and delivery of training; production of technical guidelines for clean-up and prevention operations; assistance in managing technical aspects of procurement and supervision of specialized contractor; advice on linking countries with other specialized agencies and organizations; enhancement of health and safety; assessment of laboratory capacities and oversight of monitoring and evaluation.

20. The type and level of technical support to be provided by the TSU / ASP can be divided into programme and country-specific support. At the program level, the TSU is tasked to (i) technically support data management, training of trainers, prevention and disposal workshops and review international regulations; (ii) provide project oversight and technical support on an as-needed basis; (iii) revise existing FAO technical guidelines on obsolete pesticides, and draft and publish new ones on management of pesticide containers, monitoring, inventory, safeguarding and environmental risk assessment, and disposal tender documents; (iv) consolidate and report on technical data from the countries; and (v) help countries raise funds. At the country level, the TSU is tasked with responding to requests for assistance from country projects and coordinating technical inputs.

21. Technical support was to be provided to the ASP in two areas[13]:

- Country focused technical support related specifically to the execution of the prevention and disposal components of the ASP projects. These inputs will be provided in conjunction with and in support of technical personnel acting as advisors to the country Project Management Units (PMU). The TSU will also coordinate technical inputs to countries from various sources and provide technical oversight of country projects on behalf of the ASP;
- Technical advice and support related to the implementation of the ASP at country and programme level. In addition to support provided directly by the TSU, the TSU may call upon the specific technical expertise from other partners in the ASP to include UNEP Chemicals, UNIDO, Secretariat of the Basel Convention (SBC), CLI and in some instances specialist NGOs to provide specific technical advice.

[13] These are the original outputs foreseen for the TSU / ASP. Apart from the fact that essentially all outputs took much longer to be produced, some were modified or dropped in the course of project implementation.

A. Technical support at Programme level (*outputs indicated in italics*)

22. At the programme level the TSU was to provide technical support in the following areas:

I. Technical assistance:

- Development of a ***data base*** of approved disposal companies and environmental consultants. The organisations included in the data base were pre-qualify for inclusion in any request for bids by the countries for ASP related activities such as training, disposal, specialist waste management inputs, etc. The database was supposed to be completed in collaboration and consultation with other partners such as SBC, UNIDO and UNEP Chemicals;
- ***Development and delivery of training of trainers (TOT) sessions*** to cover the areas of inventory, environmental assessment and safeguarding of pesticides. Training was to be provided in a series of ToT sessions at a sub-regional level for country PMU and technical advisory staff;
- Assistance to the countries in the development of a national M&E plan to be initiated and managed at the country level but designed to meet the requirements set at the programmatic level. ***Data collected at country level will be consolidated at programme level by the TSU*** (see below under Data Management);
- Establishment of a help desk which all countries, including those that are not included in current ASP projects can access in order to obtain advice and guidance on all aspects of the prevention and elimination of obsolete pesticides. The TSU was responsible for ensuring that up-to-date information and guidance is always available for dissemination to countries. A query recording system was to be established to ensure that all ***enquiries are logged*** and actions followed up, and that a record is kept of all queries that can be used to guide future ASP and TSU activities;
- Organisation of an annual lessons learnt workshop. Proceedings to be developed into a ***Technical Report*** by the TSU. All local costs for the workshop to be covered through the TSU budget. All travel and costs associated with country participation to be covered from country budgets;
- Periodic review of international regulations related to the ASP technical components and development of country ***guidance documents/fact sheets*** based on developments in collaboration with operational units of FAO, SBC, UNIDO and UNEP Chemicals;
- Inputs to ASP cross-cutting activities of a technical nature that will benefit all countries.

II. Project oversight:

- Coordination of technical inputs from various contributing organisations to ensure that country needs are effectively met and that high standards of advice which comply with national and international regulatory requirements and with ASP requirements are delivered consistently;
- Assessment of project progress against work plan and objectives. To be completed via a series of country assessment missions throughout the life of the project, programmed to coincide with milestones in project delivery. These missions were also to assess the effectiveness of the working relationship in the country between the stakeholders for the project (national and international) and develop lessons learnt documentation for use in other countries. Findings to be consolidated in a ***progress report***;
- Establishment and maintenance of a "***compliance matrix***" for all ASP related activities. The matrix was to detail all relevant international and national regulations and standards applicable to each individual component of the ASP. Both country and programme level matrices to be updated on an on-going basis with new legislation and best practice being translated into the operational manuals for the TSU and the country projects;
- Production of ***progress and impact indicator*** related to the M&E for disposal and prevention components;
- Response to requests for technical guidance from countries on an as-needed basis.

III. Technical guidelines:

- Revision of existing FAO technical guidelines on obsolete pesticides and publication of updated documents for use by the ASP (***pesticide disposal, pesticide storage, prevention of accumulation***);
- Drafting and publication of new technical guidelines on management of pesticide containers, monitoring of prevention and disposal projects, pesticide inventory, safeguarding of obsolete pesticides and environmental risk assessment;
- Development of ***framework disposal tender documents*** for use by countries issuing tenders for obsolete pesticide disposal. Framework to include clear guidance in review and assessment of tender submissions plus an evaluation matrix to assist in selection of technically competent companies.

IV. Data management:

- ***Consolidation and reporting of all technical data from the countries*** (inventory, safeguarding, disposal, training, prevention initiatives, capacity development, etc). The responsibility for the capture and consolidation of the data to be assigned to a dedicated M&E officer and an information clerk based in the TSU. Data will be collated, reviewed for technical accuracy and forwarded into the programme level Knowledge Management System;
- Consolidation of country level data on key performance indicator (KPIs) collected by the country through the M&E system. Consolidation to result in the ***identification of a series of composite KPIs to indicate project progress in areas such as risk reduction (the level of risk having been established through the inventory and Environmental Risk Assessment process), quantity of stocks repackaged and centralised, quantity of stocks disposed, completion of reviews of legislation, etc***.

V. Fund raising:

- Assistance to countries in the ***drafting of project proposals*** related to but not covered by the ASP project. Examples include projects in areas such as Integrated Pest Management, remediation of pesticide contaminated soils, development of container recycling programmes, development of laboratory capacity, etc. Many of these areas were included in the earlier documents related to the ASP and – according to the TSU / ASP project document – had remained a high priority on the agenda of many of the countries. The TSU will provide support to assist countries to find bi-lateral/alternate donors to support these activities. Support may include development of linkages with other initiatives related to project activities to maximise the impact of the programme. The TSU will work in close collaboration with other ASP partners to maximise the linkages with parallel initiatives;
- The TSU and FAO, in collaboration with the country PMUs will develop a ***strategy for securing local co-financing*** to the ASP. The TSU with the PMU were to meet with donors and prepare proposals to meet the specific needs and interests of donors.

B. Technical support at country level

23. Technical support for the day-to-day execution of country projects was not to be provided by the TSU. The TSU was, however, to have a critical role to play in the three main components of the ASP (Project Preparation, Disposal Activities and Prevention Activities). The details of the role of the TSU at the country level are outlined below:

I. Responding to requests for assistance from country projects

24. The mobilisation of inputs from the TSU to the country projects (in terms of training) was to be subject to the development of detailed work plans by each country PMU. This data was to be consolidated and a mission schedule developed for delivery of the necessary training of trainer inputs in areas of inventory, environmental risk assessment and safeguarding. These three areas are considered as common to all country projects.

25. In addition to the physical inputs above there was seen a need for continued inputs from the TSU for the preparation of technical guidelines. Countries were also free to approach the TSU for advice and guidance at any time through an ASP Help Desk to be managed by the Information Management Clerk.

26. The TSU was to work with the country teams to assist in the development of TOR, work plans, tender selection decisions etc to ensure that all countries meet the requirements of the ASP set at the programme level. The TSU was to review the final decisions made by the country teams and comments will be forwarded to the ASP Programme Coordination Unit. In cases where technical standards were not met, the TSU was to work with the country PMU to resolve the issue. This role emphasised the supervisory and project oversight role of the TSU at the ASP programme level. In the final instance, the TSU reserves the right to issue a "non-compliance" note to the PMU if it finds technical standards are compromised in any way. A system of recording such notices will be maintained at the TSU and presented to the PCU at the World Bank for follow-up action.

II. Coordination of technical inputs

27. According to the TSU / ASP project document, several organizations had expressed a desire to contribute to the ASP by providing technical advice directly to participating countries. Examples include the offer from CLI to fund Technical Advisors for disposal in participating countries and the offer from the Fonds français pour l'environnement mondial (FFEM) to provide financing and technical advice to Mali and Tunisia with a focus on prevention and capacity building activities. An important role for the TSU was foreseen to liaise with donors or contributing organizations and recipient countries to ensure that:

- there is no duplication of technical inputs;
- all requirements for technical inputs to countries are met;
- the expertise offered is appropriately qualified and experienced;
- the standards of the ASP are maintained and;
- rules for procurement of services are able to be applied by countries. (The rules applied will depend on the source of funds and the mechanism for fund disbursement).

28. The TSU will provide impartial oversight and coordination to ensure that all these issues are adequately addressed and that countries, as well as providers of technical advice and services, can approach the TSU for advice, guidance and information.

III. Project oversight and Monitoring and Evaluation

29. The TSU was expected to exercise M&E via a series of programmed missions to each ASP-1 country. Initially, there were to be two missions per year to each country, totalling 12 country missions. The TSU missions will assess the performance against the standards set by the ASP at the programme level. These missions were to the TSU team to complete the following tasks:

- assess the compliance of project activities against the international and national compliance matrix compiled for the ASP at Programme level;
- assess project ***progress against the project work plans*** for the disposal and prevention components and critical time flow analysis prepared at the start of the project;
- review progress and facilitate the ***revision of the work plan*** to reflect any changes in priority that need to be accounted for in further activities;
- assess ***effectiveness of training*** by PMU staff to field operatives;
- facilitate the preparation of the critical ***time flow analysis for the coming reporting period*** (6 months) with emphasis on identification of required consultant inputs and procurement of other critical resources;
- review ***budget utilisation*** and propose revisions based on forecasted costs;
- participation in ***stakeholder meetings*** and reporting of progress;
- random field visits for ***quality assurance*** purposes.

30. The process of monitoring and oversight at the country level was to be considered as a management tool to assist the PMU in the successful implementation and execution of each of the country projects. The PMU was free to call upon the TSU for independent advice and guidance at anytime during the project implementation.

31. Each monitoring and oversight mission was to result in the ***publication of a report detailing achievements, issues, outstanding actions, work-plan for the coming period and lessons learnt*** for adoption by the PMU in the country in question or by the broader ASP.

1.2.2 Funding of TSU / ASP

32. The majority of funds for the ASP were managed through the World Bank. The Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (TSU) project was directly funded by a component of the GEF grant to the ASP and by a grant from the Government of the Netherlands. Some pre-financing for preparatory activities has been provided to FAO by the World Bank, as illustrated in the table below:

Table 1. Funding sources and amounts[14]

Funding source	**Amount (USD)**
GEF allocation	3 256 000
World Bank-DGF	243 958
The Government of the Netherlands)	640 032
FAO (in kind)	761 940
Total project budget	4 901 930

33. The Netherlands project (GCP/INT/959/NET) started in April 2005. It was closely followed by the GEF project in September 2005, with original end dates of May 2008 and September 2009, respectively. Both projects went into no-cost extension to December 2009 for the first project and to December 2011 (later extended to June 2012) for the second one.

2 Assessment According to Evaluation Criteria

34. Where the evaluation ratings applicable are as follows:

1 Highly Satisfactory (HS),
2 Satisfactory (S),
3 Marginally Satisfactory (MS),
4 Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU),
5 Unsatisfactory (U), and
6 Highly Unsatisfactory (HU).

35. Using the standard DAC evaluation criteria, the following aspects are identified:

2.1 Relevance (Problems and Needs)

36. The relevance of a project/programme relates primarily to its design and concerns **the extent to which its stated objectives correctly address the identified problems or real needs**. It needs to be kept under review throughout the life of the project/programme in case changes occur either in the nature of the very problems originally identified, or in the circumstances – whether physical, political,

[14] Another document (Africa Stockpiles Programme Annual Report July 2010 – October 2011) gives a different figure for the WB contribution: "FAO received from the GEF a US$ 3.256 million grant as well as a US$ 646,000 WB DGF Grant to support ASP at both the program and country levels."

economic, social, environmental, institutional or policy – in which the project/programme takes place, necessitating a corresponding change of focus. In other words, relevance concerns the appropriateness of the project design to the problems to be resolved at two points in time: when the project was designed and, at the time of the evaluation.

37. Assessment of ASP under the Relevance criterion is analysed under the following headings:

2.1.1 Consistency with Country Needs and Objectives

38. The relevance of the ASP was undoubted: over more than forty years, all countries of the African continent had accumulated large quantities of pesticides and other chemicals which had become unfit for use or reformulation, in other words, obsolete. The unwanted build-up of such products had occurred due to inadequate stock management, non-distribution to farmers, bans on several pesticides, uncoordinated or inappropriate supply from donor agencies, unsuitable packaging and supplier incentive Programmes. Before that start of the ASP, the amount of publicly-held obsolete pesticides and associated highly contaminated soils stockpiled across the continent of Africa was estimated at 50,000 tonnes.

39. Many of these pesticides include Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), which are chemical substances that persist in the environment, migrate across continents to bio-accumulate through the food chain posing a risk to human and animal health as well as the environment. Of the current 12 chemicals defined as POPs and covered by the requirements of the Stockholm Convention, nine are pesticides. These are aldrin, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene, mirex and toxaphene. Stockpiles of obsolete pesticides are often in a severely deteriorated condition, poorly stored and located close to habitation or water supplies and therefore represent a serious risk to human health, ground and surface water, land use and the environment.

