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Foreword



It is challenging in Afghanistan to develop and implement meaningful projects targeting rural women. The scale at which the HLP project poultry component aimed at doing this was even adding additional challenges to this already daunting task. In some communities visitors are being looked at with suspicion. When male visitors want to talk with the women of the community the suspicion is even greater. In some communities it is impossible for male visitors to meet with the women or for strangers without authorisation even to enter

the village. I was impressed with the experience the project and ministry people accompanying me to the programme sites had with these sensitivities and with the speed with which they picked up the vibes and the only adequate action of leaving the area. There have been examples of direct threats to facilitating partners during the 3 years' project implementation and I admire people's patience, courage and perseverance. Although visits by foreigners are made "safer" by using armoured vehicles and at times even armed escorts it is obvious that the threats "from within" the community for trouble are at least as realistic and probably less predictable than the dangers coming from outside the community.

It is my hope that this evaluation report will assist in developing the poultry development support model for rural women towards a viable business prospect, which will continue also after the project finishes, which all projects eventually do. Although many contributed with their opinions and observations I remain fully responsible for the contents of this evaluation report and possible mistakes or misrepresentations, for which I apologize.

Kabul/Almaty, November 2011
Anton van Engelen

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I would like to thank everybody, who has facilitated this evaluation assignment and made it an enjoyable return to Afghanistan after a 10 months' absence. The FAO NPOs showed their knowledge of the programme and the field, the 3 female Poultry Master Trainers were able to in many cases give the women's perspective on certain issues. The CTA was forthcoming with all information requested and also the not requested. The office staff made my stay comfortable with plenty tea and great Afghan lunches. I would also like to thank the staff of the various HLP departments, who accompanied the FAO and IP staff and myself into the field and were always available for clarifications and discussions. Although this evaluation was supposed to be a joint FAO/MAIL evaluation this in the end did not work out. There were however frank discussions with the various government representatives, which brought their views into this evaluation.

A special personal word of thanks to Jamila Iqbal and Razia Zakhra Akbari, who translated for me in Central and Northern Region respectively. Their and the female poultry master trainers' subject matter knowledge and commitment towards the programme left me with the conviction that a future poultry project geared towards rural women can easily be run and managed by an all-women team!



Composition of the Evaluation Team

Evaluation team

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Acronyms

ALP	Alternative Livelihood Project
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASAP	Accelerated Support to Agriculture Project
AVA	Afghanistan Veterinary Association
CFP	Call For Proposals
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DAIL	District department for Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
DASP	District Agricultural Services Provision
DCA	Dutch Committee for Afghanistan
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FOD	Farmer Organisation Development
FPMIS	Field Programme Management Information System
HLP	Horticulture and Livestock Project
IB	Infectious Bronchitis
IBD	Infectious Bursal Disease (“Marek”)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILSA	Livestock Development for Food Security
IMST	Implementation Management Support Team
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDV	Newcastle Disease Virus
NPO	National Poultry Officer
OED	FAO Office of Evaluation
PASP	Provincial Agricultural Services Provision
PC	Programme Committee
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RAMP	Reconstruction of Agricultural Markets Project
QC	Quality Control
ToC	Table of Contents
TOR	Terms Of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VETSERV	the private company buying drugs and vaccines for paravets/VFUs
VFU	Veterinary Field Unit
VGL	Village Group Leader
VPPG	Village Poultry Production Group

Executive Summary

Information about the evaluation

- ES1. The Evaluation of the “Consultancy Services for Poultry Sub-Component of HLP”, executed by FAO on a contract basis with the MAIL was commissioned according to the FAO rules that any project with a budget over USD 4 million should undergo an external evaluation. This evaluation was executed in October 2011 by an international evaluator, assisted by 2 national staff members of the HLP Implementation Support Team.
- ES2. The Evaluation assesses the project’s performance during the period June 2008 till October 2011. It covers 3 of the 5 provinces where the project was active (Balkh, Parwan and Kabul). Kunduz and Panshir could not be visited due to security concerns. As this project is to a certain extent a continuation of an earlier applied approach the evaluator talked with some key stakeholders of these earlier projects. Extensive use was made from the large amount of reports, assessments and evaluations written on the Afghan poultry sector, both small/village- and larger/commercial scale.
- ES3. The preliminary findings were presented during a meeting with representatives of MAIL, HLP IMST, FAO staff from both the project and country office and WB. In the same meeting CTA of the project gave a slide presentation to give the current status of the project. The first draft report was scrutinized by CTA, the poultry expert of AGAH, formerly directly involved in Afghanistan poultry projects and the FAO evaluation manager.

Key findings

- ES4. Poultry plays an important role in the family life as provider of high-value food and cash. The village poultry project identified the lack of technical knowledge in feeding and disease control, the timely supply of quality inputs such as feed, drugs and pullets and the marketing as key issues hindering the development of the traditional backyard/scavenging poultry husbandry system in what became known as the “semi”-commercial poultry production system, which satisfies family demands for eggs and meat and brings in some additional cash from the sale of eggs and birds. The FAO put a strong emphasis on the training and capacity building of village women and improvement of the input supply. It seems that at times the emphasis of the MAIL/HLP project shifted to the productive aspects of import substitution and increased production for the market: in that light the recommendation at some stage to replace half the programme for layers with one to promote the production of broilers. Experience of this project has however shown that the issues of poultry health and reliable input supply, especially quality pullets, is not sufficiently solved to expect a drastic commercialization of the village poultry sector, which is underlined by the fact that most beneficiaries after the first project donated batch of birds do continue, but hardly ever with more than 15 birds and in most cases a mix of birds of different age and source.
- ES5. The project assumed that the private sector would be ready to take over the input supply and service provision at the end of the project lifetime. Village Group Leaders of the Village Poultry Production Groups were linked to so-called feed agents, representing

the two larger-scale feed mills in Afghanistan. These feed agents have developed into key traders in inputs and in some cases also a wholesaler of eggs. The business volume of e.g. sold balanced feed is far less than what one would expect on the basis of the number of chickens distributed and the assumption that everybody continues with at least the same number of chickens. The sold volume is anywhere between 10% and 50% of what one would expect if everybody fed 100% balanced feed to all chickens. The situation of vaccines is still difficult: for most VFUs it is a too risky business to stock poultry vaccines, which will expire if not bought in time. Availability of cash to make major purchases the project introduced saving boxes, in which women are encouraged to make weekly savings of Afgh 40-50 per week. Together with the returns on the sale of spent hens this should be enough to buy replacement pullets and initial feed stock. The VPPGs do not seem to be incorporated within a structure that can support and further develop them: the reported cooperatives seem to be extremely embryonic and do not fit in with the main-stream HLP formed FOD groups and their structure.

ES6. The project was quite prescriptive with the location, shape and interior of the coops. From house to house visits it was obvious that people, especially after the first cycle came with their own ideas and designs, which suited their conditions, capacity and needs. The project did not promote clear laying nests and perches for health reasons (parasites and leg infections). In mixed flocks in terms of age and origin these are necessary to protect the rank lower animals from the older ones.

ES7. Poultry keeping has many socio-economic benefits for a family and especially for the woman/women of the household. The economic profitability of poultry under confinement with 100% balanced feed and practicing an all-in-all-out system is not that clear. It depends upon the genetic potential of the birds used and management practices. The genetic potential of especially the 2011 birds is less than the stated “Golden” brand production potential, as the parent stock farmers do not refresh their parent stock for a number of years and keep on using off-spring as parent stock in the following year. The project brought about major changes in the management practices. With 30-40% of all eggs being consumed in the household there is however a too heavy drain on the cash flow of the enterprise to feed 100% balanced feed; the introduction of kitchen waste might reduce the feeding costs but most likely also the laying percentage, as can be concluded from discussions with farmers reporting 150 to 180 eggs, the project reported average production of 205 eggs per housed hen against e.g. 260 in the FAO managed coops in the office.

ES8. The project, contrary to earlier poultry projects, was this time able to purchase most inputs in-country. Although the tendering was done according to FAO procurement rules with a no objection of HLP there were some instances of dissatisfaction and complaints. For future projects it should be considered whether smaller and more localized tenders would not be able to solve (part of) this problem and improve the link between suppliers and poultry farmers. In this respect one could also think of a coupon system, with which farmers can obtain the requirements from one of the short-listed suppliers. In this way it is avoided that suppliers are only geared towards institutional buyers and ignore to build up their business with and for individual farmers.

ES9. During the lifetime of HLP there were frequent changes in management approaches and TA for livestock. New PDO was introduced, together with clusters, FOD groups and at times it must have been hard for the FAO implemented poultry activity to keep track

and align with all these changes. The creation of DASP and PASP, HLP livestock extension workers within the HLP clusters created duplication or even triplication of training and monitoring efforts, in which HLP IMST did not play its coordinating and facilitating role very efficiently and effectively. An example is the issue of poultry vaccine supply and availability, task for the VFUs and necessary for the improvement of poultry production in the villages, both activities supported by HLP through different channels, but not coordinated and resolved.

Conclusions

ES10. This poultry project served 3 purposes, whereby the ones of restocking and improving the backyard poultry husbandry capacity were successfully addressed; significant contributions towards the development of a semi-commercial poultry production system in the rural areas have been made, but there are still “issues” to be resolved to achieve the take-off of commercial poultry production. It has once again been established that the 3 in earlier FAO conducted poultry development projects factors of reliable feed, pullet and poultry vaccine and drugs are still crucial for the development of a more intensive poultry industry in the country. Especially the poultry vaccine situation is the most burning issue, not yet resolved.

ES11. Although at first sight the economic basis of commercial poultry production in the village setting looks quite promising it turned out that with the 15 hen model the home consumption of between 30-40%, the high cost of balanced feed and the moderate productivity of the birds provided by this project the reality is more stubborn. The farmer’s cost cutting measure by feeding kitchen waste has limits in terms of the number of animals that can be supplemented and suppresses the egg production and cannot be the basis for market oriented egg production. Farmers eat into their donated working capital and it becomes hard to continue the business, unless one has sufficient own feed resources besides the commercial poultry feed.

ES12. The organisational model of VPPGs and VGLs, which has been used now for the last 11 years has shown mixed results, whereby in some cases the VGL when assisted by her husband seems to have developed her private business out of the service provision to group members. In other cases after the project lifetime and the support from and monitoring by the poultry trainers finishes women resort to purchasing their inputs directly from the feed agents, VFU and hawkers of birds or own incubation. Especially the last choice brings less productive birds into the system undermining the profitability of the system and thus further reducing the use of balanced feed. The time-frame of most poultry projects and the high work pressure to reach large numbers of beneficiaries have made that too little attention could be paid towards making the groups functional units for collaboration and business development support. The opportunity to let other (FAO) projects geared towards women economic empowerment (e.g. emergency food security, adult literacy and microfinance development projects) make use of the same groups has not been utilized.

ES13. Afghanistan’s poultry sector consists of the family/household small-scale poultry production sector and the re-emerging larger scale poultry production sector. This project has worked on establishing business linkages between these two sectors and links between the veterinary field services vested in the VFUs and the poultry farmers. It has made some progress in this field, but more and more targeted attention is required to

firmly establish these linkages. Especially in the veterinary field a larger contribution by the project towards developing a national poultry disease control strategy, applicable to the specific conditions of village poultry farming could have brought such collaboration further.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: To FAO Senior Management, on its policy on monitoring and evaluation

FAO should make change to its policy on backstopping and evaluation to improve project's effectiveness and efficiency. Backstopping and/or mid-term evaluation by someone independent from the project formulation process and without having worked in a similar project will bring new views and ideas and will lead to timely identifying of changes to the project needed for increased impact, effectiveness and efficiency. Final evaluations should not be an administrative formality but its outcomes and recommendations actively used in the formulation and execution of follow-up projects. The current rule that projects over a certain budget are evaluated and others not seems arbitrary and not conducive for an across the project board learning and improvement process.

Recommendation 2: To FAO Senior Management, on achieving FAO strategic objectives, organisational results and core functions

FAO is more than a project implementer, in this case of a poultry project activity, and should keep its FAO strategic objectives, organisational results and core functions, which might not be specifically included in the project write-up in mind. It might be helpful in the future for the FAO to make its own organisational results logical framework besides the project logical framework to make sure that its own strategic objectives and core functions as a normative body in terms of technical agricultural issues will be met. In this project the development of a national poultry policy and developmental strategy, although started in the last project year and a village poultry health care plan should have been developed earlier and been used as the guideline in the further project implementation.

Recommendation 3: To FAO Senior Management, on project formulation

It seems that FAO is increasingly involved in tendering for projects. In the process of preparation a peer review of the proposal might diminish the risk of copy and paste and overlooking the developmental changes, which always take place in any country. In the case of this project e.g. more formal attention to develop and support the formal link between large-scale and small-scale poultry production, supported with a budget line, would have contributed towards increased sustainability of the action.

Recommendation 4: To FAOR, HLP management (and donor), on being development partner when sub-contracting

The FAO was in this case sub-contractor for the execution of MAIL's HLP project's poultry component. In a situation where the FAO is part of a larger project it is important to clearly establish and agree on the mode of operation, communication and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. In World Bank funded projects the operational manual is a document in which this is determined. This project activity operated without it. Having such an operational manual avoids communication problems, diverging opinions on implementations and gives clear guidelines. In the case of HLP, a project that was and is constantly searching its way forward, this would even have meant updating and amending it on several occasions, but would have assured a better contribution of the FAO towards achieving longer-term objectives of especially sustainability. Project owner and implementer should have the same PDO's and indicators, which in this project was at some stage not the case. HLP IMST could have played a more pro-active role in streamlining monitoring and evaluation, the various training activities and liaising between the FAO implemented poultry project and the VFU coordinating and support structures, which also received extensive support from HLP.

Recommendation 5: To FAO Senior and Project Management on gender

Gender is not only about women but about women AND men. In some cases paying also specific attention to the role of men in a production system, which from the outside seems to be owned and driven by women, can go a long way towards increased efficiency and sustainability. The village poultry activities are, although executed largely by women, still a family enterprise. In future better information should be given to the male family members and leadership of villages on the role they play in such an activity: the construction of coops, liaison with veterinary services and feed agents and possibly in the marketing of the produce. Giving them information about project intends and their role in the project will hopefully in future lead to less worries and tension among the Afghan husbands, fathers and brothers, when a project targets their women. The fact that the success stories all involved cases with cross financing of various family economic activities stresses this point to keep the men on board.

Recommendation 6: To FAO Senior and Project Management on procurement

It should be avoided that procurement leads to insinuation and distrust. All national staff should declare their involvement and their and their relatives interests in the sector the project is concerned about, just like e.g. international consultants to the FAO have to declare their relatives' involvement in the UN system. Tenders, especially the large ones should be published widely and sufficient time should be given to the potential suppliers to prepare for it. The tender committee should include members of the project client, the opening of tenders should be done in public and evaluation against clearly spelled out criteria in the presence of the bidders. Shortlisting of interested bidders against clearly spelled out criteria on competence, experience, business size and performance will avoid fly-by-night contenders.

Recommendation 7: To FAO Project Management on exit strategy for support to "FAO" poultry groups and associations

One important aspect of the project was to organize the women in VPPGs and train VGLs to provide services. If not further supported this activity will have been in vain. The FAO

project management should actively negotiate with HLP how the “FAO poultry groups” can be incorporated within the HLP FOD groups so as to assure some continued supervision and support in the future and with other on-going and upcoming FAO projects how these groups can be incorporated in their project activities. Especially the project working on the introduction and processing of soya seems to be a logical choice for further support to and working with the groups formed by this poultry project.

Recommendation 8: To the Afghanistan government on testing facilities

With the increasing use of balanced feed and concentrates and their manufacturing the country needs independent testing facilities for such. Also the government needs this in the case of purchase abroad of animal feeds. The capacity for poultry pathology and disease diagnostics should be increased: provincial veterinary services should know how and what to sample for the diagnosis of the 5 principle poultry diseases (NDV, IB, IBD, Marek, CRD), which need laboratory confirmation and in the provinces with increasing commercial poultry production (Herat, Balkh, Jalalabad, Kabul) the veterinary services should have simple poultry pathology facilities, from which samples can be sent to the Central Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory in Kabul.

Recommendation 9: To MAIL veterinary department and FAO project management

The project should agree with the veterinary department of MAIL on a village poultry preventive disease strategy and make sure that VETSERV and DCA know and are involved in the formulation of such a strategy. Ways and means have to be found to make sure that the vaccines required are available within the VFU cold-chain system and that the VFUs are given sufficient protection against the potential expiry of vaccines, because it is very likely that farmers will not purchase all vaccine. The current needle vaccines in large number of doses bottles should be as much as possible be replaced by drinking water/eye drop vaccines and the vaccination schedule during the first 2 months rearing of pullets agreed upon with the veterinary department; the veterinary department should start a registration system of parent stock owners, incubators and rearers up to two months to start monitoring the health status of parent stock and assure the health status of the animals and all-round vaccination of the growing pullets according to the agreed schedule.

Recommendation 10: To FAO project management

Taking a forward looking perspective it is advised not to get engaged again in the first 2 objectives of the village poultry farming support (restocking and improvements to backyard poultry farming), but concentrate on developing a more holistic approach towards improvements in the overall poultry sector, whereby the policy and strategy formulated by the project are key. A value-chain approach should be followed, whereby after a thorough analysis the bottlenecks in the value chain and or the services linked to it will be addressed. A possible future poultry sector support project should operate from within and with the MAIL poultry department in an attempt to put the village poultry farming on their map and increase the interlinkages within the sector. Any future project should try to be less prescriptive but more facilitating in exploring different models, modalities and making more exact farm business models.

1 Introduction

1.1 Evaluation background

1. The evaluation of this project was foreseen in the project document, in line with FAO regulations that projects with a budget over USD 4 million will have to be evaluated. Besides observations on and reports of the current project use has been made of reports of earlier projects, which, combined with information from and observations in the field on these projects, gave some indications on the possible sustainability of this approach and methodology for poultry development.

2. The Evaluation assesses FAO's performance from June 2008, which was the signing of the contract and October 2011, the time of this evaluation. Besides studying project documents and reports and meeting with key informants in ministry, NGOs and private sector field visits were made to Kapisa, Balkh, Samangan and Kabul Provinces; due to security it was not possible to make field visits to Panshir and Kunduz. The mission tried to capture information on earlier village poultry projects in Afghanistan of a similar nature to assess the differences and the possible sustainability of activities. More on the methodology can be found in chapter 3.

