

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE ON THE EVALUATION OF THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE 2005

A. Overall Response to the Evaluation

1. Management accepts, with some caveats all of the recommendations of the evaluation of the response by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. Management also notes that the report is well written, structured and organized and provides valuable lessons and recommendations for future emergency responses to earthquakes and many other sudden onset natural disasters.
2. Management welcomes the evaluation's overall judgement that FAO's earthquake relief and rehabilitation programme was well-designed, efficient and relevant. As the evaluation report correctly highlights, the programme was adjusted at various occasions to better reflect the evolving needs on the ground. Donors of the FAO earthquake response were particularly receptive to changes in the project design, and they were ready to adjust interventions to better reflect the needs of communities as identified in improved needs assessments.
3. Management notes that the fact that the evaluation took place three years after the earthquake left only very limited opportunity to build upon the findings and recommendations and introduce changes to ongoing programme activities, with the exception of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency-funded (Sida) Livelihoods Project. During the evaluation process, there was a continuous information exchange between the evaluation team and the Emergency Rehabilitation and Coordination Unit (ERCU) on one hand and the operations and technical units on the other. As a result, some of the preliminary findings raised in 2008 could be addressed in a timely manner. In any case, the evaluation provides feedback that enables management to make adjustments to ongoing programmes and act sooner upon systemic issues, thereby benefiting other programmes.
4. Management notes that a number of recommendations concern the Organization's administrative rules and procedures. It is expected that the ongoing evaluation of FAO's operational capacity in emergencies will address many of the issues raised.

B. Comments on the Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations of the Evaluation

1. A High Quality Relief Phase

- a) Management welcomes the recommendations that address procurement issues and the advice to increase the in-country signing authority to at least USD 100 000. Management believes that an increase of the delegation of authority for the signing of Letters of Agreement (LoAs) and the procurement of inputs is needed and appropriate, which should also allow for case-by-case decisions taking local capacities and the magnitude of the disaster into account.
- b) Management is aware that, in some cases, FAO faced problems with procurement and timely delivery of inputs and it is agreed that, in some instances, the timelines of input distribution could have been improved. At the same time, Management would note that in seeking to respond to the complex procurement challenges and the wide range of input types and varieties required, that the Organization drew upon the full range of procurement modalities and options available, including the: fielding of an AFSP Procurement Officer in 2006 for the purchase of inputs for the animal shelter and feed component in 2006 and 2007; direct purchase of up to USD 100 000 worth of live birds; and increased delegated authority to the FAOR for numerous local tenders.
- c) It should be noted that delays in the construction of animal shelters were not caused by delays in either the procurement or delivery of construction materials but were the result of a very slow in-house FAO approval of a LoA with a key implementing partner (IP).

2. Poor Maize Seed Distribution in 2006

Management accepts the findings and recommendation with regard to the maize seed distribution in 2006. Measures were taken to enhance the quality of inputs and quality testing, such as superintendence at loading and unloading, establishment of demonstration sites throughout the earthquake zone and on-the-spot visits of potential suppliers to verify production capacity, storage facilities, etc. Management concurs with the proposal of training emergency staff to detect potential problems at an early stage of the procurement and distribution process through simple germination tests. However, sampling and testing of seeds requires specific capacities, time and resources, and increased supervision, in order to obtain accurate results. For this reason, trained technicians from national seed services should also sample and test seed used in emergency response operations. The Organization should be prepared to handle potentially contradicting test results and superintendence reports.

