FINAL EVALUATION OF THE UN-REDD TANZANIA NATIONAL PROGRAMME
FINAL REPORT

PREPARED FOR: UN-REDD PROGRAMME, AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

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Acronyms

AWP	Annual Work Plan
BAU	Business-as-usual
CCIAM	Climate Change Impact, Adaptation and Mitigation
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ET	Evaluation Team
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FBD	Forestry and Beekeeping Division
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
GIS	Global Information System
GoT	Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
IP	Implementing Partner
IRA	Institute of Resource Assessment (University of Dar es Salaam)
MAFC	Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
MARV	Monitoring, Assessment, Reporting, and Verification
MEM	Ministry of Energy and Minerals
MJUMITA	Mtandao wa Jamii wa Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NAFOBEDA	National Forest and Beekeeping Data Base
NAFORMA	National Forestry Resources Monitoring and Assessment of Tanzania
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
NCMC	National Carbon Monitoring Centre
NRTF	National REDD Task Force
PAG	Project Advisory Group
PCMG	Project Coordination and Management Group
REDD	Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
REDD+	Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation plus conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of carbon stocks
RPP	Readiness Preparation Proposal
SFM	Sustainable Forest Management
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture
TAFORI	Tanzania Forestry Research Institute
TFS	Tanzania Forest Service
TNP	Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme
TOC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TWGs	Technical Working Groups
UNDAP	United Nations Development Assistance Plan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
UN-REDD	United Nations REDD+ initiative
USD	United States Dollar
VPO DoE	Vice President's Office, Division of Environment

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the final evaluation of the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme Quick-Start Initiative (UN-REDD National Programme) that commenced in 2010 and initially expected to end in 2011 but requested extensions up to December 2013.

The objective of the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme (TNP) is to assist Tanzania to prepare and implement the national REDD+ strategy. The expected outcomes of the TNP are:

Outcome 1: A national governance framework and institutional capacities strengthened for REDD+;

Outcome 2: Increased capacity for capturing REDD+ elements within National Monitoring, Assessment, Reporting and Verification systems;

Outcome 3: Improved capacity to manage REDD+ and provide other forest ecosystem services at district and local levels;

Outcome 4: Broad based stakeholder support for REDD+ in Tanzania.

The evaluation process involved three phases: inception, fieldwork, and reporting. The evaluation started on 26 August 2013 with the preparation of an inception report, the fieldwork was conducted between 10 September and 27 September 2013, and report writing was undertaken in October and November, with revisions based on comments from the client. The overall approach is based on the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) methodology to assess the TNP's intended impacts using the Theory of Change (TOC). The methodology involved review of documents, interviews with key stakeholders (Development Partners, Implementing Partners at national level, academic institutions, and villagers)... The evaluation framework was based on a series of questions, judgement criteria and indicators against the standard criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the status of REDD+ readiness in Tanzania, and to promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing among participating agencies.

DESIGN

The TNP was designed in the context of complex national circumstances and limited guidance on global REDD+ modalities. The design team therefore extracted ideas from dialogue emerging via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) proceedings since 2005, the Bali Action Plan (2007) and Decision 2/CP.13. Guidance on key components such as institutional frameworks, benefit distribution systems, reference emission levels (REL), leakage, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), safeguards and so on were very much undefined and still emerging.

The REDD+ context in Tanzania changed during the design stages largely due to the signing of a financially substantial cooperation agreement on climate change between the Government of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Tanzania (GoT). Planning of the TNP started in September 2008, but programme document approval and funds transfer occurred in January 2010. This lag between programme design and implementation became a key factor to the many challenges faced during implementation.

The goals and outcomes of the TNP were intended to be "quick start" measures for laying the foundation for future programmes to assist Tanzania for REDD+ readiness. However, the introduction of the Norwegian supported REDD+ programmes, coupled with limited national coordination and inter-agency collaboration, low national institutional and technical capacity introduced unforeseen overlaps and administrative challenges that affected the impact of the TNP.

The cooperation agreement between Norway and GoT was signed in April 2008 followed by planning and designing specific projects between 2009 and 2011. Specifically, the Institute of Resources

Assessment (IRA) was engaged to start coordinating the National REDD+ Task Force (NRTF) in February 2009, followed by initiation of the Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation, and Mitigation (CCIAM) in November 2009 and the research project on Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) project in June 2011. In addition to these projects, from 2008 the Government of Finland in collaboration with the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and GoT were planning the National Forestry Resources Monitoring and Assessment (NAFORMA). It is also during 2008 and 2011 that Tanzania prepared a REDD+ Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) and Readiness Preparation Proposal.

This group of projects may have culminated in administrative and coordination burden in a government and institutions that already had limited capacity, policies, and governance framework unprepared for the complex and demanding requirements of the REDD+ readiness process. These limitations may have resulted in fundamental failures by both the GoT and international support agencies to design projects in an adaptive, coordinated and collaborative manner and working towards a common vision that fits with the needs of Tanzania. The GoT, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), and the NRTF should have taken stock of the evolving situation and make attempts to harmonize objectives across all proposed projects. International agencies also need to make efforts to harmonize support programmes by adding value to existing frameworks or activities.

There were some reservations about selecting the MNRT to host the TNP because of historical failures and substantial constraints and challenges in terms financial, human, governance, and political pressure. However, its role as the REDD+ Focal Point makes it the appropriate institution. Although its ability to manage the TNP was considered low and high risk, in the long-term the MNRT is likely to play an important role in operationalizing and hosting key components of the REDD+ such as MRV systems, safeguard monitoring systems, and National Forest Inventory (NFI) built through the NAFORMA project. It is therefore strategic to build capacity and position MNRT and its respective agencies to become the custodian of these systems in the future. It is also important that the national level coordination, collaboration across government departments and sectors improves in order for the institutional arrangements to be effective. During the phases of the REDD+ readiness process, various activities may be hosted in say the Vice President's Office (VPO), academic and research institution, but in the long-term under business-as-usual, the appropriate host is a government agency that can sustain the ongoing requirements.

The TNP has some activities and outputs that are over ambitious with too wide a scope and poor sequencing hence the design grossly underestimated the timeframe required for implementation resulting in requests for two no-cost extensions of one year duration. It seems that all countries implementing UN-REDD National Programmes have had to request for extensions (e.g. Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia). For future programmes, thorough, coordinated, and collaborative contextual analysis by the UN agencies, GoT and other stakeholder would improve the design.

Some government officials expressed concerns that the UN agencies largely drove the design process and the consultation process was insufficient, too short and perceived as seeking endorsement of preconceived ideas. While this might be the case, it is more likely that these views are symptoms of the complex nature of REDD+ and extended global discourse on developing guidelines and modalities for performance-based incentives which are challenging to explain and simplify. These views could have led to what became a challenging implementation environment.

To mitigate such risks in future, UN agencies may need to put more effort into simplifying complex REDD+ concepts and take time to understand and assess the ability and willingness of the GoT to commit and to fast track institutional and regulatory reforms to accommodate the complex requirements for REDD+ readiness. It is not just the TNP that has faced delays but other programmes such as the REDD+ Policy Project under Norwegian government support had the same difficulties. For instance, the establishment of the National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC) has taken a

substantially long time and it is still not operational because the government is still deliberating the terms of reference, legal and operational mandate of such an institution.

The link between the TNP and the Norwegian support is important to highlight but **note that this is not an evaluation of the Norwegian support to Tanzania. It is necessary to contextualise and reflect on the level of funding support, the outputs, effectiveness and subsequent impacts of all REDD+ readiness support programmes.** This point reiterates the issue of design and harmonization of national programmes. There is no global guidance and benchmark to compare the relative cost of REDD+ readiness but the level of funding in Tanzania in comparison to achievements is being questioned by many stakeholders and support agencies. Perhaps the assessment of the cost elements of REDD+ carried out as part of Outcome 1 of the TNP should be extended further to improve global understanding of this important aspect.

A 2013 real-time evaluation of the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) programme found that Norway has made large contributions to MRV in Tanzania, and that the results are limited. The evaluation report indicates that between 2009 and 2014, Tanzania would receive substantial financial support (approximately USD 25 million) for activities that contribute towards forest resource monitoring and development of reference emission at project level including testing of voluntary carbon markets methodologies such as Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). It is noted that the primary intention of the REDD+ pilots was not to develop a MRV system but to gain experiences from the ground on how REDD+ could work at the community level.

The Finnish government provided a further USD 6 million for the NAFORMA project. The TNP Outcome 2 has a budget of USD 1.4 million and is also contributing to components of a MRV system. Yet despite this substantial support, the progress in developing Tanzania's MRV system, reference level and associated data has been slow and limited. The key issue here is that both the GoT and international support agencies fundamentally failed to align and integrate new and existing efforts and also to harmonise objectives to be more effective.

RELEVANCE

The TNP is generally relevant and is one of several interventions to address increasing deforestation and forest degradation, improve governance, institutional capacity and develop mechanisms for monitoring the performance of policies and measures in the forestry sector. By 2010 mainland Tanzania had 33.4 million hectares (ha) of forest with Zanzibar contributing some 63 000 ha. It is estimated that the annual rate of forest loss through deforestation is roughly 1.2%. Forest loss is attributed to the high reliance on fuel wood which provides 95% of the country's energy supply. Several underlying factors cause uncontrolled deforestation and forest degradation. They include policy failures, population growth, rapid urbanization, rural settlement growth, and rural poverty. Insufficient financial and management capacity are the main causes of failure by the government to implement adequately the instituted centralised and decentralised management systems. In addition, there is recognition that management of forest resources has been inefficient and the government has found it challenging to adequately define resource tenure rights, eliminate over-exploitation of resources and to create the right investment incentives in forest activities.

For Tanzania to be REDD+ ready, governance and institutional framework needed to be strengthened through capacity building and preparation of foundation programmes that could be up-scaled over time. While the outputs do not necessarily target changing specific policies or regulations, they provide outputs that enable evidence-based policy formulation processes.

The capacity building carried out through the TNP is also relevant but the impact is likely to be limited because the institutional financial constraints and operational sustainability in government departments is low. The level of commitment from government has been questioned by many.

EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

The TNP has been effective in some areas, such as influencing the level of dialogue and thinking towards REDD+ readiness. The processes of establishing key governance frameworks, stakeholder engagement, safeguards, and MRV are under consideration and being discussed at central government level. The TNP contributed to the development of the National REDD+ Strategy (NRS) released in 2013. The NRS gained substantially from the UN-REDD normative products through dialogue and advice from the UN agencies. Despite the significant challenges that are discussed in this report, the experience in implementing the TNP and the Norwegian funded activities provides important lessons that can be useful for future programmes in the country.

The components of the TNP that were less effective are mostly artefacts of poor design and limited collaboration and coordination across the implementing institutions. The low level of stakeholder engagement at the design stage affected the level of institutional commitment and subsequently the ownership of outcomes. The flow-on effect is that efforts in capacity building will have far less impact than they could have achieved with stronger stakeholder involvement at the design stage. In addition, the on-going delays to implement the various outputs, poor coordination arrangements and limited collaboration between the NRTF and TNP limited the effectiveness and efficiency of the TNP.

The execution of some activities was fairly effective, such as Outcome 1 outputs (capacity needs assessment and the assessment of the cost elements of REDD+ projects in Tanzania). The results have contributed to the thinking around the capacity development planned for the period 2012-2017, including a clear outline of key principles of intervention design packages.

Most activities under the TNP were performed by project-recruited staff and external consultants (both national and international). The primary reasons for this are the lack of commitment and resource constraints within the MNRT. The MNRT has limited financial resources with which to motivate a modestly remunerated workforce. Staff members are often away from the office preferring to work on activities that provide daily subsistence allowance to supplement the generally low wages. This environment has resulted in limited trust in institutions and increased engagement of individual consultants in order to get activities carried out. The downside of this is that the opportunity to build institutional capacity is missed affecting the long-term sustainability to manage REDD+ activities.

The TNP's engagement with some key groups such as the sectoral Technical Working Groups (TWG) established through the NRTF was less effective. UN agency representatives participated in few coordination meetings with limited involvement in NRTF meetings. Since Outcomes 1 and 2 have highly technical components, closer collaboration with TWGs in deciding, for instance, the design for generating national maps, RELs and studying degradation would have been beneficial. Typically such technical working groups provide essential support and advice to the NRTF to assist it to make informed decisions. It would have been beneficial for the NRTF and TWG to take a leadership role in coordinating activities across different programmes including those under the TNP.

There is no specific comparable benchmark to measure the appropriateness of the funding levels. According to the recent NICFI review, little information is available on what might constitute an appropriate balance of funding for MRV and RELs. However, the fact that there is still no functional national MRV or REL is a major concern after such levels of expenditure.

IMPLEMENTATION

The key mechanism for programme delivery was the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) represented by the MNRT, the Vice President's Office (VPO), and the three UN agencies, representatives from the government of Zanzibar, the NRTF, the REDD+ Secretariat, and Civil Society. Following a Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) in early 2012, the Programme Coordination and Management Group (PCMG) was replaced by the PSC. The Programme Advisory Group (PAG) was dissolved and the overall assurance and advisory function was transferred to the NRTF. The membership of the newly

formed PSC was broadened by including the Project Executive ((Tanzania Forest Services (TFS) Agency Chief Executive as the project shifted from MNRT to TFS)). The UNDP Deputy Country Director (Programme), the chairman of the NRTF, and a representative from Zanzibar were also brought into the PSC. These changes seem to have improved working relations between UN agencies and the GoT although it still appears the involvement of UN agencies staff in NRTF meetings remained limited.

The PSC developed and approved work plans and budgets and agreed on implementation of activities. These coordination arrangements seemed adequate on paper but the reality appears to differ. UN agencies seem to have found it difficult to engage in timely dialogue and to get responses from government counterparts. The engagement with the NRTF and TWG is noticeably limited. This affected the pace of progress at the activity level resulting in no-cost extensions amounting to two years.

Amongst the UN agencies, there were coordination and harmonisation challenges which caused frustrations in the Tanzanian institutions. The financial and technical management mechanism was implemented based on discussions with the GoT, and in accordance with how the One UN programme works in Tanzania. Funds were provided from the UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to the three UN agencies and each took responsibility for transferring funds from its own allocation to implementing partners. This is the pass through mechanism which required substantial paperwork and compliance. This arrangement of working with three independent agencies imposed unacceptable transaction costs and administrative overheads. The already small funding was spread too thinly across a broad range of activities.

The TNP monitoring and evaluation framework is well structured with elaborate Annual Work Plans (AWP). Starting in 2010, well-detailed AWPs were provided to the GoT and key stakeholders with clear operating guidelines and coordination mechanism. But the level of commitment from the GOT, collaboration and coordination with the NRTF, TWG made implementation and sequencing of activities difficult.

OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS

The TNP intended to close operationally on 30 June 2013 but some activities are still not finalised. Outputs under Outcome 1 were achieved in a moderately satisfactory manner. The main outputs include a detailed capacity needs assessment (CNA) and the assessment of the cost elements of REDD+ projects in Tanzania. The CNA has contributed to the thinking around the capacity development planned for the period 2012-2017, including a clear outline of key principles of intervention design packages. A useful tool for estimating cost elements of REDD+ was produced. Similarly, training was provided to MNRT and other ministries through workshops as part of building institutional and individual capacity to deliver the REDD+ production chain in the implementing partners.

From Outcome 2, capacity building in the form of training in remote sensing and geographic information systems (GIS), soil analysis and many more activities was provided. A physical library on REDD+ was set up and computer hardware was also provided. A roadmap for the development of reference emission levels (REL) was prepared. A full list of achievements is presented in Annex 5. The completion of activities was delayed due to procurement problems, dependency on NAFORMA data for completion of outputs, staff changes, sub-standard and slow delivery of some outputs from collaborating partners and consultants.

Outcome 3 achievements are relatively limited. It was more likely to be difficult as the execution of activities depended on the willingness of national institutions to fully engage. In addition, the decentralisation of governance framework is a socio-political intervention that requires leadership from senior government officials at both national and sub-national levels. Unfortunately the institutional interaction and coordination between TNP staff and senior government officials was somewhat limited.

Visits were undertaken to villages in Liwale, Morogoro Rural, and Babati districts in 2011 to explore and discuss options for REDD+ funding, benefit distribution and governance structures with villagers, local government and district forestry officials. This was an opportunity to commence dialogue with REDD+ beneficiaries and to get to understand their perspective. However, the dialogue with these communities was poorly executed and considered flawed and risky by the PSC.

Outcome 4 has contributed to an increasing level of stakeholder participation in debate and dialogue. The level of awareness of REDD+ issues among forest-dependent communities was low to begin with. Awareness-raising activities, training events and policy dialogue initiatives, on both REDD+ in general and specific REDD+ matters, are now routinely conducted in Tanzania. The TNP has been a frequent organizer and fund-raiser for media campaigns.

With support from the TNP specifically, the GoT shared experiences on the international stage at the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP18) of the UNFCCC held in Qatar in 2012. The NRTF hosted a side event highlighting the National REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan and sharing experiences on aspects of designing MRV systems and REDD+ payments. These are all activities that are gradually contributing to a broad understanding of the key policy issues on REDD+.

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABILITY AND UP-SCALING

The impact of the capacity building through the TNP is limited as a result of a combination of design flaws, poor collaboration and coordination. Insufficient consultation at the design stage, poor coordination and collaboration, and unfortunate lack of synchronisation with other projects such as NAFORMA, and the Norwegian supported projects, the NRTF, and TWGs limited the impact of the capacity building. The ET is of the view that perhaps the design team could have taken the opportunity to inform the UN-REDD Policy Board of the evolving situation in Tanzania with respect to the planning for the Norwegian support. Besides raising it as a risk on the TNP, escalating dialogue could have enabled better coordination, collaboration and synchronisation of capacity building activities between the two programmes.

Appropriate capacity building activities were identified such as training of MNRT and TFS staff on remote sensing, MRV, REDD+ safeguards, soil analysis and mapping, data management, forest inventories, reference emission levels, allometric equations, and REDD+ implementation, among others. But the training was conducted as one-off activities with no long term strategy for follow-up and support mechanism.

Synchronisation with NAFORMA and closer collaboration with REDD+ pilot projects, NRTF and TWGs would have provided opportunities for continued learning, sharing experiences, and knowledge transfer. To increase the likelihood for more impact and sustainability, capacity building will need to be part of a transitional process that enables Tanzanians to clearly see the pathway to full output ownership beyond donor funding. Training and capacity building need to be designed with a long-term view with follow-up and progress assessment phases.

The institutional setup necessary for effective implementation of a national REDD+ programme in Tanzania is still evolving. While substantial ground work has been laid to prepare the country for subsequent participation in a performance-based payment system under REDD+ more work is still required. The regulations such as the Executive Agency Act Cap. 245 of 2002, Forest Act Cap. 323 of 2002, Environmental Policy of 1997, Land Policy of 1995, Investment Policy of 1999, Local Government Act of 1982, Environment Management Act Cap. 191 of 2004, and Land Act Cap 113 and Village Land Act Cap. 114 of 1999 which provide policy and legal frameworks to support REDD+ readiness. As acknowledged in the National REDD+ Strategy, but enforcement and operationalization of these policies and other instruments that support the sustainable use of natural resources is weak.

The technical and political understanding of the requirements of implementing basic systems such as MRV, safeguards monitoring and governance systems has progressed at a much slower pace. The

commitment and willingness of the GoT to take full ownership of the process of REDD+ readiness is being questioned because of the slow pace of progress. At this stage there is still need for substantial capacity building to improve institutional governance, ownership and sustainability.

The ET's view is that the current financial and human capacity constraints and conflicting socio-economic demands will limit the ability of the GoT to commit significant finance from its own national budget to sustain the REDD+ readiness process. As the interventions of the TNP were expected to lay the groundwork for activities in later years, some of the activities were never expected to be sustainable but rather to provide a strong basis for subsequent long-term programmes but needing the GoT to take ownership. Outputs such as the capacity needs assessment and estimation of cost elements of REDD+ provide information to support the decision making process.

At the more fundamental level, the lack of a fully resourced REDD+ operational unit in the MNRT is likely to substantially limit the sustainability of components such as MRV systems, safeguards monitoring systems, reporting and REDD+ funds management. As the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation transcend the forestry, agriculture, and energy and various other sectors, policy formulation processes need to be coordinated, monitored, and enforced across these different sectors. Central government needs to support implementing institutions with staff retention and programme continuity.

The support from central government to implementing institutions is limited hence a risk to the sustainability of programmes as staff are constantly moving to new jobs and organisations. It is surprisingly acknowledged that staff frequently engage in activities such as workshops, meetings and unnecessary out of office travel to obtain daily allowances. An organisation cannot properly function when staff members are constantly out of the office in order to earn daily allowances to supplement wages. Agreed annual work plans are severely compromised resulting in delays and sometimes non-delivery.

The notion of sustainability goes along with capacity building. The capacity needs assessment undertaken through Outcome 1 reiterated that capacity relates to "*the ability of individuals, institutions and society in Tanzania to establish and manage a vision for REDD+, key policy objectives and field implementation whilst meeting challenges for REDD+ in a sustainable manner*". Capacity development is a term often misinterpreted or misunderstood when assessed devoid of the national cultural context and the work environment. Lack of commitment and minimal or lack of ownership by the implementing partner's should not be interpreted as lack of capacity but rather competing priorities at times.

To achieve REDD+ readiness, it will be necessary for national institutions to embrace a change in organisational culture so as to improve commitment and accountability. Senior managers will need to enforce behavioural change by creating a rewarding environment that is linked to performance. These core elements are missing and this was acknowledged by staff members that were interviewed during this evaluation.

In designing the safeguards monitoring and MRV systems, a number of key national policy decisions are essential. These include settling on an agreed national forest definition, and calculation of associated Reference Emission Levels (REL), and Reference Levels (RL). In addition, the existence of a legal and administrative custodian of MRV data and data sharing policy will enable clarification of the role of various institutions. In the Tanzanian context, these key elements are still evolving and require immediate focus because they are important external factors influencing the implementation of the TNP.

There are several important REDD+ readiness components still missing as well as opportunities for scaling-up activities that are being implemented through the TNP. Since a REL roadmap is now complete, the next logical step would be to prepare the actual RELs and emission factors for specific

carbon pools and land uses using the NAFORMA data. Safeguards monitoring system, clarification of benefit sharing and financing mechanism also still need to be considered.

IMPACT

The TNP's goals have not yet been achieved but there are intermediate outputs that are attributable to the TNP. The ROtI (Annex 6) conducted during the inception phase of this evaluation concludes that the programmes outcomes and outputs were designed to only lay a foundation for future activities. As such, the outputs have limited direct contribution to key intermediate states identified in the TOC i.e. increased sector participation, enhanced policies / laws to enable stakeholder participation, capacity at the sub-national level and clarification of carbon ownership to name a few.

The TNP has, through Outcome 1, introduced dialogue on the cost elements of REDD+ projects and illuminated the need for a robust dataset to accurately estimate costs. Robust data is part of a functional and well-resourced and coordinated MRV system which in itself is an intermediate state for REDD+ readiness. The Capacity Needs Assessment (CNA) and Cost Curves for REDD+ in Tanzania have enabled much more informed conversations on the realities of REDD+ costs. What remains is to enable the translation of the findings into opportunities for focusing on elements that enhance Tanzania's REDD+ readiness position.

There are concerns from some key stakeholders that Tanzania has been a recipient of disproportionate donor support but the rate of progress and impact is limited. Tanzania should now be in a much better position to robustly design programmes that are better sequenced, aligned and coordinated through learning. It is now possible to analyse activity inter-dependencies. Key constraints that are limiting the impact of international support in general include limited central government commitment to enforce regulatory measures and policies geared towards addressing the underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation. The impact of the TNP is hampered uncertainties in in national REDD+ strategic direction. Unfortunately because of operating in the shadow of the much larger Norwegian support, the TNP has been trivialized into workshops and a convenient activity for discretionary funds.

CONCLUSIONS

The TNP is relevant and so are three of the four outcomes. However, the effectiveness, sustainability and likelihood for significant impacts are stifled by a combination of poor coordination and collaboration, lack of national strategic direction and flawed design that lacked robust analysis of the national context to identify key risks.

In designing the TNP, a more explicit strategy would have been to build upon existing in-country capacity within government, research institutes and CSOs and harmonize with activities supported by the Norwegian Embassy. However, in reality, the operating environment was more difficult for the UN agencies to support the achievement of the intentions of this strategy. This is partly because the rate of progress to implement essential REDD+ institutional frameworks has been slow, and stifled by limited capacity. In addition, the UN agencies system was not flexible enough to accommodate the evolving situation in the design of the TNP.

The uncertainties at the time of designing the TNP resulted in many implementation challenges. The status of REDD+ readiness in Tanzania is moderately unsatisfactory considering the length of time the TNP and other bilateral support programmes have operating in the country and the amount of resources that have been available to the country. There is probably no other country with comparable funding for REDD readiness.

Conclusions about the overall performance of the TNP are summarised in Table 1.1 below as well as in Section 7 of this report. The overall performance of the TNP has been moderately unsatisfactory with positive outputs and minimal impact.

Table 1-1: Summary of Evaluation of Programme Performance[1]

Criterion	Rating	Summary Assessment
Concept and relevance of the NP		
Design	MU	Moderately unsatisfactory
Relevance	R	Relevant
Results and contribution to stated objectives		
Delivery of Outputs	MS	Moderately satisfactory
Effectiveness	MU	Moderately unsatisfactory
Efficiency	MU	Moderately unsatisfactory
Cross-cutting issues:		
Gender	S	Satisfactory
Capacity Development	MS	Moderately satisfactory
Normative Products	MS	Moderately satisfactory
Sustainability	MU	Moderately unlikely
Up-scaling	ML	Moderately likely
Likelihood of Impact	MU	Moderately unlikely
Factors affecting performance		
Programme Management and Coordination	MU	Moderately unsatisfactory
Human and Financial Resources Administration	MS	Moderately satisfactory
Technical Backstopping and Supervision	MS	Moderately satisfactory
Government participation and ownership	MU	Moderately unsatisfactory
Monitoring, reporting and evaluation	MS	Moderately satisfactory
Overall Programme Performance	**MU**	

[1] **Agency coordination and implementation; outcomes; overall programme results:** Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S) Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), Highly Unsatisfactory (HU).

Sustainability: Likely (L); Moderately Likely (ML); Moderately Unlikely (MU); Unlikely (U).

Relevance: relevant (R) or not relevant (NR).

Impact: Significant (S), Minimal (M), Negligible (N).

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations are formulated based on the ET's view on what could have been done to enhance the opportunity for Tanzania to achieve a state of REDD+ readiness. During the evaluation, it was noted that discussions for a possible second phase were underway. The first set of recommendations address the UN-REDD agencies with regards to programme design. The second set of recommendations informs the UN agencies and other donors, the third set is for consideration by the Got while technical recommendations should be considered by all parties.