40. The impact is often greatest on the poor who are often exposed to these chemicals during their daily lives with little or no information regarding the risks which they face. Abandoned pesticide stockpiles and dumps are often located in poorer communities where people scavenge for "recyclables" with no awareness of the dangers involved. Most African countries lacked adequate technical, institutional and financial capacity to develop the policy and regulatory conditions necessary to properly manage the clean-up of contaminated wastes/sites, together with the destruction of obsolete stocks of pesticides. Most also lacked the capacity and means to implement sound prevention practices.

41. FAO was an obvious choice to get involved in ASP as the Organization had already in 1994 established a programme on prevention and disposal of obsolete pesticides. This programme primarily focused on Africa and the Near East to raise awareness of the existence of obsolete pesticide stockpiles and the hazards they present; quantify the scale of the problem by supporting national inventories of obsolete pesticides; provide training and guidance to countries wishing to address the problem; and help developing countries to design and implement projects for the prevention and disposal of obsolete pesticides.

2.1.2 Project Design

42. The ASP was intended to be implemented through a rolling programme of projects within a 15 – 20 year programmatic framework. The first phase (ASP-1) was to focus on disposal and prevention activities in the first six countries which had been identified as having significant stockpile problems and which had demonstrated readiness to address them through ratification of a series of relevant international chemical conventions, including the Stockholm Convention. In addition, a pilot project to establish measures to prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides and prepare for the disposal of stocks found in a country was to be implemented in Nigeria. This and other projects implemented through FAO were supposed to provide a model for subsequent projects to be implemented in the ASP. The seven countries initially participating in ASP-1, i.e., Ethiopia, Mali,

Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, had ratified the Stockholm Convention on POPs, and it was expected that follow-on projects targeting some eight additional countries would start operations during ASP-1, to be chosen among: Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Swaziland.

43. ASP ultimately aimed to cover all 53 African countries. In order to achieve this in a reasonable timeframe, the program was to allow flexibility to let new countries enter the programme even if countries in the earlier phases have not completed their programmes, hence the case for overlapping phases. The overall programme was thus structured in four overlapping phases, each phase spanning over 4 to 5 years, for a total of 12-15 years. The risk was recognized, however, that it might not be possible to implement ASP projects in a small number of African countries, or that a number of countries might not feel that this is a national priority.

44. The ASP's set of assumptions about its projected course displayed a good deal of optimism: while the project designers were right to identify the high priority attached to disposal of obsolete pesticides, they seriously underestimated the challenge of bringing a number of institutions and organizations together with significantly different operational styles, and also the potential risks of launching parallel projects in several countries were not explicitly recognized.

2.1.3 Coordination and Oversight Arrangements[15]

45. A more important constraint of the design over-optimism turned out to be the rather vague provisions regarding ASP governance, and the cooperation agreements between the agencies/institutions/organizations involved.

46. In ASP countries, the project typically set up a National Steering Committee (NSC), often chaired by high-ranking officials from relevant ministries, or (as initially in Tanzania) from the Vice President's Office. The first NSC meeting had the authority to approve the PMU (one-year) work plan[16].

47. In addition, a National Stakeholders Forum (NSF) was created as a consultative forum with stakeholders (NGOs, farmers, Government) to provide feedback to the project. However, as the role and mandate of the NSF had not been clearly defined in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), the existence tended to give cause for confusion in certain countries.

48. At the international level, the ASP Stakeholder Forum was to be maintained for the life of ASP-1 subject to available funds, and any pesticide management program/project would be invited to participate. Future meetings of stakeholders will be based on extension of existing meetings in the area of pesticide management; the biannual FAO consultation meetings for pesticide stakeholders were to offer one such opportunity for covering ASP-type project reviews.

49. Finally, the ASP Implementing Committee (ASPIC) was intended as a kind of Steering Committee.

---

[15] Assessing ASP efficiency (and also other areas) was not easy for the Evaluation Team; much of the background information documenting project activities (such as minutes of meetings, requests for administrative actions, etc.) was not available (or delivered late) and made it therefore difficult to assess the efficiency of operations.

[16] It appears that the cost of running these PMUs may have been high in some countries. Again for Tanzania, a 2011 WB Aide-Memoire ominously wrote about ("... the need to reduce associated funding. The mission recommended that project management activities comprise only those actions directly required for overall project management. The mission also highlighted the need to keep total cumulative project management costs below 10% of the total project costs, in accordance with GEF guidelines.")

50. However, already the 2008 ASP evaluation report[17] stated that: "The existing project documents defining the ASP have been prepared as a basis for financing by the GEF and they only cover ASP-1. The link between ASP-1 activities and their complementary activities - perceived as ASP (umbrella) activities - is not clearly described (e.g. FAO-led country projects and the CropLife Safeguarding project).

51. Furthermore, although the predicted governance structures never became operational in ASP-1, the actual governance structures (ASPIC and the Stakeholder Forum) were never formalised or adequately communicated either.

52. As a consequence, the roles and the working relationship of the actual bodies governing ASP-1 have not been clearly defined, nor have the roles of the individual partners in those bodies. In addition the roles and responsibilities of the individual partners in the partnership have been perceived differently by different Partners. Unclear division of roles and responsibilities has among other things resulted in divergence in the FAO Bank collaboration, which in turn has caused tension and has negatively affected the perception of the ASP as a partnership. It has delayed implementation of ASP-1."

53. This seems to describe fairly accurately the constraints that were facing the ASP partners throughout the programme's lifetime: governance and institutional arrangements were not clearly spelled out (especially FAO and the World Bank did not seem to be able to agree on the respective roles – whether FAO had more than a technical support function, and whether the World Bank could aspire to match FAO's technical expertise), and salvage operations to rescue the partnership remained unsuccessful[18].

2.1.4 Gender Mainstreaming

54. The ASP project is relevant to the needs of women and men, and particularly those population groups living in the vicinity of obsolete pesticide dumps – often the poorer strata of society. Gender as such was mentioned only once in the TSU / ASP project document: as an area where FAO on the whole possessed some expertise. As ASP concentrated on technical issues, there was no specific definition of gender outcomes and indicator in the ASP project design. Concerning participation of women in ASP activities, not enough gender-disaggregated data are available to make sound statements.

A rating of: 1 or Highly Satisfactory[19]

2.2 Effectiveness (Achievement of Purpose)

55. The effectiveness criterion, in log-frame terminology, concerns how far the project/programme results were used or their potential benefits were realised – in other words, whether they achieved the project purpose. The key question is: What difference the project/programme made in practice, as measured by how far the intended beneficiaries really benefited from the products or services it made available.

Assessment of ASP under the Effectiveness criterion is analysed under the following headings:

---

[17] The World Bank / ASPIC Independent Evaluation of Design and Initial Implementation of Africa Stockpiles Programme Evaluation Report June 2008 (COWI A/S, Denmark)

[18] Here again, the evaluation was frustrated by the lack of documented evidence concerning the partnership arrangements; it is highly unlikely that these were not discussed frequently between the Programme parties – but the record is scanty.

[19] The rating of Highly Satisfactory is limited to the aspect of Relevance only (as a standard evaluation criterion); the rating for project design would be significantly worse.

2.2.1 A Comprehensive Approach

56. The original intention of the overall programme was to have a second phase (ASP-2) following on to the work done during Phase I, and expanding the programme to additional countries. The results and evaluation of first-phase activities like these were to be used to guide the launch of a second phase in 10 to 15 additional African countries[20]. However, by 2010 it was clear that ASP had no future, and a 2011 gathering (5TH FAO/WHO Joint Meeting on Pesticide Management, and 7th Session of the FAO Panel of Experts on Pesticide Management, 11 – 14 October 2011 Rome) "... acknowledged the difficulties encountered in establishing a new phase of the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP), and expressed its satisfaction that FAO had still been able to start implementing projects in most of the selected countries".

57. While the World Bank was probably not alone in creating administrative delays, many interlocutors referred to a risk-avoidance tendency among WB staff that discounted their partners' risk management systems, and thereby led to procrastination and also a reduction of country ownership[21].

58. As a result on at least two occasions, the TSU took unilateral action against the stated recommendations of World Bank staff or consultants to reduce high risks from obsolete pesticides that had been identified in ASP projects. In Tunisia, FAO undertook to safeguard 50 tons of DDT that had been found in the grounds of a hospital; in Mali the TSU removed and destroyed 70 tons of dieldrin that were found to be leaking in a store in Gao.

2.2.2 Procedural Issues

59. A recurrent complaint by some country officials and FAO staff referred to complex World Bank administrative procedures causing delays in the completion of the activities planned by TSU. This issue was highlighted in the 2008 ASP mid-term evaluation, as well as the 2010 evaluation. In addition, the TSU / ASP's Terminal Report states that "... the TSU was affected with some difficulties related to the delayed start-up of some country projects due to the World Bank procedures" as the reason why the project only ended in 31 December 2011 with no change in the budget, instead of 30 September 2009 as initially planned[22].

60. But World Bank procedures were often quoted also by countries as a factor delaying progress.

61. The World Bank's Country Environmental and Social Assessment are a case in point: CESA is a critical component of all country projects under the ASP umbrella. There is a legal requirement for countries to complete a CESA and Environmental Monitoring Plan (EMP) before funds can be released from the World Bank for the safeguarding and disposal of obsolete stocks. CESA-TOR were developed by TSU in collaboration with World Bank; however, the slow response to the non-objection from the WB has been raised by some countries as a constraint to their activities. (For example, the response of WB for non-objection of CESA-Mali took four months.)

62. In addition, there were delays e.g. in the recruitment of technical advisers on disposal (TADs) via CLI. This was sometimes slower than expected, and led to an increased TSU workload as a

---

[20] A senior agricultural specialist working in the World Bank's Africa Region confirmed in late 2007 that "We look forward to a successful launch of the second phase thereby enlarging the sphere of ASP activities and maximizing impact."

[21] The World Bank has recently acknowledged that some of its procedures have considerably raised the cost of doing business. In this connection, the WB President stated that procedures would be simplified as "the biggest risk is not achieving results".

[22] The 2010 FAO evaluation report was more optimistic: "After some difficulties during the first years due to the World Bank procedures constraints, the projects have made a great progress and achieved impressive results thanks to the flexibility allowed by the Netherlands and GEF projects."

consequence of not having TADs in place in countries. The TSU adjusted its work programme to provide additional support where it was needed. These problems caused delays in the commencement of disposal operations. Efforts to dispose of stocks from South Africa through direct agreement between the country and CLI only began after two years of negotiations and delays.

2.2.3 Capacity-building and Training

63. At the country level, the TSU responded to requests from assistance from country projects on the implementation of the activities related to clean up and disposal, prevention, capacity building activities and country programme management activities.

64. A total of 13 training modules (on, among others, inventory-taking, the use of PSMS, pesticide management and the development of a prevention framework) have been delivered to complement the variety of the guidelines produced. The TSU also provided a series of training of trainers' sessions at the sub-regional level for country PMUs and technical advisor staff which cover areas of inventory, environmental assessment and safeguarding of pesticides.

65. The TSU also provided training of the use of PSMS. The PSMS automates EMTK Volume 1 and part of EMTK Volume 2. The system has also been expanded to cover the registration of pesticides and track distribution of new stocks imported for the control of migratory pests. Further trials and development are planned with the installation of new features such as pop-up help tips. Most countries have been provided with training on the use of PSMS, except South Africa who has expressed no interest in the system due to the particular nature of pesticide supply through the private sector.

66. Overall, based on all of the factors outlined above, this criterion is assessed as:

A rating of: 4 or Marginally Unsatisfactory [23]

2.3 Efficiency (Sound Management & Value-for-Money)

67. The efficiency criterion concerns how well the various activities transformed the available resources into the intended results (sometimes referred to as outputs), in terms of quality, quantity and timeliness. A key question it asks is: "Were things done right"? and thereby, also addresses value-for-money that is whether similar results could have been achieved more by other means at lower cost in the same time.

68. Assessment of ASP under the Efficiency criterion is analysed under the following headings:

2.3.1 Project Management

69. For most of its existence, the Technical Support Component of the ASP was implemented by the Technical Support Unit (TSU) hosted by FAO AGP in Rome. The TSU was staffed by a Coordinator, a Prevention Officer and two support staff and another Technical Officer operating from Pretoria in South Africa. The Rome-based team supported North and West African countries while the Pretoria-based Officer supported Eastern and Southern Africa.

[23] It has to be kept in mind that in this as well as all other ratings, the TSU / ASP project cannot be de-linked from the overall ASP. If the rating was just about the quality of technical advice and support provided, the rating would be better. This is also true in view of the fact that the TSU / ASP project document did not define specific objectives for the TSU: the TSU performance remained intimately linked with the overall ASP achievements.

70. Project management was praised in the 2010 evaluation report as having been "exceptionally efficient and professional. The organizational and managerial skills of the TSU Coordinator and his collaborator as well as their experience and commitment to the project have been an important factor for the progress realized. The TSU team brought considerable technical experience, enthusiasm and commitment to the projects."

71. Similarly, efforts made by staff members of the TSU in the implementation and the management of the projects were judged by the 2010 evaluation to have been very satisfactory. The current evaluation has no reason to doubt this judgment; only the lack of success in improving communications and collaboration among ASP partners somewhat affects the overall positive picture, and also the inconsistent reporting (see below) has brought down the rating to some extent.