3. Rehabilitating as a Balancing Act

- a) The evaluation report correctly describes the challenge of the three rehabilitation projects in determining the right balance between quantity, quality and speed. Overall, the reconstruction of Community-based Physical Infrastructures (CPI) was seen as very relevant, even though the report states that irrigation infrastructure was less attended by FAO programme designers at the initial design of the earthquake response. While management recognizes the fact that the immediate response aimed to restart agricultural production with quick impact activities, such as the provision of seeds, fertilizer and animal feed, it must be stressed that FAO had already highlighted in the Flash Appeal (launched a week after the earthquake) and in more detail in the “Post-earthquake early recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction programme” for the agriculture and livestock sectors of 15 November 2005, the urgent need for community-based infrastructure rehabilitation. FAO tried to sensitize donors along these lines. While some of the projects funded under the umbrella heading of “saving livelihoods to save lives” could have been flexible enough to include infrastructure rehabilitation components, the duration of these projects was often too short and budgets were too limited to allow for efficient and cost-effective investments in rural infrastructure. The experience in the relief phase of emergencies worldwide shows that donors tend to prioritize humanitarian lifesaving activities, making it difficult for FAO to promote time-critical investments in the agriculture sector, as well as recovery and rehabilitation actions for rural infrastructure. There is no doubt that the early reconstruction of infrastructure would have had positive impacts on the provision of agricultural inputs. Management is committed to the further sensitization of donors on these aspects.
- b) Management fully agrees that the protracted negotiations with the Asian Development Bank (the second biggest donor of the FAO programme in Pakistan) were indeed regrettable and resulted, arguably, in the loss of more than a year for earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in these particular project areas. Management concurs fully that a global umbrella agreement should be established with the Asian Development Bank as soon as possible.
- c) The evaluation highlights the innovative approaches used for the CPI rehabilitation and provides useful clarification regarding the pre-fixed numeric targets set for CPI delivery which pre-empted community decisions and priorities. Approaches included cash-for-work components, delegation of procurement to IPs and cash transfers to communities for civil works through joint community bank accounts. These components were implemented through LoAs. While the ERCU and IPs aimed to address the priorities as identified by the communities, it should be noted that the current guidelines for LoAs (Manual Section 507) limit such flexibility, as specific targets and exact unit costs in the budget are required for the FAO in-house approval process. Lump-sum payments for “cluster activities” such as CPI rehabilitation would certainly represent a useful step in the right direction. Final results differed substantially from the original targets, reflecting a certain degree of flexibility in actual project implementation.

4. Insufficient Monitoring Capacity within the ERCU

Management fully concurs with the recommendation to build the capacity for the independent monitoring of IPs. Such capacity could consist of either in-house monitoring experts or could be outsourced to an independent organization. Monitoring capacity was indeed a weakness of the overall programme and, in hindsight, more efforts were needed to build up such a capacity. FAO took steps to

improve monitoring, as can be seen by the CPI Verification carried out in August/September 2008 by an independent engineer, and the Animal Shelter Verification and Preliminary Poultry Impact Assessment of September 2008, conducted by independent consultants. Management agrees that monitoring in general should have been more institutionalized, systematic and independent.

5. Forestry and Watershed Management

Management largely agrees with the findings and recognizes that the ambitions of the watershed management component of the Sida-funded project went beyond the immediate earthquake response. It was felt that rather than focusing only on the repair of landslips – which would constitute nothing more than temporary repair measures – that sustainable outcomes would only result from an integrated watershed management approach. From this perspective, it was proposed that the project would become learning sites where the approach could be demonstrated and taught to the staff of the Department of Forests and other Line Agencies and partner organizations. It is from this perspective that the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) was brought in to ensure that the learning would incorporate the experience of other countries in the Himalaya region. However, the actual field implementation of the watershed management approaches under both interventions was carried out by local staff with ample experience and by the same IP (i.e., the Department of Forests). This ensures that there is a significant level of coordination between both interventions. The larger part of the technical input from ICIMOD for the Sida-funded project was also related to the rehabilitation of landslips, where local knowledge is limited. The Integrated and Collaborative Watershed Management Approach, while new as an approach, makes use of known methods and technologies and relies largely on the knowledge and skills of the Pakistani staff hired by the project, who work closely with their Department of Forests counterparts and the communities. The need for more hands-on, day-to-day input was addressed by requesting ICIMOD for a permanent (international or national) presence of their staff with the project office. This was first delayed and finally cancelled owing to the deteriorating security situation in the project area. The need for a realistic work plan was also addressed by the Mid-Term Review (MTR) Mission of the Sida-funded project. Unfortunately, the review of the work plan experienced some delay when it became part of the approval process of recommendations of the MTR. The recommendation to turn some of the watershed management sites under the Sida-funded project into learning sites was followed, also forming part of the effort to generate donor interest in the approach with the prospect of a continuation after the project end.