3. On the penultimate day of the evaluation mission in Afghanistan the project organised a session, where the CTA gave a presentation on the current status of the project and consultant gave an overview of the main points of the evaluation. A member of the WB supervisory team, the livestock expert of HLP, the director of the livestock department MAIL and 2 members of the Poultry Department together with project staff, the deputy resident representative and head of operations FAO country office attended this session.

1.2 Poultry production in Afghanistan

4. This project is one in a line of poultry projects the FAO developed in Afghanistan over time. To better understand what lies at the basis of this village poultry development model the mission has made an attempt to compile an overview of the developments in the Afghan poultry sector and the various poultry projects of the FAO implemented since 1994.

5. Commercial poultry production in Afghanistan started in the seventies with various projects, of which the Chinese one in Bagrami was the most prominent. This poultry farm apparently produced, besides chicks for the own farm, chicks and feed for sale to farmers and had a network of sales agents in the country. After the Soviet invasion this farm was joined by other commercial poultry production units, modelled along the Soviet Union practices. With the start of the liberation war in the early eighties and the civil war in 1990 after the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan these farms all ceased to function. The older poultry experts in the country were all "raised" within this large-scale commercial poultry production system and their way of thinking about poultry is still largely based on what they saw and learned in that period.

6. Starting in the late eighties most poultry interventions geared towards the Afghan farmers originated in Pakistan and were implemented from there: projects and individuals brought poultry from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Especially in Jalalabad, depending upon inputs from the Pakistan commercial poultry sector and Herat, based on the Iranian commercial poultry sector, various initiatives were started by entrepreneurial farmers, which laid the basis for today's commercial poultry industry in those areas, on which the various recently developed commercial poultry sector support projects have built.

7. The first FAO poultry project the mission could find information about started in 1994 and was executed under the umbrella of the Livestock Development for Food Security in Afghanistan (ILSA) programme, a collection of projects. The activities were geared towards two categories of poultry farming:

- Semi-commercial poultry production using kerosene incubators in the peri-urban areas of Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Helmand and Herat city
- Improved backyard poultry production in adjacent villages to these peri-urban areas, based on chicks and feed produced in the peri-urban areas supported poultry farms.

8. The main constraints at that time for the semi-commercial poultry production were identified as a lack of technical knowledge in feeding and disease prevention, poor supplies of chicks, feed and other materials and inadequate marketing of the products. The project provided formal training to farmers and worked with around 100 selected families in the target areas. Poultry Farmers Associations were established in Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat and Kandahar, which all still exist in some form or another. These were and are "all male" organisations. A programme to replace the Fayoum type layers (70% of flocks at that time) with more productive breeds and brown egg layer DOCs was introduced through the associations. Farmers were required to pay the full cost plus a small added service charge that would provide the association with an income and the start of working capital. The improvement of the backyard poultry production was directly piloted in a project under the ILSA programme with 500 families in 40 villages and implemented through female technical staff. This project was supposed to comprise technical training, vaccination, cock exchange programmes, performance testing of local hens, crossbreeding programmes and the development of mini hatcheries with 100 egg capacity¹. It is however hard to establish to what extent the planned activities were actually executed in those difficult times in terms of security and absence of close supervision (FAO offices were in Pakistan at that time).

9. Further support was provided with smaller projects with separate funding. It aimed at supporting the emerging commercial poultry farms in the provision of pullets and quality feed to the market. In Mazaar the first 300 leghorn and 300 New Hampshire eggs to produce parent stock were sent by the FAO in 1997. There was also support to village hatcheries, which were run by community groups. Other programmes adopted elements of this project: various programmes such as UNDP distributed mini-incubators, but the technical results were not good and people stopped using these. In this phase in the poultry development in Afghanistan 5 nationals were trained in India in the various aspects of smallholder/improved backyard poultry production. These became the master trainers (2 ladies and 3 men). Three of these still play a prominent role in projects for the Afghan family poultry sector for different organisations.

¹ Information on ILSA was found in a FAO brochure "Livestock Development for Food Security Afghanistan", printed in Islamabad office of the FAO programme AFG/96/007 in 1999.

10. In 1999 the FAO developed, making use of all earlier experience, the improved backyard poultry production development concept, which was the basis of all consecutive poultry production projects executed by the FAO: the two German funded projects (GCP/AFG/021/GER and GCP/AFG032/GER) and the USAID funded project under RAMP (Rehabilitation of Agricultural Markets Project GCP/AFG/030/USA). The goal of this project was stated as

„To improve food security and increase rural incomes by using this successful model and introducing new methods of village poultry production to more than 25,000 rural women in 25 districts of the Ghazni, Helmand, Kunduz, Nangarhar and Parwan Provinces“.

11. There are large similarities between this project and the project under evaluation, especially in terms of the training programme. The major differences are in the procurement of most inputs, which in the last years have become more readily available in Afghanistan itself and in some financial aspects (see further). RAMP eventually covered 28,000 beneficiaries through inclusion of 2 more provinces besides the ones planned. RAMP started in 2004 and continued until 2007. Further post-project support could be given in Bamyan province through two FAO Projects, respectively GCP/AFG/029/UK (Development of Sustainable Agriculture Livelihood in Eastern Hazarajat) and GCP/AFG/036/UK (Alternative Agriculture Livelihood Programme).

12. The RAMP successor project ASAP did contemplate a poultry component, but this was cancelled due to Statehouse/USAID policy changes. The ASAP poultry programme intended to address the problem of lack of quality commercial pullets. The DOC Bovans-Nera parent stock, which had already arrived at the time of the changes of the project, were taken over by a collaborator of the project on private basis, but had little to no impact on the Afghanistan poultry stock as most DOCs and hatching eggs were exported to Pakistan².

13. The Alternative Livelihood Projects ALP East and South, US funded, targeted the development of integrated broiler production in Nangarhar and layer production in Helmand, removing the dependency on Pakistan for DOCs and feed for the local broiler and layer industry. The project assets were privatized after the project lifetime and have now changed into independently operating private enterprises, which supply the local market with chicks and feed (in the case of Nangarhar the company is building a network of agents also in the north of the country).

14. With the advent of agricultural business credit facilities under the various USAID programmes and from commercial banks independent medium to larger scale poultry enterprises are starting up in Herat, Kabul and Nangarhar, usually depending on imported animal material, vet drugs, vaccines, feed ingredients and know-how.

15. In this way the Afghan poultry industry has developed into a number of distinct segments:

- *The backyard/scavenging system* with people keeping between 1 and 20 birds. Practically all rural households and a substantial number of urban households practice this system (with 30 million Afghans with average family size of 6 this would mean anything between 3 million and maximum 5 million units and

² Pers. Comm. Eng. Haroon

anything between 12 million and 20 million birds, assuming 4 birds as average per family).

- *The improved backyard system*, of which some producers have gone to semi-commercial production, result of the various project interventions. On paper its number should minimum be around 60.000 families if everybody who benefited from one of the 4 FAO projects had continued this mode of production and higher if the model were emulated by others without project support, seeing the better productivity of the birds and economic profitability of it, if this is the case. There is no statistics on this number of poultry farmers as these producers are not on the radar of the poultry department of MAIL. The opinion on how many people continue with improved birds and feed differs widely and merits further investigation. A project executed survey among the 7000 beneficiaries of 2009 showed that 92% still keeps poultry with an average of 13 per household, whereas at the time of the baseline study this was 1.2 per household. Anecdotal evidence from earlier projects gives the impression that in the past this figure was much lower, but so was the availability of improved feed and pullets.
- *Commercial poultry production system*, which produces for the market, works for profit and runs the enterprise as a business with proper recording and administration. These include two distinct groups:
 - Some of the then small upstart poultry farms, which were supported by the FAO programmes in the late nineties and onwards, which developed into service providers to initially an institutional clientele, increasingly to private farmers for chicks, pullets and feed (around 8000 registered according to the poultry department of MAIL and
 - Closed commercial poultry farms, highly dependent for their inputs on importation of genetic material and essential poultry feed ingredients (not separately recorded, but according to MAIL officials not more than 50 in the whole country)

16. The veterinary support services in Afghanistan for the various poultry sectors are still poorly developed and fragmented: There is no national poultry health and vaccination plan. Some of the above mentioned poultry service providers stock and sell vaccines and drugs for poultry, but some of it is of dubious quality and at times not the most appropriate for the village and smallholder poultry sectors. The network of now privatized Veterinary Field Units stocks some antibiotics, vitamin and mineral premixes and coccidiostats, in terms of vaccines they only stock thermostable NDV- 12 vaccine. Farmers would need IB, IBD, Marek, fowl pox and Coryza as well.

2 Evaluation purpose and scope

2.1 Purpose

17. The final evaluation of the Consultancy Services for Poultry Sub-Component of HLP (Emergency Horticulture and Livestock Project) has as purpose to assess the project outputs, outcomes and results (see TOR annex 1). The evaluation appraised the overall contribution of the project towards the set goals and objectives. The main objective of the evaluation mission was to assess the project approach and to provide recommendations to support designing and implementing future poultry projects for rural poultry projects, in which vulnerable women are included. Evaluator has on purpose replaced “similar” from the TOR (see annex 1) into “future”: whether it should be similar or different is part of this evaluation, as the evaluation is supposed to have a forward-looking emphasis.

18. In particular, the purpose of the project evaluation is:

- To assess the relevance, design, implementation and results of the HLP/MAIL funded project UTF/AFG/051/AFG.
- To learn lessons about the effectiveness and sustainability of the project in particular regarding the economic empowerment of rural women and their participation in business in a culture sensitive country.
- To provide accountability to the receiving country, the donor and FAO regarding the project’s performance.

19. The emphasis of the evaluation, as earlier said, was to collect information for forward-looking, i.e. areas for improvement in project design and implementation to be identified especially about lessons learned in order to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of future project’s endeavours in the poultry sector. Immediate and future support options to MAIL, during the actual project phase and beyond have been identified.

2.2 Scope

20. The scope of the evaluation is elaborated in the TOR (see annex 1) and can be described as follows:

- *Relevance and Logic* (Chapter 4.1)

Its relevance to: national development priorities, needs of the population; FAO Global Goals and Strategic Objectives/Core Functions and other aid programmes in the sector (4.1.1) and robustness and realism of the theory of change underpinning the project, including logic of causal relationship between inputs, activities, expected outputs, outcomes and impacts (against specific and development objectives) and validity of indicators, assumptions and risks (4.1.2)

Quality and realism of the project design (4.1.3), including:

- Duration;
- Stakeholder and beneficiary identification.
- Institutional set-up and management arrangements;
- Approach and methodology;

- *Implementation arrangements* (Chapter 4.2)

Financial resources management, including (4.2.1):

- Adequacy of budget allocations to achieve outputs;
- Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions in matching necessary adjustments to requirements of implementation;
- Rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation.

Management and implementation (4.2.2), including:

- Effectiveness of management, including quality and realism of work plans;
- Efficiency and effectiveness of operations management;
- Gaps and delays if any between planned and achieved outputs, the causes and consequences of delays and assessment of any remedial measures taken, efficiency in producing outputs;
- Effectiveness of internal monitoring and review processes;
- Efficiency and effectiveness of coordination and steering bodies (if any);
- Coordination with other projects active in the same sector
- Quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO; and
- Timeliness, quality and quantity of inputs and support by the Government and resource partner.

- *Effectiveness* (Chapter 4.3)

Extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and timeliness (4.3.1).

Extent to which the expected outcomes have been achieved (4.3.2).

Use made by the initiative of FAO's normative products and actual and potential contribution of the initiative to the normative work of the Organization (4.3.3).

- *Assessment of gender mainstreaming* in the initiative (Chapter 4.4). This covers:

- Analysis of how gender issues were reflected in project objectives, design, identification of beneficiaries and implementation;
- Analysis of how gender relations and equality are likely to be affected by the initiative;
- Extent to which gender issues were taken into account in project management.

- *Sustainability* (Chapter 4.5)

The prospects for sustaining and up-scaling the initiative's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the initiative. The assessment of sustainability will include, as appropriate:

- Institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed technologies, innovations and/or processes;
- Perspectives for institutional uptake and mainstreaming of the newly acquired capacities, or diffusion beyond the beneficiaries or the project.
- Environmental sustainability: the initiative's contribution to sustainable natural resource management, in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the natural resource base.

21. Overall performance of the project (Chapter 4.6): extent to which the initiative has attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives and FAO Organizational Result/s (impact), and hence, to the relevant Strategic Objectives and Core Functions; this will also include the identification of actual and potential positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

22. The mission has also been asked to evaluate if project resources were efficiently used to support the overall project objective given the overall adverse factors during project life. Based on the above analysis, the evaluation will draw specific conclusions and formulate recommendations (Chapter 5) for any necessary further action by Government, FAO and/or other parties to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-up action. The evaluation draws attention to specific good practices and lessons of interest to other similar activities. Any proposal for further assistance includes specification of major objectives and outputs and indicative inputs required.

3 Evaluation methodology

23. The evaluation mission discussed the project and the overall Afghan poultry sector extensively at ministerial level, with the various departments of the HLP project team (livestock, FOD and M&E), with various NGOs and international organisations working on poultry projects. Consultant when still at home contacted various people, who were involved in now finalized projects such as RAMP, ILSA, PIHAM, ALP East and ALP South. The mission contacted and met with private sector stakeholders of the poultry sector in the various locations visited (see annex 3 for people met). Site visits and discussions with beneficiaries, feed agents, VFU paravets and the IPs was the major source of information.

24. The evaluation mission spent the first week in Kabul for discussions and meetings with the various officials and government and private stakeholders. The second week was spent in the northern zone, covered from the Mazaar e Sharif office. It was decided not to visit the Kunduz office, as due to the poor security situation field visits would have been impossible or only under armed escort, which is not the most convenient way to enter a village for an evaluation: people would definitely not feel free to talk. During the third week the project sites in Kabul and Kapisa were visited; a visit to Panshir was not authorised due to a recent suicide attack on the PRT there. The last 5 days were used for the preparation of the debriefing presentation, the debriefing, concluding meetings with the various government and project entities and report writing.

25. The mission followed a value-chain type of approach towards the poultry sector, moving through the chain, talking to the various service providers and trying to identify everybody's capacity, plans, shortcomings and problems, but most importantly the linkages. For a semi-commercial village poultry undertaking to be successful it will have to be fully imbedded in a value chain that provides the inputs, supplies the services and gives a market for the produce. During the field visits semi-structured interviews with women poultry farmers, village poultry group leaders and feed agents and VFU (para) vets were held, for which a simple checklist can be found in annex 7. In the case of home visits female staff of the IP would first enter and seek permission from a male family member for me to enter the yard, which would give women the chance to prepare and put on a burqa. Male staff of the IP witnessed the discussions in the offices of the IPs with the female poultry trainers.

4 Analysis of the programme and its activities

4.1 - *Relevance and Logic*

4.1.1 *Relevance*

26. In the Agricultural Master Plan of Afghanistan the increase in livestock production and increased commercialization are key aspects of the livestock development policy and strategy. The poultry development policy and strategy paper under development by the project takes this in mind and the working groups have elaborated strategies how these objectives of the master plan can be achieved. Backyard poultry still produces more than 90% of all poultry products in Afghanistan. It plays many roles within the family setting: it supplies high-value animal protein and can generate some additional money. Often poultry is “the small change” within the family, when money is required for e.g. medical expenses or school requirements. It is also important in building and maintaining relationships within the community. It is taken as present when visiting or given to friends. A chicken might be slaughtered for visitors and eggs are often given as presents. Traditionally the domain of women any improvements in the poultry production will automatically improve the nutritional status of the family and the position of women in the family and the larger society through her contributions towards the family economy. It increases her decision-making and financial power and options. Poultry have many advantages in mixed farming systems; they are small, reproduce easily, do not need large investments and can scavenge for food. They can live on kitchen waste, broken grains, earthworms, snails, insects and vegetation. The number of birds per household that can live like that is limited by available feed resources and space: the IFAD project document for the states that before 1978 there were on average 12 birds per family and currently 4; the HLP baseline survey puts it even at 1.6, which might be an effect of their focus on the poorer families: is the overall decline a result of less feed resources within the household for chicken, increased incidence of fatal diseases, a combination of the two or simply wrong data/information?

27. Village/backyard poultry production fits well in a pro-poor livestock development policy as such production is closely linked with poorer household. Choosing farmers whose only livestock is poultry usually means targeting very poor farming households. Impact studies³ have demonstrated that income from the sale of eggs in South Asia is used to educate children and can start the process of asset accumulation within the household. In addition, the sale of poultry products is often the first step towards investment in other livestock such as goats, cattle, expanded poultry production or other business enterprises.

4.1.2 *Project logic*

28. The FAO Programme for Afghanistan mentions in the RAMP proposal that it carried out an analysis of the situation and main constraints to semi commercial poultry production and found that lack of technical knowledge in feeding and disease prevention and proper input supply and marketing of the products were the main problems. A backyard poultry model was developed to address the problems from this analysis and has been used with only few modifications for the German funded, the USAID RAMP funded and for this WB funded HLP project. In the RAMP project the project goal was:

³ R.G. Alders, R.G., B. Bagnol and M.P. Young (2010): Technically sound and sustainable Newcastle disease control in village chickens: lessons learnt over fifteen years (World's Poultry Science Journal, Vol. 66, September 2010)

“The project goal is to improve food security and increase rural incomes by introducing new methods of village poultry production to rural women.”⁴

29. In the HLP project the overall goal at the beginning of the project was:

“ To enhance productivity and stimulate livestock production marketable output at national and regional levels in order to contribute to poverty reduction, nutrition improvement and import substitution.”⁵

30. The revised objective of the HLP as stated in the September 2011 Aide Memoire of the project supervisory mission is

“ To assist the producer households in adopting improved practices so as to increase horticulture and livestock productivity and production in focus areas.”⁶

31. It can be seen that in the RAMP project food security and livelihood were the main elements of the project goal, whereas in HLP, besides these elements, also a national objective of import substitution, requiring a strong commercial production was added, but later dropped again. As earlier mentioned one can recognize 3 approaches in the development of rural poultry production:

- 1) *Restocking of those who lost all their birds* as refugees, IDPs, through poultry diseases or out of sheer poverty. Such people produce for home consumption and cannot be expected to contribute towards commercial poultry production for the market and achieving import substitution. The HLP baseline study estimates that the flocks of this class of people without improvements consist of 31% chicks, 59% hens, and 10% roosters. The farmers targeted for restocking and ending up in this class of poultry farmers would need hens that can brood eggs, lay eggs and produce meat and are thus preferably of a strong local dual-purpose breed, which are hard to find in large quantities of good quality in the country for projects to distribute to beneficiaries
- 2) *Improvement of the backyard/scavenging poultry production system* through training and transfer of skills and knowledge and improved service provision: these interventions would have a huge benefit on the livelihoods of many, especially when the service provision is developed and the training and extension institutionalized in existing or emerging structures. Production is used for home consumption (in the project around 35-40%) and selling on the local and town markets. These activities can apply to most rural households that are settled and stable and keep some poultry for home consumption. If more productive birds are distributed, which don't get broody, care has to be taken that there are still local breed hens or turkeys to brood eggs and produce replacement stock. The earlier mentioned HLP baseline study report estimates that in this system the average flock consists of 20% chicks, 67% hens and 13% roosters.