2.3.2 Budget Utilization

Table 2. Table D.1. Financing plan for the TSU

	GEF	**Netherlands**	**DGF**
Staff costs	2 083 586	463 700	151 149
Country project inputs	263 500	440 700	62 500
ASP Programme support & TSU Operational costs	724 649	51 968	172 400
Project Servicing Costs	184 307	124 332	23 163
Total	3 256 042	1 080 700	409 212

Table 3. Table D.2. Detailed budget for GEF contribution to the TSU

Budget	**Year 1**	**Year 2**	**Year 3**	**Year 4**	**Total**
Staff Costs					
Salaries					
TSU Coordinator and Chief Technical Advisor	131 250	175 000	175 000	175 000	656 250
TSU Senior Technical Advisor (Elimination)(SAFR)	131 250	175 000	175 000	175 000	656 250
TSU Senior Technical Advisor (Prevention)	0	0	0	0	0
Technical Officer Monitoring and Evaluation	65 000	130 000	130 000	130 000	455 000
Obsolete Pest. T. Field Officer (SAFR)	0	0	0	0	0
Obsolete Pest. T. Field Officer (RAF)	0	0	0	0	0
General Service Programme Administrator	57 384	76 512	76 512	76 512	286 920
General Service Information & Data management	36 063	48 084	48 084	48 084	180 315
Subtotal	420 947	604 596	604 596	604 596	2 234 735
Total Staff Costs	420 947	604 596	604 596	604 596	2 234 735
Consultant (Preparation P2 Projects)	20 000	20 000	0	0	40 000
Consultants (P1 country project inputs)	12 500	10 000	10 000	5 000	37 500
Consultants (Evaluation monitoring)	20 000	5 000	13 000	5 000	43 000
Consultants (Training)	0	10 000	10 000	3 000	23 000
Consultants (Guidelines)	9 000	10 000	10 000	10 000	39 000
Contracts	40 000	35 000	25 000	20 000	120 000
Travel (Experts and consultants)	168 776	138 306	81 720	78 392	467 194
Training	0	0	0	0	0
Equipment					

	Expendable	5 000	5 000	5 000	4 806	19 806
	Non-expendable	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	20 000
General Operating Expenses		7 500	10 000	5 000	5 000	27 500
	Subtotal	287 776	284 306	164 720	136 198	837 000
Support Costs (6%)		42 524	51 175	46 160	44 449	184 307
	Total	751 247	904 077	815 476	785 243	3 256 042
General Overhead Expenses						0
Chargebacks						0
Technical support costs						0
Total Budget		751 247	904 077	815 476	785 243	3 256 042

72. For GCP/INT/979/GFF, staff costs were the highest expenditure item (US$ 2,234,735), followed by consultants, contracts, travel, equipment, and GOE (US$ 837.000). The GEF contribution covered the salaries of key TSU staff (Coordinator, Senior Officer on Pesticide Disposal based in South Africa, and Monitoring and Evaluation consolidation, Technical Support Officer based at FAO HQ and General Service staff)[24]. During the first years of the project disbursements were low as ASP country projects were slow to develop; they then rose gradually during the following years as country project gained momentum.

Table 4. Financial Statement (Trust Funds)

Period from 1997-11 to 2012-12

Activity	Account Description	Budget	Soft Commitment	Hard Commitment	Total Commitments	Actuals	Commitments & Actuals
Funds Received							
TF5G11AA05525 150142 GCP/INT/979/GFF Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) (Project)							
	3001 Contributions Received In Advance	0	0	0	0	-3,256,000	-3,256,000
Totals by Activity (TF5G11AA05525 150142 GCP/INT/979/GFF Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) (Project))		0	0	0	0	-3,256,000	-3,256,000
Total Funds Received		0	0	0	0	-3,256,000	-3,256,000
Expense							
TF5G11AA05525 150142 GCP/INT/979/GFF Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) (Project)							
	5011 Salaries	1,894,291	0	0	0	1,894,291	1,894,291

[24] From April 2009 costs for the three professional posts supported by the GEF contribution to the TSU were co-financed at 50% by a 4-year grant of the European Commission related to "Capacity Building for the implementation of Multi-lateral Environmental Agreements in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries".

Professional						
5012 Salaries	355,777	0	0	0	355,777	355,777
General Service						
5013 Consultants	209,414	0	8,959	8,959	199,737	208,696
5014 Contracts	32,734	0	0	0	32,734	32,734
5020 Locally Contracted Labour	1,066	0	0	0	1,066	1,066
5021 Travel	426,584	0	0	0	426,584	426,584
5023 Training	1,007	0	0	0	1,007	1,007
5024 Expendable Procurement	10,682	0	0	0	10,682	10,682
5025 Non Expendable Procurement	9,647	0	0	0	9,647	9,647
5027 Technical Support Services	15,656	0	0	0	15,656	15,656
5028 General Operating Expenses	76,689	0	0	0	76,689	76,689
5029 Support Costs	183,145	0	0	0	182,565	182,565
5040 General Operating Expenses - external common services	15,756	0	0	0	15,756	15,756
5050 General Operating Expenses - internal common services	3,123	0	0	0	3,123	3,123
Totals by Activity (TF5G11AA05525 150142 GCP/INT/979/GFF Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) (Project))	3,235,571	0	8,959	8,959	3,225,314	3,234,273
Total Expense	3,235,571	0	8,959	8,959	3,225,314	3,234,273
Balance	3,235,571	0	8,959	8,959	-30,686	-21,727

Organization level = FAO TF Activity level = PROJECT Funds Received Account Level = PARENT Expense Account level = PARENT ONLY Organization value = ALL TF Activity value = TF5G11AA05525 Include ODG = NO

73. The financial statement for December 2012 shows a pattern similar to the original budget allocations: only staff costs have gone down somewhat, while expenditure on consultants has gone up.

(Some of the cost increases were due to exchange rate fluctuations between the Euro and US$.) Expenditure on the seven ASP-1 country projects was lower than the original budget estimates due to delays in implementation of the programme at country level. This also allowed for a no-cost extension initially to December 2011 (later June 2012).

2.3.3 Partnerships

74. The overall ASP was conceived as a unique partnership combining the strengths of government, international organizations, private sector, and civil society and bringing them to bear on a clearly-identified problem.

75. The ASP owes its origins to advocacy by the Pesticide Action Network (PAN) UK and Africa and World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The programme was developed as a joint effort to provide a comprehensive solution for the elimination of obsolete pesticides, reduce future accumulations and promote improved handling and safe management techniques and regulations concerning chemical use.

76. Initially, the partnership counted 13 donors (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, GEF and the World Bank's Development Grant Facility and pesticide producers represented by CropLife International).

77. Project management and monitoring activities at country level was to take place through small project management units hosted by the relevant ministry of agriculture or environment to manage the project. Most governments of the ASP-1 countries did establish a Project Management Unit (PMU) within the relevant ministries to coordinate the project, mostly financed by governments. Again in most cases, National Steering Committee (NSC) was formed and chaired by either the Minister of Environment or the Minister of Agriculture or their nominees. The PMUs had the responsibility for the implementation and the management of the country ASP project using TSU technical assistance.

78. At the country level, coordination and partnership seems to have worked mostly in a satisfactory way. The international partnership, however, did not produce the desired results. There seems to have been a clash of organizational cultures particularly between the World Bank and FAO, and especially regarding procedures governing procurement and the organization of the CESA. Some efforts were made in 2008 to improve the relationship: in March, a matrix detailing the respective roles in ASP-1 implementation was completed, and later that year, a joint framework note for ASP-2 was developed by FAO and the WB. However, the matrix did not effectively address the contentious issues: responsibilities for technical, financial and operational procedures remained split across the two organizations.

2.3.4 Government Support

79. Government support to, and ownership of, ASP was uneven. The case of Morocco stands out where the country project was cancelled prematurely in 2010 due to WB dissatisfaction with slow progress made.[25] (This was contested by the Moroccan side, and later events seem to prove them right: the Moroccan Government invested substantial amounts of money in storage sites.) On the other hand, special mention was made in a 2010 evaluation report[26] of Mali where "very satisfactory results with high level of technical and management capacity were obtained".

[25] Aide-memoire December 2009: « i) la clôture du projet au 30 juin 2010, en raison de ses faibles performances et en l'absence de changements drastiques pour renforcer l'organisation et les modes opératoires d'exécution … »

[26] Evaluation Mission Report Netherlands (GCP/INT/959/NL) & GEF (GCP/INT/979/GFF) Contributions to Technical Support Unit (TSU) Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP), February 2010

80. It is obvious that in-country arrangements changed over time, and that personnel and funding issues sometimes affected performance. For example, a 2007 mission noted that "PMU has changed significantly from that reflected in the Operational Manual prepared in March 2006 and as recorded at the time of the signing of the ASP Grant Agreement in December 2006. Key personnel have either left the project completely or are no longer available to focus on day to day implementation of ASP. Furthermore, the official nomination of the PMU coordinator is still pending. Thus the latter is currently handling both his function as the Director of NEMC and the PMU coordinator role. This heavy workload of the coordinator coupled with the lack of a procurement specialist has heavily contributed to the slow implementation of the ASP."

81. However, at least in the countries visited by the mission, it is clear that disposal of obsolete pesticides has remained relatively high on government agendas: even if the original ambitious plans concerning disposal have not been met, activities are continuing and improvements are being made.

2.3.5 Project Reporting and M&E Issues

82. The TSU / ASP project was designed to be well documented project, and in terms of volume of reports produced, this was probably true.

83. However, with the changes happening during project implementation, some of the expected reporting schedules were not maintained. While the six-monthly TSU reports were regularly produced, and monthly partner conference calls concerning TSU activities were held more-or-less regularly until September 2010, reports documenting ASP missions may have been produced, but only a selection was available on the FAO data management system (Field Programme Management Information System – FPMIS).

84. Similarly, mission aide-memoires[27] were probably circulated to all ASP partners, but were not uploaded to FPMIS (and the Evaluation Team had great problems obtaining copies). And although it became clear during project implementation that the original targets would not be met, the progress reports continued to give mostly satisfactory ratings regarding progress made: these ratings were correct at the time they were made as expectations had been scaled down – but compared to the original design, ASP was falling more and more behind schedule.

85. Overall, based on all of the factors outlined above, this criterion is assessed as:

A rating of: 3 or Marginally Satisfactory[28]

2.4 Impact (Achievement of Wider Effects)

86. The term impact (sometimes referred to as outcome), denotes the relationship between the project/programme purpose and overall objectives, that is the extent to which the benefits received by the target beneficiaries had a wider overall effect on larger numbers of people in the sector or region or in the country as a whole. The analysis, which should be both quantitative and qualitative wherever possible, will need to take account of the fact that, at this level, the project/programme will normally be only one of a number of influences contributing to the wider outcome.

87. Assessment of ASP under the Impact criterion is analysed under the following headings:

---

[27] The aide-memoires stemming from joint (WB, FAO and others) supervision mission also provide a hint of FAO's status in these missions: many aide-memoires obtained by the Evaluation Team were still in draft form – the final version was not available from FAO.

[28] For partnerships alone. this rating would be lower. Although there is evidence that efforts were made to improve collaboration and avoid institutional clashes, these were ineffective and seem to have become weaker after 2008.

2.4.1 Increased Capacity for Dealing with Obsolete Pesticides

88. Capacity Building and Training was one of the strong elements of the TSU / ASP performance. A total of 13 training modules (on, among others, inventory-taking, the use of PSMS, pesticide management and the development of a prevention framework) have been delivered to complement the variety of the guidelines produced.

89. The TSU also provided a series of training of trainers' sessions at the sub-regional level for country PMUs and technical advisor staff which cover areas of inventory, environmental assessment and safeguarding of pesticides. The TSU also provided training of the use of PSMS. The PSMS automates EMTK Volume 1 and part of EMTK Volume 2. The system has also been expanded to cover the registration of pesticides and track distribution of new stocks imported for the control of migratory pests. Further trials and development are planned with the installation of new features such as pop-up help tips. Most countries have been provided with training on the use of PSMS, except South Africa who has expressed no interest in the system due to the particular nature of pesticide supply through the private sector.

90. However, going by the documentation available, there was absence of sufficient evidence-based data/information in a standardised format and on a consistent basis that would have demonstrated measurable progress, impact and trends resulting from capacity-building interventions.

2.4.2 Impact in Countries

South Africa

91. South Africa made progress in both the disposal and prevention pesticide management components of the project. A pilot scale collection inventory and safeguarding exercise in the Province of Limpopo was successfully implemented. Based on this exercise, the disposal of pilot project stocks from the Province of Limpopo is underway through a partnership with CropLife International. South Africa has also developed national pesticides management and prevention action plans under the ASP. CESA preparation is underway. South Africa entered into an agreement to establish an industry-led 'booking line' for farmers to hand over stocks prior to detailed inventory. Ultimately the project closed with an estimated 250 tons of obsolete pesticides that had been identified under the ASP and were not disposed of. This was a result of non-response on the part of government combined with delayed project implementation and administrative complexities on the part of the Bank.

Tanzania

92. Following training in the FAO database system (PSMS), inventory data collection has been completed for Tanzania. The project also developed a safeguarding work plan and began the bidding process for safeguarding and disposal. The process of CESA preparation is underway. The project established linkages with IPM programmes, started reviews of pesticide legislation and of the pesticide life-cycle, developed and rolled out a communications strategy. Tanzania has developed national pesticides management and prevention action plans.