Recommendations for the UN agencies with regards to programme design

1. Noting that national circumstances can be complex, it is necessary to design programmes that have substantive adaptive capacity to adjust outputs to re-align with evolving national context. In some cases, decisions should be taken to terminate a programme if implementation environments become untenable. It is important that programme design is based on robust analytical foundation based on broad consultation and collaboration with national institutions. This means that monitoring and evaluation frameworks must contain detailed risk analysis, mitigation measures, and escalation process to resolve major problems swiftly. Once the Norwegian government and the GoT signed the cooperation agreement in 2008, perhaps the TNP design team should have escalated the matter with the UN-REDD Programme Board as a mitigation measure. In general, inherent risk management strategies for large programmes can include creating multiple phases and feasibility assessments before committing to a full programme.
2. If a Phase II is agreed upon, it must be needs-based and country-driven. The design should then incorporate a clear exit or a scale-back strategy which allows national institutions to see the end point and the structure of the handover process. The strategy, among other things, may include embedding technical experts to mentor and provide technical support to national institutions such as the model adopted by the NAFORMA project (the notion of "job shadowing" where a "Chief Technical Advisor" is provided over the duration of the project or phase. Such an approach would build rapport with local counterparts to create the necessary team dynamics that encourage team work. Not that this approach also requires local institutions to commit to making this relationship work.
3. The One UN principle presents an opportunity to minimise what Tanzanians have described as a confusing operating environment. It is necessary that the UN Agencies, in addition to reporting as one via UNDAP, channel future activities through an integrated programme that does not separate activities by agency. As noted in the Vietnam national Programme evaluation, such an approach would reduce administrative burdens on national institutions and also enable the UN agencies to speak with one voice.
4. Noting that the use of the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer (HACT) is unlikely to succeed due to inherent risk within national institutions, the approach would be for the UN agencies to channel programme funding through one coordination agency in line with Recommendation 3.

For consideration by international donor agencies

5. Having simultaneous bilateral or multilateral support programmes often results in coordination challenges and risks of activity overlap and duplication. In this case, having the TNP operating side-by-side with initiatives supported directly by the Norwegian

Embassy increases the administrative burden, reporting, and coordination required of the GoT.

6. Consider undertaking a thorough needs analysis and any potential conflict with existing or planned support projects. Where multiple projects already exist, consideration should be given to harmonising programmes that share similar or potentially overlapping goals. Of course it has to be acknowledged that in certain circumstances harmonisation of programmes supported by different international agencies is problematic but the Tanzanian case warranted such an approach. The mechanics of harmonising the two programmes is beyond the scope of this evaluation but this is something the GoT, MNRT, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the VPO, and the NRTF, and possibly Ministry of Finance could review so as to identify better ways to improve coordination and increase efficiencies

For consideration by the GoT

7. Noting the history of policy failures and present challenges to address the underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation, it is necessary to enhance and accelerate the REDD+ readiness process by taking a more direct approach to improve adherence to national policies and regulations. It is worth considering ensuring accountability documents such as annual and long-term business plans of government departments in different sectors incorporate strategic components of the REDD+ framework. In doing so, it also necessitates implementing accountability measures that enforce active adherence to national policies across the sectors as part of progress monitoring. Note that this does not occur in a short space of time because it requires political champions to carry this into policy reform and implementation process therefore it requires a sustained effort. In particular, this would address the cross-sectoral coordination challenges involving
    a. The agriculture and energy sectors, which have a significant impact on deforestation and forest degradation.
    b. Enable relevant sector reviews and strategic studies to determine options and a roadmap for policy harmonisation between these key sectors and the forestry sector.

8. The REDD+ team in MNRT only has one staff member. MNRT will not be able to implement any meaningful activities without staff resources. MNRT, in collaboration with VPO, NRTF, could urgently consider establishing and properly resourcing an operational team to take over the activities completed under the TNP. If MNRT is not the preferred, at this point the location of such a team would not matter but such a team needs to be able to translate policies into operational activities and also be able to translate technical and scientific material into policy advice. It is important that the results and momentum built through the TNP, NAFORMA and other REDD+ activities continues. Along with this option, national staff and agency managers be encouraged to take a proactive role in development of donor supported projects. The ET noted that nationals working within the GoT are poorly remunerated. These staff are required to work on programme activities in addition to their daily office routine. Unless there is a financial motivation to do so, they will be inclined to conduct other duties that provide them with additional income rather than working on programme activities.

9. The NCMC is a key component of the REDD+ framework but the prolonged process to make it operational is causing profound drawbacks on key policy and technical decisions. Many of the technical recommendations given below are dependent on the future operational status and *modus operandi* of the NCMC. Consideration should be given to accelerating the decision process to operationalize it, otherwise much effort could in fact be wasted.

Technical Recommendations for up-scaling

10. Noting the existence of significant information and data generated through TNP, the nine REDD+ Pilot projects, and NAFORMA, Tanzania is at a point where it is ready to operationalize a national MRV system, RELs, safeguards monitoring systems and many other REDD+ readiness activity data. The team proposed in Recommend 8 could be tasked to.

    a. Determine options and methodological approaches to up-scaling outputs mentioned above and take charge of outstanding work on national LULC, RELs and soil carbon estimation through up-scaling activities and products started under NAFORMA. Such a team can then be supported by an international technical advisor

    b. To support Recommendation 8 and noting that sectoral Technical Working Groups are already established to support the NRTF, a coordination framework would be necessary to bring together institutional technical experts to work with the proposed MNRT team to continue supporting the NRTF and the NCMC once it is established.

PART 1. INTRODUCTION

1 CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME

1. By 2010, the Tanzanian Mainland had 33.4 million hectares (ha) of forest and Zanzibar had a vegetation cover of just over 63 000 ha. The estimated rate of forest loss through deforestation and forest degradation is roughly 1.2% of the total forest area. Forest loss is attributed to the high reliance on wood which provides 95% of the country's energy supply. There is recognition that market and policy failures, rapid rural expansion, urbanization, and poverty are indirectly behind the causes of deforestation and forest degradation.

2. Participatory forest management (PFM) has been in practice in Tanzania for many years and is regarded as a central element in ensuring sustainable forest management. Two major approaches form the basis for participatory forest management in the country and these are Community-Based Forest management and Joint Forest Management (JFM). In addition, a large set of national policies has also been in place for a substantial length of time.

3. The UN-REDD Programme (Global) is the United Nations (UN) collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries and was launched in 2008. The UN-REDD Programme (Global) supports nationally led REDD+ processes and promotes the informed and meaningful involvement of all stakeholders, including Indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities, in national and international REDD+ implementation.

4. International support programmes for climate change, forestry and natural resource sectors go back more than 20 years. Since 2008 in addition to ongoing national programmes, key externally funded programmes include those funded by the Norwegian government, which include REDD+ Policy Project, the Climate Change Impact, Adaptation and Mitigation (CCIAM) research initiative and nine REDD+ Pilot Projects. In April 2008, Norway and Tanzania signed a Letter of Intent on a Climate Change Partnership and cooperation for an initial period of five years. The partnership focused on developing pilot programmes to reduce deforestation; developing methodologies for carbon accounting; and promoting research and capacity building programmes related to climate change challenges. It was during this period (late 2008) that the National REDD+ Task Force (NRTF) was formed chaired by the VPO, and supported by a Secretariat along with representatives from MNRT, Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD), and the Prime Minister's Office.

5. Tanzania has received substantial support for activities that will subsequently support the establishment of a national REDD+ MRV system through Norwegian support. A recent real-time evaluation of the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) programme indicates that between 2009 and 2014, Norway's financial support will total over USD83 million and allocates nearly 30% (USD 25 million) to project level MRV and reference level development. It is important to put this level of support and investment in the context of progress to date. With this level of funding, perhaps more progress could have been achieved compared to what is currently observable.

6. The national forestry resources monitoring and assessment (NAFORMA) was designed and established under the National Forest Programme of Tanzania as a priority activity for the FBD of the MNRT. The Programme started in 2009, jointly funded and supported by the Finnish government and FAO with some contribution from the GoT totalling USD 6 million. In the context of this evaluation, the REDD+ Policy Project and NAFORMA are important and significant in relation to the design of the TNP in Tanzania but note that they are not part of this evaluation. In particular, NAFORMA had seven objectives, which broadly focused on establishing a national forest monitoring system and development of tools and contribution to REDD+ MRV methods. It

is noted that the initial design of NAFORMA did not include elements of REDD+ but was subsequently adjusted to reflect changing circumstances.

7. Tanzania prepared a Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) to the Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 2008 and submitted the Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP) in November 2010. In recent years, the GoT has taken an aggressive stance to implement changes in policies, laws, programmes, regulations and guidelines relating to the forestry sector, in particular decentralisation to the district as the operational unit of government and to the village for the actual implementation on the ground. There has been accelerated evolution of national development policies including the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, known as the MKUKUTA (Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania) and its three clusters (Cluster 1: Growth and reduction of income poverty, Cluster 2: Improved quality of life and social well-being, and Cluster 3: Governance and accountability).

8. At the global level, as of 2008, much of the discourse on REDD and REDD+ was only just starting to emerge through dialogue via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) proceedings since 2005, the Bali Action Plan (2007) and Decision 2/CP.13. Guidance on key components such as benefit distribution systems, reference emission levels (REL), leakage, MRV and so on were very much undefined and still emerging. Developing countries particularly struggled to understand this complex environment especially because guidance on specific actions was limited.

9. Tanzania faced significant challenges in terms of the complexity and sectoral disaggregation of the root causes of deforestation and degradation. Among the root cause was agricultural expansion, energy needs, and plantation development challenges notwithstanding the financial and human capacity constraints within government departments to adequately respond to these nationally significant challenges and numerous historical policy failures. The TNP came in as an additional responsibility for MNRT. It is noted that a REDD+ team was created in MNRT with five staff comprising a lawyer, three foresters and an economist. This level of resource was insufficient to interpret the TNP document. Perhaps it was also a failure on the part of MNRT to realise the complexity of the requirements to deliver a TNP.

10. It is within this context that the UN-REDD National Programme in Tanzania was designed and approved in December 2009. The funds transferred in January 2010 were based on the budget presented in Table 1-1 below as well as the four outcomes i.e.

- Outcome 1: National governance framework and institutional capacities strengthened for REDD+.
- Outcome 2: Increased capacity for capturing REDD+ elements within National Monitoring, Assessment, Reporting and Verification systems.
- Outcome 3: Improved capacity to manage REDD+ and provide other forest ecosystem services at district and local levels.
- Outcome 4: Broad based stakeholder support for REDD+ in Tanzania.

Table 1-1: Programme Approved Budget

UN Agency	Approved Programme Budget[2] (USD)	Amount Transferred[3] (USD)
FAO	1 400 000	1 400 000
UNDP	2 400 000	2 400 000
UNEP	200 000	200 000
Indirect support costs	280 000	280 000
Grand Total	4 280 000	4 280 000

11. The Tanzania Quick Start Initiative was planned for completion by September 2011 but it was extended to June 2013 although at the time of this evaluation, some activities were still not completed. The MNRT, the VPO and three UN agencies: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) implemented the programme for the Government of Tanzania (GoT). Key stakeholders in the implementation of the TNP included the National REDD+ Task Force, Institute of Resource Assessment, Royal Norwegian Embassy (Tanzania), and a host of Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and sub-national public agencies.

[2] The total budget for the entire duration of the Programme, as specified in the signed Submission Form and National Programme Document. This information is available on the MPTF Office GATEWAY: http://mptf.undp.org

[3] Amount transferred to the participating UN Organization from the UN-REDD Multi-Partner Trust Fund. This information is available on the MPTF Office GATEWAY: http://mptf.undp.org

2 THE EVALUATION

2.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

12. The objective of the evaluation was to:

- Provide evidence of the results meeting accountability requirements.
- Assess the status of REDD+ readiness in Tanzania, including gaps and challenges to be addressed and the TNP's possible role in the future REDD+ process in the country.
- Promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among the participating UN Organizations and other partners. In particular, the evaluation will identify lessons of operational and technical relevance for reference by future programmes.
- Identify key building blocks that have successfully brought about the desired outcomes.

13. The primary audience for the evaluation are the Government of Tanzania, the three participating UN Organizations and the programme-implementing partners. The secondary audience for the evaluation will be the UN-REDD Policy Board and national REDD+ stakeholders.

2.2 Methodology of the Evaluation

14. Following the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) methodology, the ET sought to understand the UN-REDD National Programme intended impacts and mapping out the corresponding Theory of Change (TOC). The basis for the evaluation framework is a series of tailored questions, judgement criteria and indicators against the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Criteria (DAC). These cover the following five thematic areas:

- **Relevance:** the extent to which the National Programme and its intended outcomes or outputs are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of the intended beneficiaries. Relevance also considers the extent to which the initiative is aligned with the UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015[4] (or the UN-REDD Programme Framework Document[5] for Programmes approved before November 2010) and the corporate plans of the three participating UN Organizations. Relevance *vis*–à–*vis* other REDD+ or REDD+-related programmes implemented in the country should also be examined, in terms of synergies, complementarities and absence of duplication of efforts.
- **Effectiveness**: measures the extent to which the National Programme's intended results (outputs and outcomes) have been achieved or the extent to which progress towards outputs and outcomes has been achieved.
- **Efficiency:** measures how economically resources or inputs (such as funds, expertise and time) are converted to achieving stipulated outcomes and outputs.

[4] The UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015 is available on:

http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4598&Itemid=53

[5] The UN-REDD Programme Framework Document is available on:

http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4&Itemid=53

- **Sustainability:** analyses the likelihood of sustainable outcomes at programme termination, with attention to sustainability of financial resources, the socio-political environment, catalytic or replication effects of the project, institutional and governance factors, and environmental risks.
- **Impact:** measures to what extent the National Programme has contributed to, or is likely to contribute to intermediate states towards impact, such as changes in the governance systems and stakeholder behaviour, and impact on people's lives and the environment. The evaluation will assess the likelihood of impact by critically reviewing the programmes intervention strategy (Theory of Change) and the presence of the required drivers and assumptions for outcomes to lead to intermediate states and impact.

15. The evaluation framework constituted the main instrument for data collection during the evaluation. However, the framework is treated as a guide because it evolved during delivery of the assignment. The ET analysed the project log frame to determine project design appropriateness and link to outcomes.

16. The evaluation consisted of the following phases

Table 2-1: Summary of Phases and Timeframe for the Evaluation

Activity	Timing
Inception phase: Draft inception report delivered Call for comments on inception report	*26 August to 10 September* 2 September 9 September
Evaluation mission phase: Interviews	*10 September to 01 October*
Reporting phase: Analysis Draft final report delivered Review of draft final report Final report delivered	*3 October to 2 December*
Presentation of evaluation results	December 2013

17. The ET interviewed staff in the UN agencies, high profile leaders in the ministries, the private sector, higher learning institutions, NGOs and villagers. In addition, the ET evaluated key documents e.g. programme documents, annual work plans and held consultative meetings with the client throughout the process of the review. Annex 4 contains a list of interviewees.

18. Evaluations of this nature are important to identify opportunities for improving the delivery of programmes of national significance. However, for the evaluation to be useful, it is important that all parties and stakeholders provide feedback. To do so, stakeholders need substantial notice of the evaluation intentions. It seems some stakeholders were not fully aware of the process and timing of this evaluation. Nonetheless, key stakeholders were willing to adjust the schedule to accommodate the ET's requirements.

PART 2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION

3 PROJECT CONCEPT AND RELEVANCE

3.1 Design

Table 3-1: Ratings for Programme Design

Outcome	Rating
Outcome 1	S
Outcome 2	MU
Outcome 3	U
Outcome 4	MU

Complex global discourse and complex national circumstances

19. The design of the programme made significant attempts to align the intended outcomes with the REDD+ readiness roadmap but grossly underestimated the timeframe for implementation. There was insufficient effort and analysis of context to ensure national institutions were in fact able to fully commit and take ownership of the programme. There were failures to design the programme in the context of existing programmes especially the Norwegian supported programmes. Note that the TNP is not solely to blame for failing to fully assess the context, but it should have been a joint effort with the GoT.

20. There is a broader global challenge and potential weakness in the REDD+ readiness phases. The overlap of phases makes it somewhat difficult to identify progress in each phase unless there is a concerted effort to map out key activities and their transition into business as usual. It is then necessary that agencies providing funding and technical support set clear programme timelines and signal their exit strategy as an upfront way to transfer ownership and build capacity.

21. While the design concept and the outcomes are consistent with the global UN-REDD Programme's own vision and strategy, intersection of the TNP strategies and national circumstances, contextual baselines, and national development strategies does require tailoring. Adapting to national circumstances is essential. The outputs under Outcome 1 focus on delivering intermediate states at the central government level and across sectors and so were those in Outcomes 3 and 4. In reality, the timeframe was insufficient because these elements are in fact significant undertakings, being both transformational and long-term, and were unlikely to be fully achievable under this programme, which is a "quick start" initiative.

22. The TNP was designed to strengthen Tanzania's REDD+ Readiness as a component of the GoT's evolving REDD Strategy, and was intended to closely integrate with other REDD+ activities in the country as well as laying the groundwork for activities in later years. At a high level, the Tanzanian context required a strategic design, which encompasses a phased approach and exit points or handover of outputs from each Outcome than an end-to-end programme. Note that the use of *exit or handover* refers to a gradual transition or scaling down of involvement of donor agencies in the implementation process based on achievements under each outcome. The design lacks intermediate phases and options to terminate the programme if the relevance diminishes or the implementation is poor. A clearly exit strategy outlining the transition process would enable the Tanzanian government identify the magnitude of commitment and the effort required to sustain the outputs from the programme in order to achieve the intended impacts.

23. The key challenges for Tanzania are to address the increasing rates of deforestation and forest degradation, address the broader economic issues of poverty, and to ensure forestry regulatory and sustainable management policies are successfully implemented to support participation in a performance based REDD+ regime. The policy failings resulting from weak institutional governance and capacity at both local and regional government levels create challenges in efforts to reduce or prevent continuing deforestation and forest degradation.

24. The design of the TNP attempts to address the inadequacies of governance and the institutional framework through Outcome 1. It specifically supports the development of the National REDD+ Strategy (NRS) (Output 1.1) with cross-sectoral institutional and individual capacities built to deliver the REDD production chain (Output 1.2), institutional capacity building and enhancing the understanding of cost curves for REDD+ in Tanzania. There were assumptions that the implementing institutions would be fully committed to the objectives and willing to sustain the momentum. For the more tangible outputs such as the capacity needs assessment and assessing the cost elements of REDD+, counterpart participation is probably less critical. However, for the less tangible outputs such as institutional frameworks and cross-sectoral and individual capacity building, counterpart commitment is a necessity therefore it is important to determine whether such commitment exists and why it might be absent. The set of assumptions must be coherent with national circumstances through understanding existing perception. For the TNP, some assumptions were implicit while others were explicit in the logical framework matrix. On the other hand, the explicit assumptions focused on the needs – for instance these assumptions related to Outcome 1 outputs:

- Strong stakeholder participation and technical assistance are required
- Complex training methodologies are required; risk of limited understanding
- Complex economic training required on cost curves
- Thorough collection and analysis of REDD studies required.

25. It is unclear from the design document whether the GoT took note and understood these assumptions. Section 5 provides a more detailed discussion on how design architecture affected the programme implementation.

26. The design team drew much of the background from a wide range of sources including Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) proceedings since 2005, the Bali Action Plan (2007) and Decision 2/CP.13. There was limited specific guidance at the global level on what constitutes an optimal institutional framework, ecosystem services, benefit sharing and payment mechanism, MRV systems, and safeguard monitoring system. The logical framework is therefore based on best knowledge available at the time. However, over time various sources of guidance material have become available. These include United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (UNFCCC) (2009b,c), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (IPCC) (2006); Global Observations of Forest and Land Cover Dynamics, GOFC-GOLD (2010), and many more countries have provided guidance on identifying data and information needs to support a robust REDD+ policy processes. In anticipation of evolving knowledge and guidance, it would have been strategic to design the TNP with short phases to allow adaptive implementation as new guidance emerges.

27. Outcome 2 design appropriately identifies the need for an MRV, and a system for information synthesis as well as capacity requirements to run these systems. The UNFCCC has made it clear that the eligibility of countries for participating in global compliance markets or non-market compliance mechanisms will require having compliance-grade monitoring and reporting system and accounting of emissions and removals. By the very fact of a being a Party of the UNFCCC, it means that in undertaking REDD+ activities, Tanzania is encouraged to set up a robust and transparent national forest monitoring system comprised of a monitoring function and a MRV

function. Outcome 2 appropriately builds on these requirements but the key challenges for implementation is that the current institutional framework in Tanzania does not provide sufficient strategic guidance on how the individual components come together for achieving REDD+ readiness.

28. The GoT does not appear to have been ready for a fast-paced process to change institutional and legal frameworks to accommodate REDD+. This is a major oversight in the context analysis. Attempting to address high-level aspects of national governance and institutional framework through Outcome 1 over a relatively short-timeframe was ambitious. Strengthening of institutional capacity is a process that evidently takes longer than two to three years in a national development context. The limited institutional linkages and poor policy implementation across agriculture, energy and forestry sectors made it much more difficult to ensure wide stakeholder consultation and coverage to match outcomes to national interests both in the short and long-term.

29. In terms of alignment with the REDD+ readiness roadmap, Outcomes 1 and 2 are in line with REDD+ readiness Phase 1, which entails defining the national strategy, capacity building and establishment of monitoring systems while Outcome 3 would enable development of options for benefit sharing and payment mechanisms. The shortcoming of Outcome 1 is that by the time the TNP started, work on the National REDD+ Strategy was already included in the REDD+ Policy Project coordinated by the NRTF. This significantly weakened the position of the TNP and the poor coordination and collaboration with the NRTF, MNRT and VPO further diminishes the potential for intended impact.

30. Nevertheless, the capacity needs assessment (Output 1.2) was clearly essential and an important part of Phase 1 of a REDD+ readiness roadmap so this aspect fitted well with the context. All outputs under Outcome 2 were appropriate but perhaps the execution was poor and the timeframe underestimated. Evidently activities such as development of RELs and national carbon maps were also over-ambitious outputs for the duration of the Programme. In addition, it is highly questionable why these activities were not considered more in the context of NAFORMA.

31. Under Outcome 3, there was an initial intention to test decentralised REDD governance in pilot districts and to outline a payment distribution system. While pilot activities are relevant to include in the design as they are critical for the REDD+ readiness Phase 2 (i.e. Monitoring and Demonstration), nine pilot projects were already being initiated supported by the Norwegian programme. It would have been pragmatic to find ways to take advantage of interim plans for pilot projects and possibly use one or several of these to jointly test specific policies. The GoT, through the NRTF and TWGs should have taken leadership to harmonise objectives of the different programmes. Again, this highlights the risks that the weak institutional collaboration and coordination presents for bilateral support programmes in Tanzania.

32. Outcome 4, (broad-based stakeholder support for REDD in Tanzania) has some components that are poorly conceived and outputs that are likely to have limited impacts. Being a quick start initiative, achieving broad-base support for REDD in Tanzania would perhaps require a strategy that involves the joint effort of central and regional government. The historical policy failings and the poor coordination and collaboration between national institutions and indeed at the political level makes it difficult to achieve broad-based stakeholder support unless the interventions are embedded in programmes that are familiar to beneficiaries. From a TOC perspective, the impact of broad-based support for REDD+ would most likely be realised through familiar programmes such as PFM, JFM and national forest monitoring, where subnational structures already existed. The results framework is not explicit on interaction with the PFM or JFM programmes.

33. The TNP design allowed Tanzania to share experiences on the international stage including attending and supporting the NRTF to host side event at UNFCCC COPs highlighting the National

REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan aspects of designing MRV systems and REDD+ payments. These are all activities that are gradually contributing to a broad understanding of the key policy issues on REDD+ globally.

34. With respect to bilateral programmes, the TNP came along in the wake of the much larger Norwegian supported REDD+ Policy Project, the nine REDD+ pilot project, and the CCIAM. The design process needed to be more deliberate to coordinate and collaborate with these programmes through the NRTF and simply consider adding value or even prepare for subsequent up scaling to avoid operating in the shadow of a much larger programme. It is much more difficult to receive the necessary attention from GoT. This is particularly pertinent for all four Outcomes. For future programmes, there is a need to either establish a clear point of difference or establish a platform that demonstrates a shared vision with the objectives of the existing bilateral projects such as REDD+ Policy Project and CCIAM or national driven programmes such as JFM and PFM. We discuss this further in Section 3.2 (Relevance).

35. Some government officials are of the opinion that the UN agencies largely drove the design process and the consultation process was insufficient, too short and perceived as seeking endorsement of preconceived ideas. From this evaluation, it seems there is a divergence in views and perceptions around the programme objectives and intended outcomes. Some stakeholders see value in the programme while some believe the programme is simply to satisfy the agenda of the UN REDD global programme. However, the ET views this divergence as symptomatic of the complex nature of REDD+ and extended global discourse on developing real actions. It is also indicative of poor collaboration and coordination process, which in turn resulted in a programme that was not fully taken on-board by the national institutions. At the Outcome level, the UN REDD Programme outcomes appeared perhaps too similar to the REDD+ Policy project and this caused some initial confusion.

36. The ET views this divergence as symptomatic of the low level of understanding of the REDD+ concept and the long-standing global discourse on what constitutes real actions and outcomes. The GoT and most stakeholders in CSOs and the private sector acknowledge uncertainties and the slow pace of the evolution of the international REDD+ mechanism. Informants raised questions on what benefits to expect and when they will be distributed to needy communities.

Weak institutional capacity and weak consultation process

37. The effectiveness of the TNP depended largely on the design architecture, level of national ownership and coordination, and its ability to integrate into pre-existing national programmes and other bilateral support mechanisms. The ET acknowledges that policy projects are not simple to implement because there is the need to understand and identify the correct process to influence stakeholders at various levels. This takes a great deal of collaboration, cultural integration, understanding organisation culture and solid counterpart arrangements (the notion of equal counterpart). Both parties have to see value and the parties have to have a shared vision. The ET is of the opinion that perhaps both parties struggled to identify shared vision as well as a key outcomes because of the quick start nature of the TNP. Section 6.1 discusses the institutional arrangements of both the UN agencies and national institutions in more detail. From a design perspective, the splitting of activities and budget among the three UN agencies created implementation challenges.

38. As noted, the institutional framework and capacity was weak from the onset. The Programme Document was developed through a series of discussions, missions and consultations between UN experts, Tanzanian government officials and a wide range of stakeholders. This analysis identified some of the key barriers to achieving reductions in deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania. While it appears that engagement and discussion with the GoT took place during the

design phase in order to ensure adequate alignment to national policies and priorities, it does not appear to have led or translated into full national ownership of the programme.

39. During the course of this evaluation, through informant comments, it became apparent that the UN agencies might have perceived the consultation as agreement while stakeholders viewed it as sharing of pre-conceived ideas and seeking endorsement. This highlights the need to understand the cultural and social values in a country in order to create a shared vision and goal. In certain cultural groups, there is a tendency to avoid open disagreement. In circumstances where an individual is not necessarily conversant with the subject, there is a tendency to take a "watch and see what happens" stance. Anecdotally, this may have been the case when the consultations to design the TNP took place.

40. The ET accepts that programmes and projects are built on assumptions on how and why they are supposed to achieve the agreed objectives through the selected strategy. This set of assumptions constitutes the programme theory or 'theory of change' and can be explicit (e.g. in a logical framework matrix) or implicit in a project/programme document. It is important to state that assumptions must also be realistic and based on a comprehensive assessment of national circumstances.