⁴ FAO (2003?): Development of rural poultry production: activity for RAMP (project proposal document)

⁵ MOA (2008): Contract no. MOA/559/SSS for the consultancy services for poultry sub-component of HLP between MAIL and FAO

⁶ ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, IRRIGATION AND LIVESTOCK EMERGENCY HORTICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK PROJECT (IDA Grant H226-AF, ARTF Grant TF091885) Implementation Support Mission (September 9 - 20, 2011) Aide Memoire

- 3) *Development of commercial poultry production*, which has profit as the chief aim and produces (almost) exclusively for the market. This production system contributes towards import substitution as its eggs reach formal markets, where they substitute the imported eggs. This would require the development of marketing channels and even stronger service providers to supply chicks, pullets, veterinary inputs, advice and training and in most cases credit. Farmers produce for a market and for profit, whereby re-investment of a large part of the returns is necessary to maintain the business and invest in growth. They should practice an all-in all-out production system and make use of highly productive all round vaccinated birds. In this system parent stock farms keep 10% roosters and 90% hens, commercial layers systems keep 100% hens. The size of commercial poultry farms is highly variable.

32. The main problems identified for the (semi-) commercial poultry sector were lack of technical knowledge in feeding and disease prevention and proper input supply, such as feed, vaccines and drugs and suitable replacement birds, and marketing of the products. Except for the lack of technical knowledge the project evaluated did not invest directly in solving the input supply situation: for most requirements it organized these inputs through the private sector and worked on linking the farmers with these private sector service and input suppliers, but did not contribute towards increasing the capacity of these input suppliers and service providers to deliver the goods and services in future. There was no logical framework developed for this project, which could have helped in showing the logical relationship between the various project elements and assumptions made. Some of the more rigid logical framework proponents insist that a project can only have 1 project goal. This project is maybe an example where such a restriction in project goal could have helped in making the interventions more logical and geared towards that particular goal. The project now targeted the three approaches towards poultry production development (targeting widows and poor for restocking, improving the backyard production system and facilitating poultry producers to enter increasingly into commercial, market oriented production systems) at the same time.

33. With the inputs and elements of training it seems that mainly “approach 2 farmers” were served, so basically improvement in the backyard/scavenging system. The project did not really have the means to concentrate on commercial poultry production as the package used was geared towards improved backyard production. This approach has definitely given many positive changes in the lives of the women and families involved, but has not led to real commercial poultry production on a wide scale. Some so-called “success stories” were probably paid from egg income; in other cases there were signs of cross-financing of the poultry enterprise from other economic activities in the family. In none of the cases there was really a fully commercial production model with 100% feeding of commercial/balanced poultry feed and all-in all-out. Unfortunately the FAO project staff did not monitor individual farm income and expenditures on a sample of farms of the different sizes. The improved and expanded backyard poultry production system will be a step for some to go really commercial, but under the current conditions of still unreliable supply of quality replacement pullets, feed and veterinary drugs and vaccines and services, for most people probably still too risky and expensive in terms of investments step to take. With these risks to commercial poultry production it is most probably a wise choice of farmers to at this stage not move into larger-scale commercial poultry production.

34. In order to address the problems in the overall poultry sector a holistic view has to be developed of the sector, which at the beginning of the project did not exist as the baseline of HLP mainly looked at the poorest farmers. Towards the end the project facilitated the formulation of an overall poultry development policy and strategy paper, but was not in a position to make this policy and strategy operational within MAIL. The following figure gives a graphical depiction of the poultry landscape in Afghanistan and the various stakeholders operating within it.




Figure 1: the poultry production landscape in Afghanistan

35. On top are the commercial service providers for feed, pullets or chicks and veterinary drugs and vaccines, already identified as crucial for the autonomous development of the rural poultry sector. In the middle of the figure is the Rural Poultry Sector, currently mainly backyard semi-scavenging systems. At the bottom is the market for eggs, live birds and poultry meat. On the right the various necessary government services, of which some are not yet in existence or fully operational. The figure shows a heavy arrow between the FAO and the beneficiaries to show the important coordinating role of FAO between private sector and farmers and input supply for the farmers during the first year by the project. It would be important for another actor, such as the poultry department of MAIL to be able to take over this role in future, for which they are still ill prepared. At the market the import's importance is of a similar magnitude as the role of the FAO on the production level: import levels have a great influence on the market prices and farmers have little influence on these with their supply.

36. The project assumes that the private sector service providers will fully take over the service provision the project took care of during the first year: to a certain extent the link was made between farmers and service providers through the group leaders and instituting the feed agents, but many women do not have sufficient money to keep their chickens according to the recommendations on balanced feed and with full

vaccination. The service providers are understandably more interested in their institutional clients, among which the FAO is one, for quick larger volume business than to invest a lot of time and effort in building up rural service provision networks for many small-scale producers, although a start has definitely been made with the feed agents but who are still too far from the women, requiring a male intermediary.

37. The project training period per “batch” of beneficiaries was increased from 6 months in RAMP to 12 months in HLP, which was a good move as people clearly were and are in need of a longer period of support and advice. Although also in RAMP there was follow up the high intensity of new beneficiaries entering the programme must have made follow up more difficult than when there is only one round of new beneficiaries per year. For the development of meaningful and vibrant women village (poultry producer) groups also this increased period was far too short: so much time is needed for the training in all the practical aspects of poultry raising that all the following aspects of production economics and management and organisation of marketing and supply systems have necessarily been dealt with in a quick way. It is also questionable whether all of the locally recruited poultry trainers with their short and intense training and in most cases their young age would be capable of playing the facilitating and mediating role required to create buy-in into a concept of women poultry producer groups. Except for the 4 earlier formed poultry associations with the small-scale commercial poultry farmers in Kabul, Mazaar, Kandahar and Jalalabad there is on asking nobody who has seen anything remaining of the women poultry groups formed under RAMP. The groups’ revolving funds disappeared and the district feed mixing units seem to be defunct.

38. The project risks were formulated in the Call for Proposals⁷ as avian influenza, security conditions, demand for poultry products, supply of pullets and unstable socio-economic situation. These risks seem to have been formulated rather narrowly as project risks and would have better been formulated as the main risks for any (“semi commercial”?) poultry producer in the country:

- *Poultry diseases in general*: the project could contain these with an extensive vaccination programme, for which the project could guarantee the supply and quality through import. The only remaining risk for the project remaining was identified as HPAI. The last the project could only tackle by building awareness of the disease and encourage people to take the necessary biosecurity measures. However poultry diseases remain a major production risk for both backyard and commercial poultry producers in the country. There is no sufficient commercial stock of quality vaccines available in the country against IB, NDV, IBD, Marek and Fowl Pox. It is difficult to expect that the private sector would take the commercial risk of importing and keeping large stocks of vaccines, which might expire, also the government has no facilities and capacity to step in and solving this issue requires a more-year plan and agreement between government, private sector and future projects.
- *Security conditions*: were seen as a threat to the implementation of the project and in particular the working of female trainers. The project had the possibility to mitigate this risk by changing the activities to another area. Poultry producers

⁷ This seems to have become the project document for the FAO project staff, whereas within HLP the overall project document evolved with a risk of differences in content of these two documents.

do not have this opportunity, unless it were again to pack up bags and become IDP or refugee, which would also be the end of their poultry enterprise

- *Demand for and supply of poultry products*: it is obvious that there is a good demand for locally produced poultry products as long as these can distinguish themselves from the imported ones; the problem lies in the price setting, which depends more on the volume of import and its price than on domestic price formation. Only a strong and organised producers' organisation can achieve something in this field by demanding action from government to protect the local industry. This project had as one of its activities to develop a national poultry development board and a national poultry producers' association: neither of them have been formed during the project lifetime.
- *Supply of quality feed, pullets and veterinary drugs and vaccines*: these issues the project could not address directly within its scope, timeframe and budgetary provisions, but have been identified for a long time as the three main risks to the successful development of the Afghanistan poultry sector.

Consultant's methodology as included in the contract does not seem to provide an explicit explanation how these risks would be mitigated during the project duration. There was no plan to promote or facilitate a general wider availability and application of vaccines in the country. Although the intention was there to develop a national poultry platform, which could have worked towards better study of and control over the national market for poultry products the methodology did not give any specific detail on this.

39. One could put questions whether this approach was the most logical one to achieve objectives of increased food security and/or improving the socio-economic position of

The earlier FAO work in the poultry sector always showed availability of quality pullets, quality feed and disease control and prevention as the three main bottlenecks. The HLP Poultry project opted for another round of the application of the improved backyard poultry husbandry system.

Just for interest sake this is a comparison of a very rough cost benefit analysis for 2 intervention options: 1) the one followed and 2) a country-wide programme to promote the use of poultry vaccination, especially NDV.

- 1) With an investment cost of 84.6 million Afgh per year (USD 1.8 million @ 47 Afgh: total budget of project divided by 3) an estimated 8000 households sell 12 million eggs worth 72 million Afgh (4 million consumed) and 11 birds per beneficiary at Afgh 150 each for 13.2 million: total monetary return 85.2 million Afgh. This gives a "net" monetary profit of 0.6 million Afgh, counting the consumed eggs 24 million Afgh less return would be made and thus the net profit of 06. Million Afgh. Would change in a 23.4 million afgh "loss": the women cannibalize their business. This approach to be applied country-wide would have been extremely costly and the economic returns relatively low.
- 2) Assuming 12 million chickens in the backyard system in Afghanistan with currently a 50% annual mortality, a countrywide NDV vaccination 3*/year with thermostable I-2 vaccine could reduce this mortality with 30 % units. Vaccine and vaccination cost would amount to 54 million Afgh. This would result in 3.6 million less birds dead, each worth 150 Afgh (720 million Afgh and the 4 million eggs, which would have been needed to produce these 3.6 million replacement birds, worth 24 million Afgh: total profit of 120 million Afgh in 1 year. This approach would require a working vaccine import and distribution system and of course there would still be the issue of quality feed and pullets.

Neither of the two approaches is sufficient to guarantee the development of a more commercial poultry sector out of backyard poultry farming, but the comparison might give some food for thought on future project design and possibilities to reach more people and higher economic returns with limited project funds.

Source of data: project reports and estimates by mission

women in the household. Women in Pamir asked specifically for restocking with goats. The

FAO project applied a proven model for poultry production and these groups asking for other activities should maybe have been referred to other projects. In this respect the project was prescriptive, without prior research into alternatives to see in which way the project could give the targeted women maximum benefits in the most efficient way. The FOD⁸ approach of HLP created a supply driven approach for the poultry activities, forcing the FAO implemented project to comply and supply these group members with chickens, whereas in many cases they would not be conform the FAO prerequisites for eligibility, but for political reasons had to be complied with.

4.1.3 Quality and realism of the project design

40. The overall effective project duration has been from 1st of November 2008 till December 2011, slightly over 3 years. There was some delay in start-up due to protracted contract negotiations. The project, contrary to earlier projects, decided to run only one cycle of training, distribution and monitoring per year, as the two cycles per year coincided with less favourable periods in the year for e.g. the transport of chicks and materials to the beneficiaries. Each cycle can be divided in 3 sections:

- Training and preparation (3 months)
- Distribution and close monitoring and on the job training (3 months)
- Follow-up to stimulate and orientate the new poultry farmers to enter into a second or third cycle

41. The 2009 beneficiaries thus have had an additional 2 years of follow up, the 2010 beneficiaries and the 2011 beneficiaries actually no or extremely little follow up according to above schedule as the project will close down in December 2011. There has no provision been made for the transfer of the follow-up and continuous training and support role to alternative structures (HLP livestock extension workers?), other than assuming that the VGLs would be willing and capable to organise feed, pullets and vaccines and actually vaccinate the birds. Anecdotal evidence from earlier projects following the same approach give the impression that the VGLs at that time were not able to guarantee availability of feed, pullets and vaccines, which would have a negative effect on overall sustainability of the “semi-“ commercial poultry production in villages.

42. Beneficiary selection was a process in which FAO’s technical criteria for selection (poor woman/widow/head of household, don’t select neighbouring households and relatives) at times had to be bend by the IP to obtain buy-in from the village leadership. There were definitely for this reason some women selected who do not fit the criteria for poverty. In the collaboration with the HLP-FOD activity another selection system came in: these are groups of 25 women, who were encouraged to form a group, whereby the distribution of free chicken was an important trigger to make them form such a farmers’ organisation, but at times without their intrinsic interest to go into poultry farming, but only to gain access to project “goodies”. The system for credit envisaged for the FOD groups in the future might however be a way to gain investment support to go into more commercial poultry production, if investment money were really the bottleneck.

⁸ HLP’s Farmer Organisation Development (FOD) initiative works towards the formation of formal farmer organisations, usually with both male and female members, a management committee and ready to be registered with MAIL’s cooperative department.

43. FAO's procurement department selected on tender basis the commercial stakeholders for supply of feed and chicks. As these suppliers are few and all known to the project staff and/or at some stage in the past involved in poultry projects as supplier or even as staff member of FAO themselves there were cases of insinuation without proof of inside-trading and nepotism against national project staff. This could have been avoided or at least diminished in two ways:

- National project staff declare their involvement with and relationships in the poultry sector
- Procurement is done through an open tender: bidders hand in their envelop during a public meeting of the tender commission and witness the opening of the envelopes. They are informed on the spot who won the contract. It would require pre-registration of companies for the procurement plan and short-listing them if the number is high, otherwise invite all of them to prepare an offer. In this way hopefully the time consuming and destructive beyond people's back talking can be avoided.

44. A central position in the project design and execution is the coop, in which the chickens are to be kept. There are two designs, which are being promoted: with three windows for the lowlands extremely hot areas and the two windows one for the highland/cooler areas. There are however a number of technical aspects which are worth some remarks:

- The coop is supposed to be placed free from any walls for "all around" air circulation. This is good for all around ventilation and in theory might limit the risk of CRD and insect or rodents entering. It however also means that in the usually small yards, where often there are small areas for irrigation, the coop now covers one block of the few irrigated areas.
- When asked where they would have placed it if they had a choice, most women answered against a perimeter wall, preferably in a corner, so that 2 less walls are needed to be constructed and the coop does not take up the irrigated plot. With a coop costing around Afgh 4000 2 walls less make a vast difference. Ventilation could be increased with more traditional type vents in the roof.
- The construction of a second coop, as introduced by the WB supervisory mission of October 2010 as a means of simultaneously keeping layers and raising pullets, was unacceptable for the farmers for economic reasons: it would be too expensive to feed two batches of birds at the same time. It would also take out another piece of land in the yard. These are some explanations why not many farmers are willing or can afford to build a second coop. The 2011 beneficiaries were advised to build two coops so that they can start rearing pullets before the layers stop laying. It is too early to draw conclusions from this. To avoid occupying more space a second coop could be a second floor on top of the first one with a ventilation pipe from the bottom coop going through the "top coop". It would however require some technology development and testing for best way of construction, which could have been easily done in the FAO compounds, a farmer demonstration centre or at the home of an interested farmer
- Examples of completely different designs, making use of weldmesh from army barriers (Hesco's), simple corner coops with chicken wire fronts were seen, which showed that people have absorbed the basic requirements for a coop: protection, ventilation, light and ease of cleaning, were found in houses. The project could have prepared a number of options for a coop, linked to the conditions and production system in that particular household and probably should still document all these farmer driven designs.

- The project did not promote the use of perches and laying nests. With a mixed flock in terms of age there is an advantage if birds can get away from one another in space, which is exactly what is achieved with perches. Laying nests make that birds are not disturbed when laying or even have their cloaca's damaged from pecking. This recommendation needs consideration.
- People in many cases do use some litter, but rarely deep litter: it is possible that there is a reluctance to leave all the “dirt” in the coop and every day walk on top of it, but this requires to be investigated. Laying nests built onto the outside of the coop wall with a lid on top would reduce the frequency of having to enter the coop; using weld mesh in the front would facilitate the use of a feed trough outside the coop, further reducing the need to enter the coop (see pictures for some examples). Putting the waterer near the door would mean only entering to rake and break open the surface of the litter, which can be done from the door. In future it would be better to teach people the general principles of poultry housing and let them more free in design of their coops.



Figure 2: some examples of variations found on the standard coop design

45. In its dissemination model the project chose for a Transfer Of Technology (TOT) model with free inputs. There seem to have been little to no dialogue and discussion with the beneficiaries on the modalities of the project and approaches with the possibility to adjust the model and approach. Other village poultry projects developed a “pass on the gift”⁹ principle, which would have given the VPPG a function in monitoring this process, a clear task and thus create some more cohesion among group members. The training programme was principally geared towards the technical aspects of poultry rearing, with little attention to the business aspects, the role of the group and time to go beyond the level of knowledge to change attitude and most importantly the practices of the women.

⁹ Helvetas programme in Samangan and Bamyan

46. Selection of project target areas had a number of criteria formulated by FAO:
- The safety situation should be such that FAO staff and the contracted female trainers and monitors would be able to work without problems
 - There should be a market for eggs and poultry meat in the area
 - The people in the area should be interested in poultry keeping as a potentially profitable enterprise for them

In some cases the FAO was strongly requested by MAIL to include certain areas, which the FAO did not want to include, because either the security was not good (Sherghali) or the conditions were not suitable for poultry production and people not really interested (Panshir). In the first case FAO did not give in, in the second case it gave in. The technical results in Panshir have been much poorer than in other areas due to the climate, less interest in poultry keeping among the beneficiaries and little supervision and monitoring due to its remoteness.

