

# The impact of SCTs on household economic decision-making and development in Kenya and Malawi

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# Why do we expect economic impacts?

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- ▶ **Environments of absent / poorly functioning markets:**

- ▶ credit / savings
- ▶ insurance

## **Liquidity constraints**

- ▶ Links b/w **consumption and production** decisions at the hh-level

- ▶ consumption, market purchases and home time

- ▶ **Injection of cash in small** (sometimes not very open) **economies**

- ▶ potential for traders and producers

- ▶ **What are medium-term impacts on households? work, investments, risk management?**

- ▶ What are meso-impacts at the community and regional levels? Price rises, networks, retail?



# Policy relevance – For programs

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Address concerns about:

- ▶ **Welfare dependency**: are CTs hand-outs or can they enable hhs to strengthen their income-generating activities?
- ▶ **Disincentives to work**: show which groups would reduce/increase their labor supply and why?

Understand how CTs fit:

- ▶ The “**graduation**/productive insertion” agenda: which complementary interventions would strengthen impacts / address constraints



# Recent evidence on hh-level impacts(1)

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## ▶ Channel 1: Labor allocation

- ▶ Decrease in child labor (Brazil)
- ▶ Small effects on adult labor:
  - ▶ Transfer is not big enough to create disincentives
  - ▶ Decrease child labor means payments for school
  - ▶ Transitory income seen as a windfall
- ▶ Some decrease for some type of individuals : unpaid workers or workers in agricultural day labor (BR)

## ▶ Channel 2: Investments

- ▶ MX: after 8 months in program, investments into farm animals, land and micro-entreprises
- ▶ NI: no impacts. Pent-up D? lack of economic opportunities?



## Recent evidence on hh-level impacts (2)

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- ▶ Channel 3: Risk-coping: avoiding detrimental strategies
  - ▶ Beneficiaries better able to keep children in school and maintain access to health services (NI)
  - ▶ ET: PSNP helped protect against high food prices but not enough where rains failed too
  - ▶ Malawi: beneficiaries less likely to beg and steal



# Data and Methods

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- ▶ Use quasi-experimental data from:
  - ▶ Kenya OVC CT program: baseline 2007, follow-up 2009 (approx. 1,900 hh)
  - ▶ Malawi M'chinji Social Cash Transfer: baseline March 2007, 1st round Sept 2007, 2<sup>nd</sup> round March 2008 (approx. 750 hh)
- ▶ Ensure that control and treatment households are similar at baseline (matching)
- ▶ Estimate difference-in-differences: changes in treatment hh relative to changes in control hh
- ▶ Analyze separately female/male headed hh, older/younger hh head and smaller/larger hh



# Findings – Kenya (1)

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- ▶ Beneficiaries purchase bed sheets, radio, mosquito nets ...
- ▶ ... no information on tools ... but beneficiaries do not buy animals or land. **Is that the crisis?**
- ▶ Paid work among younger children decreases in beneficiary households
- ▶ Agricultural self-employment seems to become less frequent




## Findings – Kenya (2)

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- ▶ Male-headed hh more likely to buy land than female headed but spend less on health and mosquito nets. Female-headed more likely to start a business?
- ▶ Children more vulnerable in large hh. Large hh buy less durables but program helps decrease younger children work
- ▶ Elderly hh have more durables to start and buy less of them, however they spend more on children's education and health.



# Findings in Malawi (1)




- ▶ Beneficiaries more likely to acquire hoes, axes (and bicycles)
- ▶ Beneficiaries more likely to acquire chickens and goats



# Findings in Malawi (2)

Adult ganyu labor participation



Graphs by round

➤ What are they doing? Working on their plots with their tools

- ▶ Beneficiaries decrease ganyu labor
- ▶ Beneficiaries more likely to hire in (especially labor constrained)
- ▶ Children miss less days of school and less likely to work outside (except in lean season)



## Findings in Malawi (3)

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- ▶ Female-headed more vulnerable. Male-headed more likely to buy tools, bicycles and chicken while female-headed more likely to buy goats and consume.
- ▶ Even larger hh buy tools
- ▶ Elderly hh are very vulnerable: while smaller, they include more disabled and elderly dependents. Not able to invest in durable goods and small animals.  
Decrease in private gifts



# Conclusions:

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- ▶ Preliminary economic impacts:
  - ▶ Decrease in some **child labor**
  - ▶ Decrease in **daily ag. labor** but probably more work on-farm in Malawi (tools)
  - ▶ Some **multiplier effects** in both countries
  - ▶ More likely if transfers are **larger**
- ▶ **Different impacts** according to gender and age of hh head and hh size:
  - ▶ Barriers to investment in agriculture among female-headed hh?
  - ▶ **Life-cycle vs vulnerability** among older hh
  - ▶ Transfer linked to number of children may enable larger hh to invest too
- ▶ More information needed on assets and income-generation, impact of the 2008 crisis



# A picture... 1000 words or regressions!

## Malawi

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Intervention woman with a bicycle



Intervention hh with new house and tobacco leaves drying

(Both pictures from Miller, Tsoka, Reichert (2008))

Thank you!

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