6. Coordination: a Major Role

- a) Management fully agrees with the recommendation to enhance FAO surge capacity immediately after an emergency to ensure adequate coverage and treatment of key technical, programmatic, operational and coordination issues. Together with the International Labour Organization (ILO), FAO took the lead in the livelihoods cluster shortly after the earthquake and succeeded in facilitating coordination mechanisms both at provincial and national levels, as highlighted in the evaluation report. This was indeed key for the promotion of FAO's livelihoods approach, thus mobilizing donor funds for the livelihoods recovery and rehabilitation phase. Producing and updating comprehensive information packages such as the 3W (Who does What Where?) matrix in a systematic way was only possible when the Sida-funded project materialized in December 2007. While the 3W matrix continues to be updated at the district Livelihoods Working Committee level, it somewhat lost its relevance more than three years after the earthquake. The core function of coordination is now largely performed by the Livelihoods Working Committees.
- b) With regard to the finding that FAO should deploy a Coordination Specialist immediately after a disaster, there is no disagreement, *in theory*. However, in practice, it is not always possible to mobilize funding from donors in the immediate aftermath of a sudden-onset natural disaster for such activities, and certainly not beforehand. Experience shows that donors prioritize assistance that provides immediate, short-term and direct benefits to vulnerable groups affected by the disaster, in particular, so-called life-saving activities. Similarly, recipient governments tend to prefer direct assistance and often raise questions about the need for activities that focus on the provision of 'technical assistance' rather than material support to immediate relief efforts. In the case of the Pakistan earthquake response however, Management would not that the Organization was able to allocate SFERA and emergency TCP resources – the latter at the direct request of Government – to undertake a rapid assessment mission and to fund initial surge capacity.

7. Fostering Successful Partnerships

1. Management largely agrees with the findings and recommendations to foster long-term partnerships with UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The findings with regard to the One UN are in line with what FAO is already doing and seeking to improve. Stronger and increasingly operational partnerships are developing with ILO, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as with a number of international and national NGOs. For example, standby agreements with international NGOs are being explored, while interagency secondments are standard. Considering the Pakistan experience, WFP and FAO have moved from institutionalized collaboration in logistics during the earthquake response to joint programming, fundraising and project delivery in the aftermath of the Balochistan floods in 2007. Management further agrees that in countries with frequent disasters or compounded crises, more stable partnership agreements with NGOs would be of benefit for quick and reliable interventions. The Organization should be aware that this will require a shift in the perception that NGOs are primarily “IPs” rather than full and equal level partners in the response to emergencies
2. Management wishes to emphasise that the ERCU and operations made all possible efforts (in the context of such an urgent situation) to screen and appraise the technical and logistical capacity, as well as the reliability, of potential IPs. While the main IPs of the ADB funded project were pre-selected by the donor, in most cases IPs were chosen after a selection process. In some cases, due to time pressure, some of steps of the selection process were skipped. It is challenging for the ERCU and operations in emergency situations to find the right balance between appraisal of the potential risks resulting from subcontracting a weak IP and the risk of missing an agricultural season through lengthy screening and approval processes.

8. Building Back Better

1. Management recognises that there are a number of questions and issues surrounding the term “Building Back Better”, many of which are raised in the Evaluation.
2. Management largely agrees with the findings and recommendations on this issue. However, Management would note that recommendation 23 is beyond the control of FAO and recommendation 24 goes beyond the mandate and funding of the current programme. This raises questions as to whether either recommendation can be addressed effectively by the Organization as part of an emergency and rehabilitation response. Moreover, any steps in this direction would require substantial additional funding.
3. With regard to the shortfalls of introducing new technologies in emergency situations, there is no disagreement, as innovations can carry considerable risks. Therefore, FAO promoted throughout its livelihoods relief and recovery programme techniques which are environment-friendly and which can be sustained by the communities, as demonstrated with the animal shelter component and, with some exceptions, with the CPI rehabilitation. On the other hand, external shocks may serve as a catalyst to enter with innovations aiming to establish more secure, sustainable and diversified livelihoods. Novelties do not necessarily imply risks, as can be seen with the introduction of fruit-tree nurseries.
4. In closing, management once again recognizes the value of this evaluation and welcomes the recommendations contained therein. Management appreciates the transparent evaluation process which allowed for the adjustment of programme activities at an early stage. Management will continue to endeavour to ensure timely, effective and efficient responses to each of the 24 recommendations; the actions to be taken are outlined in the appended matrix.