41. The design of the TNP excluded the involvement of the private sector because of the quick start nature. Furthermore, the GoT expressed reluctance to involve the private sector Perhaps future programmes need to consider engaging the private sector as some underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation emanate from private sector activities. Climate change and REDD+ is as much a concern to the private sector as it is for the public sector and CSO. In many Annex 1 countries it is common that implementation of projects is undertaken by a mix of public, private, and research institutions as a way of increasing national capacity. There is a need to look beyond institutional boundaries by taking a more business-like approach (change management strategy) and thinking of the post-transition scenario. As such, any capacity building needed to focus on institutions that would eventually adopt the outputs into business-as-usual.

42. Selecting the MNRT to host TNP is both appropriate because of its role as the REDD+ Focal Point. It is clear that the MNRT has constraints and challenges (financial, human, governance, and political pressure), which in fact were clearly identified from the beginning. Assessing the MNRT as high risk and having limited capacity to manage the TNP is therefore not surprising. However, in the long-term, MNRT is likely to play an important role in operationalizing and hosting key components of the REDD+ such as MRV systems, safeguard monitoring systems, and NFI built through NAFORMA. It is therefore strategic to build capacity and position MNRT and its respective agencies to become the custodian of these systems in the future.

43. The lack of capacity to manage programme funds within the MNRT meant that funds were disbursed using UN Agency systems (section 5.2). Such an assessment also led the UN agencies to be quite risk averse in dealing with government institutions. Although procurement of services is transparent and based on open tender processes, implementation of activities is on the basis on trust placed in individuals (trusted consultants) rather than institutions. Such an environment led to an escalation of breakdown in trust, limited ownership and subsequently significant inefficiencies and slow implementation of activities.

Outcomes too broad and activities too thinly spread

44. One of the premises for applying the TOC in designing a programme is to capture organisation culture conducive to getting IP ownership and buy-in from senior management and key decision makers. As explicitly stated, the TNP is designed around the National REDD Production Chain (NRPC). Figure 3-1 identifies key elements at field, national and international levels for the delivery of actual, lasting, achievable, reliable and measurable emission reductions (ERs) from

deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania. In each of the four quadrants of the NRPC, there are complex interactions between sub-national, national, and international frameworks to achieve and participate in performance-based payments.

Figure 3-1: National REDD Production Chain



Outcome 1 attempts to address both Quadrant 1 (Sustainable forest management) and Quadrant 2 2 (regulation and governance). Outcome 2 addresses components of Quadrant 2. In the context of of Tanzania; these are highly complex and politically charged components that require a programme programme to exert a high degree of influence. Influence can be through financial means or technical means. The Norwegian supported REDD+ Policy Project and the CCIAM in a way also address aspects of both Quadrant 1 and Quadrant 2 but extend into Quadrants 3 and 4 (market and and benefits). The issue here is that during the problem analysis, on the design of both the Norwegian supported programmes and UN-REDD, there was a missed opportunity to map out synergies, gaps and common goals in order to create complementary programmes. It seems there was reluctance to share proposal documents between different programmes. The GoT should have have perhaps taken a lead on ensuring coordination and collaboration occurred at the very start of of each programme.

45. Table 3-2 provides a high-level comparison of the TNP and the REDD+ Policy Project as a way of contextualising what appears to be a duplication of effort at the outcome level.

Table 3-2: Programme Comparison

TNP – Tanzania Quick Start Initiative	REDD+ Policy Project
Outcome 1: National governance framework and institutional capacities strengthened for REDD **Outcome 2:** Increased capacity for capturing REDD elements within National Monitoring, Assessment, Reporting and Verification Systems **Outcome 3:** Improved capacity to manage REDD and provide other forest ecosystem services at district and local levels **Outcome 4:** Broad based stakeholder support for REDD in Tanzania	**National REDD+ Strategy and implementation processes developed through the National REDD+ Task Forces and other stakeholders**
Output 1.1: A Policy Framework for REDD is in place.	Output 1: National REDD Secretariat Strengthened
Output 1.2 Cross-sectoral institutional and individual capacities built to deliver the REDD production chain	Output 2: Mechanisms to Coordinate, Implement and Monitor REDD+ processes strengthened
Output 1.3: FBD has greater capacity to develop and implement the national REDD Strategy in collaboration with other partners	Output 3: Awareness & Outreach plan on REDD+ issues implemented
Output 1.4: Cost curves for REDD in Tanzania established	Output 4: REDD+ Lessons Learning Network established & Information Management Strengthened
Output 1.5: Management oversight for JP provided	Output 5: Social and Environmental Safeguard processes for REDD+ established and implemented
Output 2.1: A system for REDD+ information synthesis and sharing established at TFS and linked to NAFOBEDA	Output 6: National REDD+ Strategy Finalized & Action Plan prepared and implemented
Output 2.2: Training provided to MNRT staff on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)	Output 7: National Carbon Monitoring Centre and REDD+ Financing Mechanism developed and operational
Output 2.3: Forest degradation indices provided for forest landscapes and capacity building for establishment of RL/REL	**Selected CCIAM Projects Focus Areas** To develop and sustain adequacy in national capacity to participate in climate change initiatives and address the effects and challenges of climate change with particular emphasis to the REDD initiatives
Output 2.4: National maps inform delivery of the REDD+ Framework	Development of appropriate climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies in forestry, other land uses, ecosystems and biodiversity management
Output3.1: Decentralized REDD Governance Framework developed and tested in pilot districts.	Assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability on ecosystem services and livelihoods under REDD initiatives
Output 3.2: Payment distribution system outlined.	Policy and legal framework analysis of climate change adaptation and mitigation with emphasis on economic efficiency, ecological effectiveness and wider political legitimacy
Output3.3: REDD payments combined with payments for non-carbon services.	
Output4.1: Improved awareness of REDD at national level.	
Output 4.2: Broad consensus built with forest communities regarding the REDD Framework.	

46. Although it can be noted that the development of the NRS as a process drew much from the UN-REDD framework and UN agency staff provided guidance whenever an opportunity was available, in real terms, it was not as effective as it should have been. There was poor coordination and low level of interaction between UN agencies, the NRTF VPO and MNRT.

47. In designing and implementing an MRV system at the national level, essential data, information, capacity and infrastructure needs, and inter-institutional linkages should have been explored and understood. Information on proposed pilot activities, and research work should have been shared to avoid duplication.

48. Global discourse has progressed significantly in relation to design and implementation of MRV systems and associated methodological approaches for collation of activity data. Three methodological levels to estimate and report carbon emissions and removals can be considered based on IPCC guidance. In order of complexity, the reporting options are:

- Tier 1: Based on the IPCC basic method and default emission factors. These methods use spatially coarse activity data, agricultural statistics and global land cover maps.
- Tier 2: Based on the same methods as Tier 1, but uses country-specific emission factors and activity data.
- Tier 3: Based on high order methods with country-specific models or inventory systems, driven by high-resolution activity data. These methods provide a greater certainty compared to lower tiers, and have a closer link between biomass and soil dynamics.

49. Further guidance is provided for representation of land area in the form of Approach 1, 2, or 3[6]. Approach 1 is the most basic and predominantly utilises pre-existing datasets. Approach 2 provides a national or regional-scale assessment of losses or gains in the area of specific land categories as well as changes between categories. Approach 3 requires spatially explicit observations of LULC and the data may be obtained by either sampling of geographically located points, wall-to-wall mapping, or a combination of the two. Approach 3 is comprehensive and relatively simple conceptually but data intensive to implement.

50. The size of Tanzania and the complexity of land cover change suggest the need for simplicity with gradual and incremental improvement towards a more sophisticated MRV. Outcome 2, Output 2.3 and 2.4 needed additional analysis and adjustment to add value and increase momentum of the NAFORMA project. By the time activities under Outcome 2 were implemented, the Finnish funded NAFORMA project was well and truly underway and had also undergone some adjustments to incorporated components of REDD+. Up-scaling the NAFORMA project and synchronising activities towards the development of baseline national maps was necessary. What is seemingly obvious is that the development of RELs and degradation indices requires land use and land cover as well as inventory data. As such, it was essential to recognise that attempts to undertake such activities without inventory and LULC data was incongruent with what might be considered an appropriate sequence. A better assessment and understanding of interdependencies would have made the planning more effective.

51. It is unfortunate that the sequencing and spread of activities in Outcome 2 (Table 3-2) has reduced the focus and subsequently the utility of the outputs. Analysis of activity inter-dependencies was inadequate and there was minimal recognition that because REDD+ is a new concept, it would result in significant organisational change. There was a need to include a transitional process for institutionalising the outputs and outcomes into MNRT and TFS. The present situation is that the

[6] http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf_files/Chp2/Chp2_Land_Areas.pdf

institutional capacity to run and manage a national forestry sector MRV system is severely depleted and needs to be rebuilt.

52. Staff within UN agencies acknowledged the limitations of the design process. In particular, there appears to have been a desire to move faster when the Tanzanian government was in no position to do so. The ET notes that the 'quick start nature' of the programme meant that once the programme design was approved it became difficult to make major changes to the intervention logic at the outcome level.

53. The objectives of Outcome 3 would seem an ambitious attempt to push for performance-based payments in the absence of an appropriate institutional and governance framework. The indicators clearly showed that there was little awareness of REDD payment distribution options as well as little awareness on governance at district and national levels. To be effective in this outcome, the TNP would have needed to have a significant sphere of influence over the political structures at national, regional, and community levels, which was not the case. It is no surprise that efforts to test the framework's REDD+ payments mechanism did not gain any traction.

54. The national REDD+ framework is perhaps the equivalent of organisational change because it introduces operational risks. At present, the evolution of REDD+ is programme based and is gradually introducing change at every level (political, policy, institutional, community and even individual). More often than not, introducing change to a bureaucracy leads to operational risk which affects staff, organisational culture, internal processes and procedures, management structures, and infrastructure to name a few. Perhaps designing a programme with these factors in mind might lead to a better outcome. Ideally, like any other organisational change, it is necessary to have a change management strategy that encapsulates transition phases and an exit strategy.

3.2 Relevance

Table 3-3: Summary of Relevance Ratings

Outcome	Rating
Outcome 1	Relevant
Outcome 2	Relevant
Outcome 3	Irrelevant[7]
Outcome 4	Relevant

55. The TNP is relevant in the context of addressing the increasing rate of deforestation and forest degradation, and the weak capacity, governance and institutional framework. But of course it needs to be viewed as one of many interventions that form the broader response to Tanzania's national climate change and development strategies.

56. By 2011 issues of climate change had become part of national plans by being included in the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan. However, the lack of clairty and strategic direction made it difficult for the TNP to select and concertrate on a set of strategic interventions which are more likley to lead to desireable impacts. Recently, talks to see Tanzania REDD+ ready by 2016 have emerged but the current state is likely to make this target extremely ambitious.

57. An important component for REDD+ readiness is having the appropriate institutional arrangement and governance framework. As clearly identified in the initial Programme Document (PD), in the Tanzanian context the applicability of REDD+ activities is likely to fall across a range of forest management types. These may include nature reserves, government forest reserves, local

[7] Untimely due to the evolving governance and institutional and legal framework

authority forest reserves, private forests, village land forest reserves and village land in general. It is therefore necessary that there is a robust national governance framework and strong institutional capacity at all levels.

58. A number of inadequacies were evident, including limited baseline data on forestry and inadequate capacity across public institutions to implement REDD+ activities. Norwegian supported programmes identified that developing, optimizing and sustaining readiness and adequacy in capacity to address the challenges brought by climate change will require a number of interventions through raising awareness, training to build capacity at various levels, research, and outreach.

59. The TNP was introduced in the context of several major policies to support forest management in Tanzania. Foremost amongst these is the Forestry Policy (1998), which was operationalized through the Forest Act No. 14 (2002) and the National Forest Programme (2001). These policy and legal documents have been accompanied by regulations and guidelines, including a major effort to involve communities in forest management through the promotion of Participatory Forest Management across both forest reserves and forest on village lands.

60. The TNP was designed to strengthen Tanzania's REDD readiness as a component of the GoT's evolving REDD+ Strategy. The interventions of the TNP are expected to lay the ground work for activities in subsequent years. The Programme compliments several bilateral programs already supporting various components preparing Tanzania for REDD+ readiness. This begs the question of whether a TNP was necessary in light of the presence of the Norwegian programmes that were being planned or in the process of approval. This is an important issue for the GoT to address in relation to future programmes. While Tanzania needs international support to achieve REDD+ readiness, the GoT needs to demonstrate commitment and accountability to deliver on these programmes otherwise donor fatigue may set in. The TNP remains relevant but the design failures, emanating from poor coordination, collaboration and a complex national context diminished the relevance of some activities.

61. The TNP is also relevant because it generally aligns with Tanzania's domestic and international priorities despite the design flaws. Since Tanzania is one of the first countries implementing the TNP, it has the opportunity to demonstrate regional leadership in climate change response and REDD+ processes. The key national policy documents that outline national priorities are the Millennium Development Goals, and the National REDD+ Strategy. However, there are many more policy programmes and processes as described in Section 1 (Context).

62. To address forest loss, the GoT has been identifying interventions that also look at the underlying causes of forest loss apart from the direct causes. Of course, identifying and creating appropriate interventions for some of the underlying causes is always going to be challenging hence a multi-pronged approach is necessary. Some of the underlying causes identified in the programme document include weak or corrupt governance, expanding human populations, and the need for additional farmland. Weak land tenure systems, law enforcement, the lack of land ownership or land use rights for the indigenous and local communities, weak or lacking benefit-sharing mechanisms, high poverty levels, and government policies and food production imperatives are also some of the key underlying causes. Thus, Outcomes 1 and 2, would be relevant to address the fundamental issues of governance at all levels, however, the reality is that the TNP alone cannot address these issues but rather provides direction through globally developed normative products.

63. CNA and Cost Curves for REDD in Tanzania (Output 1.4) are particularly relevant because the two components have assisted in the dialogue on capacity gaps and costs of implementing REDD+ projects. When more data becomes available this work could be further improved.

64. The production of a tool for cost elements of REDD+ is very useful and provides an additional dimension for discussing opportunities from REDD+. However, communicating cost curves is much more difficult due to the very technical nature of the subject. It is acknowledged that it is somewhat challenging to simplify models and concepts – but it also means the target audience, who are unlikely to understand the technical jargon, will not pay attention to studies that would otherwise assist in increasing broader understanding. The ET understands the value of the information presented on cost curves and so would a large proportion of international consultants and professionals. However, such a technical paper cannot be expected to be easily interpreted by the different stakeholders involved in implementing REDD+ activities, for whom English is a second language.

65. Outcome 2 is quite relevant for Tanzania's REDD+ readiness. The initial thinking under this outcome was to establish an information platform linked to NAFOBEDA, develop RELs, and develop baseline maps to inform the REDD+ framework. These are all relevant activities for a REDD+ readiness process Phase 1. The idea to link to NAFOBEDA was also appropriate but the functional status of the database was not clear at the beginning. Subsequent analysis determined that NAFOBEDA cannot be salvaged. Output 2.1 relied on availability of NAFORMA data, which did not become available until 2013. Noting that an MRV system is needed, Outcome 2 had the highest potential for catalysing the development of the key components had more effort been spent on identifying options for integration of existing activities.

66. The fact that Tanzania has received substantial support to develop a national MRV yet the progress has been somewhat modest is of major concern. There is minimal evidence that a functional national MRV system, safeguards monitoring system, RELs, emission factor can be established in the short to medium term. Outcome 2 is relevant but a key concern is whether any amount of funding support would result in better outputs when the combined support to date exceeds USD33 million including that from the Norwegian government.

67. The global UN-REDD Programme Strategy covers the period 2011-2015, and has a mission "To support countries' efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through national REDD+ strategies that transform their forest sectors so as to contribute to human well-being and meet climate change mitigation and adaptation aspirations". This mission supports the vision of seeing the significant reduction in forest and land-based emissions. At the outcome level, the TNP is relevant and takes advantage of normative processes and its core work areas i.e. governance, MRV, stakeholder engagement, benefits frameworks, accountability and sector transformation.

68. The ET is of the view that the broader relevance remains but the TNP has been affected by poor design, poor coordination and collaboration. The applicability of some outputs has diminished over time due to the evolving socio-political environment in Tanzania. The political and institutional framework in Tanzania is complex and the level of governance, policy formulation and implementation at various levels is bureaucratic. The impacts of these factors appear to have been under-estimated at the design stage with a flow-on effect on relevance. The complexity of the government structure suggests that the initial consultation process needed to have a wider coverage. In hindsight, it would now appear that the scope of the consultation process was too limited to gain an understanding of the institutional complexity.

69. Nonetheless, the TNP sought to support the agreed elements of the Tanzanian National Forest Programme (2001-2010), which contains four programmes that aim to put in place sustainable forest management, i.e.

- *Forest Resources Conservation and Management Programme* which aims at promoting gender balanced stakeholder participation in the management of forest resources

prioritizing ecosystem conservation, catchment areas and sustainable utilization of forest resources.

- *Institutions and Human Resources Development Programme* aiming at strengthening institutional set up and coordination, establishing sustainable forest sector funding and improving research, extension services and capacity building of human resources.
- *Legal and Regulatory Framework Programme* focusing on the development of regulatory issues such as the Forest Act, rules, regulations, and guidelines to facilitate operations of participatory management and the private sector.
- *Forestry Based Industries and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme* enhancing forest industry development through private sector investment, improved productivity and efficiency and by seizing income generating opportunities by non-wood forest products.

70. For each of these four programmes, it appears the TNP somewhat drifted away from a deliberate effort to support these programmes. The articulation of outcomes and outputs to support these programmes is not explicit in the outputs. The monitoring framework does not have any indicators that show support for these programmes. Again, the ET views the intention to support these programmes as a scattergun approach to try to address too many elements.

5 RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTION TO STATED OBJECTIVES

5.1 Delivery of Outputs

71. The National Programme closed on 30 June 2013 although a number of activities are note complete but are expected to do so by end December 2013. For each of the 4 outcomes and 15 contributing outputs, the ET has looked at how the TNP has either achieved the outputs on its own or contributed to the outputs and outcomes in the broader context. It should be recognised that there are numerous players working on REDD+ in Tanzania such that it becomes difficult to attribute any single achievement to one programme. The ET's ratings of these outcomes and outputs are based on assessment of AWP, annual reporting, document review and extensive evaluation interviews at national and sub-national levels. These ratings are indicated in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Rating of Outcomes and Outputs

OUTPUT	Description of Target	Evaluators Rating	Status Comment
OUTCOME 1: National governance framework and institutional capacities strengthened for REDD (MS)			
Output 1.1:	A Policy Framework for REDD is in place.	MS	Contributed to partial achievement
Output 1.2	Cross-sectoral institutional and individual capacities built to deliver the REDD production chain	S	Partially achieved
Output 1.3:	FBD has greater capacity to develop and implement the national REDD Strategy in collaboration with other partners	MS	Contributed to partial achievement
Output 1.4:	Cost curves for REDD in Tanzania established	HS	Achieved
Output 1.5:	Management oversight for JP provided	MS	Achieved
OUTCOME 2: Increased capacity for capturing REDD elements within national Monitoring, Assessment, Reporting and Verification (MS)			
Output 2.1:	A system for REDD+ information synthesis and sharing established at TFS and linked to NAFOBEDA	MU	Partially achieved
Output 2.2:	Training provided to MNRT staff on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)	MS	Achieved
Output 2.3:	Forest degradation indices provided for forest landscapes & capacity building for establishment of RL/REL	Ongoing	Partially achieved
Output 2.4:	National maps inform delivery of the REDD+ Framework	S	Achieved
Output 2.5.	Project management	MS	Achieved
OUTCOME 3: Improved capacity to manage REDD and provide other forest ecosystem services at district and local levels. (U)			
Output3.1:	Decentralized REDD Governance Framework developed and tested in pilot districts.	MU	Not achieved
Output 3.2:	Payment distribution system outlined.	U	Not achieved
Output3.3:	REDD payments combined with payments for non-carbon services.	U	Not achieved
OUTCOME 4: Broad-based stakeholder support for REDD in Tanzania (MS)			
Output4.1:	Improved awareness of REDD at national level.	MS	Contributed to partial achievement

OUTPUT	Description of Target	Evaluators Rating	Status Comment
Output 4.2:	Broad consensus built with forest communities regarding the REDD Framework.	MU	Not achieved

72. Outputs under Outcome 1 were achieved in a moderately satisfactory manner. Capacity limitations in MNRT and poor coordination made the execution of activities challenging. The relationship and coordination between activities under the TNP and those supported by the Norwegian Embassy could have been stronger. The ET believes that the TNP could have potentially added more value to the process of charting out technical components to support the gaps and institutional capacity needs.

73. However, some valuable outputs such as the CNA and estimation of costs elements of REDD+ projects were produced. It is noted that a Policy brief was prepared based on the CNA report. What remains of concern is how these outputs will be utilised. This is a matter of national ownership and leadership by the GoT. The report on estimating cost elements of REDD+ in Tanzania presents a good basis for national dialogue on the realities of REDD+ in order to manage community expectations. The discussion on costs is one that is often missing in dialogue with communities whose perceptions focus on the benefits of REDD+.

74. Support was provided for training of high level decision makers (including Permanent Secretaries, Chief Executives, and Directors from several ministries) through visits to REDD+ pilot projects and a sensitization workshop on social and environmental safeguards for REDD. As noted, the national REDD+ framework in Tanzania is in desperate need of higher government commitment and political champions in every sector in order to be effective.

75. Just how effective the training provided to the NRTF and the TWG has been is difficult to measure. However, discussions with representative members suggest that the level of understanding of the REDD+ framework at both the policy and technical levels remains moderate. One would expect the TWG to be aggressively active in designing the technical frameworks, tools, and strategies to support the policy process spearheaded by the NRTF. However, the level of engagement by the TWGs seems relatively limited and in fact, members seem to have limited understanding of what their role should be. It is not entirely the role of the TNP to educate these groups but it should be a joint effort across the multiple activities.

76. On occasions, the quality of outputs presented by contracted national consultants did not meet expected standards to the point that letters of agreement were cancelled and contracts terminated. This is a typical challenge with any project implementation but it also demonstrates the problems that many developing countries will face as they attempt to up skill local consultants to be able to produce outputs of international standard.

77. In relation to the above point, whether it is institutions or individuals undertaking consultancy work, it is fundamental that procurement, preparation of ToRs, and project management frameworks must identify risks and implement mitigation measures. For those in charge of working with national consultants, it is important that frameworks be in place to regularly monitor contracts and work collaboratively with consultants. In some instance, support mechanisms may be necessary to improve the quality of results. These sentiments apply more specifically to national institutions and their respective management. The procurement processes do need to be transparent to enable enforcement of contractual legal obligations where necessary.

78. Although delivery of Outputs under Outcome2 is late, it is exemplary of excellent collaboration between MNRT, FAO, and the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre.

5.2 Achievements at the Outcome level

79. The TNP outcomes need to be looked at from two angles – the perceptions of the UN agencies and that of the IPs. As already stated the outcomes were broad and attempted to influence national policy process and institutional setting in a country where governance and institutional framework is still evolving and may continue to do so for the near future.

5.2.1 Outcome 1 Achievements[8]

80. A significant number of people (in excess of 500 individuals) underwent training activities supported under Outcome 1 on aspects of MRV, mapping and remote sensing including using open source and commercial software, MRV and Monitoring for REDD. Other staff from ministries such as the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement Development, Agriculture, Water and Natural Resources and Tourism and Tanzania Forest Training Institute, Vice President's Office, and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar were trained on Global Information System/Light Detection and Ranging. Conversations with key experts indicate that the TNP has enabled the elevation of various methodological challenges and options for MRV design, development of RELs and necessary institutional capacity. However, it would be fair to view much of the capacity built thus far as being capacity to understand rather than to implement REDD+ activities. This view is well in line with the evident appetite for a future focus on activities that produce tangible outcomes.

81. There has been some progress and modest gains in the evolution of national governance and institutional capacity but overall, more work still need to be done. This is not because the TNP has failed but more because the activities undertaken were only intended to lay the groundwork for work in later years. Although the impact may be limited, Outcome 1 has added value to the efforts of the NRTF, the National Climate Change Steering Committee and National Climate Change Technical Committee - mandated to coordinate Climate Change initiatives in country.

82. The CNA is an important output as it highlights capacity gaps that are likely to hinder Tanzania's REDD+ readiness process and can provide useful input into future programmes. However, it would appear that once the work on Cost Curves was complete, limited action was taken to make use of the findings. In defence of the UN agencies, the Tanzanian institutions themselves have been less pro-active in taking ownership of outputs and utilising them as a basis for policy adjustments or designing new strategies.

5.2.2 Outcome 2 Achievements

83. The TNP has added some value to the REDD+ readiness process by bringing important issues to the forefront. A number of key components useful for establishing a national MRV frame are complete. A roadmap outlining options for establishing RELs is ready for consideration by national experts and institutions. This roadmap will enable the GoT to make critical decisions pertaining to historical emission levels, carbon emission factors and carbon pools to focus on. Going forward, the Tanzanian government and operational institutions need to take leadership in deciding, for instance, what would constitute RELs, which carbon pools are to be reported and what level of reporting is necessary. In December 2013, MNRT, FAO, UNEP, and UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre collaboratively completed work on multiple-benefits and safeguards planning for REDD+ in Tanzania as one of the key deliverables of Output 2.4 of the TNP.

84. The results of the mapping components of Outcome 2 are useful but their utility could have been enhance with support and clarification from the GoT. To adequately inform the REDD+

[8] A full list of outputs for each Outcome is presented in Annex 5

framework, the GoT needs to make some key decisions including and provide official clarification of;

- **Forest definition –** because the first step in the process of determining the REL will be establishing the forest definition. The forest definition determines the area of forest and therefore, also the change of forest area. As such, the choice of forest definition can have a significant impact on the quantification of the REL. An additional and important element to consider is the consistency of the resulting forest definition with other pre-existing international definitions, for instance, the Marrakesh Accord, FAO etc. It is noted that there are ongoing discussions on the definition of forest despite the GoT specifically communicating the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) definition to the UNFCCC.
- **Spatial boundaries** – the scale RELs are developed is important so is the identification of exclusion zones (for example, contested zones, areas demarcated for infrastructure development, cities etc.) – the GoT still needs to define such parameters.
- **Temporal boundaries and temporal trend analysis** – the historical reference covered by RELs and the baseline approaches, i.e. historical average method, or time function method (modelling) – where deforestation is expressed as a function of driver variables, is still to be determined.
- **Carbon pools** – the carbon pools included will largely depend on the data available and sources of emissions, but will at the very least include above and below ground forest carbon stocks – again the GoT needs to decide which pools are appropriate.
- **Drivers of Deforestation and Degradation, the agents and underlying causes and their likely future development –** Gaining an understanding of "who" is deforesting the forest (the "agent") and what drives land-use decisions ("drivers" and "underlying causes") is necessary for two mains reasons: (i) Estimating the quantity and location of future deforestation; and (ii) Designing effective measures to address deforestation, including leakage prevention measures. Various studies provide different views on this but there is need to collate these studies to make them useful for policy formulation.

85. However, the national maps of carbon storage, the historical land cover and land cover change, and the multiple benefits maps are still important outputs that can be further developed to suit future decisions.