47. Beneficiary selection for the FAO was clearly geared towards poor women, especially widows and disabled women. Women needed to have an interest in poultry production, had to be prepared to be present at all the training sessions and prepare a coop. It was not the intention to have coops in neighbouring households or more than one per family. Where FAO and FOD programme “overlapped the FAO was requested to provide the female FOD group members with the poultry package. Unfortunately the FOD group members could be a number of women from one household, neighbours, including the more wealthy members of the village. In this way two types of poultry groups with different structure and background have been created. Whereas the FOD group is supposed to develop its own financial structure with deposit taking, the FAO promoted individual women to save each week at least 40 Afgh so that after a year they would have, after the sale of the spent birds, sufficient money to buy growers’ mash and replacement pullets. With DAIL working on permanent structures to supervise and support the FOD groups it is likely that the FAO women poultry groups will be left without future support in this way. The way the VPPG groups were set up was to make them independent from project support. For this reason the linkages with suppliers were developed and women encouraged to start individual saving. It is too early to assess what the outcome and impact of this approach will be.

48. The project has had poor and disadvantaged rural women poultry farmers as its main beneficiaries, the private sector were not included in the project other than as potential suppliers to the project in case of a won tender and as the exit strategy of the project for the provision of essential inputs and services. This project is the first time that the local private sector has been so engaged in the supplies, but also in working towards continued availability of feed, pullets and to a lesser extend veterinary supplies and vaccines. A more active role within the project besides only supplier could have contributed towards the post-project sustainability of supply of essential supplies and services.

49. The project will, except for the informal VPPGs and the VGLs not leave any institutional set-up and future management arrangements, as the planned poultry platform and national poultry producers’ association have not materialized. One way would be if the FODs would be mainstreamed into the Afghan national cooperative movement, which does not seem very likely at this moment. The RAMP project had as one of its recommendations to formulate a national poultry development policy and as part of the strategy strengthen and support the various poultry associations and private sector service providers to come together in a national poultry development board. These steps again have not been fully taken by the project, although some initial steps during the policy formulation process to develop such

organisations have been made. In order not to leave the VPPGs and the few umbrella organisations behind in a “vacuum”, FAO should discuss with HLP-FOD how the FAO groups can be included in the mainstream farmer group formation and planning.

4.2 *Implementation arrangements*

4.2.1 *Financial resources management and procurement*

50. The budget of this project could be based on long experience of the FAO implementing this poultry development model. The project has sourced most of its inputs in country, except for drinkers and feeders, thus giving a stimulus to the local poultry service industry. At the time of budgeting the world market price of grain and thus of chicken feed had already risen; had this not been the case then that could have given budgetary problems how to cover the 30-40% price increase. In the first poultry project of this type in 2000 almost all necessities were bought in Pakistan, as these were not available locally. Feeders and drinkers are still not locally available. To promote local manufacturing of these would have required an active policy of giving manufacturers contracts to do so, including design and quality standard for the equipment sought to procure.

51. The project initially planned for 25 kg growers’ mash as donation, but WB project supervision end 2009 felt that it would be better to cover the complete growing phase of 70kg growers and add 25 kg layers’ mash, so that the women would be collecting sufficient eggs to continue purchasing layers’ mash with their own money. As there was no budget increase possible the number of beneficiaries was brought down from 25.000 to 18.000 to obtain the money for this additional feed. When in 2010 it became clear that there would be unspent money from the ARTF the poultry project was instructed to raise the number of beneficiaries back to 25.000. This sudden increase made that 48% of overall project workload fell in the last project year with a heavy stress on the supply, training and monitoring systems.

52. The project made use of armoured vehicles from the FAO transport pool before an armoured vehicle from the project budget had been procured. There is still an armoured vehicle underway, which will probably arrive after the project is over. It would have been better if this procurement had done at the beginning of the project: full use of it within the project could have been made.

53. The FAO staff closely monitored the rearing of the chicks and the application of the vaccination schedule. What they could not monitor was the genetics of the birds produced. The “Golden” from Pakistan is originally a three-way cross between Fayoum, Leghorn and Rhode Island Red. What happens in most parent stock farms in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan?) is that after one importation of parent stock from Pakistan in the following year these are replaced with the F1 cross from the parent stock and the year after with the F2. In this way all heterosis is lost and the birds lose uniformity and start looking again like the 3 different lines. The genetic potential of the Golden of 260 eggs/year apparently has gone down to the 205 eggs the project staff estimates as the annual egg production of this type of bird, but in case of 3rd or 4th generation birds, as distributed in 2010/2011 maybe even to the 150-180 eggs per year some beneficiaries mentioned. This seriously hampers the profitability of the system, especially if farmers would feed 100% balanced feed: at 23 Afgh/kg and 100 gr consumption per day (assumed that there is some scavenging) and an egg at 6 Afghani it would mean that 4.6 Afghani out of the 6 Afghani for the egg would have to be “allocated”

already to the feed, leaving little for veterinary care, depreciation of the coop and an income for the farmer.

54. The project bought layers' mash produced according to a formula given to the suppliers. Afghanistan does not have testing facilities for feed, neither have the feed milling companies, so quality assurance is based on trust; with people mixing with own grain and kitchen waste production figures are not a good indicator of feed quality. At times CTA took samples to Sri Lanka for testing during his R&R and results were within the range of expectation. Balanced feed, the most expensive component of the poultry enterprise, is critical for high production, but seen by the women as being too expensive and therefore mixed with their own grain and kitchen waste to reduce the feeding costs, but most likely also the production. It is common practice to add 1-2% river sand to layers' mash, which is essential for chicken that are 100% confined in their coop, so that their gizzards can "grind" the feed. It is not necessary for backyard partly free-range birds, which can pick up grit and sand by themselves. Backyard poultry feed therefore does not need to contain sand. The project initiated testing will safeguard farmers from buying sand through analysis. It is essential that Afghanistan gets somewhere feed testing facilities to do some simple tests (DM, ash, CP and CF as the least) as the risk that without project control feed quality will be compromised is big. Another way of reducing the cost of the feed is the use of a concentrate, which contains everything except the 60-70% grain, which many farmers have themselves or can purchase locally cheaper than the feed mill with added costs for milling and transport. Such concentrate would be more expensive per kg, but per kg balanced feed after mixing with own grain definitely cheaper than bought balanced feed. Also transport costs will be reduced and value will be added to own or locally produced and purchased grain.

55. The purchase of all vaccines for the rearing and vaccination on farm during the first year was done by the project. These vaccines came in commercial quantities. The so-called killed vaccine at USD 80/1000 doses is maybe technically the best needle vaccine available, but with the need to prime 2 times with different live vaccines, the problem for the women to collect such a vast amount of money for vaccine and logistical problems to find and vaccinate 1000 birds quickly enough before the vaccine expires it would be better to change to the I2-thermostable eye drop NDV vaccine: it is readily available in the VFUs, it can be used at any age without priming with other live vaccines and although the immunity might be less (80% protection with 3* vaccination per year) it has the added advantages of horizontal spread (60% protection in not directly vaccinated birds), no need for needle to vaccinate, the smaller number of doses (100) per bottle and lower price. From the project monitoring it shows that in the second cycle most people (66%) will hold on to the still laying birds and add some chicks, raised from eggs hatched under a local chicken: in such a mixed flock of different breeds and ages I2 for NVD vaccination through eye drop is the best option. There is need to coordinate with VETSERV (the privatised purchase wing of DCA) on which vaccines are required and how these can be purchased and its use promoted. There is also need to assist the MAIL veterinary department to develop a recommended vaccination schedule for backyard/village chicken.

56. The total budget for the contract was USD 4,790,588 and can be divided in the following categories:

- R1 (A)	Foreign Personnel (3)	799.750
- R1 (B)	National Personnel (20)	685.800
- S1	Sub-contracts	983.100
- S2	Travel	300.390

- S3	Training	66.760
- 4	Expendable equipment for offices	23.300
- 5	On-farm poultry supplies	1.292.500
- 6	Vehicles (5)	180.000
- 7	Technical support services	22.405
- 8	General Operating Expenses	142.200
- R4	Project support (6.5% of remuneration + reimb.)	292.383
Total		4.790.588

Personnel takes 31% of the overall budget, whereas on-farm poultry supplies (the direct investment in the poultry farms) is 27%. Consultant got the impression that the FAO project personnel was very closely linked to and involved in the actual project execution, for which there were sub-contractors. In a future project of this type it would be good to be more specific about the additional tasks for FAO project staff so that also the FAO mandates in the policy and technology development and information gathering and sharing fields will be reached. In this particular project little information was generated to increase the general understanding of the village poultry sector in technical, economic and financial terms.

4.2.2 *Management and implementation*

57. The project has been executed under the technical responsibility of FAO AGAS. There was one formal backstopping from Rome in 2008 and CTA could count on support and advice from HQ during the project implementation. As AGAS had already been responsible for 4 projects of this format there is a risk of going on the automatic pilot and not sufficiently asking oneself whether this model still suits the current situation and delivers what it was supposed to deliver: organised semi-commercial village poultry farmers, feeding into the private sector for the marketing of their eggs and the purchase of quality feed, pullets and veterinary care. There were frequent HLP and WB missions and it is not clear whether the frequent changes in the project approach of HLP did not make the FAO project “stick” to the initial design. It is obvious that the project was executed as much as possible to the letter of the initial project document. The HLP livestock expert position was frequently changed (4, of whom 1 part-time), which might also have had a negative effect on the project development and consistency of management and oversight. The FAO Senior Poultry Advisor and National Field Manager had regular meetings with the HLP technical and monitoring staff. Also World Bank project supervision visited regularly. Consultant got the impression from representatives of these bodies that FAO staff was little receptive for recommendations and criticism and stuck to the original project document, which led to frustration on the side of supervision mission and HLP staff. There was no advisory/technical committee or steering committee for this project. Outside ideas and support at the time of formulation or for backstopping and/or a mid-term evaluation could have added a different perspective to the project design and implementation. The project had two additional consultants visits to facilitate the formulation of the national poultry development policy in May and September 2011 (project paid) and to do an economic impact assessment in November 2011 (HLP initiated). Both inputs were however too late to make a meaningful contribution towards the implementation of this project and should be seen as investments into future poultry development projects.

58. The project’s management has been effective and what had to be done was done in a timely manner. The work plan ideally should have been synchronized with the best timing for young pullets to grow up: under increasing day length to stimulate egg production. Unfortunately date of signing of contract and in the first year time of money transfer made

that not all activities could be done at technically the best time. This led to e.g. increased mortality in pullets after transport during cold weather, animals reaching point of lay in shortening day length and not achieving their maximum possible production levels etc. It was a good move to change earlier management procedures of running 2 cycles per year to running 1 cycle of distribution per year: although staffing for training and monitoring needed to be doubled it made that more of the activities were done at the optimal time and most likely more follow up during a longer period. In the old situation when the following batch of beneficiaries would come in after 6 months there were less people to go back to batch 1 beneficiaries of that year to supervise and support).

59. There were some problems with increased mortality due to transport in too cold weather with the Panshir part of the programme: the supplier replaced these pullets with POL birds at his own expense. In some 2011 batches the sexing had not been done properly and there was more than 1 (anything between 2 and 8) cockerels among the 15 birds distributed. Replacing these with pullets caused a problem, as the pullets offered for replacement were smaller than the cockerels, so people refused. A model of distributing a mix of pullets and cockerels would have overcome this problem, would have given women cockerels to sell and use the money to buy layers' mash, but the project did not explore alternative models, so we still do not know whether this would have been economically feasible. The system of replacing the birds that died during the first week led to suspicion among the HLP monitors that some women were hiding some of their chickens with non-beneficiary relatives in the hope that they would be given additional chickens to replace the dead ones. It is hard to respond to this type of dishonesty and one would expect peer pressure to avoid this type of behaviour, which apparently in some groups did not happen.

60. The staff of the various implementing partners, under the supervision by their management and the FAO project National Poultry Officers and Training Coordinators, monitored the project activities. On top of this the HLP IMST also developed a monitoring system with an over time increasing involvement of the district based HLP and DAIL livestock extension staff. There was no system to coordinate these various monitoring processes or exchange experiences and observations, which one would have expected to be facilitated by the HLP IMST as the oversight consultant. Quite often issues arising from the monitoring were discussed at national level, which with proper procedures and agreements could have been dealt with at district or if necessary provincial level. The above suspicion of women hiding pullets the first week under the pretext that they had died is an example of an issue that should have been locally resolved. A regular meeting of MAIL poultry department, FAO project and HLP representatives could have improved the mutual understanding of how the project was progressing instead of the now often incidental meetings.

61. The project received support from the FAO country office through the transport pool for an armoured vehicle at beginning of the project, centralized procurement system and in financial management. These tasks were executed in a timely and adequate way. Procurement in Afghanistan, especially when it is not public, very quickly leads to rumours and accusations of conflict of interest. National expert staff of the various projects has of course their links with the private sector related to the sphere of work, which makes it quite easy to accuse them of inside trading and conflict of interest. An open tender procedure, where potential suppliers are present, with public opening of offers might be a way of diminishing this problem in future.

62. The project management drew advice and support from other FAO projects, such as the HPAI control project and the Transboundary Animal Disease Control project (GTFS/INT/907/ITA). Foreign and local consultants of the HPAI control project conducted training on biosecurity for the poultry trainers in the target districts. The TAD project's laboratory was used to check the vaccination titres with ELISA after vaccination. The project followed a concise vaccination schedule during the first 2 months of the growing phase with boosters during the period the chickens were in the villages. The vaccination schedule was presented in meetings, but not coordinated with the veterinary services or veterinary projects with a country-wide role in improving animal health, such as the EU funded AHDP (Animal Health Development Project). There is doubt that the NDV vaccination schedule would be the most appropriate in the post project period as this killed vaccine is sold in 1000 doses bottles and is quite expensive. It is also a needle vaccine, which gives the risk of cross-infections and gives higher cost for needles and syringes. CRD was the main health problem and controlled through the proper administration of antibiotics prophylactically. It were better if parent stock were certified free from CRD to start with healthy pullets.

63. The project started a little bit unconventional. After an initial issuing of a CFP this was withdrawn and FAO was granted the contract as single source procurement. This project is called "consultancy services for poultry sub-component of HLP". The HLP project aimed and aims at an increasing involvement of the relevant government departments in the execution of all project activities. It has therefore appointed a number of facilitating partners, of which FAO is one for this poultry project. The government has a HLP implementation team with a fully-fledged management, finance-administration, M&E and technical departments, operating under the leadership of an Implementation Management Support Team (IMST), managed by GIZ. Although supervisory missions of the WB have often stated that it were better if the various IMST experts would become embedded in the respective structures of the MAIL this has never happened. The Minister and MAIL rely on the IMST for the day-to-day management of the HLP project and to answer questions in case these arise. In the case of the FAO signing a contract with the MAIL for the execution of this **consultancy services** contract with MAIL it is obvious from the title that it was probably never the idea that the FAO would be executing the project on behalf of MAIL but advising the Ministry structures during the execution. This has however nowhere materialized within the HLP project: the executive tasks have been taken up by the facilitating partner and the monitoring tasks of project implementation and project progress by the IMST. This at times has led to friction and confusion between IMS and FAO, which could maybe have been avoided by a proper delegation memorandum from MAIL to IMST with copy to facilitating partners. A similar situation on some occasions has arisen between the IPs in the field and the visiting HLP IMST and DAIL monitors.

64. The mission could notice a certain amount of confusion about the relationship between the FAO poultry project, HLP and MAIL: was the FAO a contractor for MAIL or a sub-contractor of HLP? Another issue in this area was that the component operated without a mutually agreed operational manual in which all procedures and modes of operation should have been laid down as per WB requirements. HLP has turned out to be a project which after a slow start turned over time into a project with quickly changing paradigms, relationships, creation of new concepts (e.g. FFS and Farmer to Farmer extension) and structures (DASP and PASP). It seems that the FAO was not part of these discussions and changes and continued with its own programme component undisturbed. This has led to a situation of duplication, in which e.g. farmers could be visited by VPTs of the implementing partner of

the FAO, the HLP livestock extension workers and the DAIL extension worker for training and extension without these three knowing of one another what the plan of the other was.

65. The MAIL poultry department at Kabul level is staffed with the type of experts, who gained their experience in the seventies and eighties in large-scale commercial poultry production. They seem to have little to no interest in issues related to backyard poultry farming, although they would participate in major project meetings, workshops etc. when invited. With 90% of all poultry in Afghanistan being kept in the family sector it would be important though for this department to be shown how this sector can and should be helped to improve and expands its production and also become part of the department's felt mandate.

4.3 - Effectiveness

4.3.1 Outputs: quantity, quality and timeliness

66. The HLP Implementation Management Support Team revised the project's objectives and developed for the poultry component the following Project Development Objective (PDO):

“At least 60% of target producer households adopt improved practices in focus districts and incremental production of 12 million eggs and 200 tons of meat per year achieved”

67. If the 60% refers to the selected beneficiaries then with the construction of the improved coops as a precondition for receiving pullets and the increase in the number of chickens this PDO is already reached; if this PDO means that 60% of the women in the focal area adopt even without the project's free inputs these improved practices the PDO has not been met. The real development objective should maybe have been that sustainable “semi”-commercial poultry production continues after the direct project involvement after year 1 is finished with as definition of “semi-commercial poultry production” market oriented egg production, following an all-in all-out system making use of balanced feed and full vaccination?

68. The overall Development Objective as described in consultant's methodology as per contract is:

“To develop and strengthen national production of safe low cost animal proteins (poultry meat and eggs), to make them available and accessible to the Afghan population in urban and rural areas.”

69. It is not easy for IMST on behalf of MAIL and the FAO as implementer to compare notes on the effectiveness of the project if there are different PDOs in use. Agreement on the overall project logic creates clarity on purpose, objectives, activities and expected outcome. A logical framework instead of the various versions of the project's PDO's in a narrative way would have created such clarity. The project component operated also without the usual operational manual most WB financed projects have.

70. More specific the FAO project team aimed at:

- 1) To further enhance productivity and stimulate poultry production in 25 new districts in up to 10 provinces and promote sustainability of all added production through organization of VPPGs and advise the private service providers to manage all needed services, input supplies and marketing activities
- 2) To assist in drafting a national poultry production policy for supporting peri-urban semi-commercial and rural family poultry development throughout Afghanistan
- 3) To develop and strengthen a national poultry production strategy as an effective tool for providing economic opportunities and empowerment of women, improving food security and increase rural incomes of vulnerable households and for countering the risks associated with spreading of HPAI virus

It is obvious that in the FAO's approach there was more specific mention of the socio-economic aspects in terms of training and farmer organisation in this village poultry production development than the PDO of HLP suggests.