Management response to recommendations – FAO 2005 Pakistan Earthquake Response								
Recommendations	Further funding required (yes or no)	Acceptance by Management			Comment on the Recommendation	Action to be taken		
		Accepted	Partially Accepted	Rejected		Action	Timing	Unit Responsible
1. FAO should deploy a qualified procurement specialist early on in “crowded” emergency theatres where the flow of vast aid resources increases the risks of fraud and inflation.	Y	Y			Accepted. Will depend on availability of AFS officers, the availability of local expertise and capacities.	To be decided on a case-by-case basis for new emergencies.	Continuous	AFS, TCE
2. In all emergency responses, the cadre of technical staff should include experienced national researchers or extension workers with good familiarity with the area, so as to strengthen varietal choices and other technical decisions.	Y	Y			Accepted. TCE made all efforts to recruit technical people who are familiar with and/or who originate from the earthquake zone. The increased use of local expertise may raise questions regarding the possibility of increased delegation of authority regarding technical issues.	FAO continues to seek staff who combine both technical expertise and knowledge of the region.	Continuous	TCE, Technical Units
3. FAO should consider raising the in-country signing authority to at least USD 100 000 to improve the timeliness of operations.	N	Y			Accepted, in line with current revision of AFSP procurement manual, depending on local resources, capacities and market conditions to ensure efficient, competitive and transparent procurement	To be decided on a case-by-case basis.	ASAP	AFS, TCE
4. FAO emergency personnel should be trained to physically check seed, identify storage pests and	Y		Y		Accepted in part. FAO staff should remain vigilant regarding seed quality and be fully aware of potential problems. Proper training would help them do this. Simple germination	Training of TCE staff by national seed service in sampling, testing and principles of storage and identification of storage	ASAP	TCE, AGP

conduct a rough germination test if a seed quality problem is suspected. Such tests by FAO personnel should not replace the results of the superintendence as a basis for acceptance, penalty application or rejection of the seed lot, but rather allow FAO to verify the integrity of the distributed planting material independently from superintendents.					testing by FAO emergency staff could be done in special cases if a seed quality problem is suspected. However, the sampling and testing of seed requires capabilities, time and attention in order to obtain accurate results. For this reason the trained technicians from the national seed service should also sample and test seed used in emergencies. The Organization should be prepared to handle potentially contradicting test results and superintendence reports	insects should be undertaken		
5. FAO and its partners should continue to pursue cost-effective ways of ensuring community participation in early recovery and rehabilitation assistance, while holding realistic expectations as to what level of participation is possible in such contexts (i.e. modest yet significant involvement of communities in priority setting, implementation and, an often forgotten step, evaluation).	Y	Y			Accepted. It is recommended that relevant technical units at FAO Headquarters develop standard packages and methodologies/guidelines in this regard and that subsequent training of emergency staff (international and national) is provided.	Under the Sida-funded project, community participation is a key component in the planning and implementation of their livelihoods rehabilitation plans. The project is also building capacity of government departments and NGOs in the use of community participatory approaches.	ASAP	TCE, NR
6. Review operational arrangements for Community based Physical Infrastructures rehabilitation to avoid delays in implementation	N	Y			Accepted. Logistics and operational arrangements for release of funds for community physical infrastructure need to be timely as delays negatively influence implementation. Cash-flow both from Headquarters to field level and within field level needs to be streamlined. At the request of PBE, in 2008 TCE	Operational arrangements of CPI delivery have to be integrated within ongoing LoA revision exercise.		TCE, AF, PBE

					(and AFF) participated actively in discussions with the PBE-led Evaluation of FAO Operational capacity in Emergencies (OCE) to describe the current LoA business processes and operational/procedural bottlenecks, as a basis for the OCE team to make recommendations for improvement/streamlining of these procedures			
7. Irrigation technical standards developed in Pakistan should be applied more systematically and consistently in the earthquake rehabilitation programme	N		Y		Accepted in part. National technical and financial standards should be indeed applied systematically, leaving some degree of flexibility to adjust to the local context, especially considering the situation after the earthquake often warranted "local" solutions.	A CPI verification mission was carried out in September 2008 and confirmed the quality of the works done. 12-24 months after project NTE (August 2008), ADB will carry out an impact assessment of the project.	12-24 months after ADB project NTE.	TCE, Technical Units
8. Simplify the institutional setup of the SIDA-funded project and speed up implementation		Y			The institutional setup of the project has been addressed by the project's Mid-Term Review in July 2008 but only some of its recommendations have been implemented to date. The protracted discussion with the local counterpart on the recommendations of the Mid-Term Review mission has further delayed implementation Embedding the project in another Government Project limits flexibility and generates inappropriate expectations from local counterparts.	A planning workshop will be organized in June 2009 to gather all stakeholders. During this workshop, targets and implementing modalities will be reviewed and the work plan will be finalized for the last year of implementation (including a six-month no-cost extension of the duration)	May 2009	TCE, Technical Units, FAOR
9. Retrain the people implementing the Farmer Field Schools to impart a greater sense of participation in experimentation and	Y	Y			Accepted in principle. All OSRO projects that entail a FFS component came to an end or are currently phasing out. Moreover, retraining FFS personnel requires additional funding.	Under the Sida-funded project, materials are being developed to promote a greater sense of participation and are being tested for use by NGOs. The materials are	Upon funding availability	TCA, Technical Units