93. TSU support to Tanzania was quite diversified compared to some other countries: the EMTK (Environmental Management Toolkit) documents were very much appreciated, and the fact that all six major collection centres were appraised by TSU staff was helpful for planning further actions. In addition, FAO was involved in developing the TOR of the Tanzanian TAD, drafting of a Pesticides Management Framework, and developing a container management strategy.

94. Training on inventory, CESA and safeguarding as well as on project management and PSMS helped to build up a cadre of qualified staff to deal with obsolete pesticides also in the future.

Mali

95. Significant progress has been made in Mali. Data entry to PSMS and data validation has been completed and a complete analysis is available. The project provided training in PSMS and inventory-taking, developed a tender for disposal, completed partial disposal in a parallel activity to the ASP with separately secured funds, which FAO managed, advanced land farming in contaminated sites, established a container management system and completed a pilot project on risk reduction of sites contaminated by pesticides. The CESA preparation has been completed. Mali has also developed national pesticides management and prevention action plans as well as a database and a strategy for the management of pesticides used in Desert Locust control, and created a database of pesticides used in large cotton production areas.

Ethiopia

96. FAO had designed and implemented a series of projects for the prevention and disposal of obsolete pesticides in Ethiopia. The funding for these projects was counted as co-finance for the GEF contribution to the ASP, and the technical aspects of the projects were the model for ASP country projects. Under the ASP, the TSU has been successful in assisting Ethiopia for the inventory of obsolete stock, following training on PSMS. It provided training in the pesticide stock management system (PSMS) and inventory-taking, safeguarded obsolete stockpiles, continued disposal, prepared the bidding process and established a container management system.

97. The CESA process is underway and Ethiopia has developed national pesticides management and prevention action plans. The TSU also provided support for initiating IPM pilot activities. It reviewed the pesticide and biopesticide legislative framework and submitted it to the Government for approval and reviewed national laboratory capacities for the analysis of pesticide residues and the quality control of pesticide products.

Tunisia

98. The obsolete pesticide inventory was completed and validated. The TSU provided training in PSMS, developed training in the creation of an inventory and database on obsolete stocks and provided support to start safeguarding (in parallel to the ASP and with separately secured funds), to complete the bidding process for disposal and to establish a container management system. The development of the CESA has been also completed.

99. With the TSU's assistance, Tunisia has developed national pesticides management and prevention action plans. The project also established linkages with the FAO-IPM programme, conducted a study on IPM status, reviewed pesticide legislation, and began to develop an empty container network. TSU was seen in Tunisia as having been very active, and the training provided was useful for updating the information on the national stock of obsolete pesticides. TSU also helped to provide and install a drum crusher in Sousse (which, however, had remained unused for a longer period of time).

100. However, although PSMS is seen in principle as a good tool, it was not being used due to internet connectivity requirements, and the pesticide guidelines were not widely circulated because only English copies were available.

Morocco

101. An inventory data collection and validation has been completed. The TSU provided training in PSMS and inventory-taking. It provided assistance to develop a database on obsolete pesticides, to plan for safeguarding, to prepare the bidding process for disposal, to establish a container

management system. The CESA preparation was also completed and national pesticides management and prevention action plans have been developed.

102. Morocco has been the only country were the ASP country programme was stopped prematurely (in 2010); and while delays had occurred in implementing the country activities, Moroccan counterparts still expressed amazement as to why such a drastic decision had been taken by the World Bank, while the TSU support was appreciated.

103. The Moroccan commitment to pesticide disposal became more obvious after 2010 when the construction of a storage facility (entirely from Government funds) in Tiznit was initiated; three stores of 1000m2 with a potential capacity of 3 million litres were under advanced construction at the time of the Evaluation Team's visit. (The construction of a 4th store with similar capacity is planned.)

Nigeria

104. The TSU provided training in PSMS and inventory-taking and developed a database on obsolete pesticides. A programmed pilot inventory survey in six states was completed and a comprehensive inventory training was made. The bidding process for the CESA has also started. The TSU also developed a questionnaire on the implementation of the code of conduct, almost completed a review of pesticide legislation and supported the preparation of a national action prevention plan.

General

105. Project performance at country level (where it mattered most) was delayed. Much of the delays seem to stem from procedural issues: while FAO procedures can be slow as well, more often than not the World Bank rules and procedures were being quoted as the main retarding element. Some documents available to the Evaluation Team (i.e. the comments on the 2008 evaluation report) acknowledge the issue; however, it is not clear to the Evaluation Team whether anything had been done about it.

106. When carrying out inventories in the ASP-1 countries, higher quantities of obsolete pesticides were often found than had been expected. Costs of disposal were therefore underestimated in the original projects[29]. FAO is now focused on developing and implementing proposals that, as a first step, will complete the inventory and safeguarding of existing stocks. Parallel to this, the prevention framework and mechanisms are addressed. Once the inventory and safeguarding are complete, an additional project will be developed to dispose of the obsolete stocks. The project is then based on the latest accurate inventory and allows for an estimation of costs for disposal that reflects the actual situation.

107. One aspect that received less attention was prevention of future build-ups. Although some activities were carried out, this appears to be the weakest component of most ASP country projects[30]. (The project document said: "Each country project in ASP-P1 can be considered as consisting of three major components. These can be summarised as the Preparation, Disposal and Prevention components.") Prevention activities should have included strengthening regulatory regimes, management practices, and public awareness and promotion of reduced reliance on pesticides. Some of this was done, but the emphasis clearly was on inventory and disposal – understandable given the delays occurred already in these areas.

108. Overall, based on all of the factors outlined above, this criterion is assessed as:

[29] The TSU maintains that "… based on its own long experience, FAO advised the ASP to plan on 100% increase in estimated inventories for costing purposes. This was not done because insufficient funds were secured which had to be stretched thinly".

[30] The TSU maintains that "FAO insisted that prevention be a component of equal status to disposal in all ASP projects. This advice was overridden by the Bank due to funding constraints".

A rating of: 4 or Marginally Unsatisfactory

2.5 Sustainability (Likely Continuation of Achieved Results)

109. Often the most important criterion, sustainability relates to whether the positive outcomes of the project/programme at purpose level are likely to continue after external funding ends, and also whether its longer-term impact on the wider development process can also be sustained at the level of the sector, region or country.

110. Assessment of ASP under the Sustainability criterion is analysed under the following headings:

2.5.1 Continuing Efforts to Remove Obsolete Pesticides

111. The ASP approach has proved not to be sustainable; with a different mix of personalities and more serious efforts to overcome conflicting organizational cultures, there might have been a chance to keep the partnership going[31].

112. However, even if the ASP model did not work out, lasting efforts have been produced. The capacity for dealing with obsolete pesticides (from stock-taking and monitoring to actual disposal) in many countries has greatly improved, and the fact that several countries have invested significant amounts of their own funding for creating and maintaining obsolete pesticide disposal programmes testifies to the relevance, and also the lasting effects, of the ASP.

113. The tools, guidelines and working methods developed under the ASP remain in use in the development and implementation of similar projects in other countries in Africa as well as other global regions.

2.5.2 Future Initiatives

114. A key factor in the sustainability of the project's achievements is the prevention of re-accumulation of pesticide stocks. The combination of the appropriate institutional and regulatory capacity, the long-term management of pesticides mainstreamed into government-funded systems and increased public awareness should help to ensure this.

115. It is clear that the use of pesticides will not be abandoned in the future and the problem of obsolete pesticides will therefore continue to exist. Although the preventive measures developed under the ASP projects will contribute to reducing the use and accumulation of pesticides, pesticides will continue to be applied and their accumulation cannot be completely avoided. Nevertheless, the ongoing efforts are contributing to minimizing and limiting the risk of future accumulation. In this regard FAO has developed guidance for countries on establishing sustainable mechanisms for managing the routine accumulation of obsolete pesticides, pesticide wastes and empty containers. The work of the TSU is also a reflection of the normative functions of FAO in supporting countries to improve pesticide life cycle management, eliminate risks to people and the environment from pesticides and comply with international standards for pesticide quality and residue limits in food.

116. Overall, based on all of the factors outlined above, this criterion is assessed as:

A rating of: 2 or Satisfactory

[31] Developing partnerships was not made any easier by the rapid fluctuation of World Bank personnel; all-in-all, there have been 8 TTL on the WB side.

3 Main Conclusions

117. The TSU support to the ASP can be seen as a 'qualified success' in terms of its efforts to provide sound technical advice to the ASP; good results towards POPs disposal have been achieved but after long delays. Many of the inefficiencies and conflicting actions seem to be due to inconsistent guidance from programme and project document and unsatisfactory governance structures which did neither clarify the institutional responsibilities nor provide clear definitions concerning the roles of the various parties in the execution of the ASP.

118. Differences on procedure and an almost dysfunctional institutional set-up for the ASP conspired to delay progress on a massive scale. Lines of command were unclear, and differences of opinion among ASP partners frequently remained unresolved.

119. This represented a missed opportunity, since the ASP was a very strategic and high-profile programme that aimed at completely removing all obsolete pesticides, including POPs pesticides, from all African countries in a phased programme lasting 15 years by developing sufficient national capacity in each country to effectively prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides in Africa.

120. The first phase of the ASP (ASP-1) was scheduled to last four years and cover up to 15 countries in two groups. An initial group of six countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia) were prioritized for early quantification and removal of their obsolete pesticide stockpiles and implementation of a comprehensive programme of measures to strengthen national capacity in the management of pests and pesticides with the objective of preventing further accumulation of obsolete pesticide stocks. In addition, a project in Nigeria was implemented to quantify obsolete pesticide stocks and implement a programme of measures to prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides. These country projects together with their institutional structures that support them constituted the ASP-1 project.

121. Country Operations (Component 1 of the ASP) were funded by grants by the World Bank directly to the countries. FAO's role in the ASP was as Technical Support Unit (Component 2) providing technical advice to the country teams to support their national execution. These were supported by the Cross Cutting and Monitoring and Evaluation component (Component 3) headed by WWF and PAN, and the Project Coordination component (Component 4), both with World Bank funding.

122. The work programme was implemented in all seven countries listed above. In addition, the TSU launched scoping missions in ten additional countries that meet the eligibility criteria for entry in the ASP. The missions were designed to determine the level of readiness to participate in the ASP in terms of priority needs (i.e. emergency considerations of known stockpiles), political support, and status of obsolete pesticide inventories, among others.

123. The strength of the TSU work was the preparatory work on country projects for incorporation into the ASP, the coordination and provision of technical assistance to participating countries, and overseeing the standard of technical operations in all ASP related activities. In addition, the TSU provided guidance and the tools to assist countries in implementing their ASP projects including developing capacities in the use of the tools and guidelines where necessary. At the programme level, the TSU established the procedures and standards for the design and delivery of training; production of technical guidelines for clean-up and prevention operations; assistance in managing technical aspects of procurement and supervision of specialized contractor; advice on linking countries with other specialized agencies and organizations; enhancement of health and safety; assessment of laboratory capacities and oversight of monitoring and evaluation.

124. At the country level, the TSU provided technical and specialized expertise required for preparation, design, implementation, supervision and monitoring & evaluation of country level activities (clean up and disposal activities, prevention activities, capacity building activities and

country programme management activities). Training modules (on, among others, inventory-taking, the use of PSMS[32], pesticide management and the development of a prevention framework) have been delivered to complement the variety of the guidelines produced.

125. In addition, the TSU supported (with WB inputs) ASP countries in setting up and adopting an M&E system for project implementation at country level, which was initiated and made operational in all ASP-1 countries, as well as being circulated in FAO for use by other projects. Online user help and technical guidance were developed in support of the system, which will be put to use in new countries.

126. However, differences of opinion regarding applicable rules and procedures led to massive delays and sometimes stoppages of work at country level. In the eyes of the TSU implementers, particularly WB rules and procedures seemed not to take account of the specific needs of ASP countries, and also did not seem to do justice to the urgency of some situations. This refers both to procedures governing the Country Environmental and Social Assessments (CESA)[33] as well as WB procurement activities, and also the development of country grants[34].

127. This also affected the recruitment of longer-term technical experts (called technical advisers on disposal/TADs) by another ASP partner (CLI), which in turn increased TSU's workload as the in-country support to be provided by the TADs was often lacking due to late recruitment. (The in-country experts were not to be hired by FAO due to a perceived conflict of interest.) By the time the evaluation mission took place, some disposal operations had been concluded, others were under implementation, but several countries still has to initiate the disposal operations. (This sometimes also had to do with the fact that in several ASP-1 countries, higher quantities than expected of obsolete pesticides were found, requiring an adjustment of budgets and timeframes.)

128. The TSU organized a large number joint supervision missions (mostly with WB, CropLife International and WWF) as well as dedicated technical support missions; the final number of missions was higher than foreseen in the original TSU work programme and budget.

4 Key Lessons Learned

129. The Key Lessons Learned are:

1. The project design for the TSU support work to the ASP was deeply flawed. The TSU project document was not a stand-alone project document: core parts of the project logic were borrowed from the ASP programme document – the performance indicator were taken from the overall ASP targets; the TSU was never meant to be a separate project in itself. This resulted in an inconsistent definition of the TSU role. On the one hand, TSU appears to have been given the (limited) role of technical service provider (production of training manuals and guidelines, technical trouble shooting, assistance with tender specifications, etc); on the other hand, TSU was supposed to perform a liaison, monitoring, oversight and coordination that also other ASP partners (in particular, the WB) claimed for themselves.

[32] FAO's pesticide database system.