71. The project outputs were (see annex 8 for a project prepared more complete overview):

- 1) - The project did establish 25.000 poultry units over 3 years in 11 provinces and 19 districts. There was a diversion of the original plan: a WB mission in 2009 decided that beneficiaries should get 95kg feed instead of the planned 25 kg so that they could feed their birds up to point of lay and the first month's laying with project supplied feed, but without making additional project funds available. To cater for this modification the number of beneficiaries was brought down to 18.000 and the work plan was updated. In 2010, when it became clear that there were excess funds available for HLP through other than WB sources it was decided that the poultry component should reach 25.000 beneficiaries, so do the planned 2011 number of beneficiaries and an additional 7000. This means that in 2011 the project team and IP had to handle nearly half the total target of the overall project.
- As planned 505 Village Poultry Production Groups (VPPG) were formed and their Village Group Leaders (VGL) trained to become the central "hub" of the poultry service provision activities. It seems that the group concept is mainly the collection of clients for services from the VGLs: there were nowhere seen any signs of any joint activities within the group.
- To a certain extent the project managed to "entice" the 2 main feed suppliers to the project to establish a network of feed agents in the respective districts covered by the project. VGLs are introduced to these agents and a business relationship between VGLs and feed agents established. It is assumed that if business is profitable these feed agents will continue and it looks as if they are as some visited are expanding into all sorts of agricultural inputs. Pullets were during the project implementation delivered by the contractors themselves to the beneficiary villages. In this way contact between supplier and beneficiaries could be established. The only ways in which beneficiaries can now "access" pullets is either by giving money to the VGL when she is actively working in the service provision and orders collectively, in some cases use the feed agent to order or to go to town and pay directly for pullets. The supply of veterinary drugs and vaccines through the VFU system is still limited to NDV vaccine as they do not stock any other poultry vaccines: there has been no business for the VFUs out of the project and thus they did not see or develop their business of supplying such vaccines. Especially in the north the feed manufacturer/pullet seller sells now also vaccines, however in packaging of commercial quantities, difficult to manage for VGLs working with maximum 750-1000 birds (50 group members * 15

birds added some local already present birds) and form now direct competition with the VFU system.

- 2) The drafting of the poultry policy started with an initial mission of a poultry consultant in May 2011, followed by a second mission in September 2011. The process was participatory with a wide consultation of the various stakeholders. The policy is not yet available in draft and as such will not be able anymore to contribute towards and used in the implementation of this project.
- 3) The national poultry development strategy as referred to would be a logical sequence to the national poultry development policy. FAO has over the years promoted the formation of poultry production associations: from the earlier projects in the nineties there are poultry producer associations remaining in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazaar. These associations have however in many instances developed more into restricted membership business collaborative frameworks than in bodies that would and could represent the poultry sector with government, veterinary services, donors etc. and lobby and work on advocacy for the poultry sector.

There was no farm budget for the 15 pullets model at farm level and the evaluator from available data compiled the following 2 scenarios: 1 with “golden” and 2 with a commercial poultry layer, which was assumed to be double as expensive as the ‘golden’. Full feeding of commercial layers mash and replacement of all birds after 1 laying cycle. Feed consumption assumed 100gr/day per layer

Returns, based on project data

Scenario “golden”

* 11*205eggs@6

13.530

* 11 cull birds 2.200

* **Total return**

15.730

Returns scenario Isabrown

* 11*95 extra eggs 6270

It can be seen that in the case of the “golden” a farmer does not make a profit, but an operational loss of Afgh 1108; in the case of the commercial layer with 300 eggs/year, still consuming the 100 gram mash per day (+ some scavenging) there is a profit of Afgh 2792. If the 30% of eggs consumed within the family are included the situation becomes even more bleak in terms of maintaining the business capital, converted as an absolute number home consumption the commercial layer scenario also shows a negative result in financial terms. Farmers overcome this by replacing part of the commercial poultry feed with kitchen waste, letting birds scavenge part of the day and settling for less eggs per year (farmers talk about 150-180 per year. It also could be a reason why people do not really go beyond the 15 birds (average in cycle 2 and 3 farmers is around 13 birds). Project calculations of 5 Afgh/kg local feed are not realistic if lowest grade of broken and small grain wheat is already 17 Afgh/kg

72. A WB supervisory mission in 2009 suggested to replace 50% of the programme with broilers, this most probably to speed up the commercialization of the poultry production and a broiler DOC production farm in Jalalabad had come on stream. The project however only agreed with a pilot project, as there was no earlier experience with broiler production in the village setting in Afghanistan. The 195 pilot broiler growers raised in 2010 and 2011 three cycles of broilers. According to the project reporting this was a great moneymaker for the farmers, which was confirmed by the eagerness shown by farmers to continue and expand the business. Broiler production nowhere on this earth works without an “integrator”, who takes responsibility for parent stock, incubation, feed preparation and purchase and processing of

the birds produced. The farmers in most cases become “outgrowers”, who will be paid a fixed sum for their work, if the results fall within certain parameters. In the case of this project activity the FAO was that integrator during the first cycle, organizing and coordinating up to the marketing. The Afghan broiler sector is in its infancy with a handful of companies running parent stock and feed mills. As most people prefer to buy a live broiler to be sure that it is not a thawed frozen broiler and to pay a premium price for this, it is hard to think about a poultry slaughterhouse in Afghanistan until the regulator can exercise more control over the import of frozen poultry meat. These 195 women have now tested broiler production, some of the husbands spoken to were definitely very enthusiastic for more broiler production, but broiler production on farm can only be done being part of a vertically integrated chain. Together with the uncontrolled import of frozen poultry meat, live broilers from Pakistan and Iran and the high risk of diseases and mortality it seems that broiler production within the small-holder sector might be, although technically and economically feasible, a step too far for Afghanistan under the current structure and capacity of the poultry service providers when far from the parent stock, incubator and feed mill. FAO advised against this activity for these reasons, but complied with the wishes of the client on a pilot scale. It was an interesting experiment done by the project, which results still need good documenting in both technical and economic terms.

4.3.2 Outcome

73. The expected outcome was that village women after the initial project support with some equipment, birds, feed and training and monitoring and supervision, with organisation in VPPGs and with a trained VGL to vaccinate and coordinate purchase of inputs and marketing would develop increasingly into commercial poultry farmers. For this to happen one would expect them to raise the number of birds kept in following batches and to procure new pullets, utilize balanced feed and adopt a “full vaccination” strategy. Although according to the project monitoring system 66% of the beneficiaries order and buy new pullets and 25% produce their own replacement pullets few if any seem to practice an “all-in all-out” system. Birds still laying are maintained in the coop and either bought in pullets or own reared chicks are added to these. The number for following production “cycles” seems to be hovering around the original 15. The feed agents are present in the districts. On asking some of them how much feed they are selling those in the north, where the 2009 and 2010 beneficiaries are, seem to be selling only 10% of what they would sell if all beneficiaries would still have 15 birds and were fed 100gr of mash a day; in Kapisa and Kabul provinces this is higher at 25% and there the feed agents gave a far more vibrant business impression. The house-to-house survey of 2009 beneficiaries gave 58% of feed requirement being bought balanced feed. The truth will be somewhere in between as the feed agents complained that the project gave too much feed for free spoiling their business and the surveyors were the same employees of IPs, who were supposed to promote the use of balanced feed. It is extremely complicated when people hatch chicks to apply a vaccination schedule and it is very likely that the degree of vaccination and protection in second and third cycle coops is less than in the first cycle coop, where most vaccinations were done by the chick to pullet rearers. Whereas the output was the planned 25,000 beneficiaries the outcome has not been 25,000 semi-commercial layer farms. The 2009 beneficiaries’ survey showed that 92% is continuing with poultry farming. The language of people “giving consent” to continue with a second cycle gives the impression that people need convincing, follow up and gentle persuasion to continue with this poultry activity and does not give the impression of a vibrant economic activity people are engaging in eagerly. Unfortunately even the house to house survey done in November 2011 does not

analyse the reasons why some people discontinued their poultry activities, most kept a comparable number and some increased. The underlying reasons would have increased our understanding of the conditions for success for the development of semi-commercial poultry production in villages.

74. The VGLs seem to be doing their level best to support their group members with services, but with so few people buying balanced feed and the low uptake of all-round vaccination of birds in the absence of small quantity packages of vaccines except NDV from the VFUs it seems to be more of a poorly paid service provision system than a business prospect. In the case of sale of eggs through the VGL, whereby she can claim 0.5 Afgh per egg the related overall business volume and return look brighter, but not all women market their eggs through the VGL. To establish whether the VGL concept is a viable business concept an impact assessment at a later stage could give this answer; the impression of earlier projects does not give the impression that in the long run it is.

75. Considering that some of the beneficiaries in Dedhadi were also beneficiaries from the 1999-2003 poultry projects with nothing remaining in the household of earlier poultry project activities, it appears that the realities in the poultry sector are slightly more stubborn than the project reports imply: apparently the three key bottlenecks (availability of quality feed, quality pullets and quality veterinary drugs and vaccines near the homes of the women) have been hard to solve satisfactorily by the private sector providers.

76. In this project the private sector, providing pullets, feed and veterinary drugs and vaccines, were brought closer to the villages and the beneficiaries than in earlier projects. The setting up of a simple network of agents is a first step in bringing the inputs closer to the women, but is probably still not close enough when women are outside the district centres. The VFU network is not capable of taking over the system in which the project pays the first year for the vaccines required and in the second (and some cases third year) the VPTs facilitate the purchase of vaccines from the poultry companies in Kabul, Kunduz and Mazaar. The availability of vaccines in the villages cannot be guaranteed without the VFUs starting to stock the full range of preferably non-needle vaccines, but for them to start stocking and selling these vaccines someone will have to take initiatives to organize this and to buffer their business risks of expiring vaccines during the first year when this vaccine business has to be developed.

77. The project undoubtedly increased knowledge and skill levels among the women poultry farmers. It also aimed at changing attitude and practices: to think commercially, work towards an all-in all out system of poultry keeping, feed balanced feed and vaccinate. Also for women to work together in groups to organise procurement of birds and feed and organise the marketing of eggs the project made some headway. Such changes in attitudes and practice changes take however longer than the 1-year's intensive training and support the groups received. The later "follow-up" and "monitoring" with far less contracted national experts was not enough to instil these changes. The 2011 beneficiaries will have to do without this follow up and monitoring.

4.4 *Assessment of gender mainstreaming in the initiative*

78. Poultry production in the family sector in Afghanistan is considered a women owned activity with its benefits accrued being owned and managed by women. The project aimed at targeting poor and vulnerable women, including widows and disabled. The IPs made use of a list of criteria, with which to select the beneficiaries and which had been used before in

similar projects. The women were divided in groups of 50. Within this group a woman preferably with education, demanding the respect of the other women and with the authorisation of her husband, would be selected to become the Village Group Leader (VGL). The implementing partners made contracts with women and girls who have 12th class and who are allowed to go out into the villages and meet with the women for training and monitoring activities.

79. This poultry activity gave many women an activity with which they could improve the food supply in their family. They can now also generate some cash, which is largely in their hands. It seems that the most successful women are those who have managed to interest their husbands as well to participate in the poultry activity. The success-cases shown all had a proud husband looking on, showing a motor rickshaw or a few fattening lambs part financed with egg money. It is very likely that husband and wife have participated financially in times of need in one another's economic activities. Although the project promoted a money saving scheme to buy the next batch of pullets it is likely that at certain times cross-financing would be a more effective way to make required larger investments at time of purchasing new pullets or building a new coop. At the time of coop building women would need support from her husband, as traditionally women do not do building work. Although the VGL in many cases seems to play a key role in selling poultry feed and vaccination services within the community also she would need a male to go to the feed agent to purchase the full bag of feed or the VFU or town dealer to get the vaccine.

80. The project respected existing gender relationships and worked in a gender-sensitive way. The IPs made in many cases use of literate women from the local community, which has as advantage an intricate knowledge of the local situation, relationships and intricacies; the disadvantage of this might also be susceptibility to outside pressure at the time of beneficiary identification and selection. The only remark that could be made on the gender awareness of the project is that it overlooked the role of the men in what is considered a women's activity: this improved backyard/semi-commercial poultry keeping requires men not only to be supportive but also help in constructing the coops, maintaining contact with service providers if women are restricted in their movements and to go and buy the inputs, either for a VGL or for individual women. It seems that in the overall project management women were restricted to the training coordination. In a possible future project it would be interesting for effectiveness and gender mainstreaming purposes to aim for more women in the project management crew. It were better if a future external evaluator were a female for easier access to and more contact with the project beneficiaries.

4.5 - Sustainability

4.5.1 Of the village semi-commercial production model

81. It is hard to make a judgement on the sustainability of the activities of this project at this stage. Considering that this is a third cycle of more or less the same project formula the evaluator tried to find out what happened with earlier projects. In Balkh both the IFAD and HLP poultry projects are now working in districts where there was earlier support from the German funded FAO poultry project. It turns out that some of the current beneficiaries were beneficiaries 7-10 years ago, but that the coops had been demolished and the chicken slaughtered. On asking why the women stopped the activities reasons given were the bird flu outbreak in 2006, which

had a scary awareness campaign on the risks of HPAI and consecutively many people slaughtered their chicken preventively. Two other women stated that they had had health problems and needed cash and sold the hens. It gives the impression that semi-commercial poultry farming is not very robust in terms of resisting external shocks. The fact that these women did not revert themselves into poultry production after the HPAI had gone or after their own health issues had been solved raises the question whether people see poultry farming as an economic viable and profitable activity. The November 2011 house to house survey showed on 7000 beneficiaries that 92% still had chickens 2 years later, that the average number of birds had gone up from the 1.2 birds/family baseline survey to 13, which is still less than the 16.2 expected, when adding the 1.2 already owned to the 15 project distributed. In the 2009 project area a total of 794 farmers started poultry production with an average of 16 birds per family. These women followed the training classes conducted by the project and it is thus remarkable to see that someone, who was not given any project inputs after 2 years maintained a larger flock than those who received support from the project!

82. The more recent USAID funded RAMP project (2004-2007) promoted the formation of village poultry associations at primary and secondary level, district feed mills and a revolving fund to enable the feed milling and joint purchase of e.g. pullets. On asking and looking around there could not be found any evidence that this system was still in operation: the revolving funds after the direct supervision over these funds during the project lifetime stopped seem to have “evaporated” and there does not seem to be any feed milling activities under the group’s umbrella remaining¹⁰. This RAMP poultry project had a wide geographical coverage area, in many instances in areas now hardly accessible due to security. When the project finished there was no provision for continued supervision and support by e.g. MAIL and whatever joint activities there were in villages petered out. The poultry keepers’ associations formed during earlier projects have by now become more of business groups serving the commercial interests of a few than really associations busy with advocacy and lobbying for the poultry sector as a whole. The envisaged “Afghanistan Rural Poultry Development Federation (ARPDF)” to be located in Kabul never materialized (and the current project also did not manage to start up such a body, see further).

83. This Project followed basically the same format as earlier poultry projects, but made a number of modifications geared towards increased sustainability. It took the principal decision to source as much as possible what was needed from the country itself so as to promote the private sector poultry inputs sector. It sought to engage the private sector to establish business relationships with the VPGs, but without any project support, and two of the operators established their networks of so-called poultry agents in the districts covered. The project, after having learned from earlier attempts to create financial sustainability through an own contribution or a revolving fund which failed, decided to promote a home savings scheme with “piggy banks” for the women to save sufficient capital to be able to purchase together with the money generated from the sale of the spent hens new pullets at the end of the laying cycle. Again as in earlier projects also this project aimed to develop organizational structures of VPPGs of 50 members each and umbrella organisations, registered as cooperatives with MAIL. Due to the relatively short time-frame the project is operational in an area and the only limited follow-up (1 or 2 follow up officers per district) it is the question whether this time over the groups will develop into sustainable organisations supporting its members.

¹⁰ pers. Comm. Former project staff and head of agriculture Bamyan

84. Most farmers will continue with the keeping of layers after the project has finished, probably not in much larger numbers than the 15 and most probably as a mixed flock of young and old, “golden” and traditional. The broiler initiatives are unlikely to continue, unless there will come a strong vertically organized operator, who provides farmers with credits, advice, inputs and market. This seems highly unlikely at the moment, although it would be interesting to study to see what is happening in Jalalabad, where earlier “agents” of chicks and feed purchased in Pakistan were replaced with a local supplier.

4.5.2 Of the approach followed by this specific project

85. The HLP project as a whole has during its lifetime worked continuously at the development of sustainability mechanisms, which can be briefly grouped under the following headings:

- (i) Coordination of capacity building of DAIL in the nine HLP focus districts;
- (ii) Supporting and strengthening District and Provincial Agriculture Service Provision Systems (DASPS and PASPS);
- (iii) Piloting Farmer Services Centers;
- (iv) On-going support to HLP technical components in their information and public relations activities;
- (v) Skills trainings

86. It shows that HLP put its trust for sustainability on increased capacity within the government structures. The FAO executed poultry project looked extensively at the private sector to guarantee sustainability through assured inputs, some transfer of knowledge and provision of veterinary services. It is most probable that neither of the two systems of depending solely on government or private sector is sufficient to guarantee sustainability, but that combined there is more hope of coming to sustainable village poultry farming. The FAO project could have done with more flexibility in and demonstration of poultry housing systems, which could have been demonstrated in the HLP initiated Farmer Services Centres; the government DAIL could have taken advantage from learning from this project to work with the private sector as partner in agricultural development and adopt a less supply driven approach. To a certain extent the FAO project staff has liaised with the district agricultural departments, but not in such a way as to prepare them for future training, monitoring and supervision needs of poultry development activities.

87. The MAIL is actively promoting the formation of registered farmers associations who are going to be the backbone of the privatization efforts that the GoA is promoting. HLP has a FOD group, whose task it is to form farmers’ organisations, unfortunately often with a supply driven approach, from which the FAO poultry project suffered (beneficiaries not according to FAO project criteria, little motivation to become active poultry farmers), but which seems to be the mainstream policy. The first draft national poultry development policy is developed in a participatory way and tries to avoid such supply driven development initiatives in the future. It is however questionable whether within MAIL’s poultry department there is sufficient know-how, experience and the right attitude to complete the policy document, to operationalize it and keep it updated. The project’s involvement with groups for one year with some follow up can hardly be seen as sufficient to create sustainable farmers groups; the formation of apex organisations of such groups can only be done by the groups themselves and would per definition fall outside the project period: it takes times for groups to start working and realize that organizing and working together is in all poultry farmers’ interest and benefit.