86. The achievements of the TNP are commendable and efforts should be made to capitalise on these gains. However, it is worth noting that by international standards, the level of investment to date should have produced a substantial set of outputs and data to inform the REDD+ framework. A number of reports reviewed during this evaluation are pessimistic and critical of the level of national commitment to implementing game-changing strategies to expedite REDD+ readiness.

5.2.3 Outcome 3 Achievements

87. The achievement of Outcome 3 in the main was more likely to be difficult as the execution of activities depended on the willingness of national institutions to engage fully. The decentralisation of governance frameworks is a socio-political intervention that requires leadership from senior government officials at both the national and sub-national level. Unfortunately, the institutional interaction between TNP staff and senior government officials might have been too limited to be effective.

88. It was an ambitious outcome because navigating the hierarchical political and public administrative structures in Tanzania is somewhat challenging. To be effective in this outcome, the TNP would have needed to have a significant sphere of influence over both the national and sub-national political and administrative structures (Regional and Local Government). It is no

surprise that efforts to test the framework's REDD+ payments mechanism did not gain any traction.

89. The TNP had very limited involvement with local communities. In November 2011, exploratory visits were undertaken to villages in Liwale, Morogoro Rural, and Babati districts. During these visits, a team met with district officials and villagers and discussed REDD+ funding and benefit distribution options including administrative or governance structures with nearly 250 villagers, local government and district forestry officials. It is the ET's view that a shotgun approach was taken in discussing such specific opportunities from REDD+ in the absence of a coherent national governance framework. Nonetheless, the PSC appropriately concluded that the approach was flawed and risky hence activities planned under Output 3.2 were never carried out.

90. The ET observed a degree of scepticism arising from poorly executed consultations or attempts to engage local communities on REDD+. It must be understood that for local level activities to succeed, there must be national level understanding of what constitute benefits, ownership rights and so forth. Approaching local communities to discuss potential participation in a PES scheme without proper national direction will unnecessarily raise expectations and there is a subsequent loss of confidence when promises are not fulfilled.

5.2.4 Outcome 4 Achievements

91. In Tanzania, while general public awareness would be difficult to accurately measure due to the size of the population and the spread of stakeholders countrywide, a number of indicators suggest an increasing level of willingness to engage in debates and participate in dialogue on the broad front. Noting that the baseline was fairly low, with little awareness of REDD+ issues among forest-dependent communities, some progress has been made.

92. The level of dialogue was also generally low but it does appear that awareness-raising activities, training events and policy dialogue initiatives, on both REDD+ in general and specific REDD+ matters, are now routinely conducted in Tanzania. The TNP has been a frequent organizer and fund-raiser of such efforts. A number of approaches have been employed ranging from use of public media, direct training, featured media articles, seminars, and policy briefs targeting government officials, and CSOs.

93. Through the TNP, the GoT has shared experiences on the international stage at the 18th Conference of the parties (COP18) of the UNFCCC held in Qatar in 2012. The NRTF hosted a side event highlighting the National REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan as well as sharing experiences on aspects of designing MRV systems and REDD+ payments. In 2013, the TNP supported two senior government representatives to attend the Green Economy Symposium in Indonesia as well as attending the UN-REDD Policy Board meeting. These are all activities that are gradually contributing to a broad understanding of the key policy issues on REDD+. However, the effectiveness of these different approaches can be viewed as temporary unless they are used on a sustained basis with follow-up measures.

94. Among research and academic institutions, the level of understanding of concepts such as MRV, RELs, and GHG Reporting has increased gradually. For instance senior managers at TAFORI repeatedly highlighted the necessity for sustained data collection, custodianship, management, and sharing mechanisms as the cornerstone of evidence-based policy formulation. There is a general perception that central government is not showing sufficient commitment and leadership on policies to continuously collect and maintain data and information in the development process.

5.3 Effectiveness

Table 5-2: Rating for Effectiveness

Overall rating for effectiveness	MU
Outcome 1	S
Outcome 2	MS (partially completed)
Outcome 3	U
Outcome 4	MU

95. The TNP has been moderately limited because of design flaws, coordination and collaboration challenges discussed in Section 3.1 (Design). The REDD+ team in the MNRT was under-resourced (i.e. 3 foresters, an economist, and a lawyer). Such a small team would not have been able to fully engage in the implementation of the large number of activities presented in the Programme Document. This level of resourcing was insufficient and did not demonstrate commitment and or ownership. Taking ownership inherently means committing human resources and leading the execution of activities. Sometimes such commitment can be demonstrated by explicit actions such as inclusion of REDD+ focused activities in annual business plans, budgets, and departmental strategies. This has not been the case with the MNRT.

96. On the other hand, the MNRT has basic budgetary constraints hindering its capacity to take on new programmes as it also struggles to motivate a modestly remunerated workforce. An organisation cannot properly function when staff are constantly out of office whenever an opportunity to earn daily allowances comes up. It is not sustainable. Thus for the TNP to be effective, the necessary resources and structures needed to be in place in the implementing institutions in addition to having institutional willingness to accept technical advice and support where necessary. Note that it is necessary to highlight the point for institutional willingness because some informants and officials acknowledged being reluctant to work with international consultants with a perception that the TNP made excessive use of international consultants. This is an unfortunate perception as the global TNP has a wide range of normative products and experts to assist countries effectively implement national programmes.

97. The MNRT also faces conflicting demands in relation to sustainably managing forest resources in an equitable manner. As such, in designing interventions, it would be necessary to ensure objectives and indeed outcomes are coherent with national priorities. During this evaluation, some stakeholders expressed that the TNP design process was insufficient, too short, and predominantly driven by UN agencies. This suggests a weak analytical foundation, which in turn resulted in limited national ownership. The reason for needing a detailed analytical foundation is that Tanzania is a large and heavily populated country where the rapidly increasing population is largely depending on wood for meeting daily energy needs. The tension between economic development and resource utilisation creates a significantly complex socio-political environment. In addition, the agents, drivers, and underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation are varied and challenging to address and therefore it is important to have a full understanding in order to be effective with selected interventions.

98. The absence of the FAO country representative even if it was for a short period created some disconnection with the national institutions executive management. In early 2012, FAO did not have an MRV expert for five months and the NAFORMA chief technical advisor temporarily assumed this role. The MTE highlighted the relationship between the UN agencies and GoT as needing a high-level dialogue to resolve the impasse to what had become an unproductive and unconstructive relationship. The relationship breakdown is potentially a result of an ineffective

programme management team. Planned programme meetings did not occur quarterly as initially agreed hence the breakdown in communication.

99. The effectiveness in engaging with local level stakeholders was very limited although it was inherently included in the outcomes. The attempts to engage villagers in Liwale, Morogoro Rural, and Babati district might have unnecessarily raised community expectations. Without necessarily re-analysing the design flaws of the TNP, suggesting and even testing REDD+ payment schemes in the absence of sufficiently integrated institutional and policy frameworks can cause mistrust and loss of confidence from local communities. The institutional framework and relevant policies to deal with REDD+ revenue and financing have progressed at a slow pace in Tanzania therefore caution needs to be taken to avoid premature promotion of ideas and approaches without appropriate analytical foundation and central government leadership.

5.4 Efficiency

Table 5-3: Rating for Efficiency

Overall rating for effectiveness	MU
Outcome 1	S
Outcome 2	MS (partially completed)
Outcome 3	U
Outcome 4	MU

100. Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 outline the AWP budgets by Agency and Outcome. UNDP and UNEP were able to provide detailed financial records; the disaggregation of annual expenditure at the output level seems to be difficult for FAO. The ET's requests for disaggregated financial data could not be fulfilled by FAO. Therefore, the efficiency described in this section is mostly qualitative. It is assumed that a full financial report will be prepared at the conclusion of all activities.

Table 5-4: Annual Work Plan Agency Budgets[9]

AWP Financial Year	2010	2011	2012
UNDP	500 000	2 155 000	1 215 000
FAO	300 000	1 360 000	994 500
UNEP	110 000	200 000	20 000
Total	**910 000**	**3 715 000**	**2 274 790**

101. Because of the two no-cost extensions, the budgets' figures show a residual balance beyond June 2012 when the Programme was original intended to end. In addition, it has not been possible to fully determine the administrative costs, any cost savings or cost overruns because the financial records at the output level seem to be overly difficult to obtain from the UN agencies.

Table 5-5: Annual Work Plan Budget by Outcome

	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013		Total Programme Budget

[9] Administration figures not accounted for as the Evaluation Team was not able to accurately determine administration costs.

Outcome 1	470 000	1 405 000	540 000	765 000	2 415 000	1 650 000
Outcome 2	300 000	1 360 000	994 500	1 254 500	2 654 500	1 400 000
Outcome 3	30 000	550 000	480 000	510 000	1 060 000	550 000
Outcome 4	110 000	400 000	215 000	325 000	725 000	400 000
						4 000 000
GMS/Mgt Support						**280 000**
	910 000	**3 715 000**	**2 229 500**	**2 854 500**		**4 280 000**

102. According to UN agency staff, major concerns were raised with respect to the modalities for procurement and this applies to procurement processes with both UN agencies and IPs. In general, services and asset procurement were characterised by protracted documentation processes including occasional disagreements on who should be engaged to undertake specific activities.

103. Some informants questioned the widespread use of individual consultants because that approach limits the opportunity for institutional capacity building which underpins the likelihood for longer-term sustainability. In particular, it does appear that the same consultants are repeatedly engaged in carrying out the assignments across a range of activities. There is a view from some stakeholders that international consulting tends to be expensive and therefore use of national consultancies is favoured. This is valid as long as national consultants have the capability to undertake the work to required standards and within agreed timeframes.

104. The agreed financial and technical management mechanism was implemented based on discussion with the GoT in 2010 and in accordance with how the One UN programme works in Tanzania. Funds were provided from the UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in New York to the three UN agencies. Each UN agency took responsibility for transferring funds from its own allocation to implementing partners and reporting back to MDTF. The GoT perspective here is that this arrangement of working with three independent agencies imposed unacceptable transaction costs and administrative overheads

105. The UN agencies advocate operating as One UN, but in practice this appears to be challenging to achieve across key aspects such as funds management and disbursement. It is noted that the budget for Tanzania programmes are managed separately by each agency. It would appear that each agency also has its own financial management system, disbursement and accounting policy. This creates confusion and inconsistency.

106. Efforts were made to introduce the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer (HACT) but this would have introduced complex administrative requirements on Tanzanian IPs. From the UNDG perspective, HACT shifts the management of cash transfers from a system of rigid controls to a risk management approach aiming to reduce transaction costs pertaining to the country programmes. However, in the Tanzanian context, some significant capacity building would be required to increase accountability and transparency to and enable the use of assurance activities such as audits and spot checks during programme implementation.

107. The UN agencies employed international and national consultants to work alongside national counterparts. During the tenure of this programme, there has been turnover of staff that has hampered programme continuity particularly for activities under FAO.

5.5 Cross cutting issues: Gender, Capacity Development, Normative Products

Table 5-6: Summary Ratings for Cross-cutting issues

Overall rating for Cross-cutting issues	MS
Gender	S
Capacity development	MS
Normative Products	MS

5.5.1 Gender

108. Gender aspects are at the core of the programme and reflective of one of the five principles of the United Nations, gender equality. In Tanzania, gender equality is a priority in programming and the country has a Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children overseeing gender issues, among other things. Several women were trained on MRV (13 females and 64 males) at MNRT, and others at SUA, IRA and TAFORI. Also, women consultants were used, both national and international, notably for the soil analysis, the land cover change assessment and the REL work

109. While not necessarily attributable to the TNP, the National REDD Task Force has three females from the Ministries of Community Development, Gender and Children, Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, and Energy and Minerals.

5.5.2 Capacity development

110. As no particular activities were actually implemented beyond government, regional and district institutions, limited use was made of the TNP's normative products, guidelines and safeguards, e.g. the TNP Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). However, guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness were included as part of capacity building through training activities.

111. Taking note of the capacity needs assessment undertaken through Outcome 1, it is worth reiterating what capacity relates to in the context REDD+ in Tanzania – i.e. "*the ability of individuals, institutions and society in Tanzania to establish and manage a vision for REDD+, key policy objectives and field implementation whilst meeting challenges for REDD+ in a sustainable manner*". Capacity development is a term often misinterpreted or misunderstood when assessed devoid of national cultural context and work environment. Lack of commitment and minimal or lack of ownership by the implementing partner's may be interpreted as lack of capacity.

112. For Tanzania to achieve REDD+ readiness, national institutions will need to understand that a change in organisational culture is necessary to enhance transparency, commitment, and accountability. "Institutions" is used broadly to include political establishments in addition to government departments at all levels. On the other hand, management will also need to accept that behavioural change comes from a rewarding environment that is linked to performance. These core elements are missing and informants acknowledged this.

113. At the technical level, training activities were carried out and these are adequately reported. However, it is essential to note that workshop-based training does not provide government officials with enough time to learn and understand basic issues about REDD+ unless there are on-going follow-up workshops and seminars for instance.

114. Without being overly critical, there is perhaps a fundamental limitation with some of the capacity building approaches used. The programme's capacity building targeted programme implementers. Training has been provided to MNRT and TFS staff on remote sensing, MRV and the broader context of REDD+ safeguards, soil analysis and digital soil mapping, data management, forest inventories, MRV for REDD+, reference emission levels, allometric equations, and REDD+ implementation, among others. Additional sensitisation of the REDD+ framework also occurred at the political level.

115. An exit strategy can be developed at the programme level or at the outcome level. For instance, there is a fundamental need for a functional MRV system, which will essentially become a legacy output but this requires support and commitment from the GoT beforehand. As such, any capacity building activities would be more effective if the project is designed with an explicit exit strategy and clear transition phases to business-as-usual.

116. The MTE and the CNA enabled further understanding of constraints affecting successful achievement of targets specifically for the TNP. However, the findings are also applicable widely across different programmes. A number of other reviews across REDD+ programmes have also provided significant management information useful for improving and increasing capacity, ownership, sustainability and subsequent benefit realisation. For instance the final evaluation of the Vietnam TNP, the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the REDD Policy Project[10], the MRV Research Project[11] , the CCIAM, 9 REDD+ Pilot Projects[12] and many more need to be drawn together in order to develop a coherent forward looking business strategy that will enable transition into BAU owned by national institutions. This approach is part of creating an exit strategy which can then be the reference point for both the donor agencies and the GoT.

117. For the TNP capacity building activities are both explicit and implicit. Where they are explicit, they have been reasonably well implemented. The level of institutional and staff commitment has in some way influenced the effectiveness of the capacity building activities.

118. Overall, the capacity development for REDD+ in Tanzania can be characterised as a concerted multi-pronged process targeting multiple levels – political, central, and regional and district government, tertiary institutions, civil society, and private sector to a limited extent. On the broad scale, the UN agencies have provided building blocks through a large number of interventions, which include supporting mainstreaming environment and climate change adaptation and strengthening the institutional framework for climate change governance under the Environment and Climate Change Adaptation workstream. Two committees were set up to coordinate Climate Change initiatives in Tanzania (National Climate Change Steering Committee and National Climate Change Technical Committee). One of the key outcomes is the review and endorsement of the National REDD+ Strategy, and launch of the National Climate Change Strategy.

5.5.3 Use of TNP's normative products

119. The TNP builds on the convening power and expertise of its three participating UN agencies and follows the structure of the REDD+ readiness roadmap activities which are broken down into the three phases i.e.

- Phase 1: Development of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity building
- Phase 2: Implementation of national policies and measures and national strategies or action plans that could involve further capacity building, technology, development and transfer, and results-based demonstration activities
- Phase 3: Results-based actions that should be fully measured, reported and verified

[10] http://www.norway.go.tz/News_and_events/Climate-Change/Mid-Term-Review-of-REDD-Policy-Project-in-Tanzania-/#.Ul9YfFBi1ik

[11] http://www.norway.go.tz/News_and_events/Climate-Change/Mid-Term-Review-of-REDD-Policy-Project-in-Tanzania-/#.Ul9YGlBi1ik

[12] http://www.reddtz.org/?page_id=10

120. As noted in Section 4.5.2 above, the programme design limited the use of the TNP's full suite of normative products, guidelines and safeguards, e.g. the TNP Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). However, it would appear that normative tools were inherently built into some capacity building activities such as awareness campaign materials and workshops, and were imbedded in ToRs for all consultancy work.

121. Looking forward, perhaps a more concerted effort could be considered so that each of the UN agencies has a more focused approach in core areas through harmonisation of existing frameworks, national programmes and existing bilateral activities. Noting that the process and attempts to establish a functional MRV system in Tanzania has been going on for a lengthy period and financially supported through bilateral funding, the TNP presented an opportunity for FAO to use its global presence to accelerate this process. FAO's forestry sector activities, in particular monitoring, assessing and sharing information on forests in relation to climate change, should have provided an impetus for a much more targeted focus. Interestingly, the UN-REDD Programme's 2011-2015 Strategy readily identifies MRV systems as typically among the first activities addressed in national readiness planning processes.

122. However, the limited progress towards the establishment of a functional MRV cannot be blamed on a lack of appropriate guidance from the UN agencies or any other international support agency. The National REDD+ Strategy highlights some policy failures due to a wide range of reasons, among them being inadequate capacity of the government to implement instituted central and decentralised management systems.

123. In their areas of core expertise, under the right conditions, the UN agencies do have the capacity to accelerate the REDD+ Readiness process in Tanzania. Now that a National REDD+ Strategy is in place, an opportunity exists for both the TNP and other bilateral support programmes to engage in a transitional process that sees the GoT take more ownership and leadership, thus moving towards independence.

124. By the time the TNP commenced, much of the normative products / guidelines were becoming common themes in global discussion as well as receiving increasing attention from the research community.

5.6 Sustainability and Up-scaling

Table 5-7: Ratings for Sustainability

Overall rating for sustainability and up-scaling	ML
Financial sustainability	U
Institutional sustainability	ML
Operational sustainability	ML
Up-scaling	L

5.6.1 Financial Sustainability

125. The protracted international negotiations mean that there are no clear long-term financing options for REDD+ in developing countries. With respect to Tanzania, it is highly unlikely that the GoT will commit significant finance from its own national budget to sustain the REDD+ readiness process.

126. As the interventions of the Quick-Start Initiative were expected to lay the groundwork for activities in later years, some of the activities were never expected to be sustainable but rather to provide a strong basis for subsequent long-term programmes. Outputs such as the CNA and estimation of cost elements of REDD+ provide information to support the decision making process.

5.6.2 Institutional Sustainability

127. The institutional setup necessary for effective implementation of a national REDD+ programme in Tanzania is still evolving. Substantial groundwork has been laid to prepare the country for subsequent participation in performance based payment system under REDD+. However, being REDD+ ready requires commitment on many fronts. For instance, implementing institutions need regular and predictable financial support from central government to be able to retain REDD+ programme support staff and sustain outputs from the TNP and any other programme. While national forestry and environmental policies are generally in place and continue to evolve, institutional and cross-sector coherence and implementation of these policies still needs strengthening through better monitoring, reporting and enforcement of accountability at central government level to identify where potential failures might occur. Since drivers of deforestation and forest degradation originate in agriculture, energy sector, and other economic drivers, the institutional collaboration and coordination needs enforcement through annual planning process and business plans.

128. At the more fundamental level, it is concerning that the REDD+ readiness efforts are largely driven by efforts of individuals rather than institutions. In fact, having noted that the vertical integration across institutions appears limited with fundamental constraints that have handicapped the progress towards REDD+ readiness, there is a risk to the sustainability of programmes as staff are constantly moving to new jobs and roles.

129. The opportunity for institutional strengthening to enhance sustainability was missed. In the event of future support, opportunities could be taken to strengthen and institutionalise operational business units within government departments. Such business units could include teams to run REDD+ project including MRV systems. At present it appears retention of staff recruited under the TNP is challenging. The opportunity for sustaining the momentum created through this the TNP continues to diminish. This in part is attributable to a programme design that lacks an exit strategy and a transition to business-as-usual.

130. The evolving institutional arrangements, in particular the slow process of establishing the NCMC, which is intended to be the integrating institution, continues to create uncertainties and makes decision-making at project level difficult. Informants are of the view that there is inadequate commitment to operationalize the NCMC. There is acknowledgement that the establishment of the NCMC is critical to the future of the national REDD+ framework. The NCMC would be the institution that provides necessary leadership in the planning, coordination, and collaboration between institutions, departments, and sub-national projects. At this stage, the role and operational mandate of the NCMC is still to be formalized which means that important aspects that guide the implementation of the national REDD+ programme beyond the Readiness Phase is still substantially weak. Beyond this point, a high degree of expedience and commitment would be essential if Tanzania is to achieve a solid and sustainable state of REDD+ readiness.

5.6.3 Operational Sustainability

131. In the long-term, it will be necessary to establish business units that operate, for instance, the national and sub-national MRV systems, prepare reports for national and international reporting, manage, and update and maintain fundamental datasets relevant to climate change reporting across all sectors. At this point, there are few indications that this capacity can be fully developed and sustained in the absence of external financial and technical support. The future of the TNP in Tanzania is uncertain, as the GoT not yet secured funds to continue implementation of REDD+ activities. The two national consultants implementing UN-REDD activities (for UNDP and FAO) have resigned. The GoT's REDD+ national coordination (located within MNRT) is now limited to one person (the national coordinator).

132. The need to establish centralized data management cannot be overemphasized. Making sure the data is updated and backed up and everyone knows where to access the most recent version is imperative to avoid current practice of individuals having fragmented parts of the data on laptops and portable hard drives, which are very vulnerable to loss and damage.

133. The limited institutional emphasis on data collection, management, and dissemination will limit the ability of Tanzania to create awareness and promote base participation. Although there are positive indications of willingness to share and make some data freely available demonstrated by a ministerial commitment to make the NAFORMA data freely available. However, at the departmental level, there is still hesitation to share data freely due to lack of formal policies and protocols at national level. This will limit an integrated evidence-based cross-sector policy formulation. Policy formulation requires multisource and multi-layer data and information analysis – especially for MRV.

134. In addition to the MRV system, a complete national REDD+ framework needs a functional national safeguards information system, a financing strategy, and governance systems. As much as dialogue is underway and capacity building already taking place through the NRTF, the current institutional framework does not demonstrate operational sustainability of these crucial components. The pace of development is slow and bureaucratic.

5.6.4 Opportunities for Up-scaling

135. There are clearly numerous opportunities for up-scaling activities to an operational level with significant tangible outputs. For this evaluation, we consider the discussion on up-scaling in the context of follow-up and ongoing activities by the TNP and indeed for those (where relevant) supported by the Norwegian government. This discussion further translates into recommendations. In addition, a strategy for any subsequent support must in the first instance promote the fundamental issue of ownership with a long-term view to transition project activities into business-as-usual within Tanzanian institutions.

136. On the part of the Tanzanian government, the level of commitment and expediency will determine the success or failure of any future REDD+ programme in subsequent phases. An additional condition which is in the critical path of multiple decisions is the operationalization of the NCMC where the decision process is slow and taking very long.

137. Some components of the REDD+ process in Tanzania are somewhat organic and it is not simple to see the full pathway and preferred strategy. This is particularly the case with development of datasets, tools and methodological approaches to prepare baseline information necessary for validating policy frameworks. It may be timely to consider undertaking a gap analysis and a status mapping exercise in order to identify the pathway for achieving REDD+ readiness in a more coherent manner. For example, the CNA is a useful output to use in assessing existing capacity gaps and approaches to in addressing those gaps.

138. To this point, a functional MRV system is not yet established but there is significant collateral data, information, and lessons useful to design one. The MRV system can also be the basis for implementing scaled-up jurisdictional and national programmes. Along with the MRV systems, NAFORMA is useful to develop country-specific emission factors for different forest types and carbon pools.

139. The finalisation of the RELs roadmap is an important opportunity to move to the next logical step of establishing RELs and an integrated MRV system. The approach for compiling REL and MRV will need to anticipate the rules that are likely to be adopted by the SBSTA to the UNFCCC, alongside the methodological work of the IPCC. Key guidance that are currently available for consideration include:

- Decision 12/CP.17, part II: Modalities for forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels[13]
- Rules for the determination of RELs for Annex I countries for the use of forest management under Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol in the 2nd commitment period; and,
- Annex I of document FCCC/SBSTA/2012/2 which provides "Elements for a possible draft decision on modalities for national forest monitoring systems and measuring, reporting and verifying".
- UN-REDD National Forest Monitoring Systems: Monitoring and Measurement, Reporting and Verification (M&MRV)
- IPCC Good Practice Guidance (GPG)

140. The outputs from the Pilot projects present an opportunity for up-scaling some of the concepts to zonal level. In light of the recommendations of 12/CP.17 to adopt a 'stepwise' framework for implementation of REDD+, the stepwise framework developed by Herold et al. (2012)[14] is useful for setting the national and subnational forest RELs and MRV systems. This approach recognizes that development of forest RELs and MRV systems is a phased approach, encouraging continual improvement from a 'best available data' phase, to 'best practice' phase.

141. As such, the step-wise framework presents ways of dealing with the variety of REL and MRV methods that exist, the variability in data and their quality, uncertainties and country (or jurisdictional) circumstances. Other benefits of this framework include: embedded processes to stimulate broad stakeholder participation; mechanisms to build in-country capacity; and provision of a pathway for continuous improvement through the REDD+ implementation phase. Lessons can also be drawn from three key documents: 1) Guidelines for REDD+ Reference Levels: Principles and Recommendations (Meridian Institute, 2011a)[15]; 2) Modalities for REDD+ Reference Levels: Technical and Procedural Issues (Meridian Institute, 2011b)[16]; and 3) The Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) Jurisdictional and Nested REDD Initiative: Summary of Technical Recommendations – Chapter 6 (Jurisdictional Baselines).

142. Noting that most of the focus has so far been on the forestry sector, there is an opportunity to consider other sectors such as agriculture and energy since these are already part of the discussion. However, the agriculture and energy sectors present a potentially higher level of complexity and therefore a measured approach would need to be considered.

5.7 Likelihood of Impact

143. The TNP goals have not been fully achieved but there are intermediate outputs that are attributable to the Programme. The TNP is however contributing to the evolution of the institutional framework, developing components, data and information that is contributing to better understanding of REDD+ requirements.

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[13] Specifically, decision 12/CP.17, part II: "Modalities for forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels",

[14] Herold, M., Angelsen, A.,Verchot, L.N., Wijaya,A., and Ainembabazi, J.H. (2012). A step-wise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels. In Analysing REDD+. Challenges and Choices. CIFOR. Available at: http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BAngelsen1201.pdf

[15] Meridian Institute. 2011. "Guidelines for REDD+ Reference Levels: Principles and Recommendations." Prepared for the Government of Norway, by Arild Angelsen, Doug Boucher, Sandra Brown, Valérie Merckx, Charlotte Streck, and Daniel Zarin. Available at: http://www.redd-oar.org/links/REED+RL.pdf

[16] Meridian Institute. 2011. "Modalities for REDD+ Reference Levels: Technical and Procedural Issues." Prepared for the Government of Norway, by Arild Angelsen, Doug Boucher, Sandra Brown, Valérie Merckx, Charlotte Streck, and Daniel Zarin. Available at: http://www.redd-oar.org/links/RL_report.pdf

144. Through the REDD+ readiness process, the profile of the forestry sector in general has been raised on the domestic political agenda and at higher levels of government. The GoT recognises the role forests play in climate change mitigation as reflected in recently adopted national climate change policies. The contribution of the TNP to the REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania has engendered more progressive policy dialogues in the forestry sector. The key challenge and factors that limit the impact of bilateral support programmes is low level of commitment to improve policy enforcement, improve institutional accountability and increase cross-sector coordination. The likelihood for impact on REDD+ readiness and reducing deforestation and forest degradation will remain low unless the current dialogue translates into action.