[33] CESAs were governed by WB safeguard provisions, which are meant to ensure that Bank operations do no harm to people and the environment. However, the WB procedures turned out to be more time-consuming (and in TSU eyes, also more cumbersome) than expected. The perceived difference was that the stockpiles were an existing danger and needed an urgent response, while the WB procedures seemed to focus on an overall minimization of risks, without factoring in the time dimension.

[34] TSU felt sidelined by the WB in the development and implementation of country grants; formally perhaps correct as this was WB's mandate under ASP Component 1, but it affected TSU's ability to play its role as a full-fledged partner.

2. Governance and oversight mechanisms in the overall ASP programme were not clearly defined, and TSU performance and effectiveness suffered as a result. (In particular the relationship between FAO and WB seriously deteriorated to the extent that ASP was no longer working as it was envisaged.) Already a 2008 evaluation report stated that "implementation of the first phase has encountered challenges, particularly relating to the partnership structure, internal and external communication, as well as timely country implementation". Despite this early finding, the actual governance structures in ASP (ASPIC and the Stakeholder Forum) were apparently never formalised or adequately communicated either. The FAO and WB "components" of the ASP programme went their separate ways and worked more or less in isolation from each other.

3. The ASP partners seem to have been unable to commit themselves fully to a spirit of partnership; from the limited evidence available to the evaluators, there were fairly frequent arguments concerning the role of the various partners in the ASP governance/management set-up as well as their mandates to be fulfilled. Opportunities to come to terms with an unsatisfactory situation (for example, the 2008 evaluation report) apparently went unheeded: a highly visible programme such as ASP would have benefited from senior management intervention – but this unfortunately did not happen in the ASP. By 2010 (in the context of an Implementation Committee/ASPIC meeting) it became obvious that ASP would not continue as a joint programme: the WB announced that future projects would be integrated into the WB's agriculture work programme, and no more have an ASP identity.

4. In sum, the ASP performance (and in consequence, also the TSU support role) fell short of expectations because of a flawed design process, insufficient efforts at reconciling design with reality during implementation, a lack of flexibility on the side of ASP partners to re-define their roles as well as their procedures, and the absence of senior management interest in the performance of what should have been a flagship programme for all concerned agencies.

5 Key Recommendations

130. As ASP has ceased to exist and follow-up activities have taken a different shape, this evaluation report has only a few key recommendations, mostly to FAO:

1. Multi-agency projects are by definition more complex than single-donor, single-agency projects. During the design phase of future multi-agency activities, special care therefore needs to be given to the review and consultation process.

2. Likewise, design and implementation shortcomings can under normal circumstances be identified and rectified, for example through a competent M&E system, functioning governance arrangements, and stakeholder workshops. In ASP, although these elements existed, they were not enough to prevent the deterioration of the working relationships. Future projects, especially if they involve multi-agency collaboration, should make sure that the project approach and management set-up is validated not too long after project launch, and throughout implementation.

3. A potential flagship project – such as ASP – needs high-level attention. Although it appears that senior management in all involved institutions were at various stages aware of delays and coordination issues in ASP, there was not enough demonstrated commitment by senior management to keep the project on track. Future projects should design key events where senior management can be briefed on progress and exercise a certain amount of oversight.

Annexes

Annex 1, Terms of Reference of the Terminal Evaluation
Annex 2, Terminal Evaluation Team – Profiles
Annex 3, Itinerary and List of People Met
Annex 4, Evaluation Instruments (copies of questionnaires)
Annex 5, List of Documents Reviewed

Annex 1. Terms of Reference of the Terminal Evaluation

1. Background of the Initiative

1.1 Programme overview

1. The Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP) was a strategic partnership of intergovernmental organizations led by FAO, regional organizations such as NEPAD, non-governmental organizations such as WWF, the private sector as represented by the pesticide manufacturers' association CropLife International and financial institutions led by the World Bank. A steering committee (ASPIC) provides implementation oversight of the ASP.

2. The ASP aimed to completely remove all obsolete pesticides, including POPs pesticides, from all African countries in a phased programme lasting 15 years. The ASP also aimed to develop sufficient national capacity in each country to effectively prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides in Africa.

3. The first phase of the ASP (ASP-P1) extended over four years and worked with up to 15 countries in two groups to fulfil the objectives of the programme. An initial group of six countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia) were prioritized for early quantification and removal of their obsolete pesticide stockpiles and implementation of a comprehensive programme of measures to strengthen national capacity in the management of pests and pesticides with the objective of preventing further accumulation of obsolete pesticide stocks. In addition, a project in Nigeria was implemented to quantify obsolete pesticide stocks and implement a programme of measures to prevent future accumulation of obsolete pesticides. These country projects together with their institutional structures that support them constituted the ASP-P1 project.

4. The Country Operations (Component 1 of the ASP) were funded by grants by the World Bank directly to the countries. FAO's role in the ASP was as Technical Support Unit (Component 2) providing technical advice to the country teams to support their national execution. These were supported by the Cross Cutting and Monitoring and Evaluation component (Component 3) headed by WWF and PAN, and the Project Coordination component (Component 4), both with World Bank funding.

5. The work programme was implemented in all seven countries listed above. In addition, the TSU launched scoping missions in ten additional countries that meet the eligibility criteria for entry in the ASP. The missions were designed to determine the level of readiness to participate in the ASP in terms of priority needs (i.e. emergency considerations of known stockpiles), political support, and status of obsolete pesticide inventories, among others.

6. Simultaneously, FAO undertook projects with similar objectives outside the ASP in Mozambique and Eritrea.

7. The TSU's overall mandate was to support the Country Operations (ASP Component 1) by:

- Providing technical advice and oversight of ASP implementation at country and programme level
- Providing focused technical support in conjunction with project management units (PMUs) in the implementation and execution of country project components;
- Coordinating appropriate response and ensure timely delivery of technical and financial assistance of partners and donors to countries participating in the ASP; and
- Providing assistance to countries in the drafting of project proposals related to but not covered by the ASP project and mobilize bi-lateral or other donor financing to support these activities.

8. FAO's activity in the ASP-P1 terminated at the completion of activities in December 2011. The country projects and programme were not completed at this time and the World Bank has received for further funds from GEF and is now attempting to complete ASP-P1.

9. The TSU was funded principally by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with contributions from the Netherlands, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The Project finance amounts to around USD 4 901 930. FAO is both the GEF Agency and the executing agency of the project.

Funding sources and amounts

Funding source	Amount (USD)
GEF allocation	3 256 000
World Bank-DGF	243 958
The Government of the Netherlands)	640 032
FAO (in kind)	761 940
Total project budget	4 901 930

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

10. In accordance with the Project Document, an independent Terminal Evaluation will be undertaken at the end of the project implementation. The Terminal Evaluation will determine progress being made towards achievement of outcomes and will assess the impact that the TSU made on its stakeholders. It will, inter alia:

- review the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of project implementation;
- analyse effectiveness of implementation and partnership arrangements;
- identify lessons learned about project design, implementation and management;
- highlight technical achievements and lessons learned;
- assess and levels of project accomplishment; and
- synthesize lessons that may help improve the selection, design, and implementation of future GEF activities

11. The Terms of Reference for this Terminal Evaluation were prepared in close consultation with FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) and the FAO GEF Coordination unit within FAO Investment Centre (TCID) in accordance with the evaluation policies and procedures of FAO and the GEF.. The objective of this terminal evaluation is to evaluate FAO's delivery of Technical Support as described in Component 2 of the ASP. It is not to evaluate the whole of the ASP.

12. The Terminal Evaluation is planned to take place in the period 25 May to 29 June 2012; this will allow the operational closure of the project before 30 June 2012.

3. Scope of the Evaluation

13. The evaluation will critically assess the programme through internationally accepted evaluation criteria, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In addition, mainstreaming of gender issues will also be a criterion for assessment. Within these criteria, the evaluation will analyse the following features of the programme, as appropriate.

a. Relevance of the initiative to: the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides; the GEF III-POPs Strategy under which the project was approved; ASP

countries development priorities and needs for to the sustainable management of the pesticides; FAO Global Goals, Organizational Result A3 and Core Functions[35];

b. Robustness and realism of the theory of change underpinning the project, including logic of causal relationship between inputs, activities, expected outputs, outcomes and impact (against specific and development objectives) and validity of indicator.
c. Particular attention will be paid to the validity of assumptions and risks as initially identified in the project document and whether unforeseen issues are affecting negatively project implementation and progress towards objectives.
d. Quality and realism of the project's design, including:
   - Duration;
   - Stakeholder and beneficiary identification.
   - Institutional set-up and management arrangements;
   - Approach and methodology;

e. Financial resources management, including:
   - Adequacy of budget allocations to achieve outputs and promote outcomes;
   - Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions in matching budget adjustments to implementation needs and project objectives;
   - Rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation.

f. Coordination, Management and implementation:
   - Effectiveness of management, including quality and realism of work plans;
   - Efficiency and effectiveness of operations management;
   - Gaps and delays if any between planned and achieved outputs, the causes and consequences of delays and assessment of any remedial measures taken;
   - Efficiency in producing outputs;
   - Effectiveness of internal monitoring and review processes;
   - Efficiency and effectiveness of coordination and steering bodies, e.g. the ASPIC;
   - Quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO to the project, including the Lead Technical Unit, the Budget Holder and project Task Force.

g. Timeliness and adequacy of resources and inputs made available through co-financing from participating countries and resource partners.
h. Extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and timeliness, and the expected outcomes have been achieved. The key outputs and outcomes from the project document for the evaluation to assess are listed in Annex 3.
i. Use made by the project of FAO's normative products and actual and potential contribution of the project to the normative work of the Organization. In particular, the team will assess the use made by the Programme of the international instruments and FAO Technical Guidelines developed for the obsolete pesticides programme and the implementation of the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides , whenever appropriate, as well as of any other relevant methodological and technical document developed by FAO. Equally, the team will identify potential products by the Programme for wider diffusion of lessons learned.
j. Overall performance (cost-effectiveness) of the project/programme: extent to which the initiative has attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives; this will also include the identification of actual and potential positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended[36].

[35] See Annex 2 of this TOR

[36] In assessing project results, the evaluation will seek to determine the extent of achievement and shortcomings in reaching project objectives as stated in the project appraisal document. In assessing project performance, the focus will be on outcomes. Project impact will be identified to the extent that available evidence exists.

k. The catalytic role of the programme in supporting the creation of an enabling environment with a view to achieve sustainable global environmental benefits.

14. Based on the above analysis, the evaluation will draw specific conclusions and formulate recommendations for any necessary further action by Government, FAO and/or other parties to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-up action. The evaluation will draw attention to specific good practices and lessons of interest to other similar activities. Any proposal for further assistance should include specification of major objectives and outputs and indicative inputs required.

4. Evaluation methodology

15. The evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms & Standards[37].

16. The evaluation will adopt a consultative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. Triangulation of evidence and information gathered will underpin the validation of evidence collected and its analysis and will support conclusions and recommendations.

17. The evaluation will make use of the following tools: review of existing reports, semi-structured interviews with key informants, stakeholders and participants; direct observation during field visits. To the maximum possible extent, standardised interview protocols and check-lists etc will be used throughout the evaluation, so as to ensure comparability of findings across countries.

18. The evaluation will include the following activities:

i. A desk review of the project document, outputs, monitoring reports (e.g. Project inception Report, PSC Reports and reports from other relevant meetings; Project implementation Reports; quarterly, six-monthly progress reports, annual PIRs), and other internal documents including consultant and financial reports;
ii. A review of specific products including the annual work plans, publications and other materials and reports;
iii. Interviews with staff and national institutions involved in project implementation including the, other members of the ASPIC as relevant; the Lead Technical Unit and Budget Holder, National coordinator and related national counterparts (the list of key contacts is included as annex 4);
iv. Phone interviews with project staff in the countries that will not be visited, to canvass their views on achievements, issues and ways forward;

19. The evaluation team will visit three of the seven participating countries, namely Morocco, Tanzania and Tunisia in order to capture a varied perspective of the different context in which the programme operates and the specific challenges and progress. The selection criteria included the state of progress, allowing a mix of more and less advanced, location of FAO offices, time and cost considerations, and were agreed by OED, the TSU and the FAO GEF Unit in the Investment Centre Division.

20. The team will independently decide which outputs and outcomes to assess in detail, within resources available, after consultation with OED and programme management.

[37] http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards; both GEF and FAO evaluation units are members of UNEG and subscribe to its Norms and Standards

5. Consultation process

21. The evaluation team will maintain close liaison with the FAO Office of Evaluation, FAO offices at country level and the TSU as appropriate, and all key stakeholders. Although the mission is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of the Government, the donor or FAO.

22. At the end of the mission, the team will present its preliminary conclusions and recommendations to the LTU, FAO-GEF Unit and OED in Rome.

23. The Terms of Reference of the evaluation and the final draft report were circulated among key stakeholders before finalisation; comments and suggestions will be incorporated as deemed appropriate by the evaluation team.

6. The Evaluation Report

24. The evaluation team will agree on the outline of the report early in the evaluation process. The annotated outline Report Structure included in Annex I to the evaluation Terms of Reference can be modified by the evaluation team, as long as the key contents are maintained in the report and the flow of information and analysis is coherent and clear.

25. The report will be prepared in English, with numbered paragraphs. Translations in other languages of the Organization, if required, will be FAO's responsibility.

26. The evaluation report will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation issues, questions and criteria listed in the TOR. It will include an executive summary. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the report when considered important to complement the main report.

27. The recommendations will be addressed to the different stakeholders and prioritized: they will be evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable.