88. Although it was expected in the RAMP poultry project's completion report that this WB funded HLP follow-up phase of the poultry development project would specifically address "the consolidation of the process initiated for developing appropriate organizational structures of VPPGs in the context of the design and implementation of a comprehensive institutional framework for the whole poultry sector in Afghanistan", this started to be addressed too late in the project lifecycle to come to a sustainable organisational framework of the whole poultry sector.

4.5.3 Of the overall Afghanistan poultry sector

89. The sustainability of the overall Afghanistan poultry sector depends upon a number of factors:

- The market for poultry products should give a fair place for domestic products: it is prone to dumping with poultry produce from far and nearby. The egg market is still largely filled with Indian, Pakistani and Iranian eggs, which come across in large numbers and often are of doubtful freshness, the poultry meat market with chicken thighs/bush legs from mainly America, but also Brazil and Thailand. The regulator, in this case the Ministry of Commerce, will have to develop mechanisms of avoiding dumping, maintaining quality standards and protect local production against unfair competition
- There are 2 systems within the Afghan poultry sector: the large-scale and the smallholder commercial/village poultry farming one. For a vibrant Afghan poultry sector these two sectors need to work more closely together and would need to "cross-fertilize" one another: the large-scale sector needs the small-holder sector as an outlet for the inputs they produce and the small-holder sector the large-scale sector for its input supply. Poultry experts in future will have to be able to understand and operate in both so that they can make permanent cross-links between the two sectors. This project started this process with the promotion of feed agents.
- The regulator will have to start to regulate the sector, in terms of quality control and food safety of inputs and the product, disease control and prevention programmes and the regulation of and control on the import of vaccines and drugs. This would require active support in future to build capacity
- The creation of the capacity to produce quality poultry feed, whereby especially more production of protein rich crops in country would be important to increase the availability of specific feed ingredients and the overall competitiveness of the sector (soya, peas e.g.)

4.5.4 FAO Organizational Result/s (impact), and hence, to the relevant Strategic Objectives and Core Functions of the organisation

Increased sustainable livestock production
The livestock sector effectively and efficiently contributes to food security, poverty alleviation and economic development
Reduced animal disease and associated human health risks
Better management of natural resources, including animal genetic resources, in livestock production
Policy and practice for guiding the livestock sector are based on timely and reliable information

90. The above are the strategic objectives and core functions the FAO sees for itself in the livestock sector. The project has made a contribution towards achieving these to a certain extent. Bringing the input suppliers nearer to the villages and farmers through the feed agents might assure in future that farmers will continue to have access to pullets and feed of quality. The increased poultry management skills will probably have the largest effect of all activities on individual families' food security and poverty alleviation and was the main purpose of the FAO village poultry concept; the experience so far with earlier projects shows that economic development through semi-commercial poultry farming depends on many factors, of which the project could only address a limited number in the timespan given.

91. This project depended on its own supply of vaccines and drugs and did not manage to actively involve those nearest to the poultry farmers in the supply of vaccines: the VFUs. Although there have been one day training sessions for the VFUs it remains to be seen that they will be able to find paying business in starting to deal with poultry vaccines and drugs without external support. Their earlier active involvement from the beginning of the project might have given this a better chance. HLP, supporting both poultry development and the privatisation and further development of the VFUs could have played a coordinating role here, which it didn't. Choices of vaccine and mode of application have been too much based on experience in the commercial poultry sector and might not be sustainable in the village smaller-scale poultry sector. Human health risk from poultry keeping in the first place is HPAI: farmers have been trained on the risks of HPAI, need for confinement of the birds at times of outbreaks, and to a certain extent on the need for general personal hygiene (especially in the broiler pilot). These training activities would be needed in future and it is not clear where these will be placed: with the VFUs, the district extension workers or the VGLs.

92. The project has contributed towards the development of a national poultry development policy and strategy, but did not have the time to promote the application of this same policy. With the widespread distribution of exotic breeds and brands of chickens such a policy should have a chapter on the conservation of local genetic resources. The project document did not foresee any activities in this field and the project has not been able to contribute towards this.

FAO Core Functions

a	Monitoring and assessment of long-term and medium-term trends and perspectives
b	Assembly and provision of information, knowledge and statistics
c	Development of international instruments, norms and standards
d	Policy and strategy options and advice
e	Technical support to promote technology transfer and build capacity
f	Advocacy and communication
g	Inter-disciplinarity and innovation
h	Partnerships and alliances

93. On the FAO core functions the project contributed principally in d and e. A policy and strategy paper was prepared and this document will advise the ministry on the way forward. The project did not find the time to work on the monitoring and assessment of long-term and medium-term trends and perspectives. It did not look back at earlier beneficiaries to see how these were faring. Although the facilities were there little innovation on the model were achieved, except for the savings scheme, which would have given a chance to introduce the

women to micro-finance institutions. With on average Afgh. 2000 in each piggybank and 25.000 women there was at any time Afgh 50.000.000 involved, which could have been an interesting credit fund for women if managed well. The project did not build real partnerships and alliances, except to a certain extent with the IFAD poultry project, which is being executed under FAO responsibility. Especially its communication with MAIL, HLP and the donor representatives at times was strained.

4.6 Overall performance of the project

94. In conclusion of this chapter on the performance of this project in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability the following can be said: the project largely attained what it was set out to do: assist 25.000 farming families to build up and improve their poultry production. This poultry activity served three purposes: restocking, improving backyard poultry production and development of semi-commercial poultry production. The project was told by the MAIL and HLP in which areas to develop the poultry activities, which were not always in the most suitable ones according to the criteria beforehand formulated by the FAO. The model followed was quite rigid. For rebuilding people's livelihood through restocking and training it was not researched whether there were alternative approaches or activities that would have led to similar results. One could think about the promotion of local poultry husbandry for meat production through the introduction of disease control measures and improved management at some crucial points during the animals' lifecycle or distribution of non-sexed chicks with people selling cockerels, distribution of some turkeys as natural incubators etc.

95. The organization could have done more on being partner in the overall HLP project to develop capacity within the provincial and district ministerial structures and to align its own project activities more with the on-going changes within HLP; HLP as the overseer of all activities could have been more pro-active and give guidance instead of complaining afterwards. More proximity and communication between the two partners would have gone a long way in achieving this. The more general policy and strategy development objectives for the poultry sector were addressed, but unfortunately late in the project cycle and without the possibility to contribute towards the implementation of these.

96. This poultry project learned from earlier projects and put the emphasis on local purchase and bringing the private input supply sector nearer to the farmers. It did away with the revolving fund concept and opted for an individual saving scheme. It also increased the number of poultry trainers working with the IPs and brought the two cycles of distribution per year to one per year. This must have had a positive effect on the supervision and monitoring of the activities.

97. In conclusion it can be said that in terms of restocking and improving backyard poultry keeping the project has been successful in terms of improving women's knowledge and understanding of poultry keeping, with some non-beneficiaries emulating the beneficiaries, but at less than 10% of the number of farmers that received project support not really convincing that village poultry production is an extremely profitable economic activity; in terms of developing a more commercial poultry production in the rural areas the project did experiment with broilers, but found the necessary support infrastructure missing at local level; for layers the project did not manage to find the optimum model to guarantee a take off of semi-commercial egg production system. The 15-bird model with 30-40% own consumption of eggs does not seem to generate sufficient profit for farmers to expand on

their poultry enterprise without further project support. Those who did managed this through cross-financing from other economic activities and support from their husbands and reached a level of production whereby the home consumption did most probably not jeopardize the continuity of the poultry enterprise.

5 Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

98. This poultry project served 3 purposes, whereby the ones of restocking and improving the backyard poultry husbandry capacity were successfully addressed; significant contributions towards the development of a semi-commercial poultry production system in the rural areas have been made, but there are still “issues” to be resolved to achieve the take-off of commercial poultry production. It has once again been established that the 3 in earlier FAO conducted poultry development projects factors of reliable feed, pullet and poultry vaccine and drugs are still crucial for the development of a more intensive poultry industry in the country. Especially the poultry vaccine situation is the most burning issue, not yet resolved.

99. Although at first sight the economic basis of commercial poultry production in the village setting looks quite promising it turned out that with the 15 hen model the home consumption of between 30-40%, the high cost of balanced feed and the moderate productivity of the birds provided by this project the reality is more stubborn. The farmer’s cost cutting measure by feeding kitchen waste has limits in terms of the number of animals that can be supplemented and suppresses the egg production and cannot be the basis for market oriented egg production. Farmers eat into their donated working capital and it becomes hard to continue the business, unless one has sufficient own feed resources besides the commercial poultry feed.

100. The organisational model of VPPGs and VGLs, which has been used now for the last 11 years has shown mixed results, whereby in some cases the VGL when assisted by her husband seems to have developed her private business out of the service provision to group members. In other cases after the project lifetime and the support from and monitoring by the poultry trainers finishes women resort to purchasing their inputs directly from the feed agents, VFU and hawkers of birds or own incubation. Especially the last choice brings less productive birds into the system undermining the profitability of the system and thus further reducing the use of balanced feed. The time-frame of most poultry projects and the high work pressure to reach large numbers of beneficiaries have made that too little attention could be paid towards making the groups functional units for collaboration and business development support. The opportunity to let other (FAO) projects geared towards women economic empowerment (e.g. emergency food security, adult literacy and microfinance development projects) make use of the same groups has not been utilized.

101. Afghanistan’s poultry sector consists of the family/household small-scale poultry production sector and the re-emerging larger scale poultry production sector. This project has worked on establishing business linkages between these two sectors and links between the veterinary field services vested in the VFUs and the poultry farmers. It has made some progress in this field, but more and more targeted attention is required to firmly establish these linkages. Especially in the veterinary field a larger contribution by the project towards developing a national poultry disease control strategy, applicable to the specific conditions of village poultry farming could have brought such collaboration further.

5.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 11: To FAO Senior Management, on its policy on monitoring and evaluation

FAO should make change to its policy on backstopping and evaluation to improve project's effectiveness and efficiency. Backstopping and/or mid-term evaluation by someone independent from the project formulation process and without having worked in a similar project will bring new views and ideas and will lead to timely identifying of changes to the project needed for increased impact, effectiveness and efficiency. Final evaluations should not be an administrative formality but its outcomes and recommendations actively used in the formulation and execution of follow-up projects. The current rule that projects over a certain budget are evaluated and others not seems arbitrary and not conducive for an across the project board learning and improvement process.

Recommendation 12: To FAO Senior Management, on achieving FAO strategic objectives, organisational results and core functions

FAO is more than a project implementer, in this case of a poultry project activity, and should keep its FAO strategic objectives, organisational results and core functions, which might not be specifically included in the project write-up in mind. It might be helpful in the future for the FAO to make its own organisational results logical framework besides the project logical framework to make sure that its own strategic objectives and core functions as a normative body in terms of technical agricultural issues will be met. In this project the development of a national poultry policy and developmental strategy, although started in the last project year and a village poultry health care plan should have been developed earlier and been used as the guideline in the further project implementation.

Recommendation 13: To FAO Senior Management, on project formulation

It seems that FAO is increasingly involved in tendering for projects. In the process of preparation a peer review of the proposal might diminish the risk of copy and paste and overlooking the developmental changes, which always take place in any country. In the case of this project e.g. more formal attention to develop and support the formal link between large-scale and small-scale poultry production, supported with a budget line, would have contributed towards increased sustainability of the action.

Recommendation 14: To FAOR, HLP management (and donor), on being development partner when sub-contracting

The FAO was in this case sub-contractor for the execution of MAIL's HLP project's poultry component. In a situation where the FAO is part of a larger project it is important to clearly establish and agree on the mode of operation, communication and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. In World Bank funded projects the operational manual is a document in which this is determined. This project activity operated without it. Having such an operational manual avoids communication problems, diverging opinions on implementations and gives clear guidelines. In the case of HLP, a project that was and is constantly searching its way forward, this would even have meant updating and amending it on several occasions, but would have assured a better contribution of the FAO towards achieving longer-term objectives of especially sustainability. Project owner and implementer should have the same PDO's and indicators, which in this project was at some stage not the case. HLP IMST could have played a more pro-active role in streamlining monitoring and evaluation, the various training activities and liaising between the FAO implemented poultry project and the VFU coordinating and support structures, which also received extensive support from HLP.

Recommendation 15: To FAO Senior and Project Management on gender

Gender is not only about women but about women AND men. In some cases paying also specific attention to the role of men in a production system, which from the outside seems to be owned and driven by women, can go a long way towards increased efficiency and sustainability. The village poultry activities are, although executed largely by women, still a family enterprise. In future better information should be given to the male family members and leadership of villages on the role they play in such an activity: the construction of coops, liaison with veterinary services and feed agents and possibly in the marketing of the produce. Giving them information about project intends and their role in the project will hopefully in future lead to less worries and tension among the Afghan husbands, fathers and brothers, when a project targets their women. The fact that the success stories all involved cases with cross financing of various family economic activities stresses this point to keep the men on board.

Recommendation 16: To FAO Senior and Project Management on procurement

It should be avoided that procurement leads to insinuation and distrust. All national staff should declare their involvement and their and their relatives interests in the sector the project is concerned about, just like e.g. international consultants to the FAO have to declare their relatives' involvement in the UN system. Tenders, especially the large ones should be published widely and sufficient time should be given to the potential suppliers to prepare for it. The tender committee should include members of the project client, the opening of tenders should be done in public and evaluation against clearly spelled out criteria in the presence of the bidders. Shortlisting of interested bidders against clearly spelled out criteria on competence, experience, business size and performance will avoid fly-by-night contenders.

Recommendation 17: To FAO Project Management on exit strategy for support to "FAO" poultry groups and associations

One important aspect of the project was to organize the women in VPPGs and train VGLs to provide services. If not further supported this activity will have been in vain. The FAO project management should actively negotiate with HLP how the "FAO poultry groups" can be incorporated within the HLP FOD groups so as to assure some continued supervision and support in the future and with other on-going and upcoming FAO projects how these groups can be incorporated in their project activities. Especially the project working on the introduction and processing of soya seems to be a logical choice for further support to and working with the groups formed by this poultry project.

Recommendation 18: To the Afghanistan government on testing facilities

With the increasing use of balanced feed and concentrates and their manufacturing the country needs independent testing facilities for such. Also the government needs this in the case of purchase abroad of animal feeds. The capacity for poultry pathology and disease diagnostics should be increased: provincial veterinary services should know how and what to sample for the diagnosis of the 5 principle poultry diseases (NDV, IB, IBD, Marek, CRD), which need laboratory confirmation and in the provinces with increasing commercial poultry production (Herat, Balkh, Jalalabad, Kabul) the veterinary services should have simple poultry pathology facilities, from which samples can be sent to the Central

Recommendation 19: To MAIL veterinary department and FAO project management

The project should agree with the veterinary department of MAIL on a village poultry preventive disease strategy and make sure that VETSERV and DCA know and are involved in the formulation of such a strategy. Ways and means have to be found to make sure that the vaccines required are available within the VFU cold-chain system and that the VFUs are given sufficient protection against the potential expiry of vaccines, because it is very likely that farmers will not purchase all vaccine. The current needle vaccines in large number of doses bottles should be as much as possible be replaced by drinking water/eye drop vaccines and the vaccination schedule during the first 2 months rearing of pullets agreed upon with the veterinary department; the veterinary department should start a registration system of parent stock owners, incubators and rearers up to two months to start monitoring the health status of parent stock and assure the health status of the animals and all-round vaccination of the growing pullets according to the agreed schedule.

Recommendation 20: To FAO project management

Taking a forward looking perspective it is advised not to get engaged again in the first 2 objectives of the village poultry farming support (restocking and improvements to backyard poultry farming), but concentrate on developing a more holistic approach towards improvements in the overall poultry sector, whereby the policy and strategy formulated by the project are key. A value-chain approach should be followed, whereby after a thorough analysis the bottlenecks in the value chain and or the services linked to it will be addressed. A possible future poultry sector support project should operate from within and with the MAIL poultry department in an attempt to put the village poultry farming on their map and increase the interlinkages within the sector. Any future project should try to be less prescriptive but more facilitating in exploring different models, modalities and making more exact farm business models.

Annex 1. Evaluation terms of reference

Terms of Reference of the Evaluation Mission

Consultancy Services for Poultry Sub Component of Horticulture and Livestock Project
UTF/AFG/051/AFG

1. Background

The Poultry Project UTF/AFG/051/AFG is one of the components of World Bank funded integrated Horticulture and Livestock Project (HLP). This small-scale poultry project is predominantly focused on vulnerable rural women in Afghanistan. This project document was signed on June 23, 2008 between MAIL and FAO. The project targeted beneficiaries are 25,000 women in 10 Provinces.

The objective of the Poultry Project is to enhance productivity, stimulate production, and to develop and strengthen the national poultry production strategy as an effective tool for providing economic opportunities and empowerment of women. The project aims at improved food security, supported nutrition and increased rural incomes of vulnerable households. The poultry project has already established 25,000 small-scale layer units for 25,000 rural vulnerable women in Afghanistan. 25,000 units were established according to the following manner:

2009	7,000 beneficiaries
2010	6,000 (5,800 layer and 200 broiler units)
2011	12,000

The project has produced 21.2 Million eggs and 105.6MTs of chicken valuing US\$ 2.5 Million and US\$ 465,031 respectively from 13,000 beneficiaries enrolled in the project. Out of the total eggs produced, 7,522,776 eggs were consumed by beneficiary families.

250 poultry trainers, 505 Village Group Leaders, 25,000 rural women, 35 national counter parts and Veterinary Field Unit members were trained by project on improved practice of poultry management.

Furthermore, 503 Village Poultry Producer Groups (VPPGs) and 16 Primary Poultry Cooperatives were formed during the project period through Social Mobilization.

Results show that after the first cycle of the production (one year in lay), beneficiary families could obtained a profit of 7,887.70 Afs (US \$ 175.28) from the 15 pullets supplied by project.

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

The final evaluation is planned for October 2011 to assess the project outputs, outcomes and results. The evaluation will appraise the overall contribution of the project towards the set goals and objectives. The main objective of the evaluation mission is to assess the project approach and to provide recommendations to support designing and implementing similar poultry projects for rural vulnerable women.

In particular, the purpose of the project evaluation is:

- To assess the relevance, design, implementation and results of the HLP/MAIL/HLP funded project UTF/AFG/051/AFG.
- To learn lessons about the effectiveness and sustainability of the project in particular regarding the economic empowerment of rural women and their participation in business in a culture sensitive country.
- To provide accountability to the receiving country, the donor and FAO regarding the project's performance.