learning.						part of the capacity-building component of the project that also trains NGO and Government staff in use of these approaches.		
10. FAO and ADB should finalize a global umbrella agreement for all administrative aspects to avoid delays in the implementation of joint relief and rehabilitation programmes in the future	N	Y			Accepted. A global umbrella agreement is required to avoid similar delays in the future. This issue has been raised a number of times with the ADB mission in Pakistan and negotiations between FAO and ADB Headquarters are ongoing.	Pursuing ongoing efforts	End of 2009	TCAP, AFS
11. FAO must build a capacity (either internal or contracted out) to monitor IP performance independently (e.g., on how well the IP performed in targeting vulnerable households).	Y	Y			Accepted. TCE made significant efforts to conduct proper and independent monitoring of IPs to compensate for the weaknesses of the current set-up. An engineer was recruited in 2008 to conduct an independent CPI verification. Furthermore, a verification of the animal shelter component and a preliminary impact assessment for the poultry component were carried out by independent monitors in 2008.	For the future, this activity should be budgeted for in a more systematic way.	Continuous	TCE, PBE
12. The two watershed-related interventions implemented by FAO should coordinate their activities and bring technical standards closer to one another than is currently the case.	N	Y			Accepted. This recommendation is currently being implemented at the field level.. Coordination is ongoing between the two interventions; in a number of sites there is even a situation where locations are adjacent automatically leading to “cross-fertilization”.	The Technical Review Committee of the watershed interventions under the Sida-funded project includes people who supervise the activities of the EC/ UNDP-funded other watershed interventions; again a mechanism to ensure coordination. Furthermore it should be noted that the IP for both interventions is the	Continuous	TCE, Technical Units

						same, i.e. the Forest Department		
13. Technical assistance needs for the FAO/Sida watershed component should be reassessed and flexibility introduced in terms of reference to address the emerging needs of the project and to build local capacities.		Y			Accepted	FAO Headquarters technical backstopping mission to raise the issue in a workshop in Pakistan scheduled for June 2009.	June 2009	TCE, Technical Units
14. The Sida-funded project should finalize a realistic work plan and clarify responsibilities. In view of the resources and time available, the watershed pilot activities of the project should be confined to eight sub-watersheds.		Y			Accepted. The possibility of reducing the number of watersheds from 17 to 8 was raised at a number of meetings with counterpart institutions, but no agreement with the counterpart has yet been reached. It was however, agreed that the interventions in the “new” watersheds would be limited and less intense compared with the “old” watersheds.	FAO Headquarters technical backstopping mission to raise the issue during workshop scheduled for early June 2009. During this workshop targets and implementing modalities will be reviewed, and the work plan will be finalized for the last year of implementation (including a six-month no-cost extension of the duration).	June 2009	TCE, Technical Units
15. A project should be prepared and funds raised for extending the FAO-Sida integrated watershed management approach.	Y	Y			Accepted. It should be noted however, the limited progress in the implementation of the Sida-funded project reduces the likelihood of mobilizing additional funding for similar activities.	TCE continues to promote watershed activities and sensitizes donors, but no additional funding could be secured yet.	Continuous	TCE, TCAP, Technical Units
16. In emergency operations of significant size, FAO should hire a coordination specialist to set up livelihoods clusters (or working groups) and carry out effective “who does what	Y	Y			Accepted. As highlighted in the evaluation report, surge capacity in the immediate aftermath of an emergency is vital if the importance of (agricultural) livelihood attention is to given the attention it deserves and to ensure effective coordination between various livelihood activities. There is	Emergency staff are trained on a continuous basis in rapid emergency response, including issues related to the cluster approach, overall coordination and needs assessment.	Continuous	TCE, Technical Units