28. The team leader bears responsibility for submitting the final draft report to OED within 4 weeks from the conclusion of the mission, which will provide comments within one week. The revised report will be circulated to other FAO stakeholders, who within two additional weeks will submit to the team comments and suggestions that the team will include as appropriate in the final report within one week.

29. Annexes to the evaluation report will include, but are not limited to:

- Terms of reference for the evaluation;
- Profile of team members;
- List of documents reviewed
- List of institutions and stakeholders met during the evaluation process;[38]
- Itinerary of the evaluation team mission;
- Data collection instruments (e.g. copies of questionnaires, surveys – if applicable)

Ratings

[38] The team will decide whether to report the full name and/or the function of the people who were interviewed in this list.

30. In order to facilitate comparison with routine reporting to GEF and contribute to the GEF programme leaning process (IWLearn), the evaluation will rate the success of the project on the GEF six-point scale system: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S), Marginally Satisfactory (MS), Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), and Highly Unsatisfactory (HU).

31. Each of the items listed below should be rated separately, with comments and then an overall rating given.

- Achievement of objectives
- Attainment of outputs and activities
- Progress towards meeting GEF-4 focal area priorities/objectives
- Cost-effectiveness
- Impact
- Risk and Risk management[39]
- Sustainability[40]
- Stakeholder participation
- Country ownership
- Implementation approach
- Financial planning
- Replicability
- Monitoring and evaluation.

7. Composition of the evaluation team

32. Mission members will have had no previous direct involvement in the formulation, implementation or backstopping of the initiative. All will sign the Declaration of Interest form of the FAO Office of Evaluation.

33. The Evaluation Team is responsible for conducting the evaluation and applying the methodology. All team members, including the Team Leader, will participate in briefing and debriefing meetings, discussions, field visits, and will contribute to the evaluation with written inputs.

34. The Evaluation Team is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government or of FAO. An evaluation report is not subject to technical clearance by FAO although OED is responsible for ensuring conformity of the evaluation report with standards for project/programme evaluation in FAO.

35. The evaluation team will comprise the following skill mix:

- Demonstrated experience in the evaluation of large/complex, regional technical assistance projects;
- Demonstrated experience in pesticide management.

36. In so far as possible, the team will be regionally balanced. It will tentatively be composed as follows:

- Team leader with extensive experience in the evaluation of regional development programmes in the agriculture sector;

[39] Financial risks, socio-political risks, institutional framework and governance risks, and environmental risks.

[40] Sustainability will be assessed in terms of Likelihood: Likely (L): There are no risks affecting this dimension of sustainability. Moderately Likely (ML). There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability. Moderately Unlikely (MU): There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability Unlikely (U): There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability

- Agriculture Specialist with experience in crop protection, including pesticide removal.

37. All team members will have a University Degree and a minimum of 15 years of professional experience, or equivalent level of competence, in their respective areas of specialization. Team members will be fluent in English, and have an understanding of French. (Knowledge of Arabic is desirable.) Individual Terms of Reference will be developed referring to this TOR, upon recruitment of each team member

8. Evaluation timetable

38. The time-table is still being developed in consultation with prospective team members. Number of days allocated to team members will vary according to responsibility

Evaluation time table

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
				25-May Rome Briefing (1 Day DSA paid by project	26-May Travel MAOB to Nouakchott (Paid by COAG)	27-May Free day
28-May Desk work	29-May Desk work	30-May Desk work	31-May Desk work	01-Jun Desk work	02-Jun Desk work	03-Jun **MAOB** travel Mauretania to Morocco (paid by project) **BB** travel Rome to Morocco
04-Jun Morocco Evaluation	05-Jun Morocco Evaluation	06-Jun Morocco Evaluation	07-Jun Morocco Evaluation	08-Jun Morocco Evaluation	09-Jun Travel to Tunisia (paid by project)	10-Jun Desk work
11-Jun Tunisia Evaluation	12-Jun Tunisia Evaluation	13-Jun Tunisia Evaluation	14-Jun Tunisia Evaluation	15-Jun Tunisia Evaluation	16-Jun Report Writing	17-Jun Report Writing - Travel to Rome (paid by Government)
18-Jun DLCC	19-Jun DLCC	20-Jun DLCC	21-Jun DLCC	22-Jun Interim Briefing	23-Jun Travel to Tanzania (paid by project)	24-Jun Desk work
25-Jun Tanzania Evaluation	26-Jun Tanzania Evaluation	27-Jun Tanzania Evaluation	28-Jun Tanzania Evaluation - Flight to Rome (paid by project)	29-Jun Debriefing Rome	30-Jun Deadline for Operational Closure of the Project - **MAOB** Flight Rome-Tunisia-Mauretania (paid by Government)	01-Jul

Annexes to the TOR

Annex A, Annotated Report Outline
Annex B, FAO Global Goals, Strategic Objectives and Organization results
Annex C, Log frame elements for component 2 of the Africa Stockpile Programme phase 1 with the outputs of component 2 highlighted
Other Annexes: Project documents, progress reports; Technical reports and BTOR; Budget revisions
Annex D, Key contacts to be interviewed in the consultation

A. Annotated project evaluation report outline

- The evaluation team can modify the structure of the report, as long as the key contents are maintained in the report and the flow of information and analysis is coherent and clear.
- The report should be presented with numbered chapters and paragraphs; the length of a project/programme evaluation reports should be 15-18,000 words, excluding executive summary and annexes.

Acronyms

- When an abbreviation is used for the first time in the text, it should be explained in full; it will be included in the list of acronyms when it is used repeatedly within the report.

Executive Summary

- The Executive Summary should:
  - *Be in length approximately 10-15% of the main report, excluding annexes;*
  - *Provide key information on the evaluation process and methodology;*
  - *Illustrate key findings and conclusions;*
  - *List all recommendations: this will facilitate the drafting of the FAO Management Response to the evaluation.*[41]

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and purposes of the evaluation

This section will include:

- the purpose of the evaluation, as stated in the Terms of Reference;
- project/programme title, starting and closing dates, initial and current total budget;
- dates of implementation of the evaluation.

It will also mention that Annex I of the evaluation report is the evaluation Terms of Reference.

1.2 Methodology of the evaluation

This section will comprise a description of the methodology and tools used and evaluation criteria that were applied by the evaluation. This should also note any limitations incurred in applying the methodology by the evaluation team.

2. Context of the project/programme

This section will include a description of the developmental context relevant to the project/programme (global/regional/national as appropriate) including major challenges in the area of the intervention, political and legislative issues, etc.

It will also describe the process by which the project/programme was identified and developed and cite other related UN (including FAO) and bilateral interventions if relevant.

3. Concept and relevance

[41] The Management Response is the written reply by FAO to the evaluation; it illustrates acceptance or justified partial acceptance or rejection of recommendations, including actions, responsibilities and time plan for their implementation.

3.1 Design

Programmes and projects are built on assumptions on how and why they are supposed to achieve the agreed objectives through the selected strategy; this set of assumptions constitutes the programme theory or 'theory of change' and can be explicit (e.g. in a logical framework matrix)[42] or implicit in a project/programme document.

This section will include a short description of the project/programme theory of change, of its objectives and assumptions and will analyse critically:

- The appropriateness of stated development goals and outcomes (immediate objectives);
- The causal relationship between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes (immediate objectives) and impact (development objectives);
- The relevance and appropriateness of indicator;
- The validity of assumptions and risks.

This section will also critically assess:

- The project/programme's institutional set-up and management arrangements;
- The adequacy of the time-frame for implementation;
- The adequacy of resources from all parties and appropriateness of budget allocations to achieve intended results;
- The adequacy of the methodology of implementation to achieve intended results;
- The quality of the stakeholders' and beneficiaries identification.

3.2 Relevance

This section will analyse the extent to which the project/programme's objectives and strategy were consistent with country's expressed requirements and policies, with beneficiaries' needs, and other major aid programmes, at the time of approval and at the time of the evaluation.

There will also be an analysis of the degree to which the project/programme corresponds to priorities in the FAO Country Programming Framework.

4. Implementation

4.1 Budget and Expenditure

This section will contain the analysis of project/programme financial resources and management, including:

- Efficiency in production of outputs;
- Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions in matching required budget adjustments to implementation needs and project/programme objectives; and
- Assessment of rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation, compared to the initial plan.

4.2 Project/programme Management

[42] Logical framework matrix, if present, should be reproduced as an Annex to the report.

This section will analyse the performance of the management function, including:

- effectiveness and efficiency of operations management, both within the project/programme and by FAO including timeliness, quality, reasons for delays and assessment of remedial measures taken if any;
- effectiveness of strategic decision-making by project/programme management;
- realism of annual work-plans;
- efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring system and internal evaluation processes;
- elaboration and implementation of an exit strategy;.
- role and effectiveness of institutional set-up, including steering bodies;

4.3 Technical Backstopping

This section will analyse the extent, timeliness and quality of technical backstopping the project/programme received from involved units in FAO, at all levels (HQ, regional, sub-regional and country offices).

4.4 Government support

This section will analyse government's commitment and support to the project/programme, in particular:

- Financial and human resources made available for project/programme operations;
- Uptake of outputs and outcomes through policy or investment for upscaling;

5. Results and contribution to stated objectives[43]

5.1 Outputs and outcomes

This section will critically analyse the project/programme outputs: ideally, the evaluation team should directly assess all of these, but this is not always feasible due to time and resources constraints. Thus, the detailed analysis should be done on a representative sample of outputs that were assessed directly, while a complete list of outputs prepared by the project/programme team should be included as annex. If appropriate, the section will also include an analysis of gaps and delays and their causes and consequences.

Further, the section will critically analyse to what extent expected outcomes (specific/ immediate objectives) were achieved, or are likely to be achieved during the project/programme life's time. It will also identify and analyse the main factor influencing their achievement and the contributions of the various stakeholders to them.

5.2 Gender issues

This section will analyse if and how the project/programme mainstreamed gender issues. The assessment will cover:

- Analysis of how gender issues were reflected in objectives, design, identification of beneficiaries and implementation;
- Analysis of how gender relations and equality and processes of women's inclusion were and are likely to be affected by the initiative;
- Extent to which gender issues were taken into account in project/programme management.

[43] The term 'results' includes outputs, outcomes and impact.

5.3 Capacity development

The evaluation will assess

- the extent and quality of project/programme work in capacity development of beneficiaries;
- the perspectives for institutional uptake and mainstreaming of the newly acquired capacities, or diffusion beyond the beneficiaries or the project/programme.

5.4 Sustainability

This section will assess the prospects for long-term use of outputs and outcomes, from an institutional, social, technical and economic perspective. If applicable, there will also be an analysis of environmental sustainability (maintenance and/or regeneration of the natural resource base).

5.5 Impact

This section will assess the current and foreseeable positive and negative impacts produced as a result of the project/programme, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

It will assess the actual or potential contribution of the project/programme to the planned development objective and to FAO's Strategic Objectives, Core Functions and Organizational Results.[44]

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions need to be substantiated by findings consistent with data collected and methodology, and represent insights into identification and/ or solutions of important problems or issues. They may address specific evaluation questions raised in the Terms of Reference and should provide a clear basis for the recommendations which follow.

The Conclusions will synthesise the main findings from the preceding sections: main achievements, major weaknesses and gaps in implementation, factor affecting strengths and weaknesses, prospects for follow-up, any emerging issues. It will consolidate the assessment of various aspects to judge the extent to which the project/programme has attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives. Considerations about relevance, costs, implementation strategy and quantity and quality of outputs and outcomes should be brought to bear on the aggregate assessment.

The section will include an assessment of FAO's role as implementing/ executing agency and the quality of the feedback loop between the project/programme and FAO's normative role, namely:

- actual use by the project/programme of relevant FAO's normative products (databases, publications, methodologies, etc.);
- actual and potential contribution of project/programme outputs and outcomes to FAO's normative work.

Recommendations should be firmly based on evidence and analysis, be relevant and realistic, with priorities for action made clear. They can tackle strategic, thematic or operational issues. Recommendations concerned with on-going activities should be presented separately from those relating to follow-up once the project/programme is terminated.

[44] See Annex 2 of the TOR

Each recommendation should each be introduced by the rationale for it; alternatively, it should be referenced to the paragraphs in the report to which it is linked.

Each recommendation should be clearly addressed to the appropriate party(ies), i.e. the Government, the resource partner, FAO at different levels (HQ, regional, sub-regional, national) and the project/programme management. Responsibilities and the time frame for their implementation should be stated, to the extent possible.

Although it is not possible to identify a 'correct' number of recommendations in an evaluation report, the evaluation team should consider that each recommendation must receive a response.

7. Lessons Learned

Not all evaluations generate lessons. Lessons should only be drawn if they represent contributions to general knowledge.

Where this is the case, the evaluation will identify lessons and good practices on substantive, methodological or procedural issues, which could be relevant to the design, implementation and evaluation of similar projects or programmes. Such lessons/practices must have been innovative, demonstrated success, had an impact, and be replicable.

B. Global Goals of FAO Member States, FAO Strategic Objectives, Organizational Results and Core Functions 2010-19

Box 1. Global Goals of FAO Member States

a) Reduction of the absolute number of people suffering from hunger, progressively ensuring a world in which all people at all times have sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life;
b) Elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all with increased food production, enhanced rural development and sustainable livelihoods;
c) Sustainable management and utilisation of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources, for the benefit of present and future generations.