The emphasis of the evaluation will be to collect information for forward-looking, i.e. areas for improvement will be identified especially about lessons learned in order to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of similar endeavours in the future. Immediate and future support options to MAIL, during the actual project phase and beyond will be identified. The lessons learned from the UTF/AFG/051/AFG evaluation are expected to inform future (FAO) activities in food and nutrition security projects in general.

3 Scope of the Evaluation

- The evaluation will assess the project as follows:

Its relevance to: national development priorities, needs of the population; FAO Global Goals and Strategic Objectives/Core Functions and other aid programmes in the sector;

Robustness and realism of the theory of change¹¹ underpinning the project, including logic of causal relationship between inputs, activities, expected outputs, outcomes and impacts (against specific and development objectives) and validity of indicators, assumptions and risks;

Quality and realism of the project design, including:

- Duration;
- Stakeholder and beneficiary identification.
- Institutional set-up and management arrangements;
- Approach and methodology;

Financial resources management, including:

- Adequacy of budget allocations to achieve outputs;
- Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions in matching necessary adjustments to requirements of implementation;
- Rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation.

Management and implementation, including:

- Effectiveness of management, including quality and realism of work plans;
- Efficiency and effectiveness of operations management;
- Gaps and delays if any between planned and achieved outputs, the causes and consequences of delays and assessment of any remedial measures taken, efficiency in producing outputs;
- Effectiveness of internal monitoring and review processes;
- Efficiency and effectiveness of coordination and steering bodies (if any);

¹¹ May be expressed in a logical framework matrix

- Coordination with other projects active in the same sector
- Quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO; and
- Timeliness, quality and quantity of inputs and support by the Government and resource partner.

Extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and timeliness.¹²

Extent to which the expected outcomes have been achieved.

Use made by the initiative of FAO's normative products and actual and potential contribution of the initiative to the normative work of the Organization.

Assessment of gender mainstreaming in the initiative. This will cover:

- Analysis of how gender issues were reflected in project objectives, design, identification of beneficiaries and implementation;
- Analysis of how gender relations and equality are likely to be affected by the initiative;
- Extent to which gender issues were taken into account in project management.

The prospects for sustaining and up-scaling the initiative's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the initiative. The assessment of sustainability will include, as appropriate:

- Institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed technologies, innovations and/or processes;
- Perspectives for institutional uptake and mainstreaming of the newly acquired capacities, or diffusion beyond the beneficiaries or the project.
- Environmental sustainability: the initiative's contribution to sustainable natural resource management, in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the natural resource base.

Overall performance of the project: extent to which the initiative has attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives and FAO Organizational Result/s (impact), and hence, to the relevant Strategic Objectives and Core Functions; this will also include the identification of actual and potential positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. The mission will also evaluate if project resources were efficiently used to support the overall project objective given the overall adverse factors during project life.

- Based on the above analysis, the evaluation will draw specific conclusions and formulate recommendations for any necessary further action by Government, FAO and/or other parties to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-up action. The evaluation will draw attention to specific good practices and lessons of interest to other similar activities. Any proposal for further assistance should include specification of major objectives and outputs and indicative inputs required.

4 Evaluation methodology

- Under the overall guidance of the FAO Office of Evaluation:

¹² Key outputs should be listed for the evaluation team to assess. The evaluation team may add to the list as appropriate.

- The evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms & Standards;
- The evaluation will adopt a consultative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. Triangulation of evidence and information gathered will underpin the validation of evidence collected and its analysis and will support conclusions and recommendations;
- The evaluation will make use of the following tools: review of existing reports, semi-structured interviews with key informants, stakeholders and participants, supported by check lists and/or interview protocols; direct observation during field visits; surveys and questionnaires; the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework for assessment of project results.

5 Consultation process

- The evaluation team will maintain close liaison with the FAO Office of Evaluation, project management, the LTU and Task Force members at headquarters, regional, sub-regional or country level, and all key stakeholders. Although the mission is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of the Government, the donor or FAO.
- The evaluation briefing and debriefing process will include the Government, the resource partners, the FAO Representation and other relevant actors
- The team will present its preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to the key stakeholders, to obtain feedback from them.
- The Team Leader will have a debriefing meeting in FAO HQ to present the results of the mission. He/She bears responsibility for finalization of the report, which will be submitted to FAO within four weeks of mission completion. FAO will submit the report to Government(s) and donor together with its comments.
- The draft evaluation report will be circulated among key stakeholders for comment before finalization; suggestions will be incorporated as deemed appropriate by the evaluation team.

6 Evaluation Team

The mission will comprise experts/expertise to handle different components.

- Mr. Antoon Seth Van Engelen (Team Leader): To evaluate if the poultry techniques applied, the models tested were relevant and effective. The expert should have solid experience in evaluating poultry projects in a developing country.
- Monitoring and Evaluation officer: Representative of MAIL, Government of Afghanistan.
- The mission will be supported by local expertise.
- Mission members will be fully independent who have not been directly involved with the project formulation, implementation or backstopping. However, they should be familiar with the socio-political situation of Afghanistan.

The mission will be supported by local experts from HLP (Mr. Vis Herman) and FAO (Dr. Premasiri H Pathirage) if needed. In order to gain access to the female beneficiaries, it will be important to have a female expert involved in the evaluation.

7 Reporting

- The evaluation report will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation issues, questions and criteria listed in the ToR. It will include an executive summary. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the report when considered important to complement the main report.
- The recommendations will be addressed to the different stakeholders and prioritized: they will be evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable.
- The evaluation team will agree on the outline of the report early in the evaluation process, based on the template provided in Annex I of this ToR. The report will be prepared in English, with numbered paragraphs.
- The team leader bears responsibility for submitting the final draft report to FAO within four weeks from the conclusion of the mission. Within three additional weeks, FAO will submit to the team its comments and suggestions that the team will include as appropriate in the final report within one week.
- Annexes to the evaluation report will include, but are not limited to:
 - Terms of reference for the evaluation;
 - List of Persons Met, including job titles;
 - Itinerary of the evaluation team mission;
 - Data collection instruments (e.g. copies of questionnaires, surveys – if applicable).

8 Timetable and Itinerary of the Mission

- The mission will commence 02 October 2011 with introductory meetings with project team, and officials of MAIL in Kabul. The mission will visit the pilot sites in three provinces to see activities of the projects and hold meetings with project stakeholders. Besides, some of the mission members will hold detailed meetings with relevant officials of MAIL and project partners in Kabul.
- The briefing and debriefing meetings in FAO Headquarter in Rome are mandatory. The mission will spend at least two weeks in Afghanistan including their travel days to field. The mission will submit its draft report during the meeting in FAO HQ after the debriefing.
- A detailed itinerary will be prepared for the mission including daily activities. The mission in Afghanistan will conclude with a debriefing workshop.
- The mission will submit the first draft of report by 20 November 2011.

Annex 2. Profile of team members

Anton van Engelen- team leader

Mr. van Engelen is a consultant with extensive experience in project identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, built up during 15 years working in projects in different countries in Africa and 11 years' international consulting. During the last 7 years he has been active in agribusiness sector development through value chain analyses, project formulation, livestock sector studies, advisory services and policy advisory work with World Bank, IFAD, ADB and FAO in West Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkan and Central Asia. He has executed evaluations for EU, NGOs, FAO, OIE and the World Bank. His involvement with Afghanistan started in January 2003, when he started working for an INGO in Kandahar. He has done various assignments in different parts of the country for a range of organisations.

Jamila Iqbal – team member

Mrs. Iqbal holds a B.Sc. (Hons) degree from the Institute of Food Science and Technology, University of Agriculture Faisalabad, Pakistan, 2007 and a F.Sc. (Pre Medical), Federal Government Inter-Women College, Abbottabad, KPK, Pakistan. 2003. She came back to Afghanistan in 2007 and worked briefly as Project Officer with the Afghanistan Rehabilitation and Construction Unit (ARCU, USAID Funded). From 2008 till 2009 she worked for the Swiss Inter-Cooperation organization as project associate. In 2010 she joined the HLP project as the female M&E Coordinator, where she still works. She has a special interest in gender mainstreaming in Afghanistan development work and has taken a special interest in village poultry farming as a model for poverty alleviation and assisting women.

Shakir Ullah Hashimi – team member

Shakir had his secondary education in Peshawar and studied Veterinary Science from 2005 till 2010 in Lahore. During his study he specialized on poultry farm management and pathology, clinical surgery and dairy management. During his study and for some time after graduation he worked as farm supervisor for “Asian Poultry Farms” and as farm services officer for “Macro International”. He has been active in extra-curricular activities during his study and gained management experience through various functions in students' and professional organisations. He joined the HLP programme as a Poultry Programme Officer beginning of the year.

Annex 3. List of documents reviewed

- ACIAR (2005?): ND vaccination training manual
- Alders, R. et al (2010): Technically sound and sustainable Newcastle disease control in village chickens: lessons learnt over fifteen years. *World's Poultry Science Journal*, Vol. 66, September 2010
- DAI (2006): (ALP/E) Poultry sub-sector analysis strategy and action plan, AISD
- Newnham, Jack (?): The BRAC poultry programme in Bangladesh, a performance measurement framework case study on Business Development Services for micro-small and medium enterprises
- Emamudin, Q. et al (2011): Field vaccination trials with locally produced Newcastle Disease Vaccine (Strain I-2), Kabul Afghanistan (in press)
- FAO: monthly and six monthly reports on the consultancy to the poultry component of HLP Project
- FAO (2003): Development of rural poultry production, Activity for RAMP. Project Proposal
- FAO (2006): Development of Rural Poultry Production Afghanistan PROJECT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Report prepared for the Government of Afghanistan by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
- FAO (2011): Afghanistan and FAO: Achievements and success stories
- Glaeser (2011): FOD draft concept paper (HLP)
- Helvetas (2011): PPP overview of poultry programme
- HLP (2008): Quick Assessment of the Selected RAMP-FAO Implemented Semi-intensive Household Poultry Production Units
- HLP/WB (2011): Aid Memoire October 2011
- HLP various back to office monitoring and evaluation reports
- ICARDA (2002): Needs assessment on feeds, livestock and rangelands in Afghanistan
- Iqbal, Jamila (2011): Case Study of Most successfully organized group in HLP Target village.
- Maarse, Lucy (2011): The policy making process: towards a policy for the Afghan poultry sub-sector MISSION REPORT, ROUND TWO: 10 – 18 September, 2011
- MAIL (2011): Control of trans-crossing points (on quarantine: Dr. Anwar Sadaf)
- MAIL (2008): Contract no MOA/559/SSS Consultancy Services for Poultry Sub-Component of HLP
- MAIL/HLP (2008): Quick Assessment of the Selected RAMP-FAO Implemented Semi-intensive Household Poultry Production Units
- MAIL (2009): Umbrella document for the National Agriculture Development Framework
- MAIL (2009): National Agricultural Development Framework
- MAIL (2011): Agricultura Price Bulletin
- NDDB/FAO (): Code: SAGP25 Good Practice Note Unpacking the 'Poor Productivity' Myth
- Nessar, M.H. , O. Thieme: Family Poultry Production in Afghanistan (FAO Programme for Afghanistan, Kabul: draft article, no reference)
- Pathirage, Premasiri (2010): PPP for WB mission
- Pathirage, Premasiri (2011): Economic analysis of layer management (FAO internal

document)

RAMP (2004): Afghanistan poultry sub-sector assessment, findings and recommendations

RAMP/Tom Fattori (2004?): Organizing Afghan women to generate income from poultry

Sadaf, Dr. Anwar (2011): Monitoring of all HLP projects (MAIL-consultancy department)

USAID (2008): Case study of the poultry and grape/raisin subsectors in Afghanistan. Guided case studies in value chain development for conflict-affected environments microreport #106

Annex 4. List of institutions and stakeholders met during the evaluation process

Name	Function	Organisation	E-mail	Telephone
Amir, Daad Mohammad	CEO	Vetserv Ltd	daadmamir@gmail.com	93777324841
Aqa, Muhammad	Ass. Representative	FAO	mohammad.aqa@fao.org	93799668336
Aria, Aziz R.	Food Security Officer	FAO/TCSF Rome	Aziz.Arya@fao.org	3.90657E+11
Azami, Mohammad				
Khalid	Deputy P.D/DRM project Man.	Helvetas	khalid.azami@helvetas.org	93774076808
Aziz Rahman Haji	President	ARAM Group	aramcoltd2009@yahoo.com	93700000015
Basir, Abdul	Nat. Poultry Officer	FAO	basir_dr@yahoo.com	93797701637
Benavides, Danilo	Senior Value Chain Specialist	ADF/ MAIL	danil_benavides@adf-af.org	93793141482
Bokkers, Ton	Poultry trader	Private	bokkers@solcon.nl	by phone
Chatura, Gift	Hum Affairs Officer	OCHA	chafora@un.org	
Dennison, Tania	Project Manager	AHDP	tania.dennison@ahdp.net	93797424540
Diana	Master Poultry Trainer	FAO	Mairheshamayubi@yahoo.com	93788880057
Dodd, Nina	Techn. Advisor/Coordinator	MDG Achievement Fund	nina.dodd@fao.org	93705871446
Faiz	project officer	ADB Bus. Dev. Project		
Fattori, Tom	project officer RAMP	Chemonics	t.fattori@chemonics.org	by e-mail
Fazlul Hoque, Mohammad	outgoing Country Rep	BRAC	fazlul1957@yahoo.com	93700288300
Flouran Wali	Bus. Dev. And Gender Advisor	ADF/MAIL	Flouran_wali@adf-af.org	93797747045
Garcia, Juan	CTA and ECTAD Team Leader	ERCU FAO	juan.garciagarcia@fao.org	93793355403
Ghuriani, Abdul Ghani	Dep. Minister Tech. Affairs	MAIL	ghani.ghuriani@mail.gov.af	93707959786
Halimi, Mohibullah	Director General An Health/Prod	MAIL	mohibullah.halimi@mail.gov.af	93700267328
Hameedullah Hamid	Food Processing Advisor	ADF/ MAIL	hameedhamid1@googlemail.com	93796147933
Haroun, Eng	Project Officer	DCA		93797492470
Hashimi, Shakir Ullah	Poultry Prog. Officer	HLP/MAIL	shakir_vet@yahoo.com	93775545654
Hassani, Feza	Comm. Dev. Promoter	Helvetas	feza.hasani@helvetas.org	93771149052
Jaco, Enio	Lending Advisor	Ag Dev Fund	enio_jaco@dai.com	93793141483

Jamaluddin, Sayed	Project Manager ILRC	Helvetas	jamal.sedigi@helvetas.org	93779971156
Jamila	M&E Officer	HLP/MAIL	jamila_afg@hotmail.com	93787019080
Khamosh, Safar Ali	TA ec. Dev.	Helvetas	safarli.khamosh@helvetas.org	93775375360
Khondoker Ariful Islam	Country Representative	BRAC	ariful.ki@brac.net	93700288300
Khushal Saifi	National FOD Coordinator	HLP/MAIL	khushal.saifi@mail.gov.af	93799056281
Lamp, Dale	Director Operations	MISFA	dale.lampe@misfa.org.af	93795431875
Maariji, Gulistan	Technical specialist layers	Mail		93799339629
Maarse, Lucy	Senior Livestock Consultant	FAO	lucy.maarse@gmail.com	by e-mail
Marouf	President	Afgh. Social p+A Farmer Ass.		93799320827
Marzai, Noor				
Mohammad	Head of poultry department	MAIL		93799710861
Merchant, Karim	Rural Dev. Consultant	IFAD	kmerchant@yahoo.com	
Mohibi, Ruhina	Admin/Fin assistant Food Sec. Pr.	FAO	rohina.mohibi@fao.org	93799600204
Mutaleb, Abdul	Director	SOFA	mutaleb_safa@yahoo.com	93700291668
Nessar, Haroon	Project Manager	DCA/Brooke	hnessar@dca.org.af	93797492470
Niguhath, Haseeba	Poultry Assistant	HLP/MAIL	haseeba-nigulaut@yahoo.com	93798188168
Noordman, Nico	Regional Prog. Director	DCA Mazaar	DCA-Noorman@hotmail.com	93796718901
Noorman, Nico	Regional Prog. Director	DCA	DCA.Noorman@hotmail.com	93796718901
Rota, Antonio	CTA FAO RAMP poultry project	FAO/ IFAD	a.rota@ifad.org	by e-mail
Sadat, Anwar	"Zootechnique" specialist	MAIL	dranwar_sadaf@yahoo.com	93799326037
Sadat, Atifa	National Poultry Trainer	FAO	atifa.sadat@fao.org	93700217160
Safoie, Abdul Mutaleb	Director	SOFAR	mutaleb_safar@yahoo.com	93700291668
Shafi, Mohammad	technical officer poultry dep.	MAIL		93797639892
Shafiei, Mohammad				
Farzai	National Epidemiologist	ERCU FAO	shafiei.farhad@gmail.com	93700089013
Sharifa Wardak	National FOD Coordinator	HLP/MAIL	sharifa_wardak@hotmail.com	93702333794
Shichiri, Tomio	Int. Project Manager	FAO	stomio@juno.ocn.ne.jp	93799675928
Shirzad.Akbar	National Poultry Officer	FAO	mohammadakbar.shirzad@fao.org	93700252348
Shobair, Sayed Sharif	National Coordinator EIRP	FAO	sayed.sharif@fao.org	93799346026
Shobair, Sayed Sharif	Nat. Project Coord EIRP	FAO	sayed.sharif@eirp-afg.org	93700281800

Stanikzai, Rahmat Shah	ID Assistant	UNDSS-CR	stanizair@un.org	93707165132
Thieme, Olaf	Senior Livestock Consultant	FAO	olaf.thieme@fao.org	by e-mail
Tondeur, Wim	poultry vet/ex DCA/ALP specialist legislation/licenses	private consultant	w.tondeur@planet.nl	by phone
Yousef mohammad	poultry	MAIL		
Zenullah Akbar	Nat. Field Manager	FAO	zenullahkhan.akbar@fao.org	93799327533