where” (3W) mapping as early as possible.					scope for FAO to take the lead more effectively in the coordination of the livelihoods cluster with adequate training and resources. A 3W is especially important in the early post-emergency time period when duplication and lack of coverage are more likely to occur in view of the large number of agencies and heavy influx of inputs.			
17. In the Pakistan earthquake response, FAO should update the 3W information and present it in a map form to identify current underserved areas that many NGOs have left.			Y		Accepted in part.	The Sida-funded project is updating its 3W matrix, though the usefulness of the tool has decreased with time (see pt. 16) Within the Sida-funded project the district-level Livelihoods Working Committees are the forum where these issues are being discussed.	Continuous	TCE
18. In the absence of a capacity-building cluster, FAO and other UN organizations should find alternative ways of coordinating who does what in capacity building and institutional development, so as to avoid overlaps.		Y			Accepted. The current cluster approach allows for coordination of cross-cutting issues such as capacity building, even though there are inefficiencies. Adding formal layers in the coordination might impose more drawbacks than benefits especially in view of different organizational mandates.	Activities have been embedded within current FAO efforts to reinforce its cluster leadership capacity.	Continuous	TCE
19. Start the capacity-building component of the Sida-funded project as soon as possible, in order to improve IPs’ targeting, distribution processes,			Y		Accepted in part. The project’s Mid-Term Review mission recommended a shift in approach from traditional training towards demand-driven capacity building. Discussion with the counterpart on its implementation are	A technical mission from Rome to Pakistan in early April and the workshop of June 2009 are planned to address this issue.		TCE, Technical Units

participatory planning skills, progress reporting and technical understanding of the issues at hand.					still ongoing.			
20. In countries with frequent disasters or compounded crises, FAO should build long-term partnerships with local NGOs as IPs along the lines of the global agreement between WFP and IFRC for the use of National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies in food distributions.		Y			<p>Accepted. This recommendation goes back to the Tsunami Evaluation and some progress has been made. Even if not fully implemented yet, the recommendation remains valid.</p> <p>The Organization is aware that this may require a shift in the perception that NGOs are primarily “IPs” rather than full and equal level partners in the response to emergencies</p>	<p>FAO shall identify interested partners in selected countries with frequent or compounded crises and initiate discussions to test their interest (locally and at their HQ level) in such agreements while assessing value-added of such partnerships.</p> <p>In parallel, FAO shall consider other partnerships between UN agencies and International Organizations, and verify the possibility to adapt them to its own case.</p>	December 2009	AFS, LEG, TCE
21 All concerned actors including FAO should be careful with innovations during rehabilitation phases. For instance, irrigation channels should not be lined (cemented) in their entire length, even where no damage occurred, on account of cost and environmental considerations.			Y		Accepted in part. Management agrees that one should be cautious, and that innovations can only be introduced gradually, In some instances, external shocks might be a catalyst to enter with innovations.	Continuous		TCE, Technical Units
22. In both NWFP and AJK, the need for a new environment-friendly livelihoods development			Y		Accepted in part. The idea to implement an environment-friendly livelihoods development policy was mentioned in the project’s Mid-Term Review, but not as a main priority.	The topic is likely to be brought up during the workshop planned for June 2009, where priorities for the remaining part of the project	June 2009	

policy in mountainous areas was voiced, and FAO might usefully help develop such policies under the Sida-funded project.						and the sustainability of the interventions will be discussed. Assisting the government in the development of such policies is clearly a part of the post-project sustainability.		
23. Making the new houses of the earthquake zone more fuel-efficient for heating and cooking should be a foremost priority of the GOP and its development partners.			Y		Accepted. However, reconstruction of human housing is beyond FAO's control and mandate. FAO promoted environment-friendly interventions throughout its rehabilitation programme that can be sustained and maintained by the people using local available knowledge (animal shelter component, CPI rehabilitation).			
24. FAO should advocate for land stabilization and conservation practices along existing roads and for treatment of cuts and fills during any new road construction or widening project in the area.			Y		Accepted in part. Further clarification required to demonstrate the extent to which this would represent a realistic and practical part of an FAO emergency response and rehabilitation programme.	These activities could be subject of an additional (development) project, either funded through FAO's own resources or donor funds.		TCAP, Technical Units