145. While TNP and other bilateral support have served as a platform for discussing and raising awareness on important forestry policy issues, such as corruption, illegal logging, and sustainable financing of the sector, the slow response from the GoT to implement essential and sustainable institutional frameworks, and governance limits the level of impact.

146. Based on the TOC, outcomes need to be observable and all stakeholders need to know whether the outcome has been achieved. The ROtI conducted during the inception phase demonstrates that the outcomes of the TNP were intended to contribute to a long-term transformational process that incorporates REDD+ readiness and GHG emissions reduction as part of the country's low carbon development agenda. Therefore, the impact is more likely to be a result of subsequent support mechanism, finance strategies and the willingness of the GoT to sustain the momentum built from the outcomes.

147. The TNP has supported important institutional structures such as the NRTF, district offices, and senior government officials to a limited extent to understand the policy and technical requirements of establishing a sustainable REDD+ framework. As these institutions evolve and continue to participate in the process, perhaps the intended impacts will be realised. Tanzania is now in a much better position to design programmes that are robust and properly sequenced, aligned and coordinated through learning from this experience. It is now possible to analyse activity inter-dependencies. The GoT has an opportunity to prepare strategies to sustain this momentum and accelerate the REDD+ readiness process by addressing the institutional constraints that are likely to limit sustainability.

6 FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

Table 6-1: Ratings for Programme Management and Coordination

Overall Quality of Project implementation	MS
Agency coordination	MU
Project Supervision	S

6.1 Programme Management and Coordination

6.1.1 UN Agencies

148. The TNP would have worked well but the situation in Tanzania presented some unforeseen management and coordination challenges. The structure of the TNP outcomes, outputs and activities initially increased the administrative oversight and coordination because there were perhaps too many sub-activities to be tracked and monitored. The unfortunate outcome of this project structure meant that TNP activities became more or less trivial at the MNRT executive level hence a limited level of attention and commitment. The Joint Programming Monitoring Framework and AWP were elaborate. Starting in 2010, detailed Annual Work Plans provided clear operating guidelines and coordination mechanisms. The need to work with the NRTF was recognised because of its responsibility of delivering a national REDD+ strategy and framework, and for coordinating activities related to REDD+ in Tanzania operational relationship with the NRTF was obviously weak.

149. An important component that perhaps did not receive adequate attention is risk analysis and developing mitigation measures. The ET's view is that a comprehensive risk analysis might have illuminated plans by the Norwegian government, which culminated in a substantial programme in Tanzania. Once the Norwegian government and the GoT signed the cooperation agreement in 2008, perhaps the TNP design team should have escalated the matter with the UN-REDD Programme Board as a mitigation measure. This is an important lesson for the global UN-REDD Programme to recognise and to acknowledge the need for adaptive management in implementing national programmes as well as considering ways to harmonize with other bilateral and multilateral programmes.

150. The UN agencies were generally well coordinated especially with all reporting done through the Joint UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP). For Tanzania, the UN developed a single business plan approved by the GoT and UN Joint Steering Committee in 2010. The UNDAP captures the entire range of activities supported by the UN system in Tanzania, replacing the current requirements of the UNDAF and agency specific country programme planning documents thus reducing the administrative burden.

151. Generally, the UN agencies made efforts to ensure implementation arrangements were adequate to allow smooth programme implementation and demonstrated willingness to adjust where necessary. For instance, the initial management arrangements were adjusted following the MTE in February 2012. The PAG was dissolved and the overall assurance and advisory function was transferred to the NRTF. The PCMG was transformed into a PSC and membership broadened by including the Project Executive (TFS Chief Executive as the project shifted from MNRT to TFS) and UNDP Deputy Country Director (Programme), the chairperson of the NRTF, and a representative from Zanzibar. In addition to these changes, additional project staff were recruited including a National Programme Coordinator and National MRV expert.

152. At the operational and technical level, attempts to collaborate with the NRTF and the technical working groups were limited. The PSC appears to have been ineffective in providing advice and

linkages to other REDD+ projects because of inadequate and irregular communication. Large programmes of this nature require constant monitoring to minimise and mitigate potential risks. Failure to meet quarterly as planned is perhaps an indication of limited understanding of the complexity of the programme and the need for frequent monitoring. It should have been the role of the PSC and NRTF to resolve coordination and collaboration issues between TNP and other bilateral projects.

153. The coordination between the TNP and other bilateral programmes could have been better with more willingness to collaborate. This reluctance to collaborate is unfortunate as it affected the implementation of the TNP. This came about because of initial misalignment of the TNP to projects that were already under way or planned. There is a strong view that the TNP should have been coordinated by the NRTF and that perhaps needless to have a separate PSC. The introduction of other bilateral REDD+ projects while UN-REDD project document was being prepared resulted in overlapping roles between the UN-REDD PSC and the NRTF. There was failure by GoT, the PSC, NRTF to jointly and collaboratively assess the implications of each programme on the development of the national REDD+ framework. The coordination and collaboration with the TWG was also limited with very limited interaction.

154. The fact that the Norwegian funded programme was planning to focus on matters of institutional arrangements, governance and capacity building meant that there was an opportunity for the TNP to refocus and redefine direction at the outcome level – taking an adaptive management approach. It is perhaps necessary for the UN-REDD Programme Board to take note of the need for greater flexibility once project documents have been approved and signed off. In addition, the design of UN-REDD national programmes could consider use of multiple phases to allow progressive tailoring according to current and evolving recipient country circumstances. For instance, there are no tangible outputs produced under Outcome 3 largely because the policy process for decentralised REDD+ governance framework is politically driven, bureaucratic and lengthy. The limited collaboration and coordination between institutions diminished the ability of the UN agencies to influence such a process. Similarly, the framework for payment distribution and benefit sharing is multi-faceted requiring appropriate governance, significant consultation of beneficiaries. These are all process that require significant effort, which is perhaps beyond the ability of the TNP

155. Fund disbursement is one area that created challenges for both the UN agencies and IPs. The discussion on the institutional arrangements presented in Section 3.1 (Design) illuminates additional issues regarding design assumptions. For instance, there was an implicit assumption that individual UN Agency operational procedures such as modalities for funds disbursements would easily work in Tanzania. Programme based operational procedures and systems from three different agencies in an already complicated national bureaucracy were always likely to create further confusion. In addition, different bilateral programmes used different modalities for funds disbursements..

6.1.2 National Institutions

156. The institutional structures necessary for implementing REDD+ framework are in place and continue to evolve. There are indications of increased engagement at the political and policy level based on the ET's discussions with government officials. The adjustment to the membership of the NRTF and its Secretariat to include representatives from the MAFC and MEM shows increasing awareness for need for cross-sector coordination. However, the key factors affecting programme management largely relate to institutional commitment, poor coordination and collaboration.

157. Senior managers in MNRT acknowledge the human resource capacity and the budgetary constraints. There is further acknowledgement of competing priorities – responding to political

pressure, increasing revenue from state-owned forestry assets, and working towards demands set under the MDGs and national development strategies. To some extent, these wider national priorities trivialise the TNP hence the level of commitment and interest from senior management is likely to be limited.

158. The MNRT has basic budgetary constraints with which to motivate a modestly remunerated workforce. It is noticeable and acknowledged that staff frequently engage in activities such as workshops, meetings, and unnecessary out of office travel to obtain daily allowances. An organisation cannot properly function when staff are constantly out of office in order to earn daily allowances to supplement wages. Agreed annual work plans are severely compromised hence it is not surprising that the programme has taken much longer to complete.

159. Operating in such an environment created an unwarranted level of risk evasiveness by UN agencies, with a rather negative outcome. The level of national ownership has been limited and the level of trust between UN agencies staff and national staff diminished. The lack of staff in MNRT to perform some of the core activities necessitated the use of both national and international consultants. The use of qualified and experienced national and international consultants is appropriate and necessary in many cases although it limits the opportunity to increase institutional capacity and create sustainable institutional teams. UN staff ended up preparing AWP and subsequent annual and semi-annual reports with very limited input from national staff.

160. Noting that the level of commitment and ownership among IPs was limited, the capacity building will have limited impact. Within TFS, there is currently limited in-house resources as the REDD+ team has been reduced to one staff member. This limits retention of in-house knowledge and opportunities for business continuity and sustainability.

161. The MTE and the Capacity Needs Assessment (CNA) enabled some simple changes to be made on the implementation of the TNP. However, a number of other reviews across REDD+ programmes have also provided significant management information useful for improving and increasing capacity, ownership, sustainability and subsequent benefit realisation through desirable impacts. For instance the final evaluation of the Vietnam TNP, the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the REDD Policy Project[17], the MRV Research Project[18] , the CCIAM, 9 REDD+ Pilot Projects[19] and many more need to be drawn together in order to develop a coherent forward looking business strategy that will enable transition into BAU owned by national institutions. This approach is part of creating an exit strategy, which can then be a reference point for donor agencies and the GoT. This has not been well elaborated at this point.

[17] http://www.norway.go.tz/News_and_events/Climate-Change/Mid-Term-Review-of-REDD-Policy-Project-in-Tanzania-/#.Ul9YfFBi1ik

[18] http://www.norway.go.tz/News_and_events/Climate-Change/Mid-Term-Review-of-REDD-Policy-Project-in-Tanzania-/#.Ul9YGlBi1ik

[19] http://www.reddtz.org/?page_id=10

6.2 Human and Financial Resources Management

Table 6-2: Ratings for Human and Financial Resources

Overall Quality of Human and Financial Resource Management	MS
Human Resources	MU
Project Supervision	S

162. The UN agencies have full financial accountability for all UN-REDD funds. UNEP elected to channel funding for Outcome 4 through UNDP. The modality for funds disbursement is viewed as problematic and often creates tension between UN agencies and GoT. The GoT prefers direct transfer of funds to government accounts. However, a review of MNRT determined that such an approach is risky due to potential misuse. It would be possible to use the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer (HACT) but major capacity building and training is required across government institutions noting that the MNRT and TFS have constraints and challenges such as inadequate human capacity, governance, and political pressure.

163. However, one area the UN agencies could improve is to simply the financial reporting. At this stage, it appears quite complicated to breakdown expenditure at activity level. While the ET received financial tables, interpreting these across all outcomes and activities is not simple.

164. The funds disbursement modality is also a major source of frustration. It is perceived as mistrust of national institutions. Understandably, historical cases of institutional corruption limits the confidence in national institutions and influences the financial disbursements modalities of current and future programmes. The ET's views is that significant capacity building and commitment from the GoT to support measures that increase accountability, proper governance would subsequently lead to more trust and confidence in national institutions. For the TNP, activities were implemented based on trust placed in individuals (trusted consultants) rather than institutions. It is important to note that a subsequent capacity needs assessment identified building of institutional capacity as essential to getting Tanzania REDD+ ready.

165. Table 6-3 summarises the programme cumulative expenditure up to December 2012. The ET did not review detailed financial reporting because a number of programme activities were still not completed.

Table 6-3: Cumulative Expenditure up to December 2012

	Approved Programme Budget	Annual Cumulative Expenditure up to 31/12/2012	
UN Agency		2011	2012
UNDP	2,568,000	927,294	1,881,680
FAO	1,498,000	166,571	545,559
UNEP	214,000	12,658	193,841
Co-financing	247,350		247,350
Total	4,527,350		

166. The staff resourcing with the UN agencies was adequate to support the delivery the TNP. UNDP appointed an international consultant and administration staff who are based in MNRT to coordinate the activities on behalf of the UN agencies. In addition, FAO also appointed an

international forestry expert and on national MRV expert. Retaining national staff seems to be problematic because national staff employment contracts were limited to one-year tenure and renewal seems to occur quite late. Such short tenure contracts are not conducive for promoting work continuity. Ideally, staff contracts tenure should align with the duration of the programme to minimise disruptions. For instance, Tanzania did not have a national MRV expert for 5 months, from around April 2012 to September 2012.

167. There are strong views among national consultants and MNRT staff that remuneration should be at par with international standard rates. Working for international agencies and projects is viewed as an opportunity for earning higher salaries. Unfortunately, the disparity in remuneration between national and international consultants is a significant source of demotivation for national experts. This is not an issue that the TNP can necessarily address because national circumstances determine the market salary rates for locally recruited staff. Remuneration and motivation of national staff is a matter for the national institutions to address.

168. The structure of the UN-REDD outcomes, outputs and activities initially increased the administrative oversight and coordination because there were just too many sub-activities to be tracked and monitored. The unfortunate outcome of this project structure meant that UN-REDD activities became more or less trivial at the MNRT executive level hence a limited level of attention and commitment.

6.3 Technical Backstopping and Supervision

Table 6-4: Ratings for Technical Backstopping

Overall Quality Technical Backstopping	MS

169. The UN agencies employed International and National consultants to work with IPs. During the tenure of this programme, there was turnover of staff, which disrupted programme continuity particularly for activities under FAO. It is understood that the UNDP's international consultant provided technical backstopping and represented all UN agencies when necessary. However, the large number of activities would have made it difficult for a single person to sufficiently manage every single activity. However, technical backstopping from FAO significantly increased from September 2012 after a request by the GoT following a recognition of the low delivery for Output 2 during the MTE.

170.

6.4 Government Participation and Ownership

Table 6-5: Summary of Ratings of Government Participation

Over rating for participation and ownership	MU
Participation	MS
Ownership	U

171. The acceptance and hosting of the TNP under MNRT is a sign of the GoT taking administrative ownership. MNRT should also be credited for initially setting up the REDD team. However, the subsequent challenges arising from poor collaboration and coordination has in fact minimised the impact of the TNP. Note that the issues of coordination are not the responsibility of MNRT alone. The NRTF, the REDD+ Secretariat and the VPO all have significant roles to play to create a robust national REDD+ framework for Tanzania.

172. While Zanzibar was not part of the initial stages of the TNP, it was subsequently included following high-level discussions and is now has representation on the NRTF. It seems the low REDD potential in Zanzibar may have contributed to the minimal focus on Zanzibar's inclusion during the earlier stages of the programme implementation.

173. The collaboration and coordination across institutions is limited with fundamental constraints that have clearly inhibited the progress towards REDD+ readiness and not just for the TNP. Decision-making is relatively slow. For instance, the establishment of the NCMC has taken a frustratingly long time to the point it is hampering strategic decisions such as the design and custodianship of the national MRV, including the process for establishing RELs and associated activity data. While the structure and design of the TNP outputs and sub-activities somewhat increased the administrative burden on IPs, the relationship between senior executives in both the UN agencies and national institutions (MNRT, VPO, NRTF, and TWG) is unproductive and diminishes trust between technical counterparts.

174. Typically, the NRTF would have been the appropriate facilitator on stakeholder interactions but it appears the relationship between the TNP and the NRTF and its Secretariat diminished. Various informants commented that a closer working relationship is necessary between the TNP, other bilateral programmes and the NRTF. The TNP was convenient when it provided resources for say workshops, support for overseas travel to conferences and training but less convenient in terms of facilitation, accountability, such as providing inputs into reporting, and performance evaluation.

175. The limited human capacity and challenges with managerial oversight in government, restricted the level of commitment and consequently led to general dissatisfaction with the government's participation. In designing future programmes, it will be essential for the GoT to take a lead and seek to establish a clear implementation road map. Rather than living it to the UN agencies to lead components such as monitoring and reporting, the GoT perhaps can take the opportunity to establish permanent programme implementation teams.

176. Like the UN partners, the GoT faced challenges that come within any large and highly politicized bureaucratic system confronted with a high level of uncertainty, competing priorities and limited resources. The Capacity Needs Assessment facilitated by FCPC and UN-REDD identified institutional capacity needs, and institutional functions that would catalyse and accelerate the pace of development towards REDD+ readiness.

177. Although the institutional structures necessary for implementing the REDD+ framework are continuing to evolve, the pace is slow.

178. The participation at political level is increasing as a result of the capacity building and awareness-raising activities through the TNP and particularly the Norwegian supported projects. While it is encouraging to note that key government ministries such as MoF, Agriculture, and Energy are engaged in the REDD+ process, the level of operational commitment remains low and key areas such as creating national REDD+ financing and payments mechanism are still missing

179. At the technical level, the academic institutions, TWGs, research institutions, CSOs, and private sector to a limited level are all engaged. In addition, at the political level, there is the National Climate Change Steering Committee and National Climate Change Technical Committee - mandated to coordinate Climate Change initiatives in country. However, the coordination across institutions appears limited, with fundamental constraints that have clearly limited the progress towards REDD+ readiness and not just for the TNP.

180. At this point, it is essential to state that the establishment of the NCMC has taken a frustratingly long time to the point it is hampering strategic decisions such as the design and custodianship of the national MRV, including the process for establishing RELs and associated activity data. According to a number of informants, the institutional arrangements for the national MRV system

are clear on paper, but these presentations do not refer to the reality of the capacity constraints and other barriers and limitations of the various institutions involved.

6.5 Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation

Table 6-6: Ratings for Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation

Overall Quality Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation	S
Monitoring	MS
Reporting	S
Evaluation	S

181. Funds used by the participating UN agencies are subject to internal and external audit as articulated in their applicable Financial Regulations and Rules. In addition, the Technical Secretariat will consult with the participating UN agencies on any additional specific audits or reviews that may be required, subject to the respective Financial Regulations and Rules of the Participating UN Organizations.

182. Participating UN agencies provide a summary of their internal audit key findings and recommendations for consolidation by the MDTF Office and submission to the Policy Board and National REDD Committee as applicable. The use of funds allocated to IPs is reported back to the relevant UN agency charged with responsibilities for those funds using relevant reporting mechanisms.

183. The execution of activities was in line with agreed protocols and it is noted that due process was followed to procure required services. Procurement used an open tendering process in which both parties agreed on the outcome as stated in the 2011 and 2012 Annual Reports under Achievement of the Annual Targets.

184. The GoT, and the UN agencies, jointly conducted scheduling, annual planning and held review meetings for all activities covered in the results framework, monitoring and evaluation plan and work plans covered by the Joint Programme. This included an assessment of the risks and assumptions to determine whether they are still holding.

185. Annual project reviews were conducted during the fourth quarter of the year to assess the performance of the project and appraise the AWP for the following year.

PART 3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7 CONCLUSIONS

Despite the highlighted challenges arising complex national circumstances, design, and uncertainty of the global REDD+ mechanism, the TNP, alongside the Norwegian and Finnish support, has contributed significantly in catalysing discussion and development of some fundamental components of REDD+ readiness. Tanzania is now be in a much better position to robustly design programmes that are better sequenced, aligned and coordinated through learning. It is now possible to analyse activity inter-dependencies and create a clear REDD+ readiness roadmap.

The TNP in Tanzania has contributed to dialogue and thinking towards REDD+ readiness and how Tanzania will subsequently participate in a performance-based REDD+ regime. The level of confidence to engage in national and global discourse has gradually increased through the support on governance frameworks, stakeholder engagement, safeguards, monitoring, reporting and verification.

Tanzania is one of the first countries in Africa to embark on the REDD+ readiness process, therefore it has been a steep learning curve. Although the UN-REDD global strategy has been instrumental in providing guidance and coordination of global discourse, the uncertainty of the REDD+ mechanism at the time of designing the TNP resulted in design flaws. The TNP could have been more effective with a more adaptive and flexible implementation strategy. The TNP underestimated the timeframe necessary to implement activities because outcomes and outputs are ambitious in scope and were poorly sequenced. But Tanzania is not alone in this problem as other countries are experiencing similar difficulties.

The presence of multiple bilateral support programmes has enabled Tanzania to tackle the challenges of climate change in a multipronged approach. However, the presence of multiple support programmes has also created a complex environment which in some cases has caused confusion, duplication, poor coordination and coordination, and significant administrative burdens as each bilateral or multilateral programme tries to achieve its objectives and in some cases competing strategies. A strong analytical foundation is necessary to understand the national context.

The TNP management structure could have been more effective through better inter-agency coordination and collaboration between the GoT, UN agencies, and the NRTF. The UN agencies operating as three different institutions with different operating systems created confusion, a larger than necessary administrative burden on the GoT, and reduced the level of effectiveness in coordinating a large number of activities.

As much as the institutional framework is now present, fundamental limitations such as human resource capacity, technical expertise, and infrastructure investment undermine the sustainability of the gains achieved so far. As the interventions of the TNP were expected to lay the groundwork for activities in later years, some of the activities were never expected to be sustainable but rather to provide a strong basis for subsequent long-term programmes but needing the GoT to take ownership. The current financial and human capacity constraints and conflicting socio-economic demands will limit the ability of the GoT to commit significant finance from its own national budget to sustain the REDD+ readiness process. Unless the international agencies provide additional support and the international negotiations can move beyond the current rhetoric it is unlikely that Tanzania and other similar countries will be motivated enough to invest much to sustain the complex process necessary to achieve REDD+ readiness.

At the more fundamental level, the lack of a fully resourced REDD+ operational unit in the MNRT will reduce the sustainability of components such as MRV systems, safeguards monitoring systems, reporting and REDD+ funds management.

As the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation transcend the forestry, agriculture, and energy and various other sectors, policy formulation processes need to be coordinated, monitored, and enforced across these different sectors. Central government needs to support implementing institutions with staff retention and programme continuity

At the outcome level, Outcomes 1 achievements are moderately satisfactory while Outcome 2 outputs are satisfactory and provide significant opportunities for up-scaling. Outcome 3 failed to achieve its original outputs because the policy, governance and institutional framework, benefit sharing schemes and REDD+ financing mechanism are still evolving. The GoT needs to show substantial leadership and accelerate the political dialogue to set up necessary frameworks and policies. Outcome 4 achievements have been modest because of the same reason

There are several important REDD+ readiness components still missing. A functional MRV system is not yet established but there is significant collateral data, information, and lessons useful to design one. The finalisation of the RELs roadmap is an important opportunity to move to the next logical step of establishing RELs and an integrated MRV system. The approach for compiling REL and MRV will need to anticipate the rules that are likely to be adopted by the SBSTA to the UNFCCC, alongside the methodological work of the IPCC. The MRV system can also be the basis for implementing scaled-up jurisdictional, zonal or national level using outputs from the Pilot projects and NAFORMA.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for the UN agencies with regards to programme design

11. Noting that national circumstances can be complex, it is necessary design programmes that have significant adaptive capacity to adjust outputs to re-align with evolving national context. In some cases, decisions should be taken to terminate a programme if implementation environment becomes untenable. It is important that programme design is based on robust analytical foundation based on broad consultation and collaboration with national institutions. The context in developing countries often presents substantial risk. This means that monitoring and evaluation frameworks must contain detailed risk analysis, mitigation measures, and escalation process to resolve major problems swiftly. A comprehensive risk analysis and consultation process might have illuminated plans by the Norwegian government, which culminated in a substantial programme in Tanzania. Once the Norwegian government and the GoT signed the cooperation agreement in 2008, perhaps the TNP design team should have escalated the matter with the UN-REDD Programme Board as a mitigation measure. In general, inherent risk management strategies for large programmes can include creating multiple phases and feasibility assessments before committing to a full programme. The TNP did not have this level of risk management neither did it have the necessary escalation process to adapt to evolving process in the country.
12. If a Phase II is agreed upon, it must be needs-based and country-driven. The design needs to incorporate a clear exit or a scale-back strategy which allows national institutions to see the end point and the structure of the handover process. The strategy, among other things, may include embedding technical experts to mentor and provide technical support to national institutions such as the model adopted by the NAFORMA project (the notion of "job shadowing" a "Chief Technical Advisor"). This does not guarantee success but it leads to better collaboration and continuous capacity building. Having international technical experts (not project managers) operating from UN agency offices does not build rapport with local counterparts nor does it create the necessary team dynamics that encourage team work. Establishing common goals and ownership comes from sustained, timely, and frequent communication of the desired outcome. Project management and governance teams must be encouraged to provide status reports more frequently than quarterly and adjust if the level of risk is deemed low enough.
13. The One UN principle presents an opportunity to minimise what Tanzanians have described as a confusing operating environment. It is necessary that the UN agencies, in addition to reporting as one via UNDAP, channel future activities through an integrated programme that does not separate activities by agency. As noted in the Vietnam national Programme evaluation, such an approach would reduce administrative burdens on national institutions and also enable the UN agencies to speak with one voice.
14. Noting that the use of the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer (HACT) is unlikely to succeed due to inherent risk within national institutions, the approach would be for the UN agencies to channel programme funding through one coordination agency in line with Recommendation 3.

For consideration by international donor agencies

15. Having simultaneous bilateral or multilateral support programmes often bring coordination challenges and risks of activity overlap and duplication. In this case, having the TNP operating side-by-side with initiatives supported directly by the Norwegian Embassy increases the administrative burden, reporting and coordination required of the GoT.

16. Consider undertaking a thorough needs analysis and any potential conflict with existing or planned support projects. Where multiple projects already exist, consideration should be given to harmonising programmes that share similar or potentially overlapping goals. Of course it has to be acknowledged that in certain circumstances harmonisation of programmes supported by different international agencies is problematic but the Tanzanian case warranted such an approach. The mechanics of harmonising the two programmes is beyond the scope of this evaluation but this is something the GoT, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the VPO and the NRTF, and possibly Ministry of Finance could review so as to identify better ways to improve coordination and increase efficiencies

For consideration by the GoT

17. Noting the history of policy failures and present challenges to address the underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation, it is necessary to enhance and accelerate the REDD+ readiness process by taking a more direct approach to improve adherence to national policies and regulations. It is worth considering ensuring accountability documents such as annual and long-term business plans of government departments in different sectors incorporate strategic components of the REDD+ framework. In doing, it also necessitates implementing accountability measures that enforce active adherence to national policies across the sectors as part of progress monitoring. Not that this does not occur in a short space of time because it requires political champions to carry this into policy reform and implementation process therefore it requires a sustained effort. In particular, this would address the cross-sectoral involving
    a. The agriculture and energy sectors, which a significant impact on deforestation and forest degradation.
    b. Enable relevant sector reviews and strategic studies to determine options and a roadmap for policy harmonisation between these key sectors and the forestry sector.

18. The REDD+ team in MNRT only has one staff member. MNRT will not be in a position to implement any meaningful activities without staff resources. MNRT, in collaboration with VPO, NRTF, urgently establish essential operational teams to take over the activities completed under the TNP. At this point the location of such a team does not matter. It is important that the results and momentum built through the TNP, NAFORMA and other REDD+ activities continues. Along with this option, national staff and agency mangers be encouraged to take a proactive role in development of projects. The ET noted that nationals working within the GoT are poorly remunerated. These staff are required to work on programme activities in addition to their daily office routine. Unless there is a financial motivation to do so, they will be inclined to conduct other duties that provide them with additional income rather than working on programme activities.

19. The NCMC is a key component of the REDD+ framework but the prolonged process to make it operational is causing profound drawbacks on key policy and technical decisions. Many of the technical recommendations given below are dependent on the future operational status and *modus operandi* of the NCMC. Consideration should be given to accelerating the decision process to operationalize the NCMC, otherwise much effort could in fact be wasted.