Annex 5. Itinerary

Date	Place	Activity
31/9/11	Almaty	Organizing Indian transit and Afghan tourist visa
1/10/11	Delhi	Report reading, travel Almaty to New Delhi
2/10/11	Kabul	Travel Delhi to Kabul, security briefing, courtesy call to FAO res rep
3/10/11	Kabul	Briefing by NPO, briefing by dep res rep, UN ID card, Pak visa
4/10/11	Kabul	Meeting HLP, Helvetas poultry team, meeting KNF team
	Kabul	Meeting Eng. Harun DCA, CEO Vetserv, FOD team of HLP, HLP female M&E officer, head of poultry dept.
5/10/11	Kabul	Meeting with CTA project, meeting French Cooperation, CEO Sabayun Amir Feedmill, Dep. Of Planning, Dept. Minister of Ag,
6/10/11	Kabul	Friday: report reading, meeting Kari Mehry, poultry expert, director operations MISFA
7/10/11		
8/10/11	Mazaar	Flight from Kabul to Mazaar, briefing by NPOs in FAO office
	Mazaar	Meeting with director ag/director livestock DAIL, meeting AMO company, security briefing, meeting with IP
9/10/11	Dhedhadi	Meeting with IP trainers, field visit, meeting with Nadara of BLCU (former poultry project worker)
10/10/11	Khulm	Meeting with IP poultry trainers, house visits, meeting with IFAD poultry project director
11/10/11		
12/10/11	Aibak	Meeting with IP poultry trainers, house visits, vet Afghan Aid
	Mazaar	Meetings with Ariana poultry ass/coop, DCA, CEO AMO, HLP Kabul poultry monitor
13/10/11	Mazaar	Friday, visits to 2nd cycle Dedadhi and 2 beneficiaries FAO/? Poultry project 2003
14/10/11		
15/10/11	Kabul	Flight Mazaar Kabul
	Mirbacha	
16/10/11	Kot	Visits to feed agents, project beneficiaries of different cycles
	Mahamood	Meeting with DAIL, visit to feed agents, project beneficiaries of different cycles
17/10/11	Raqi	
	Kabul	Meeting DG animal. health&production, head vet. Diagn. Lab, MAIL poultry dep, CTA and TL ECTAD,
18/10/11	Kabul	Meeting with Ag Dev Fund, Kabul Poultry Association, BRAC, office work
19/10/11		
20/10/11	Kabul	Friday: report writing
21/10/11	Kabul	Report reading and writing, meeting HLP livestock advisor
	Kabul	ZOA Eng. Sakhi, Nico Noordman DCA Mazaar, preparation for debriefing
22/10/11	Kabul	Meeting CTA and project finance and administration, FAO small ruminants project, FAO TAD project
23/10/11	Kabul	Presentation FAO project progress CTA, debriefing evaluation to FAO, HLP and WB, meeting HLP co-evaluators
24/10/11		
25/10/11	Kabul	Meeting WB supervisory mission
26/10/11	Delhi	Travel from Kabul to New Delhi
27/10/11	Almaty	Travel from New Delhi to Almaty

Annex 6. Check list of questions for semi-structured interviews

Some guidelines for questions village poultry keepers

- 1) How many chickens did you have before the project and how many do you have now? What plan do you have for your poultry enterprise?
- 2) What changes did the project make in your poultry keeping and life in general?
- 3) What vaccinations do you practice? Who vaccinates and how much do you pay?
- 4) Feed: bought or own feed? Where do you buy the feed?
- 5) After one year laying what are you going to do with the chicken? Do you save money and how much?
- 6) Tell about the group and the village poultry group leader: what do they mean to you?
- 7) What was good about the project, what would you have done differently and what would you like to reach/achieve in the future with your poultry?

Some guidelines for questions to the village poultry group leaders

- 1) What changes did the project bring in the village for the women?
- 2) What activities do you develop as group leader? What is against payment and what is for free?
- 3) What is the volume of business you get out of your poultry work and how much you earn with it?
- 4) Give examples of what women ask from you? How many group members you help and how many outside women?
- 5) How have you organized the supply of goods, transport etc.?
- 6) What is the function of the group and what further activities does the group develop further besides poultry?
- 7) What will happen with your business when the FAO/IP does no longer monitor/train/advise?

Some guidelines for questions to the feed agents

- 1) What products do you stock for the poultry farmers?
- 2) What is your trading volume and what has been the trend since you started this work?
- 3) What are your margins and how much do you earn from this business per month?
- 4) What is the role of the feed suppliers in your business: what do you get from them?
- 5) Where do you source materials and how do you get them to your shop?
- 6) Are you involved in marketing eggs or chickens? If yes, give details.
- 7) What do you expect will happen with your business when the FAO project involvement ends?

Annex 7. Correspondence with Deputy Minister MAIL

Ref:
Date: 18 September 2011

Excellency,

**Request for Nomination of Government Representative in Final Evaluation Mission for
“Consultancy Services for Poultry Sub Component of Horticulture and Livestock
Project” UTF/AFG/051/AFG**

I have the pleasure to inform Your Excellency that “Consultancy Services for Poultry Sub Component of Horticulture and Livestock Project” UTF/AFG/051/AFG Projects joint Evaluation would be undertaken for the period 02 to 25 October 2011 with participation of the FAO, the Government of Afghanistan and HLP/WB. The TORs of the evaluation mission is enclosed.

This is to kindly request your cooperation of authorizing your concerned staff to join the Joint evaluation mission as MAIL.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration, and many thanks for your continued support and cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Tekeste G. Tekie
FAO Representative
FAO, Afghanistan

**To: H. E. Abdul Ghani Guryani, Deputy Minister,
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock (MAIL),
Kabul, Afghanistan.**

CC: Mr Herman , HLP
Mr. Moeen Ud Din Siraj POO, FAO, Kabul
Mr. Mohammad Aqa, Assistant FAOR, FAO
Mr. Premasiri Pathrige, CTA, UTF/AFG/051/AFG
FAO Registry

Annex 8. Activities and achievements as reported by project

Consultancy Services for Poultry Subcomponent of Horticulture and Livestock Project (UTF/AFG/051/AFG)¹³

Date of commencement : 1st Nov 2008 (EOD)

Date of Completion : 31st Dec 2011 (NTE)

Total budget : US\$ 6,999,684.00

1. Achievements :

1.1.Poultry units Established : 25,000 poultry units were already established.

Province	District	2009	2010	2011	No. of Beneficiaries
Balkh	Khulm	1000	-	2000	3000
	Dehdadi	1000	-	1000	2000
Samangan	Aybak	1000	-	1000	2000
	Hazrat Sultan	-	-	1000	1000
Jowzjan	Shaberghan	-	1000	1000	2000
Saripul	Sozmaqila	-	-	500	500
	Saripul	-	-	1000	1000
Kundoz	Khanabad	1000	-	-	1000
	Imam Sahib	-	1000	-	1000
Takhar	Farkhar	1000	-	500	1500
	Taloqan	-	-	1500	1500
Baghlan	Pul-e-Khumri	-	1000	-	1000
Kabul	Mirbachakot	1000	555	-	1555
Kapisa	Mahmood Raqi	1000	1445	500	2945
	Kohistan	-	-	1000	1000
Panjsher	Bazarak	-	325	-	325
	Rokha	-	264	-	264
	Unaba	-	411	-	411
Parwan	Sayed Khel	-	-	1000	1000
Total		7000	6000	12000	25000

1.2.Capacity Building: All the training sessions mentioned below were completed.

1.2.1 No. of National Poultry Officers, National Poultry Trainers, and Project

Managers of Implementing Partners. = 17

¹³ Some of the figures rounded for easier reading by evaluation consultant

1.2.2. No. of Poultry trainers	= 250
1.2.4. No .of Village Group Leaders	= 505
1.2.5. No .of women beneficiaries	= 25,000
1.2.5. VFU and National counterparts	= 35
1.2.6. No of rural women trained on Poultry management who are not beneficiaries.	= 800

1.3. Egg Production : So far 20.3 Million eggs were produced up to Aug 2011

Year	No. of Pullets Dist.	Eggs consumed	Eggs sold	Total egg production	Value	Remarks
2009	105,000	-	-	-	-	-
2010	87,000	4,697,000	8,580,000	13,277,000 (one year laying cycle)	US\$1.5 Mil.	Production from birds distributed in 2009
2011	180,000 (not laying yet)	2,826,000	5,181,000	8,007,000 (From Jan to 31st Aug 2011)	US\$1.0 Mil.	Production From birds distributed in 2010
Three years	372,000	7,523,000	13,761,000	21,284,000	US\$2.5 Mil.	-

As 300 Mil eggs are being imported into Afghanistan every year, for last nineteen months, 425 Mil eggs would have been imported. Since the project has produced 20.7 Mil eggs for last nineteen months, the contribution from the project for import substitution is 5% (second cycle production was not considered). As the project will be produced 64 mil eggs (The second cycles were not considered.) at the end of project period, the import substitution will be 15%.

1.4 Meat production :105.6 MTs of chicken meat were produced

1.4.1 Curry chicken

From culled hens distributed in 2009 (96,319 hens) - 100MT
Value - US\$ 440,000

1.4.2. Broiler Meat : (From First cycle)

From broiler units established in 2010 - 5.632MT
Value - US\$ 25,031
Total value of meat - US\$465,031

The contribution from the project for import substitution of chicken is 0.2% as this project is predominantly layer project.

1.5.Social mobilization : 503 VPPGs and 16 primary cooperatives were formed.

1.5.1.No of Village Poultry Producer Groups (VPPGs) - 505

1.5.2.No of primary Poultry cooperatives - 16

1.6.Profit obtained per beneficiary:

Total cost incurred by beneficiary = 8,950.00 Af

Total income obtained by beneficiary = 16,478.00

Profit = 7528.00Af(US\$ 167.00)

NB. 1. Inputs given by project were not valued.

1.7. Sustainability :

Summary of 2nd cycle pullets purchased by beneficiaries enrolled in 2009.											
S/NO	District	# of origina Beneficiaries	A		B		C		Kept project pullets	Total # of pullets	No interest in 2nd cycle
			Natural Brooding		Pullet purchased by bene		Pullets purchased through directed suppliers				
			# of bene	#of pullets	# of bene	# of pullets	# of bene	# pf pullets			
1	Farkhar	1000	140	2800	340	2729	450	5000	5800	16329	930
2	Khanabad	1000	200	3000	321	2892	400	4200	5900	15992	921
3	Dehdadi	1000	220	2640	281	2533	427	4700	5980	15853	928
4	Mirbachakot	1000	205	2580	349	3145	430	4300	7020	17045	984
5	M. Raqi	1000	200	2600	347	3184	420	4200	5800	15784	967
	Khulm	1000	210	2940	322	2900	418	4600	5700	16140	950
	Aybak	1000	260	4200	240	1920	422	3800	5300	15220	922
Total		7000	1435	20760	2200	19303	2967	30800	41500	112363	6602

Sustainability - Second Cycle of 5800 Beneficiaries enrolled in 2010

Dist.	No. Ben. Orig.	No. 2ndcoop	No. Ben	8 weeks pullet	No. of beneficiary	16 wks old pullet	Com.of cycle	Ben. Gave consent
M.Kot	355	196	166	2100	30	225	Dec	300
M.Raqi	1445	851	648	5861	203	1494	2011	1156
Panj shir	1000	305	128	1200	177	1048	to	700
Imamsahib	1000	720	633	8499	87	802	Jan	860
Pul-e khumri	1000	397	369	2900	28	325	2012	820
Sheberghan	1000	290	290	4395	-	-		830
GrandTotal	5800	2759	2234	24955	525	3894		4666

One year egg production cycle will be completed in Jan 2012.

1. Out of 2759 second coops only 800 are newly built coops.
2. 80% of the beneficiaries gave the consent to go for the second cycle.
3. 2759 (48%) already purchased pullets for the second cycle. Many beneficiaries will enter into the second cycle at the end of the production cycle after selling their spent hens.
4. Buying pullets for the second cycle is an on-going and slow process.

H. P. Premasiri
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Annex 9. FAO Strategic Objectives, Org. Results and Core Functions 2010-19

Box 1. FAO Strategic Objectives and Organizational Results

Code	Title	Lead Unit
A	Sustainable intensification of crop production	AG
A01	Policies and strategies on sustainable crop production intensification and diversification at national and regional levels	AGP
A02	Risks from outbreaks of transboundary plant pests and diseases are sustainably reduced at national, regional and global levels	AGP
A03	Risks from pesticides are sustainably reduced at national, regional and global levels	AGP
A04	Effective policies and enabled capacities for a better management of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) including seed systems at the national and regional levels	AGP
B	Increased sustainable livestock production	AG
B01	The livestock sector effectively and efficiently contributes to food security, poverty alleviation and economic development	AGA
B02	Reduced animal disease and associated human health risks	AGA
B03	Better management of natural resources, including animal genetic resources, in livestock production	AGA
B04	Policy and practice for guiding the livestock sector are based on timely and reliable information	AGA
C	Sustainable management and use of fisheries and aquaculture resources	FI
C01	Members and other stakeholders have improved formulation of policies and standards that facilitate the implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) and other international instruments, as well as response to emerging issues	FI
C02	Governance of fisheries and aquaculture has improved through the establishment or strengthening of national and regional institutions, including RFBs	FIE
C03	More effective management of marine and inland capture fisheries by FAO Members and other stakeholders has contributed to the improved state of fisheries resources, ecosystems and their sustainable use	FIM
C04	Members and other stakeholders have benefited from increased production of fish and fish products from sustainable expansion and intensification of aquaculture	FIM
C05	Operation of fisheries, including the use of vessels and fishing gear, is made safer, more technically and socio-economically efficient, environmentally-friendly and compliant with rules at all levels	FII
C06	Members and other stakeholders have achieved more responsible post-harvest utilization and trade of fisheries and aquaculture products, including more predictable and harmonized market access requirements	FII
D	Improved quality and safety of food at all stages of the food chain	AG
D01	New and revised internationally agreed standards and recommendations for food safety and quality that serve as the reference for international harmonization	AGN

D02	Institutional, policy and legal frameworks for food safety/quality management that support an integrated food chain approach	AGN
D03	National/regional authorities are effectively designing and implementing programmes of food safety and quality management and control, according to international norms	AGN
D04	Countries establish effective programmes to promote improved adherence of food producers/businesses to international recommendations on good practices in food safety and quality at all stages of the food chain, and conformity with market requirements	AGN
E	Sustainable management of forests and trees	FO
E01	Policy and practice affecting forests and forestry are based on timely and reliable information	FOM
E02	Policy and practice affecting forests and forestry are reinforced by international cooperation and debate	FOE
E03	Institutions governing forests are strengthened and decision-making improved, including involvement of forest stakeholders in the development of forest policies and legislation, thereby enhancing an enabling environment for investment in forestry and forest industries. Forestry is better integrated into national development plans and processes, considering interfaces between forests and other land uses	FOE
E04	Sustainable management of forests and trees is more broadly adopted, leading to reductions in deforestation and forest degradation and increased contributions of forests and trees to improve livelihoods and to contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation	FOM
E05	Social and economic values and livelihood benefits of forests and trees are enhanced, and markets for forest products and services contribute to making forestry a more economically-viable land-use option	FOE
E06	Environmental values of forests, trees outside forests and forestry are better realized; strategies for conservation of forest biodiversity and genetic resources, climate change mitigation and adaptation, rehabilitation of degraded lands, and water and wildlife management are effectively implemented	FOM
F	Sustainable management of land, water and genetic resources and improved responses to global environmental challenges affecting food and agriculture	NR
F01	Countries promoting and developing sustainable land management	NRL
F02	Countries address water scarcity in agriculture and strengthen their capacities to improve water productivity of agricultural systems at national and river-basin levels including transboundary water systems	NRL
F03	Policies and programmes are strengthened at national, regional and international levels to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity for food and agriculture and the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources	NRD
F04	An international framework is developed and countries' capacities are reinforced for responsible governance of access to, and secure and equitable tenure of land and its interface with other natural resources, with particular emphasis on its contribution to rural development	NRC
F05	Countries have strengthened capacities to address emerging environmental challenges, such as climate change and bioenergy	NRC
F06	Improved access to and sharing of knowledge for natural resource management	OEK
G	Enabling environment for markets to improve livelihoods and rural development	ES
G01	Appropriate analysis, policies and services enable small producers to improve competitiveness, diversify into new enterprises, increase value addition and meet market	

	requirements	
G02	Rural employment creation, access to land and income diversification are integrated into agricultural and rural development policies, programmes and partnerships	ESW
G03	National and regional policies, regulations and institutions enhance the developmental and poverty reduction impacts of agribusiness and agro-industries	
G04	Countries have increased awareness of and capacity to analyse developments in international agricultural markets, trade policies and trade rules to identify trade opportunities and to formulate appropriate and effective pro-poor trade policies and strategies	EST
H	Improved food security and better nutrition	ES
H01	Countries and other stakeholders have strengthened capacity to formulate and implement coherent policies and programmes that address the root causes of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition	ESA
H02	Member countries and other stakeholders strengthen food security governance through the triple-track approach and the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security	ESA
H03	Strengthened capacity of member countries and other stakeholders to address specific nutrition concerns in food and agriculture	AGN
H04	Strengthened capacity of member countries and other stakeholders to generate, manage, analyse and access data and statistics for improved food security and better nutrition	ESS
H05	Member countries and other stakeholders have better access to FAO analysis and information products and services on food security, agriculture and nutrition, and strengthened own capacity to exchange knowledge	ESA
I	Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural threats and emergencies	TC
I01	Countries' vulnerability to crisis, threats and emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions	TCE
I02	Countries and partners respond more effectively to crises and emergencies with food and agriculture-related interventions	TCE
I03	Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development	TCE
K	Gender equity in access to resources, goods, services and decision-making in the rural areas	ES
K01	Rural gender equality is incorporated into UN policies and joint programmes for food security, agriculture and rural development	ESW
K02	Governments develop enhanced capacities to incorporate gender and social equality issues in agriculture, food security and rural development programmes, projects and policies using sex-disaggregated statistics, other relevant information and resources	ESW
K03	Governments are formulating gender-sensitive, inclusive and participatory policies in agriculture and rural development	ESW
K04	FAO management and staff have demonstrated commitment and capacity to address gender dimensions in their work	ESW
L	Increased and more effective public and private investment in agriculture and rural development	TC

L01	Greater inclusion of food and sustainable agriculture and rural development investment strategies and policies into national and regional development plans and frameworks	TCI
L02	Improved public and private sector organisations' capacity to plan, implement and enhance the sustainability of food and agriculture and rural development investment operations	TCI
L03	Quality assured public/private sector investment programmes, in line with national priorities and requirements, developed and financed	TCI

Box 2. *FAO Core Functions*

a	Monitoring and assessment of long-term and medium-term trends and perspectives
b	Assembly and provision of information, knowledge and statistics
c	Development of international instruments, norms and standards
d	Policy and strategy options and advice
e	Technical support to promote technology transfer and build capacity
f	Advocacy and communication
g	Inter-disciplinarity and innovation
h	Partnerships and alliances