Cattle farmers in Burkina Faso receive low prices and have few incentives to increase production and marketing. Cattle producers would receive higher prices if several specific measures, for example increasing export opportunities, were in place.
Rice farmers and traders in Uganda receive higher prices thanks to existing policies. However, rice consumers also pay higher prices since they do not receive subsidies designed to offset high producer prices. FAO/MAFAP analysis suggests that increasing rice production is the key to making rice more affordable for consumers while protecting producers.
Ghana’s dependency on imported rice, and excessive costs and taxes on rice imports, lead to high prices for consumers. However high prices for consumers do not translate into higher prices for farmers.
Payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly discussed as appropriate mechanisms for matching the de mand for environmental services with the incentives of land users whose actions m odify the supply of those environmental services. While there has been considerable discussion of the institutional mechanisms for PES, relatively little attention has been given to the inter-relat ionships between PES institutions and other rural institutions. This paper presents and builds upon the proposition that both the function and welfare effects of PES institutions depend crucially on the co-institutions of collective action (CA) and property rights (PR).