20. Noting the existence of significant information and data generated through the nine REDD+ Pilot projects, NAFORMA, and methodological approaches developed through Output 2 (RELS, national land use and land cover maps), Tanzania is at a point where it is ready to operationalize a national MRV system through establishment and investment in a business unit or well-resourced team within MNRT.

    c. The role of such a team would immediately be to determine options and methodological approaches to up-scaling outputs from pilot projects. The team would also take charge of outstanding work on national LULC, RELs and soil carbon estimation through up-scaling activities and products started under NAFORMA.

    d. To support Recommendation 8, noting that sectoral Technical Working Groups are already established to support the NRTF, a coordination framework would be necessary to bring together institutional technical experts to work with the MNRT team to continue supporting the NRTF and the NCMC once it is established.

9 LESSONS LEARNED

The key lessons coming out of the TNP in Tanzania at this stage relate to programme design. Note that these lessons are anecdotal, based on a limited stakeholder assessment exercise which is part of this evaluation and should not be treated as a full lessons learnt result.

A. Programme designs need to be based on broad and robust country needs and stakeholder analysis

As noted in Recommendation 1, failure to understand national context and stakeholder needs may well lead to a substantially flawed design and subsequent failure to achieve the desired outcomes. The evaluation team noticed the divergence of views between the UN agency staff and the government officials as being symptomatic of a lack of shared vision and goals. Consultation should go beyond seeking endorsement of concepts – instead, it should be related to stakeholder's own perspective and needs.

B. It is important to establish working relationships with respective national institutions and have a strategy for ongoing dialogue and regular meetings to maintain professional interest

Institutional relationships are important to establish at the beginning of the programme. The ET observed that the type of communication between UN-REDD staff and government staff was more or less a matter of convenience. This is evidence of a breakdown in communication and perhaps trust. The flow on effect of this is unnecessarily protracted and artificial bureaucracy. Unfortunately for the TNP, operating in the shadow of a much larger initiative made it much more difficult to receive the necessary attention from Tanzanian counterparts.

C. National institutions and respective governments must participate in the design process and take full or part ownership and accountability for the delivery of outputs and outcomes.

As noted in Recommendation 2, without ownership and accountability, national institutions are less likely to commit additional resources, especially in light of often competing needs and scarce financial resources. Participating in the design, and understanding the exit point of donor support, may result in greater commitment.

D. It is essential to understand the context specifically with regards to other bilateral and multilateral support programmes

As noted in point 8 under the recommendations, without fully understanding the national landscape and existing bilateral or multilateral programmes, the risk of duplication of effort is relatively high. Furthermore, it is not just understanding what programmes exist, but engaging with the respective agencies at the design stage.

ANNEXES TO THE EVALUATION REPORT

Annex 1. Evaluation Terms of Reference

UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme Final Evaluation Terms of Reference

UN-REDD Programme

March 2013

1 Background and Context

The TNP is the United Nations collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries. The Programme was launched in 2008 and builds on the convening role and technical expertise of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), referred to as the participating UN organizations. The TNP supports nationally-led REDD+ processes and promotes the informed and meaningful involvement of all stakeholders, including Indigenous Peoples and other forest-dependent communities, in national and international REDD+ implementation.

The TNP supports national REDD+ readiness efforts in two ways: (i) direct support to the design and implementation of UN-REDD National Programmes; and (ii) complementary support to national REDD+ action through common approaches, analyses, methodologies, tools, data and best practices developed through the UN-REDD Global Programme.

1.1 TNP – Tanzania Quick Start Initiative

Table 1: Programme information

Programme title:	TNP – Tanzania Quick Start Initiative		
Programme Objective:	To strengthen Tanzania's readiness for REDD+ as a component of the Government's evolving REDD+ Strategy.		
Approval date:	22/12/2009	Fund transfer date:	22/01/2010
Completion date:	30/09/2011	Non cost extension date:	30/06/2013

1.1.1 Objective, Expected Outcomes and Outputs

The overall objective of the TNP – Tanzania Quick Start Initiative is to strengthen Tanzania's readiness for REDD+ as a component of the Government's evolving REDD+ Strategy. The specific aims of Tanzania's original UN-REDD National Programme are represented by the following 4 outcomes and the outputs aligned with and supporting those outcomes:

Outcome 1: National governance framework and institutional capacities strengthened for REDD. The outputs and activities under this component provide capacity building support to the central and zonal sections of the FBD or MNRT, and the Vice President's Office, Division of Environment (VPO DoE), and they include these specific outputs:

Output 1.1: A Policy Framework for REDD is in place.

- Output 1.2: Cross-sectoral institutional and individual capacities built to deliver the REDD production chain.
- Output 1.3: FBD has greater capacity to develop and implement the national REDD Strategy in collaboration with other partners.
- Output 1.4: Cost curves for REDD in Tanzania established.
- Output 1.5: The National Joint Programme for UN-REDD in Tanzania effectively Managed, Monitored and Evaluated.

Outcome 2: Increased capacity for capturing REDD elements within national Monitoring, Assessment, Reporting and Verification (MARV) systems. The outputs and activities under this outcome support REDD in Tanzania by implementing a system for REDD MARV within FBD/VPO. This will provide a basis for accounting for carbon stocks and fluxes and develop knowledge about carbon and co-benefits (biodiversity and social attributes). This outcome is to be achieved via the following outputs:

Output 2.1: A system for REDD information synthesis and sharing established at FBD and linked to National Forestry and Beekeeping Data Base (NAFOBEDA).

Output 2.2: Training provided to forest staff on monitoring, assessment, reporting and verification (MARV).

Output 2.3: Forest degradation indices provided for forest landscapes.

Output 2.4: National maps inform delivery of the REDD Framework.

Outcome 3: Improved capacity to manage REDD and provide other forest ecosystem services at district and local levels. This component aims to build the capacity of the decentralized forest sector governance systems to support the REDD production chain. This outcome is to be achieved with the following outputs:

Output 3.1: Decentralized REDD Governance Framework developed and tested in pilot districts.

Output 3.2: Payment distribution system outlined.

Output 3.3: REDD payments combined with payments for non-carbon services.

Outcome 4: Broad-based stakeholder support for REDD in Tanzania. This component and its outputs and activities will generate knowledge on the successful implementation of elements within the REDD production chain. This will be aimed to provide a tool for Tanzania to promote their capacity to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation while creating additional benefits/trade-offs associated with REDD. In parallel the potential and complexity of REDD will be communicated to stakeholders in Tanzania to allow a multi-sectoral approach to the development and implementation of the national REDD framework.

Output 4.1: Improved awareness of REDD at national level.

Output 4.2: Broad consensus built with forest communities regarding the REDD Framework.

1.1.2 Executing Arrangements

Initially, the National Programme was managed by a Programme Coordination and Management Group (PCMG) which included representatives of Government and the three UN agencies. Project

oversight was provided by the Programme Advisory Group (PAG) which had a broader composition and included representatives from Civil Society.

Following a Mid-Term Evaluation (conducted in mid-2012) and in line with national institutional developments, these programme management arrangements were changed in 2012. The PAG was dissolved and project oversight transferred to the National REDD+ Task Force (NRTF). The PCMG was turned into a Programme Steering Committee (PSC) which again is broader in membership than the PCMG and also has strong links with the NRTF.

In addition, the UN-REDD National Programme has been fully integrated into the United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) 2011-2015, which commenced on 1 July 2011 and coordinates all UN activities in Tanzania.

1.1.3 Cost and Financing

The total amount transferred to the TNP – Tanzania Quick Start Initiative is US$ 4.28 million as shown in Table 2. According to the programme's latest annual report, in addition to the TNP funding, additional co-financing (cash) for UN-REDD supported activities was provided by: Tanzania Country Office (US$170,969.00), FCPF/WBI (US$73,381.00) and UNEP Nairobi (US$3,000.00).

Table 2: Programme Financing (US$)

Participating UN Organization	Amount allocated	Amount Transferred from the UN-REDD Multi-Partner Trust Fund
FAO	1,498,000	1,498,000
UNDP	2,568,000	2,568,000
UNEP	214,000	214,000
Total:	4,280,000	4,280,000

1.1.4 Programme Implementation Status

In Tanzania, the TNP has to be seen in the context of the overall REDD+ process in the country. The UN-REDD National Programme has been implemented in close cooperation with other REDD-related initiatives, in particular the Norwegian-Tanzanian Partnership on Climate Change. The National REDD+ Strategy, which was launched in March 2013, was developed by the NRTF through direct support by the Norwegian Embassy. However, the UN-REDD National Programme has contributed to the development of the National REDD+ Strategy, including through technical and economic analysis and multi-stakeholder consultations.

Key outputs to date of the UN-REDD National Programme include:

A study on "Estimating Cost Elements of REDD+ in Tanzania". The final report and a policy brief were published and distributed widely. In addition, a software tool was made available that allows REDD+ project developers and other interested parties to calculate and monitor the cost of REDD+ projects.

A capacity needs assessment for REDD+ at all levels of government was conducted; the final report and a policy brief were published and widely distributed.

The UN-REDD National Programme initiated strategic work on the drivers of D&D and expanded its work with the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security in this respect.

Several capacity-building exercises on Measurement, Reporting and Verification of forest carbon stocks were undertaken, including training on remote-sensing, geographic information systems and allometric equations.

Further information on the implementation of the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme can be found in the Annual and Semi-Annual Programme Reports. Further updates on implementation in 2013 will be provided at the beginning of the evaluation. The Final Report of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme is another important document for assessing the status of the national programme and for understanding the changes that were made to programme objectives and governance. The Final Evaluation should build on the Mid-Term Evaluation where possible, and in particular verify the extent to which Mid-Term Evaluation recommendations have been implemented.

2 The Evaluation

2.1 Objectives and Scope

The scope of the evaluation is the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme. The evaluation will be based on data available at the time of evaluation and discuss outputs delivered by the programme from the time of inception, January 2010, until the time of closure in June 2013. It will also assess the likelihood of future outcomes and impact that may not have been achieved yet by the end of June 2013.

The evaluation of the UN-REDD National Programme is undertaken to assess (i) programme performance in terms of relevance, effectiveness (outputs and outcomes) and efficiency, (ii) sustainability and up-scaling of results, and (iii) actual and potential impact stemming from the programme. The evaluation has the following objectives:

To provide evidence of results to meet accountability requirements,

To assess the status of REDD+ readiness in Tanzania, gaps and challenges that need to be addressed to achieve REDD+ readiness and the TNP's possible role in the future REDD+ process in the country.

To promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among the participating UN Organizations and other partners. The evaluation will identify lessons of operational and technical relevance for future programme formulation and implementation in the country, especially future TNPs, and/or for the TNP as a whole.

The primary audience for the evaluation will be the Government of Tanzania, the three participating UN Organizations of the TNP and the programme resource partners. The secondary audience for the evaluation will be the UN-REDD Policy Board and national REDD+ stakeholders. The evaluation will also be made available to the public through the TNP website (www.un-redd.org).

2.2 Evaluation Criteria

To focus the evaluation objectives, by defining the standards against which the initiative will be assessed, the following five evaluation criteria will be applied:

Relevance, concerns the extent to which the National Programme and its intended outcomes or outputs are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of the intended beneficiaries. Relevance also considers the extent to which the initiative is aligned with the TNP Strategy 2011-2015[20] (or the TNP Framework Document[21] for Programmes approved before November 2010) and the corporate plans of the three participating UN Organizations. Relevance vis-a-vis other REDD+ or REDD+-related programmes implemented in the country should also be examined, in terms of synergies, complementarities and absence of duplication of efforts.

Effectiveness, measures the extent to which the National Programme's intended results (outputs and outcomes) have been achieved or the extent to which progress towards outputs and outcomes has been achieved. To explain why certain outputs and outcomes have been achieved better or more than others, the evaluation will review:

Efficiency, measures how economically resources or inputs (such as funds, expertise and time) are converted to achieving stipulated outcomes and outputs.

Sustainability, analyse the likelihood of sustainable outcomes at programme termination, with attention to sustainability of financial resources, the socio-political environment, catalytic or replication effects of the project, institutional and governance factors, and environmental risks.

Impact, measures to what extent the National Programme has contributed to, or is likely to contribute to intermediate states towards impact, such as changes in the governance systems and stakeholder behaviour, and to impact on people's lives and the environment. The evaluation will assess the likelihood of impact by critically reviewing the programmes intervention strategy (Theory of Change) and the presence of the required drivers and assumptions for outcomes to lead to intermediate states and impact.

Factors and processes affecting the attainment of project results – which looks at examination of preparation and readiness of the project, country ownership, stakeholder involvement, financial planning, performance of national and local implementing agencies and designated supervision agency, coordination mechanism with other relevant donors projects/programmes, and reasons for any bottlenecks and delays in delivery of project outputs, outcomes and the attainment of sustainability.

2.3 Evaluation Questions

The following list includes standard questions and issues that the UN-REDD National Programme evaluation should address. It is based on the internationally accepted evaluation criteria mentioned above, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as an

[20] The TNP Strategy 2011-2015 is available on:

http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4598&Itemid=53

[21] The TNP Framework Document is available on:

http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4&Itemid=53

additional category of questions regarding factors affecting programme performance. The evaluation will assess the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme as follows:

2.3.1 Concept and Relevance of the NP

Design

National Programmes are built on assumptions on how and why they are supposed to achieve the agreed objectives through the selected strategy; this set of assumptions constitutes the programme theory or 'Theory of Change' and can be explicit (e.g. in a logical framework matrix) or implicit in a programme document.

This section will include a diagram and short description of the programme Theory of Change, including its results chains from outputs to impact, drivers and assumptions[22] and will analyse critically:

- The appropriateness of stated development goals and outcomes (immediate objectives);
- The evolution of outputs and outcomes since programme formulation;
- The causal relationship between outputs, outcomes (immediate objectives) and impact (development objectives);
- The extent to which drivers for change have been recognized and supported by the programme;
- The relevance and appropriateness of indicators;
- The comprehensiveness of drivers and assumptions identified by the programme.

The section will also critically assess:

- The Adequacy of the time and efforts invested in the design process;
- Realism of time-frame for implementation;
- The adequacy of the methodology of implementation to achieve intended results;
- The clarity and logic of the programme's results framework;
- Did the programme prepare and follow a clear REDD+ readiness roadmap, with appropriate sequencing of activities and outputs?
- The quality of the stakeholders' and beneficiaries identification;
- The appropriateness of selection criteria for pilot areas.

Relevance

The relevance of the National Programme's objectives and strategy to:

- Country needs;
- National development priorities as expressed in national policies and plans as well as in sector development frameworks;
- The UNDAP and One Plan between the Government of Tanzania and the UN Organizations;
- The TNP Framework Document23;

[22] **Drivers** and **assumptions** are external factors to the program that influence change along the causal pathways of the Theory of Change. They influence whether a change at a certain results level (e.g. an immediate outcome of the programme) can lead to a change at a higher results level (e.g. an intermediate state towards impact). **Drivers** are external factors over which the programme has a certain level of control, e.g. through a certain output that the programme delivers or through influence on a stakeholder who is expected to provide the driver. **Assumptions** are entirely outside the control of the programme.

[23] The TNP Framework Document is available on: http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4&Itemid=53

- Other REDD+ related programmes in the country, in particular the National REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan which were launched by government in March 2013.
- How well were existing policies, programmes, mechanisms and experiences taken into consideration so that REDD+ readiness could be built as much as possible on improving those rather than on the creation of new, parallel ones?

2.3.2 Results and contribution to stated objectives

Delivery of Outputs

The extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and timeliness, and any gaps and delays incurred in output delivery and their causes and consequences.

Ideally, the evaluation team should directly assess all outputs, but this is not always feasible due to time and resources constraints. Thus, the detailed analysis should be done on a representative sample of outputs that were assessed directly, while a complete list of outputs and their delivery rate and quality, prepared by the programme team, should be included as annex.

Effectiveness

- Extent to which the expected outcomes (specific/immediate objectives) have been achieved.
- Main factors influencing their achievement (with reference as needed to more detailed analysis under the "Factors affecting performance").
- Contributions of the various stakeholders to their achievement.
- What is the status of REDD+ readiness in the country, looking at the typical REDD+ readiness components, and to which extent the programme contributed to each?

Efficiency

- Cost and timeliness of key outputs delivered compared to national and regional benchmarks
- Administrative costs (including costs for supervision and coordination between participating UN agencies) compared to operational costs
- Any time and cost-saving measures taken by the programme
- Any significant delays or cost-overruns incurred, reason why and appropriateness of any remedial measures taken

Cross-cutting issues

- Assessment of gender mainstreaming in the National Programme. This will cover:
  - Analysis of how gender issues were reflected in Programme objectives, design, identification of beneficiaries and implementation;
  - Analysis of how gender relations and equality are likely to be affected by the initiative;
  - Extent to which gender issues were taken into account in Programme management.
  - Assessment of likely distribution of benefits and costs between stakeholders.
- The extent and quality of programme work in capacity development of beneficiaries; including the perspectives for institutional uptake and mainstreaming of the newly acquired capacities, or diffusion beyond the beneficiaries or the programme. To what extent were capacity building efforts based on a strong needs assessment, identifying both what people should know and know to do, and what the gaps are?
- Use made by the National Programme of the TNP's normative products, guidelines and safeguards, e.g. the TNP Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and

Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness, and the extent of which they have contributed towards national safeguards24.

- Actual and potential contribution of the National Programme to the normative work of the three participating UN Organizations, e.g. contribution towards the "Delivering as One" initiative and lessons learned incorporated into broader organizational strategies.

Sustainability and up-scaling

- Major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme;
- Adequacy of the exit strategy of the programme;
- The prospects for sustaining and up-scaling the National Programme's results by the beneficiaries after the termination of the initiative. The assessment of sustainability will include, as appropriate:
  - Institutional, technical, economic, social, political and environmental sustainability of proposed technologies, innovations and/or processes;
  - What are the prospects for follow-up and scaling-up REDD+ in Tanzania, providing suggestions for potential UN-REDD engagement (if pertinent)?
  - Are pilot interventions replicable under local conditions without project financing?

Likelihood of Impact

- Extent to which the initiative has attained, or is expected to attain, its social and environmental objectives; this will also include the identification of actual and potential positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended
- Presence of the required drivers and assumptions for outcomes to lead to intermediate states and impact.

2.3.3 Factors affecting performance

Programme Management and Coordination

- Role and effectiveness of institutional set-up;
- Quality of operations management, both within the programme and by the participating UN Organizations;
- Strategic decision-making by programme management;
- Realism of annual work-plans;
- Effectiveness of changes in management structure after the mid-term review;
- Was there an adequate central leadership, either by a government agency or one of the UN partner agencies?
- Quality of programme coordination:
  - Between the three participating UN organizations;
  - Between the Government and the three participating UN organizations;
  - Within and between Government ministries;
  - Between the National Programme and other bilateral and multilateral REDD+ initiatives.

Human and Financial Resources Administration

- Human Resources
  - The adequacy in terms of number and competencies of staff managing and supervising NP activities in partner agencies including government;

[24] None of the guidelines referred to were available during most of the period of programme implementation.

- Personnel turn-over rates and the balance between continuity and new staff in the NP and with partner agencies including government;
- The ability of managers to plan, coordinate and delegate work, communicate effectively, motivate and reward staff;
- Factors influencing the morale and job satisfaction of staff.

- Financial resources administration
  - Adequacy of allocation of funds towards, and expenditure rate by, each component, type of intervention and partners;
  - The quality, transparency and effectiveness of the systems and processes used for financial management;
  - Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions in matching implementation needs and programme objectives;
  - Efficiency of fund administration arrangements.
- Other administrative processes facilitating or inhibiting fluid execution of NP activities.

Technical Backstopping and Supervision

- Extent, timeliness and quality of technical backstopping from involved units in the participating UN Organizations, at all levels (headquarters, regional, sub-regional and country offices).
- Timeliness, quality and quantity of inputs and support by the Government and other in-country partners.
- Effectiveness of supervision and steering arrangements and processes of the overall programme but also within the different partner agencies involved. Did project supervision improve after the mid-term review? Was the Steering Committee operational?

186. Output 2.1.1 Study with TAFORI was stopped before submitting last payment, as data quality and deliverables were incomplete and of sub-standard quality. LoA with FRAM-RG was closed, but deliverables were deemed sub-standard, unclear whether the studies can be of any use.

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National Stakeholder participation and ownership

- Government commitment and support to the programme, in particular:
  - Financial and human resources made available for programme operations;
  - Uptake of outputs and outcomes through policy or investment for up-scaling.
- To what extent are all sectors driving deforestation or forest degradation involved in policy processes (and not only the focal ministry or department)?
- How strong was local (grass-roots level) stakeholder involvement in project design, implementation and M&E? Is there sufficient certainty that awareness raising and discussions at the local level can be followed-up in the short term with concrete action and benefits at the local level?
- Is there an appropriate understanding of the difference between UN-REDD and REDD+ at national and sub-national levels? Was there an appropriate balance between UN-REDD branding and ensuring national ownership of REDD+ policies and processes?

Monitoring, reporting and evaluation

- The quality, comprehensiveness and regularity of reporting on outputs, outcomes and impact drivers and assumptions towards the Government, UN partner agencies and donors. What verification mechanisms are in place to ensure the reliability and accuracy of reporting?

- The effectiveness of monitoring and internal review systems, including clear definition of roles and responsibilities for data collection, analysis and sharing and adequate resources for monitoring.
- How is monitoring information used for programme management, supervision and steering. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that monitoring results are used to enhance programme performance?
- The appropriateness of performance indicators to measure progress towards the achievement of outputs, outcomes and drivers to impact;
- Quality of the Mid-term Review/Evaluation and extent to which recommendations have been used by the programme.
- In how far have lessons learned from the programme been extracted, communicated and informed the design of a possible follow-up?

2.4 Evaluation Methodology

The UN-REDD National Programme final evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms & Standards[25]. It will be conducted by two independent consultants under the overall responsibility and management of the three participating UN Organizations' Evaluation Departments through their participation in the Evaluation Management Group, in consultation with relevant headquarter, regional and country staff of the participating UN Organizations.

Evaluation findings and judgements should be based on sound evidence and analysis, clearly documented in the evaluation report. Information will be triangulated (i.e. verified from different sources) to the extent possible, and when verification is not possible, the single source will be mentioned[26]. Analysis leading to evaluative judgements should always be clearly spelled out. The limitations of the methodological framework should also be spelled out in the evaluation reports.

The evaluation will rate the different evaluation criteria as detailed in Annex 6.

In attempting to attribute any outcomes and impacts to the programme, the evaluators should consider the difference between what has happened with and what would have happened without the programme. This implies that there should be consideration of the baseline conditions and trends in relation to the intended programme outcomes and impacts. This also means that there should be plausible evidence to attribute such outcomes and impacts to the actions of the project. Sometimes, adequate information on baseline conditions and trends is lacking. In such cases this should be clearly highlighted by the evaluators, along with any simplifying assumptions that were taken to enable the evaluator to make informed judgements about project performance.

As this is a final evaluation, particular attention should be given to learning from the experience. Therefore, the "why?" question should be at the front of the consultants' minds throughout the evaluation exercise. This means that the consultants need to go beyond the assessment of "what" the programme performance was, and make a serious effort to provide a deeper understanding of "why" the performance turned out the way it did, i.e. of processes affecting attainment of programme results. This should provide the basis for the lessons that can be drawn from the programme. In fact, the usefulness of the evaluation will be determined to a large extent by the capacity of the consultant to explain "why things happened" as they happened and are

[25]UNEG Norms & Standards: http://uneval.org/normsandstandards

[26] Individuals should not be mentioned by name if anonymity needs to be preserved. In such cases sources can be expressed in generic term (Government, NGO, donor etc.).

likely to evolve in this or that direction, which goes well beyond the mere assessment of "where things stand" today. The consultant could also provide recommendations for the way forward.

2.5 Evaluation Tools

The Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme final evaluation will make use of the following tools:

a) A desk review of project documents including, but not limited to:
   - Relevant background documentation, including the TNP Framework Document[27];
   - Relevant reports, such as National Programme Annual, Semi-Annual and quarterly Reports, Year in Review publication, external evaluations by donors, partners etc.;
   - Project design documents, such as the National Programme Document, annual work plans and budgets, revisions to the logical framework and project financing;
   - Documentation related to National Programme outputs and relevant materials published on the Programme website;
   - The final report of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme;
   - Other relevant documents, such as possible new national policy documents, sector plans and available evaluations bearing relevance for UN-REDD.

b) Semi-structured interviews[28] with key informants, stakeholders and participants, including:
   - Government counterparts;
   - Government stakeholders including all ministries participating from coordinating bodies or steering committees;
   - Civil Society Organizations;
   - Indigenous Peoples Organizations;
   - Country , regional and headquarter personnel from the three UN-Agencies involved in the National Programme, e.g. the Programme Management Unit, Resident Coordination and Regional Technical Advisers;
   - Representatives from other bi-lateral or multi-lateral initiatives co-financing the NP if applicable.

c) The Theory of Change and subsequent application of the ROtI approach on progress towards impact[29].

A list of key stakeholders and other individuals who should be consulted is included in Annex 5.

2.6 Consultation process

While fully independent in its judgements, the Evaluation Team will adopt a consultative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders. Throughout the process the evaluation team will maintain close liaison with: the Evaluation Management Group (Consisting of representatives of the evaluation departments of the three participating UN Organizations and the UN-REDD Secretariat), the Programme Management Unit, UN headquarters, regional, sub-regional and country level staff members, and other key stakeholders. Although the mission is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not

[27] The TNP Framework Document is available on: http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4&Itemid=53

[28] Face-to-face or through any other appropriate means of communications

[29] GEF Evaluation Office, (OPS4) Progress towards Impacts: The ROtI Handbook: Towards enhancing the impacts of environmental projects – Methodological paper 2.

authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor or the participating UN Organizations.

The draft evaluation report will be circulated among the three participating UN Organizations, including the Evaluation Management Group, and other key stakeholders for comment before finalisation; suggestions will be incorporated as deemed appropriate by the evaluation team.

2.7 The Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team should consist of two evaluators, including one team leader. The evaluation team should comprise the best available mix of skills that are required to assess the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme. Knowledge of the country in question, good technical understanding of the REDD+ field, as well as competence and skills in evaluation will be required. To the extent possible the Evaluation Team will be balanced in terms of geographical and gender representation to ensure diversity and complementarity of perspectives.

The Evaluation Team members will have had no previous involvement in the formulation, implementation or backstopping of the initiative, and have no future engagement with the TNP or the operational units, in Tanzania or within the participating UN agencies, involved in UN-REDD. All members of the Evaluation Team will sign the Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct[30] Agreement Form (Annex 3).

The Evaluation Team is responsible for conducting the evaluation as set out in these TORs and applying the approach and methods proposed in the inception report they will prepare. All team members, including the Team Leader, will participate in briefing and debriefing meetings, discussions, field visits, and will contribute to the evaluation with written inputs.