Box 2. FAO Strategic Objectives and Organizational Results

Code	Title	Lead Unit
A	Sustainable intensification of crop production	AG
A01	Policies and strategies on sustainable crop production intensification and diversification at national and regional levels	AGP
A02	Risks from outbreaks of transboundary plant pests and diseases are sustainably reduced at national, regional and global levels	AGP
A03	Risks from pesticides are sustainably reduced at national, regional and global levels	AGP
A04	Effective policies and enabled capacities for a better management of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) including seed systems at the national and regional levels	AGP
B	Increased sustainable livestock production	AG
B01	The livestock sector effectively and efficiently contributes to food security, poverty alleviation and economic development	AGA
B02	Reduced animal disease and associated human health risks	AGA
B03	Better management of natural resources, including animal genetic resources, in livestock production	AGA
B04	Policy and practice for guiding the livestock sector are based on timely and reliable information	AGA
C	Sustainable management and use of fisheries and aquaculture resources	FI
C01	Members and other stakeholders have improved formulation of policies and standards that facilitate the implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) and other international instruments, as well as response to emerging issues	FI
C02	Governance of fisheries and aquaculture has improved through the establishment or strengthening of national and regional institutions, including RFBs	FIE
C03	More effective management of marine and inland capture fisheries by FAO Members and other stakeholders has contributed to the improved state of fisheries resources, ecosystems and their sustainable use	FIM
C04	Members and other stakeholders have benefited from increased production of fish and fish products from sustainable expansion and intensification of aquaculture	FIM
C05	Operation of fisheries, including the use of vessels and fishing gear, is made safer, more technically and socio-economically efficient, environmentally-friendly and compliant with rules at all levels	FII
C06	Members and other stakeholders have achieved more responsible post-harvest utilization and trade of fisheries and aquaculture products, including more predictable and harmonized market access requirements	FII

D	Improved quality and safety of food at all stages of the food chain	AG
D01	New and revised internationally agreed standards and recommendations for food safety and quality that serve as the reference for international harmonization	AGN
D02	Institutional, policy and legal frameworks for food safety/quality management that support an integrated food chain approach	AGN
D03	National/regional authorities are effectively designing and implementing programmes of food safety and quality management and control, according to international norms	AGN
D04	Countries establish effective programmes to promote improved adherence of food producers/businesses to international recommendations on good practices in food safety and quality at all stages of the food chain, and conformity with market requirements	AGN
E	Sustainable management of forests and trees	FO
E01	Policy and practice affecting forests and forestry are based on timely and reliable information	FOM
E02	Policy and practice affecting forests and forestry are reinforced by international cooperation and debate	FOE
E03	Institutions governing forests are strengthened and decision-making improved, including involvement of forest stakeholders in the development of forest policies and legislation, thereby enhancing an enabling environment for investment in forestry and forest industries. Forestry is better integrated into national development plans and processes, considering interfaces between forests and other land uses	FOE
E04	Sustainable management of forests and trees is more broadly adopted, leading to reductions in deforestation and forest degradation and increased contributions of forests and trees to improve livelihoods and to contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation	FOM
E05	Social and economic values and livelihood benefits of forests and trees are enhanced, and markets for forest products and services contribute to making forestry a more economically-viable land-use option	FOE
E06	Environmental values of forests, trees outside forests and forestry are better realized; strategies for conservation of forest biodiversity and genetic resources, climate change mitigation and adaptation, rehabilitation of degraded lands, and water and wildlife management are effectively implemented	FOM
F	Sustainable management of land, water and genetic resources and improved responses to global environmental challenges affecting food and agriculture	NR
F01	Countries promoting and developing sustainable land management	NRL
F02	Countries address water scarcity in agriculture and strengthen their capacities to improve water productivity of agricultural systems at national and river-basin levels including transboundary water systems	NRL
F03	Policies and programmes are strengthened at national, regional and international levels to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity for food and agriculture and the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources	NRD
F04	An international framework is developed and countries' capacities are reinforced for responsible governance of access to, and secure and equitable tenure of land and its interface with other natural resources, with particular emphasis on its contribution to rural development	NRC
F05	Countries have strengthened capacities to address emerging environmental challenges, such as climate change and bioenergy	NRC
F06	Improved access to and sharing of knowledge for natural resource management	OEK
G	Enabling environment for markets to improve livelihoods and rural development	ES
G01	Appropriate analysis, policies and services enable small producers to improve competitiveness, diversify into new enterprises, increase value addition and meet market requirements	
G02	Rural employment creation, access to land and income diversification are integrated into agricultural and rural development policies, programmes and partnerships	ESW

G03	National and regional policies, regulations and institutions enhance the developmental and poverty reduction impacts of agribusiness and agro-industries	
G04	Countries have increased awareness of and capacity to analyse developments in international agricultural markets, trade policies and trade rules to identify trade opportunities and to formulate appropriate and effective pro-poor trade policies and strategies	EST
H	Improved food security and better nutrition	ES
H01	Countries and other stakeholders have strengthened capacity to formulate and implement coherent policies and programmes that address the root causes of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition	ESA
H02	Member countries and other stakeholders strengthen food security governance through the triple-track approach and the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security	ESA
H03	Strengthened capacity of member countries and other stakeholders to address specific nutrition concerns in food and agriculture	AGN
H04	Strengthened capacity of member countries and other stakeholders to generate, manage, analyse and access data and statistics for improved food security and better nutrition	ESS
H05	Member countries and other stakeholders have better access to FAO analysis and information products and services on food security, agriculture and nutrition, and strengthened own capacity to exchange knowledge	ESA
I	Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural threats and emergencies	TC
I01	Countries' vulnerability to crisis, threats and emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions	TCE
I02	Countries and partners respond more effectively to crises and emergencies with food and agriculture-related interventions	TCE
I03	Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development	TCE
K	Gender equity in access to resources, goods, services and decision-making in the rural areas	ES
K01	Rural gender equality is incorporated into UN policies and joint programmes for food security, agriculture and rural development	ESW
K02	Governments develop enhanced capacities to incorporate gender and social equality issues in agriculture, food security and rural development programmes, projects and policies using sex-disaggregated statistics, other relevant information and resources	ESW
K03	Governments are formulating gender-sensitive, inclusive and participatory policies in agriculture and rural development	ESW
K04	FAO management and staff have demonstrated commitment and capacity to address gender dimensions in their work	ESW
L	Increased and more effective public and private investment in agriculture and rural development	TC
L01	Greater inclusion of food and sustainable agriculture and rural development investment strategies and policies into national and regional development plans and frameworks	TCI
L02	Improved public and private sector organisations' capacity to plan, implement and enhance the sustainability of food and agriculture and rural development investment operations	TCI
L03	Quality assured public/private sector investment programmes, in line with national priorities and requirements, developed and financed	TCI

Box 3. FAO Core Functions

a	Monitoring and assessment of long-term and medium-term trends and perspectives

b	Assembly and provision of information, knowledge and statistics
c	Development of international instruments, norms and standards
d	Policy and strategy options and advice
e	Technical support to promote technology transfer and build capacity
f	Advocacy and communication
g	Inter-disciplinarity and innovation
h	Partnerships and alliances

C. Key outputs and outcomes from the log-frame

The key outputs and outcomes from the log-frame for component 2 (TSU) for the evaluation to assess are listed below; however the evaluation team should feel free to explore in detail other specific outputs and outcomes[45].

Output from each Component:	Output Indicator:	Project reports:	(from Outputs to Objective)
2. Technical support to country level activities implementation 2.1 Preparation of Technical Guidelines, Standard Bidding Specifications, Training Programmes 2.2 Specialized Technical Input into Country Project Supervision, Implementation Support and Monitoring	2.1 Preparation of Technical Guidelines, Standard Bidding Documents, Training Programmes; 2.2 Use of guidelines by Country Projects and feed back on their usefulness; Quality index of Technical Supervision, Implementation Support and Monitoring; 2.4 Timely and relevant reporting by Technical Support Unit.	2.1 Guidelines and documents 2.2 Supervision and monitoring reports, procurement monitoring, EMPs approved, reports on bilateral programs, reports on technical advice given, reports on small country/ multi-country programs.	Good technical team in place and maintained through programme; Adoption and maintenance of international standards Availability of training capacity; Adequate resources for intensive technical supervision of program Buy-in to ASP by other donors; Maintenance of capacity.

Project Components/Sub-components:	Inputs: (budget for each component)	Project reports:	(from Components to Outputs)

[45] A narrative of the overall ASP objectives and the role of the TSU is appended below the logframe

2. Technical assistance to country level activities 2.1 Preparation of Technical Guidelines • Develop standard specifications for bidding documents for selection of technical assistance/project manager, and for clean-up and disposal contracts • Design core training plans and guidelines • Establish a resource base of expertise 2.2 Country Project Technical Implementation Support and Monitoring • Technical support and monitoring missions to countries • Assistance in identifying and short-listing personnel (expert roster) and contractor • Technical procurement review of technical assistance/project manager selection and clean up and disposal contractor selection • Review and monitor implementation of country Environmental Management Plans • Technical guidance for training and monitoring training programs	4.0	TSU's Quarterly and annual progress reports Technical guidelines and specifications for bidding documents published. Training guidelines Data base of expertise operational Mission reports Technical notes Consolidated reports (quarterly, annual) on country programs (using country-level M&E data and reports, and own TA reports.	Same as above (from Outputs to Objectives) Coordination of activities between TSU, CCAME and Countries is effective

ASP programme objectives

The overall objective of the ASP programme was to Clean up and dispose of currently stockpiled obsolete POPs pesticides in up to 7 African countries and contribute to implementation of Stockholm Convention; Implement prevention measures to ensure stockpiling and large-scale obsolescence of

pesticides does not recur. This was to be achieved through Country Operations (Component 1 of the ASP) which would entail:

a) Country cleanup and disposal activities:
   Inventories of obsolete stocks and contaminated sites, Environmental Assessments and Environmental Management Plans, Safeguarding and Disposal and risk reduction of contaminated sites.
b) Prevention:
   strengthening of pesticide management through improvement of pesticide registration, licensing, enforcement of import controls, stock management, waste management, and formulation of effective procurement strategies, as well as promotion of alternatives to chemical pesticides through improvement of pest control strategies with particular attention to IPM for agriculture. Prevention activities will also include communications and awareness-raising and training for pesticide users and farmers to encourage safe pesticide handling and alternative pest control.
c) Capacity Building:
   to be determined based on assessed needs but could include to a limited extent enhancements to laboratory capacity
d) Country Project management
   the establishment of national Project Management Units for the smooth running of the project.

TSU project objectives

Specific objectives of the TSU under component 2 of the ASP are to:

i. Provide technical advice and oversight of ASP implementation at country and programme level;
ii. Assist countries in project implementation (i.e. their activities under Component 1 described above) through the participation in joint supervision missions with other ASP partners and assess work plans and budget allocations based on FAO experience of project implementation;
iii. Provide programmatic technical guidance to the 7 Phase 1 ASP countries through development of guidelines and systems; and
iv. Make preparations for Phase 2 of the ASP through country evaluation missions.

The objective of this terminal evaluation is to evaluate FAO's delivery of Technical Support as described in component 2 of the ASP. It is not to evaluate the whole of the ASP.

TSU Project components/outcomes

The detailed components and outcomes are shown in the Project document in section 4.3. A summary is shown below.

Technical support at Programme level (outputs indicated in italics)

At the programme level the TSU was expected to provide technical support in the following areas:

i. Technical assistance:

- Development of a ***data base*** of approved disposal companies and environmental consultants.;
- ***Development and delivery of training of trainers (TOT) sessions*** to cover the areas of inventory, environmental assessment and safeguarding of pesticides.
- Assistance to the countries in the development of a national M&E plan to be initiated and managed at the country level but which will be designed to meet the requirements set at the programmatic level. ***Data collected at country level will be consolidated at programme level by the TSU*** (see below under Data Management);
- Establishment of a help desk which all countries, including those that are not included in current ASP projects can access in order to obtain advice and guidance on all aspects of the prevention and elimination of obsolete pesticides.;

- Organisation of an annual lessons learnt workshop. Proceedings to be developed into a ***Technical Report*** by the TSU.;
- Periodic review of international regulations related to the ASP technical components and development of country ***guidance documents/fact sheets***;
- Inputs to ASP cross cutting activities of a technical nature that will benefit all countries

ii. Project oversight:

- Coordination of technical inputs from various contributing organisations;
- Assessment of project progress against work plan and objectives.
- Establishment and maintenance of a "***compliance matrix***" for all ASP related activities.
- Production of ***progress and impact indicator*** related to the M&E for disposal and prevention components;
- Response to requests for technical guidance from countries on an as-needed basis.

iii. Technical guidelines:

- Revision of existing FAO technical guidelines on obsolete pesticides and publication of updated documents for use by the ASP (***pesticide disposal, pesticide storage, prevention of accumulation***);
- Drafting and publication of new technical guidelines on management of pesticide containers, monitoring of prevention and disposal projects, pesticide inventory, safeguarding of obsolete pesticides and environmental risk assessment;
- Development of ***framework disposal tender documents*** for use by countries issuing tenders for obsolete pesticide disposal.

iv. Data management:

- Consolidation and reporting of all technical data from the countries

v. Fund raising:

- Assistance to countries in the ***drafting of project proposals*** related to but not covered by the ASP project.
- The TSU and FAO, in collaboration with the country PMUs will develop a ***strategy for securing local co-financing*** to the ASP.