2.8 Evaluation Deliverables

2.8.1 Inception Report

Before going into data collection the Evaluation Team shall prepare an *inception report* containing a thorough review of the project design quality and the evaluation framework. The *inception report* should detail the evaluators' understanding of what is being evaluated and why, showing how the evaluation questions can be answered by way of: proposed methods and sources of data, as well as data collection procedures. The *inception report* will also present a draft, desk review-based Theory of Change of the National Programme, identifying outcomes, intermediate states towards impact, drivers and assumptions for evaluation. The *inception report* should also include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, as well as a desk based Theory of Change of the programme[31]. The evaluation framework should summarize the information available from programme documentation against each of the main evaluation parameters. Any gaps in information should be identified and methods for additional data collection, verification and analysis should be specified. The evaluation framework will present in further detail the evaluation questions under each criterion with their respective indicators and data sources. This will allow the three participating UN Organizations to verify that there is a shared understanding about the evaluation and clarify any misunderstandings at the outset. A list of important documents and web pages that the evaluators should read at the outset of the evaluation and before finalizing the evaluation design and the inception report is included in

[30] UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN system: www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

[31] GEF Evaluation Office, (OPS4) Progress towards Impacts: The ROtl Handbook: Towards enhancing the impacts of environmental projects – Methodological paper 2.

Annex 4. The Inception Report will be shared with the three participating UN Organizations and other relevant stakeholders and reviewed by the Evaluation Management Group.

2.8.2 Evaluation Reporting

At the end of the field mission, the consultants will prepare a *preliminary findings report* (mission Aide memoire) and present their first findings to stakeholders in Dar Es Salaam at a debriefing session. The *preliminary findings report* should be no longer than 5,000 words and it should be shared with stakeholders invited to the debriefing session at least 24 hours in advance.

The reviewers shall prepare a *draft evaluation report* within three weeks after the field mission. The Team Leader bears responsibility for submitting the draft report to the UN-REDD Secretariat within three weeks from the conclusion of the mission, and the Secretariat will immediately transmit the draft report to the evaluation departments of the three participating UN Organizations. The evaluation departments will verify that the draft report meets their evaluation quality standards and may request a revision of the draft report by the consultants before it is shared with a wider audience. The draft evaluation report will then be circulated among the three participating UN Organizations, including the Evaluation Management Group, and other key stakeholders for comments. Comments will be incorporated as deemed appropriate by the Evaluation Team. The consultants will prepare a *response to comments* in the form of a table listing all comments partially or entirely rejected by the evaluation team with an explanation why, which will be shared with stakeholders to ensure transparency. Confidential comments on the report will not be shared.

The *final evaluation report* will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation issues, questions and criteria listed in the Terms of Reference. The length of the final evaluation report should be 15-18,000 words, excluding executive summary and annexes. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the report when considered important to complement the main report. The recommendations will be addressed to the different stakeholders and prioritized: they will be evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable. Lessons learned will be based on programme experience and will specify the scope of their applicability beyond the programme.

The Evaluation Team shall propose the outline of the report in the inception report, based on the template provided in Annex 2 of this Terms of Reference. The report shall be prepared in English, and translated into French and Spanish.

The Evaluation Team is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government or the three participating UN Organizations. An evaluation report is not subject to technical clearance by the evaluation departments of the three participating UN Organizations, but has to meet the quality standards for evaluation of the three Organizations. The final report will be published on the TNP web site (www.un-redd.org).

The Evaluation Team will be invited to present the findings, recommendations and lessons learned from the evaluation to a relevant event bringing (UN-) REDD stakeholders together in Tanzania, to promote the dissemination and ownership of evaluation results. The inception report should suggest at which appropriate event(s) this could be done. The Team may, after completion of the evaluation process, also be invited by one or more participating UN agencies to present the evaluation at regional office or headquarters level.

2.9 Evaluation timetable and budget

Table 3 outlines the tentative timetable and responsibility of the evaluation process. The timetable will be adjusted according to the availability of the selected consultant.

Table 3: UN-REDD National Programme Evaluation Timeline

Date:	Activity	Responsibility
July 2013	Recruit consultants	National Programme Evaluation budget holder in consultation with the Evaluation Management Group (Evaluation departments of the three participating UN Organizations and the UN-REDD Secretariat)
August 2013	Preparation of Inception Report (5 days)Submission on 2 September 2013	Evaluation Team (consultants) Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations National Programme staff
September 2013	Review inception report (one week)	The three participating UN Organizations and the Evaluation Management Group (Evaluation departments of the three participating UN Organizations and the UN-REDD Secretariat)
8 September	TL travel to Tanzania	Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations National Programme staff
10 September 2013	Inception Workshop	UN Organizations' National Programme staff and Evaluation Team (consultants) Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations' National Programme staff including invitation of stakeholders
10 September – 1 October	Evaluation Mission, including preparation of *preliminary findings report* (21 Business days)	Evaluation Team (consultants) Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations' National Programme staff. Also, a one day debriefing workshop with stakeholders will be held at the end of

		the Evaluation Mission. At this workshop the *preliminary findings report* will be presented.
1 October 2013	Mission debrief	UN Organizations' National Programme staff and Evaluation Team (consultants) Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations' National Programme staff including invitation of stakeholders
2 October 2013	TL Departs Tanzania	Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations National Programme staff
3 October - 24 October 2013	Preparation of draft evaluation report and submission to UNREDD Secretariat. (submission on 25 November 2013)	The draft evaluation report will be submitted to the UN-REDD Secretariat at the latest 3 weeks after the mission has been completed.
25 October -8 November 2013	Review Draft Evaluation Report by the evaluation departments of the participating UN Organizations (two weeks)	The Evaluation Management Group (Evaluation departments of the three participating UN Organizations and the UN-REDD Secretariat) reviews the draft from the point of view of its evaluation quality and make comments to the Evaluation Team in that respect. If need be, the evaluation team will revise the draft report. The latter will be then circulated to other stakeholders for comment.
9 November 2013 – 22 November 2013	Review Draft Evaluation Report by the participating UN Organisations, Government Counterpart, UN Country Offices	The National Programme staff should ensure the Draft Evaluation Report is shared with the Government Counterpart and other relevant key stakeholders for information and their comments.

	and other stakeholders (two weeks)	
25 November – 2 December 2013	Final Report (one week)	Evaluation Team (consultants) Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations National Programme staff
3 December 2013	TL Travel to Tanzania	Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations National Programme staff
5 December 2013	Presentation of evaluation results in Tanzania	Evaluation Team (consultants) Logistical support provided by the NRTF in Tanzania
6 December 2013	TL Departs Tanzania	Logistical support provided by the participating UN Organizations National Programme staff
December	Management response from the Participating UN Organizations (one month)	Participating UN Organizations
January/February	Management response from the Government Counterpart (one month)	Government Counterpart
(TBC)	Dissemination of the report	The UN country offices on the national level and the TNP Secretariat on the global level.

Annex 1: Evaluation consultancies Terms of Reference

The Evaluation Team should consist of two evaluators, including one team leader. The Team Leader must have sound evaluation experience. The evaluation team should comprise the best available mix of skills that are required to assess the Tanzania UN-REDD National Programme, and ideally include in-depth knowledge of the National Programme country, good technical understanding of REDD+, as well as competence and skills in evaluation. To the extent possible the Evaluation Team will be balanced in terms of geographical and gender representation to ensure diversity and complementarity of perspectives.

The Evaluation Team members shall have had no previous direct involvement in the formulation, implementation or backstopping of the National Programme, and have no future engagement with the TNP or the operational units, in Tanzania or within the participating UN agencies, involved in UN-REDD. All members of the Evaluation Team will sign the Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct[32] Agreement Form (Annex 3).

The Evaluation Team is responsible for conducting the evaluation as described in the overall TORs of the evaluation, and applying the approach and methods they will propose in the inception report. All team members, including the Team Leader, will participate in briefing and debriefing meetings, discussions, field visits, and will contribute to the evaluation with written inputs and oral presentations. The Evaluation Team shall collaborate on a single document for each of the three main deliverables (inception report, preliminary findings report and main report), while the Team Leader is responsible for coordinating the inputs and ensuring all deadlines are met.

Competencies:

- Independent from the TNP and the participating UN Organizations, FAO, UNEP and UNDP.
- The evaluation team should comprise the best available mix of skills that are required to assess the National Programme, including:
    - Good technical understanding of REDD+;
    - Preferably in-depth knowledge of Tanzania.
- Demonstrate experience from evaluations of similar types of programmes, using a Theory of Change approach to evaluation.
- Excellent writing and editing skills.
- Attention to detail and respect for timelines.

Qualifications:

- Advanced university degree in relevant field.
- Minimum 11 (team leader)/7 (team leader assistant) years of professional experience is required, longer professional experience is an advantage, including proven experience from developing countries.
- Fluency in English language, both written and spoken is a requirement. Knowledge of local language would be a distinctive advantage.

[32] UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN system: www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

Deliverables:

- Prepare an inception report;
- Prepare a preliminary findings report and present it at the end of the mission to programme stakeholders;
- Produce a consolidated draft report that meets the quality requirements of the evaluation departments of the three participating UN agencies. The team leader is responsible for consolidating the report;
- Prepare a response to comments received from stakeholders on the draft report;
- Produce a consolidated final report. The team leader is responsible for consolidating the report.
- Prepare a PowerPoint presentation of findings and recommendations of the evaluation to be presented in Indonesia to key stakeholders.

Schedule of Payment:

Deliverables	Percentage payment to Consultant One (Team leader):	Percentage payment to Consultant Two:
Inception report	20%	
Submission and approval of the draft evaluation report	40%	50%
Submission and approval of the final evaluation report	40%	50%

Annex 2: Annotated UN-REDD National Programme evaluation report outline

The Evaluation Team can somewhat adjust the structure of the report outline below, as long as the key contents are maintained in the report and the flow of information and analysis is coherent and clear. The length of the UN-REDD National Programme final evaluation report should not exceed words, excluding executive summary and annexes.

The document will use paragraph numbering for easy cross-referencing in the text.

Acknowledgements

Insert acknowledgements.

Table of Contents

Insert Table of Contents.

Acronyms (Maximum 1 page and only for acronyms used more than 3 times in the report. When an abbreviation is used for the first time in the text, it should be explained in full.)

Executive Summary

The Executive Summary should:

- Maximum 1,800 words;
- Provide key information on the evaluation process and methodology;
- Illustrate key findings and conclusions;
- List all recommendations: this will facilitate the drafting of the Management Response to the evaluation.

Part 1. Introduction

A. Context of the National Programme

This section will include a description of the developmental context relevant to the National Programme including major challenges in the area of the intervention, political and legislative issues, etc. It will also describe the process by which the programme was identified and developed and cite other related and bilateral interventions if relevant.

It will further describe the National Programme (title, starting and closing dates, expected outcomes and outputs, initial and current total budget, implementation arrangements etc.).

B. The Evaluation

B.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

This section will include:

- The purpose of the evaluation, as stated in the Terms of Reference;
- Dates of implementation of the evaluation.

It will also mention that Annex I of the evaluation report is the evaluation Terms of Reference.

B.2 Methodology of the evaluation

This section will comprise a description of the methodology and tools used and evaluation criteria that were applied by the evaluation. This should also note any limitations incurred in applying the methodology by the evaluation team.

Part 2. Main findings of the evaluation

A. Concept and relevance of the NP

A.1 Design

A.2 Relevance

B. Results and contribution to stated objectives

B.1 Delivery of Outputs

B.2 Effectiveness

B.3 Efficiency

B.4 Cross-cutting issues: Gender, Capacity Development, Normative Products

B.5 Sustainability and up-scaling

B.6 Likelihood of Impact

C. Factors affecting performance

C.1 Programme Management and Coordination

C.2 Human and Financial Resources Administration

C.3 Technical Backstopping and Supervision

C.4 Government participation and ownership

C.5 Monitoring, reporting and evaluation

Part 3. Conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

A. Conclusions need to be substantiated by findings consistent with data collected and methodology, and represent insights into identification and/or solutions of important problems or issues. They may address specific evaluation questions raised in the Terms of Reference and should provide a clear basis for the recommendations which follow.

The Conclusions will synthesise the main findings from the preceding sections: main achievements, major weaknesses and gaps in implementation, factors affecting strengths and weaknesses, prospects for follow-up, any emerging issues. It will consolidate the assessment of various aspects to judge the extent to which the programme has attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives. Considerations about relevance, costs, implementation strategy and quantity and quality of outputs and outcomes should be brought to bear on the aggregate final assessment.

B. Recommendations should be firmly based on evidence and analysis presented under the conclusions, be relevant and realistic, with priorities for action made clear. They can tackle strategic, thematic or operational issues. Recommendations concerned with on-going activities should be presented separately from those relating to follow-up once the National Programme is terminated.

Each recommendation should be clearly addressed to the appropriate party(ies), i.e. the Government and the Participating UN Organizations at different levels (headquarter, regional, and national). Responsibilities and the time frame for their implementation should be stated, to the extent possible. Although it is not possible to identify a 'correct' number of recommendations

in an evaluation report, the evaluation team should consider that each recommendation must receive a response.

C. Lessons Learned. The evaluation will identify lessons and good practices on substantive, methodological or procedural issues, which could be relevant to the design, implementation and evaluation of similar projects or programmes, especially future UN-REDD activities and programmes in Tanzania and the rest of the world. Such lessons/practices must have been innovative, demonstrated success, had an impact, and be replicable.

Annexes to the evaluation report

I. Evaluation Terms of Reference

II. List of documents reviewed

III. List of persons interviewed during the evaluation process

The team will decide whether to report the full name and/or the function of the people who were interviewed in this list.

IV. Programme outputs matrix

This table will present the degree of achievement and comment on the quality of all intended programme activities per component (training events, meetings, reports/publications…). It should be prepared with assistance from the programme staff, in a format decided by the evaluation team, when details cannot be provided in the main text because too cumbersome.

V. Brief profile of evaluation team members

Annex 3: Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct33 Agreement Form

The form is to be completed by all consultants and included as an annex in the final report.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: _____

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at (place) on (date)

Signature: _____

[33] Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System: www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

Annex 4: Basic documents to be consulted

The following list of basic documents should, as a minimum, be consulted by the evaluators at the outset of the evaluation and before finalizing the evaluation design and the inception report:

1. TNP Strategy:
    a. http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4598&Itemid=53

1. Burgess, N.D et al (2010) Getting ready for REDD+ in Tanzania: a case study of progress and challenges: Fauna & Flora International, Oryx, 44(3), 339–351
2. Tanzania Final UN-REDD National Joint Programme
3. UN-REDD Tanzania Programme Mission Report of Inception Process and Workshop, January 26-29, 2010 (final version of 6 May 2010)
4. FINAL REPORT MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE TNP – TANZANIA QUICK-START INITIATIVE
5. Annual and quarterly work plans
6. Minutes of the meetings of the Programme Coordination and Management Group (PCMG), Programme Advisory Group (PAG) and Programme Steering Committee (PSC)
7. Terminal Evaluation of the UN-REDD Vietnam National Programme
8. Estimating Cost Elements of REDD+ in Tanzania
9. Runsten, L., Ravilious, C., Kashindye, A., Giliba, R., Hailakwahi, V., Kashaga, L.R.A., Khalid, S., Mbilinyi, B., Mwampashi, Y., Pastory, M.,Mant, R., Osti, M., Crête, P., Pekkarinen, A., Leppanen, M., Miles, L. (2013) Using spatial information to support decisions on safeguards and multiple benefits for REDD+ in Tanzania. Prepared by UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge, UK; published by Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania.
10. Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding development cooperation concerning: "Enhancing the measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of forests in Tanzania through the application of advanced remote sensing techniques" – Signed 25 June 2011. United Republic of Tanzania.2013. National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). Division of Environment, Vice President's Office, Dar es Salaam.
11. Agreement between The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania regarding Support to Tanzania Revenue Authority (various dates from 1988 to 2011)
12. Chambers, J. Q., Asner, G. P., Morton, D. C., Morton, D. C., Anderson, L. O., Saatchi, S. S., Esp´ırito-Santo, F. D. B., and Souza Jr., M. P. C.: Regional ecosystem structure and function: ecological insights from remote sensing of tropical forests, Trends Ecol. Evol., 22, 414–423, 2007.
13. GOFC-GOLD (2008) Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries: a sourcebook of methods and procedures for monitoring, measuring and reporting. GOFC-GOLD Report version COP13-2. GOFCGOLD Project Office, Natural Resources Canada, Alberta, Canada.
14. Jensen, J. R.: Remote Sensing of the Environment – an Earth Resource Perspective, 2nd ed., Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2007.
15. Progress Report May 2012 - April 2013
16. Progress Report May 2011 – April 2012
17. Minutes Of Annual Project Meeting Held at Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro, Tanzania on 20th July 2012
18. Financial Report 2011-2012

19. Financial Report 2012-2013
20. Mayaux, P. and Archad, F. 2010. Overview of Carbon and REDD: The Need for MRV Systems. Retrieved June 25, 2013, from http://pfbccbfp.org/docs/rapports_act/Atelier%20COMIFAC%20Brazzaville%202010/Proceedings_COMIFAC_Workshop_Brazzaville_2010.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,0,849
21. Millennium Development Goal 7 http://www.tz.undp.org/content/tanzania/en/home/mdgoverview/overview/mdg7/
22. Minutes of Annual Project Management Board (PMB) Meeting Held at Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUATF), Arusha, Tanzania on 11th February 2012
23. Field work instructions for the Project in Amani Nature Reserve
24. Norwegian Computing Center. 12 June 2012. Cloud and cloud shadow detection in Landsat images for monitoring tropical forests in Tanzania (
25. Norwegian Computing Center. 5 April 2013. Spectral variability of surface reflectance for monitoring tropical forests in Tanzania (draft work in progress) Project TropSkogTanz - Project Number 220512)
26. Norwegian Computing Center. 18 October 2011. Evaluation of Landsat surface reflectance estimated by LEDAPS. Project GEO-FCT Hub - Project Number 220515
27. Stephens PR, Watt PJ, Loubser D, Haywood A, Kimberley MO. Estimation of carbon stocks in New Zealand planted forests using airborne scanning LiDAR. Workshop on Laser Scanning. 12–14 September 2007. Finland. pp 389–394, IAPRS XXXVI, Part 3/W52. 2007.
28. United Republic of Tanzania. 2013. Action Plan for Implementation of the National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). Division of Environment, Vice President's Office, Dar es Salaam.
29. United Republic of Tanzania (unpublished). Tanzania National Forest Resources Monitoring and Assessment (NAFORMA). Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam.
30.

Annex 5: Key stakeholders and partners (Terms of Reference)

The following list of key stakeholders and other individuals should be consulted:

Name	Title / Organisation	Contact information
Participating UN Organizations		
Mr. Philippe Poinsot	Country Director, UNDP	P.O. Box 9182 Dar es Salaam Philippe.poinsot@undp.org
Ms. Diana Tempelman	Country Director, FAO	Diana.Tempelman@fao.org
Ms. Mandisa Mashologu	Deputy Country Director, UNDP (Programme)	P.O. Box 9182 Dar es Salaam Mandisa.Mashologu@undp.org
Ms. Gertrude Lyatuu	UNDP Programme Specialist, Energy and Environment	P.O. Box 9182 Dar es Salaam Getrude.lyatuu@undp.org
Mr. Ralf Ernst	International UN-REDD Coordinator Tanzania	P.O. Box 9182, Dar es Salaam Ralf.Ernst@undp.org
Ms. Clara Makenya	National Officer, UNEP	P.O. Box 9182 Dar es Salaam clara.makenya@unep.org
Mr. Josep A. Gari	UN-REDD Africa Coordinator	Josep.gari@undp.org
Mr. Niklas Hagelberg	UNEP	Niklas.Hagelberg@unep.org
Mr Philippe Crete	FAO Lead Technical Officer UN-REDD Tanzania	Philippe.Crete@fao.org
Mr. Dismas Mwikila	National UN-REDD Coordinator, UNDP	Dis20tz@yahoo.co.uk
Mr. Almas Kashindye	National MRV Expert, FAO	Almas.kashindye@fao.org
Mr. Mgaza Lusonge	UN-REDD Project Assistant, UNDP	Mgaza.lusonge@undp.org
Non-Governmental Organizations		
Mr. Cassian Sianga	Senior Forest Programme Officer, Tanzania Natural Resources Forum (TNRF)	c.sianga@tnrf.org

Mr. C. Meshack	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG)	cmeshack@tfcg.or.tz
Mr. Theron Browne	MJUMITA	theronmb@gmail.com
Mr. Edwin Nssoko	Jane Goodall Institute	nssokov@yahoo.com
Mr. J. Chenga	TRAFFIC	Jumapili.chenga@traffic.org
Mr. A. Thani	CARE	thani_ali@yahoo.com
Mr. P. Nnyiti	WCST	paul_nnyiti@yahoo.co.uk
Dr. R. Otsyina	DASS/TaTeDo	rotsyina@gmailcom
Mr. S. Ball	Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI)	Steve.ball@mpingoconservation.org
Ms. G. Massao	MCDI	Glory.massao@mpingoconservation.org
Mr. Raja Jarreh	CARE/HIMA	jarrah@careinternational.org
Donor/Bilateral projects		
Ms. Inger G. Naess	Counsellor, Environment and Climate Change, Norwegian Embassy	P.O. Box 2646 Dar es Salaam ign@mfa.no
Ms. Merja Makela	Counsellor, Natural Resources, Embassy of Finland	P.O. Box 2455 Merja.mekala@formin.fi
Mr. Soren Daalsgard	Chief Technical Advisor, NAFORMA	P.O. Box 426, Dar es Salaam Soren.Dalsgaard@fao.org
Tanzanian Government		
Dr. J. Ningu	Director of Environment, VPO	P.O. Box 5380 Dar es Salaam jningu@vpo.go.tz
Mr. Juma S. Mgoo	CEO, Tanzanian Forest Service, TFS/MNRT	jsmgoo@mnrt.go.tz
Mr. Evarist Nashanda	Schedule Officer, Catchment Forests and	P.O. Box 426 Dar es Salaam Evarist.nashanda@gmail.com

	Nature Reserves & REDD Coordinator, TFS	
Ms. S. Natai	Head, Environment Management Unit, MAFC	P.O. Box 9192 Dar es Salaam shakwaa@yahoo.co.uk
Ms. V. Kisamfu	Staff, Environment Management Unit, MAFC	P.O. Box 9192 Dar es Salaam kisamfu@yahoo.com
Ms. J. Marwa	Staff, Environment Management Unit, MAFC	P.O. Box 9192 Dar es Salaam janemarwa@yahoo.com
Ms. Winnifrida Mrema	Senior Chemist/Environmental Officer, Ministry of Energy and Minerals and member of the National REDD Task Force	P.O. Box 2000 Dar es Salaam howinnie66@yahoo.com
Mr. Ephraim Mushi	Environmental Officer, Ministry of Energy and Minerals	P.O. Box 2000 Dar es Salaam
Mr. Nurdin Chamuya	TFS/MNRT	nuruchamuya@yahoo.com
Research Institutes		
Prof. P.Z. Yanda	Director, IRA and Coordinator REDD Secretariat	P.O. Box 35097 Dar es Salaam pyanda@gmail.com
Prof. Yonika M. Ngaga	Dean, Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation- SUA Chair, National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC)	yngaga@yahoo.co.uk

Annex 6: Rating Programme Performance

The evaluation will provide individual ratings for the evaluation criteria described in section 2.C of these TORs.

All criteria will be rated on a six-point scale as follows: Highly Satisfactory (HS); Satisfactory (S); Moderately Satisfactory (MS); Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU); Unsatisfactory (U); Highly Unsatisfactory (HU). Sustainability is rated from Highly Likely (HL) down to Highly Unlikely (HU).

An aggregated rating (on a six-point scale) will be provided for Concept and relevance, Results and Contribution to stated objectives, and Overall Project Performance. These ratings are not the average of the ratings of sub-criteria but should be based on sound weighting of the sub-criteria by the Evaluation Team. All ratings should use letters (not numbers).

In the conclusions section of the report, ratings will be presented together in a table, with a brief justification cross-referenced to the findings in the main body of the report.

Criterion	**Rating**	**Summary assessment**
Concept and relevance of the NP		
Design		
Relevance		
Results and contribution to stated objectives		
Delivery of Outputs		
Effectiveness		
Efficiency		
Cross-cutting issues:		
Gender		
Capacity Development		
Normative Products		
Sustainability		
Up-scaling		
Likelihood of Impact		
Factors affecting performance		
Programme Management and Coordination		
Human and Financial Resources Administration		
Technical Backstopping and Supervision		
Government participation and ownership		
Monitoring, reporting and evaluation		
Overall Programme Performance		

Annex 2. Brief profile of evaluation team members

Mr Nelson Gapare (International Consultant/Team Leader). Mr Gapare has over 20 years of working experience in Forestry, Climate Change, Environmental Management, Mapping and Geospatial Technology. He has experience in Africa, Asia, South America and Australasia. He holds an M.B.A. from Massey University, New Zealand, a Postgraduate Diploma in Resource Studies from Lincoln University, New Zealand and a Diploma in Forestry Management from the Zimbabwe College of Forestry.

Mr Gapare has participated in assignments related to the local and national implementation of REDD+ initiatives. Specifically, he has acted as REDD+ technical advisor and MRV Specialist for the Laos Department of Forestry. He has managed assignments for VCS projects on carbon monitoring and avoided deforestation in Papua New Guinea and Lao PDR. He was workstream leader for the development of New Zealand's National Land Use and Carbon Analysis System (LUCAS) and continued to leads project to map and monitor. In 2010, he successfully led a team of national experts on Land Use, Land-Use Change & Forestry (LULUCF) for the in-country New Zealand 2008 GHG Inventory Report, as part of meeting international obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC.

Mr Gapare has been a team member for REDD+ MRV implementation in Guyana. He also worked as a Senior Research Officer for the Forestry Commission in Zimbabwe.

Mr Gapare has been involved in the review and evaluation of Climate Change and Natural Resource Management projects, programmes and initiatives in New Zealand, Lao PDR, and Vietnam and Tanzania. In addition, Mr Gapare has trained in and has applied change management strategies, at project, programme, and organisational levels using various approaches encompassing theory of change and outcomes frameworks.

Dr Christopher William (National Consultant). Dr William completed his Doctoral degree in 2010 and has vast research and working experience in Tanzania. He has undertaken research on the ecology, conservation, and climate change and effects of fire in Uluguru Nature Reserve, Tanzania. He has also evaluated the Implication of Land Use and Land Cover Change on Forests and Biodiversity on Half-Mile Forest on Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania.