Technical support at country level

It is to be noted that technical support for the day-to-day execution of the country projects will not be provided by the TSU. The day to day support was to be provided by country project Technical advisors. The TSU provided support to these advisors through training programmes and guidance. The TSU will, however, have a critical role to play in the three main components of the ASP (Project Preparation, Disposal Activities and Prevention Activities). The details of the role of the TSU at the country level are outlined below:

i. Responding to requests for assistance from country projects

The mobilisation of inputs from the TSU to the country projects for training and advice and support for developing TOR for consultant and contract inputs.

ii. Coordination of technical inputs

The TSU will be to liaise with donors or contributing organizations and recipient countries to ensure that:

- there is no duplication of technical inputs;
- all requirements for technical inputs to countries are met;
- the expertise offered is appropriately qualified and experienced;
- the standards of the ASP are maintained and;

- rules for procurement of services are able to be applied by countries. (The rules applied will depend on the source of funds and the mechanism for fund disbursement).

The TSU will provide impartial oversight and coordination to ensure that all these issues are adequately addressed and that countries, as well as providers of technical advice and services, can approach the TSU for advice, guidance and information.

iii. Project oversight and Monitoring and Evaluation

The TSU will assess the country level activities to ensure that they are executed to the required standards set at the programme level.

TSU execution and management structure

ASP-P1 consists of three global programme components consisting of a Technical Support Unit (TSU) hosted by FAO and provision of technical support to all country projects and to the ASP funded by GCP/INT/979/GFF; a Cross Cutting Activities Management Entity (CCAME) hosted by WWF; and a Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) for the ASP proposed to be hosted by the World Bank. These units lend support to the Country Operations Project that includes establishment of a Project Management Unit (PMU) to implement the full range of disposal, clean up and prevention activities to achieve the Project objectives. Each country project in ASP-P1 consists of four major components: Project Management, Capacity Building, Disposal and Prevention.

D. List of Contacts

Country	Name	Current Institution	Location	Role in ASP	Email 1
Ethiopia	Fikre Markos	MOA	Addis Abeba	Chair of National Steering Committee	fikrem2001@yahoo.com
Ethiopia	Shimelis Hassen	MOA	Addis Abeba	NPC	shimelishassen@yahoo.com
Ethiopia	Alemayhu Wolday	MOA	Addis Abeba	Project Prevention Focal Point	alemaworke@yahoo.com
Mali	Demba Sidibe	MOE?	Bamako	NPC	demba.sidibe@pasp-mali.org
Mali	Mamadou Camara	MOA	Bamako	Prevention Officer	mamadou.camara@pasp-mali
Mali	Cheick Hamallah Sylla		Bamako	PMU	cheikh.sylla@pasp-mali.org
Mali					
Morocco	Mekki Chouibani	ONSSA	Rabat	NPC	mekki.chouibani9@gmail.com
Morocco	Ahmed Jaafari	ONSSA	Rabat	PMU staff	ahmedjaafari@yahoo.fr
Morocco	Dr. Berrada Jouad	ONSSA	Rabat	Director ONSSA	jaouad.berrada@gmail.com
Nigeria	Theodore Nwaokwe	Environment	Abuja	NPC	tmnwaokwe@yahoo.com
Tanzania	Bonaventura Baya	NEMC	Dar es Salaam	Chair of National Steering Committee	bbaya@hotmail.com
Tanzania	Samuel Msangi	NEMC	Dar es Salaam	NPC	ssmsangi57@yahoo.com
Tanzania	Gasana Damian	MoA	Dar es Salaam	Prevention Officer	gasanadamian@yahoo.com
Tanzania	Dr. Francisca F Katagira	MoA	Dar es Salaam	Director Plant Protection	fkatagira2002@yahoo.com
Tunisia	Walid Dhouibi	Banque Mondiale-Bureau de Tunis	Tunis	NPC (previous)	wdhouibi@worldbank.org
Tunisia	Hassine Ben Salah		Tunis	NPC since 2008/9	hassinebensalah@yahoo.fr
Tunisia	Jobrane Grami		Tunis	Director	grami_jobrane@yahoo.fr
South Africa	Jonathan Maluta Mudzunga	National Dept of Ag in SA	Pretoria ?	NPC	MalutaM@nda.agric.za
ASPIC memb	Alaya Peled	World Bank	Washington	Secretary of Project Coordination Unit (Project analyst)	apeled@worldbank.org
ASPIC memb	Angela Mwandia	WWF	Nairobi	Focal point at WWF	AMwandia@wwfearpo.org
ASPIC memb	Eloise Tourni	Consultant	Athens	Former Focal point at PAN UK	eloiset@gmail.com
ASPIC memb	Joan Nielsen	COWI		Technical Advisor Disposal for Morocco and Mali	jmn@cowi.dk
ASPIC memb	Keith Jones	Croplife International	Singapore	Focal Point at Crop Life	keith@croplife.org

Annex 2. Terminal Evaluation Team – Profiles

Bernd Bultemeier (Team Leader): Evaluation Officer with FAO since 1990; Socio-Economist

Dr Mohamed Abdallahi Ebbe (Ould Babah): Senior Entomologist/Consultant; Head of Desert Locust Centre Mauretania

Annex 3. Itinerary and List of People Met

FAO Headquarters – Rome
TSU :
1. Mr. Mark Davis, TSU Coordinator (FAO/TSU)
2. Mr. Mohamed Ammati, Technical officer Prevention (FAO/TSU)
3. Mr. Richard Thompson, (AGPM)
4. Mr. Kevin Helps Technical officer Prevention (FAO/TSU) by SKYPE
5. Ms Chiu, Grazia (AGPM)
6. Ms Kedjour, Desiree (AGPM

GEF:
1. Ms. Barbara Cooney, FAO GEF Coordinator (TCID)

Tunisia:
1. Mr Jobrane Grami coordinateur du PASP-P1 TUNISIE
2. Walid Dhouibi, Spécialiste en passation des marches Banque Mondiale EX-coordinateur du PASP
3. M. Hassine Ben Salah consultant national du Projet
4. M. Bouzid Nasraoui, Directeur général de la protection et du contrôle de la qualité des produits agricoles (DGPCQPA, MA),
5. M. JEMMAZI Adel, Ingénieur en chef, entomologiste-Production & Protection intégrée
6. M. Hammadi Dekhil, Ingénieur General, Directeur Classe Exceptionnelle du Contrôle Environnemental des produits
7. Ms. ZOUHRA Swalhia Ingénieur Chef Service Control environnemental
8. M.Laajimi Jawhar chef de la station regionale de Sousse
9. M.Mohamed Nejib Elhandouss inventoriste à Sousse

Bureau sous-régional de la FAO pour l'Afrique du Nord :
1. M.Benoit Horemans Directeur du Bureau sous- régional de la FAO pour l'Afrique du Nord
2. M.Ahmed BOUGACHA Assistant du Directeur Régional pour l'Afrique du Nord

United Republic of Tanzania

1.	M.RUNYORO, MR GERALD TUSIME	ASSISTANT FAOR (PROGRAMME)
2.	Ms AJ GLAUBER	WORLD BANK
3.	M. AZIZ LAGNAOUI	WORLD BANK
4.	M. TOBIAS VON PLATEN	WORLD BANK
5.	MS.VERUSCHKA SCHMIDT	WORLD BANK
6.	M.DINESH ARYAL	WORLD BANK
7.	M.SAMWEL S. MSANGI	NEMC
8.	DR. ROBERT NTAKAMULENGA	NEMC
9.	M.GASANA RWABUFIGIRI	MAFSC
10.	M.ALFRED E. MSOKWA	NEMC
11.	M.KAMUGENYI P. LUTEGANYA	NEMC
12.	M.ARNOLD C. KISIRAGA	NEMC
13.	M.SADIQ SANGAWE	NEMC
14.	M.WANJARA K. JANDWA	NEMC
15.	M.PENDO KUNDYA	NEMC
16.	M.MWL ANTHONY	NEMC
17.	M.HALPAN CHALAMILA	Agricultural Cooperative in Morogoro

Morocco

	Name	Institution
1.	M.MOHAMED EL BELKACEMI	ONSSA
2.	M. MOHAMED AMAL RAHEL	ONSSA
3.	M.MOHAMED AKCHATI	ONSSA

4.	MS.MARIAM EL AKEL	ONSSA
5.	M.ABDERRAHIM ALOUI	ONSSA
6.	M.AHMED JAAFARI	ONSSA
7.	M.DRISS DAHHANE	ONSSA
8.	M.MEKKI CHOUIBANI	ONSSA/NEPPO
9.	MS.BTISSAM AMEUR	DELM/MS
10.	MS.AMAL LEMSSIOUI	DSPR/DE
11.	M.AZZEDINE DAAIF	DCCP/DE, FEM focal point
12.	M.SAID GHAOUT	CNLA/AGADIR
13.	M.SAID LAGNAOUI	CNLA/AGADIR
14.	M.HASSAN COURANI	CNLA/AGADIR
15.	M.RASHID KHALOUANI	CNLA/AGADIR
16.	M.HASSAN ELMIGDAR	CNLA/AGADIR
17.	BAIDILLAYEV ALMAS	Kazakh trainee at CNLA/AGADIR

Annex 4. Evaluation Instruments (copies of questionnaires)

Questionnaire for the Evaluation of the Project: FAO Technical Support Unit (TSU) to Phase 1 of the Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP-P1), GCP/INT/979/GFF

Dear Colleague,

You may know that the Technical Support Unit to Phase 1 of the Africa Stockpiles Programme was launched in late 2005 in order to provide technical advice and oversight of ASP implementation at country and programme level, provide technical support in conjunction with project management units (PMUs) in the implementation and execution of country project components, coordinate response and ensure timely delivery of technical assistance of partners and donors to countries participating in the ASP, and provide assistance to countries in the drafting of project proposals related to the ASP Programme and mobilize bilateral or other donor financing to support these activities.

The TSU Project is currently being evaluated as part of a final stock-taking exercise, in order to provide ASP donors (and in particular GEF), participating countries and FAO with an independent and objective assessment of the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the TSU component of the ASP. The Mission is carried out by the independent Evaluation Office of FAO; all replies with be treated on a strictly confidential basis. (The summary TOR for the evaluation are attached.)

The Evaluation Team consists of Mr Bernd Bultemeier, FAO Evaluation Officer, and Mr Mohamed Abdellahi Ebbe, Independent Consultant, Mauritania.

We have tried to keep the questionnaire relatively short; it should take not more than 15 minutes to complete – but please feel free to make any other comments that you think may be relevant for the Evaluation Team.

It would be appreciated if you could return the questionnaire by 5 July in order to allow the Evaluation Team time to finalize their report in July. The Evaluation may also contact you directly via email, telephone or Skype so as to clarify some points relating to you country or institution. (Please keep in mind that the evaluation is focused on the performance of the TSU, and does not evaluate the ASP as a whole.)

Please send your replies to bernd.bultemeier@fao.org.

With many thanks in advance for your collaboration and with best regards.

Bernd Bultemeier, Evaluation Officer
Mohamed Abdellahi Ebbe, Independent Consultant

FAO-OED

Name: _____ Date: _____

Position/Organization: _____

Country :_____ Tel: _____ Skype: _____
Email: _____

1. In your opinion, what have been the main positive features of the Technical Support Unit work related to your country/your institution within the framework of the Africa Stockpiles Programme?

2. Which objectives of TSU work do you consider particularly important for your country/institution? Kindly explain where you feel the TSU could have been more active, and in where you feel the TSU did particularly well.

Objective	Comments
Technical support (e.g. data base of approved disposal companies and environmental consultants, training of trainers (TOT) sessions, assistance to countries in the development of a national M&E plan, prevention strategies)	

Objective	Comments
Project oversight (e.g. coordination of technical inputs, assessment of project progress) Provision of tools (e.g. Pesticide Stock Management System, Project progress monitoring tool)	
Technical guidelines (e.g. monitoring of prevention and disposal projects, pesticide inventory, safeguarding of obsolete pesticides and environmental risk assessment, development of tender documents and their technical specifications)	
Data management (e.g. consolidation and reporting of technical data regarding inventory, safeguarding, disposal, training, prevention initiatives, capacity development, etc)	
Fund raising (e.g. assistance to countries in the drafting of complementary of follow-up project proposals)	

3. ASP has been a collaborative effort involving several partners (internationally, e.g. FAO, World Bank, CropLife, African Union/NEPAD, WWF , Pesticide Action Network-UK and PAN-Africa; within countries, normally ministries of agriculture and institutions dealing with health and environment). In your opinion, have the institutional arrangements within ASP been adequate?

3a At the international level?

3b Within countries?

4. ASP was – among others – designed to promote dissemination of experience gained among neighbouring countries. In your opinion, has collaboration on pesticide management increased among the participating ASP countries?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

   Please explain:

5. Has the work of the TSU contributed to significant changes in pesticide management (especially disposal) in participating countries? Please describe:

6. For ASP stakeholders within countries: Kindly tell us (in a few words) about the status of obsolete pesticide disposal in your country.

7. Please give below any other comments on the TSU, including suggestions for future activities.

Annex 5. List of Documents Reviewed

Evaluation Reports:
The World Bank / ASPIC Independent Evaluation of Design and Initial Implementation of Africa Stockpiles Programme Evaluation Report June 2008 (COWI A/S, Denmark)
Evaluation Mission Report Netherlands (GCP/INT/959/NL) & GEF (GCP/INT/979/GFF) Contributions to Technical Support Unit (TSU) Africa Stockpiles Programme (ASP), February 2010

Documents downloaded from FAO's FPMIS (Field Programme Management Information System)

Documents received from ASP partners (WWF, WB)

General Background Information downloaded from Internet (ASP website was hardly functional any more in 2011).