Dr William has worked as a consultant on capacity building projects related to Climate Change Adaptation and Ecosystem Management and on Climate Change policy related projects. He has also participated in Environmental and Social Impact Assignments and Socio-Economic Studies for different projects in Tanzania

Annex 3. List of documents reviewed

1. TNP – Tanzania Quick Start: Programme Document (November 2010)
2. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme - Mission Report of Inception Process and Workshop, January 26-29, 2010
3. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: Annual Work Plan 2010
4. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: Annual Work Plan 2011-2012
5. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: Annual Work Plan 2012-2013
6. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: 2011 Annual Report
7. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: 2012 Semi-Annual Report
8. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: 2011 Annual Report
9. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: Minutes of the 1st Programme Coordination and Management Group (PCMG) Meeting 23 May 2012
10. Minutes of the 3rd Programme Coordination and Management Group (PCMG) meeting for TNP-Tanzania 17th March 2011
11. Minutes of the 2nd Programme Coordination and Management Group (PCMG) for TNP-Tanzania. 1st October 2010

12. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: Meeting Minutes of the PAG Meeting 25 May 2012
13. UN-REDD Tanzania National Programme: Minutes of the 1st PSC Meeting 12 November 2012
14. CCIAM Programme (2012) Proceedings of the First Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation Programme Scientific Conference. Directorate of Research and Postgraduate Studies. Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro, Tanzania.
15. National REDD+ Secretariat, The Institute of Resource Assessment (2012)Training Report: Capacity Building on REDD+ Safeguards in Tanzania Livingstone Hotel, Bagamoyo (22nd - 23rd May, 2012)
16. National REDD+ Secretariat, The Institute of Resource Assessment (2012). Report - Climate Change Awareness Raising Seminar to Honourable Members Of The Parliamentary Standing Committees: Held on 27th and 28th January 2012 in Bagamoyo, Coast Region Tanzania.
17. Burgess, N.D et al (2010) Getting ready for REDD+ in Tanzania: a case study of progress and challenges: Fauna & Flora International, Oryx, 44(3), 339–351
18. Clarke, M. & Salmi, J. (2013). *Evaluation of the Norwegian International Climate and Forestry Initiative for Monitoring Reporting and Verification*. 12th April 2013. Debriefing presentation at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
19. Deloitte (August 2012): Mid-term Review Report of the Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation (CCIAM) research and capacity building programme.
20. Deloitte (August 2012): Mid-term Review Report of Nine NGO REDD+ Pilot Projects in Tanzania -Higher-Level Overview of NGO REDD+ Portfolio
21. Edwards, K., Lukumbuzya, K. and Kajembe, G. (2012). Capacity Needs Assessment of Government Institutions at Central, Regional, District and Local Levels for the Establishment and Management of a REDD+ Scheme in Tanzania. Ref No RFP/UNDP/TZA/2011/005. Final Report and Capacity Development Plan Prepared by LTS International for the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) and the UN-REDD National Programme in Tanzania. 5 September 2012. Scotland. 104 p.
22. FAO, (2010). *Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010*. Country Report United Republic of Tanzania FRA2010/222, Rome, Italy.
23. FAO (2009) *National Forestry Resources Monitoring and Assessment* (NAFORMA). Available at: http://www.fao.org/forestry/17798-04da8582de56952874a52c47c17601ba9.pdf
24. FAO, UNDP, UNEP Framework Document (June 2008): UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD)
25. FCPF (2010). *Readiness Preparation Proposal* (R-PP). Final Submission. Republic of Tanzania, 12 October 2010.
26. FCPF (2012a) *Tanzania REDD Progress Fact Sheet*. Submission to FCPF. October 2012. Available at: https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Oct2012/REDD%20Tanzania%20Fact%20Sheet_October%202012.pdf
27. FCPF (2012b) *Tanzania REDD Progress Fact Sheet*. Submission to FCPF. June 2012. Available at: https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/June2012/REDD%20Tanzania%20Fact%20Sheet_June%202012_0.pdf
28. IPCC (2006) *Guidelines for National GHG Inventories*. Volume 4 AFOLU. Available at: http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.html
29. IPCC (2003) *Good Practice Guidance for Land Use Land use Change and Forestry*. Available at: http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf_contents.html
30.
31. Key Deliberation on Sustainability of NCMC (July 2013). From stakeholders' workshop held on 19 July 2013, at Blue Pearl Hotel-Ubungo Plaza
32. Lutz, E., Chamshama, S. (May 2012). Mid-Term Evaluation of the TNP – Tanzania Quick-Start Initiative
33. NORDECO and Acacia Resource Consultants (April 2013). National REDD+ Strategy Development and Implementation Process in Tanzania – Mid-Term Review Final Report

34. Regalia Media (23 January 2012). Inception Report. Developing a communication strategy, production of REDD awareness raising materials and organising Training of Trainers and media representatives on REDD and Climate Change
35. Sokoine University of Agriculture (2011). Enhancing the Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of Forests in Tanzania through the Application of Advanced Remote Sensing Techniques. Proposal for the Application of Funding through the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. 103 p.
36. Salmi, J., Lindroos, K., and Karani, I. (2011) Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007-2010. Country Report: Tanzania. Evaluation Report 17/2010. NORAD, Oslo, Norway.
37. TNRF (2011) REDD Realities: Learning from REDD pilot Projects to make REDD work. Based on informational interviews with pilot project staff, as well as project presentations made at a national REDD Stakeholders Workshop (3-4 October 2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) hosted by the Tanzania National REDD Task Force.
38. TWG REDD+ MRV (2013) Establishing a National Carbon Monitoring Centre for Tanzania; A proposal presented to RNE, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
39. United Republic of Tanzania (2012). National Climate Change Communication Strategy (2012-2017)
40. United Republic of Tanzania (2013). National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)
41. United Republic of Tanzania (2013). Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism – Tanzania Forest Service (TFS) Agency – Business Plan and Associated Budget for the Financial Year 2013/2014
42. United Republic of Tanzania (2012). *Submission to the UNFCCC SBSTA on the issue related to Agriculture*. 5th March 2012. Available at: http://unfccc.int/files/methods_science/redd/submissions/application/pdf/20120305_tanzania_subm_agriculture.pdf
43. TNP Strategy:
44. http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4598&Itemid=53
45. Tanzania Final UN-REDD National Joint Programme
46. UN-REDD Tanzania Programme Mission Report of Inception Process and Workshop, January 26-29, 2010 (final version of 6 May 2010)
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53. Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding development cooperation concerning: "Enhancing the measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of forests in Tanzania through the application of advanced remote sensing techniques" – Signed 25 June 2011. United Republic of Tanzania.2013. National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). Division of Environment, Vice President's Office, Dar es Salaam.

54. Agreement between The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania regarding Support to Tanzania Revenue Authority (various dates from 1988 to 2011)
55. Chambers, J. Q., Asner, G. P., Morton, D. C., Morton, D. C., Anderson, L. O., Saatchi, S. S., Esp´ırito-Santo, F. D. B., and Souza Jr., M. P. C.: Regional ecosystem structure and function: ecological insights from remote sensing of tropical forests, Trends Ecol. Evol., 22, 414–423, 2007.
56. GOFC-GOLD (2008) Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries: a sourcebook of methods and procedures for monitoring, measuring and reporting. GOFC-GOLD Report version COP13-2. GOFCGOLD Project Office, Natural Resources Canada, Alberta, Canada.
57. Jensen, J. R.: Remote Sensing of the Environment – an Earth Resource Perspective, 2nd ed., Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2007.
58. Progress Report May 2012 - April 2013
59. Progress Report May 2011 – April 2012
60. TNP Strategy 2011-2015
61. UN-REDD (2012) Capacity Needs Assessment of Government Institutions at Central, Regional, District and Local Levels for the Establishment and Management of a REDD+ Scheme in Tanzania. Ref No RFP/UNDP/TZA/2011/005. 5th September 2012. Final Report and Capacity Development Plan submitted by LTS International, United Kingdom.
62. Zahabu, E. & Chumuya, N. (2012) Establishing a Monitoring and MRV System for Tanzania. Side Event Presentation at the 18th Conference of Parties (COP18) December 1st 2012. Doha, Qatar. Available at: https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/attachments/get_attachment?code=VGG1ADJ7CA7QJCSNVNCORP11DUGEHSSB

Annex 4. List of institutions and stakeholders met during the evaluation process

	Interviewee	Institution/Activity	
	Participating UN Organizations		
	Ms. Diana Tempelman	(FAO) Country Director	
	Mr Ralf Ernst	(FAO) International UN-REDD Coordinator Tanzania	
	Mr Philippe Crete	(FAO) Lead Technical Officer UN-REDD Tanzania	
	Mr Almas Kashindye	(FAO) National MRV Expert,	
	Japhet Kashaigili	FAO, Allometric Equations	
	Mr. Philippe Poinsot	(UNDP) Country Director	
	Ms Mandisa Mashologu	(UNDP) Deputy Country Director, UNDP (Programme)	
	Mr. Joseph A. Gari	(UNDP) UN-REDD Africa Coordinator	
	Ms. Gertrude Lyatuu	(UNDP) Programme Specialist, Energy and Environment	
	Mr. Dismas Mwikila	(UNDP) National UN-REDD Coordinator,	
	Mr. Mgaza Lusonge	(UNDP) UN-REDD Project Assistant,	
	Ms. Clara Makenya	(UNEP) National Officer,	
	Mr. Niklas Hagelberg	UNEP	
	Inge Jonckheere	FAO (Remote Sensing Expert)	
	Donna Lee	Consultant (RELs)	
	Benoît Rivard	Consultant (LTS International)	
	Christian Held	Consultant (Unique)	
	Government Institution		
	Dr Ningu	Director of Environment, VPO – Chair (NRTF)	
	Mr. Juma S. Mgoo	CEO, Tanzanian Forest Service, TFS/MNRT	
	Mr. Evarist Nashanda	Schedule Officer, Catchment Forests and Nature Reserves & REDD Coordinator, TFS	
	Amina Akida	TFS/MNRT	
	Mr. Nurdin Chamuya	TFS/MNRT	
	Ms Berit Tvete Mille Lunde	Counsellor for Climate Change, Norwegian Embassy	
	Soren Dalsgaard	CTA - NAFORMA	
	Non-Governmental Organizations		
	Mr. Cassian Sianga	Senior Forest Programme Officer, Tanzania Natural Resources Forum (TNRF)	
	Mr. C. Meshack	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG)	
	Mr. Theron Browne	MJUMITA	
	Mr. J. Chenga	TRAFFIC	
	Mr. A. Thani	CARE	
	Mr. P. Nnyiti	WCST	
	Dr. R. Otsyina	DASS/TaTeDo	
	Ms. G. Massao	MCDI	
	Mr. Raja Jarreh	CARE/HIMA	
	Ms. S. Natai	Head, Environment Management Unit, MAFC	

	Ms. V. Kisamfu	Staff, Environment Management Unit, MAFC	
	Ms. J. Marwa	Staff, Environment Management Unit, MAFC	
	Ms. Winnifrida Mrema	Senior Chemist/Environmental Officer, Ministry of Energy and Minerals and member of the National REDD Task Force	
	Mr. Ephraim Mushi	Environmental Officer, Ministry of Energy and Minerals	
	Research Institutes		
	Prof. P.Z. Yanda (SC Member)	Director, IRA and Coordinator REDD Secretariat	
	Dr. Emma Liwenga	Deputy Coordinator, REDD Secretariat	
	Prof. Yonika M. Ngaga	(SUA) Dean, Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation- SUA	
	Prof. Rodgers Malimbwi	NAFORMA-SUA	
	Prof. Salim Malyondo	CCIAM-SUA	
	Dr Suzanna Augustino	Chair, National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC)	
	Dr Eliakimu Zahabu	MRV expert-SUA	
	Dr. Lawrence Mbwambo	DG-TAFORI	
	Siima Bakengesa	Director, Forest Production-TAFORI	
	Francis Laswai	Ag. Director, Forest utilization-TAFORI	
	Private Sector (Forestry)		
	Mr. Hans Lemm	Kilombero Valley Teak Company	
	Alois Mabutho	Green Resources	
	Local communities in REDD Project Pilot areas		
	Mr. Adam Shomari	Village Executive Officer-Maseyu	
	Mr. Shoto Maila Shoto	Village Chairman-Maseyu	

Annex 5. List of project outputs

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
OUTCOME 1: National governance framework and institutional capacities strengthened for REDD					
Output 1.1: A Policy Framework for REDD is in place.		• National REDD+ Strategy and the related Action Plan, but is not a direct result of the UN-REDD National Programme. • A capacity needs assessment was conducted at all levels of government that will form the basis for future capacity development for REDD+ in Tanzania. • Produced the estimation of cost elements of REDD+ projects in the country. This project resulted in policy and technical advice for decision-makers in			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
		Tanzania and internationally and the development of software that helps project managers and other interested parties in calculating and monitoring project cost. • Additional support and advice provided to the NRTF			
Output 1.2 Cross-sectoral institutional and individual capacities built to deliver the REDD production chain		• Training provided for the NRTF and its Technical Working Groups on the carbon production chain and a range of emerging issues of the REDD+ discussions, such as REDD+ and the Green Economy, carbon finance and the role of the private sector for REDD+ implementation. This enabled the NRTF to integrate such issues into the National REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan. • Indirect training of high level decision makers (including Permanent Secretaries, Chief Executives and Directors from several ministries) through visits to REDD+ pilot projects and a sensitization workshop on social and environmental safeguards for REDD+. • Training materials produced and distributed to further build capacity of government forest officers on REDD+.			
Output 1.3: FBD has greater capacity to develop and implement the national REDD Strategy in collaboration with other partners		• Outcomes of the Capacity Needs Assessment used to enhance capacity building measures (including planning, monitoring and law enforcement) • Piloting initiated in the 3 districts of Angai (Liwale District), Ayasanda (Babati District) and Kitulangalo (Morogoro Rural District) but this is not yet completed and is expected to be completed by the end of 2013. • Presents potential for up-scaling of successful trials and could be considered in a follow-up phase for the UN-REDD National Programme. • Training courses: Capacity building carried out for TFS staff through specialized training on programme and project management, including planning, monitoring and evaluation, and on financial management. 18 MNRT/TFS staff members attended this training course.			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
		• Over the 3 years, an estimated more than 500 government staff are have undergone training on REDD+ in general and on specific areas of REDD+			
Output 1.4: Cost curves for REDD in Tanzania established		• Estimating Cost Elements Of REDD+ In Tanzania - Final Report • Estimating Costs Of REDD In Tanzania - Policy Brief • 2012 REDD+ Cost Elements Tool Tanzania • The article "A bottom-up approach to estimating cost elements of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania" was published in Carbon Balance and Management 2012, 7:9. All publications can be downloaded here. **http://www.un-redd.org/UNREDDProgramme/CountryActions/Tanzania/tabid/1028/language/en-US/Default.aspx**			
Output 1.5: Management oversight for JP provided		• Materials provided on time. • Staff recruited on time.			
OUTCOME 2: Increased capacity for capturing REDD elements within national Monitoring, Assessment, Reporting and Verification					
2.1: A system for REDD+ information synthesis and sharing established at TFS and linked to NAFOBEDA		• Strengthening of the mapping unit at MNRT/TFS, based on comprehensive training and the provision of essential equipment (hardware and software for data management, mapping and printing); • An annotated bibliography and a physical library on REDD+ have been established at MNRT/TFS and are available for researchers and the general public interested in REDD+ and forestry in general; • A roadmap has been developed for the establishment of a Reference Level / Reference Emission Level and can be implemented by the National REDD+ Task Force; • MNRT/TFS and the NRTF have been provided with data from different sets of permanent sample plots (primarily for miombo forests) across the country which could potentially be used for the development of emissions factors; • In collaboration with NAFORMA, a historical forest cover change assessment for the period 1990-2000-2010 will be completed by December 2013,			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
		which will provide the first official assessment of Tanzania's deforestation rate; • A comprehensive dataset of soil carbon from NAFORMA permanent sample plots was produced and analyzed in Tanzania, which has been used to develop: • A national soil carbon map in collaboration with other data sets provided by ISRIC, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives of Tanzania and AfSIS; • Analysis of soil profiles and properties, including soil carbon, for different land cover types; • A national database of allometric equations by eco-zone has been produced, as well as a wood density database. Also, new allometric equations have been developed for under-represented areas of the country. All information has been integrated as part of the GlobAllomeTree database; • Maps on REDD+ environmental and social co-benefits have been developed and extensive training has been provided to MNRT/TFS and related agencies to support the planning of REDD+ activities, as well as to support the eventual development of a safeguards information systems and the monitoring of social and environmental co-benefits of REDD+. • Training relevant to REDD+ planning and implementation (e.g. remote-sensing, geographic information systems, data management, national forest inventories, MRV for REDD+, reference levels, allometric equations, REDD+ implementation, etc) has been provided to government staff (primarily MNRT and VPO) and partner institutions (Forest Training Institute, Sokoine University of Agriculture, Forest Industry Training Institute, University of Dar es Salaam).		
Output 2.2: Training provided to MNRT staff on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)		• 4 computers, 1 plotter (plus servicing contract), new AC units and venetian blinds were purchased for mapping and data analysis unit at MNRT. Tables and bookshelves were paid for the REDD+ library, and walls were fixed. Plotter still need installation support, and one AC unit needs to be fixed. New phones were purchased, but			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
		incompatibility issues have slowed down installation (Remain to be installed) • Training has been provided on mapping, remote sensing, allometric equations and other MRV-specific matters. In 2013, two training events on allometric equations were organized for national experts (mainly from SUA), notably to support NAFORMA in improving biomass and carbon estimates. • National database of allometric equations and wood density still to be completed for integration in the GlobAllomeTree platform. In addition, new allometric equations will be developed by ForConsult for mountain forests, an under-represented eco-zone in the country and a network of all AE experts in the country has been created. • Two extensive training/working sessions (each of 2.5 weeks) on open-source GIS software and multiple-benefits mapping were provided to several members of the mapping unit and other relevant institutions (FTI and SUA). • Also, three separate trainings are being provided on soil analysis and digital soil mapping, with a focus on the soil carbon data gathered through the NAFORMA campaign. One training on soil analysis will be provided at SUA in October 2013, while two trainings on digital soil mapping techniques are being provided (September 2013 in the Netherlands and November 2013 at SUA). • Finally, presentations and outreach activities are being conducted on Reference Levels as part of a consultancy launched to develop a Reference Level roadmap. These presentations are targeting pilot project representatives, key members of governments and civil society representatives. • Unfortunately, capacity building on GHG inventories (implemented by VPO) had been foreseen but no agreement was reached on the workplan to implement this activity. It was therefore canceled.		
Output 2.3: Forest degradation indices provided for forest landscapes and		• Finalize forest degradation studies by TAFORI and FRAM-RG (i.e. Assessment of forest degradation through field measurements). Study with TAFORI			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
capacity building for establishment of RL/REL		was stopped before submitting last payment, as data quality and deliverables were incomplete and of sub-standard quality. LoA with FRAM-RG was closed, but deliverables were deemed sub-standard. Unclear whether the studies can be of any used. • Sample-based assessment of historical forest area changes (1990-2000-2010) at National level linked to NAFORMA PSP. FAO to manage contracts with 2 individual consultants. This work has approximately 8 months delay due to many issues. First NAFORMA data was not available in late December 2012, as anticipated. Three consultants were hired to work on this, and one of them disappear off the map. The two others have been slow in delivering and capacities are relatively low. • 2.3.3 Assess carbon stocks for various land cover types. FAO provides direct support + contracting of one national consultant + LoA with FORCONSULT • For compiling relevant information and initiating development of a Reference Emission Level (REL) 2 consultants (one international and one national) were recruited and are currently carrying out interviews/consultations + literature review. A validation event will be held in late October, to complete the RELs road map by early November. • For soil carbon analysis FAO has hired BACAS and METLA for this task. BACAS and METLA are awaiting the last soil samples to complete their analytical work, but most samples have been analyzed. METLA has produced a draft report and will be training SUA scientists on soil analysis techniques in mid-October. •			
Output 2.4: National maps inform delivery of the REDD+ Framework		• ONGOING: For production of national maps of carbon storage and changes in carbon stocks based on data collected from NAFORMA and other programmes in Tanzania, ISRIC has been hired to develop digital SOC maps with NAFORMA data and to train national scientists in the Netherlands and in TZ. Support is also provided to NAFORMA and FAO-FIN to improve above-ground carbon maps through ongoing work on AEs. The analysis of the historic land cover change for the			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
		period 1990-2000-2010 will produce a scientifically sound and official deforestation rate for Tanzania. This analysis is being done using a sample-based approach focusing on the NAFORMA permanent sample plots. • Multiple benefits and safeguard maps, e.g. biodiversity, poverty, ecosystem services, protected areas, population, mammal species (REDD+ co-benefits) for the entire country completed. • Training and capacity building for the analysis of NAFORMA database: carbon and co-benefit mapping and related knowledge management systems. This work was conducted through a LoA with UNEP-WCMC, in collaboration with FAO and MNRT. Publications yet to be released			
2.5. Project management		• Recruited international consultant, MRV Expert, • Preparation of final report underway • Final Evaluation underway			
OUTCOME 3: Improved capacity to manage REDD and provide other forest ecosystem services at district and local levels.					
Output3.1: Decentralized REDD Governance Framework developed and tested in pilot districts.		• There is increased dialogue among stakeholders at national and local level. • Changes to strategy made to reflect concerns raised regarding the absence of national policy on REDD+ payments. • On 12 November 2012, the UN-REDD National Programme's Programme Steering Committee (PSC) decided that in the absence of a clear national policy on REDD+ payments and without a REDD+ safeguards system in place, it was not appropriate for the Programme to make 'test payments' for REDD+, even at a local level and for piloting purposes. • Funds were diverted to financing of incentives at local levels against efforts to address drivers of deforestation (rather than "REDD+ payments") which was seen as a less risky and controversial approach; and to continue assessment of REDD+ payment and benefit-sharing modalities in existing REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania, with			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
		further comparative analysis, field surveys, compilation of lessons (nationally and abroad) and further consultations, to derive policy guidance at national level. • For the first part of this approach, cooperation with the UNDP's Small Grants Programme was established. • The approach proposed by the PSC has been fully developed; however, implementation could not be initiated before the end of the programme. UN agencies and implementing partners are examining options for completing activities under this Outcome.			
Output 3.2: Payment distribution system outlined.		• The UN-REDD National Programme's National Dialogue on Carbon/Environmental Related Payment Systems initiated a discussion on REDD+ payment distribution systems and resulted in better understanding of the options available and already tested in the country. Decisions about a national approach for REDD+ payment distribution require further considerations, also among political decision-makers			
Output3.3: REDD payments combined with payments for non-carbon services.		• An approach has been developed in close cooperation with stakeholders and a research project has been commissioned that will improve the understanding between REDD+ and other environmental services. Results are expected by the end of 2013 and will support and inform implementation of the National REDD+ Strategy thereafter.			
OUTCOME 4: Broad-based stakeholder support for REDD in Tanzania					
Output4.1: Improved awareness of REDD at national level.		• The awareness-raising campaign, including the training-of-trainers on REDD+, was completed successfully. Trainers were provided with additional resources under Output 4.2. • The TNP supported 2 government representatives to attend the Green Economy Symposium in Jakarta, Indonesia, and the UN-REDD Policy Board meeting in Lombok, Indonesia, in June 2013.			
Output 4.2: Broad consensus built with forest communities		• Participants in the training-of-trainers sessions under Output 4.1. received further assistance for the development of workplans to implement			

Outputs / expected results	Status	Implementation arrangements	Status Outputs		
regarding the REDD Framework.		REDD+ awareness-raising campaigns in their respective areas. These campaigns would also contribute towards collecting local communities' perspectives on REDD+. The TNP is seeking additional funds to support implementation of these workplans.			

Annex 6. Theory of Change Analysis

The analysis of the TOC in the first instance requires a clear understanding of the intended impact, which in turn enables identification of achieved intermediaries. The ROtI conducted during the inception phase of this evaluation concludes that the programmes outcomes and outputs were designed to only lay a foundation for future work programmes. As such, the outputs have limited direct contribution to key intermediate states identified in the TOC i.e. increased sector participation, enhanced policies laws to enable stakeholder participation, capacity at sub-national level and clarification of carbon ownership to name a few. The TNP here is not necessarily explicit on goal timeframe – but rather makes an implied statement to assist Tanzania adequately participate in a post-2012 REDD+ regime. The objective i.e. **to assist Tanzania to prepare and implement the national REDD+ strategies** is in fact statement of intermediate state achievable through a series of conditions based on outputs under each outcomes. The relationship between the outcomes is based on the REDD+ readiness phases and overlap each other. These outcomes remained the same even though circumstances changed and necessitated adjustments to outputs.

Outcomes



Outputs

The REDD Production chain is the basis for the logical framework and monitoring and evaluation matrix. The sub-activities were developed from the outputs in an attempt to bring together components that fit into the 3 phases of REDD+ readiness. However, the hierarchy is somewhat disjointed with the evolution of national policies or process – this is the case with Outcome 3.



The intermediary states would be Tanzania being REDD+ Ready based on a complete Phase – national strategy, phase 2 demonstration and pilot programmes and phase 3 – implementation. There is a weakness in the TNP for Tanzania in that while the outcomes are in fact appropriate for achievement of REDD readiness if implemented, the activities and the programme resources and budget are limiting. This is the very reason there needed to be closer collaboration with existing bilateral programmes to jointly achieve the intermediates states illustrated in the revised TOC below.

The TNP has for instance through Outcome 1, introduced dialogue on the cost elements of REDD+ projects and illuminated the need for robust dataset to accurately estimate costs. Robust dataset is part of a functional and well resource and coordinated MRV system which in itself is an intermediate state for REDD readiness. The Capacity Needs Assessment (CAN) and Cost Curves for REDD+ in Tanzania have enabled much more informed conversations on the realities of REDD+ costs. What remains is to enable the translation of the findings into opportunities for focusing on elements that enhance Tanzania's REDD+ readiness position


Tanzania is REDD+ Ready
GHG Emissions reduced/removals enhanced
IMPACTS
Increased sectors participate in REDD
Functional MRV system is in place
Ownership of carbon and emissions reductions REDD clarified
Designing MRV Framework at national and sub-national
Capacity at sub-national level to undertake REDD increased
REDD issues are incorporated in
Stakeholders are able to participate in the REDD process.
Build the capacity of FBD, Districts to undertake REDD functions in Tanzania (planning, monitoring and enforcement)
National REDD task force supported
Existing policies, laws enhanced to enable stakeholder participation
INTERMEDIATE STATES
Outcome 1:
National Governance Framework & Institutional capacities strengthened for REDD
Outcome 2:
Increased capacity for capturing REDD elements within national MARV system
Outcome 3:
Improved capacity to manage REDD and provide other forest ecosystem services at district and local levels
Outcome 4:
Broad-based stakeholder support for REDD in Tanzania
OUTCOMES
Policy Framework for REDD is in Place
Cross-sectoral institutional and individual capacities built to deliver the REDD production chain
FBD has greater capacity to develop and implement the national REDD Strategy in collaboration with other partners
Cost curves for REDD in Tanzania established
A system for REDD information synthesis and sharing established at FBD and linked to NAFOBEDA.
Training provided to forest staff on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)
Forest degradation indices provided for forest landscapes Mapping of co-benefits (overlay biodiversity, poverty)
Decentralized REDD Governance Framework developed and tested in pilot districts
Payment distribution system outlined
REDD payments combined with payments for non-carbon services
Improved awareness of REDD at national level
Broad consensus built with forest communities regarding the REDD Framework
OUTPUTS
Assumption
Strong stakeholder participation and technical assistance required
Complex training methodologies are required; risk of limited understanding
Technical Advisor operating at sufficient capacity
Complex economic training required on cost curves
Capacity exist to provide service
Thorough collection and analysis of REDD studies required
Precise training methods and training are delivered
Complex training on forest degradation indices required
Strong coordination with the various initiatives for establishing national carbon stocks
Participatory process required in bringing up levels of capacity in district officials

Annex 7. Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: **Nelson Gapare**

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at (Auckland, New Zealand) on (4 December 2013)

Signature: _